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CONFIDENTIAL

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Further Correspondence

respecting

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 60

January to March 1945

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CONFIDENTIAL

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 60.—JANUARY TO MARCH 1945.

CHAPTER I.—AFGHANISTAN.

[E 772/772/97] No. 1.

Mr. Squire to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd February.)

(No. 6. Confidential.)

Sir, *Kabul, 19th January, 1945.*

WITH reference to Viscount Halifax's circular despatch, dated the 4th November, 1939, I have the honour to forward as an enclosure to this despatch a political review of Afghanistan during the year 1944.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch, with enclosure, to the Secretary of State for India, to the Government of India, the Government of the North-West Frontier Province, the Baluchistan Administration and to His Majesty's Consuls, Jalalabad and Kandahar.

I have, &c.
G. F. SQUIRE.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Political Review for 1944.

ON the whole the year has passed off peacefully and the position of the Afghan Government appears tolerably secure. They have never during the year had any reason to doubt that the United Nations will win the war, though victory has not come so speedily as some anticipated. In pursuing their own policy, therefore, there has been no need to pay too much attention to possible Axis reactions and, in fact, the Prime Minister was at one time reported to be in favour of breaking off relations with the Axis and evicting the German and Japanese Legations. Disagreement in the Royal Family and fear of unfavourable repercussions in the country apparently prevented the Prime Minister from getting his way. No important change in the personnel of the Government has taken place during the year. The Prime Minister's health has been almost fully restored after his illness in November 1943, but there is no doubt that he has lost a great deal of his former energy, and he now speaks frequently of his wish to retire—preferably to England. Meanwhile he has gone to Jalalabad for the winter, the first time for many years that he has been able to risk such a prolonged absence from the capital.

2. A serious threat to the security of the Government arose in the early summer from discontent in the Southern Province culminating in armed opposition from Mazrak, the Zadran leader, in Khost. Two brigades sent from Kabul were successful in dispersing his following and driving Mazrak himself into the hills on the Waziristan border. His efforts to enlist the support of the Madda Khel in North Waziristan were firmly countered by the Government of

India and Mazrak himself was evicted from British territory by air action against the tribesmen who were offering him temporary shelter. He has still not tendered his submission, but he has lost most of his following and is more or less in hiding on the Afghan side of the border. The appearance in November of a mysterious Malang who posed as the brother of Amanullah gave a temporary fillip to Mazrak's failing fortunes, but lack of money with which to bribe the tribes caused the failure of this movement also and the Malang has since relapsed into obscurity. On the Baluchistan border trouble with Daru Khan Badinzai has subsided and there have been no troublesome incidents of any importance. The northern frontier with Russia continues to give rise to minor unpleasantnesses and the Russian claim to the southern bank of the Oxus, as the rightful boundary, has neither been pressed nor withdrawn. There have been a few armed clashes resulting in casualties among frontier guards, but they have not assumed serious proportions, though ill feeling was recently aggravated by the throwing into the Oxus, by the Afghans, of carcases of cattle which had died from rinderpest on the Afghan side of the border with the risk that this would cause the spread of the disease to Russian territory.

3. There has been some increase in the efficiency of the Afghan army, partly as a result of their successful operations against Mazrak in the southern province which enhanced their prestige and raised their morale. In this, as in other spheres, the Afghans have tended, during the year, to turn more and more to the Government of India for help. Negotiations for the purchase of further Tiger Moth aircraft for the Afghan Air Force are in progress. Requests have been made for equipment such as water bottles, A.T. carts and saddlery; a number of officers have been sent for training in survey at Abbotabad, and finally, in December, a military mission of six officers, headed by the Chief of General Staff of the Afghan army, left for India to inspect modern methods of training and military equipment, and to get some insight into the fighting in Burma.

4. Generally Indo-Afghan relations have improved steadily throughout the year. The Afghans themselves talk openly of turning a new page in their history. The most striking development has been the willingness of the Government to announce publicly for the first time their friendship for and their community of interests with India. Hitherto such protestations have been confined to the privacy of personal discussions with His Majesty's Minister and members of his staff and have been conspicuous by their absence from the press and other forms of publicity. The latter half of 1944, however, saw a spate of articles in the newspapers, openly acknowledging Afghanistan's gratitude to and dependence upon India for the help which had been so important a factor in enabling them to maintain the economic life and prosperity of their country, and in guarding it from the more serious effects of the war. A handsome donation by the Government of India to a relief fund for victims of a local flood disaster in August called forth the first grateful tribute; and this was followed shortly by a series of articles detailing the economic assistance received in many other spheres. Further articles followed on the occasion of the departure of the military mission to India and, more recently, on the arrival in Afghanistan of the remains of Sayyid Jamaluddin Afghani from Istanbul, where they had been interred since his death in 1897.

Relations between His Majesty's Consuls in Kandahar and Jalalabad and the local authorities have shown steady, if not startling, improvement, and social intercourse generally is slowly getting easier.

5. Our cultural relations with the Afghans have also made satisfactory progress. They are increasingly looking to us to help them in the reorganisation of their education and are hoping that we shall shortly be able to obtain for them the three English professors for the Ghazi College for whom they have asked. Meanwhile they have taken steps to engage a further twenty-five Indian teachers who are to be employed in the provinces as well as in Kabul. They are also opening a new faculty of literature which is to form part of the university of the future and for which they are trying to get Indian professors of Sanskrit and Avestan. In all these matters they have asked for the help of the Government of India, a welcome departure from the previous practice, which was to avoid at all costs our interference, with the result that the appointments made were often far from suitable. The teaching of English is making considerable progress, and some interest is being shown in basic English as a result of a visit during the summer of Mr. Myers, of the Orthological Institute. Several of the Indian teachers in Kabul are hoping to take courses in basic English during their winter vacation with a view to giving instruction to various classes on their return. English is generally being adopted as the Afghan second language in preference

to French, and Urdu is also being more widely taught. A visit by Major Shah, of the Indian Information and Broadcasting Department of the Government of India, was warmly welcomed by the Afghan Publications Department, which is now proposing to send three representatives on a return visit to India with a view to establishing closer co-operation in the matter of broadcasting and cultural relations generally.

6. Towards the end of the year the Afghan Foreign Office instituted informal discussions with His Majesty's Legation in order to see whether their frontier policy was not capable of improvement with a view to inducing gradually a more peaceful and settled form of life on both sides of the border. These discussions, though at present only in their preliminary stages, mark a great advance on anything that has gone before. The Afghans are, however, seriously handicapped by the uncertainty of India's political outlook. As long as India remains under British rule the Afghan Government are content with their present position and with attempts at improving relations on the existing basis. They have, however, no intention of standing idly by and allowing those whom they consider to be the Afghan inhabitants of tribal territory and of the North-West Frontier to become part of a congress and therefore Hindu India. They make no secret of this, though they decline to commit themselves to any formulation of their specific intentions. It is obvious, however, that they are speculating anxiously what the results to themselves would be if the friendly British Government were to withdraw from India and leave Afghanistan to face the future and her Russian neighbour without at least the moral support she now enjoys from us.

7. In fact, the declared Afghan policy of friendship towards Great Britain and America is to a large extent motivated by fear of Soviet Russia. This is no new phenomenon. Though Russian policy towards Afghanistan appears to have been correct, almost to the point of neglect, their activities in Persia have not been such as to inspire confidence. The Prime Minister, who ever since his appointment as Ambassador in Moscow, some years ago, has always held pronounced anti-Russian views, has, of course, been confirmed in his fears and sees no hope for the independence of his country other than in reliance on Great Britain, together with such moral help as they may expect to obtain from America. He is even reported to have said that he would acquiesce in the absorption of his country in British India, which would in any case be only temporary, if that would save her from the clutches of Soviet Russia. Afghan fears of Russian intentions have by no means been allayed by the appointment of a new and forceful ambassador, M. Bakoulin, in March 1944, followed by the transfer of all the important members of his staff and their replacement by new and far less friendly officials. Tours by the ambassador to Kandahar in April and to the northern provinces in November did nothing to allay Afghan suspicions.

8. Along with their attempts at improving Anglo-Afghan relations the Afghans have been assiduous in courting the favour of America. The visit, in January 1944, of General Hurley as the President's personal representative, was a great encouragement to them and led them perhaps to expect even more assistance than they have actually been receiving. Economic help has, however, been forthcoming in the shape of lorries required for the country's transport; and the easing of the world shipping position has enabled the United States to supply Afghanistan with many of the more urgent requirements which cannot be supplied by India. Another way in which America has been willing to help Afghanistan has been in the matter of irrigation engineers, three of whom arrived during the year to take over charge of the Irrigation Department. One of these, Mr. Henry, was not a success and left, but the other two, Messrs. Alexander and Keesee, seem to have settled down and are hopeful of accomplishing something to clear up the mess left by a succession of incompetent and mostly dishonest foreigners, chiefly Italians and Germans, who have been responsible for inaugurating several schemes all of which have so far proved complete failures. The Afghans are also looking to America for assistance in civil aviation and their Minister in Washington was appointed as their representative to the recent conference in Chicago. Nothing has apparently come out of these discussions, though the Afghans at one time expressed themselves as willing to allow an American Air Service to function over Afghanistan.

9. I have already mentioned the Prime Minister's proposal to break off diplomatic relations with the Axis Powers. He still suspects the Axis Legations of improper intrigues and has done his best to keep a close watch on their activities. Of the two legations the Japanese is by far the more active. Sichida, the Japanese Minister, paid a visit to Moscow during the year, no doubt to receive

instructions, if nothing else, from his Government. The Afghans, though suspicious of these moves, have apparently been unable to discover that the Japanese are actually abusing their diplomatic privileges and have therefore taken no action. As regards the German Legation, the removal of Rasmuss, the commercial secretary, which was welcomed, if not actually engineered, by the Afghan Government in March, seems to have relieved them of all anxiety on the score of improper activities on the part of the German Legation. And, indeed, the Germans appear to have for the most part handed over their interests in this country to the Japanese. In September the Afghan Government decided to withdraw their Minister from Vichy France and later in the year officially recognised the Government of General de Gaulle. The reappointment as Minister in Paris of Shah Wali Khan, who was formerly accredited to the Governments of both France and Switzerland and who is now in the latter country, is expected shortly. The Afghan Government have also recognised the independence of Syria and Lebanon and have concluded a treaty of friendship with China which will involve the opening of a Chinese Legation in Kabul. There have been changes among the heads of diplomatic missions in Kabul during the year. Signor Quaroni, the Italian Minister, left in May on appointment as Ambassador in Moscow and M. Fouad Bey, the Egyptian Minister, on transfer to Ankara in September. The departure of the latter was as sincerely regretted by the Afghan Government as that of the former was welcomed, and it is significant that Signor Quaroni did not receive the customary decoration of the Sardar-i-Ala from the King. The Turkish Ambassador and American Minister are also under orders of transfer.

10. The economic life of the country continues much as before. The working of the State monopolies leaves much to be desired and a more liberal policy more honestly pursued would greatly increase its prosperity. But Afghanistan has one priceless advantage over such countries as Persia in the person of her Prime Minister. Sufficiently well off himself and a bachelor with no family to provide for, he has no desire further to enrich himself at the expense of the country, and, as a corollary, is not prepared to allow unlimited licence to others to do so. There is always the risk that corrupt officials may be found out and ruthlessly punished, with the result that in spite of much dishonesty and great inefficiency the Government in general is able to insist on its policy being carried out. Price control is therefore tolerably effective and, though the black market flourishes, bread at least is cheap and plentiful. In November an important pronouncement was made placing a ban on the cultivation of opium. This was in deference to American representations and if enforced will apparently involve the country in the loss of some 3½ million Afghanis annually. The contract for the supply of 10,000 tons of Afghan wool for Russia, negotiated by the U.K.C.C. in 1943, has proceeded on the whole satisfactorily and had been practically completed by the end of the year. The Afghan Government have also done their best with the limited means at their disposal to improve their road communications. Work continues on the new Kabul–Peshawar road which is to follow the course of the Kabul river the whole way to Jalalabad, and the lower half of which has recently been opened to traffic. They also allowed Mr. Flannery, the American representative of General Motors, to make a tour of the country with a view to recommending improvements in the country's transport system. He has, as a result, suggested the building of a special Chevrolet lorry suited to Afghan conditions. Meanwhile the supply of 200 lorries by the Government of India (to be replaced by a similar number ordered for Afghanistan from America) has been of material assistance in easing their most pressing transport problems. On the whole the Afghan Government may congratulate themselves on having successfully weathered a difficult year and may reasonably look forward to a great increase in prosperity once war-time restrictions are removed.

CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 608/195/93] No. 2.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 26th January.)

(No. 15.)

Sir, *Bagdad, 9th January, 1945.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, in accordance with standing instructions, a review of the major political and economic events in Iraq during 1944.

2. I am indebted to Mr. P. F. Hancock, second secretary to this embassy, for the preparation of this report, the concluding section of which (paragraphs 33–37, inclusive), however, I wrote myself.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident, Cairo, and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Political Review, 1944.

Introductory.

THE year 1944 has been a quiet one for Iraq. The recession of the enemy threat to the Middle East and the recent Allied victories have led Iraqis to believe that the war is as good as over. Apart from supplying primary products required by the Allies, Iraq, like all other countries of the Middle East, is playing no active part in the fight. Indeed, it is only the presence of British and Indian troops that provides visible evidence that she is a belligerent. On the other hand, the economic consequences of war have made themselves painfully felt. The country as a political unit has enjoyed continued prosperity, thanks to the maintenance, though on a reduced scale, of British war expenditure and to an adequate harvest. But the general population's condition of life has been further depressed by restricted imports and rising prices. The measures taken to combat these tendencies proved in the main ineffective, and the dismissal of Colonel Bayliss, the Director-General of Imports, was followed by a period of economic decontrol.

2. In the sphere of internal politics, Nuri Pasha's Cabinet was replaced in June by an administration of similar type under Hamdi Pachachi. Apart from the endemic restlessness in the Barzan area of Kurdistan, internal order was well maintained. Relations between imperial troops and the Iraqi population were unruffled. In the sphere of foreign affairs, the problems of Palestine and the Levant States were closely followed with increasing indignation against the Zionists and the French.

3. The excellent Anglo-Iraqi relations which subsisted throughout the year have again proved the value of His Majesty's Government's policy towards this country. While indications are not lacking of difficulties ahead, it is appreciated by the majority of thinking Iraqis that their country is too weak to stand alone in the world of our times, that Iraq therefore needs the help and protection of a friendly Great Power, and it is hoped that that Power will continue to be Great Britain.

Internal Politics.

4. For the first six months of the year Iraqi politics were concerned mainly with the question whether or not Nuri Pasha was to continue to direct the administration of the country. He had been Prime Minister continuously from October 1941, but he had been obliged to reorganise his Cabinet no less than nine times. Having used and discarded twenty-four different colleagues, he seemed to be coming to the end of possible combinations. His last team, formed in December 1943, was in many respects a good one, but it was strangely unpopular and never enjoyed the Regent's confidence. His Royal Highness particularly disliked the inclusion of Taufiq Suwaidi, Umar Nadhmi and Ali Mumtaz, whom he regarded as disloyal to himself. In Parliament the personal opponents of the Prime Minister and of his colleagues soon realised how the land lay, and, encouraged by Tahsin

Ali, the chamberlain at the Palace, set out to make trouble. The Government's request for an adjournment was refused and the Opposition Deputies, abetted by a sympathetic President, were able to sustain their attacks with such persistence that in the end they wore down the strength of the Ministers and forced them to resign. The first manœuvre of the Opposition was to call in question the legality of the appointment of Taufiq Suwaidi to be Deputy Prime Minister, a post specially instituted for him by Nuri Pasha. Having brought about Taufiq Suwaidi's resignation by compelling the Government to refer to the High Court for a ruling, they were encouraged to seek to open up a more general engagement on every occasion. The Ministers became disheartened and maintained that it was unfair of the Regent to put them into office and then to encourage their enemies by allowing it to be known that they did not enjoy his favour. His Majesty's Ambassador repeatedly warned His Royal Highness that the uncertain situation in which he placed the Cabinet was harmful to the Administration and advised him that he should make up his mind either to give them a reasonable trial or to replace them by others if he were sure that better men could be found. Throughout the spring months His Royal Highness vacillated between these two courses, while the Cabinet's critics, both in the Senate and the Chamber, continued to gain confidence and to increase the weight of their attacks. The climax was reached during the last days of the debate on the budget. The Opposition Deputies passed from criticism to abuse and an uproar ensued, which obliged the President to suspend the meeting. Nuri Pasha tendered his resignation, explaining that it was impossible for him to continue in office without the full and avowed support of the Regent. His Royal Highness thereupon called Hamdi Pachachi, a rich landowner of indifferent health, to form a Government. The invitation was accepted, but as the new Prime Minister was too unwell to collect colleagues, the Palace had to do it for him. The Cabinet which took office a fortnight later was everywhere known to be the Regent's handiwork. The principal posts were filled by Mustafa al Umari (Minister of the Interior), Arshad al Umari (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Acting Minister of Supply), Salih Jabr (Minister of Finance), Tahsin Ali (Minister of Defence). Hamdi Pachachi offered portfolios to Nuri Pasha and Ibrahim Kemal, but both refused. Nuri was genuinely in need of rest and recuperation, and Ibrahim Kemal wanted nothing less than the premiership.

5. In a statement made in the Chamber shortly after the formation of his Government, Hamdi Pachachi regretted that, owing to his indisposition, no full programme for his Administration had been prepared. The Cabinet would, however, give their principal attention to three practical tasks, namely (*a*) to improve the organisation and work of the Supplies Department; (*b*) to take all measures to establish "normal security and order" throughout the country; (*c*) to improve efficiency and probity of Government officials. This statement made no reference to the Kurdish problem, but in a subsequent statement Hamdi Pachachi said that it was the intention of his Government to carry on the Kurdish policy of their predecessors and to implement an extensive programme of development in the north.

6. The extreme heat of midsummer, inducing as it invariably does frayed nerves and quickened tempers, usually produces a Cabinet crisis and in 1944 this supervened in August, when the Minister of Defence violently disagreed with his colleagues over General Renton's scheme of army reform. After a reshuffle of short duration, Hamdi Pachachi resigned and reformed his Cabinet. Apart from the dropping of Tashin Ali and a change-over in certain portfolios, the composition of the new Cabinet did not differ from that of the old. The Ministry of Supply, which for some months was held by more than one Minister in an acting capacity, was eventually filled by the promotion of its Director-General, no better-known politician being prepared to accept this invidious post or to associate himself with a Cabinet whose future by the close of the year had become very uncertain. Further changes took place in December at the Ministries of Social Affairs and Defence, the latter being awarded to the previous Chief of the General Staff. The parliamentary scene remains quiet, with the odds shortening at the time of writing on Nuri Pasha as the next Prime Minister.

7. Outside Parliament and the family circle of the Iraqi oligarchy there was a notable resurgence of political activity and discussion. This tendency was exemplified in the press. At the beginning of the year five Arabic daily newspapers were published in Bagdad. There are now eleven. Part of the press is, of course, engaged in supporting the Government. The Opposition, whether in the press or out of it, is, thanks to a gradual lifting of the censorship, throwing off the restraint of the last three years. In many cases the old xenophobia and irresponsible nationalism are apparent just below the surface, especially in attacks upon

the "imperialism" of other Powers. But the general tone of the Opposition has not been by any means unconstructive. In the sphere of internal politics it has demanded an effective tackling of the supply problem, the purging of public life, decentralisation and the formation of political parties. As for the first two demands, no one could pretend that they were not justifiable. An important step towards decentralisation will have been made if the Government succeeds in its declared intention of placing on the statute book a revised Liwa administration law. The formation of political parties is unlikely to make rapid progress in a country where personalities count for more than principles, and where the mass of the population are politically uneducated. "Communism" has undoubtedly increased during the year under review and "Communist" leaflets have been distributed on a wide scale. But these terms in Iraq imply no more than an academic and impracticable sense of frustration with things as they are.

8. Mention has already been made of the lack of confidence shown by the Regent in Nuri Pasha's administration. While His Royal Highness's behaviour in this matter seemed at the time somewhat shortsighted, it must be allowed that he is on the whole a steadying and satisfactory influence in Iraqi politics and that his pro-British sympathies are above question. He is usually amenable to advice and determined to do his duty. That he is seriously alive to many of the problems facing his country is shown by a long memorandum which he drew up early in the year setting forth the lines on which he would wish the Government to work. This was by no means a contemptible document and indicated an advance in His Royal Highness's political capacity. It is not in his nature to inspire popular enthusiasm, and unfortunately over Kurdistan he has been stubborn in his reluctance to give Cabinet, Parliament and people any noteworthy lead towards the early implementation of a constructive policy. Nevertheless, throughout the year, he has been untiring in public appearances and military inspections all over the country.

9. The Regent's interest in the Iraqi army has been timely. Under a scheme prepared by General Renton, the new head of the British Military Mission, the army's strength is being reduced from four to two divisions and one training division. This plan could hardly be expected to commend itself to all Ministers, especially as it involved the retirement of many old friends among the senior officers. But, except for Tahsin Ali, they accepted it under the impetus of last year's military failures in Kurdistan. The reorganisation should improve the morale of the remaining officers, whose prospects of promotion are now better. Vigorous training is now in progress. General Renton is putting through overdue reforms which will result in better feeding and clothing of the army and a lower incidence of disease. The Iraqi Air Force now takes to the air more frequently than before. Its proper rôle having been defined as that of army co-operation, His Majesty's Government are selling it 30 Anson aircraft. They are to be delivered in February, 1945.

10. In the past, the Iraqi army has been the centre of political danger and anti-British feeling. The work of General Bromilow in winning the confidence of the younger officers is now bearing fruit. The reorganisation of the Mission by General Renton, and the introduction of young British officers who have seen war service, have had an excellent effect. Some disaffection still exists but, happily, with less force. The principal use of the Army should, of course, be to maintain order in Iraq. This is now generally appreciated. The reorganisation and training now going on are popularly interpreted as preparation for a spring campaign in Kurdistan.

Kurdistan.

11. Both Nuri Pasha's Cabinet and their successors found themselves much occupied with Kurdish affairs. In January peace was made with Mulla Mustafa, the Barzani insurgent, largely through the exertions of Majid Mustafa, a Minister without portfolio charged with advising on Kurdish policy. It was an uneasy settlement and there were several occasions during the following months when a further outbreak of fighting seemed likely.

12. The Barzan troubles had, however, awakened the Government to a sense of the need for conciliatory action and they began to consider reorganising the administration of the Northern districts. Early in the year the Prime Minister sent Majid Mustafa to tour the chief Kurdish centres, to remove some of the worst officials and to hasten the distribution of the cheap grain which had been made available for those villages where the crops had failed. A new and efficient mutasarrif, General Baha-ud-Din Nuri, was appointed to Sulaimani and plans

were considered for accelerated expenditure on the public services to bring them nearer to the standards established elsewhere in the country. This wise policy was persistently attacked by the Government's critics in Parliament, particularly in the Senate. The Ministers concerned, still finding themselves without support from the Palace, had not the heart to go steadily ahead. The Kurdish tribes soon sensed that something had gone wrong and significant rumblings of discontent were again heard from the north. His Majesty's Ambassador warned both Nuri Pasha and the Regent that they would soon be faced by an exceedingly grave and difficult situation unless they did something effective to redress legitimate Kurdish grievances. Nuri Pasha thereafter twice visited the north and during his second tour in May spoke reassuringly to large gatherings of officials, tribal leaders and notables and obtained from the mutasarrifs detailed memoranda on the administrative improvements, roads, schools, clinics and other works which were needed in their liwas. His Excellency's tours were rather too hurried. Many of those to whom he spoke said openly that they had heard fair promises before but had waited long in vain for their fulfilment. Nevertheless, his visits did something to improve the temper of the people. Unhappily, soon after his return to Bagdad, his Cabinet fell and much of the good impression he had made was effaced.

13. When Hamdi Pachachi took office His Majesty's Ambassador renewed private pressure on the Regent and his Ministers to adopt a sympathetic policy towards the Kurds and to take up the work of pacification and social and administrative development in the northern liwas from the point at which it had been left by the last Cabinet. Progress was, however, slow and the replacement of General Baha-ud-Din in August by a mutasarrif of the normal type caused an unfavourable impression. Meanwhile the Barzanis had established and cemented by marriage an alliance with their neighbours the Zibaris. Their control over the north-eastern confines of Iraq was thus complete. The state of the Iraqi army precluded for the time being the possibility of a successful punitive expedition. The Government were therefore disposed to be patient and sent Colonel Taufiq Wahbi, the Kurdish Minister of Economics, in September, to tour the north explaining the central administration's good intentions. But hardly had the Minister returned to Bagdad, when Mulla Mustafa, backed by armed retainers, demanded the surrender of 100 tons of grain from a local Government headquarters. There was nothing for it but to release the grain. In December further symptoms of unrest showed themselves, of which details need not be recorded here. Mulla Mustafa's demands of the Central Government were reported to include the fulfilment of the promises made by Nuri Pasha's administration, the release of various Kurdish prisoners, the appointment of a Kurdish commissioner with wide powers in Bagdad and an "agricultural loan" of ID.144,000 to himself. Some of the Ministers pressed for military operations but it was finally, and wisely, decided to make certain precautionary troop dispositions only. Mulla Mutafa has now retired to Barzan. In the meantime, grain and cloth have been distributed in most of the Kurdish areas.

14. This crisis and the preceding crisis—there have been quite a number of alarms—demonstrate the unsatisfactory and unstable situation which obtains in Kurdistan. Mulla Mustafa is a bandit. He is interested, not in the political or economic welfare of his people, but only in the maintenance of his feudal state. If he continues to make trouble, there would be no justification for disarming the Iraqi Government from military action against him, provided that the operations are undertaken in accordance with the approval of the British Military Mission. It has been impressed upon the Iraqi Government that the Ambassador and General Officer Commanding-in-Chief expect, and are entitled, to be consulted beforehand in such an event. Such consultation is essential as a precaution against a situation arising in which the use of British forces would be sought to rescue their Iraqi allies from difficulties. His Majesty's Ambassador has, indeed, pointed out to the Iraqi authorities on numerous occasions that the latter can expect neither British assistance nor a solution of their Kurdish difficulties so long as they delay the implementation of their promises of relief and administrative reform. Nevertheless, it must be appreciated that in the event of serious trouble in Kurdistan, it would almost certainly be necessary to deploy British troops defensively for the protection of our interests.

Security.

15. Political security remained good throughout the year. In March the case files of men interned at Amara were reviewed and twenty-nine were released. During the rest of the year 23 further internees were released from Amara.

Some 130 persons remain in the internment camp and it is to be anticipated that more will be released as time goes on, since the majority have already been detained for three years or more. Many of these men are, of course, hostile to the Allied cause. In general it is His Majesty's Ambassador's object to see that the more dangerous of them remain interned as long as possible. It is desirable that such releases as do take place should be made gradually and in small groups so that those who are enlarged may be kept under police supervision; and to avoid the creation of a *bloc* of political "martyrs," which would certainly be exploited to our detriment once the war is over. This policy is, in fact, being satisfactorily carried out by the Iraq Government.

16. In April, 19 Iraqis who fled to Persia in 1941 and were there arrested by British troops and sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment, were returned to Iraq and taken into custody on various charges. Those accused of treason were tried and one (Kamil Shabib, a member of the notorious "Golden Square") was hanged. Eight of these internees were subsequently released.

17. Four Iraqis were dropped from a German aircraft on the 28th November west of Mosul. Two of these men remain at large.

Arab Affairs.

18. At the beginning of the year Nuri Pasha was still pursuing the promotion of Arab Unity. He visited Beirut and Damascus on his return from medical treatment in Palestine, and informed His Majesty's Ambassador that he had agreed in principle with the Syrian Prime Minister that, whatever the other Arab countries might do, Iraq and Syria should establish a close understanding including a common policy for defence and foreign affairs. No such agreement has in fact been concluded; Nuri Pasha must have over-estimated the extent to which the Syrians were prepared to go forward with him. In February the Iraqi Government advanced their charge d'affaires in Syria and the Lebanon to the rank of Minister and a few weeks later a Syrian delegation, including Jamil Beg Mardam, stayed for a few days in Bagdad on their way to discuss Arab unity with King Ibn Saud at Riyadh. They were cordially entertained and appropriately decorated. At the beginning of April a Lebanese delegation headed by the Prime Minister passed through Iraq on a similar mission. The planning of practical Arab co-operation was, however, left to the congress which, at that time, it was expected that the Egyptian Prime Minister would summon during the summer.

19. Meanwhile, there was the Palestine question. In February Nuri Pasha received from Washington news of Senator Wagner's resolution in Congress demanding that the United States Government should use their good offices to assist the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine. At his Excellency's instance, the Iraqi Presidents of the Senate and the Chamber sent telegrams of protest to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. After an initial period of restraint, the press took up the theme in tones of moderated indignation. The Government refused applications made for permission to hold public demonstrations. The resolutions of the United States Republican and Democratic parties regarding Palestine came as a further blow. Displeasure was expressed in the newspapers, but no campaign was worked up. For this the Minister for Foreign Affairs was probably responsible. Unlike Hamdi Pachachi, who was now Prime Minister, Arshad-al-Umari is not at heart a keen pan-Arabist. His advice at this stage was that the Arabs should go gently until after the United States presidential elections; they should then try to make their case more widely known both in the United States and the United Kingdom.

20. The preliminary conference on Arab Unity met at Alexandria in September. Its results were felt in this country to be unexpectedly practical, but it is doubtful whether their potential importance has yet been realised. Naturally, this conference concentrated attention on the affairs of Palestine and Syria; nor was North Africa forgotten. About this time the press began to throw off its previous restraint, thus coming more into line with the press in Palestine and Egypt. Violent comments appeared on Zionism, the Palestine problem and, in particular, the murder of Lord Moyne. Many of these effusions, which continue unabated, dealt sharply with the United States. Touching the United Kingdom, their general tone was one of friendship alloyed by nervousness.

21. Towards the end of the year Iraqi delegates attended the Arab Women's Conference in Cairo. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Nuri Said also visited that city for discussions preliminary to the Conference on Arab Unity, which, it was expected, would be held early in the New Year.

22. The Iraqi press and public are united in their hatred of Zionism, and both are apprehensive about the form any eventual Palestine settlement may take. The longer the settlement is delayed, the greater the restlessness that will be felt here. The Arabs are not a match for the Jews in money, organisation or influence, and they know it. Their realisation of these facts merely increases their bitterness. Nor have the Iraqi authorities failed to notice the extent or the violence of Zionist propaganda or, in particular, the licence of the Hebrew press in Palestine—a fact which makes them unreceptive to counsels of moderation. Zionism and the Palestine problem have not been the only subjects of indignation in the press or in discussion. French designs on Syria and the Lebanon were universally condemned. Iraq has close ties of sympathy and interest with these territories; they are not only a principal outlet for Iraqi trade and oil through the pipe-line, but also the resort of numerous well-to-do Bagdadis in the hot weather. They are of more practical importance to Iraq even, perhaps, than Palestine. Their future is therefore watched with care. It is very widely hoped in Iraq that the United Kingdom will be able to assist the Syrians to become independent of France. Latterly, however, some fears have been expressed that His Majesty's Government's policy in this matter may have taken the wrong turning.

Foreign Relations.

23. War conditions continued to restrict Iraq's relations with other Powers. Nevertheless, direct diplomatic relations were established with China, Czechoslovakia and Russia. The Ministers of the first two Powers live in Tehran. Relations with Russia were established on the 11th September after long searchings of heart on the part of the Iraqi Government, the leading members of which are nothing if not reactionary. The move attracted much notice and was welcomed by the press. It is understood that a M. Gregory Titovitch has been appointed as Soviet Minister, and at the time of preparing this report the Russian Consul in Kermanshah is in Bagdad searching for a legation house and other premises. It is anticipated that Soviet representation here will be on an impressive scale numerically.

24. In May the French Committee of National Liberation sent Colonel Spillman to Bagdad from Algiers to discuss the recognition of the committee by the Iraqi Government. The ensuing talks were interrupted by the fall of Nuri Pasha's Government. Nuri's successors were disinclined to take a decision, and, rather than dally in the heat of Bagdad, Colonel Spillman returned to Algiers. No French representation exists in this country other than that afforded by a commercial agent whom the Iraqi Government do not officially recognise.

25. Iraqi-American relations were somewhat clouded towards the end of the year by evidences of pro-Zionism which have already been touched upon. The publicity given to American plans for oil development in Arabia and the Persian Gulf attracted attention. In October a United States mission under Mr. Culbertson came to Bagdad to investigate the possibilities of American-Iraqi trade. The United States authorities have shown interest in future supplies for the Iraq State railways, and they would evidently like to see the procedure discontinued by which Iraqi Government Departments order stores through the Crown agents. In addition, Iraqi students and a representative panel of Iraqi merchants have visited America. In general, United States interest in Iraq is increasing, and with it United States propaganda. Iraq's shortage of dollar exchange is a growing preoccupation to the Americans, who find in it a grave obstacle to the desired development of their exports to this country.

26. Towards the end of the year developments in Greece, Belgium and Italy were the subject of some public concern and doubts were cast upon the wisdom of the policy which His Majesty's Government were pursuing towards those countries.

Economics.

27. During the period under review it is probably true to say that it was economic developments which chiefly occupied the minds of the people of this country. As in 1943, British war expenditure, reduced imports and lack of local production combined to produce a condition of limited but burdensome inflation. The currency in circulation amounted to some I.D.6 million in 1941. In October 1944 the figure stood at I.D.40·3 million. While the rate of expansion became less rapid during 1944, the general cost of living has continued to rise, causing, as might be expected, especial hardship to the urban population and the recipients

of fixed incomes. The poorer Iraqis are hard put to it to clothe themselves, and, in view of the inordinate price of many common food-stuffs, particularly meat, fruit and vegetables, their diet is ill-balanced and often inadequate.

28. Acting on the pressing advice of His Majesty's Ambassador, the Iraqi Government had set up towards the end of 1943 administrative machinery to establish rationing and to control prices, and secured the services of Colonel Bayliss from the Middle East Supply Centre to operate it. This officer embarked on his difficult task with all energy and rationing of tea, coffee and sugar began on the 1st January, while that of cotton textiles and numerous other commodities followed. Supplies of tea, sugar and coffee were large enough to enable a fairly adequate ration to be distributed, but the available quantity of the cotton cloth used for the clothing of the common people was not sufficient to provide more than about 4 metres for each person for the year, except for those who could afford to buy in the black market. Administrative corruption and the lack of experienced supply officials combined to impede the arrangements for distribution which, as a result of the haste and keenness of Colonel Bayliss and his staff at the Directorate General of Imports, were not always simple or well conceived.

29. On the 1st May Parliament passed a law creating a Ministry of Supply, thus giving effect to a scheme advocated by Colonel Bayliss for the concentration of the supply organizations hitherto dispersed among five different Departments of State. Colonel Bayliss's anxiety to centralize this organization and to control it himself was understandable but, in the event, unfortunate. In spite of warnings, he aroused serious opposition in Ministerial and British Advisory circles and gave rise besides to many misunderstandings of M.E.S.C. policies. A series of disagreements with the Acting Minister of Supply culminated in the Colonel's dismissal. His fall was hailed with delight by all who hoped for personal enrichment at the public expense and was felt at the time as a blow to British prestige in this country, as indeed it was.

30. The dismissal of Colonel Bayliss was followed by a relaxation of economic controls. The Government's policy, so far as one could be discerned, was now to keep the price of essential goods low and to intercept the profits made on non-essentials, while maintaining the prices of such articles at a level sufficiently high to discourage smuggling out of the country. Mr. Grice, the present Director-General of Imports, has pursued these restricted aims quietly and with an understanding of the limitations which a primitive administrative system imposes. Meanwhile, there has been no reduction in the cost of living. A further distribution of cotton cloth (2 metres per person) is expected to take place shortly.

31. While Iraq is principally dependent on imports for her requirements of manufactured goods, she has a substantial surplus for export of certain primary products. Since 1941 it has been repeatedly made clear to the Iraq Government that the main contribution of their country to the war effort is the production of cereals, especially barley. The Iraqi Minister of Finance opened this year's barley negotiations with an offer of over ID.18 a ton at collecting centres. This price was altogether too high. In the course of some three months' discussions the Iraqi authorities were brought to a more realistic frame of mind, the price being finally fixed at ID.19/500 f.o.b. Basra cleaned and bagged, and at ID.15/000 and ID.14/500 for barley not exceeding 10 per cent. dirt on sief at Basra and Bagdad respectively. The quantity to be purchased was 200,000 tons. Though this price was very considerably lower than that paid in 1943, it was nevertheless above the world level but less than the price prevalent in other Middle Eastern areas. If the maintenance of Iraq's economy is a political desideratum, then His Majesty's Government were justified in paying a special price for the Iraqi barley surplus, for which there would have been no other outlet.

32. In the field of finance, mention should be made of the Bill passed by the Iraqi Parliament on the 28th May providing for two loans, one a short-term loan for ID.1 million at 3 per cent., the other a long-term lottery loan at 4 per cent. The Iraqi Government sent strong delegations to the Middle East Financial Conference in April and to the International Monetary Conference held in the United States in July. In December representatives of the Treasury and Board of Trade after some weeks of successful negotiations in Egypt, allotted five and eight days respectively to Bagdad in an endeavour to persuade the Iraqi Minister of Finance to agree to a new system of allocating dollar and other "scarce" foreign exchange for Iraqi's essential needs in 1945. These hurried discussions unhappily led to no result and at the close of the year no progress had been achieved

Conclusion

33. The year 1944 saw the continuance of the good relations which subsist between Great Britain and Iraq, and it is probable that amongst Iraquis as a whole a more genuine desire exists than at any time in the past [illegible] the bonds of friendship and co-operation between the two nations.

34. As the war begins to draw to its close, however, various questions which have been held in abeyance are coming before the [illegible] and are causing grave anxiety to those who are interested in the preservation of Anglo-Iraqi relations. Foremost amongst such questions are the problems of Palestine and the Levant States. It was events in Palestine which produced and accelerated the deplorable deterioration of Anglo-Iraqi relations in the years 1936 to 1941. It is [illegible] that Iraqi [illegible] could not survive a settlement which gave the Jews a dominating position. Indeed, any settlement which did not safeguard what the Arabs believe to be their rights in Palestine and the Levant States would [illegible] between Iraq and Great Britain. It seems doubtful that the Arab Union now in Egypt, even though they do not result in a formally constituted Confederation, will lead at least to some agreed scheme among the Arab States [illegible] which may be accepted by Foreign Powers. It must [illegible] to be expected that Iraq will take a prominent part in any such plan and that her opposition which in the past has been instinctive and badly organized will in the future assume a more formidable character.

35. If, however, the end of the war sees a settlement of these questions which is not unfavourable to the Arabs, the most potential stumbling block in Anglo-Iraqi relations will have been removed, and provided that we treat the Iraqis with [illegible] there is every reason [illegible] not [illegible] difficulties. Relations between [illegible] is always a matter [illegible] the stockade [illegible] dramatic [illegible].

36. The Iraqis are, at the moment, in the pleasant position of being wooed by the Americans and it is probable that in the near future the [illegible] by the Russians as soon as the Soviet Minister takes up his abode in Bagdad. They feel nowadays that they have a definite position in the international scheme and that they are [illegible] independent of [illegible] and they are [illegible] give to others.

37. In these circumstances, it obviously behoves us to take nothing for granted. We must be zealous in preserving the position [illegible] we have [illegible] we must [illegible] that the Iraqis have [illegible] results. We must take advantage of the ordained opportunities [illegible] the British [illegible] bearing [illegible] to be [illegible] [illegible] we hold [illegible] to politically. It is worth while taking trouble [illegible] Iraq and [illegible] holds it should be treated as favourably as [illegible] The prompt provision of first-rate British officials for the Iraqi Government [illegible] assistance in schemes of public health and an extension of the [illegible] work of the British Council will also be of value. Given these things [illegible] attendance of our imperial [illegible] prospects are favourable for [illegible] strengthening of the Anglo-Iraqi connexion.

[E 627 195 63]

No. 9

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 27th January.)

(No. 29.)

Sir,

Baghdad, 5th January, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to [illegible] with reference to my despatch No. 510 of the 31st October last the following report on the main events that have since occurred in this country.

2. Throughout the period under review the Cabinet of Hamdi al Pachachi has remained in office in spite of repeated rumours that it was about to fall. [illegible] and the criticism to which it has been subjected in the Chamber of Deputies and in the local press certainly lent colour to the rumours. Nevertheless, it now seems more stable than it did two months ago. It is generally understood that the present Cabinet will remain in being at least until Nuri Pasha and Arshad al Umari return from Egypt. On the 20th December a [illegible] changes were announced, consequent upon the election of Mohammed Hassan Kubba as President of the Chamber. [illegible] of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Minister for Foreign Affairs [illegible] before his departure to Egypt [illegible] to General Ismail Namq [illegible] October 1941 [illegible] Acting Chief of the General Staff. [illegible] the Regent and [illegible] of not making [illegible] Minister's confidence in Arshad al Umari [illegible] General Namq [illegible] previous post.

3. Parliament was opened by the Regent on the 2nd December. The Speech from the Throne followed in the main the lines of former speeches and after referring to the great efforts of the Iraqi Government to further Arab Unity and to the continued good relations with His Majesty's Government and with other Powers, went on to catalogue the achievements of the Government and list its aims for the future. The programme was not notably impressive, and was widely criticized in the [illegible] press. In particular the absence of any mention of the formation of political parties, or of the freedom of the press, two subjects which have been well to the fore in public comment recently, has caused widespread dissatisfaction. In fact, as I have already reported, the press is now being allowed far greater latitude than formerly; though it is still subject to stricter control than the newspapers of neighbouring countries.

4. In opening the debate on the reply to the Address from the Throne on the 31st December, Hamdi al Pachachi considered it necessary to make a long speech to the Chamber defending, [illegible] and amplifying its foreign policy. He said that Iraq had played a leading part in the Alexandria Conference, had done everything possible to hasten its meeting, and had besides insisted that something concrete must result from it. He claimed that Iraq was largely responsible for the Alexandria Protocol and the idea of the Arab League. In the second place, he said that Iraq had exerted every effort to persuade the Governments of the United States, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan to recognise the independence of Syria and the Lebanon, and he gave the impression that their eventual recognition of that independence was partially, at least, the result of Iraqi efforts. The third plan in Iraq's foreign policy, said the Prime Minister, was support for the Arabs of Palestine. Concrete proposals had been put forward for this purpose. The opening of Propaganda Bureaux in London and Washington had been [illegible] by the Iraqi Council of Ministers and just approved the spending of a sum of 10,000 dinars as Iraq's contribution to these bureaux [illegible] to be followed by another [illegible] 20,000 during the coming one. Propaganda, he declared, was most necessary for the Arab cause, and he alleged that Zionism was a greater menace than Hitler. The Iraqi Government had also strongly urged all the Arab Governments to support the "National Fund" started in Palestine to buy up land there which would otherwise be sold to the Jews. There seems to be some prospect that Iraq will subscribe to this activity also.

5. As regards domestic affairs, Hamdi al Pachachi explained that the slowness of the progress of public works particularly irrigation projects was largely due to the [illegible] of experts and added I fear [illegible] doctrine. No [illegible] for technical posts [illegible] has been [illegible] in securing [illegible] requests for British officials. It is [illegible] that really capable Britons should be found in the future to make good the present shortage, and to fill future vacancies.

6. [illegible] has been a topic of conversation ever since the announcement that diplomatic relations were to be established with the Soviet Union and that a Russian Minister was to be expected here shortly. But the street of the Russian [illegible] from Kermanshah just before Christmas to acquire actual and imposing premises for a legation has greatly increased the flood of speculation

and gossip. The wealthy classes are, of course, particularly apprehensive, and even go so far in [illegible] to Russian inspiration. On the occasion of 'Id al Fitr' religious holiday, professedly Communist leaflets were distributed [illegible] was naturally ascribed to Kamil Chadirchi and his Fabian friends, who are generally labelled as "Communists." Whoever may have been responsible, there is no doubt that many educated young Iraqis are impatient with the selfish maladministration of the "old gang" though the former seem to be almost equally lacking in constructive ideas or the courage to realise them. The discussion in England of plans for social reorganisation have undoubtedly inspired a feeling that the time has come for some measure of social advance in Iraq. It might be expected that the ruling class, if only out of fear, would itself undertake measures of reform, and I and my staff lose no opportunity of impressing this on those who anxiously [illegible] communism. That reform must come is clear, but that it should have to be the Communists, who profess to be inspired by Russia and by Marxist doctrines, who should lead the public demand is a pity. But I doubt whether the Pashas can ever be persuaded to abandon their present attitude, and I understand that Mustafa al [illegible] Minister of Interior is contemplating the forma[illegible] and defend vested interests. Political p[illegible] Communists or otherwise, are the subject of much talk at the moment, and we shall, I think, see their re-emergence in the not distant future.

7. As I have already reported in detail, Kurdish affairs have occupied much of the Government's time, and also much of mine. There was a violent flutter [illegible] middle of December when Mulla Mustafa set out on a flag march towards Amadia and Zakho with what was first said to be 250 armed men, though this figure was later reduced to 85. When asked what he was doing he said to have replied curtly, "Training," and this did not help to make Ministers feel more comfortable. Their immediate reaction in fact has been to support more actively the reorganisation of the army by General Renton in readiness for a possible campaign against Mulla Mustafa in the spring. Indeed, people like Saleh Jabr and Mustafa al [illegible] it is a pity that the Government by the slow development of their policy and administrative inertia have allowed a brigand to assume something of the importance of a national figure. His immediate neighbours and many of his humble countrymen who suffer from his exactions and depredations, regard him in no such light.

8. Meanwhile, the Government have taken action, however grudging and inadequate. From the 20th November to the 26th November the Minister of Interior had toured the northern liwas and came back with certain concrete proposals. Hamdi al Pachachi displayed a most commendable spirit of conciliation, and eventually forced through the Council of Ministers an order transferring the Nahiyas of Barzan and Mazuri Bala from the Qadha of Zibar (in the Mosul Liwa) to the Liwa of Erbil, where there is an energetic and sympathetic Kurdish Mutessarif, Said Qazzaz. I have considerable hope that this action may go far to restore the situation in Barzan to normal. Efforts are already being made to transport the 800 tons of free barley destined for the area which has been lying at Aqra for four months, and the mutessarif is himself preparing to visit Barzan, a thing which the Mutessarif of Mosul would not dream of doing.

9. In the debate on the reply to the Address, the state of Kurdistan came under discussion, and Majid Mustafa and another Kurdish Deputy from Erbil made a favourable impression by their exposition of the simple nature of Kurdish grievances and the absence of any separatist ambitions.

10. The rest of Kurdistan has been quiet, the inflated price being paid for [illegible] the Government [illegible].

11. The tribal situation remains tranquil. There have been the usual small skirmishes over land [illegible] Political Advisory staff [illegible].

12. The rains have been exceptionally plentiful in the last two months and crop prospects [illegible] lack of enough wheat seed. In the absence of unforeseen disease or other natural developments, growers will certainly be faced with a very large surplus, for which it will be harder than ever to find a foreign market even at a price more in conformity with world prices than they have grown accustomed to expect. Meanwhile United Kingdom Commercial

Corporation purchases under last year's agreement are so far proceeding smoothly and rapidly.

13. The supply situation remains difficult, though there has been a slight improvement, particularly in the distribution of rationed commodities. The distribution of "kham," a course cotton cloth, has been notably more equitable than before. The efforts of Mr. C. R. Grice, the director-general of local products and acting director-general of imports, together with the activities of Mr. R. Corderoy who has toured most of the country personally supervising the distribution of cloth, should be mentioned in this connexion. A few days before the close of the year the Iraqi Government were officially informed by Identic B[illegible] 1945 [illegible] Supply [illegible] tre control over a large category of imports would be relaxed. While this announcement at first caused much satisfaction, the range of commodities still to be "screened" in Cairo and, for various reasons, still in short supply has been found to be so extensive that it has come to be regarded as not meaning [illegible].

14. In December Mr. Davidson, representing the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, and Mr. Gilbert, of the Board of Trade, visited Bagdad briefly in the hope of agreeing with the Iraqi authorities on the allocation to this country during 1945 of United States dollars and other "scarce" foreign exchange. From the beginning the Minister of Finance proved difficult, and it seems clear that he resented Mr. Davidson's inability to spare more than five days for this capital after several weeks of successful negotiations in Cairo, thinking that an attempt was being made to stampede him [illegible] without his being afforded sufficient time to consider fully [illegible]. Other difficulties, such as an incipient Cabinet crisis, also supervened, while there is reason to suppose that the influence of the American Minister, exerted through Ibrahim Kebir, the Iraqi accountant-general, against any arrangements involving strict control of dollar exchange, was an additional complication.

15. Briefly, and in round figures, Mr. Davidson's proposals envisaged a "target of $13 million for Iraq's essential purchases in 1945, of which $3 million would be contributed from the sterling dollar pool, the remainder being obtained from present Iraqi holdings of dollars and potential receipts from exports to the United States. In return, Iraq would undertake to contribute all [illegible] imposing import control upon her trade with Turkey and Persia, such control being considered essential to guard against the latter country, especially developing into a wide backdoor entrance for dollar goods into this Kingdom.

16. The request for renewed control over imports from Persia proved the principal rock on which the discussions foundered, though there was also trouble over the Iraqi desire to exempt from compulsory contribution to the sterling pool dollar exchange derived from "abnormal non-commercial transactions," that is gifts and or special dollar credits of one sort or another. The Minister of [illegible] conversations, while it has since been discovered that the American Minister was strongly opposed to the Iraqi Government limiting their freedom of action in the disposal of their dollar exchange. Mr. Henderson has indeed made it perfectly plain, in a frank conversation with a member of my staff, that rigorous control over foreign exchange here could only, in his opinion, militate against any desire on the part of the Iraqis to increase exports to the United States, and would besides react upon their schemes for capital development and the extension of [illegible] the solution lies in agreement between Washington and London.

17. At the time of writing, the position that has arisen with regard to Iraq is under examination by the interested authorities of His Majesty's Government, and I am hopeful that in time some means of overcoming the present deadlock may be found. Were it to continue indefinitely, the repercussions on Anglo-Iraqi relations could only be unfortunate. Meanwhile, pending further instructions from your department, I and the senior members of my staff immediately concerned are doing what we can to bring about a better understanding of the problem as a whole by responsible Iraqis, and to this end our offer has been explained to Ibrahim Kemal, who headed the Iraqi delegation to Bretton Woods. His reaction was very satisfactory and I understand that within twenty-four hours of hearing the story of the recent abortive negotiations, he had already consulted the British Adviser to the Ministry of Finance, and the minister himself. From what I hear, the latter is continuing his studies of the problem [illegible] Agreement, the final text of which has only to-day reached Bagdad.

18. At the beginning of November Mr John Smith, Director-General of Agriculture and Forests in the Sudan Government, arrived here at the invitation of the Iraqi Government in the person of Tawfiq Wahbi, the Kurdish Minister of Economics) to make a report on the forests of Kurdistan. Mr Smith made a comprehensive tour of the whole area and will be submitting a report shortly. I understand that it will recommend that before anything else is done land settlement of certain forest areas, to be created Forest Reserves, should be carried out by a responsible official. Until this is done no forest can possibly survive the attacks of man and goats. The next step would be the planting of the areas so settled as Government property and the passing of legislation to restrict absolutely all cutting of trees (except for the needs of remote villages) to the reserved areas. Cutting would, of course be done on a definite plan in these areas and replanting would at once follow cutting. If some such programme were put into effect the forests of Kurdistan, as well as its soil, might be saved from extinction and erosion. But it would I think, require a number of British officials to carry it out effectively.

19. In December Dr Wright, an expert in animal products, toured the north of Iraq to make a survey of the possibilities of increasing livestock and its allied products. His report is awaited.

20. On the 28th November four Arab parachutists were dropped from a German aircraft in the neighbourhood of Tel Afar west of Mosul. Two of them, [illegible] and propaganda in exploitation of the uneasy situation in Palestine were to be their main activities.

21. On the 18th November Hama Rashid Khan, a Kurdish leader (of Iraqi nationality, who had rule[illegible] for some two years without any interference from the Persian Government, fled with many followers to Iraq before the advance of General Hooshmand Afshar's forces and surrendered to the Iraqi authorities. He is to live in *residence forcee* at Kirkuk. The Persian Government are reported to be pleased with the results of the operations. I am sorry to have to report, however, that the Jaf tribesmen who were imprisoned by the Persian General Afshar by a trick last summer are still detained, and no restitution has been made for property confiscated in spite of protests by the Iraqi Government, reinforced by representations made at my request by His Majesty's Ambassador at Tehran.

22. An innovation this year was the official celebration on the 24th November of the Regent's birthday. There was a special broadcast from Radio Bagdad and the press published articles praising the wisdom of the Regent and expressing admiration for the Hashimite House in general. His Royal Highness held a levee which I and various members of my staff in fortunate possession of suitable clothing duly attended.

23. The Armenian Catholic Patriarch, from Beirut, visited Bagdad on the 23rd November for the centenary celebrations of the Armenian Catholic Church in Iraq. His Eminence called on me at the embassy during his visit.

24. I am glad to report that the B.B.C.'s Arabic broadcasts continue to exert considerable influence here. In two months ninety-eight letters were received by the B.B.C. Arabic section from listeners in Arabic speaking countries, and of these no less than twenty-eight came from Iraq, which represents nearly a third of the whole. Considering what a hold Berlin's Arabic broadcasts used to have here, and the wide *reclame* acquired by the notorious Yunis Bahri, this spontaneous interest in the B.B.C. seems to me to be an eloquent proof of the value of the London Arabic programme and the authority it now commands.

25. The Amir Talal, eldest son of the Amir of Transjordan, visited Bagdad in October and November and the usual dinners and receptions were given in his honour. He appeared to have a great liking for military life and duties, and spent much time with the detachment of the Arab Legion which is stationed in Bagdad. I have learnt from other sources that the detachment's commanding officer is much pleased at the friendliness with which he has been treated by British officers here.

26. At last a dean has been found for the Law College, Dr Abdul Hakim [illegible] from Egypt. I hope he will [illegible] the regrettable state of indiscipline in which the college has for so long been sunk.

27. Daud al Haidari, the Iraqi Minister in London, returned, together with his two step-daughters, to Bagdad on the 6th November. He intends to have a long rest; but it is not yet known whether he will resume his post in London or not. His Excellency and the two girls are loud in their admiration of the British people's war effort.

28. The reaction of Iraq to the [illegible] was one of [illegible] [illegible] Mr [illegible] comments [illegible]

29. An interesting British [illegible] Basra [illegible] this [illegible] [illegible] Arab [illegible] Twenty of the [illegible] Bedouin elected a [illegible] with [illegible] Arab deserting [illegible] to be expected [illegible] Regent [illegible] and the Iraq Government [illegible] has been [illegible] at Basra [illegible] been added.

30. There have been two sets of Iraqi army manœuvres in the period, the first in the north, when the Regent was present in camp for several days, and the other in the Muntafiq area and the Western Desert. General Renton appears to be satisfied with the efforts of the more junior officers and the men, but has been drastic in recommending the dismissal of inefficient commanders. The new Chief of the General Staff, General Sabih Saib, should prove an energetic director of the army's work.

31. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident, Middle East, to the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East, and to the Government of India; also to His Majesty's High Commissioner, Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

E 1531/1190/G] No. 4

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 4th March.)

No. 164.
(Telegraphic.) *Bagdad 4th March, 1940.*

IN my telegram No. 58 to Minister Resident I reported that the Regent made veiled reference to his possible resignation. I thought he was merely talking wildly and when I delivered Mr Churchill's message contained in telegram No. 13 from Cairo he did not give me the impression that such an idea was still in his mind. The Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that the Regent had also [illegible] in about resigning, but his Excellency did not take the matter seriously and asked me not to repeat the information.

2. His Royal Highness then went to Mosul for a week and when I saw him yesterday on his return he appeared cheerful and normal.

3. Last night, however, I entertained him at the embassy and on stepping into his car he handed me draft of letter which he said he was going to send to Iraqi Prime Minister to-day. In this document, which is colourless in tone, His Royal Highness [illegible] country has passed, the [illegible] the political situation which has [illegible], and concludes by [illegible] one in any way [illegible]

4. I [illegible] with His Royal Highness [illegible] me [illegible] who he proposed to take [illegible]

5. His Royal Highness said that he felt he [illegible] work in this country was [illegible] success. He was getting [illegible] help from responsible Iraqis [illegible] for the good of the country [illegible] He felt he was [illegible] failure or [illegible] was too [illegible] for him. He had [illegible] after the war was over, but omission to invite him to Cairo recently had led him to do so.

take the step now. It was obvious that His Majesty's Government did not rate him highly or attach much importance to Iraq now that the war was nearly over. A number of Iraqis had recently said to him that the British always cast away their friends when they were of no more use.

6. These last remarks annoyed me excessively and I jumped heavily on His Royal Highness. After reminding him that I had explained fully why he had no [illegible] bluntly that he was ungrateful for all the friendship which had been extended to him and that the generosity which was shown by His Majesty's Government [illegible] to the Iraqis in 1941 was almost unparalleled in view of how they had [illegible]. His Royal Highness hastened to retract by saying he did not agree with the remarks which had been made to him.

7. Returning to the main question, I told His Royal Highness that he could not discard his responsibilities. Existence of state of internal affairs which he had described should, if true, be incentive to him to put them right, not to run away. He must think of the consequences of such an action, both to the country and to the young King, of whom I knew he was very fond. He remarked gloomily that he expected the King would be dethroned in due course "with all these Communists about." I reminded him seriously that the war was not yet over and that conditions of security in Iraq, which was on our main line of communication to the Far East, were of direct interest to His Majesty's Government. It was true that the country was quiet, but that was because there was a firm hand in control. As he knew, there were many who wanted to relax the present discipline. All responsible Iraqis, and we ourselves, looked to him to rule. His resignation would come as a profound shock to the Iraqis. It would be a crippling blow to the stability of the State. It would inevitably be attributed to the British by all our enemies and might well be the cause of serious disorders in the country. I did not believe Parliament or the country would allow him to go in any case, but he would wantonly have destroyed everything that has been laboriously built up during the last four years. With these and other arguments I sought to deflect him from his purpose and to realise his responsibilities, but I could only succeed in making him promise to take no further action without seeing me first. He has made the same promise to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had audience with him later in the morning.

8. His Excellency and I have not yet decided whether His Royal Highness is merely suffering from inferiority complex of a weak man or whether he has been led astray. His Excellency inclines to the latter theory, but there is no evidence. There is no sensible reason for his attitude. He is on terms of friendship with many British people here, and his relations with me are most cordial. He does not like two of his Ministers, but there has been [illegible] rupture. He has greatly strengthened his position with Iraqi army [illegible] most of their exercises and, although Iraqis do not show great enth[illegible] not unpopular. There is no local reason for him to be upset and I am inclined [illegible] think this disappointing display of his frailties is not to be taken too serious[illegible] for that reason I mixed severity with encouragement in talking to him. M[illegible] for Foreign Affairs considers that the crisis is probably over for the m[illegible] that danger of some foolish action still exists. Fortunately, no one else knows about it at present, but both his Excellency and the Regent himself asked that I should inform you fully of what has passed to-day.

9. There is no satisfactory alternative to the Regent. Amir Abdullah is unpopular here. Amir Zaid would not inspire public confidence as the Regent and there is no material from which to form a good Regency Council. We have therefore, to keep to the Regent. I hope that his sense of responsibility will improve with time, but I would be failing in my duty if I did not point out that His Royal Highness was right in saying that there is a growing feeling that His M[illegible]esty's Government are treating Iraq with less sympathy than in the past. This country has given less trouble than most for the last three years, but it would be a great mistake to assume that this state of things will continue automatically. Experience has shown that Iraq can be the most troublesome country in the Middle East if its problems are not treated with understanding.

E 1531/1190 G]

Mr Eden to Sir K. Cornwallis (Bagdad).

(No 115.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, 5th March, 1945.*

YOUR telegram No. 164.

I entirely approve the firm manner in which you dealt with the Regent's threat of resignation. I hope that your words will arouse in him a stronger sense of his responsibilities and that his mood of depression will pass.

2. If you think that it would serve any useful purpose, you may tell him that I was much disturbed by your report that he was contemplating possibility of resignation, and that I fully endorse what you said to him about the grave consequences to his country and to the Arabs in general which such a step would entail.

3. You may add, if you think fit, some reference to the interest with which His Majesty's Government have followed the progress of the Cairo discussions on Arab unity; and you may also add that I look forward to meeting the Iraq delegation at San Francisco, where they will be able to make a valuable contribution to the great work of reconstruction which the United Nations have now to undertake.

CHAPTER III.—PERSIA.

(A) Miscellaneous.

[E 39 24, 34] No. 6.

M. Gousev to Mr. Eden.—(Received 29th December.)

(No. 4125-A.)

Sir,

M. le Ministre, *Soviet Embassy, 29th December, 1944.*

WITH reference to the notes of Sir A. Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador in Moscow, dated the 2nd and 20th November, on the subject of Iran, I have the honour, by direction of the Soviet Government, to inform you as follows:—

In September the Soviet Government despatched to Iran a Government commission headed by M. S. I. Kavtaradze, Deputy People's Commissar for [illegible] Soviet Union of an oil concession in the northern regions of Iran. The terms of the proposed agreement, which the Soviet Government contemplated concluding with the Government of Iran on this subject, were very profitable and favourable to Iran, and naturally in nowise infringed the sovereignty [illegible] independence of the latter. It was intended at the same time to take [illegible] consideration any wishes from the Iranian side and to initiate the practice [illegible] discussion of the terms of an agreement in the spirit of friendship and alliance existing between the two countries.

At the outset of the discussions M. Saed, the head of the Iranian Government, declared himself favourably disposed towards the Soviet proposals. On this basis the Soviet commission commenced their preparatory labours connected with the discussions. A month later, however, the attitude of M. Saed's Government altered under the influence of pressure behind the scenes, and M. Saed unexpectedly returned to the Soviet commission a refusal to grant the concession. The Government of M. Saed did not even attempt to become acquainted with the Soviet terms for the concession, which, as the Soviet Government expected, would be examined by the representatives of both sides under conditions of free discussion and consideration of mutual interests.

Thus M. Saed's Government carried on the negotiations in a manner obviously disloyal to the Soviet party. This disloyal attitude on the part of M. Saed to the proposals of the Soviet Government, who were sincerely striving to discover means for the practical conclusion of an important economic agreement with Iran, which would harmonise with the interests of both countries and afford Iran considerable economic assistance, together with other facts affording evidence of the hostile attitude of M. Saed in a series of questions relating to Soviet-Iranian co-operation, could not fail to evoke a negative reaction from the public opinion and press of the Soviet Union.

As may be gathered from subsequent events in Iran, the hostile line adopted by [illegible] U.S.S.R. [illegible] and by many Iranian politicians and wide circles of public opinion in Iran.

Such are the facts of the case regarding the Soviet proposals for an oil concession in Iran. The Soviet Government consider it necessary to mention these facts in order that the British Government may be in possession of correct information on this question.

At the same time the Soviet Government cannot pass over the unfavourable attitude adopted by the British in relation to the Soviet-Iranian negotiations for an oil concession.

The Soviet Government are unable to agree with the contention that the grant of an oil concession to the Soviet Union can possibly affect the sovereignty of Iran. Should the validity of such arguments be acknowledged, they would apply first and foremost to Great Britain who, as is well known, has long held a substantial oil concession in Iran.

In the opinion of the Soviet Government, there are likewise no practical grounds for asserting that the question of the grant of an oil concession to the [illegible] to the post-war period. The former Government of M. Saed were unable to produce a single convincing argument in support of this contention.

The Soviet proposals for an oil concession in Iran do not in any way conflict with the treaty of alliance with Iran of 1942, or with the declaration made by

the three Powers in 1943 on the subject of Iran. On the contrary, the proposals are in complete harmony with the latter and the spirit of both the above-mentioned instruments, which, moreover, contemplated the necessity of the Allies according economic assistance to Iran. It is obvious that a favourable decision [illegible] to the further development of amicable Soviet-Iranian relations, and at the same time would be one of the methods for giving considerable economic assistance to Iran.

In this sense the Soviet proposals for a concession fully comply with the obligations which the Allies, and in particular the Soviet Government, undertook in regard to Iran, both in the treaty of alliance with that country and in the declaration of the three Powers regarding Iran.

The following additional considerations may be added:—

Early in December, concealed from public opinion and in conflict with Iranian constitutional rules, M. Saed, the former Prime Minister, in company with a certain Seid Zia ed Din, succeeded in getting a resolution adopted by the Majlis forbidding the members of the Iranian Government to enter into negotiations with any party on the subject of oil concessions.

In this connexion M. S. I. Kavtaradze, the Deputy People's Commissar, visited the new Prime Minister of Iran and, by direction of the Soviet Government, made a declaration containing the statement that, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, the above-mentioned resolution regarding oil concessions ought to be reconsidered, as it had been adopted under the influence of the intrigues of hostile elements, such as Saed, Seid Zia ed Din and others. Besides this, the said resolution is inconsistent with the fact that a large oil concession [illegible] held by a foreign Power exists on Iranian territory. Having made this declaration M. S. I. Kavtaradze returned to Moscow.

In informing the Government of Great Britain of the foregoing, the Soviet Government consider it necessary to state that in the matter of an oil concession in Iran they adhere to the position set forth in the present note and in particular in the above mentioned declaration made by M. S. I. Kavtaradze, the Deputy [illegible]ple's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the new Prime Minister of Iran.

I have &c.

F. T. GOUSEV.

[E 39 24, 34] No. 7.

Mr. Eden to M. Sobolev.

Sir, *Foreign Office, 20th January, 1945.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to M. Gousev's note, No. 4125-A of the 29th December last, regarding the Persian Government's attitude towards the Soviet Government's application for an oil concession in Northern Persia, and to request you to communicate to your Government the following reply.

2. His Majesty's Government are well aware of the decision taken by the Persian Government not to grant any new oil concessions in Persia so long as the Allied troops are stationed in Persian territory. Indeed, this decision was communicated not only to the Soviet Government's representative, but also to the representatives of a British oil company and of certain United States oil companies which had applied for concessions in South Persia some time before [illegible] forbidding the Persian Government to enter into any negotiations regarding the grant of concessions to foreign Governments or companies.

3. It is clear that the Persian Government have adopted an identical attitude towards the applications made to them by the Soviet, United States and British interests concerned, and His Majesty's Government feel that it is desirable for our three Governments to endeavour to agree upon a common policy to be pursued in this connexion. The letters addressed by His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow to M. Molotov on the 2nd and 20th November, 1944, to which his Excellency referred, were intended to help towards the formulation of this common policy.

4. I note that in the Soviet Government's view the terms which they intended to propose to the Persian Government were very favourable and profitable to Persia. The position, however, is that the Persian Government are not in fact willing to negotiate any concession for oil at least during the present abnormal war situation, and it does not appear likely, especially in view of the law of the 2nd December, that they will be ready to reverse this decision. His Majesty's Government, who were anxious that the British company concerned should, if possible, obtain the oil concession for which they had applied, naturally had no interest in the passage of such a law and can only regret that the persistence of the Soviet Government's representatives in pressing their demands after the Persian attitude had been made known should apparently have provoked the Majlis into passing this restrictive legislation.

5. In taking the decisions referred to above, the Persian Government and the Persian Parliament were no doubt acting as they thought would best serve the interests of their country, and it does not seem necessary to draw the conclusion that they were actuated by motives of hostility towards the Allied Powers. As an independent sovereign State, Persia has the undeniable right to grant or to withhold, as she may judge to be most advantageous to herself, concessions for the exploitation of her mineral resources.

6. These considerations have led His Majesty's Government to conclude [illegible] they must accept the [illegible] although they have made it clear that, should there be any change in Persian policy, they hope that the proposals of the interested British company will be favourably considered and form the basis of future negotiations. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government do not intend to take any further action to induce the Persian Government or the Persian Parliament to adopt a less negative attitude.

7. Any other course, if it involved an attempt to bring pressure to bear on the Persian Government and the Persian Parliament to alter their decisions, would be open to strong objection. His Majesty's Government take the view with which they trust that the Soviet Government will agree, that pressure against Persia of any kind would not be in accordance with the undertakings assumed by the parties to the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of Alliance and the Tehran Declaration of December 1943 as regards the maintenance of the [illegible]

8. As [illegible] willing to [illegible] upon other [illegible]

9. [illegible]

I have, &c.
C. W. BAXTER.

E 492 20 34 — No. 8

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran)

(No. [illegible])

Foreign Office, 22nd January, 1945

Sir,

His [illegible] Acting Chief Secretary of State on the 16th January to discuss the present position in his country.

2. M. Taqizadeh said that he had received instructions from his Government to bring the facts before His Majesty's Government so that the latter might have them in mind in the event of a meeting of the three Heads of Governments in the near future.

3. His Excellency said that Russian pressure in Northern Persia was steadily increasing. The Soviet [illegible] forces

to enter the region where they were in control, and the Russians could terrorise the population into making such manifestations as they themselves desired. They were also pressing for the repeal of the recent oil concession law, but it was impossible for the Persian Government to agree to this. Generally, the Persian Government were determined to maintain firmly the position which they had so far held. The Ambassador declared that he could not understand the motives behind the Soviet action. It could not really be the need for oil. He said that he had recently read a translation of an extract from an article in *War and the Working Class*, in which it was said that Russia herself did not need the oil, but wished to deny it to the Americans and British.

4. The Ambassador enquired whether His Majesty's Government would be prepared at the forthcoming meeting to put the Persian case and endeavour to secure that Soviet policy should conform to the Tripartite Treaty and to the Tehran Declaration of 1943.

5. Sir A. Cadogan told the Ambassador that if and when a meeting took place, he expected that we should be disposed to raise the question.

I am, &c.
ANTHONY EDEN.

E 908 31 34 — No. 9

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 7th February.)

(No. 21)

Sir,

Tehran, 23rd January, 1945

WITH reference to my despatch No. 401 of the 18th October, I have the honour to convey to you herein a report on Persian affairs during the months of October, November and December, 1944.

Internal Politics and the Oil Dispute with the Soviet Union

2. At the beginning of October Sa'id's Cabinet continued to enjoy the [illegible] the Ittahadi Mills, which towards the end of August had combined to form a Government majority, still continued to hold together, although there were signs [illegible] articles in the press. The Government and Millspaugh were studying the problem [illegible] the Allies. On the 1st October article 12 of the Compulsory Education Bill, providing for an increase in teachers' salaries, for an expansion in the provision of [illegible] Majlis. Steps taken by Surur, the Minister of the Interior, to remove the worst criminals out of Tehran to prisons in the south were approved in the press and [illegible] good start by dealing successfully with a strike among municipal workers. A [illegible] the support of the press for the Government took the form of frequent invita[illegible] the activities of their departments. As a result, the Government was free for a brief period, from the usual violent attacks in the press.

3. These events were, however, soon overshadowed by a Russian demand [illegible] an oil concession in North Persia. Kavtaradze, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, who had been in Persia for about two weeks, had informed the Shah [illegible] the 1st October that the Soviet Government sought permission to explore for oil over almost the whole of North Persia during a period of five years, after which [illegible] exploration area were 216,000 square kilometres and for the concession area a maximum of 150,000 square kilometres). Kavtaradze further informed His Majesty that he had already approached the Persian Government, whom he found slow to move, and intimated that the Russian Government were not satisfied with Soviet-Persian relations and that the future of Russo-Persian economic relations might depend on the Persian reply to the Russian demand.

4. The news that the Russians were seeking an oil concession was given to the public on the 5th October, when the newspaper *Ittila'at* published an interview on the subject with Kavtaradze. Much anxiety had for some time been felt

by Persians in Tehran at Soviet penetration in North Persia. The news that they now wanted an extensive oil concession caused widespread alarm, and the controversy it aroused in Persian political circles put other issues into the background for the rest of the year.

5. The Russians immediately began pulling all possible wires to influence Persian opinion and were supported by a section of the press. The Shah however informed His Majesty's Ambassador on the 8th October that the Russian demand for oil rights in the north would be refused, and a few days later Sa'id informed Kavtaradze that the Government had decided early in September to postpone until after the war the question of granting oil concessions. This [illegible] that there might be unpleasant consequences, while acceptance would be most advantageous to the [illegible] the support of the Soviet Government at the Peace Conference. There was little doubt, however, that the decision represented the will of the Persian people. At a secret session of the Majlis only one Deputy, Taimurtash, son of the former Minister of Court who was elected to the Majlis with Russian help, spoke in favour of the Russian request. Even the Tudeh members, who were for the Russians, at first showed embarrassment, because some weeks earlier, when it was only a question of British or American requests for concessions, they themselves had recommended that no concession be given till after the war.

6. The Persian Government's decision was followed by a violent campaign in the pro-Russian press against Sa'id whom they accused of being opposed to Russian interests and of adopting a one sided policy. They argued that the balance in foreign relations upset by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concession in the south must be restored by giving the Russians a concession in the north. It was even said that as Russia did not need more oil her demand was prompted solely by the altruistic desire to help Persia by developing her resources and pro[illegible] on the side of the Government in this dispute but as public opposition to the grant of a concession gradually hardened a number of them plucked up courage and began to oppose the Russian demand, in spite of the fact that the editors of the first three papers to do so were threatened by the Russians. In some quarters, however, it was feared that Sa'id might have to resign in the face of the violent Russian opposition and Taqizadeh, Persian Ambassador in London now on a [illegible] to Tehran was mentioned as a successor. The Shah, indeed, was said to be [illegible] number of conferences to discuss Persia's post war problems, returned to Lon[illegible]

7. [illegible] the Majlis explaining and [illegible] taken, there was [illegible] ed every form of pressure and intensified their war of nerves. They allowed no grain to be moved to Tehran on the Northern Railways. They interrupted telegraphic communication with Tabriz for a few days. On the 22nd October lorry loads of armed Russian troops were seen in the streets and in particular near the Majlis. Deputies were subjected to pressure. Violent attacks on the Prime Minister continued, and in a broadcast from Tehran which purported to be by the Persian Soviet Cultural Society, the Soviet Embassy broadcast the Soviet point of view in a most violent form. Moscow radio and papers proclaimed that the Persian Government's decision was not based on public opinion and that the Persian press was in favour of the Russian demand for a concession. Sa'id and his supporters were, of course, described as Fascists. Finally, the story was put about that the Russians considered that their relations with Sa'id's Government [illegible] of the deadlock, but the Majlis remained solidly behind him and the Shah was as yet opposed to his resignation.

8. On the 24th October Kavtaradze gave an interview to the Tehran press, in which, after describing in vague terms the advantages to Persia of granting a concession to the Russians, he stated that Sa'id had originally signified complete agreement and promised his help, but that his subsequent refusal had strained relations between Persia and Russia. Sa'id's reply to this was that in the talks to which Kavtaradze referred only the Khourian oil business had been mentioned. In reply to a question put by one of the journalists as to the conditions offered by [illegible] He thereby confirmed the statement of M. Sa'id that M. Kavtaradze had insisted on the concession being granted in principle without consideration of any conditions

except the areas demanded by the Soviet Government first for exploration and then for development.

9. On the 27th October a demonstration [illegible] the police was [illegible] in the street of [illegible] was [illegible] to disperse [illegible] police was [illegible] was [illegible] [illegible] Military [illegible] that three persons in the streets [illegible] Minister also issued a statement to the press giving a complete reply to the statement issued by Kavtaradze on the 24th October. Trouble was now reported from Tabriz, Resht, Isfahan and Sultanabad. In Tabriz the mob tried to rush the police headquarters and was fired on, one man being killed and several wounded. Russian troops intervened and prevented the Persian police and military from interfering with the mob. The officer commanding the Persian troops was given twenty four hours to leave the town. At Resht the shops were closed and the Persian police were similarly prevented from dispersing the crowd. In Isfahan and Sultanabad, where there are no Russian troops, the demonstrations were small and soon dispersed without incident.

10. All the efforts of the Russians to incite the press and the Tudeh to agitate in their favour served only to show that public opinion was opposed to the grant of this concession and was being antagonised and disillusioned by the [illegible] to ensure that only Moscow's partisan account of the matter should reach the outside world. They not only stopped any press telegrams giving an objective opinion, but suppressed the official Persian version which M. Sa'id tried to telegraph to Persian representatives in London, Washington and elsewhere, first in [illegible] however, the Persian Government's version of the matter eventually reached the newspapers abroad. As a result of the publicity which the dispute had now acquired, Russian propaganda began to shift its ground. Sa'id was attacked not so much for refusing the concession as for upsetting Russo-Persian relations and he was accused of trying to establish in Persia a base for Fascist aggression against Russia, and the facts were falsified so as to appear to justify Russian indignation.

11. Nevertheless, in spite of public support of Sa'id and the Government, a number of deputies began to find the strain intolerable and the opinion in the Majlis was gaining ground that Sa'id should resign, as a sop to the Russians. The various fractions in parliament began to hold meetings to discuss Sa'id's [illegible] In this, he went over a lot of old history and criticised the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concession but finished by advising the Government not to give a concession to the Russians but to form a Persian or an international company to exploit the Northern oilfields and sell the surplus oil.

12. By the 3rd November there seemed to be a slight *détente* in the crisis and it was said that the Russians were prepared to drop their demand for a concession. The Russians permitted the transport of grain to Tehran to be resumed on the Northern railways and the Russian censor passed oil crisis tele[illegible] but pressure on Sa'id to resign was intensified. The cam[illegible] the Russian sponsored press increased in violence and on the 6th November Moscow radio broadcast in Persian "a national protest against the Government of Sa'id," giving reports of alleged mass meetings throughout Persia against his reactionary Government. The Government also had to take steps to suppress another Tudeh demonstration on the 7th November by sending troops to occupy their premises and by arresting some of their leaders. Sa'id was by now receiving information by indirect means from the Russians that if he resigned they would drop their demand for a [illegible]

November invited some twenty deputies representing all sections of the Majlis to a meeting and told them [illegible]

13. Finally, on the 10th November Sa'id resigned. The Shah informed His Majesty's Ambassador that Sa'id's resignation had been accepted for fear lest the Russians should resort to extreme measures such as instigating a separatist movement in Azerbaijan. For some days after Sa'id's resignation Majlis discussion continued to centre round the nomination of Dr. Musaddiq. On the 14th November the deputies voted almost unanimously for Dr. Musaddiq, but almost equally unanimously against accepting his condition that special legislation be passed authorising him to resume his seat in parliament if he had to resign from the premiership at any time before the end of the 14th Majlis. The [illegible] Minister, and it was not until the 20th November that Mustafa Quli Bayat was elected Prime Minister with fifty votes against forty-five given to Sadiq Sadiqi. Until the last moment the favourite was Sami'i, formerly a diplomat but now a Court official, but he withdrew and Bayat was apparently chosen, in spite of his defects, as an alternative to Sadiq Sadiqi, who had been heard recommending compliance with Russian demands.

14. Bayat presented his Cabinet to the Shah on the 25th November and to the Majlis the next day. Two of the new Ministers, Khalil Fahimi, Minister [illegible] in Sa'id's Government. With the exception of Nadir Amateb, the new Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, all the new men had previously held Cabinet rank. Nasrullah Intizam was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs after Muhsin Rais, Persian Ambassador in Bagdad, had refused the post. Kerim Hidayat became Minister of Commerce, Amanullah Ardalan, Minister of Finance, Dr. Isa Sadiq, Minister of Education, Ibrahim Zand, Minister of War, Dr. Said Malik, Minister of Health; Mustafa Adl, Minister of Justice, and Ali Akbar Siasi Minister without Portfolio. On the whole the new Cabinet was thought to be a fairly good one.

15. On the 2nd December a new turn was given to the oil dispute when Dr. Musaddiq tabled a bill in the Majlis making it illegal for any Persian Government to give an oil concession to any foreign Government or company, but authorising the Prime Minister or Ministers to discuss the sale of oil or the manner in which the Government should undertake the exploitation and administration of its oil resources, and to inform the Majlis. The bill was passed immediately. The Tudeh deputies were completely nonplussed by this new development and asked for time to collect their fraction and discuss the bill but were refused. The next day Rahimian, deputy for Kuchan, tried to bring forward a bill to cancel the Anglo-Iranian oil concession but could find no backers and [illegible] seventy two to nine with sixteen abstentions.

16. In the Majlis itself the coalition of the three fractions, the Mihan, the Ittihad-i Milli and the Azadi did not survive the crisis which led to Sa'id's resignation. The Azadi group had disintegrated until by the end of December it contained only seven to eight members. Two new fractions composed of ex-Azadi members and a number of independents were reported to be taking shape during December. These were the Mustaqil group which claimed about seventeen members, and the Democrats, said to number about twelve. The attitude these two new fractions intend to adopt remains to be seen. During the period under review the Majlis passed the credentials of a number of deputies from the North who had been elected with Russian help. The credentials of Mujtahid [illegible] for Tabriz and of Ovanessian, deputy for the Northern Armenians and a former member of the Tudeh party, were passed on the 15th October. Those of Ipekchian and Lankarani, both creatures of the Russians, were passed early in December. Lankarani was elected by a particularly shameless exercise of Russian influence. The pro-Government majority in the Majlis, which had long obstructed the acceptance of these Russian-sponsored deputies, had finally deemed it unwise, in view of the crisis in Russo-Persian relations, to maintain their opposition. The credentials of four other deputies were also passed during this period: those of I'timad Toulieh, deputy for Rey, of Murad Aryeh, member for the Jews, of Pur Reza, deputy for Firuzabad; and of Muhammad Hussein Qashgai, who had recently been elected deputy for Abadeh.

17. The Tehran press was divided by the oil crisis into two violently anti-Russian groups, the Freedom Front and the [illegible] Front. The former, consisting of newspapers which receive money, paper and promises of future help from the Russians, violently [illegible] Sa'id was to be forced into the oil concession and continued to attack him after his resignation. They also

attacked the ruling classes whom they accused of being the instruments of reaction and imperialism. Seyid Zia, who is a particular object of their hatred, was said to have been brought back by his "masters" from Palestine to prepare another *coup d'Etat*. Taqizadeh was also said to have returned from London with some sinister scheme in connection with the oil question. Towards the end of the period under review some of the Freedom Front papers were comparing conditions in Persia to conditions in Greece and Belgium and were alleging that a fight was going on all over the world between the proletariat and the ruling classes. Meanwhile, however, the number of papers which opposed the Russian demand for a concession had increased until in December they formed an Independence Front in opposition to the Freedom Front. Ra'd Imruz, one of the principal papers of the Independence Front, published on the 21st December a very outspoken "declaration" on the crisis by Seyid Zia, containing a reasoned criticism of Russian policy and methods in Persia which caused a great impression and sent Seyid Zia's stock up considerably.

18. Kavtaradze left Tehran for Moscow on the 9th December but he had previously informed the Prime Minister of the Soviet Government's displeasure at the Oil Bill which, he said, the Majlis would do well to reconsider. Meanwhile Russian propaganda was intensified among all classes and even in the schools. There were further Tudeh demonstrations in Maragheh, Shahpur and Tabriz and trouble in a factory in Shahi where some workmen were reported to have been killed. The year ended in an atmosphere of growing uneasiness and uncertainty as regards Russian intentions in North Persia where they had already begun to exercise a considerable measure of direct political control.

Soviet Affairs

19. In connexion with the oil dispute, this embassy suggested to the Foreign Office that discussions should be held as to the possibility of withdrawing British forces at least from Tehran as soon as war material and goods despatched to the Soviet Union from overseas were diverted to some other route in Persia. There [illegible] of aviation spirit from Abadan to the Soviet Union until the middle of 1945, the fact that the presence of Royal Air Force personnel in Tehran enabled the British authorities concerned to maintain their connexion with the Persian Air Force and aircraft factory and to supply the necessary technical services for the British Airways line to Tehran. On the other hand, withdrawal offered several advantages: (1) if the British evacuated Tehran, the Soviet authorities must either do the same or expose themselves as less considerate than the British; (2) the evacuation of Tehran by the foreign troops would in itself strengthen the Persian Government; (3) if the touchiness of the Soviet authorities was due in part to the suspicion of British motives (as it probably was) an offer on our part to evacuate Tehran and perhaps other places, might help to calm them down, even if at first they did attribute the offer to a wish to remove Soviet influence from the capital. His Majesty's [illegible] number of cases actions which [illegible] profound suspicion in the Soviet mind, *e.g.*, attempts made by British parties during the first year of occupation to enter the Soviet "zone" to make surveys or reconnaissances. Moreover, the defenders of the Soviet Government's demand for an oil concession represented it as prompted by the manœuvre of capitalist concession hunters in Persia. However mistaken, and even dishonest, Soviet accusations in such matters might be, His Majesty's Government should consider seriously all possible causes of suspicion with a view to their elimination or diminution wherever possible. (Possible innocent causes of Soviet suspicion are the continued maintenance by the British authorities of the 300 mile road from Zahidan to Kerman and the 600 mile road from Zahidan to Meshed and the completion of the Kerman aerodrome, although aid to Russia by the East Persia route has ceased and the danger of a German attack from the Caucasus has passed.)

Anglo-Soviet-Persian Censorship

20. Our difficulties with the Soviet authorities over the political censorship of books and periodicals continued and, indeed, increased during the period under review. In spite of reminders the Soviet Ambassador did not reply to the protest sent by Mr. Lascelles on the subject in September, and the Soviet censor extended his activities against British publications. Previously he had been opening parcels addressed to the British Council and to booksellers, c/o the Public

Relations Bureau, British Embassy. Early in December, however, the Soviet censor complained that the Public Relations Bureau were selling at their premises [illegible] he would examine all parcels addressed to the Public Relations Bureau direct. This embassy thereupon requested the British censor to inform his Soviet colleague that the publications in question would be withdrawn, but at the same time to [illegible] Relations Bureau, which was an integral part of the embassy and covered by [illegible] privilege. The Soviet censor, [illegible] requested the British censor to express [illegible] as the latter continued this practice, the [illegible] addressed to the Soviet Trade Delegation (who are the main channel through which Russian publications are put on the Persian market and for whom the Soviet authorities claim diplomatic privilege). At the same time the British censor was to reiterate the suggestion that both parties should cease to conduct political censorship.

21. The question now arises whether the British organisations concerned should or should not put on the Persian market copies of publications condemned by the Soviet censor, which reach them by channels not liable to censorship (*e.g.* by diplomatic bag). This embassy expressed the view to the Foreign Office that the Public Relations Bureau should not sell such publications in their own shops, but it seemed a pity to forbid their distribution to private booksellers, as the Soviet censor had by now condemned a wide range of publications, mostly on [illegible] grounds, and many of them standard works. The instructions of His Majesty's Government on this point are awaited.

22. The American Embassy in turn are now worried at the large proportion of American newspapers and periodicals which fail to reach American subscribers in Persia, and they unofficially informed this embassy that they were thinking of reporting to their Government that this was presumably due to the Soviet censor. This embassy replied that they understood the anxiety of the American Embassy, and that, for reasons of their own, they would not regret it if the matter was brought to the attention of the United States Government.

23. The Soviet censor has slashed unmercifully the material [illegible] by the Polish Legation for broadcasting in the time allotted to them [illegible] so much so that often their p[illegible]. To restore the balance, the British censor was requested [illegible] objectionable material from the material submitted for broadcasting [illegible] sponsored Polish Patriots. The Soviet authorities countered this by [illegible] the whole of the Polish Patriots' mate[illegible] the [illegible]

Security

24. There are signs that the Soviet authorities are planning to use as agents some of the Persians interned for activities directed against the Allies.

25. The Persian internees are divided into those who are mainly a British and those who are mainly a Soviet concern. The British authorities allowed the Soviet authorities to take to Resht for interrogation two Persians on the British list, the Mullah Kashani, who is perhaps the most important and most dangerous of the Sultanabad internees, and Nautakht, who also played an important part in the plot against the Allies. It was noted with surprise that the Soviet officers who returned them to the British security authorities treated them with the greatest consideration, shaking hands with them and parting with them on the most friendly terms. Kashani expresses the greatest detestation of the Brit[illegible] and says openly that when he is released he will do us all the harm he can. He would make an ideal Soviet agent.

26. Neither side releases any internee without the concurrence of the other. The Soviet Embassy recently sent to this embassy their first list of internees whom they proposed to release. Among the names was that of General Aghevli, who at the time of his arrest was commanding the gendarmerie. For some time the Soviet security officers had been trying, without success, to persuade the British security officers that Aghevli had not taken any serious part in anti-Ally activities. The attitude of the British security officers was that both written [illegible] plot, and this, combined with his intelligence and his official position, made him a most dangerous enemy of the Allies. This embassy therefore felt bound to refuse his release, giving the above reasons, and adding that, if his name had not

been on the Soviet list, we should have put him on ours. There is no doubt that the Soviets expect assistance from Aghevli if he is released, in return for their unexpected and undeserved leniency.

27. A number of the less important Persians on the British list of suspects have been released, with Soviet consent, during the period under review. Piqued, however, by our refusal to release General Aghevli, the Soviet Embassy refused to allow this embassy to release four unimportant suspects, alleging that they were highly dangerous. This embassy replied that, in view of the Soviet [illegible] the opportunity of pointing out that it would not have submitted their names to the Soviet Embassy if the British security authorities had not previously ascertained from the Soviet security authorities that there was no objection from the Soviet side to their release; it was unfortunate that the Soviet security authorities had failed apparently, to keep their embassy fully informed in this matter.

"Aid to Russia."

28. The assembly of United States aeroplanes for the Soviet Union at Abadan ceased at the end of November. The assembly of British aeroplanes [illegible] and at Shaiba but on a very reduced scale.

29. The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and the [illegible] Army Motor Transport Service ceased lifting "Aid to Russia" cargo during the period under review. The United States trucks are being transferred to other war theatres. Transport of freight through Persia for "Aid to Russia" is now confined to the railway, except for such freight as can be carried in trucks assembled in the south for the Soviet army.

30. On the 15th December, 1944, the United States truck assembly plant for imported cased motor transport was closed down and the plant and equipment was dismantled and is now *en route* to the Soviet Union for re-erection in a Black Sea port, preparatory to the opening up of direct shipping from the United States to Black Sea ports. The only truck assembly plant now working is the United States plant at Khorramshahr, and the output from this has been raised to 5,000 imported trucks per month. There are enough cased motor transport on hand and *en route* to keep output at this rate until the end of April, when this plant will be available for transfer elsewhere. With effect from the 1st January the British Army vehicle assembly plant at Rafidya will no longer be required to assemble cased motor transport for the Soviet Union.

31. From the 1st January, 1945, the port of Bandar Shapur will not be utilised for discharging "Aid to Russia" cargoes as the number of ships is now so limited that Khorramshahr can easily handle and despatch all "Aid to Russia" cargo now arriving. February 1945 is the latest month in which United States "Aid to Russia" ships will arrive in the Persian Gulf. They will thereafter proceed to Black Sea ports. It would appear that from the 1st March, [illegible] ships entering the Persian Gulf with "Aid to Russia" cargoes will [illegible] ships from Ind[illegible].

32. A considerable numbe[illegible] operational personnel are now being despatched [illegible]

33. The supply of motor spirit to the Soviet Union from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company refineries at Abadan ceased in November, but the supply of aviation spirit will continue till the end of June 1945.

[illegible]

34. In the course of their talks with the State Department regarding the Soviet oil crisis, His Majesty's Embassy in Washington reported that Mr. Wallace [illegible] preoccupied with the fear of Soviet penetration in the Balkans and the Middle East, and his views about the Soviet Union were increasing his desire to co-operate with the British on every issue and in particular to consult with the British in advance on all matters and to concert action.

34a. At the end of December Brigadier General Booth took over from Lieutenant General Conolly the command of the American Persian Gulf Command.

American Advisory Mission

(a) *Millspaugh Mission*

35. The oil crisis very much overshadowed the Millspaugh crisis during the period under review and there were fewer attacks upon Dr. Millspaugh. This

was also partly due to the improvement in the economic situation. Much of this progress was due to the course of the war, though Dr Millspaugh claimed the credit in an open letter which he sent to the Prime Minister early in October. In this letter he stated that everything possible had been done to secure adequate quotas for imports, that prices were falling, that monopoly goods were being distributed, that road transport had improved, that a large stock of grain was in hand and that revenue had increased. He added, however, that as the special powers in economic matters conferred on him by the Majlis were held by some to conflict with the Constitution he intended in future to act in economic as in financial matters, *i.e.*, under the supervision of the Minister of Finance.

36. Dr Millspaugh, however, spoilt whatever effect this letter might have had by sending at the same time a letter M. Ibtihaj, the Governor of the National Bank, dismissing him from his office. M. Ibtihaj, a clever but very arrogant and bad tempered man, had for some time been attacking Dr. Millspaugh, whom with the assistance of M. Saïd and of the Shah, he tried to unseat during a visit to the United States as Persian delegate to the Bretton Woods Conference. The Persian Cabinet decided that Dr Millspaugh had no power to dismiss Dr Ibtihaj and Dr Millspaugh countered by writing to all the banks informing them that Dr Ibtihaj's signature should not be recognised. This violent action had no effect, M. Ibtihaj remains in his post and the affair has so far constituted a defeat for Dr Millspaugh.

37. In December the new Prime Minister found himself under strong pressure from his supporters among the Deputies to get rid of Dr Millspa[illegible] or to rescind his special powers. After [illegible] between the Prime Minister and Dr Millspaugh a Bill was presented to the Majlis revoking the exceptional powers under which he administered economic affairs, he would, however, still retain his original powers in financial matters. This Bill had not been passed by the end of the year as the Deputies were unable to reach a decision as to who should inherit the economic powers.

38. Although the Prime Minister would be glad to get rid of Dr Millspaugh altogether, he appears anxious to keep the rest of the Millspaugh Mission, and His Majesty's Government have instructed this embassy to do everything possible to secure their retention. Meanwhile that stubborn old gentleman seems to have given up any idea he had of resigning in February.

(b) *Military Mission.*

39. General Ridley has gone to America. From confidential sources it is known that he is to discuss the future of the American Military Mission whose contracts expire this spring, and to arrange for the shipment of equipment for the Persian army. There is a general lack of enthusiasm among the officers of his mission, a feeling that there is little that they can achieve. They have, in fact, improved the supply and transport arrangements of the Persian Army, but their control ceases as soon as issues leave the depots. Even so, a greater proportion does perhaps reach the man in the ranks than reached him two years ago.

(c) *Gendarmerie Mission.*

40. The State Department succeeded in persuading the War Department in [illegible] Persian Government to dispose their police. They did not, however, feel justified in proposing the matter to the Persian Government; the latter, either of their own accord or at British prompting, must make a definite request that Colonel Schwartzkopf should take over the police as well as the gendarmerie, and that additional American officers should be engaged to train the former. His Majesty's Government instructed this embassy to impress on the Persian Government the importance of acting quickly in the matter. Approaches to the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior have, however, produced no result so far. It may be that the known hostility of the Russians in the presence of American advisers in Persia makes the police unwilling to add to the number of such advisers when Persia is already being accused by Russia and the pro-Russian Persian press of following a "one-sided" policy.

Anglo-Persian Public Relations.

41. The British and American attitude in readily accepting the Persian Government's decision to postpone consideration of the granting of oil concessions until after the war has reflected to our credit by comparison with the aggressive reaction of the Russians. The increased fear of Russian post-war designs on

Persia caused by this has not been balanced by any great reliance upon Britain's ability to restrain them. It has rather resulted in a general desire to be rid of all foreign interference in and control over local affairs. The decrease in the activities of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation has not attracted much attention, and public opinion looks forward to the end of the war for a more general relaxation of all foreign control such as that exercised by the Middle East Supply Centre over local imports.

42. The Persian press has continued to report favourably upon Allied successes and, in spite of being very much occupied with reporting local problems, has devoted just as much space as formerly to the war. The Greek situation has been much commented upon from both points of view.

British Propaganda Activities.

43. A slight increase in the sales of the *Tehran Daily News*, published by the Public Relations Bureau, was noted during the last three months. The continued and growing success of the *Children's Newspaper*, published in Persian, has aroused a certain amount of comment in the Persian press probably caused by a feeling of envy that their own publications have not achieved the same measure of popularity amongst their own people.

44. The showing of Ministry of Information newsreels in public cinemas throughout Persia has suffered on account of the strike of the Tehran cinemas which have remained closed for some six or seven weeks as a protest against new municipal taxes. The Films Section of the Public Relations Bureau is, however, more active than ever, operating seven touring cinema vans and nine portable 16 mm. projectors in British Council Institutes and local colleges and schools, in addition to its own Tehran Newsreel Theatre where free educational programmes are shown to school-children twice every morning during term time. There is a constantly growing demand for film shows from all varieties and classes of Persian associations. British feature films have hitherto been [illegible] in December the first important sale of British films was completed by the Public Relations Bureau with contracts placed for twenty four film[illegible].

45. His Majesty's consulates continue to be fed with publicity material for distribution although this is hampered by the arbitrary holding up of apparently innocuous material by the Russian censors. It is remarked that there are increasing requests for new reading rooms in the provinces. The Irano-Soviet Cultural Society is trying to increase its influence in the provinces by methods which are not always popular.

46. This embassy has had under review the question of broadcasting in foreign languages from Tehran Radio. This embassy and various other Allied Missions in Tehran each have short periods allotted to them every week for propaganda broadcasts. It was in any case clear that this was one of the first propaganda activities which this embassy would have to close down when things began to return to normal in Persia, certain other [illegible] Netherlands Legation and the French deleg[illegible] their own bro[illegible] [illegible] 2nd March [illegible] Persia. New Y[illegible]

[illegible]

47. In October an Indo-Iranian Cultural Society was formed in Tehran and was given its official baptism on the 17th at a public meeting which was attended by the Persian Prime Minister and His Majesty's representative and leading Persian educationalists. By [illegible] the statutes [illegible] of the society were also [illegible] and a Managing Committee of fourteen chosen, *i.e.* —

(1) Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(2) Persian Minister for Education.
(3) The Chancellor of the Tehran University.
(4) The head of the Persian College of Arts.
(5) The representative of the British Council in Persia.

(6) One representative of the British Embassy (the Government of India counsellor)
(7) The attaché for Indian affairs.
(8) The Indian Trade Commissioner; and
(9) Six prominent savants of Persia approved by the Minister of Education.

The society meets weekly and is at present busy trying to find Persian lads capable of taking up the seventeen scholarships generously offered by the Govern- [illegible] Forest Rangers course in Dehra Dun, and (4) five at the Delhi Polytechnic (three in engineering and two in textiles). [illegible] should be sent to India unless his knowledge of English is really sufficient to enable him to follow the course, and partly because there is much anti Indian prejudice to be overcome.

48. The four Indian teachers of English have just reached Meshed (2) [illegible] great demand for their services in Persian schools, and also in private classes and for individual tuition. On the success of these four teachers depends the question of obtaining more Indian trained teachers of English to supplement the excellent work being done by the British Council.

49. Major Hasan of the Indian Army has been selected to be the first [illegible] in India before taking over [illegible] for him have been rested in [illegible]

50. The British In[illegible] that they would like to enter [illegible] and civil Indian Troops [illegible] in their own houses or in the Indian Young M[illegible] These parties are purposely kept small in order that the personal aspect should be maintained and have been a great success. A Fund is contemplated in order to cover large-scale entertainment on certain Indian religious festivals and holidays.

51. The Government of India continue to interest themselves in post-war propaganda in Persia as is shown by their generous offer of seventeen scholar- [illegible] another at [illegible] are also being made whether an Indian film company could operate in Persia.

British Military Interests

52. Thanks partly to better co operation from the Persian authorities, the [illegible] of great inconvenience to the Allied military authorities. It still continues, an [illegible] improvement may result from the application of military government law [illegible] committed on the railway and on roads used by Allied troops. This will allow of the more speedy trial of offenders and the award of more severe sentences than are permissible under the ordinary law.

Persian Forces

53. *The Army.*—The army remains handicapped by shortage of funds [illegible] hand to mouth on monthly credits on the scale of 1/12th of the previous year's budget. An additional credit of 15 million tomans, particularly for the purpose of increasing the pay of officers, was sanctioned by the Majlis in October but Dr. Millspaugh has not yet made the funds available. In spite of this morale of the lower ranks has slightly improved, the troops are generally a little better fed, a little less ragged; the condition of animals in Tehran has markedly improved and there is now sufficient transport for the distribution of supplies and of [illegible] further [illegible] have met with a success which has done something to restore the army's confidence in itself. But political intrigues, personal ambitions, dissensions among officers, favouritism, and the always existing uncertainty that arises from the ambiguous positions of the Shah and the Ministry of War in relation to the army, all combine to prevent the consistent execution of a practical policy to reform. Tudeh party

propaganda has recently been directed towards junior officers and non-commissioned officers urging them not to allow themselves to be used as tools of the reactionaries, particularly in the suppression of the legitimate aspirations of their oppressed brothers, inciting them against the exploitation of their corrupt seniors and encouraging them to become politically educated and politically minded. As this propaganda is generally believed to be inspired by the Soviet Authorities, it is not without effect on those who expect that Soviet favour may affect their prospects.

54. Ibrahim Zand was re-appointed Minister for War after an interval of three months and almost immediately came into conflict with the vigorous personality of General Razmara, the Chief of the Staff. The latter had offended the Shah by some rather arbitrary actions, lost some favour with the Soviet authorities who considered him to blame for repressive action taken by the Military Governor against Tudeh demonstrations and antagonised a number of the Deputies by his successful and selfish exploitation of various sources of income, by his widespread intrigues and by his boundless personal ambition. He was dismissed on the 21st December, but he will be heard of again. He is about the ablest and most energetic officer in the Persian army, but quite unprincipled. There is reason to believe that the Soviet authorities are annoyed at his dismissal, the indications of their displeasure having been intended only to bring him to heel. He has been succeeded by General Hassan Arfa, who has some ability, but is little respected in the army and has faults of character that make his success doubtful. His mother was Russian; he himself has a very lively fear of Soviet designs, and, although inclined to be xenophobe, he is not, at present, unfriendly to us.

Air Force

55. Sarlashkar Ahmad Nakhchevan, at that time commanding the Persian Air Force, left Tehran on the 28th October, 1944, accompanied by Colonel Bayendor, Persian air attaché in London, for a visit to England. General Nakhchevan returned on the 12th December, 1944 greatly impressed by what he had seen in England and by the courtesy and hospitality he had experienced. During his absence his enemies had succeeded in getting him replaced in the command of the air force, by Sartip Ahmad Khosrovani, an air force officer, who had, however, no connexion with the air force for about three years. General Nakhchevan was offered the new post of Inspector of the Air Force, but declined it. On the 27th December, 1944, accompanied by Colonel Siah Posh, an English speaking technical officer of the Persian air force, he left for America in the aircraft that took General Connolly of the United States Persian Gulf Command back to the States. This visit, according to General Nakhchevan, had been provisionally arranged while he was in London, as an antidote to that of Colonel Khosrovani, brother of the General, who had been sent to attend the Chicago Conference on civil aviation and is still in America.

Civil Air Lines

56. Two of the three Dominies ordered by the Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones were delivered in October 1944, and are now operating on the [illegible] Baghdad route. The third force landed on its way to Tehran and was taken back to Habbaniyah for repairs, where it still is.

57. The group who are seeking to establish a commercial air line have formed their company and are about to approach the Majlis for the necessary authority to operate. G. H. Elsebaj is managing director and the board includes some good names. They seem anxious to work closely with British Overseas Airways Corporation, and this attitude shows signs of provoking the usual Russian reaction. Meanwhile the Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones declare they will not relinquish their own services to anyone. They too are anxious for British help, so they say.

Tribal Situation.

58. The tribal situation has on the whole remained remarkably quiet. The [illegible] quarterly despatch, resulted in the occupation with little opposition of Baneh and later of Sardasht and in the expulsion of Hama Rashid from Persian territory. He has now been removed from the vicinity of the frontier by the Iraqi [illegible] Government have [illegible] to ask for Hama Rashid's extradition but are asking for the sheep and other property which he carried off to be returned. On the other hand the Persian Government

have not yet released the Jaf chiefs who were imprisoned some months ago [illegible] Persia (1) without permission and (2) carrying arms. Most of the chiefs of this area have made their peace, for the time being, with the Persian authorities, and if the Persians were capable of just administration and a consistent policy they [illegible] foundations of a permanent settlement. Little has been heard recently from Persian Kurdestan of aspirations to autonomy, but Russian contacts with the Kurds, for whatever purpose they may be, are maintained.

59. Disarmament of the Arab tribes of Khuzestan continues. After some 1,000 rifles had been collected from the Arabs of the Ahu Dasht area the Persian troops turned their attention to the Beni Taruf who, with opposition from only a small section who fled to Iraq, surrendered some 1,300 rifles. The Beni Tamim have now begun to hand in their arms.

60. In Kuh i Galu a delicately balanced situation exists between the conflicting sections of the Bair Ahmadi. Both sides are wearying of the tension and showing a tendency to come to terms. Whether this will be to the benefit of their neighbours only time will show. There has certainly been less than the usual Bair Ahmadi raiding since the tribes were occupied in sparring with each other.

61. The so-called union of the tribes of the south continues to attract the interest of the Russians and the hostility of the Tudeh press. To both it looms as a plan organised by the British for the support of feudalism and reaction as a defence against the purer tenets of the Tudeh party, or more simply, as a [illegible] if necessary, against a Russian inspired revolution of the working classes. According to this unfounded theory not only do the reactionaries, by whom the the British are clearly meant, oppose any suggestion that these tribes should be disarmed, but they connive at the supply to them of arms and ammunition and may even supply them themselves.

Finance

62. Although over nine months of the financial year (which began on [illegible] 21st March, 1944) have gone by, the budget has not yet been passed by [illegible] Majlis and Government expenditure has been authorised by votes [illegible] account from month to month. Nor have the monthly figures of revenue [illegible] expenditure been published, but this embassy is informed that those for the [illegible] eight months of the year are as follows (figures for the preceding year [illegible] shown for comparison) —

	1943-44 (*)	1944-45
	(million rials)	
Ordinary Revenue	2,871	2,582
Ordinary Expenditure	2,263	2,544
Surplus	[illegible]	[illegible]
Commercial Revenue	[illegible]	[illegible]
Commercial Expenditure	[illegible]	[illegible]
Deficit	[illegible]	486
Net Deficit	[illegible]	448

63. The estimates for 1944-45 show a deficit of 611 million rials on the Ordinary budget, and a surplus of 612 million on the Commercial budget. It is impossible to say at the moment how the Commercial budget will turn out, as the magnitude of the Government's commercial operations, *i.e.*, purchase and distribution of food-stuffs and other goods over the remainder of the year, has not yet been determined. It is clear, however, that the estimates for the Ordinary budget have proved over-optimistic. In particular, receipts from income tax will be very much below those estimated, so far they have been less than for the same period in 1943-44, when the rates were considerably lower. It seems hardly possible that expenditure can be kept to a sufficiently low figure to compensate for this failure.

(*) [illegible] the third set of figures produced. The differences are the result of adjustments made between the Ordinary and Commercial budgets. It is to be hoped that the present figures are final.

64. Sales of gold for the account of His Majesty's Government have continued during the quarter. The bulk of this gold is, as is known, smuggled [illegible] and in other Middle Eastern countries, and the comparative ease or danger of the smuggling traffic from time to time. The price is adjusted periodically to [illegible] of sales during the quarter have been equivalent to £1·57 million. The question whether sales of gold should be continued has been raised separately.

65. The draft of the agreement covering the administration of the Persian railway system since September 1941, which is to be presented to the Persian Government by His Majesty's Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly, has still not been agreed by the Soviet authorities in Moscow, although there can no longer be any possible points of [illegible] deliberate.

Economic Situation

66. The course of the war since last June has resulted in some reduction of the cost-of-living figure. From 855 in August (July 1939 = 100) it went down to 650 in November, but there were fluctuations in the interval, and in December it increased again to 684. There will no doubt be periodical upturns rather than a steep decrease unless the war comes to an earlier conclusion than is now [illegible] between which there has been serious discrepancy in the past, are showing a tendency to come more closely together.

67. [illegible] discourage the passage of goods from hand to hand among speculative merchants (which is a feature of Persian commerce), but the quarter has seen the usual steady purchases for provincial consumption after the sale of harvest.

68. The supply of goods from overseas under the aegis of the Middle East Supply Centre has been satisfactory throughout the quarter. Tea stocks are, in fact, so high that the Persian Government have decided in principle to forego [illegible] by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, Persia continues to receive small imports by dhow and relatively small quantities from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but the price of sugar on the open market (as distinct from the Government rations) has risen slightly during the period under review. Textiles are in good supply (but dear) and Swiss artificial silk remains plentiful although, of course, there have been no new arrivals.

69. During the quarter interest has been shown in the re-equipment of some local industries. The Tehran power station is to be extended and new machinery is to be installed in the country's biggest glass factory as soon as [illegible] can be effected. No such moves have been noticed in the textile industries, which are not expected to be able to compete with overseas production under peace-time conditions.

Cereals and Agricultural Development

70. In spite of a fortnight's vindictive hold up by the Soviet authorities of grain movements from the north of Persia to Tehran (as recorded in the first section of this despatch), grain has been coming in in good quantities and the stock of food grains in the Tehran silo amounted on the 31st December to over 53,000 tons including 31,897 of wheat and wheat flour, and this ensures sufficiency for 265 days at the present rate of adulteration with barley. In general the Persian Government has in hand the unprecedented stock of 260,000 tons of food grain.

71. The 1,000 tons of seed-wheat from India reached the Persian Gulf ports in November and was distributed by the Persian officials of the newly created "Selection of Agricultural Monopolies" of Dr. Millspaugh's Mission.

72. Of the twenty British army officers seconded to the Cereal Collection Team in the Millspaugh Mission, fourteen are to be released for grain collection work in Bengal (7) or return to military duty (7). Their good work has been much appreciated by the American Chief Administrator of Persian Agricultural Monopolies.

Transport

73. Civil traffic on the railway was well maintained on the whole during the quarter. A lift of about 14,000 tons from south to north was achieved in

October and was raised to over 22,000 tons in December. The average percentages of the target figures which were achieved in the past year are announced as: Goods from ports 91 per cent., cereals 69 per cent. and sugar-beet 57 per cent. The Persian officials concerned deserve some of the credit for the way in which they are learning the task of movement control in difficult circumstances.

74. The Road Transport Administration's position has been greatly improved by their taking over the contracts of Persian lorry owners who were formerly employed by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation on "Aid to Russia." As a result it was possible (on the 22nd December) to make a slight relaxation in the Government's control over privately-owned lorries.

75. The seasonal demands for haulage of cereals, sugar beet and coal have been met, and the stocks of petroleum supplies throughout the country have been well maintained, except in Tehran where a large unexpected increase in the use of oil drip stoves has caused a temporary reduction in reserves.

Locust Control.

76. No locusts were present in Persia during the quarter.

77. The normal invasion of desert (*i.e.*, migratory) locust swarms from India during the autumn and early winter was prevented by efficient control in [illegible] South Persia as a result of breeding which is now occurring in Arabia.

78. This danger was considered by an international conference at Tehran in November, and preliminary arrangements were made to meet it. The Persian Ministry of Agriculture's probable requirements of motor vehicles have been [illegible] ments are very large, and the Middle East Anti-Locust Unit has therefore undertaken to carry out any control which may be necessary between Lingeh and Jask. Its locust officer disposes of transport and radio vans supplied by the Persia and Iraq Force, and His Majesty's Government are paying for the hire of local labour and have provided poison and bran.

79. The Government of India have agreed under certain conditions to carry out both survey and control work in the south-east corner of Persia [illegible] the Indian frontier. Wave and mealie are now under [illegible].

80. Moroccan (*i.e.*, non-migratory) locust egg deposits which have now been completely mapped indicate that over 110,000 hectares will have to be controlled at the hatching next spring, mainly in Azerbaijan and Gurgan. The Ministry [illegible] cake meal as a bait material, and they have put before the Road Transport Administration a demand for the vehicles which will be required in this [illegible].

81. [illegible] Tehran took over from the embassy the work of co-ordinating locust reports, of representing the United Kingdom and Indian Governments on the Tehran International Locust Control Committee, and of maintaining liaison between the British locust officer in Persia and those concerned in and outside the country.

United Nations Rehabilitation and Relief Administration, and the Polish Refugees.

82. The total number of Polish evacuees in Persia diminished during the period under review from 5,440 to 4,435. Among those who left were seventy-nine [illegible] the remaining half of the Children's School at Isfahan and their attendant grown-ups. Once they have gone, there will be no Poles left in Persia apart from (*a*) those employed by the British and American Armed Forces and Government organisations and (*b*) those living by their own efforts, who consequently are their own masters and free to leave or stay as they wish, subject only to Persian regulations regarding *permis de séjour*.

83. United Nations Rehabilitation and Relief Administration take no financial responsibility for these Polish refugees and, in fact, no responsibility other than that of ultimate repatriation. They are, however, prepared to act (without commitment) in a certain measure as regards transport, through what personnel they may have in the countries concerned. It is understood that the reason for the United Nations Rehabilitation and Relief Administration's attitude is that these Poles are not war refugees within the Administration's definition of the term.

British Council.

84. The Council is now responsible for instruction in English to over 4,000 Persians throughout the country, and the demand is increasing. Applications for teachers have been received from many provincial centres where there are as yet no Anglo-Persian Institutes, and textbooks have been sent to schools in these areas. The Institute of [illegible] has sponsored a series of concerts by the newly-formed Tehran Symphony Orchestra. The Orchestra has given two concerts, both of which were attended by more than 500 persons. In view of the absence in Tehran of a suitable hall for dramatic performances, the cellar of the Anglo-Persian Institute in Tehran has been converted into a little theatre. The theatre was inaugurated with five most successful performances of Wilde's "The Importance of Being Earnest."

85. Copies of this despatch are going to His Majesty's Consular Officers in Persia, His Majesty's Representative in Moscow, the Government of India, the Minister Resident in Cairo and the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

E 1075/464/34] No. 10

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 14th February.)

(No. 28.)

Sir, *Tehran, 30th January, 1945.*

I HAVE [illegible] despatch No. 440 of the 20th [illegible] 1944, and to enclose herewith copy of a further report by the financial counsellor to the Ministry of Finance [illegible] Persia.

2. Copies of this despatch and the enclosure are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, Moscow and Baghdad, the Minister Resident in the Middle East, and to the Government of India, New Delhi.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 10.

PERSIA.

Financial Situation.

THIS report follows in series my general reports of the 3rd July and the 23rd October, 1944 (enclosed with despatches No. 283 E. of the 9th July, and No. 410 of the 20th October, 1944).

Public Finance.

2. The figures of revenue and expenditure for the first nine months of the financial year 1944-4[illegible] (corresponding to the Persian year 1323 A.H.) are now available. They compare as follows with those for the corresponding period in the previous year:—

	(Million rials.)	
Ordinary Budget—	*1943-44.*	*1944-45.*
Revenue ..	3,287	2,972
Expenditure	2,841	2,716
Surplus . . .	446	256
Commercial Budget—		
Revenue	1,[illegible]47	2,[illegible]
Expenditure	2,[illegible]	3,1[illegible]
Deficit	1,283	475
Net Deficit	837	219

3. The estimates for the whole year 1944–45 are as follows :—

	Million rials
Ordinary Budget—	
Revenue	[illegible]
[illegible]	4,559
Deficit	611
Commercial Budget—	
Revenue	6,167
Expenditure	5,755
	612(5)

It may be noted here for reference that the budgetary deficit for the year 1943–44 was 1,052 million rials.

4. As to the Ordinary Budget, the situation is less favourable than appears from the figures in the second paragraph. For one thing, the expenditure does not include the salaries of Government servants for the ninth month (some 20[illegible]). The budget [illegible] Majlis [illegible] meantime by periodical Votes on Account, the last (like some of the others) having been passed too late for the punctual payment of salaries. More important, however, is the fact that receipts from income tax, which were estimated at 885 million rials for the year, are likely to fall far short of this figure. Although the rates are considerably higher than in 1943–44, receipts in Tehran have been no more than 284 million rials in the first nine months of the year, compared with 273 million in the same period of the preceding year, and this figure has only been reached because the income tax paid by the National Bank has amounted to 140 million as against 40 million last year. Similarly, receipts (including income tax [illegible]) as against 500 million in the first nine months of 1943–44.

5. The recent history of income tax in Persia has been unfortunate. There was long and widespread opposition to any increase in the previous inadequate rates, and the new rates were only voted, as from the 21st March, 1944, after Dr. Millspaugh [illegible] threatene[illegible] [illegible] passive resistance [illegible] Dr. Millspaugh [illegible] as Persia [illegible] heavy direct taxation [illegible] [illegible] of total [illegible] with a [illegible] [illegible] Next the future [illegible]

6. The shortage of income tax receipts has also, as [illegible] an earlier report, affected seriously the finances of the municipalities, [illegible] they were to be financed by a 10 per cent. surtax on income tax payments, in place of other [illegible] from the National Bank guaranteed by the Central Government, which will have to honour its guarantees sooner or later. At the present time the Government has reached its statutory limit for borrowing from the National Bank.

7. The activities covered by the Commercial Budget fall into two chief parts: (*a*) purchase and sale to the public of food-stuffs and piece-goods [illegible] of the Government [illegible] and property [illegible]. Under the latter heading outgoings during the first nine months of the year have been 820 million

(5) Overall surplus 470,391 rials.

rials as against receipts of 376 million; Dr. Millspaugh's plans for closing or turning [illegible]. Under the former, large stocks are [illegible] the Russian [illegible] of taxation [illegible] revenue is [illegible] Government [illegible]

9. As a result of the change of Government, M. Ammanullah Ardalan [illegible] Minister of Finance towards the end of November [illegible]. He is a former official of the Ministry of Finance, and has already been Minister. He is about as good a man to fill the position as anyone whom Persia can provide.

Banking, Currency and Price Indices

10. The following table brings up to date the figures given in previous reports of notes in circulation and bank deposits :—

(*Million rials*)

	Notes.	*Deposits*
June 1941	1,312	671
June 1942	1,913	[illegible]
June 1943	4,070	[illegible]
June 1944	[illegible]	[illegible]
July 1944	[illegible]	[illegible]
August 1944	[illegible]	[illegible]
September 1944	[illegible]	[illegible]
October 1944	[illegible]	[illegible]
November 1944	[illegible]	[illegible]
December 1944	[illegible]	[illegible]

11. The following index (prepared by the National Bank) shows wholesale prices and the cost of living :—

(1939 = 100)

	Wholesale Prices.	*Cost of Living*
June 1941	141	145
June 1942	239	254
June 1943	422	[illegible]
June 1944	513	[illegible]
July 1944	507	[illegible]
August 1944	534	[illegible]
September 1944	506	[illegible]
October 1944	442	[illegible]
November 1944	445	[illegible]
December 1944	497	684

12. It appears from these figures that (*a*) the inflationary process is still continuing after a break following on the invasion of western Europe, and (*b*) prices which fell partly from the same reason and partly because of improved distribution have now begun to rise again. There is probably, however, some [illegible] It is satisfactory to note that the marked [illegible] wholesale and cost-of-living indices, the reasons for which were [illegible] a previous report, is now tending to disappear, and the two sets of figures are coming more closely together. The general trend of prices should

now be on the decrease, apart from seasonal factors and such fluctuations as may occur in the course of war operations. Generally, however, it is of advantage to Persia that the decline in prices should be cushioned and gradual. The country is far from ready to meet the shock of post war economics

13. Sales of gold in Persia for the account of His Majesty's Government which began in the summer of 1943, were suspended on the 15th January, 1945 During this period they amounted to a total of £6 95 million. These sales have had no appreciable effect in checking inflation, the purpose for which they were originally designed, but have been useful in the past in enabling His Majesty's Government to obtain local currency at a cheaper rate than that fixed under the Anglo Persian financial agreement of May 1942. Ultimately, however, the [illegible] ount, and it appeared about two [illegible] able) about 90 per cent. of the gold [illegible] and the supply of Per[illegible] recently been that Iraq dinar notes have been finding their way into Persia, with the result that the Government's sterling balances have correspondingly increased In view of the provision in the Anglo-Persian financial agreement that 60 per cent. of the increase in sterling balances from quarter to quarter is to be converted by His Majesty's Government into gold its gold sales in Persia have, for the present at least, been discontinued

Prospective Position

14 A few months after Dr Millspaugh came to Persia as Administrator General of the Finances in February 1943, he took over at the request of the Persian Government certain economic powers in addition. These were mainly (*a*) the purchase, transport, distribution and rationing of food-stuffs and certain other goods, (*b*) price control, and (*c*) administration of the Gov[illegible] When the [illegible] withdrew from their posi[illegible] Not long afterwards he issued [illegible] Ibtihaj, governor of the [illegible] considered that he had [illegible] powers [illegible] exceedingly ill judged (even if possibly legal) a [illegible] Dr [illegible] agitation against him was renewed, and the Pa[illegible] weeks debate punctuated by public holidays [illegible] on other subjects, passed early in January an Act depriving him of his economic powers as distinguished from his functions in the Ministry of Finance. They did so, however, without having reached, or attempted, any conclusion as to how these functions should be discharged, but they have now appointed a committee (consisting of Persians only) to deliberate on the subject. Some are in favour of establishing a new Ministry of Economic Affairs for the purpose; but it is to be hoped that this will not be done since it would be many months before the Ministry would function with anything approaching efficiency. A better solution would be to attach these functions to the Ministry of Commerce and [illegible] advisory authority, [illegible]

[illegible] uphold his action in dismissing M Ibtihaj he will resign; and a number of his [illegible] have announced a similar intention. These resignations have been deferred [illegible] present until the issue between the two protagonists has been discussed and determined by the Parliament, but it is unlikely that they will decide against a Persian in favour of a foreigner Nevertheless, Persia is a country devoted, perhaps excessively, to compromise, Dr Millspaugh does not wish, if he can avoid it, to leave Persia as the failure which he would be accounted to be if he went at the present time, and he has not yet made up his mind whether to leave or to stay In view of his defects in temperament it is not desirable that he should remain here much longer; but his presence in the country at a time when the financial situation is serious and plans for the post war period are inchoate would present certain advantages, especially since if he leaves now the more

competent of his American staff may go with him If he remains for a few months (as at any rate M. Ardalan, the Minister of Finance, hopes he will do) he will be able to see the end of the current financial year, to present the budget for 1945-46, to do something through the American staff to set the new economic organisation on its feet; and to prepare the way for the successor from abroad who is required if the financial affairs of this unhappy, incompetent and corrupt country are to be administered with any degree of success

Tehran, 30th January, 1945

E N R TRENCHAM

E 1466/1466/34] No. 11

Sir R Bullard to Mr Eden.—(Received 28th February)

(No. 212 Telegram)

Tehran, 28th February 1945.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has just informed me and my American colleague that the Shah will sign this evening decree declaring Persia to be in a state of war with Japan from the 28th February

2. The news may be released at noon, Tehran time, 8 hours 30 G M T

E 1801, 103 34] No. 12

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran)

(No. 53.)

Foreign Office, 7th March, 1945

THE [illegible] Ambassador asked to see me this afternoon, when he said [illegible] Government were most anxious to learn whether there was any information [illegible] give them about the Crimea Conference discussions in relation to their country His Government's anxieties as to Russian behaviour in northern Persia continued and his Government would be [illegible] them any reassurance on the subject

2. I replied that some reference had been made at Yalta to the position of Persia, though not formally at the conference table nor at the meetings of the three Heads of Governments. My impression was that the Russians fully understood the concern with which we had watched certain recent developments in Persia and the sincerity with which we held to the terms of the Tehran Declaration [illegible] the Soviet Government had signed together with the United States Government and the Government of the United Kingdom at Tehran in the autumn of 1943 Though our discussions on the Persian issue had been neither formal nor lengthy, I had the impression that they had resulted in reduced Russo-Persian tension. This impression had been confirmed to me by a recent message I had had from you

3. The Ambassador seemed slightly comforted by this information, but hinted that there could not be any real easement of the situation while foreign armies remained in Persia. I replied that the Ambassador would be aware that by the terms of the Tehran Agreement the three Great Powers were obliged to withdraw their armies within six months of the end of the Japanese war and that this date might not now be very far distant. So far as we were concerned we were not opposed to Allied examination to see whether some withdrawal could not be made before that date. In any event our policy remained unchanged which was to see a strong and independent Persia. The A[illegible] left me, but left still murmuring under his breath his suspi[illegible] Russian intentions

I am, &c
ANTHONY EDEN

E 2930 31 34

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 27th March.)

(No. 72.)

Tehran, 9th March 194

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 127 of the 20th March, 1944, I [illegible] the honour to transmit herewith a review of the principal events affecting our interests in Persia during 1944.

2. I am indebted to Mr. Lascelles, Lieutenant-Colonel Gastrel, Mr. Trentham, Mr. Monypenny, Colonel Pybus, Air Commodore Runciman, Mr. Somers Cocks, Mr. Seager, Mr. Mackenzie, Mr. Simpson, Colonel Robb[illegible] (Military Movements) and Mr. Owen (British Council) for contributions to this report.

3. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His M[illegible] in Persia, His Majesty's representative in Moscow, the [illegible] the Minister Resident in Cairo and the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle [illegible]

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 13

Introduction.

THE report for 1943 recorded a stormy and eventful year, at the end of which the Persian ship of state appeared to have reached comparatively calm waters. Serious tribal disturbances in the south, fomented by German agents, had been survived, though with small credit to Persian arms. A start had been made, with the help of the American experts, on the formidable task of bringing order out of the chaos of the economic and financial administration. Other [illegible] regeneration of the army. [illegible] Persia's declaration of war on Germany, and [illegible] Declaration of the United Nations, seemed to have brought [illegible] of the international fence [illegible] participants in the Tehran Conference appeared to have assured for the future her position as an independent and sovereign [illegible]

2. No such major events marked the course of the year 1944 in this country. There were no really serious tribal disorders. No crisis comparable with those of the preceding year occurred in the collection and distribution of food supplies. For more than half the year the Government was headed by a man who, though neither forceful nor experienced, had at least the distinction, very rare in Persia, of being honest and patriotic.

3. Nevertheless, it was a year of all-round disintegration, and by the end of it the country's prospects of survival were perhaps as dark as they had ever been before. For this, three principal causes must be assigned. Persian [illegible] American inexperience and Russian ill will. For the most part [illegible] holding office thought of nothing but the promotion of their personal interests, and obstructed even such elementary measures of social reform as the introduction of an income tax law. The new Majlis, after months of wrangling over the credentials of some of its most suspect members, showed [illegible] might have led one to expect. The American economic experts, some of whom were not of a very high calibre and all of whom were constantly thwarted by a massed array of vested interests, proved in the main unequal to their task. At the head of them, Dr. Millspaugh himself spoiled what chance he ever had by a rigidly authoritarian manner, an inability to delegate work, and indulgence in a whole series of political indiscretions, so that before the year was out he had become almost completely disredited and was about to be deprived of a large part of his powers. The American military advisers accomplished little, but were inclined to pretend that their allotted task was completed, on the grounds that they were not called upon to supervise the execution of such measures as they had recommended. The American police adviser died after accomplishing nothing at all, and was not replaced. The American gendarmerie advisers, though able and invested with wide powers, battled against incredible corruption without any appreciable sign of headway. And evidence accumulated on all sides that the Russians not only viewed this general deterioration with pleasure, but were actively engaged in accelerating its *tempo*, working mainly through the agency

of the Tudeh party and a number of more or less genuine labour organisations. Of the many groups which were bent on stultifying the work of the Millspaugh Mission, the Tudeh, whose subservience to the Russians became more and more open, was by far the most virulent and—by reason of its Soviet-inspired internal discipline—effective. Innumerable scurrilous newspapers, believed with good reason to be on the Russian pay-roll or supplied with Russian newsprint, unceasingly attacked as "reactionaries and Fascists" all those, whether Persian or foreign, who made any effort to stop the rot. Seyyid Zia ed-Din Tabataba'i (recently returned to Persia after twenty years' exile in Palestine), perhaps the only politician enjoying sufficient personal prestige to have the least chance of effecting serious reforms, was the object of their most venomous slander, being invariably represented as a British agent.

4. [illegible] They openly encouraged the separatist tendencies endemic in Azerbaijan. They constantly interfered with the attempts of the Persian police and local troops to preserve law and order. They refused to allow the Persian Government to despatch additional troops to the unruly Kurdish areas on the Turkish frontier. They obliged the local governors to expel Persians hostile to the Tudeh. [illegible] presence, if not their active policy, prevented the northern provinces—by far the richest in the whole of Persia—from contributing [illegible] the country's economic prosperity.

5. Even outside "their" zone the Russians were guilty of exte[illegible] Although towards the beginning of the year they [illegible] refusal to pay customs dues on imported goods, they maintained their refusal to allow Persian customs officials to check, or even to see, the goods imported. They demanded cash down for all sales to the [illegible] Government, but were most dilatory in paying for their own purchases. Having originally obliged the Persian Government to supply munitions and small arms without any discussion of prices, they eventually consented to pay on terms which involved the Persian Government in definite loss—and even on that unfavour[illegible] and only about one-tenth of what they [illegible] the arrangements of [illegible] goods, some of which were unsaleable—arrangements which [illegible] estimated at 250 million rials—they effectively hampered his attempts to [illegible] financial and economic reforms in the northern zone by refusing or delaying the [illegible] at such prices and on such a scale as to promote inflation, and one commodity they sold, viz., sugar, must have been rendered surplus to Soviet needs by lease-lend supplies if it was not actually, as some informants believe, lease-lend sugar repacked in Soviet wrappers. They flouted the American [illegible] road transport into essential channels by using Ir[illegible] organisation) for unlicensed commercial transport but [illegible] without the northern zone. They ignored Persian "cabotage" [illegible] operating unlicensed Russian aircraft on a commercial basis on internal Persian lines. In short, their economic policy, no less than their political influence, was uniformly indifferent to Persian sovereignty and prejudicial to the country's welfare.

6. Towards the end of the year, it is true, the Russians considerably over reached themselves by putting forward a categorical demand for the immediate grant of extensive oil concessions the terms of which were to be discussed [illegible] after, and this demand, backed by a most violent campaign of intimidation, galvanised even the moribund Persian body politic into a positive reaction and some show of national solidarity. But nothing, unfortunately, led one to suppose that they would not have succeeded immediately had they employed slightly less clumsy tactics, or that they would not ultimately achieve their object by sapping methods. Soviet exploitation of the North Persian oil would unquestionably spell the end of real Persian sovereignty in what is already known—inaccurately but not without cause—as "the Russian zone", and once these rich northern provinces had been virtually detached the independence and integrity of Persia would be past praying for. Despite the categorical nature of the Tehran Declaration concerning Persia, it is not too much to say that, in the light of all the local Russian activities during the year under review, the disintegration of Persia as a national entity appeared to be the Kremlin's long-term objective. Nor is it possible, for anyone acquainted with the Soviet system and Soviet practice, to comfort himself with the theory of a local policy insufficiently controlled by Moscow.

7. From the point of view of the conduct of the war, the close of the year saw one very important development: with the opening of the Black Sea route, Persia would shortly cease to be a channel for the supply to Russia of any appreciable quantities of Allied war material except aviation spirit. Even aviation spirit would possibly cease to be sent to Russia across Persia after June 1945, and the main justification for the presence in Persia of Allied troops in areas other than those contiguous with the southern oilfields would thereby be removed. But His Majesty's Government considered that British troops could only be withdrawn *pari passu* with the withdrawal of the Russian forces, and [illegible] plebiscites and "spontaneous" popular appeals was far better suited [illegible] the Russians to evacuate promptly any part of the rich areas of Persia which they had made so nearly their own.

8. Throughout the year the weight of Russian pressure was such that Anglo-Persian relations were largely conditioned by it. There was no cause of direct friction of the slightest importance. Barring one or two minor incidents, the comparatively few British troops in the country behaved admirably. British military intervention in Persian affairs was as unobtrusive as the protection of our vital interests allowed and was indeed scarcely perceptible outside the oilfields area except in regard to the internment of undesirables. His Majesty's Government, it is true, lent their [illegible] Millspaugh Mission, though towards the end Dr. Millspaugh's indiscretions made it impossible to continue to support him personally, but the disinterested character of their motives for doing so should be self-evident. Active pro-German sympathies automatically waned as the tide of war turned more and more strongly in our favour. British officers, seconded for service under the Persian administration, played a useful part in grain collection and the organisation of transport. The local personnel of the Middle East Supply Centre—mainly British during the greater part of the year—were manifestly out to afford the maximum of help to Persia within the limits imposed by world shortages and shipping difficulties.

9. It might be supposed that, since in all these and many other ways we compared so favourably with the Russians, there would have been a marked swing of Persian sentiment towards us. That this was not at all obviously the case is due to the fact that cowardice, moral and physical, is an outstanding trait of the Persian character. Probably most Persians realised in their heart of hearts how favourable the comparison was to us, but very few were prepared to displease the Russians by shaping their words and actions accordingly. Vanity, moreover, is next only to cowardice in the Persian make up, and the national habit is consequently to ascribe all the country's shortcomings and misfortunes [illegible] the British had to serve as scapegoats, and a large proportion of the Persian press [illegible] of British policy. This was true not only of the newspapers [illegible] or subsidised by the Russians, but also of a good many [illegible] Persian internees, for example, there was much [illegible], while the equal responsibility of [illegible] the Russians was [illegible]. In tribal matters it was the same story: the Persian military were free to conduct operations against the southern tribes without let or hindrance from us, whereas, as stated above, they were not allowed by the Russians to deal with unruly Kurds in the north, yet the press freely accused the "British imperialists" of the most sinister machinations in the south, and carefully abstained from all criticism of the Soviet attitude. It is true that the Persian press (which boasts upwards of seventy papers in Tehran alone) exists largely on blackmail and is not genuinely representative of Persian public opinion. Since, however, it is almost the sole purveyor of information to the public, its influence is by no means negligible, and it would be a mistake to dismiss as unimportant for the future the fact that, during all the year under review but particularly towards the end of it, Anglo-Persian relations were grossly distorted in the mirror of the local press.

9. In one important respect this fundamental dishonesty of the Persians in their attitude towards their two principal allies brought upon them an early retribution. Although His Majesty's Government had obviously suffered much annoyance from the wrong-headed nationalism of Reza Shah, many Persians continued to foster the belief—at once pleasing to the Russians and soothing to Persian national vanity—that the tyrant had been maintained in power by the British, who had only discarded their puppet at long last under the stress of

circumstances beyond their control. The manifest incapacity of the Persians to govern themselves in the post-Reza period was ascribed, under this convenient theory, to the after-effects of the ex-Shah's tyranny, and hence to the British. In particular, the press never tired of denouncing the alleged greed of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (which is in fact the main source of the country's wealth) and of asserting that Reza Shah's attack on the company's former concession had been a put-up job. When, therefore, the Russians demanded of the Persian Government the immediate grant of an oil concession without prior discussion of its terms, and pretended that in doing so they were only asking for parity with the British, it was impossible for the Persians to retort, as they might otherwise have done, that the British concession had been properly negotiated and freely accorded. This lesson to liars was, however, small consolation to the British victims of the lie, since the resultant weakening of the Persian case was by no means in British interests.

10. Since the Russians became our Allies in 1941, loyalty has damped down criticism of Soviet Russia to such an extent that the foregoing paragraphs, which consist largely of a catalogue of Russian misdemeanours, might [illegible] impression of prejudice. The attempt to avoid giving such an impression [illegible] however, been sadly hampered by the facts. The purpose of an annual review of this sort is to record salient events and observed tendencies, and in Persia the actions of the Russians have always been of paramount importance. It would have been almost a relief to have been able to record one or two resounding British misdemeanours in order to give a semblance of balance and objectivity, but once again the facts [illegible] and action in Persia during the year under review—and, indeed, throughout the [illegible] loyal to our Soviet ally.

11. It is indeed probable that the Soviet authorities, to whom suspicion is [illegible] of British policy in this country, but unless we are to hark back for ever to "intervention" after the last war we can only regard their suspicions as we regard some of their actions, as easier to explain than to justify. When a Soviet Ambassador, in discussing a financial claim for a few hundred pounds which a Panamanian would settle out of shame, uses the meanness and effrontery of a fraudulent bankrupt, our realisation of the fact that he may be feeling the breath of the N.K.V.D. hot on his neck leads us to understand his attitude but hardly to consider it either honourable or fair. This embassy has deprecated certain small British indiscretions committed since the occupation, not because we thought that reasonable men would be justified in thinking them hostile but because we know that men who live in constant danger of being liquidated on suspicion cannot themselves be good judges of straightforward conduct. In only one instance—the aerodrome construction mentioned in the section entitled "Soviet Interests"—could it be reasonably held that our action gave good ground [illegible] observed with suspicion our attempts to obtain one in the south! It may be so, but the suspicion is thereby merely explained not justified. To an important extent Russia owes her salvation during this war to oil supplies from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, whether sent to Russia or employed in Persia in the transport of other forms of aid, and the whole record of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company contradicts the allegation that His Majesty's Government exploit British held oil concessions for unfair political ends. Moreover, if suspicion had been the sole motive for the Russian action, the Soviet Government should have been satisfied once that action had ruled out the grant of a concession to the British, even to the Americans during the war. Do the Russians suspect us of intriguing with the southern tribes against the Central Government? The Soviet inspired Persian press has much to say on this subject, yet, whereas we in the south permit and even facilitate the Central Government's disarmament operations in tribal territory, they in Azerbaijan do nothing of the kind. Do the Russians resent the extent and success of our war-time propaganda in Persia? No doubt they do, but they know it to be concerned mainly with the winning of the war and strictly loyal to them. Our publicity has given to the Soviet war effort a share of recognition and eulogy which makes a handsome showing [illegible] the ungenerous attempt obvious in almost every number of every Soviet newspaper to minimise the British and American part in the war. Our Public Relations Bureau has tried to draw Persian doctors into contact with British, American and other foreign medical men. Do the Russians consider these purely medical activities as warranting the appointment as head of the Soviet hospital

of a man who is known from several sources to have mysterious political functions, who is apparently behind student troubles at the medical school which have resulted in a lock-out, and who recently suggested to a Persian general the formation of a mainly military Government which should be not merely pro-Russian but anti British. Is it a ground of suspicion that officers of the Persian Air Force are being trained in England? The Soviet Army might have trained a considerable number of Persian officers in the use of tanks and aircraft if they had not attached to the offer conditions which not even Persians could accept. But the Soviet case was given away when the Soviet Government accused His Majesty's Government of hostility to them in the matter of the oil concession. This accusation is based in part on the appearance in the British press of articles which mildly attempted to do justice to the Persian case when the Russians, not satisfied with sending forth a stream of falsehoods and abuse against the Persian Government, had through their section of the tripartite [illegible] which ran counter to the Russian thesis, and in part on our own protest against the violation of the censorship charter by the Russians in the suppression of telegrams despatched by the Persian Prime Minister to Persian [illegible] missions abroad. From this it became clear that to obviate Soviet [illegible] must connive at and even facilitate anything, however nefarious, which the Russians might think important to their interests. The test will come when we suggest to the Russians that the time has arrived for the foreign troops to evacuate most if not all of the parts of Persian territory where they are at present stationed. There are indications that they will stay until the latest possible moment, *i.e.*, until six months after the cessation of hostilities with Japan. This would leave Russian troops established throughout the north during the elections if these are held at the time prescribed by the Constitution, and we know from the Soviet Ambassador, as reported by Mr. Averell Harriman, that he intends to see, so far as he can, that the elections go the right way. The Russian-inspired press has already found a pretext for the retention of the foreign troops in [illegible] would leave her at the mercy of outside, *i.e.*, British influences, as in Reza Shah's time. Undoubtedly the great Russian grievance against Reza Shah was that he suppressed subversive tendencies, since these were all Russian tender[illegible]

Negotiations for Oil Concessions

(A) *British and American*

12. During the greater part of the year representatives of the Shell group of the Standard Vacuum Company, and (somewhat later in the field) of the American Sinclair Company were in competition for oil concessions over an extensive area of South Persia. Overt Anglo-American rivalry being undesirable, it was agreed [illegible] His Majesty's Government and the United States Government that neither should exert pressure on the Persian Government in favour of its nationals. His Majesty's Embassy afforded unobtrusive support to the Shell repr[illegible] instructions issued by the Foreign Office, which were to go no further than was usual on behalf of [illegible] Embassy [illegible] to be considerably more active and ostentatious—for a time the United States Embassy carried an oil attaché on its staff—than the Anglo-American understanding had led the Foreign Office to expect, and His Majesty's Embassy were therefore instructed in September to afford more active support on their side should the need for prompt intervention arise. Actually however, all parties had bogged down at an earlier stage in a quagmire of Persian suspicion and procrastination in which diplomatic support counted for little.

13. There was, indeed, some excuse for the Persian Government's procrastination, since they were totally ignorant of the technicalities involved. On Dr. Millspaugh's recommendation, therefore, they eventually agreed to seek the assistance of two American experts, Messrs. Hoover and Curtice, who represented a firm with a high reputation for supplying foreign Governments with disinterested technical advice on oil matters. These gentlemen arrived in July and within a few weeks had presented the Persian Government with the results of their study of the competing offers. The Persian Government thereupon formed a committee of their own to examine the whole question, but added constantly to its numbers, as time went on, in response to the suspicious reactions

of the Majlis and in the vain endeavour to cover themselves from every angle of fire. The committee, in these circumstances, made very little progress.

14. It should be noted, in view of the subsequent developments, that the Persian press and public as a whole, despite some disparaging talk of "concession-hunters," did not appear to be opposed in principle to the grant of concessions to an American or British firm. The suspicions raised were chiefly to the effect that M. Saed's Government could not be trusted to extract for the country's benefit the maximum advantage which the occasion offered. This was, in fact, no more than the inevitable reaction of those not in office, who scented big money and were distressed at the thought of the pickings going into other pockets than theirs. Nevertheless, there appeared to be a general realisation of the political advantages which would accrue from increasing the stake in Persia either of Great Britain or of the United States—particularly the latter. Broadly speaking only the Tudeh, obviously acting at the behest of the Soviet Embassy opposed in principle the grant of any concession, demanding both in the Majlis and in its newspapers that none should be granted until the war over and Allied troops withdrawn, Persia was left mistress in her own house. This demand was to prove embarrassing both to the Tudeh itself and to its masters when, a few weeks later, the Soviet Government demanded the immediate grant of an oil concession in the north, and it seems to show that the Russians, while inclined at first merely to try to prevent their Allies from obtaining oil concessions in an area of no commercial interest to themselves, awoke with a surprising suddenness to the realisation of their own pressing need for Persian oil.

(B) *Russian*

15. The crisis precipitated by the Russian demand inevitably deprived the British and American companies of all further prospect of obtaining concessions. M. Kavtaradze, Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, who arrived in [illegible] September, complained to the Shah barely a fortnight later that [illegible] Government were being slow in responding to his demand for an extensive oil concession in the north, adding that his Government were not satisfied with Soviet Persian relations and that on the economic side the future of these relations might depend on the Persian reply. Five days later he announced, in an interview given to a local newspaper, that the demand had been made on his arrival. According to M. Saed, whom there is no reason to disbelieve, the Persian Government had not even had as long as this to consider the question in secret, for M. Kavtaradze had begun by mentioning only the relatively insignificant Kburian oil area (to which in point of fact the Russians had a shadowy but not wholly imaginary claim).

16. The major demand, as eventually put forward, was for exploring rights over almost the whole of North Persia during a period of five years, and thereafter for a concession covering a maximum of well over two thirds of that area. This, even in the exploratory period, would have given the Russians ample opportunities for continuing the subversion of Persian authority in a region where the process had already been carried far. But the Persian Government were asked, in addition, to signify their consent without any discussion of terms.

17. M. Kavtaradze's statement to the press, which naturally caused widespread alarm, was immediately followed up by an agitation in the local Soviet controlled newspapers. The Persian Government, however, stood their ground and M. Kavtaradze was informed towards the middle of October that the [illegible] early in the preceding month, decided to grant no oil concessions whi[illegible] war lasted. This action was taken after a secret session [illegible] had been almost unanimously approved [illegible] embarrassed by the fact tha[illegible] regard to the British and Am[illegible] Russian-controlled press. Nevertheless [illegible] dismay, gradually hardened; and on the [illegible] Prime Minister justified his action before a Majlis which was clearly in [illegible]

19. The Russians thereupon gave [illegible] the transport of grain by rail within [illegible]

Persian Government were severed. M. Saed himself, of course, had by this time become a "fascist" of the deepest dye. A particularly disquieting feature of Soviet inspired comment, in view of the general attitude of the Soviet wolf towards the Persian lamb, was to the effect that the Persian Government had been the first to violate the spirit of the Tripartite Treaty of alliance by obstructing the passage of supplies to Russia. In a second press interview, M. Kavtaradze alleged that the Prime Minister had originally signified his complete agreement [illegible] nd, only to go back on it later. Apart from the fact that [illegible] egorically denied by M. Saed, it is inconceivable that that honest but [illegible] press in regard to the British and American concession-seekers, should have committed himself immediately in regard to the far more disquieting demand from the Russians, whom he knew well from long years of service in the Soviet [illegible]

20. On the 27th October there was a Tudeh demonstration in Tehran accompanied by armed Russian troops in lorries, and this was followed by similar demonstrations at Tabriz, Resht, Isfahan and Sultanabad. At Tabriz, where one man was killed and several were wounded during an attempt to rush the police headquarters, the Russians prevented the police and military from dealing with the mob, and had the commanding officer expelled at twenty-four hours notice. Public opinion, however, was hardening more and more against them, and the Persian Government were emboldened to enforce the existing prohibition on street gatherings. M. Saed issued a full reply to M. Kavtaradze's second press statement, and this further strengthened the public reaction. The Russians grossly abused their censorship powers to prevent the Persian Government's case from reaching the outside world (or even the Persian diplomatic representatives abroad) and passed only the accounts of Persian public sentiment [illegible] filtered through, and the Russians were consequently obliged to shift their ground by attacking M. Saed less for his refusal to grant the concession, than for his alleged desire to upset Perso-Soviet relations generally and to convert Per[illegible] into a base for fascist aggression against the Soviet Union. By the beginning of November indeed, the Russians were rumoured to be prepared to drop the demand for a concession, and as though to mark the *detente* they restored grain deliveries by rail and adopted a relatively restrained attitude in regard to the censorship of press messages. But M. Saed, in his new and vaguer rôle of fascist [illegible] was attacked with ever increasing virulence. The Moscow [illegible] disseminated completely false accounts of nation-wide popular protests against his administration, and preparations for a further Tudeh demonstration in [illegible] some of its leaders for a few hours. The Prime Minister was simultaneously [illegible] M. Kavtaradze would depart and the demand for an oil concession would be dropped.

21. M. Sa[illegible] had been persuaded by the Shah and the Majlis to stay. By now, however, the strain had become intolerable, and on the 10th November the Shah, fearing lest the Russians should resort to extreme measures such as the acceleration of the separatist movement in Azerbaijan, accepted the resignation of a man who had become almost a national hero.

22. Of the new Government formed after some delay by his successor M. Bayat, it need only be said here that they maintained during the rest of the year the stand which M. Saed had taken. The Russians had no doubt hoped [illegible] for honesty or patriotism to maintain would prove more amenable. But, if so, they reckoned without the Majlis and the popular resentment which their actions had aroused. On the 2nd December a Bill was tabled by Dr. Musaddiq, and passed immediately, which made it illegal for any Persian Government to grant an oil concession to any foreign government or company, and imposed on the Government the duty of informing the Majlis of any discussions that might take place concerning the sale of oil or the method of exploiting and administering the country's oil resources. Confronted suddenly with this Bill, the [illegible] taken aback, and were not given time to collect their wits or discuss it amongst themselves. The Russians subsequently asserted that the Bill had been forced through the Majlis unconstitutionally, but this is untrue, the use of the double urgency procedure is entirely constitutional and by no means uncommon, and the Bill

was passed by a large majority. There is no doubt whatever that it expressed the wishes of the Persian people as a whole. An attempt, made immediately after the passage of the Bill, by a deputy who owed his seat to Russian influence, to introduce another cancelling the concession of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Compa[illegible] was dropped for lack of a single backer, although in previous debates during the crisis Dr. Musaddiq himself had sharply criticised the compa[illegible]

23. M. Kavtaradze left Persia on the 9th December, having previously informed the Prime Minister of his Government's displeasure at the new oil law which, he said, the Majlis would do well to reconsider. The Russians continued till the end of the year (and after it) to agitate in this sense by all the innumerable means at their disposal, and made it quite clear that they were far from regarding the matter as closed. The Tudeh became, if not more influential, at least very much more active, the Soviet-controlled newspapers more abusive and outspokenly anti-British. There were several further demonstrations in the North including one at Shahi in which lives were lost and the police were thwarted and publicly humiliated by the Russians in the now customary manner. M. Saed living thankfully in completely inactive retirement, continued to be attacked with as much ferocity as though he had concluded a military alliance with Hitler himself. So too did Seyyid Zia, who was accused by the Russians—apparently without the slightest justification—of having inspired and rushed through Dr. Musaddiq's Bill in collaboration with M. Saed and at the behest of his fascist masters (*scilicet* the British). Both, if the Russian chorus had had its way, would have been arraigned for treason. The Seyyid retorted, indeed, with a vigorous public indictment of Soviet methods, which caused a considerable stir and enhanced his prestige. (In it, incidentally, he made the telling point that the Soviet insistence on the need for a "protective belt" in North Persia against potential fascist enemies was virtually identical with the Nazi clamour for *Lebensraum*.) But his chances of coming to power in the more or less immediate future were undoubtedly lessened by these violent Soviet attacks. It is not difficult to conduct a war of nerves in Persia, and at the end of the year the whole country was in a state of apprehension bordering on panic.

24. The Russians, in fact, had not retired from the field [illegible] True, they had not obtained the north Persian oil, but it is very d[illegible] they needed it for other purposes than the subversion of Persian [illegible] the deflection of a part of the Baku output from post war [illegible] to competition with Great Britain and America in foreign markets. They had, however, acquired something which is often more useful to a great and unscrupulous Power: a permanent "grievance value". As long as any Persian Government maintained the stand adopted by M. Saed a adm[illegible] no other stand was compatible with the preservation of Pe[illegible] integrity—it could be bullied and blackguarded as reactionary and Fascist, as rejecting the proffered hand of Soviet friendship in the interests of a foreign clique. If the withdrawal of Allied troops and the inevitable post-war deflation brought about unemployment—as indeed they were bound to do—that would be the criminal fault of a Government which had rejected a charitable Russian scheme for providing employment. Furthermore, the denial to the Russians of an oil concession was in itself an obstacle in the way of the prompt withdrawal of Allied troops, for was not a Government that denied the Russians "parity in oil matters with the imperialists" already sold to the latter and committed to a [illegible] was clear! To abandon the Persian people to such unprincipled masters would be a positive betrayal.

25. These and many similar themes were being tirelessly developed in the Soviet-controlled press towards the end of the year. The Russians, by their clumsy brutality during the oil crisis, may have lost a good many genuine Persian admirers, but they had got a very neat double-nelson on all future Persian administrations that evinced the slightest independence of spirit.

26. The theme of the "denial of parity" having been constantly developed, not only in the Soviet-controlled Persian press but also in Russian official statements and in the Soviet Government's correspondence with His Majesty's Government, it is worth pointing out that this theme is fallacious on at least three counts; none of which, however, is easy to handle in public. In the first place, while it is true that His Majesty's Government own a controlling financial interest in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, they do not run the company as a governmental organisation nor use it as a stalking-horse for the subversion of Persian authority. Any Soviet company exploiting the North Persian oil would, on the other hand, be simply and solely a Soviet Government organisation; and

would, as such, promote by every means the subversive policy which that Government has already carried so far in North Persia through other agencies. This is a fundamental difference of which the Persians themselves are fully aware, though they cannot afford to mention it publicly.

27. The second main difference is this. The original Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concession was freely negotiated on a commercial basis and under no threat of coercion; the present concession was, it is true, negotiated in [illegible] violation of a legally valid contract, and resulted in a new concession considerably more favourable to Persia than the original. In so far as the "parity" which the Russians claimed was genuinely commercial, not political, the Persians were no more called upon to grant it than they would have been to grant the British [illegible] Caspian littoral. In commercial matters a foreign Power may fairly claim equality of opportunity to obtain concessions (and this the Russians had had), but not, of course, equality of advantage with every other successful competitor. In so far as the parity claimed was in reality political (which the Russians do not and cannot admit in terms), the demand for it could only imply their sudden determination—after a "disequilibrium" lasting more than forty years and in the midst of a war in which Great Britain was their ally—to counteract the static influence of that ally in the territory of a third party. Unfortunately, as explained above, the Persians are debarred from using this valid argument by reason of the past mendacity of some of them and the credulity of others. They have too long stifled the consciousness of their own futility by declaring that the late Shah, as a British puppet, staged the crisis of 1933 at the behest of his [illegible].

28. There remains, however, a third point of dissimilarity which can scarcely be dismissed as unimportant: whatever may be said or believed of the circumstances attending the grant of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's present concession, it was certainly not granted without prior discussion and settlement of the financial terms. The Russians have attempted to dispose of this awkward point by pretending that M. Kavtaradze was empowered to offer "very favourable and profitable terms." If he was, he made no use of his powers. He offered no terms whatsoever, and he himself stated at the press interview referred to above that the discussion as to the currency in which payment would be made was to take place after the concessions had been obtained, and the general tenor of his statements at that interview makes it clear that what the [illegible] favourable, they forced the [illegible] small arms without [illegible] which involved the Persian Treasury in considerable loss.

29. The Persian case eventually secured some support from His Majesty's Government and the United States Government. On the 2nd November His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow addressed written representations to M. Molotov, pointing out that, while His Majesty's Government were far from contesting the right of the Soviet Government to seek a concession in North Persia, they considered that the Persian Government had the right to refuse, and they themselves had consequently accepted the Persian Government's decision to grant no further oil concessions till after the war. To coerce the Persian Government would not, they considered, be in accordance with the Tripartite Treaty and the Tehran Declaration.

30. This communication did not specifically ask for a reply, and none was received during the crisis. At about the same time the United States Ambassador made representations which are understood to have been on broadly similar lines. Oral representations were also made to a member of the Soviet Embassy in London on the 18th November. As it was decided in the first instance not to inform the Persians that these representations had been made on their behalf, and as it was a long time before the British press and the British Broadcasting Corporation began to give a reasonably balanced account of the dispute, M. Saed was not aware for many weeks of the extent to which his attitude had the moral support of the British and American Governments, and in these circumstances it was all the more creditable that he and his colleagues should have stood up so well to Russian intimidation. The British and American representations may, however, have served to prevent the Russians from resorting to even more violent measures.

31. It was not till the 29th December that the Soviet Government replied, through their embassy in London, to the representations of His Majesty's Government. Their reply, an unsatisfactory document containing several gross mis-statements of fact and a reference to Soviet public opinion which His Majesty's Government were probably not expected to take seriously, reproached His Majesty's Government with the "unfavourable attitude" they had adopted [illegible] M. Kavtaradze's warning to M. Bayat that the oil law of the 2nd December (described as a "resolution" unconstitutionally adopted) "ought to be reconsidered."

Suggested Withdrawal of British Forces from Persia

32. In connexion with the Soviet oil dispute, His Majesty's Embassy [illegible] to the Foreign Office that the possibility should be considered of withdrawing British Forces, at least from Tehran, as soon as aid to Russia was diverted from Persia. There were complications, *e.g.*, the arrangement to send aviation spirit from Abadan to the Soviet Union until the middle of 1945 and the fact that the presence of the Royal Air Force in Tehran enabled the British authorities concerned to maintain their connexion with the Persian Air Force [illegible] British Airways line to Tehran. On the other hand, withdrawal offered several advantages: if the British evacuated Tehran, the Soviet authorities must either do the same or expose themselves as less considerate than the British; the evacuation of Tehran by the foreign troops would in itself strengthen the Persian Government; if the touchiness of the Soviet authorities was due in part to the suspicion of British motives (as it probably was) an offer on our part to evacuate Tehran, and perhaps other places, might help to calm them down, even if at first they did attribute the offer to a wish to remove Soviet influence from the capital.

Soviet Interests

33. The post of Soviet Ambassador in Persia, which had been vacant several [illegible] M. [illegible] ostensibly for medical treatment, and did not return. It is thought he was removed in disgrace because the Persian Government refused to accept the conditions attached to the offer of war material made by Marshal Stalin to the Shah at the Tehran Conference. The Persian Prime Minister saw the ambassador [illegible] to death," yet maintaining that he was perfectly well. The British and American Embassies found him cold and suspicious and did not regret his departure. M. Mikhailov was succeeded by the former chargé d'affaires, M. [illegible] has a sense of humour and can be teased into taking routine action. The change, however, was [illegible] despite the [illegible] behaviour of the Soviet Embassy [illegible] Persia [illegible]

34. [illegible] Soviet troops [illegible] Persia [illegible]

35. [illegible] Russians [illegible] The conditions at Mashad and Zeraat were [illegible] of the East Persian supply [illegible] to Russia [illegible] work on the aerodrome at Kermanshah was [illegible] being maintained, though they too are no longer needed for sending supplies to the Soviet Union. It seems that the work begun on the aerodromes when the Germans were in the Caucasus was continued with a view to their eventual use [illegible] is, in fact, the most direct route between India and [illegible] Mashad [illegible] for a [illegible] through Soviet [illegible] Kermanshah [illegible] maintained [illegible] Persia [illegible] attitude [illegible] that the Russians are [illegible]

36. The Soviet authorities attempted to develop cultural activities in the course of the year, but did not make very much progress. In February the inauguration ceremony was held of a Committee for Soviet-Persian Cultural Relations, of which the Persian Prime Minister and Soviet Ambassador are

honorary presidents. In the course of the spring the society issued some impressive statutes, but its sole activity in the course of the year was to organise classes for learning Russian. (There is considerably less demand for Russian culture than for British culture, and this perhaps intensifies Russians suspicions of us.)

Soviet-sponsored "Union of Polish Patriots"

37. The Soviet-sponsored "Union of Polish Patriots" set up an office in Tehran early in the year and began to angle for support among the Polish refugees, using as bait the offer to allow them to rejoin their relations in Russia or to communicate with them and send them parcels. The Polish Legation told [illegible]y's Embassy that these blandishments would not have much effect, since one taste of the Soviet "Paradise" was enough for most of the refugees however much they loved their families. The Polish Legation's prophesy proved [illegible]

38. The Union of Polish Patriots succeeded, however, in being a nuisance to His Majesty's Embassy, since their written and radio propaganda was ha[illegible] to censorship by the Anglo-Soviet Persian Censorship, and the censoring of their material by the British section led to difficulties with the Soviet section.

Anglo-Soviet Persian Censorship

39. In this, as in so many other matters, the year 1944 saw a regrettable reversion to type on the part of the local Soviet representatives. The so-called Tripartite Censorship Commission (in reality an Anglo-Soviet organisation with a Persian sleeping partner) functioned smoothly enough as long as Russia was in desperate need of the support of her Allies. Censorship was confined to its legitimate sphere—the suppression of material damaging to Allied war interests. But in the spring of the year under review the Soviet section of the commission suddenly began to exercise a rigid ideological censorship, and suppressed large quantities of English newspapers and books, including standard works such as [illegible] Under the terms of the commission's charter, each of the three sections had the right to condemn material which it judged to be—

> "detrimental to the interests of Persia or the Allies, such as giving away State or war secrets or spreading anti-Allied propaganda, or any message likely to weaken the political or economic strength of the Allied Governments, or to prejudice their friendly relations."

But provision was also made for close co-ordination between the three sections and hence, by natural implication, for the exchange of all necessary explanations. The British section, therefore, while not disputing the right of its Russian counterpart to act as it had done, attempted to obtain reasoned [illegible] were ever forthcoming. The truth is probably that the Russian section, true to [illegible] natural action, from the performance of which it had only refrained in the past [illegible] British material was indeed critical of Soviet affairs in varying degrees; but for the most part the criticism was not only fair but also extremely mild—far more so than the habitual tone of the Soviet press in regard to the Western Allies. For example, one British newspaper which the Soviet section condemned—at a moment when the Soviet press was most critical of the Western Allies for [illegible] splendid Russian victories had been to some extent facilitated by Anglo-American air attacks on German industrial targets. Moreover, it was clear that the Soviet section, in its new-found zeal for Stakhanovite methods, had taken to the regular suppression of certain British publications out of hand, without troubling to examine their contents.

40. [illegible] showed the re 1939 frontiers of Eastern Europe (marked as such), although these maps were for the most part designed as propaganda for the Russian victories. Soviet maps imported into Persia showed, as finally incorporated in the Soviet Union, the earlier Russian victories of the Molotov-Ribbentrop period.

41. In one respect the Soviet section transgressed the letter, as well as the spirit, of the censorship charter; it regularly suppressed large quantities of publications addressed to Persian Departments of State, and even, on occasion, material addressed to the heads of Allied diplomatic missions. When tackled on this subject its only excuse was that it had in the past connived in the British

section's unofficial suppression for military reasons, of certain categories of printed matter addressed to neutral diplomatic missions and consulates from neutral countries bordering on Germany and German-occupied Europe. This was true, but scarcely justified the Soviet section's action in depriving the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs of copies of *the Sphere*, and the Persian Ministry of Finance of copies of *the Economist*.

42. The Soviet publications entering Persia contained plenty of material calling for suppression on a reciprocal basis. Some of them were doctrinaire works on communism, which, though recently published, repeated the savage attacks on British policy and reference to "the second imperialist war" which had been normal in Russia before Hitler forced her to range herself on the side of the democracies. Most of them indulged in venomous abuse of the Polish Government in London. Before deciding on retaliation, however, a determined effort was made, on instructions from the Foreign Office, to persuade the Soviet authorities to take a more reasonable line. The Soviet Ambassador was given a detailed analysis of the voluminous material suppressed by his section, was reminded in polite circumlocutions that two could play at this game; and was told that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government the suppression of material on ideological grounds was out of keeping with the spirit both of the alliance and of the censorship charter itself. M. Maximov adopted the customary Soviet line. [illegible] was authorised to suppress an appreciable but relatively insignificant quantity of [illegible] on "the Polish *émigré* clique." Up to the end of the year the Soviet Embassy had not reacted to these measures, though the Soviet section of the Censorship [illegible] complained in tones of outraged innocence to its British counterpart.

44. Until late in the year the Public Relations Bureau of His Majesty's Embassy and the Soviet Trade Delegation, both of which were importers of books and periodicals destined for the Persian public, remained exempt from the control of the Joint Censorship Commission. Then, however, the Soviet censor complained of the fact that the Public Relations Bureau was selling, at its own premises, copies of publications which had been condemned by him when sent through the ordinary post. Shortly afterwards he began to examine the parcels addressed to the bureau. His Majesty's Embassy caused the publications in question to be withdrawn, but protested through the British censor against the examination of material addressed to an organisation which was an integral part of the embassy. This protest was ignored, and the British censor was therefore authorised to examine the material addressed to the Soviet trade delegation, for which diplomatic privilege is claimed by the Russians.

45. The Soviet authorities adopted an equally unreasonable line in regard to local broadcasts. They played havoc with the material—for the most part [illegible] the Tehran Radio, and when, in order to restore the balance, the British censor suppressed the more objectionable features of the material submitted by the Soviet-sponsored "Polish patriots," the Soviet Embassy countered by broadcasting subsequent instalments without submission to the censorship, as programmes put out under their own auspices.

Security

46. At the beginning of the year the Persian suspects on the British and Soviet lists were all interned at Sultanabad under British control, but as a result of the strong pressure exercised by His Majesty's Embassy during the preceding months, the suspects not on the British list were transferred to Resht, in the Russian "zone," in February. Joint investigation by the Anglo-Persian Com[illegible] the suspects on the British list was completed in February, and it was decided to release twenty-three; only one of them, however, was found to be completely innocent; the remainder were made to sign an undertaking to refrain from anti-Allied activities. The Soviet Embassy were consulted as to the release of these persons and they concurred. Further releases of lesser fry were made by the British authorities in the course of the year. In April the internees still

remaining at Sultanabad were transferred to an internment camp in Tehran and placed under Persian control, but under general British supervision.

44. After prolonged negotiations the Qashgai tribe handed over to the British authorities early in the year four Germans whom they had been harbouring for a number of months. A fifth German had been allowed to escape two or three weeks before and he has so far evaded capture. He is known to be with the Beir-Ahmedi tribe. There are no other German undesirables loose in Persia. After further negotiations the Qashgai tribe surrendered the Persian Deputy, Naubakht, in the month of May. Naubakht had fled from Tehran and taken sanctuary with the Qashgai in August, 1943, after His Majesty's Embassy had informed the Persian Government that they had documents showing that he was one of the chief instigators of the anti-Allied plot of 1943. In June the British Security authorities located the Mullah Kashani, the most dangerous member of the conspiracy, in a villa in the hills north of Tehran and effected his arrest in collaboration with the Persian police. Out of the list of Persians whose arrest by Persian authorities was demanded by the Allies, there are some minor ones still at liberty about whom we do not think it worth while to bother, and a few more important ones have escaped to Turkey, in some cases with the obvious connivance of Persian officials.

45. There are signs that the Soviet authorities are planning to use some of these internees as agents. The British authorities allowed them to take Naubakht and the Mullah Kashani to Resht for interrogation, and it was noticed that the Soviet officers who returned them to the British Security authorities treated them with the greatest consideration, talking with them on the most friendly terms and shaking hands with them in farewell. Kashani expresses the greatest detestation of the British and says openly that when he is released he will do us all the harm he can. Again, the Soviet Embassy sent to [illegible] when they proposed to release. Among the names was that of General Aghevli, who, at the time of his arrest, was commanding the gendarmerie and against whom there was conclusive written and oral evidence that he held a key position in the anti-Allied plot. For some time the Soviet Security authorities had been trying, without success, to persuade their British colleagues that Aghevli was not seriously guilty, and the Soviet Embassy's proposal was the sequel. This embassy felt bound to refuse Aghevli's release and to say that if his name had not been on the Soviet list, he would have been put on ours. There is no doubt that the Soviet authorities expected assistance from Aghevli if he had been released through their efforts.

"Aid to Russia"

49. The total "Aid to Russia" tonnages transported on the (American and Russian operated) Persian State railways in 1944 was —

1,601,981 tons

This includes ocean-borne cargo for Russia landed at Persian Gulf ports, also 32,500 tons of aviation spirit and 5,000 tons of alkylate per month, and in addition 60,000 tons of motor spirit despatched between August and November inclusive, all from the refineries of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company [illegible]

50. The total "Aid to Russia" cargo carried by the United States Motor Truck Service, United Kingdom Commercial Corporation trucks, British Army General Purposes Transport Companies and by imported trucks for Russia assembled by United States truck assembly plants at Andimeshk and Khorramshahr and by the British Army Vehicle Assembly Unit at Rafidiyah, Iraq, was —

950,559 tons

This includes the weight of the trucks imported into the Soviet Union.

51. The British Army General Purposes Transport Companies employed on "Aid to Russia" lift ceased operations at the end of February 1944. United Kingdom Commercial Corporation trucks ceased operations from Khanaqin at the end of September. United States Motor Truck Service finished their "Aid to Russia" lift at the beginning of December. The only motor trucks continuing to lift "Aid to Russia" cargo at the end of the year were those imported as cased motor trucks and assembled by the United States truck assembly plant at Khorramshahr.

52. In December the United States truck assembly plant at Andimeshk was dismantled and despatched to Odessa. The Soviet Government advised the British army that the vehicle assembly plant at Rafidiyah would not be required

to assemble any more trucks after December 1944. The United States truck assembly plant at Khorramshahr therefore remains the only plant assembling imported cased motor trucks for Russia. It has a capacity now of over 5,000 units per month. When all three above-mentioned truck assembly plants were working they averaged 8,500 truck units per month in 1944.

53. About 1,000 [illegible] at Abadan by the United States Plane Assembly Plant and at the British Aircraft Assembly Plant at Shuaiba and flown to Russia via Tehran. Both the aircraft plants ceased to assemble aeroplanes for Russia in December 1944.

54. In April 1943 the average ship turnround in the Persian Gulf ports, Khorramshar, Bandar Shapur and Basra was no less than fifty-one days. By October 1944 it had been improved to seven days.

55. As regards 1945, with the opening of the Black Sea ports Odessa and [illegible] the "Aid to Russia" ocean borne tonnage via the Persian Gulf from January 1945 is rapidly falling off, i.e.—

January 1945 ...	..	61,588 actually forwarded
February 1945 ..	...	45,000 estimated
March 1945 ...	...	20,000 estimated

56. The aviation spirit at [illegible] will [illegible] June 1945.

57. The [illegible] of cased motor trucks for the Soviet Union will [illegible] at approximately 5,000 units per month up to the end of March and will fall to about 300 units in April. The Russians are negotiating for the transfer of the United States Truck Assembly Plant at Khorramshar to a Black Sea port, which will mean that the import of cased motor trucks for Russia will cease after April.

58. The United States Persian Gulf Command has closed its operations in Bandar Shahpur and this port, together with the railway from Bandar Shahpur to Ahwaz is being handed back to the Persian Government. The Soviet transportation directorate in Persia have stated that they will reduce their personnel and commitments in the northern zone as the "Aid to Russia" cargo diminishes and that after the aviation spirit and alkylate commitment is finished in June their organisation in Persia will probably cease to function as from mid July 1945.

Allied Co-operation in Persia

59. During their visit to London in April, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Wallace Murray raised the question of Allied co-operation in Persia. It was agreed to suggest to the Soviet Government that conversations should be held between the Allied representatives in Tehran to implement more fully the provisions of the Declaration of the Tehran Conference regarding economic assistance to Persia. The Soviet Government concurred, and the first meeting was held on the 3rd June. The American Chargé d'Affaires and His Majesty's Ambassador suggested that the Soviet Embassy, together with the Persian Government, should be represented on the new Inter Allied Higher Supplies Committee. (This would supersede the existing Combined Supplies Committee which was only Anglo-American and confined its attention, so far as imports were concerned, to entering the country from the south or east.) A second meeting was held on the 21st June. The British and American representatives impressed on the Soviet Ambassador that it was in Russia's own interests, if only as beneficiaries of a trans-Persian route, to contribute to Persia's well being. The British and American representatives proceeded cautiously with a proposal made by the State Department that the Soviet Ambassador should be pressed to support the American advisers [illegible] dangerous matter too brusquely." The meeting then discussed the grain situation and agreed that all possible help must be given by the Allies to ensure the collection of the Persian Government's share of the grain. The Soviet Ambassador, on instructions from Moscow, asked for further information about the proposed Higher Supplies Committee. It was clear that the Soviet Government were [illegible] that they might be voted down. The British and American representatives [illegible] of meeting these needs from Allied sources. In the course of June the American

Chargé d'Affaires communicated to the Soviet Ambassador a scheme by the American Director of Road Transport(1) in the north. The Soviet Ambassador promised to study this, but he was guarded and tended to throw doubt on the need for Americans. No further meetings were held pending the reactions of the Soviet Government to the proposal made. No reply was ever given, but what with the Soviet oil dispute with the Persian Government on the one hand, and on the other the improvement in the grain situation and the better war news, both the feasibility of the scheme and the need for it diminished.

60. In 1944 Persia was the one country where British, American and Soviet civil and military authorities met on a broad land front and the necessary contacts at the various technical levels proceeded reasonably smoothly and efficiently, in spite of the difficulties in the political sphere. One excellent reason for this was, of course, that "Aid to Russia" through Persia really delivered the goods during 1944.

The American Advisory Missions

(a) *General*

[illegible] vernment explained to [illegible] ous for the missions to [illegible] partiure of British troops. T[illegible] gn assistance and they would prefer that [illegible] should be provided by the United States if possible. If, however, the United States Government felt unable to provide it, His Majesty's Government would have to consider advising the Persian Government to look elsewhere. The State Department replied that the United States Government were not losing interest in Persia but they had no fixed policy of retaining advisory missions there. They had, for instance, always made it clear to the Persian Government that American advisers must not be exposed to vilification. If attacked the Persian Government must defend them, otherwise they would be withdrawn and would not be replaced. The United States Government had now decided that —

(1) Colonel Schwartzkopf and his five assistants would be left for a further year with the gendarmerie.
(2) They would investigate whether Colonel Schwartzkopf might take over the police as well.
(3) General Ridley would remain until the 1st March, 1945, by which date [illegible] would have done everything possible to accomplish his task, the War Department would probably decline to appoint a successor and were inclined to concentrate on the gendarmerie and police.

63. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires comment on these decisions was th[illegible] work covered by his contract and that such work as he had achieved would in any case be rapidly undone if he left. Mr Lascelles went on to discuss how far the possession of an efficient army would really be useful and necessary to Persia in post war conditions. As long as the present Shah remained on the throne the army would play a preponderant rôle in the country's affairs and remain the chief instrument of internal security. For the Americans to concentrate on the gendarmerie and police would be all very well if they obtained an increasing share of the revenue at the expense of the army, the continued presence of General Ridley's Mission would not entirely solve this problem but would at

(1) For the management of road transport.

least hint it sufficiently to give Colonel Schwartzkopf a fair chance. His [illegible] Schwartzkopf have additional staff so as to enable him to take over the police, but as regards General Ridley they confined themselves to asking whether, in the event of his task not being completed by that date, the War Department would let him stay on until he had finished. The State Department replied that the War Department did not hold out much hope of keeping General Ridley on beyond March 1945 unless he himself recommended it. They succeeded in [illegible] did not feel justified in proposing the matter to the Persian Government. The [illegible] r, either of their own accord, or at British prompting must make a definite request that Colonel Schwartzkopf should take over the police. His Majesty's [illegible] ernment instructed this embassy to impress upon the Persian Government [illegible] probably because of the known hostility of the Russians to the presence of American advisers in Persia, and the opposition to Dr Millspaugh in the Majlis which was becoming more and more violent and tended to prejudice the question of the employment of American advisers in general.

(b) *Dr Millspaugh's Mission.*

64. From April onwards there was a campaign against Dr Millspaugh and his colleagues both in the Majlis and in the press. The more important criticisms were —

(1) That the mission had not reorganised the finances nor prevented a rise in prices nor assured supplies.

[illegible] a period of inflation to increase revenue and reduce expenditure but was faced, through no fault of his own with a considerable deficit on the previous year's working. It is perhaps true, however, that his attempt to impose a much higher [illegible] and less corrupt countries it usually takes a number of years before people can be persuaded to pay income-tax honestly and before an administrative cadre can be developed that will ensure collection. Dr Millspaugh's income-tax has [illegible] who are entitled to criticise him for it. Again, the rise in prices is largely due to the presence of the Allied forces in this country and it is unlikely that the price level will fall until they are withdrawn or until the end of the war with [illegible] Dr M[illegible] rationed supplies at [illegible] American officials.)

(2) That the expenditure of Persian Government money on the administration of the Supply Department, the Price Stabilisation Section and Road Transport organisation was excessive.

(The pay of the American personnel in these departments is very high by Persian standards, but their work is essential to Persian economy and the expenditure is consequently justified.)

(3) That some of the members of the mission were incompetent.

(This is true to some extent but it is due (a) to the difficulty of securing [illegible] adviser to foreign Governments. Nevertheless at least a dozen of the Millspaugh Mission are capable men. As regards Dr Millspaugh himself, his qualities could be described as follows: He is honest and tenacious, but extremely obstinate. He has administrative ability up to a point, but (a) he tended to centralise all powers in himself—this hampered and offended his American colleagues and [illegible] this led to the commission of avoidable mistakes. In any case, [illegible]

The Shah disliked Dr Millspaugh, who was unwilling as well as unable to provide money for so large an army as the Shah would like to have, and was imprudent enough to say, in an interview to the press, that the security forces of Persia were not worth the money expended on them. The Russians, in turn were suspicious of and unhelpful to, the mission. Finally, there were the many powerful Persians who stood to lose by the mission's efforts to bring down prices and to control financial abuses.

65. The campaign against Dr Millspaugh led to the tabling of a Government [illegible] ground that he had not shown sufficient results. (As stated in paragraphs 86 [illegible] Dr Millspaugh had been given, in addition to his financial powers, wide economic powers [illegible] resigned. The Government then decided—quite rightly—that they could not do without him. The Bill was withdrawn, and Dr Millspaugh agreed to remain in office; but he continued to be under strong criticism, justifiable and unjustifiable. In August Dr Millspaugh granted another unfortunate interview to the press, in which he said that the United States was the only country which had championed Persian freedom and that if his mission had not been present in Persia one of three things would have happened: (a) disturbances leading to the occupation of North and South Persia, by the Russians and British respectively; (b) occupation of the country by an international force; (c) a dictatorship even more rigorous than Reza Shah's.

[illegible] the autumn, he dismissed Mr A. H. Ibtihaj from his position [illegible] National Bank (without consulting persons, such as His Majesty's Ambassador or the American Ambassador, who would have been in a position to give good advice). The Government thereupon cancelled the order of dismissal as outside Dr Millspaugh's powers. It is true that Mr Ibtihaj had [illegible] but Dr Millspaugh's action showed a want of political sense which was inexcusable. The result was an increase in the agitation against him; at the end of the year a debate was taking place in the Majlis on a renewed proposal to [illegible] of his economic powers.

67. [illegible] it was clear that Dr Millspaugh must go, the Persian Government appeared anxious to keep the rest of the Millspaugh mission, and His Majesty's Government instructed this embassy to do everything possible to secure their retention.

(c) *American Military Mission.*

68. General Ridley's mission now consists of the full complement of twenty officers.

69. General Ridley himself paid a visit to the United States during the summer in order to obtain equipment and, it was learnt confidentially, to discuss the future of his mission. Its achievements are described in the section on the Persian army. General Ridley himself, never a forceful character, seems tired and his influence is less and less in evidence. The members of the mission, catching [illegible] infection and appalled by the magnitude of their task, have become disgruntled [illegible] of the mission are now limited to matters of transport and supply [illegible] unbiased advice about the medical services. His scheme for the [illegible] organisation of [illegible] few months.

70. One is forced to the belief that the army authorities engaged the mission as a Santa Claus who would fill their stocking with exciting weapons of the latest design while relying on their powers of passive resistance and "sabotage with a [illegible] to nullify any disturbing tendencies on the part of the mission to act the part of a new administrative broom.

(d) *American Gendarmerie Mission.*

71. (See under "Persian Gendarmerie.")

(e) *American Police Adviser.*

72. Mr Timmerman, the quite useless American police adviser, died suddenly in May. He has not been replaced (see also (a) above).

Raising of His Majesty's Legation and United States Legation to the Status of Embassies.

73. At the end of 1943, the President of the United States decided to raise the American Legation at Tehran to an embassy as a result of the Tehran Conference declaration regarding Persia, the United States Government regarded the latter as a co-belligerent, and it was their policy to have embassies in co-belligerent countries.

74. His Majesty's Government decided to follow suit, and on the 10th February the two legations announced the change. His Majesty's Ambassador presented his new credentials on the 9th March. The Persian Legation in London was likewise raised to an embassy.

American Interests.

75. The American Minister, Mr Dreyfus, went on leave after the Tehran Conference and did not return, and Mr Leland Burnette Morris was appointed as first American Ambassador. His Majesty's Government, at the instigation of His Majesty's Embassy, urged the United States Government to send him to Tehran soon, on the grounds that the [illegible] between the American advisers in Persia was disturbing and that it should be the function of the American Ambassador to supply that co-ordination, for instance. Dr Millspaugh, the head of the financial mission, and General Ridley, the head of the military mission, were unable to agree on the sums which should be allotted to the Persian army. Mr Morris, however, only arrived on the 12th August, and if he came with [illegible] to [illegible] the fact, although he seemed to be impressed by the arguments of His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that such action was necessary.

76. The Hitlerian methods used by the Soviet Government in pressing the Persian Government to grant them an oil concession appear to have contributed to a change in the views held by Mr Wallace Murray, who [illegible] Middle Eastern affairs in the State Department. In the past he [illegible] being extremely suspicious of British [illegible] His Majesty's Embassy in Washington reported, however, that he was now constantly preoccupied with the fear of Soviet penetration in the Balkans and the Middle East, and that he was anxious to co-operate with the British on every issue.

77. The reduction at the end of the year of aid to Russia through Persia, and the departure of Lieutenant-General Connally from the command of the American Persian Gulf Command. He was replaced by Brigadier-General Booth.

British Propaganda Activities.

78. Propaganda and publicity material have been put out by the Public Relations Bureau throughout the year. [illegible] 1942. The press attaché's section produces a weekly publication *Tufan* containing articles translated from material received from the Ministry of Information [illegible] world wide interest with special emphasis laid upon Britain's and the British Empire's part in the war. This illustrated weekly is sent freely to some 11,400 leading P[illegible] country, including every member of the Majlis [illegible] publications include the *Naw Nehalan*, a fortn[illegible] with a circulation of 20,000 copies [illegible] 11 [illegible] the most [illegible] Queen Kawza who [illegible] Relations Bureau in Italy. [illegible] but unfortunately Persian [illegible] reading public and circulation is not [illegible] present level of 4,000.

79. The *Tehran Daily News*, the English paper published by the Public Relations Bureau [illegible] four pages twice weekly and contains world news and leading articles from *The Times* and other papers

as well as feature articles received from the Ministry of Information in London and Cairo. The paper has now risen to a daily circulation of just on 4,000.

80. The broadcasting section has throughout the year continued its half-hour daily programme "The Voice of Britain" from Radio Tehran. The Sunday time was surrendered to the French, Poles and Dutch, who arranged their own programmes. Political and world affairs were covered by three weekly newsletters. For the rest, the programmes were made up of Persian guest speakers who gave talks on various aspects of social welfare, on English liter[illegible] kindred subjects. In December it was, however, decided [illegible] time had come to cease broadcasting "The Voice of Britain" from [illegible] Tehran and the authorities have been told that as one step in the return to normal this half hour will be returned to them at Nowruz (21st March). The chief reason for deciding to take this step was the hope that it might lead to the Russians' also ceasing to broadcast their Irano Soviet Culture Society's programmes from Radio Tehran as these had become progressively less and less cultural and more and more aggressive and objectionable political broadcasts.

81. The films section issues Ministry of Information newsreels to the commercial cinemas throughout the country (some fifty in number), and in order to maintain their equipment and programme, assists them in importing essential [illegible] transport difficulties. In December a contract for twenty-four British films was completed, the most important British film contract yet placed in Persia. In addition, this section has seven touring mobile cinemas and nine portable sound projectors. Educational film shows at institutes, colleges and schools throughout the country are organised and arranged in co-operation with the Ministry of Education and the University Faculties.(1) All film shows are extremely popular in Tehran, and His Majesty's consulates report similar enthusiasm for films in the provinces and in the places visited by the vans.

82. Throughout the year window displays and reading room exhibitions have been prepared by the Visual Publicity Section for showing both in Tehr[illegible] tributed both through Persian newsagents and booksellers and from the Public Relations Bureau's own show rooms at most centres.

[illegible] His Majesty's consulates report continued efforts by the Russians to extend the field of their own publicity. There is to-day no apparent effort on the part of the Persians to resist our publicity; on the contrary, more Persians than ever now advise us as to how our campaigns should be conducted to be successful. Co-operation is generous and appears to be whole hearted since much help is given both voluntarily and without payment.

British Council

84. [illegible] Persia numbers twenty five; they are [illegible] part time teachers. These control [illegible] ing of upwards of 4,000 students in institutes, evening classes, universities, Government and private schools and agricultural and technical colleges.

85. Institutes at Tehran and Isfahan cater for 1,500 and 400 students respectively and the new institute at Shiraz, officially opened in November, has already over 800 students. These three institutes provide English teachers and class rooms as well as club amenities and games, a library, film displays, reading rooms, lectures, concerts and drama.

86. Three evening schools teach over 900 students outside the institutes. A summer school near Tehran taught 250 students in outdoor classes and provided concerts, a swimming pool and Shakespearian performances in an open-air theatre.

87. Over 80,000 books, including text books, periodicals and technical bulletins have been distributed. Sets of books have been presented to universities, colleges and clubs.

88. Educational film displays were seen by over 60,000 persons and were given in schools and colleges. Radio lessons in English are broadcast five days [illegible]

89. Other activities include an art school, physical training and dress making classes, a debating society, drama, chess and universities clubs, a medical association, art exhibitions, a theatre and restaurant in Tehran, as well as private tuition and coaching classes.

(1) The Public Relations Bureau also run a nomadic cinema, built at the [illegible] of programmes of one hour consisting of [illegible]

[illegible] Six scholarships have been granted for post graduate scholars to England. Students are prepared for Cambridge and matriculation examinations and children are placed at schools and colleges in England.

Middle East Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the Polish Refugees

91. At the beginning of the year the total number of Polish civilians in Persia was 9,622. By the end of the year it had been reduced to 4,135 [illegible] les who left went to the following destinations: Palestine, the Lebanon, India, East Africa, Rhodesia, and New Zealand. Others went to join the Polish armed forces. Half of the children's school at Isfahan and their attendant [illegible] still remain to be evacuated. [illegible] in Persia [illegible] forces and [illegible] who conseq[illegible] subject only [illegible]

92. Ex[illegible] of 1944 [illegible] per month by the end of the year. This expenditure is difficult to control since although the money is advanced by His Majesty's Government (under the Polish civil credit), the funds are Polish. At the instance of this embassy a number of economies have been effected, but there are probably still some items of extravagance which it is not possible to check.

93. On the 2nd August, 1944 the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration took over from Middle East Relief and Rehabilitation Admini[illegible] handling of the Polish refugees in Persia. These Poles, however [illegible] refugees within the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation A[illegible]ration's definition of the term, and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration take no financial responsibility for them and in fact, no responsibility other than that of ultimate repatriation. They are however prepared to act (without commitment) in a certain measure as regards transport.

Economic Warfare

94. The necessity for contraband control in Persia has naturally declined during 1944, particularly since the closing of the Balkan route to Switzerland and the occupation of Roumania and Bulgaria. In fact the only enemies with whom the Persians could now trade are specified persons in neutral territory, and such trade is easily prevented by liaison with the British section of the Anglo-Soviet Persian censorship. Merchants are generally anxious to follow such guidance and warnings as are given to them by the Economic Warfare section of the embassy.

95. On the other hand a number of contraband control prohibitions continue to exist for which the merchant can see no valid justification, *e.g.*, the prohibition of all carpet exports to Switzerland and of lambskins to Turkey. Fortunately the merchants concerned are not politically articulate, and it may be hoped that the end of the war with Germany may soon remove the cause of their complaints, and incidentally of some embarrassment to the embassy, since [illegible] allow Persian exports to pass which have not been authorised by the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

96. The weeding out of the statutory and black lists in Persia continued during 1944, and by the end of the year both were very small. Some persons remaining on the statutory list have been recommended as eligible for retention after the close of hostilities with Germany owing to their dealings with the German intelligence service.

97. There has been during the year a considerable move by Persians to send financial relief to their relatives in the crumbling fortress of Europe. Accordingly an informal arrangement was made with the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs whereby they identified the beneficiaries and the Economic Warfare Section examined each case (in secret liaison with the security authorities) before the censor passed the relevant telegraphic transfer. This arrangement has worked smoothly, though some remittances have been disallowed because the beneficiaries were working for the enemy. In such cases the refusal was accompanied by the grounds for rejection.

Relations with India

98. In response to the Government of India's invitation a small cultural mission of three Persian scholars toured India during March and April 1944. They were able to see for themselves the great progress in scientific and industrial matters in India and the richness of Persian culture there. On their return to Tehran they enthusiastically set about the dissemination of the facts and at the [illegible] he year an authoritative and representative Indo-Iranian Cultural Society was inaugurated at a meeting of savants and other persons interested in Indo-Persian culture.

99. The Government of India made a generous offer of eleven valuable scholarships for post graduate courses in (*a*) forestry (2), (*b*) agriculture (4), (*c*) engineering and technical (3), (*d*) textile (2), and six at the Aitchison College, Lahore, for younger boys. The selection of candidates by a sub-committee of the society (which includes a member of the British Council) was not completed by the end of the year, but it is hoped that sufficient suitable young men equipped with an adequate knowledge of the English language will be found.

100. Sir Olaf Caroe, Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department, and Sir Denys Pilditch, Director of Intelligence, and the Home Department of the Government of India, visited Tehran for a week in June and discussed problems of mutual interest. Their visit coincided with the climax of Soviet obstructionism, for in spite of strong pressure by His Majesty's Embassy, they were refused permission to fly to Meshed, where the Government of India have large interests, until after their departure for Ind[illegible].

101. Four members of the Indian Defence Consultative Committee travelled to Persia in May to visit the Indian troops here.

102. As the British Council could not furnish enough English teachers to meet the great demand the Government of India carefully selected four Indian graduate experts to teach English at Meshed (2), Kerman (1) and Yezd (1). On the success of this experiment depends the sending of other Indian teachers to Bushire, Ahwaz, and elsewhere, where the demand would justify the expenditure involved. The reports for the difficult initial month's work in the three centres are most encouraging. The British Council gave valuable assistance with English text books.

[illegible] community in the capital, having been purged of its most [illegible]rable elements, is beginning to show a greater interest in the part which its members must play as ambassadors of their country and their change [illegible] heart has been shown in the very generous contributions which the community has made to India's war effort in the form of charitable donations and invest[illegible] with the British welfare authorities to entertain Indian troops stationed at Tehran.

104. India's interest in the expansion of her post war export trade is shown by the establishment of a Trade Commissioner in Tehran. The first Indian Trade Commissioner is expected to take up his duties in the spring of 1945.

Internal Politics and the Majlis

(a) *Majlis*

105. At the beginning of the year the elections for the 14th legislative period had not been completed and the Majlis was not in session. The formal opening fixed for the 22nd January was moreover postponed as a result principally of the opposition of the Shah who wanted a more subservient Parliament and was apprehensive of what might happen when Seyyid Zia-ed-Din Tabatabai took his seat. It was, however, formally opened on the 26th February. Muhammad Zaghi Assad (Amir Jang) was elected temporary president for the examination of the credentials of the Deputies. Later he was succeeded as president by Seyyid Muhammad Sadigh Tabatabai who continued to be president for the rest of the year.

106. [illegible] of the time of the M[illegible] Zia was strong [illegible] so [illegible] a good impression, his credentials were passed with a sub[illegible] by [illegible]. Although a number of objections were tabled in the course of the year, the [illegible] seated.

The Deputies [illegible] were [illegible] Darabgez and Kiaie and [illegible] was elected [illegible] to have been secured by foreign agents.

107. The Tudeh group in the Majlis originally numbered eight, but was reduced in August to seven by the expulsion of one member, Khalatbari, Deputy for Babul. In October however, the passing of the credentials for Ovanassian, Deputy for the Northern Armenians and a founder member of the Tudeh, again raised the number of the group to eight. This group published at the end of February its programme for the 14th legislative period. It was a surprisingly moderate programme of reform which might have been produced by any of the progressive elements inside or outside the Majlis. The Tudeh may indeed have started as a genuinely left wing Persian movement, but its subservience to Soviet influence had become increasingly clear by the end of the year, and the co[illegible] and well-organised activities displayed throughout the year by its representatives in the Majlis confirmed the belief that the party owed much in Russian influence and support.

108. Other groups or "fractions" cont[illegible] Majlis but they were more like associations [illegible] part[illegible] Efforts to form an effective Government majority in the Majlis by a coalition of various "fractions," however, achieved temporary success towards the end of August when about eighty-five Deputies agreed to combine to support Saed's reconstituted Cabinet. This coalition survived until October, when the Russian demand for an oil concession caused a crisis which eventually brought about Saed's resignation, whereupon the coalition of fractions formed to support him began gradually to dissolve. The process of disintegration was accelerated in December by further disagreement among the Deputies over the Millspaugh question.

109. By the end of the year 130 out of the full complement of 136 Deputies had taken their seats in the Majlis, though the credentials of two of their number still remained to be examined.

110. The Majlis passed little legislation during the year, having been preoccupied with the credentials of elected Deputies, the Millspaugh question, intrigues over the composition of Cabinets and the crisis caused by the Russian demand in October for an oil concession. The Chamber had failed by the end of December to approve the Budget for the year 1323 (21st March, 1944 to 20th March, 1945) and adopted the course of financing Government expenditure by Votes on Account. Among the measures passed was article 12 of the Con[illegible] Bill [illegible] Bill [illegible] an additional credit of 150 million rials for the army, and a Bill tabled by Dr Musadiq on the 2nd December prohibiting the grant of an oil concession to any foreign Government or company.

(b) *Internal Politics*

111. Sohaily's Cabinet, which had been appointed on the 16th December, 1943, remained in power until the end of the elections when, realising it had lost the support of the Majlis, it resigned. Sohaily was succeeded by Saed who, on the 26th March, presented the following Cabinet to the Shah:

Prime Minister: Muhammad Sa'ed Maraghe'i
Agriculture: Mahmud Fateh
Commerce and Industry: Amanullah Ardalan
[illegible]: Hamid Saya
Education: Sarlashkar Ali Riazi
Finance: Mahmud Narimani
Foreign: Muhammad Sa'id Maraghe'i
Interior: Abdul Hussein Hajhir
Justice: Asadullah Mamaqani
Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones: Abdul Qasim Furuhar
Health: Dr Qasim Ghani
War: Ibrahim Zand
Without portfolio: Murteza Quli Bayat, Mustafa Adl

The Majlis did not take long to signify its disapproval of this Cabinet. The Deputies [illegible] opposition was concentrated against Zand, Dr Ghani and General Riazi who were thought to be nominees of the Shah. His Majesty's continued intervention in the affairs of the Cabinet, the Majlis and the army had caused increasing resentment. There was a strong feeling in the Majlis that the Shah's activities should be confined within strictly constitutional limits. At the end of March Sa'ed had only announced his programme and had not ventured to present his

Ministers for the approval of the Majlis, and he was obliged a few days later to reconstitute his Cabinet. General Riazi, Mahmud Fateh and Mahmud Nariman were dropped. Furuhar became Mi[illegible] on; Nasir I'timadi, Minister of Agriculture, and Dr. Sa[illegible] Minister of Health. The Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs remained vacant. The new Cabinet was, however, not greeted with any enthusiasm in the Majlis [illegible], and Dr. Ghani had resigned before the end of April. Neverthe[illegible] absence of any alternative to Sa'ed, the Majlis gave the new Cabinet [illegible] on the 16th April.

112. [illegible] Sa'ed asserted himself sufficiently to admonish the press for its irresponsible virulence and shameless blackmail. He also caused a stir by introducing a Bill to apply military law to Government employees and factory workers. The Bill was attacked by the Tudeh as reactionary and was rejected.

113. Criticism of Sa'ed soon began. His detractors said he was weak and reactionary and, owing to his long residence abroad, ignorant of conditions in his own country. Nevertheless in the absence of any general agreement as to who [illegible] ably in office until the end of August. By then Majlis opinion had decided that the best temporary solution would be for Sa'ed to reshuffle his Cabinet, and he was promised the support of a coalition of eighty-five deputies of the Mihan, Ittehad-i Milli and Azadi fractions. On the 31st August Sa'ed presented his reconstituted Cabinet to the Shah as follows:—

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs: Muhammad Sa'ed [illegible]
[illegible]
War: [illegible]
Without portfolio: Khalil [illegible]

General Muhammad Hussein Firuz, Governor [illegible] to accept the Ministry of War, which was left under the charge of Brigadier Abdullah Amdavat, as Acting Minister.

114. The new Cabinet was opposed by the Tudeh who objected to the return of [illegible] its formation. Discussions lasting a fortnight followed before the Cabinet finally obtained its vote of confidence on the 17th September. Although Sa'ed continued to enjoy the support of the coalition majority in the Majlis, the position of his Cabinet remained unstable owing to the opposition of the Tudeh and the Russians and of the Shah who was displeased because none of his nominees were in the Government.

115. A notable feature of political life in Persia during the year was the growth of the power of parties and unions. Labour unions had existed for some time in the Russian occupied zone where they were affiliated with the Tudeh [illegible]. Other unions also existed in Isfahan and Khuzistan. In Isfahan the [illegible] the workers' union combined caused trouble in April and the Govern[illegible] to send a strong Governor General to that town to deal with the situation. A[illegible]ation was also fomented in Tabriz in July when the Majlis ventured to reject the credentials of a Tudeh sponsored deputy from that district. From the 1st to the 12th August the Tudeh party held its first general conference in Tehran. The conference confirmed the programme of moderate constitutional reform adopted by its representatives in the Majlis in February. Other resolutions passed confirmed the hostility of the party to Seyyid Zia and to all foreign advisers, and to the grant of economic concessions "which constrict or weaken the economic independence of the Persian nation." Labour unions affiliated to the Tudeh played a large part in the demonstrations and street disturbances organised by that party in Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan and other towns in October and November, as a result of the refusal of the Persian Government to grant the oil concession to Russia. The Tudeh had indeed so clearly revealed itself as an instrument of Russian policy by the end of the year that it had become seriously discredited in the eyes of the public. Other parties, such as the "Hamrahan," the "Adalat," and the "Mardum" were of little importance. But Seyyid Zia

was reported to be making progress with the foundation of a party of his own, by a process of forming circles of "progressive" elements throughout the country.

116. Seyyid Zia's vigorous personality was throughout this period a source of constant provocation to the Tudeh and the Russians who could not get out of their heads the theory that he was a creature of the British. His relations with the Shah, which at first were extremely bad, gradually improved. Increasing fear [illegible] that he might before long need the strong personality of Seyyid Zia to stand up to the Russians. After several interviews the Shah and Seyyid Zia were believed to have reached a considerable measure of agreement by the end of August, but nothing further had come of the apparent reconciliation by the end of the year.

117. The Persian Government's rejection in October of the Russian demand for an oil concession precipitated a crisis which brought about Sa'ed's resignation. Although Sa'ed clearly had the support of public opinion and of a growing section of the press, the Majlis decided finally that he should go, as a sop to the Russians. Sa'ed therefore resigned on the 10th November. The various Majlis fractions thereupon went into conclave to choose a successor, but it was not until the 20th November that Murteza Quli Bayat was elected Prime Minister with fifty votes against forty-five given to Sadiq Sadiqi.

118. On the 25th November Bayat presented the following Cabinet to the Shah:—

Prime Minister: Murteza Quli Bayat.
Foreign: Muhsin Ra[illegible]
Commerce and Industry: Kamal Hidayat.
Communications: Nasrullah Intizam.
Education: Dr. Isa Sadiq.
Finance: Amanullah Ardalan.
Interior: Muhammad Sururi.
War: Ibrahim Zand.
Justice: Mustafa Ad[illegible]
Health: Dr. Saul Mank.
Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones: Nadir Arasteh.
Without portfolio: Khalil Fahimi, Ali Akbar Siasi.

Muhsin Rais, Persian Ambassador at Baghdad, having refused the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, Nasrullah Intizam was appointed to the post. Two of the new Ministers, Khalil Fahimi, Minister without portfolio, and Sururi, Minister of the Interior, had held the same posts in Sa'ed's Government. On the whole, the Cabinet was considered a fairly good one. Discussion on the new Government's programme was concluded on the 4th December and Bayat received a vote of confidence by a majority of seventy-two to nine with sixteen abstentions.

The Press and Public Relations

119. The tone of the press during the past year was, on the whole, more favourable to the Allies. This may be ascribed largely to their improved fortunes on the battle-front. As the end of the war drew nearer, there was a growing tendency to emphasise Persia's claims at the Peace Conference and to urge the Government to draw up Persia's case.

120. [illegible] the press crystallised into two, at least [illegible] an opportunity to attack [illegible] Similarly, the oil crisis in [illegible]

121. [illegible] a number of papers supporting Seyyid Zia, took a strong line over the oil crisis and asserted that Russian intimidation was an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of the country.

122. From time to time there were fulsome articles in praise of Russia, such as the occasion of the formation of the Irano-Soviet Cultural Relations [illegible] but there is little doubt that fear of Russian intentions towards Persia [illegible] d with growing rapidity. In proportion, as the attitude towards Russia [illegible] ted so did the attitude towards Great Britain improve. The oil crisis induced certain papers to stand up to Russia. To their surprise they found they were not visited immediately with some terrible punishment. The result has been that a juster balance has been observed in the allocation by the press and public of blame among Allies for Persia's ills.

123. There was a growing tendency from the summer onwards to accuse the United States of having imperialist designs in Persia and the Middle East.

124. In internal affairs the press showed itself extremely sensitive to any supposed attack on its freedom or to any attempt to establish control over it. Any measures which were thought to be a reversion to the dictatorship and its methods were also virulently attacked. The general tone towards internal affairs has been one of pessimism. The governing classes were persistently accused of corruption and incapability.

125. The Millspaugh mission was virulently attacked by the Freedom Front papers and the majority of neutral papers. Its only support came from a number of Independence Front papers and papers supporting Seyyid Zia.

Tribal Situation.

126. The tribes have remained comparatively peaceful during 1944 having been allowed, in a large measure, to manage their own affairs. The Government, perhaps as the result of three years of pressure by this embassy, has at least condescended to recognise that among the people of Persia, for whose welfare [illegible] responsible are tribal communities, outlandish barbarians in the opinion of most of the Ministers, whose way of life requires special consideration. A Tribal Commission was formed composed of two Ministers without portfolio [illegible] This [illegible] submission on its turn recommended the formation of a Tribal Affairs Department in the Ministry of the Interior which was to have branches in all the provinces. However, as the result of the successful conclusion of some very minor operations for disarming some of the weaker and more accessible tribes and, as time passed by without any serious uprising, the Persian Government's fear of, and interest in, the tribes declined and the commission ceased to function and finally disintegrated with that imperceptible decay so common to Persian institutions. Seyyid Zia also, with the object of gaining tribal support, made known his sympathy with the neglect and oppression tribes had suffered in recent years, and his views that they merited much greater consideration from the Government and that they should be allowed to retain their arms to protect themselves against oppression until they were assured of just administration. This put the Tudeh party, always in opposition to Seyyid Zia, in a difficult position. They had themselves for political purposes been championing the cause of the tribes, but their hostility to Seyyid Zia obliged them to cry loudly against what they alleged was incitement of the tribes to rearm and oppose the Government. The Shah, too, was disturbed by the thought that Seyyid Zia was trying to secure the support of the tribes with a view to using them to bring off a *coup d'Etat* as the Bakhtiari had done some decades before. For a time it seemed that he was himself going to make a bid for popularity among the tribes, but he seems to have reverted to his father's idea that they must be disarmed as soon and as ruthlessly as possible and kept in a state of weakness lest they become a dangerous instrument in the hands of foreigners or schemers against the throne. The pact of friendship between Qavam ul Mulk and Nasir Qashgai, later joined by Murteza Quli Khan Bakhtiari, has contributed to peace by removing, for a time at least, some of the causes of unrest which lay in long-standing mutual antagonisms. This pact has been represented as an alliance of the tribes of the south and Tudeh press has been lead to proclaiming that this is a sinister move by Persian reactionaries and their masters to form an imperialistic zone of influence in the south.

127. Affairs worthy of note in the various tribal zones may be summarised as follows:

(a) *Bakhtiari.*—Some discontent is becoming evident with the rather arbitrary government of Murteza Quli Khan, who, in spite of his protestations to the contrary, appears to be reverting to the customs of the days of Ilkhani rule, the return of which would be hardly more welcome to the tribesmen than the return of the military régime of Reza Shah's days. Murteza Quli Khan is

[illegible] to be levying on the tribe the old taxes levied by the Ilkhanis and [illegible] ed by Reza Shah. Moreover, he is departing from a well-established [illegible] of the old days when the lucrative posts in tribal administration were evenly distributed between the two rival branches of the ruling family. Now only his own relatives get these opportunities, and the disgruntled Khans of the other branch heartily encourage all the discontent they can find.

(b) *Qashqai.*—With the handing over of the Germans and of Naubakht our relations with the Qashqai diminished in importance. Nasir Khan has still failed to make his submission to the Persian Government in the person of the Shah but has had frequent contacts with the Governor-General of Fars and His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz. He hankers after but has not yet been given the title of "Rais-i-Intizamat" (chief administrator) which is the furthest the Persian Government were prepared to go in recognising his position as head of [illegible] of robbery serve as a reminder that brigandage is endemic in Fars.

(c) *Kuhgalu.*—On the [illegible] the Bahmai tribe of Kuhgalu has been indulging in some minor raiding. Earlier in the year plans had been made by the local Persian commanders for the disarmament of this tribe and the western Janeki tribe, but at the last moment fears that the Bahmai might be supported by other Kuhgalu tribes modified the plan, and only the Janeki lost some arms. It is through their territory that the Bahmai are now raiding, and the Janeki plead their disarmament as justification for being unable to prevent them. A delicately balanced situation exists between the conflicting sections of the Boir Ahmadi. Both sides are wearying of the tension and showing a tendency to come to terms. Whether this will be to the benefit of their neighbours, only time will show. There has certainly been less than the usual Boir Ahmad raiding since the tribes were occupied in sparring with each other.

(d) *Khuzistan.*—A measure of the disarmament of the Arab tribes has been effected and continues. After some 1,000 rifles had been collected from the Arabs of the Abu Dashi area the Persian troops turned their attention to the Beni Turuf who, with opposition from only a small section who fled to Iraq, surrendered some 1,300 rifles. The Beni Tamim have now begun to hand in their arms. Further operations have been successfully undertaken between Ahwaz and Bandar Shahpur, east of Ahwaz near Khalafabad and on Abadan Island.

(e) *Kurdistan.*—The tribal situation in Southern Kurdistan has on the whole remained remarkably quiet. In August, however, the Persian Government conducted an operation against Hama Rashid of Baneh, who had rebelled against them in 1942 and had wrested from them a settlement leaving him in effective control of his district. For some time past some Persian authorities had held the view that his position was a dangerous encouragement to Kurdish aspirations. This embassy's advice was that any measure against him should be combined with concrete evidence of an intention to provide benefits for the [illegible] tribes. [illegible] Government thereupon [illegible] tent by attacking a neighbouring village. The Government thereupon despatched a column against him as a result of which Baneh and Sardasht were [illegible] Persian territory. He has now been removed from the vicinity of the frontier by the Iraqi authorities. Most of the chiefs of this area have made their peace, for the time being, with the Persian authorities, and if the Persians were capable of just administration and a consistent policy they would now have the opportunity of relieving Kurdish fears and laying the foundation of a permanent settlement. In North Kurdistan the situation is not easy to describe. It is known that the Russians are in close touch with the Kurds and have not permitted any offensive measures, and disarmament operations or even free movement to the few small garrisons of Persian troops allowed to be stationed in Azarbaijan. The Russians or rather the Russian-controlled Tudeh party have close contacts with the Kurds and fifteen notables of the Shakkaq tribe were invited to the recent Tudeh conference in Tabriz. It is probably true to say that the Kurds have no real affinity with the Russians and realise that a separationist movement in Azarbaijan, culminating possibly in a republic under Soviet control, would hold out no especial benefit for them (their object being Kurdish autonomy) but they would stand to benefit from a complete breakdown of Persian Government authority in Azarbaijan following the withdrawal of Russian troops and are watching the situation without committing themselves too deeply.

Tribal Lands

128. Early in February the Persian Ministry of Justice prepared a complicated but comprehensive plan for the formation of sub-committees of three to examine and decide the many long-outstanding claims of individual tribesmen and their chieftains to lands which had been forcibly seized from them, and exchanged or merely requisitioned and sold to third parties, during the ré[illegible] of Reza Shah. Though no case has yet been completed, the work is progressing and it would seem that the Persian Government genuinely wish to settle once and for all these claims which have remained a festering sore in the country. The policy of His Majesty's Embassy has been to refrain from sponsoring any individual claim but to press for the early settlement of them all by means of these sub-committees.

Persian Army

129. 1944 has not been a year of great progress for the Persian army but on balance, at the close of it they are materially better off and morally no worse off than at its beginning. The defects and shortcomings are the same as those noted in previous reviews and will persist until the microbe of perverted individualism is eliminated from the Persian system.

130. A lack of continuity in direction has always been a weakness in Persian military affairs and four changes in the post of Minister of War and five changes in that of the Chief of the General Staff have resulted in much shuffling of posts and bewilderment among the subordinate officials. There is still [illegible] Chief of the General Staff and, even if [illegible] the intervention of H.I.M. the Shah either through that unnecessary body [illegible] military Cabinet, or directly as titular commander-in-chief through the Chief of the General Staff produces confusion and opens the door to backstairs intrigues.

131. The close of the year finds the post of Minister for War occupied by [illegible] Zia, a patriotic and honest man with background of military training in the Russian of Tsarist days. He has sound ideas of eliminating corruption in the army but lacks the courage to enforce his will against such formidable odds.

132. [illegible] Chief of the General Staff is General Hassan Arfa, an officer of undoubted courage, en[illegible] excitable temperament, his violent [illegible] his record not entirely blameless as regards peculation lower his respect in the army and diminish his chance of success. He has a lively fear of Russian designs and, although inclined to be xenophobic, is not, at present, unfriendly to us. Though he recognises the weaknesses in the Shah's character, he worships him as Shah and the present danger is that his exuberant nationalism and his fanatical belief that an army common test by the Shah and controlled by himself is invincible [illegible] a royal master into rash enterprises and trials of strength with the tribes in which, at their present level of training, equipment and administration, they are likely to come off the loser.

[illegible] suffers from shortage of funds [illegible] to month on doles of one twelfth or two twelfths of the military budget which [illegible] Majlis periodically sanctions and which a Treasury, said to be nearly empty, doles out with reluctance and the maximum of de[illegible].

134. Out of the original budget for 1,530 million rials the Director General of Finances has only sanctioned 1,000 million rials. An extra allotment of 150 million rials to be found from Government profits on the sale of monopoly goods, though sanctioned, has not yet been received.

135. The officer cadre of the Persian army is riven by internal dissen[illegible]. Many belong to so-called political parties—not political parties as we understand [illegible] but mutable combinations of crooks banded together to further some intrigue or obtain some temporary advantage. Many attach themselves to some patron from whom they expect to derive personal advancement.

136. Some of the junior officers and warrant officers have been receptive [illegible] R[illegible] motion, their inability to rise under the dead weight of sloth, corruption and ignorance of their seniors have been pointed out to them with, it is said, some effect.

137. Indiscipline among all ranks of officers attains serious proportions. The recipient of an unpalatable order will evade it by malingering, procrastination or bribery, or if these methods fail, obtain the support of a Majlis Deputy to air his grievances. In the last resort he may purchase the vituperative skill

of a journalist who will pour out in his columns such a torrent of slander on the author of the order that he will be glad to rescind the order in order to obtain relief.

138. To dissipate the gloom of this picture of the Persian army there are some bright features.

139. The American military mission has obtained some much-needed equipment, chiefly medical stores, clothing, boots, and 600 trucks. Two further long lists of stores have been forwarded to the United States.

140. The mission has laid down a rudimentary organisation for the issue [illegible] of military transport and a system of supply depots which will check the widespread misappropriation of stores at the centre, but, because control ceases as soon as issues leave the depots, will not eliminate petty [illegible]culation by commanders of units. A scheme for centralised recruit training at [illegible]visional centres instead of in regiments met with such opposition that it had to be abandoned.

141. As a result of certain successful minor operations to disarm the tribes of which particulars are given under the Tribal Affairs Section, the morale of the troops has improved, and provided that the General Staff refrain from operations beyond their means, this improvement should continue as the memories of the [illegible] collapse before the British and Russian troops in August 1941 grow [illegible].

142. Stalin's tanks and aircraft have never materialised. The conditions subsequently attached to the offer stipulated that the units of mixed Russian and Persian personnel which were to be formed for the purpose of training in these arms were to be under the command of Soviet officers, who were themselves to be under the command of the Red army, that the Persian personnel were to be selected with the approval of the Russian commander, and that the units were not to be removed from their appointed places of training (Meshed and Kazvin), nor could the material be used for any other purpose without the approval of the Red army. These conditions were too full of alarming possibilities to be acceptable to the Persian Government, who replied that they would accept the material gladly—without conditions. The offer was thereupon angrily withdrawn.

Persian Gendarmerie

143. In the gendarmerie, as in the army, plans for improvement are held up by lack of funds. The credit demanded by Colonel Schwarzkopf for the modified organisation he had in view for the current y[illegible] of gendarmerie with a total strength of 25,000, the [illegible] really necessary is 40,000—amounted to 600 million rials [illegible] in the budget by Dr. Millspaugh is 290 million rials, which is the bare [illegible] regiments at the increased rates of pay, these rates are, in fact, the minimum at which officers and men can be expected to refrain from partnership with brigands and thieves. Even among gendarmerie officers the opinion is forming that in the [illegible] situation of the country the interests of internal [illegible] available resources to the army and the police. Colonel Schwarzkopf's insistence that the gendarmerie should be independent of the army has accentuated the lack of co-operation that became immediately evident when the force passed from the control of the Ministry of War to that of the I[illegible].

144. Colonel Schwarzkopf's mission has now been completed to the maximum strength of six officers sanctioned by the United States. Although Colonel Schwarzkopf has extensive powers it is obvious that six officers can exercise no very effective influence over the actions of personnel scattered in small packets over an area of 628,000 square miles, and consequently in the provinces gendarmerie shows no improvement as the result of Colonel Schwarzkopf's eighteen months' hard work.

145. Encouraged by some Deputies and other influential persons who would like to see the gendarmerie established in a more important position than the army, he aims at an organisation which he estimates would require three years to build up and whose cost would be justifiable only if the army were reduced to a small striking force. However desirable that might be, it does not seem to be realisable in the near future, and it is the efficiency of the gendarmerie in the near future that is of primary interest to us. Towards that very little progress is evident. But it is reasonable to expect that Colonel Schwarzkopf's energy and drive will produce results in time. Handicapped, as he is, by inadequate funds, inadequate American staff, the lack of any co-ordinated policy on the part of the

[illegible] times be the enemy of the good, he could perhaps not fairly be expected to have effected much improvement in an organisation as demoralised, as lethargic and as uninspired by any laudable ideal as the Persian gendarmerie.

Persian Air Force

148. The fighting value of the Persian Air Force remains as it was a year ago—virtually negligible. During the second half of 1944 no fuel was available and flying was brought to a standstill. In the air therefore the force is probably even worse than it was, though a short conversion course on Ansons which was given to ten pilots in Egypt in the summer did some good. On the ground, steady though very slow, progress under Royal Air Force guidance has been made with the maintenance of airframes and engines, but the continued loss of senior [illegible] it is a grave handicap. [illegible] Government in exchange [illegible] Now that the [illegible]

149. [illegible] at the [illegible] summer. He was [illegible] officer who had built up the [illegible] than his energy. He paid a [illegible] partly in connexion with a [illegible] But he had hardly left this country when he was replaced by Sartip Ahmad Khosrovani, another Air Force officer, who had, however, not been employed in the Air Force since 1941 but who was a friend of the Under Secretary of War and had suddenly become available on his expulsion by the Russians from Tabriz where he had been commanding troops. Sartip Khosrovani is showing commendable energy in his command, but his ideas about most things are out of date. Sarlashkar Nakhcheven, whose training scheme fell with him, was offered his [illegible] declined the post of Inspector General of the Air Force and left almost at once on an official visit to America where he still is.

Civil Airlines in Persia

150. During the year the Iranian State Airline has continued its Tehran Baghdad service. Following the delivery in the autumn of two of the three Dominies ordered from the United Kingdom by the Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones the frequency has been increased to a nominal twice a week in each direction. The airline is operating from Mehrabad airfield under Royal Air Force control with crews seconded from the Persian Air Force who are [illegible] pressure. The third Dominie met with a minor accident on its delivery flight at the end of the year, but is expected in Tehran shortly. An experimental service from Tehran to Isfahan, Shiraz and Bushire was run once or twice in the summer but was not established owing to shortage of aircraft. It may soon be revived.

151. During the summer a group of prominent Persians formed a company which is seeking the monopoly of air transport within the country. Part of their scheme may be also to take over the existing postal service to Bagdad. Sarlashkar Nakhcheven is acting as technical adviser and the moving spirit is G. H. Ibtihaj, the present Mayor of Tehran. The company professes to be anxious to work with British interests, particularly the British Overseas Airways Corporation, and some of its members are genuine in this. There is, however, reason to believe that Ibtihaj himself is at the same time in close touch with the Americans. The company has yet to secure formal acceptance of its proposals by the Government.

152. The frequency of the British Overseas Airway Corporation service to Bagdad, Damascus and Cairo was increased in the summer to thrice weekly [illegible] official demands being readily taken up by non-official passengers and freight. [illegible] payment on their military aircraft plying between Meshed, Tabriz and Pahlevi and the capital. This led the Persian Government to issue a circular to the foreign missions saying that they did not "allow" any Power to use the internal air services and that as soon as aircraft ordered in the United Kingdom and the United States arrived the Persian Government would reorganise all air services.

Finance

153. The budgetary deficit for the year 1943–44 (ending [illegible] 20th March, 1944) was 1,052 million rials, as against 7,500 million in the pre[illegible] year. Of the two budgets, the [illegible] budget is divided, the ordinary showed a small surplus while the deficit on the commercial budget was 1,214 million rials. This deficit was due partly to the necessity for subsidising food-stuffs, and partly to the wasteful and often corrupt management of the Government factories. For the current financial year the estimates laid before the Majlis last June (but even now not yet approved by them) showed both the ordinary and commercial budgets practically in balance with a small surplus on both taken together of 470,000 rials.

154. The actual out-turn for the first nine months of the year up to the 21st December 1944, shows a net deficit of 219 million rials as compared with 637 million for the same period last year. The situation, however, is less favourable than it appears, partly because the salaries of Government servants have been allowed to run one month in arrear, but mainly because the receipts from income tax, the rates of which were increased from the beginning of the year are likely to be much below the optimistic estimate. It is not possible at the present stage to give any reliable estimate of the final out-turn, but it would appear that if the ordinary budget is to be balanced it will only be done by severe economies in expenditure, although it is difficult to see where (apart from the army) economies on a sufficient scale can be made without grave d[illegible] the public services. The out-turn [illegible] the stocks of food stuffs held at [illegible] ar and the cost of [illegible] Government have reached their statutory limit for borrowing from the National Bank, and both the Minister for Finance and Dr. Millspaugh realise that the position generally is very far from satisfactory.

155. There was a slight check in the inflationary process at the time of the favourable war news towards the end of the summer, but it has been only temporary. Thus the figures of note circulation, which were 5,515 million rials in January and 6,262 in June, were 6,040 in December, while bank deposits which were 6,103 million in January and 8,753 in June, were 9,003 in December. Wholesale prices which were 499 in January rose to 534 (August), declined to 442 (October) and were 497 in December. The cost of living figure was 772 in January, rose to 855 (August), decreased to 656 (November) and was 894 in December (for both indices 1939 = 100). Although the price indices were rather higher in December than in November, it is reasonable to expect that there will be a further fall from now onwards, although it is to be hoped that it will be gradual.

156. A Persian delegation headed by M. Ibtihaj, Governor of [illegible] Bank, attended the Middle East Financial Conference, which was held in Cairo during April. With the other delegations, it subscribed to the resolutions of the conference calling upon the countries concerned (*a*) to balance their budget (*b*) to absorb surplus purchasing power by taxation, internal loans and savings and (*c*) to ensure the progressive reduction of prices. In the case of Persia however, this was more easily said than done. Dr. Millspaugh fully saw the measures required to bring its finances into order, but he was faced on the one hand by the native inertia, and on the other by wide[illegible] obstruction on the part of the more prosperous classes with a view to avoi[illegible] payment of direct taxation. Moreover, it is almost impossible to raise an internal Government loan in Persia owing to the high rates of interest current in the country generally.

157. Dr. Millspaugh's difficulties (described in greater detail earlier in this despatch) naturally interfered both with day to day administration and with the urgent work of post war planning. As long ago as last June he was proposing to set up a series of inter-Ministerial committees composed of Persians and members of his American staff to study the various post-war problems. Instead, however, the Government decided a few months later to set up a "Supreme Economic Council" of twenty four members (Persians only) for this purpose. The Council however, disintegrated after a few meetings.

158. Sales of gold on behalf of His Majest[illegible] [illegible] out the year. The amount sold since sales were be[illegible] to the 31st December 1944, has been £6·6 million. [illegible] effect in combating the inflationary [illegible] enabled His Majesty's Government to acquire rials for military expenditu[illegible] a lower rate than that laid down in the Anglo-Persian financial agreement. Recently, however, it appeared that, the market in Persia having reached [illegible] point, the gold was being smuggled into Iraq and the proceeds were

returning in the form of dinar notes. Since this results in an increase in the sterling balances of the Persian Government and since under the financial agreement 60 per cent. of the increase in such balances must be converted by His Majesty's Government into gold, it was decided (after the end of the year under review) that sales should be discontinued

[illegible] The financial agreement with the Persian Government covering the [illegible] of the Persian railway system by the Allies has not yet been signed, or even presented to the Government, although the railways were taken over as long ago as September 1941. Its preparation was delayed for some time as it was expected that the United States Government would be a party to it. When they decided that they would not, the draft was placed before the Soviet Government in order that that Government and His Majesty's Government might agree a text to be presented [illegible] Persian [illegible] The draft was given to the Soviet Government some months ago, but although some small points of difference have been settled it has so far proved impossible to obtain their approval of it. It seems probable that the delay is deliberate. In the meantime the difference between expenditure and receipts is being made up by His Majesty's Government.

160. [illegible] that capital assets which will not be required by the British and United States military authorities on their evacuation of Persia are being prepared for presentation to the Persian Government with a view to their purchase by that Government or by private individuals, although the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company may be given first refusal of those items which they require. Both His Majesty's Government and the United States Government are in agreement that these assets shall not be transferred to the Persian [illegible] without payment as it is fairly clear that the Government [illegible] will be carried out in order to make it clear that the two Governments [illegible] unmoved by Persian protestations. In the meantime it [illegible] Persian Government are preparing (with the help [illegible] for this purpose) a comprehensive list of claims [illegible] for financial compensation in respect of damage or [illegible] as the result of its "sacrifices" in the Allied cause.

161. [illegible] Woods Conference in July was attended by Persian [illegible] of Persia to the stabilisation fund was fixed [illegible] and its contribution to the capital of the bank at [illegible] a token payment to be made.

Economic Situation

162. In spite of the various political disturbances during the year that have had as their setting the economic administration of the country or have related directly to important aspects of Persia's economy, the period under review has been one of steady progress in supply and organisation. Such troubles as were encountered arose from the normal instability of the Persian character (which hates to leave even a good thing alone for long) aggravated by pressure from outside. If the economic picture is cleansed of the blemishes caused by the opposition to the work of the Millspaugh Mission, the insolvency of the Government, side issues such as the conflict between Dr. Millspaugh and M. A. H. Ibtihaj, Governor of the National Bank, discussions in the body of the mission, and finally the upheaval following the rejection of the Soviet oil demands, it leaves a view of a country in a greatly improved position compared with the breadless days of 1942 or the chaotic periods of 1943. The Tehran silo is full of grain, agricultural prospects are good, stocks of essential commodities are sufficient for many months (though distribution, greatly improved over last year, still leaves much to be desired), and rail and road transport is no longer the bottleneck it was in the past just after the Allies began to send supplies to Russia across Persia.

163. This satisfactory state of affairs is the culmination of over two years' hard work by the Anglo-American civil and military authorities in Persia. The Millspaugh Mission has in 1944 been [illegible] behind which many Americans and British have done excellent work in almost every important aspect of Persian economy. British officers and civilians have played an important part in cereals collection and the organisation of road transport.

164. Soviet commercial activities were considerable. The Soviet authorities have never co-operated with the other Allies in supplying Persia on a governmental basis with her essential requirements. Nevertheless large quantities of

such goods were imported from the Soviet Union and sold by the Soviet Trade Delegation on the open market. Sugar and cotton piece goods formed the bulk of such imports. The rials obtained in this way were used to buy rice, cattle, sheep, small arms and ammunition made in the Tehran arsenals and other Persian products required by the Soviet Union, and doubtless also to finance other Soviet activities (*e.g.*, subsidies to the Tudeh party and certain newspapers). Soviet survey parties have been active in the central area (Dasht-i Kavir), and are believed to have been prospecting for oil and other minerals.

Cereals and Agricultural Development

165. [illegible] of 1943-44 caused grave apprehensions at the beginning of the year, and there was the prospect of a break-[illegible] and transport [illegible] Supply Centre, with the loan of twenty British officers for a Cereals Collection team, and of the British and American Military Authorities, with transport (17,000 tons of wheat were moved from the Hamadan-Kermanshah area to the Persian railway for Tehran) saved the situation. The gram stocks in the Tehran [illegible] and in store-rooms elsewhere in the country were gradually built up, and at [illegible] in store [illegible] tons in the silo at Tehran, enough for 205 days' supply to the city. This result was attained only by hard relentless work of the cereals control (Department of Agricultural Monopolies) organised by Dr. Black of the Millspaugh Mission. The Soviet authorities were much less helpful, but they did allow grain to come to Tehran from the north, except during the oil crisis when they maliciously cut off supplies for about twenty days. The excellent fall of snow in December removed all fears of a serious water-shortage and failure of crops in 1945. The Government of India sold 1,000 tons of seed wheat for use in the Persian Gulf area where dearth of rain necessitated this valuable assistance. Similarly the Government of India agreed to take wheat and barley from the Zabul (Sistan) area of East Persia and to supply an equivalent value of wheat flour in the Persian Gulf. The bargain was not fully implemented by the Persians who, owing to internal maladministration and greed of local officials, were unable to persuade the Zabul cultivators to release the full 4,000 tons of wheat and barley.

166. Various projects for the development of [illegible] the country chiefly by the construction of irrigat[illegible] Supply [illegible] and the need for [illegible] sed on pro[illegible] project is [illegible].

Transport

167. The Millspaugh Mission assumed charge of the Road Transport Administration in February, with a team of British and American officers to assist in the control of vehicles in the provinces and the issue of tyres. With the release by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation in the summer of contracted lorries engaged on "Aid to Russia," the Road Transport Administration were able to reinforce their fleet considerably and to relax to some extent the restrictions on the use of certain classes of lorries. The Soviet Transport organisation [illegible] in Isfahan, Kerman and other towns outside the Soviet "zone" (regardless of the Government "monopoly"). Otherwise there were few hitches in the progressive improvement of vehicle [illegible]

168. Rail transport [illegible] goods and [illegible] of the demands of [illegible] to Russia [illegible] applies, and southwards from the Soviet "zone." Oil stocks were [illegible] for a short while, in December, the unexpectedly heavy civil

demand caused some anxiety, but it was found that the increase was genuine, being due to the great increase in the use of oil instead of coal or wood for heating and cooking.

The prospects for British trade

169. With the end of the war in sight almost all the principal merchants in the country turned their attention to the possibilities of trade with Great Britain. There is no doubt that as long as Persia's supply of sterling lasts it will be possible to export to Persia anything that United Kingdom exporters can offer in the way of woollen and cotton piece-goods and yarns, dyes, chemicals, vehicles, machinery for irrigation and agricultural use, power generation &c., factory [illegible] y kinds, building materials, domestic utensils, pottery, clothing, [illegible] amps, ironmongery and haberdashery of all kinds, and a host of capital and consumption goods. We shall in fact have to decide what kinds of goods we can best spare, and endeavour to steer demand towards them and away [illegible] of technical help would be one of the best ways of providing Persia with what she needs and at the same time of maintaining British influence in this country. A useful step in that direction has been the signing of an agreement between the Ministry of Agriculture and Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners for the survey of an irrigation and hydro-electric project in the Lar valley, in the vicinity of Tehran. Another agreement reached by the same firm with the Tehran muni [illegible] system in the capital is being obstructed by the Minister of the Interior on a legal technicality.

170. The development of trade betwe[illegible] will depend very largely on the exchange situation [illegible] but the rial is not a "hard" currency. It is doubtful whether there is any advantage to be gained from increasing trade between the sterling area and Persia beyond the amount represented by the latter's sterling balances and the £5 million odd per annum represented by Anglo-Iranian Oil Company royalties and the proceeds of [illegible] to the sterling area. If Persia had industrial raw materials other than oil to export the position would be different. On the other hand, we have in the shape of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concession a valuable stake in the country, and for that and [illegible] political reasons connected with the position of Persia in relation to India and the Middle East it is necessary for Great Britain to ensure that her influence in this country is at least as great as that of any other foreign coun[illegible] kind that brings British nationals to work in this country, even if the exchange advantages are not all we could desire.

Locust Control

171. It had been expected that the control of the desert locust (*i.e.*, migratory) in 1944 would call for considerable efforts, not only by the Persian Plant Defence Department but also by the British military units and the Royal Air Force Anti-Locust Flight, which were stationed on the coastal plain between Jiwani and Lingeh ready to deal with swarms arriving from India and Arabia.

172. By March the constantly reassuring reports from both these countries had led the British Locust Officer in Persia to decide on the withdrawal of the Royal Air Force Anti-Locust Flight. The organisation in the Jiwani area was also greatly reduced and the area was placed under the control of India entomologists mainly for observation purposes.

173. Unfortunately, several swarms, borne on high winds from West Arabia, did after all reach Persia during March and the British ground forces were [illegible] sufficiently forewarned or mobile to attack these adults before they passed inland beyond the coastal plain. However, only one of the swarms laid eggs on Persian soil (in Lariatan) and the resulting hoppers were effectively destroyed by the Persian control organisation, while the parent swarm and other invading bands flew eastwards towards Baluchistan and Afghanistan without further [illegible]

174. [illegible]

they had expected to buy from the Soviet Union, and by their inability to make alternative arrangements with the requisite speed.

175. Soviet experts and aeroplanes were sent to help the Persians, but the combined forces could not prevent the maturation of very large numbers of Moroccan locusts, which laid eggs over what has later been mapped and estimated at over 110,000 hectares. Arrangements are now being made between the Persians and the Russians for a joint campaign on a very large scale in the Caspian provinces in the spring of 1945.

176. The usual autumn examination of the desert locust situation in the Indo-Persian-East Arabian zone (which took place this year at Delhi in the presence of British, Persian and Soviet members of the Tehran International Locust Control Committee) led to the conclusion that no swarms would enter [illegible] must expect an invasion by desert locusts at any time during the first quarter of 1945.

177. In view of this threat the Middle East Anti-Locust Unit has organised [illegible] officer (and provided with British military transport and British poison and bran), which has already taken up its positions to defend the coastal area between Jask and Lingeh. The Persian organisation, which, of course, retains responsibility for the defence of the whole country, has also been put on a "war footing."

R 2051/464/34] **No. 14**

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 27th March.)

(No. 82.)

Sir,

Tehran, 15th March, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 269 of the 28th June, 1944, concerning the budget (*i.e.*, both the ordinary and commercial budgets) of the Persian Government for the financial year 1944–45 (beginning on the 21st March, 1944) and to state that the ordinary budget for the year 1945–46 has recently been presented to the Majlis. Detailed figures of the budget are given in the enclosure(¹) to this despatch.

2. This budget balances at 4,412 million rials. The following figures [illegible] the ordinary budget only, show for comparison the out-turn for the [illegible] year 1943–44, the estimates for the year 1944–45 and the out-turn for the first ten months of this year:—

	1943–44 Actual	Millions of rials 1944–45 Estimates	1944–45 Actual (first ten months)
Expenditure	3,097	4,569	3,200
Revenue . ..	4,385	3,958	3,183
	+888	−611	−17

It will be observed that the figures of out-turn for the year 1943–44 differ from those given in my despatch of the 28th June, owing to certain corrections and adjustments subsequently made between the ordinary and commercial budgets.

3. It is to be [illegible] 1945–46 is only balanced by the transfer of a hypothetical surplus of 500 million rials from the commercial [illegible] income tax during 1944–45, which has proved to be much too high owing to passive resistance on the part of the taxpayer and an inadequate system of collection, has been written down to 644 million in 1945–46, which will still be too high unless the law can be more strictly enforced. This figure provides only 16 per cent. of the estimate of total receipts. Indirect taxation (including the [illegible] on opium, tobacco, sugar and tea) accounts for 50 per cent., and the Anglo-Persian oil royalties account for 12 per cent. The estimated revenue from posts and telegraphs of 120 million rials will not cover the expenditure on the service, which is estimated at 145 million. The budget also includes receipts

(¹) Not printed.

of 125 million from the public domains and ceded properties which previously formed part of the commercial budget, expenditure under this head is estimated at 76 million for the year

4. The expenditure side of the budget is divided up much in the same proportions as in 1944-45. Thus, expenditure on the army is estimated at 1,100 million rials, or no less than 25 per cent. of the total. Army, gendarmerie and police expenditure together account for just under 40 per cent. of the total. Administration of the tobacco and opium monopolies is estimated to cost 550 million rials, representing 11 per cent. of the total, while the Ministry of Finance require rather over 300 million, mainly for the collection of taxation [illegible] respectively six and three, although it is true that there is an increase in expenditure on education of 25 per cent. in 1945-46 as against the preceding year (300 million compared with 240 million)

5. It is hardly necessary to comment on the lack of proper proportion (*a*) as between receipts from direct and indirect taxation, and (*b*) on the expenditure side in general, caused by the starvation of essential public services in favour of a military body which, on account of its size, corruption and inefficiency, is regarded by most with suspicion, dislike and ridicule

6. Nor is it possible at this stage to comment, with any certainty, on the probable accuracy of the estimates. The year 1945-46 is one in which it appears likely that the Persian Government will have to begin to face its post war problems, including the difficulty of collecting taxation, for which it is far from prepared. It is impossible to consider the finances of the Government as a whole without a knowledge of probable revenue and expenditure under the commercial budget. When this budget is prepared, and when the figures of out-turn for 1944-45 [illegible]

7. In the meantime, the Majlis has turned over the ordinary budget for 1945-46 [illegible] conspicuous in expediting its business, and, indeed, the Majlis itself has not yet approved the budget for 1944-45

8. Copies of this despatch with the enclosure(1) are being sent to the Government of India, to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, to His Majesty's Ambassadors, Washington and Bagdad and to the Department of Overseas Trade

I have, &c.
(for the Ambassador)
H. W. [illegible]

(1) Not printed

(B) Weekly Intelligence Summaries.

E 70/70/34] No. 15

(1)
Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 4th January, 1945.)

(No. 479.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit [illegible] to the 17th December, 1944, compiled by the [illegible] attaché to this legation

Tehran, 18th December 1944

Enclosure in (1)

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 48 for the Period 11th-17th December 1944

Persian Affairs

Political

BEFORE his departure Kavtaradzeh informed the Prime Minister that he regarded the passing of Dr. Musaddiq's Bill by the Majlis (see Summary No. 47/44 [illegible] essential to the re-establishment of good relations between the Soviet and Persian

Governments. In an account of this interview published in a news-sheet in [illegible] added that [illegible] Said and Seyyid Zia and that such a law was inconsistent with the existence of concessions already enjoyed by foreigners in Persia. The Prime Minister and his Government have been considerably perturbed by the menacing attitude of [illegible] to the Russians. These might take the form of asking them to provide the experts and the machinery for the exploitation of the oil in the northern provinces by a so-called Persian company

2. The Russians realise that the opposition of the Majlis must be overcome. [illegible] Bribes have been offered to Deputies also, [illegible] intimidated by threats. Many are beginning to waver, and it cannot now be assumed with any confidence that a majority would be found ready to oppose proposals by the Government to give concessions to the Russians that would in effect be tantamount to surrender. Faith in the courage of the Government has been shaken by their failure [illegible] any vigorous protest against the expulsion from the northern provinces of officials and other Persians displeasing to the Russians or to recall the Governor-General of Eastern Azarbaijan for sending a clear telegram recommending the grant to the Russians of the concession they were demanding

3. It seems clear that in the northern provinces the Russians are succeeding [illegible] factories in Gilan and Mazanderan. Deputies [illegible] be the first to lose by the triumph of Russian designs, seem prepared to go to almost any length to propitiate the Russians in the vain hope of saving their estates.

4. The Prime Minister has laid before the Majlis a Bill for the abrogation of Dr. Millspaugh's special economic powers and for the transfer of those powers to the Government. It is expected that the Bill will be passed and that Dr. Millspaugh will accept the position where his functions will be limited to [illegible] withdrawal on two matters: the alleged illegal suppression of certain newspapers [illegible] the Soviet [illegible] of the Government to [illegible] by Soviet officials of Persian subjects from the northern provinces—[illegible] Government was given a vote of confidence by 72 votes against 5, with 15 abstentions

Locusts

5. For the anti-locust campaign in Persia this year the British military authorities are giving assistance by [illegible] vehicles with the necessary personnel. This unit will operate in the area Lingah Bandar Abbas Jask and it will be used for transporting poison bait and working parties and for maintaining communications.

Appointments—Civil

7.—(i) Hassan Farzaneh (F.O. 63) to be Governor-General of the 1st Ostan (Gilan)
(ii) Abbas Tabataba'i to be Farmandar of Khoi
(iii) Dr. Buzurgmihr to be Under Secretary in the Ministry of Health

Persian Forces.

Army

[illegible] the Russians [illegible] Persian [illegible]

9. General Ridley has returned to America. It is reported from confidential sources [illegible] Persian [illegible] supplies for the [illegible] is expected to be away for at least a month.

10. [illegible] by bar at the number of conscripts required each year by the army, the quota for each town or district being assessed according to its population. In the preamble to the Bill it is stated that the average class that becomes liable to conscription each year amounts to 120,000, but that not more than 40,000 are required by the army.

Gendarmerie

11. Following on the issue of new winter uniforms, of extra blankets and of [illegible] improvement is now noticeable in the morale and appearance of the gendarmerie of the Tehran district. This has resulted in a notable improvement in recruiting.

Russian Affairs

12. Persian papers that receive their inspiration from Russian sources have recently [illegible] against the [illegible] Two examples of these articles are attached to this Summary. If these articles were not, as is generally believed, dictated by the Russians they were certainly not published without their approval.

13. Within the last few days the Russians have brought to Tehran sixty [illegible] to Resht [illegible]

14. At the same airfield the Russians have [illegible] for [illegible] heights are [illegible] of German clothing have been ordered, and the popular theory is that Russian troops will be dressed in these to take part in Turkish hostilities.

15. The Persian committee that was formed for the collection of funds for [illegible] showing the sum of [illegible] for Soviet Assistance.

French Affairs

16. General de Gaulle passed through Tehran on his return from Moscow, leaving Tehran on the 14th December.

Appendix

Extracts from Russian subsidised Persian Press

Azhar 10th December, 1944

LEADER entitled "Is the New British Policy Right?" [illegible] "I heard that a lamb was saved by a great man from the mouth of a wolf. In the evening he brought out his knife and began to cut the throat of the lamb. The lamb complained and said: 'You, who rescued me from the clutches of the wolf, I see that at the end you are wolf.'" The writer states that he had learned [illegible] of this story when he was a child. He then [illegible] tions and announcements and [illegible] that force still prevailed in the world. On the previous day [illegible] a Government which had left town without a guardian in the savage war of the Nazis and had taken refuge in London, where it had passed its time with [illegible] visits. Although the world of Belgium [illegible] been committed against it by the Nazis, it had finally driven out from its homeland the evil forces of fascism and puppets of foreigners. It was now

considered as rebels and was obliged to lay down its arms without query and to surrender to a Government which threatened it, in the event of refusal, with the [illegible] and stored up for such a day. The youth of Belgium was told by [illegible] Government that it had been freed in order that it should act in accordance with the wishes of that Government and that the Atlantic Charter could not be interpreted in any other way. Of course, the people should decide their own destinies. The British people would do this, but under the force of arms and the yoke of that Government. After Belgium came the turn of Greece. The British Prime Minister in his speech revealed the hidden plan of British Conservative statesmen. The world had opened its eyes and realised the true meaning of these charters. It had realised that the colonial policy of the leaders of the Conservative Party and other reactionary [illegible] The British reactionaries, contrary to the desire of the British people, would not refrain from using force and holding down weak peoples with pressure. Churchill said the Greek people naturally were free to decide their own destiny. They could choose whatever régime they liked, but they had no right to take action in this matter, and the different classes in Greece could not struggle with each other in order to determine what régime they should have. If they took up arms Churchill had said that the British in the name of the preservation of security, would prevent any kind of violent action. These apparently logical words had a frightening meaning which Churchill's recent speech confirmed. Churchill in his recent speech had said that, although the Greek crusaders had shown self sacrifice in turning out the German invaders, they had not a majority, and the Greek people would decide upon the Government of Greece. With these apparently logical words the fight against the proud crusaders of Greece had begun. Thus those who had liberated Athens became the targets of the British forces and the streets of the capital were turned into rivers of blood. This was the blood of young men who had risen up against Hitler in spite of hunger and other hardships, with the most primitive weapons, even with sticks. The British Parliament two evenings ago had supported this ungenerous fight with a vote of confidence for Churchill of 170 to 30. Action similar to this tyrannical action, with minor differences, was being witnessed in Italy. There also in the name of the preservation of security, interference was taking place in the destiny of the people. If the American forces had not been there, perhaps the streets of Rome would have witnessed the same terrible scenes as the streets of Athens and Churchill, in the name of the preservation of the rights of the majority, would have made the Italian people, the real enemies of fascism, targets and would have set up a Government which was [illegible] to the orders of the Conservatives in London. It was apparent that any Government which was [illegible] to the taste or policy of the British Prime Minister and rose up against the puppets of London was not the representative of the majority of the people. To establish this view it was not necessary to refer to the votes of the people. The words of Churchill and the majority of the British Parliament were sufficient proof. It was not clear that this policy would not extend to France and other liberated countries and that Churchill, to preserve security, would not interfere officially in deciding the Government for the whole world. Although the American Government had expressed its dissatisfaction in Italy and announced [illegible] the internal affairs of the [illegible] and that the [illegible] people [illegible] accordance with the Atlantic Charter to decide their own destiny and bring to [illegible] among the great minds of [illegible] world affairs, but it seemed [illegible] Parliament had caused [illegible] good [illegible] Was [illegible] Was [illegible] accordance with the [illegible] who agreement with Churchill that they should [illegible] had shown self sacrifice and that they should impose upon them a Government

which had not taken the smallest step to help them (the Greek crusaders) in their struggle? [illegible] diplomats take control of world affairs and keep the peoples in slavery and darkness! Would parasites and executioners oppress the peoples in the name of the majority. The paper did not think that this plan would be easily or profitably accomplished or that the British people could succeed in such a heavy task.

Rahbar, *10th December*, 1944.

LEADER states that Kavtaradzeh had left Persia after a stay of a little over a month. None of the Persian authorities were prepared to listen to him or to consider the proposal which he brought. Sa'ed, with the formula "oil after the war," put an obstacle in his way. Dr Musaddiq went further than this and placed the responsibility for the exploitation of oil on a Government which could not even asphalt the streets of its own capital. There was, perhaps, no precedent for the refusal to consider a proposal brought by the Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs of another country. Supposing Kavtaradzeh's proposal had been unacceptable, what international exigencies could have made it proper to refuse to consider it? Kavtaradzeh had not left Persia because the oil problem was solved but because it was apparent that the ruling classes were not prepared to ask for a solution and were increasing the difficulties in his way. As the paper had stated before, the object of the Russian Government in applying for an oil concession was not to obtain an imperialist concession, but on the contrary the Russian Government had an urgent need to prevent imperialist influence in Persia and it considered an oil concession a means of achieving this. What Power could guarantee that a second dictator would not appear in Persia after the war and recreate the period of Reza Khan, which suffocated all democratic inclinations [illegible] Dr Musaddiq [illegible] had shown that the royalties received from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were spent on the railway and the purchase of arms, neither of which were in the interests of Persia, but were to be used against the Russian Government one day. As it happened, world events were such that they were used for the benefit of Russia. But who could guarantee that this would be the case in the future and they would not be used against Russia by a reactionary Government? The Russian Government had not undertaken all these sacrifices for a reactionary barrier to be put up against [illegible] Government like the hired Government of Poland or the dictatorship of Reza Khan to be put up. It was neither in the interests of Russia or of Persia that Russia's interests should be neglected. The Russian Government could not tolerate a Government which had been born of the Government of Reza Khan or a similar Government. The Persian people also, from the point of view of both internal and foreign policy, were not prepared to tolerate such a Government. If the paper was criticised for talking about Russian interests, it did so because Persian interests could only be assured by taking into consideration the interests of other Governments and peoples, and in particular the interests of powerful neighbouring Governments. Thus there were reasons why the paper should talk about Russian interests which, in the above-mentioned case, were in harmony with the interests of the Persian people in the opposition which they showed to reactionary elements in Persia and the Government of Reza Khan. Apparently after the war the armies of the three Powers would leave Persia, but the real situation was that, if the conduct of the Persian Government remained as it was at present, only the influence of Russia would be removed from Persia, because everybody knew that the Persian Government, the Persian Majlis, Persian politicians and the Administration did not belong to the Persian people and were merely agents who had no will of their own. Consequently it was natural that the Russian Government was anxious at this "set up," and the Persian people had the right to strive with all their might to change the nature of the Government. The reactionary Government of Persia opposed with all its force the grant of an oil concession to Russia and welcomed with joy the Bill of Dr Musaddiq, which like the orders of Reza Khan, was ratified without discussion, lest any deviation from his one-sided policy as a result of the grant of this concession should occur. The paper would repeat that the way taken by the Persian Government had not solved the problem. The Majlis and Dr Musaddiq had merely shown that they could not solve such problems. Dr Musaddiq and his followers had not removed the problem; they had merely removed its solution from the competence of the Persian Government and handed this over to foreign circles. In conclusion, the paper asks the Russian Government not to consider the conduct of the Persian

Government, which was based upon reactionary circles, the expression of the Persian people, and to be assured that the Persian people were disgusted at the one-sided policy of the Governments which were imposed upon them and would never take any measures against nations which respected their independence and freedom.

E 318/70/34 [illegible]

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden.—(Received 13th January, 1945.)

(No. 490.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's [illegible] Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit [illegible] summary No. 49 for the period the 18th [illegible] 1944 [illegible] attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 31st December, 1944.

Enclosure in (2).

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 49 for the period the 18th [illegible] 31st December, 1944.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

IT is reliably reported that the Soviet Ambassador has told the Persian Prime Minister that he had been instructed to inform him that the Soviet Government considered that until the law prohibiting the granting of an oil concession to any foreign organisation was revised good relations could not be established between the Soviet and Persian Governments. This intimation has compelled the hope that Kavtaradzeh had perhaps gone further than Moscow intended, and the consideration of means to placate the Soviet Government is now occupying the Government's attention to the exclusion of nearly all other business.

2. Russian or Russian-inspired activities are being intensified among all classes of [illegible] increasing in the middle classes, particularly among the [illegible] Ministers. Threats are being circulated from some source or [illegible] next demonstrations organised by the Tudeh party attempts will be made on the lives of landowners, priests and Government officials. Prominent Tudeh leaders [illegible] have been sent to Mazanderan, allegedly to organise opposition to the Vatan party, which has some following there. [illegible] there is labour unrest. After meetings of factory workers convened by the leaders of the Tudeh party in Yazd where they were incited against their employers the workers of the most important textile factory went on strike. In one of the mills in Shahi (Mazanderan) a demonstration by the workers led to rioting and to shooting by the gendarmerie, which resulted in the wounding of some workers and the death of a Soviet soldier who was in the vicinity. The Russian troops thereupon disarmed the gendarmerie and according to one fairly reliable source have expelled them from Shahi. A partial strike also occurred in the Tehran municipal power house, which was prevented from spreading by the introduction of Persian military technicians to operate the machinery. From Meshed it is reported that the Soviet Consul General has taken eleven Persians to Tashkent to attend the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Turkmenistan Republic. In Azarbaijan propaganda for the formation of provincial and district councils continues.

3. The Russian-inspired Persian press continues to make hardly veiled attacks on the imperialist nature of British policy in Europe and the east and to stress the argument that Russian policy is directed towards ensuring that Persia does not fall under the influence of imperialist powers. The Russians, says the Tudeh paper *Rahbar*, do not fear the Persian people but only those elements who may make them their tools. The Russian desire for a security zone is natural, since by that is meant a zone adjacent to the Russian people where

those elements will not be allowed to take root. Between the two wars the British established paramount influence in Persia with the object of making it a base for hostile action against Russia. They first intended to do so by means of the 1919 agreement, but they found a better way by bringing Reza Shah to power. A situation similar in some respects to that of 1918 exists to-day.

4. Another example of this propaganda is attached to this summary as the first appendix. It is having some effect, inclining Persians to think that Russia might modify her policy if British influence was less evident and that it might even be as well if Persians showed themselves to be a little anti British. They are not without justification for believing that hostility to the British is a passport to Russian favour.

5. Seyyid Zia recently published in one of the Persian papers a frank and courageous criticism of Russian policy in Persia. A summary is attached hereto as the second appendix. It created a considerable impression. The paper published about five times its usual number of copies, and even then copies were selling for up to 30s. each. Seyyid Zia's reputation now stands higher among [illegible] that it was his return to Persia [illegible] aggressive measures to counteract British influence and to prevent the establishment of a pro British Government.

6. The Prime Minister has tabled a Bill for the establishment of a Supreme Supervisory Council whose function it would be to make detailed studies of Bills drafted by the Government before they are tabled. Its composition would be the Ministers without Portfolio, the Under Secretary of State in the Prime Minister's office and five experts in various branches of administration.

7. The Bill for the abrogation of the economic powers of Dr. Millspaugh has not yet passed the Parliament. The Deputies have now had to face the fact that [illegible] to find an alternative arrangement for the effective control of the country's economy. Various proposals have been made: the creation of a Ministry of National Economy, the distribution of economic affairs among existing ministries, the appointment of a Prime Minister [illegible] continue to control economic affairs through changes of Government [illegible] transfer to the present Prime Minister personally of the powers held previously by Millspaugh. The last proposal has found little favour. There is a fairly general appreciation that the economy of the country cannot be put on a sound footing without a long term programme consistently carried out. This the Deputies realise would not be the case if full economic powers were to be vested in anyone so short lived as a Persian Cabinet Minister. There is now some appreciation of the advantages there were in having all economic powers concentrated in the hands of a permanent and impartial official, and as a result Dr. Millspaugh's stock has gone up.

8. The Independent Front newspapers (see Summary No. 47 44 paragraph 5) have published a manifesto expressing disapproval of the policy of the [illegible] suppressing newspapers, and of general weakness and inactivity.

9. An expert review of the Persian press shows that of 107 papers, including weeklies, with licence to publish in Tehran, about 70 can be classed as having negligible influence; very few have a circulation large enough to cover the cost of publication, 13 draw their inspiration from Russian sources. Not all publish regularly.

Appointments [illegible]

10.—(i) Taqi Nahavi (F O 150 M A 158) to be Persian Minister in Portugal.
(ii) Riza Fahimi to be Farmandar of Zinjan.
(iii) Zein ul Abidin Sadri to be Farmandar of Malayer.

Persian Forces

Army.

11. Discord was not long in showing itself between the recently-appointed [illegible] rather [illegible] Minister [illegible] Chief of General Staff. In the four months during which there had been no Minister, General Razmara had done more or less as he liked in the army, and in the provinces, particularly in the tribal areas, he had usurped more and more of the functions of the Minister of the Interior. The Shah had become distrustful of his intrigues and ambition; the Russians were displeased with him since they held him responsible for the action taken by the Military Governor of Tehran to suppress Tudeh demonstrations, and he had for one reason or another antagonised many of the Deputies.

Consequently there was little opposition to his removal. He was the most able [illegible] three years, but he is unscrupulously ambitious, corrupt and an inveterate intriguer. He has been succeeded by General Hassan Arfa, a strong Nationalist resentful of foreign interference in Persia, obsessed by fear of Russian designs and consequently, for the present, not unfriendly to the British. He has neither popularity nor much respect in the army.

Air Force

12. General Ahmad Nakchevan, now appointed Inspector-General of the Persian Air Force [illegible] has now left to visit America on the invitation of the United States Government. He travelled in the same aircraft as General Connolly.

Appointments—military.

13.—(i) Sarlashkar Hassan Arfa (F O 30 M A 37) to be Chief of the General Staff *vice* Sarlashkar Razmara, relieved.
(ii) Sartip Kazim Shaibani to be Military Governor of Tehran *vice* Sarhang Hejazi, relieved.
(iii) Sarlashkar Abdul Reza Afkhami (F O 2 M A 2) to be a Military Governor for the purpose of applying military law to offences committed on Allied lines of communications *vice* Sarlashkar Hassan Arfa.
(iv) Sartips Itimad Muqaddam, Qadar, and Amidi and Sarhang Atapur to be army inspectors.

Internal Security

14. For some time past the Tudeh press, which previously had been inclined [illegible] of Reza Shah, has been accusing them of being the supporters of reactionaries and of feudalism. The reactionaries are accused not only of opposing proposals for disarmament but also of supplying arms and ammunition to the tribes. Reports have been published of consignments of arms landed on the Persian shores of the gulf and distributed among the tribes. It is made clear that the reactionaries referred to are the "masters" of Seyyid Zia and his like. The alleged union of the tribes of the south comes in for much attack. One of the Russian subsidised Persian papers says that it is no surprise that Qavam ul Mulk and Morteza Quli Khan Bakhtiari should fall in with the designs of those whose [illegible] Qashqai, who like his father had always posed as a great patriot, should now have become a Persian Quisling. Such attacks are likely to have some effect on Nasir and they may discourage him from being too openly friendly with British officials.

Khuzistan

15. It seems that the Persian authorities are satisfied with the number of [illegible] Bani Tamim who have begun to surrender their arms.

Russian Affairs

16. The following is believed to be an accurate list of Russian general officers in Persia:—

At Kasvin—
Lieut.-General Sovietnikoff: Commanding all Russian forces in Persia.
Major-General Gaidukov: 2nd in command to above.
Major-General Rusov: Chief of Staff.

At Tabriz—
Major-General Glinski: Commanding troops in Azarbaijan.
Major-General Lobov: Chief of Staff.

At Rezaieh—
Major-General Smirnov: Commanding troops in Western Azarbaijan.

At Gurgan—
Major-General Trantin: Commanding troops.

At Sar
Major General Soboleff (?). Commanding troops

At [illegible]
Major General Filiatov Commanding troops

At Tehran—
Major General Kurgin Soviet Transport Directorate
Major-General Zorin Transvitrans.

It is understood that the two last-named are independent of General Sovietnikoff.

17. It is reported but not yet confirmed that of the sixty Yak fighters that [illegible] (see Summary No. 48 44 paragraph 13, thirty have returned to Russia

French Affairs

18. It is reported on fairly reliable authority that the French G[illegible] [illegible]

Egyptian Affairs

19 The Persian press reports that Muhmud Sabet Pasha has been appointed Egyptian Ambassador to Persia.

Turkish Affairs

20. Kamal Kuprulu said now to be Turkish Ambassador in Afghanistan has been appointed Turkish Ambassador to Persia.

American Affairs

21 Major General Connolly commanding the United States Persian G[illegible] Command has been recalled to America for another appointment. He has b[illegible] succeeded, temporarily at least, by his second in-command, Brigadier-General Booth.

Appendix 1

Extracts from Russian subsidised Persian Press

Rahbar 21st December, 1944

Furthermore if the Imperialist Powers needed a "sphere of influence" to preserve their colonies, if Persia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Egypt were called [illegible] annexations" in their political lexicon, then Russia, whose regime was [illegible] Powers, [illegible] colonies or their sphere of influence, which would when the time came flood over her new world For this reason Russia, after having made enormous sacrifices to save herself and the world, would not submit to being encircled by the imperialist Powers.

She [illegible] clear her colonies of the noxious influence of imperialism Otherwise her security and her existence would be in danger For this reason the [illegible] places where [illegible]

No doubt to day Britain was the ally and friend of Persia and was not considered as the country which had signed the 1907 and 1919 treaties and the [illegible] did not want his opponents to use his statements as evidence against him, but, in order to elucidate the matter, he would mention the following few examples.

(1) In 1312 when a plan for a trans-Persian railway linking the east of Persia and the Afghan borders with the Gulf was [illegible] that for fifty years the principle of the defence of India consisted of surrounding her with a belt of [illegible] and the projected railway would [illegible] defence of India of the strategic value of the Persian Desert [illegible] bring the Russians 1,000 miles nearer to India &c

(2) In the 1907 treaty Persia was so partitioned that the Russians had no common frontier with Afghanistan and the neutral zone was very narrow in the west and very broad in the east this was another measure which was taken for the defence of India

Now, of course, Britain had reconsidered the problem of the defence of India but one could not forget that before this war Russia was surrounded by countries which were under the influence of an anti-Russian policy and great damages were inflicted upon her Now Russia, in order to secure her interests was compelled to eradicate the influence of the nefarious anti-Russian policy from these districts These regions were considered the belt of security for Russia not in the sense of being under Russian influence, but that anti Russian influences should not be implanted there

Appendix 2

Summary of the statement published by Seyyid Ziaed Din Tabataba in Ra di Imruz of the 20th December, 1944

KAVTARADZEH'S statement that the Oil Bill was the work of enemies of Soviet Persian friendship such as Sa'ed and myself is an unforgivable calumny as well as a blunder against the Majlis. Persia has never been a menace to Russia —witness my own actions twenty-four years ago when Britain, then in occupation of Persia, could, had she wished, have threatened to have disreputed Russia I [illegible] the first Soviet representative to Tehran now, thanks to the errors of [illegible] presentatives, I am accused of anti Russian activities. No patriotic Persian is so stupid as even to wish to work against Russia. Such statements by Soviet representatives are deliberate attempts to find pretexts and confuse the issue The claim that the northern provinces are a "security zone" is only a prelude to further, and at [illegible] If [illegible] other countries will claim a [illegible]

Even if Great Britain and [illegible] has no meaning [illegible] and Persia does not come [illegible] does not arise, the world is big [illegible] "Lebensraum" principle—for that [illegible]

If after the war, the Majlis should decide to grant a concession to a foreign Power, the U.S.S.R. should be given precedence, because we are bound to her by ties of gratitude, of admiration and of propinquity

The interference of the Allies in the internal affairs of Persia is contrary to the letter of the Treaty, and encroachment on Persia's integrity daily increased The Persian Government is now incapable of enforcing its authority British officials in the west and south Soviet officials in the north interfered in the elections this interference was the direct result of the presence of Allied troops in the capital and of the intimidation of the central Government Soviet troops prevent Persians travelling about their own country Soviet authorities expel Persian citizens from the northern provinces, the Cabinet has to have Soviet permission to send out its own troops to preserve security. Persians have become suspicious of the political intentions of the Allies.

Even in this atmosphere an amicable solution of the oil question could have been reached had not the statements of Kavtaradzeh and the anti Sa'ed agitation of Tudeh demonstrators and the R[illegible] backed press deliberately exacerbated the situation. Kavtaradzeh, whose intentions were good, was not of reality to blame. He was misled by the Soviet Embassy and the Tudeh Still his statement was inconsistent with common courtesy and international rights He [illegible] relations. We realised that the Soviets had the power to bully us, [illegible] professing the principles of Lenin would support its Embassy in humiliating us, especially after our sacrifices on its behalf

Sa'ed's only fault was trust in the Soviet Government and in Stalin's declaration made at Tehran He was not discourteous, much less criminal He did his duty. But the demonstrators against him on the 27th October were [illegible] Tehran Telegrams to our [illegible] representatives abroad, telling them of our [illegible] the Allied censorship. We realised that we had lost our independence. Sa'ed stood

firm but the shameful behaviour of our Allies drove him to resign. The heart breaking letter of resignation should be read to future generations in Persian schools.

The base, unfounded calumny of assuming certain people of enmity to Soviet Persian friendship is the result of bad advice given to Soviet representatives in Persia by a handful of Persian traitors their object being to save the face of the Soviet officials who had blundered.

As to the points of Kavtaradzeh's statement—

(1) It is no business of a foreigner to point out the mistakes of the Majlis which is alone competent and independent.

(2) The Majlis was compelled by the threats and other mistakes of Soviet representatives in Persia to ban future oil conversations. Still, I had myself wished for the Oil Law to remain valid only for so long as Allied armies remained on Persian soil.

(3) Foreign concessions already existed at the time of the Treaty of the 24th February, 1921, and the southern oil concession still exists. So long as Allied representatives are prepared to honour the Tehran declaration they have no right to put forward interpretations or alterations detrimental to Persian sovereignty.

(4) The Majlis [illegible] may be [illegible] depends on whether Soviet representatives change their policy [illegible] foreign soldier remains on Persian soil nor while the fate of Cabinets depends not on the Majlis and the Shah but on foreign Embassies and synthetic demonstrations.

The first duty is to clarify our external relations, which is impossible without a Government which will stand up to foreigners, invite foreign Governments to withdraw their troops and refuse to tolerate interference. A declaration should be issued that, if our relations are not clarified soon, the capital will be transferred elsewhere.

Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill have the right to know what their representatives, the interpreters of their declaration are doing in Persia. The aggressors rely on force tyranny and military supremacy. Persia on right and justice. A definite date should be fixed for the departure of all foreign troops. This is possible only through a Government which will maintain [illegible] of Persia and the best possible relations with the U.S.S.R. The present Government cannot [illegible]

E 388/70/34

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 17th January.)

(No. 4.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 1 for the period the 1st to the 7th January, 1945, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 8th January 1945.

Enclosure in (3).

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 1 for the period 1st to 7th January, 1945.

Persian affairs.

Political.

1. Dr. Millspaugh still retains his powers. Although there is among the [illegible] still persists as to how the national economy should in future be controlled.

2. The Tudeh party is reported to have greatly extended [illegible] in Tehran and to be making great efforts to increase their [illegible] bands it is presumed [illegible] some kind in the near

future. The Persian police and military authorities are apprehensive of dis- [illegible] for the suppression of civil [illegible] shown by the Russians [illegible] Tudeh demonstration at the end of October (see Summary No. 41/44, para- [illegible] 26th December, when there was a disturbance in [illegible] to attack British policy and to argue that Russia is justified in trying to prevent the establishment of British influence in North Persia.

4. A circular has been sent to all Governors-General and Governors [illegible] to the following statement of the [illegible]

[illegible] for the improvement of the lot [illegible] villagers and workmen, ensuring that each individual receives [illegible] recompense according to his deserts.

[illegible] and improve the State medical services.

[illegible] and provide the instructors necessary to give [illegible]

(d) To reform and reor[illegible] government [illegible]

(e) To prepare plans for the development of agriculture, for the improvement of irrigation and for the exploitation of mines and [illegible] deposits by the formation of companies for that purpose.

(f) To reform certain existing laws.

Economic.

5. The Middle East Supply Centre has announced that its control over imports into Persia would in future be limited to—

(a) Certain supplies which require much tonnage, such as tea, sugar, cereals and similar produ is.

(b) Certain articles which are in short supply such as textiles, tyres, motor vehicles.

6. The Administ[illegible] has sent instructions to all Ministries to the effect that they are to prepare lists of all damages that can be attributed to the war, including that done to buildings and other constructions that have been at the disposal of the Allies.

Appointments, etc.

7. Ali Akbar Rasuli to be Farmandar of Dasht Miahan.

[illegible]

[illegible]

(c) [illegible] of the [illegible] Military District.

[illegible] Gulpera to be 2nd in command of the 7th (Ker- [illegible]

(d) [illegible] Nadi to be Military Prosecutor-General.

[illegible] Sartip Amir Nizami to be head of the 2nd Bureau, General Staff, Army Headquarters.

Gendarmerie.

(v) Sarhang Hussein Huma[illegible]n to command the gendarmerie of the 2nd (Azarbaijan) District.

Erratum.

Ma's Intelligence Summary No. 46/44, dated the 4th December, 1944, paragraph 8, line 6—

For "Muhammad Hussein Qashgai," read "Malek Mansur Qashgai."

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 25th January.)

(No. 12.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 2 for the period the 8th-14th January, 1945, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 15th January, 1945.

Enclosure in (4)

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 2 for the period the 8th-14th January, 1945.

Persian Affairs

Political.

THE Bill to deprive Dr. Millspaugh of his economic powers has, after much heated discussion, been passed by the Majlis by 99 votes against 8, with 20 abstentions. The Government has been charged with responsibility for the control of th[illegible] which of these should be abolished and whether those [illegible] to be distributed among existing ministries or transferred to a new Ministry of Economic Affairs. Within three months the Government must present to the Majlis a report on the accounts and activities of all the economic organisations controlled by Dr. Millspaugh, and must further, within the shortest possible period, set up a Supreme Economic Council to advise the Government in the preparation of a scientific plan to suit the country's economic requirements. Particular attention [illegible] capital and to increasing exports. Some now fear and some hope, that Dr. Millspaugh's control of the finances, which he retains, will allow him to continue to exercise some control over economic measures. Agitation for his dismissal continues in the Tudeh press, among aspirants to Russian favour and among the wealthy who would suffer from his income tax law. Dr. Musaddiq, perhaps in the hope of placating the Russians, prepared a Bill for Millspaugh's dismissal but he has not yet been able to obtain enough signatures to qualify it for presentation to the Majlis. It is understood that Dr. Black, at present head of the Cereals and Bread Section, may be asked to take temporary charge of the economic organisations previously controlled by Dr. Millspaugh.

2. Anxious speculation continues as to what the next move of the Russians through the agency of the Tudeh party will be. Tehran is full of rumours of a large influx of Caucasians and of Persians who had fled to Russia in Reza Shah's reign, brought into Persia as Russian troops and then turned loose in civilian clothes, but armed, to occupy the many houses the Russians are alleged to have hired in various quarters of the town. There is considerable anxiety with a corresponding desire either to seek Russian favour or to ask what British support will be forthcoming.

3. In Azerbaijan there is a lull in Tudeh and Russian activities, although some mild agitation for the formation of provincial and [illegible] continues. A Tudeh meeting organised to protest against Seyyid Zia a[illegible] to which reference was made in Summary No. 49/44, paragraph 5, was at[illegible] by only about 100 people.

4. The Persians who visited Tashkent at the invitation of the Russians (see Summary No. 49/44, paragraph 2) have now returned and have described their experience with apparently genuine enthusiasm. They have sung high praise of the culture, prosperity, contentment, national pride and the respect for and vitality of the Islamic faith which they found in Uzbekistan.

5. A few [illegible] attacks on the Government and on British policy, but as they have reappeared under different names no useful effect has been created.

6. In paragraph 4 of Summary No. 1/45 a statement was given of the Government's intentions. The laws mentioned in sub-paragraph (*f*), which it is intended to revise, are those relating to the formation of provincial and district councils.

Persian Forces

Army.

7. The Minister of Finance has tabled a Bill asking for a credit of approximately 3 million dollars for the purchase of arms and supplies for the army in the year March 1945-March 1946 and authorising the Ministry for War to place orders in the United States to the value of that amount.

Appointments—Military.

8. (i) Sartip Ghulam Ali Ansari (F.O. 22) to be Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

(ii) Sartip Abdullah Hidayet to be Persian Military Attaché in Paris. (It is not yet certain that he will accept the appointment.)

Internal Security

9. It is reliably reported that the Shah is becoming increasingly impatient with the continued existence at liberty of tribal chiefs, such as Nasir Qashgai and Abdullah Zarghampur of the Boir Ahmadi, who show no sign of recognising the authority of the Central Government or their duty towards their sovereign and it is considered that it may be difficult to restrain him from or[illegible] to enforce their submission. The Tudeh press cont[illegible] south. Morteza Quli Khan is dubbed a Bakhtiari outlaw but Nasir Qashgai is the chief villain. The alleged union of the tribes of the south is said to be connected with the Pan Arab movement which was well known to have been devised as an obstacle to the spread of Russian influence.

Khuzestan.

10. The second stage of the disarmament of the Arabs, which affects the Bani Tamim and the Bori, is said to be proceeding satisfactorily and to be nearly completed.

Russian Affairs

11. It is reliably reported that the Russians have informed the Persian Government that they no longer require the production of the Persian munition factories. It will be remembered that they made a contract for the monthly supply of a number of rifles and machine pistols and a quantity of ammu[illegible] A certain amount of each was delivered, but owing to the failure of the Ir[illegible] to supply necessary raw materials in adequate quantities and to other causes deliveries fell far short of the contracted amounts. The Russians did not seem to be greatly concerned, and this lent colour to the theory that they were more [illegible] British out of the factories than in the munitions that might be produced. They are now free to stir up trouble among the workmen without damaging their own interests.

12. There appeared in the Russian subsidised paper *Rahbar* a rather ominous statement to the effect that Russian policy was directed not only to the crushing of all Fascist States but also to the encouragement of movements [illegible] the working and middle classes of other countries against fascism [illegible] of the establishment of free national Governments, particularly in those States along Russia's borders.

13. [illegible] reported that the Russians recently spent [illegible] days in the [illegible] (1) reconnoitring for, surveying and measuring out a [illegible]

14. [illegible] Russian troops are now preventing the entry in [illegible] of anti-Tudeh papers and confiscating any that are found [illegible]

British Affairs

15. The Tudeh papers have begun attacks on the A.I.O.C., alleging bad treatment of their Persian employees and inefficient direction of the technical school where Persians are trained. The public is warned that the company's

(1) 55 miles south-west of Tehran.

lubricating oil is of such bad quality that it seems to be specially designed [illegible] wear out engines. This is perhaps in preparation for a campaign which [illegible] launched by the Tudeh party against the company when Russia no longer requires the company's products.

16. The matter of Persia's claims to Bahrein has also been raised in the Tudeh press. It is hazarded that the object is to remind Persians of a matter [illegible] which Russian help might be of value at the Peace Confere[illegible]

E 712/70/34 (5)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden. (Received 31st January.)

(No. 20.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 3 for the period the 15th January to 21st January, 1945, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 22nd January, 1945.

Enclosure in (5).

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 3 for the Period 15th to 21st January, 1945.

Persian Affairs.

Politics.

THE Government has been concerned mainly with consideration of the measures that should be taken to replace the control of economic affairs exercised by Dr. Millspaugh through his American assistants. Ce[illegible] appointments detailed in paragraph 8 below, have been made supplanting the American [illegible] [illegible] would [illegible] to act in an advisory capacity. It is doubtful, however, whether any important American will agree to serve on without some power of control. Dr. Millspaugh has played into the hands of those who want to get rid of him altogether by notifying the Prime Minister that, unless the present governor of the National Bank is dismissed by the 23rd January, he will himself leave Persia. There was never much chance [illegible] would have to dismiss the governor of the National Bank, [illegible] and exceptionally able, and it is believed that Dr. Mill[illegible] of that, so he has presumably made up his mind to gi[illegible] His arbitrary action has dealt a blow not only to his own [illegible] of whom has increased since he was relieved of [illegible] limited to his responsibilities for the finances, but also to those who, while disapproving of Dr. Millspaugh personally, are convinced of the value to Persia [illegible] the present political situation of an American mission with some financial [illegible]trol. Dr. Millspaugh's self opinionated obstinacy has been of great [illegible] to all the opponents of American interest in Persia, of the establishment of stability and of economic and financial reforms.

2. There is growing discontent with the Prime Minister's weakness and ineffectiveness, and it has been increased by his choice of his own friends as advisers to him on economic affairs and for lucrative employment in economic administrations. It is only the lack of a suitable successor that keeps him in power. Even that may not save him much longer.

3. Jealous to protect its honour against accusations made in the press to the effect that Deputies [illegible] for themselves, particularly in commercial transactions, the Majlis has passed a law authorising the appointment of a commission of five members to be elected by the Deputies to investigate any such charges made.

4. The Tudeh press has been making venomous attacks on Great Britain and on British policy. It is repeated *ad nauseam* that after the last war Great Britain had prepared Persia to be a "springboard" for hostile action against Russia. Two papers suggest that Seyyid Zia, on behalf of his masters, is organising a pseudo-Communist party who will create disturbances and bring the Tudeh party into disrepute and give the Government an excuse for breaking

up the party. Further attacks are made on the A.I.O.C. One paper asks [illegible] thousands of unqualified Palestinians are employed [illegible] Kurdistan are naked and hungry [illegible] now their intention to [illegible] showing their strength [illegible] to attribute to Russia [illegible] Tiraz, where they [illegible] believe to be [illegible] Qashgai. In A[illegible] an increase of Tudeh activity in the Workers' Union.

6. The internees have been getting much publicity in the press. The Persian Government is urged to stand up for the rights of Persians and to bring the internees to trial so that their innocence or guilt can be established. Great Britain is taunted with having departed from her usual standards of justice [illegible] by a junior British officer to an interned Persian colonel.

Economic.

7. Unusually plentiful snow and rain throughout almost the whole length [illegible] not, however, yet had any notable effect on prices.

Appointments—Civil.

8.—(i) Muhammad Husein Jahanbani (P.O. 104) to be head of the Road Transport Department.

(ii) Muhammad Mehdi Qalamani to be head of the Distribution Department.

(iii) Taqi I'tezan to be head of the Foreign Trade Control Department.

(iv) Colonel Muhammad Ali Safavi to be head of the Cereals and Bread Section.

The above appointments have been made in place of Americans who were at the head of those departments until the abrogation of Dr. Millspaugh's economic powers.

(v) Ismail Navab to be Farmandar of Gulpaijan.

(vi) Mehdi Feroubar to be Persian Consul in Karad.

(vii) Feraidun Adamiat and Izzeddin Kazemi to be attachés at the Persian Embassy in London.

Persian Forces.

9. [illegible] the position of General Arfa [illegible] The latter is trying to strengthen his [illegible] for Razmara's [illegible] important posts [illegible] most reliance (since he believes that if they were once pro G[illegible] certainly anti Russian) are in the internment camp. It is reported, although not on the best authority, that both the Shah and the Russians already regret the dismissal of Razmara and that they have told him so. There is nothing improbable in this. He suits their book much better than General Arfa.

10. The following Persian officers are leaving shortly to visit the French front at the invitation of the French Government: Sartip Jawadi, Sarhang Hejazi, Sarhang Mazheri, Sarhang Mozaveni, Naib Sarhang Amini.

Internal Security.

Kurdistan.

11. Qazi Muhammad, the Kurdish notable of Mahabad, and the chiefs of the Mangur, Mamish and Gavrik who had accompanied him to Tehran (see Summary No. 43/44, paragraph 13) in the hope of persuading the Government that they were not plotting against the integrity of Persia either with the Russians or with the leaders of some movement for Kurdish independence, have been allowed to return to their homes. Although not entirely cleared of suspicion, they have managed to reassure the Government to some extent. The Mangur and Mamish are to be paid from gendarmerie funds for the maintenance of sixty-seventy riflemen each, in return for which those tribes will accept responsibility for the protection of the roads from Mahabad to Sardasht and from

Haidarabad to Khaneh. Abdullah Ikhanizadeh has been appointed Bakshdar of Bukan and will draw pay for fifty riflemen in return for keeping order in that area. With the setting in of winter conditions Kurdistan is quiet. Twenty unfortunate Jaf tribesmen who were taken as hostages by the Persian military authorities at the time of the incident in August, reported in Summary No. 32 44 paragraph 10, have not yet been released in spite of lengthy negotiations between the Iraqi and Persian Governments.

Khuzistan

2. It is reported that with the collection of some 700 rifles from the Bani Tamim and Bani tribes the second stage of the disarmament of the Arabs is said to be complete. The Persian Government has, however some doubts whether the disarmament is being carried out as effectively and impartially as the local commander reports and a special officer is being sent to investigate

Fars

13. Nasir Qashgai recently paid a visit to Mamasani and to Gach Saran in the hope that he might be recognised as a sort of tribal overlord and be accepted as the arbitrator between Abdullah Zarghampur and his enemies in Kuh-i-Gah. He is reported to be now returning to Shiraz with deflated pride and to be talking again of divesting himself of the responsibilities as regards the good order of the Qashgai which he accepted and even of going abroad

Russian Affairs

14. The headquarters of the Irano Soviet Cultural Association in Tehran has now been turned into "The House of Culture". The speeches at the opening ceremony made it clear that the purpose of the House of Culture which would be managed by V O K S., was to publicise the cultural achievements of the Russian people and to teach the Russian language. It was promised that [illegible] would be opened in other towns in Persia

15. M Hashimov has replaced M Kommissaroff as Soviet Vice Consul at Resaieh The latter returns to Tehran

16. It is reported from a fairly reliable source that the Russians have now completed the widening, bridging and asphalting of the road Kazvin Resht Astara. The road is two way throughout, and it is said that it will take all classes of traffic It was built to higher specifications than British or American roads in Persia and according to one source, it is much the best road in the country

E 571 70 34] (6.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden. (Received 8th February.)

(No 27.)

His Majesty's representative pres[illegible] to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the Intelligence Summary No. 4 for the period the 22nd January to the 28th January, 1945 Compiled by the military attaché to this legation

Tehran, 29th January 1945

Enclosure in (6)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 4, Secret for the period 22nd January to 28th January, 1945

Persian Affairs

Political

1. No decision has yet been reached on the resignation of Dr Millspaugh who has been granted 15 days local leave.

2. [illegible] achieved the abrogation of Dr Millspaugh's economic powers (and possibly his [illegible]

Having been in office for over two months and having used his power of patronage for the benefit of his relatives he is regarded as having had a good run for his money Among the names of his possible successors that of Ali Scheda (F.O. 217, M.A. 2s3) has also been mentioned of late

3. Dr Black the American Chief of the Cereals and Bread Section tendered his resignation on the 18th January. It has not yet been accepted

4. After the recent publication of His Imperial Majesty The Shah's invitation to the three leaders to hold their next meeting in Tehran and his offer of his palaces to accommodate the party, many of the Persian newspapers have deduced that the next conference will take place in Tehran, and have urged the Persian Government to make certain requests to the three leaders for the relief of Persia a present ills

5. The Economic Commission, appointed to advise on the redistribution of the economic powers recently taken from Dr Millspaugh, has submitted a preliminary report. Among its recommendations are

(i) That the economic section of the Ministry of Finance should be separated from that Ministry and administered as a separate department until such time as a Ministry of Economics is created
(ii) That this department should be run on commercial lines
(iii) That Government control of certain commodities, such as key commodities, commodities in short supply or commodities imported after consultation with foreign Governments in control of trade in their own countries, should continue
(iv) That the Rent Stabilisation Department should be transferred to the Ministry of Justice, and that the Inspection Department of Foreign Trade and the Anti Hoarding Department should be transferred to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce

6. As the result of further misstatements in the Persian press about the interviews and the alleged insult to Colonel Bahrami (see Intelligence Summary No [illegible] paragraph 6) His Majesty's Embassy have sent to the press a communiqué [illegible] gives a correct account of this incident This [illegible] in the newspapers *Setare* and *Kushesh* of the 28th January It is reproduced as an appendix to this summary

The Majlis

7. The chief business of the week has been as follows

(i) [illegible] of Majlis Deputies to transactions with the Government [illegible] profit The members are Hoshmati, Moktdar [illegible] Madani Engineer Farvar and Dr Musavani
(ii) The grant of a further delay of three months for the commission appointed to study the reforms of the Electoral Law
(iii) A request by the President of the Majlis that the Government's letter [illegible] Dr Millspaugh (informing him that the dispute between him and the Governor of the National Bank would be referred to the Majlis) should first be discussed by the Deputies outside the chamber
(iv) The debate on the Budget Bill was resumed Some further proposals were accepted and others rejected No final decision on the whole Bill was reached
(v) The tabling by the Ministry of Justice of a Bill for the formation of a supreme council of Registration This council will examine the qualifications and conduct of notaries public

Persian Army

8. A passing out ceremony was held on the 24th [illegible] of medical and engineering students who, by a recent regulation, now carry out their compulsory military training concurrently with their technical studies.

Internal Security

[illegible]

9 The Azerbaijan branches of the Tudeh party met in session in Tabriz during the second half of January. Delegates from all parts of the province attended. The results of the session have not been made public and many wild stories are circulating about the completeness of the Tudeh preparations for a hoving autonomy. They included the arming by the Russians of T[illegible] Persian officials, the seizure of power and preparation to do battle [illegible] sent from Tehran at chosen positions on the Qaflan Kuh.

Sarhang Darakhshani, the Governor-General of Western Azerbaijan, does not believe the above in their entirety, but is of the opinion that something [illegible] likelihood of their being able and willing to do anything in case of an [illegible]

Khuzistan

10 For a long time pilferage of railway wagons containing military and Aid to Russia stores has been causing the Allies great concern, and the uncanny certainty with which only wagons containing stores of saleable value have been rifled has led the Allied security authorities to suspect that the thieves were led by persons having inside information. An ambush was recently laid by a combined British and American military party. A box car containing cloth was left at Fahiyah railway siding and covered by the party in ambush. A gang of 150 natives attempted to raid the box car. The gang was led by two American coloured soldiers and was engaged by the fire of the ambush party and left [illegible] site. Twelve more are believed to have died of wounds in [illegible] nearby village. One American coloured soldier was killed and the other captured.

11 General Humayun has now embarked on phase 3 of his Arab disarmament operation by despatching two companies of infantry, one machine [illegible] company and one battery of 75-mm guns from Khorramshahr to Pol i Nau. The Sheiks of Mahmoreen, Deris, Naser, Bahmanshir and Abadan have been called and have agreed to surrender rifles. Phase 4, against the Arabs of Shadgan, is being undertaken concurrently and a battalion of infantry has been despatched to Gor Gor. Phase 5, against the Arabs of Khalafabad and Hindian, was due to begin on the 23rd January.

Western

12 A false rumour to the effect that Kahn[illegible] b Idu Reki and his son Murad Khan Reki had been [illegible] Tehran respectively [illegible] murder case led to the desertion of some [illegible] prepared to [illegible] Kerman Garrison, accompanied by two Reki sardars, went to Khwash and was successful in allaying the fears of the Rekis. The situation is returning to normal.

British Interests

13. A detachment of the Arab Gulf R.A.F. levies recently mutinied at Jask. Thirty one out of fifty nine men deserted with [illegible] and 2,000 rounds of ammunition. A party of Assyrian levies has been flown to Jask and the disarmament of the remainder of the detachment (most of whom are believed to be Persians) has been effected.

14. Major-General W. A. K. Fraser, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.V.O., M.C., military attaché, left Tehran on the 27th January for London on duty for a liaison visit to the War Office.

15. Three Persian students have left Tehran under the auspices of the British Council to continue their studies in the United Kingdom.

Chinese Interests

16. Colonel Huang Tzi An has arrived in Tehran to replace Colonel Tang Te Hang, who will be leaving shortly for China. The new military attaché was commissioned in 1923 and is a graduate of the War Academy of Nanking. He has held numerous staff appointments, mostly on the operations directorate of the National Military Council.

American Interests

17 The American Ambassador, Mr. Leland Morris, has been recalled and was to leave shortly. The United States Government has asked for the agreement of the Persian Government to the appointment of Mr. Wallace Murray.

Polish Interests

18 The number of civilian Poles in Persia on the 15th January, 1945 was —

	Men	Women	Children.	Total
In Tehran ...	405	[illegible]	401	[illegible]
Isfahan ..	70	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Ahwaz ..	176	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	651	[illegible]	1,214	4,468

Appendix

As many false statements have been published regarding an incident at the [illegible] considers it necessary to state the facts.

The incident occurred when a British officer, in the normal execution of his duty, went to the camp to call the roll. When, as a mark of confidence, it was arranged that the internees at Sultanabad whose interrogation had been completed should be transferred to Tehran, no provision was made for a roll call because it was expected that the Persian authorities concerned would observe the agreement strictly. It was now found, however, that the internees were allowed to go out into the town and even to stay away from the camp for days at a [illegible] without [illegible] the security authorities, and it therefore be[illegible] a roll call. But for this the Persian officer in question would not have had to appear for a roll call and would not have made certain excited remarks which led to the incident.

It is not true that a British officer has made an apology in connexion with this incident. There was no ground for an apology and none will be [illegible]

It should be added that the visit of the British officer to effect the roll call revealed yet another serious breach of the regulations under which the internees were transferred to Tehran. Although it was a Thursday, when the internees are forbidden by the regulations to receive visitors, there were, in fact, a number of visitors in the camp.

E 1120/70/34] (7)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 16th February.)

(No. 35.)

His Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 5 of the 29th January to the 4th February, 1945, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 5th February, 1945.

Enclosure in (7)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 5. Secret, for the period 29th January to 4th February, 1945.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1 The affair of Dr. Millspaugh still drags on. The obstinate doctor has further played into the hands of his enemies by a renewed insistence on the [illegible] and by a further dismissal of A. H. Toomaj [illegible] request that, according to the terms of the law by which he was engaged, all economic functions should be placed again in his charge. This letter is now under examination by the Council of Ministers and the Persian Prime Minister

has announced in the Majlis that, as the doctor's recommendations cannot be accepted, there is no need to refer the matter to the Majlis for arbitration as previously announced (see paragraph 7 (iii) of Summary No. 4)

The Majlis

2. The chief business has been as follows —

(i) A statement by Fahimi Minister without portfolio, on his recent tour of inspection in Kurdistan. He stressed the loyalty and patriotism of the Kurds and mentioned the need for increased medical and educational facilities;

(ii) The passing of two Bills (with double urgency procedure) tabled by the Minister of Health. The first empowers the Ministry of Health to force all public health regulations previously enforced by the Ministry of the Interior. The second Bill was for the preparation of a two-year plan for the reorganisation of the Ministry of Health after approval by the Majlis Public Health commission;

(iii) The tabling of a private member's Bill for the prohibition of the [illegible];

(iv) A speech [illegible] by the Azarbaijan Tudeh [illegible] Persia was concerned the Atlantic Charter was a "scrap of paper";

(v) A parliamentary question by Dr. Musaddiq (Musaddiq-us-Saltaneh) regarding the legality of the interning of certain Persians suspected of anti-Allied activities. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, though supplied by the British and Russian Ambassadors with ample material for a convincing reply, made a weak statement in which no mention was made of the seriousness of the offences or of the possibility that [illegible] would have been passed on some of the internees if [illegible] brought to trial instead of being interned. He said that, while no legal grounds existed for their internment, there was moral justification for internment in view of Persia's obligations as an Ally. He further said that efforts had been made and would continue to be made to procure the release of those whose guilt was not adjudged to be serious.

The Press

3. The chief topics of discussion have been

(i) The forthcoming conference of the three Allied leaders and the belief that the problem of Persia would be one of the main items on the agenda;

(ii) Further attacks by the Russian inspired press on the tribal *bloc* in the [illegible] and the rearming of the tribes by "imperialists and [illegible]";

[illegible]

(iv) [illegible] attacks on Sa'ed's "one sided" policy, on Seyyid Zia and [illegible] recently, on Bayat, the Prime Minister, for his failure to achieve [illegible] thing;

(v) Gratification at the impending withdrawal of American troops and the hope that Russian and British troops would soon follow suit.

4. The tone of the Persian press has become so bad lately and abuse of the Allies so [illegible] the Minister for Foreign Affairs was made by the British and Russian Ambassadors. The Minister for Foreign Affairs attempted to defend the press by saying that their abuse was only provoked by acts of unwarranted interference by the Allies in the internal affairs of Persia and so served a useful turn by drawing public attention to these acts. It was pointed out to him that the press, at the level at which it worked in Persia was not the best judge of what constituted unwarranted interference.

Finance

5. An extract from a report dated the 30th January 1945 by the Financial Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy is published as an appendix to this summary.

6. His Majesty's Government have stopped the sale of gold to Persia with effect from the 15th January, 1945. The market had reached saturation [illegible] As the supply of goods and rial notes in Iraq had also diminished, Iraqi dinar notes in payment of this smuggled gold were being brought into Persia, thus increasing Persia's sterling balances and, hence, His Majesty's Government's obligations to convert 60 per cent. of these holdings into gold.

Appointments

7. [illegible] Samii to be [illegible] of the 4th [illegible] Western Azarbaijan [illegible] Officer Commanding Azarbaijan Division.

[illegible]

(iii) Jamshid Qarib to be First Secretary to the Persian Embassy at Angora.

(iv) Mahmud Mir Fakhrai to be Secretary to the Persian Legation in Brazil vice Khoshnawis recalled.

Persian Army.

8. The High Military Council, whose meetings General Razmara contrived to suspend, is now functioning again. Its members comprise the Minister for War, the Deputy Minister for War (General Muqtadir), the Chief of the General Staff, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff (General Ansari), General Yazdan Panah, the Secretary of the Shah's Military Cabinet (General Riazi) and the General Officer Commanding the 2nd Division (General M[illegible]).

Internal Security.

Azarbaijan.

9. With reference to Summary No. 4, 45, paragraph 9, full details of the proceedings of the Tudeh conference have been received. 142 delegates attended, 43,000 members are claimed for eastern Azarbaijan alone and 7,000 for the city of Tabriz. The resolutions passed may be summarised as follows: To oppose [illegible] landlords, to combat unemployment, to urge the exploitation of the province's mineral resources, to work for the abolition of oppressive legislation passed under [illegible] the Soviets and for all small nations fighting for freedom. The conference also thanked the Soviets for their offer to co-operate with the Tudeh for the benefit of Persia. These thanks appear to have been cheaply earned, as the fifteen Kurdish chiefs summoned to Tabriz refused to attend the conference.

Khuzistan.

10. [illegible] months ago [illegible] Bagzouneh [illegible] were [illegible] military [illegible] Mishab. They were [illegible] their camp [illegible] They were forced to [illegible] their goods [illegible] protected Persia under [illegible] They were [illegible] to train. They were sent in cattle cars of lorries [illegible] and two of their number died. [illegible] They have [illegible] present [illegible] have protested [illegible] stood.

Khuzistan.

11. The Persian Government has been issuing passports for pilgrims to Kerbela without ascertaining from the Iraqi Consulate the numbers of applicants for visas with which they could cope. They have also been running three special pilgrim trains to Ahwaz per week without concerning themselves with the arrangements for the onward transport of pilgrims from Ahwaz to Iraq. The resulting accumulation of pilgrims without food or shelter in Ahwaz is causing the local authorities much concern. Many pilgrims tired of waiting their turn at the Iraqi Consulate, will have gone south without Iraqi visas, and the trade of the Shatt-el-Arab boatmen in smuggling them across at extortionate rates is likely to be a brisk one.

12. The military governor of Abadan met the sheikhs of south-east Abadan on the 29th January and obtained promises from them to hand over their arms. While complying with the military governor's orders the sheikhs pointed out that they would remain at the mercy of the tribes on the Arab side of the Shatt-el-Arab who still retain their arms.

Malmir

13. Security around Zahidan has deteriorated and further hold ups have been reported. The area near Hormuk is particularly bad owing to its proximity to the Afghan border and the numerous safe exits afforded to bandits by the tangled mass of hills near Kuh i Malik Siah.

Turkish Interest

14. Jahid Hayta, Second Secretary to the Turkish Embassy, Tehran, has been transferred to Rome.

Russian Interest

15. Major-General I. V. Kargin, Chief of the Soviet Transport Directorate and commander of all Russian personnel in Tehran, has returned to Moscow on completion of his appointment. His successor is Colonel Kostikov, who is carrying out the same duties previously performed by [illegible] Major-General Zorrin, Chief of the Transovtrans, is occupied with that organisation only and is not commander of Soviet troops in Tehran.

Appendix

Extract from report dated the 30th January, 1945, by the Financial Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy.

Public Finance.

* * * * * *

2. The figures of revenue and expenditure for the first nine months of the financial year 1944-45 (beginning on the 21st March 1944—the Persian year 1323 A.H.) are now available. They compare as follows with those for the corresponding period in the previous year.

	1943-44.	*1944-45*
	(Million rials)	
Ordinary budget—		
Revenue	3,987	[illegible]
Expenditure	[illegible]	2,710
Surplus	440	[illegible]
Commercial budget—		
Revenue	537	2,640
Expenditure	[illegible]	[illegible]
Deficit	[illegible]	475
Net deficit	837	210

3. The estimates for the whole year 1944–45 are as follows:—

	Million rials
Ordinary budget—	
Revenue	3,95[illegible]
Expenditure	[illegible]
Deficit	[illegible]
*Commercial budget—	
Revenue	[illegible]
Expenditure	[illegible]
Surplus	612 (Overall surplus 470,301 rials)

It may be noted here for reference that the budget estimates for the year 1943-44 was 1,052 million rials.

* The [illegible] revised by the C[illegible] and [illegible] of food-stuffs and piece goods. (b) [illegible] Government buildings and properties. Under the latter heading outgoings during the first nine months of the year are [illegible] against receipts [illegible]

4. As to the ordinary budget, the situation was less favourable than appears from the figures in the second paragraph. For one thing, the expenditure does not [illegible] rials). The budget, although submitted to the Parliament (Majlis) last June, has not yet been approved, and the expenditure is being authorised in the meantime by periodical votes on account, the last (like some of the others) having been passed too late for the punctual payment of salaries. More important, however, is the fact that receipts from income tax, which were estimated at 885 million rials for the year, are likely to fall far short of this figure. Although the rates are considerably higher than in 1943-44, receipts in Tehran have been no more than 284 million rials in the first nine months of the year, compared with 273 million in the same period of the preceding year, and this figure has only been reached because the income tax paid by the National Bank has amounted to 140 million as against 46 million last year. Similarly, receipts (including income tax) from the provinces for the period have so far been 430 million as against 500 million in the first nine [illegible] of 1943-44.

* * * * * *

Banknotes, Currency and Price Indices.

10. The following table brings up to date the figures given in previous reports of notes in circulation and bank deposits.

	Notes.	*Deposits*
	(Million rials)	
June 1941	1,312	671
June 1942	1,913	[illegible]
[illegible] 1943	4,070	[illegible]
[illegible] 1944	[illegible]	[illegible]
July 1944	[illegible]	[illegible]
August 1944	[illegible]	[illegible]
September 1944	[illegible]	[illegible]
October 1944	[illegible]	[illegible]
November 1944	6,600	[illegible]
December 1944	6,640	9,003

11. The following table (prepared by the National Bank) shows wholesale prices and cost of living.

	Wholesale prices.	*Cost of living*
	(1939 = 100)	
June 1941	141	143
June 1942	239	254
June 1943	422	628
June 1944	[illegible]	[illegible]
July 1944	407	[illegible]
August 1944	[illegible]	[illegible]
September 1944	406	798
October 1944	442	717
November 1944	445	656
December 1944	497	684

E 1305/70/34] (8)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 24th February.)

(No. 43.)

His Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 6, for the period the 5th February to the 11th February, 1945. Compiled by the Military Attaché to this embassy.

Tehran, 12th February, 1945.

Enclosure in (6)

(Secret.)

Military Attache's Intelligence Summary No. 6 for the period 5th February to 11th February, 1945

Political

1. The latest steps taken by Dr. Millspaugh to retain his post have not been very dignified. Having received no answer to his letter to the Persian Prime Minister (referred to in paragraph 1 of last Intelligence Summary) he addressed another in which he said that, as he had received no reply, he understood that his [illegible] had not been acceptable and that in consequence he tendered his [illegible]. Subsequently he wrote yet another letter to the Persian Prime Minister [illegible] designed to expel him from the country and sabotage the work of his financial mission. He finally appealed to the Majlis to arbitrate on the justice of his case [illegible] details of the correspondence between himself and Dr. Millspaugh. His statement to the effect that the Persian Government could no longer work with Dr. Millspaugh on any conditions was greeted with cheers.

2. Bayat's position as Persian Prime Minister has further deteriorated and there are but few who would estimate his chances of retaining office at more than a few weeks or who would regret his passing. The Parliamentary fractions are already busy in making their selections for a new cabinet. The qualifications demanded of any future Prime Minister are not easy to find. He must be acceptable to the Shah, the Majlis, the Russians and the British and, with vested interests as strong as they are at present in Persia, be a man who can afford not to show reforming zeal in putting an end to a state of administrative [illegible]. There are a great many classes of the population dei[illegible].

3. The Tudeh party have not slackened their [illegible]. Dr. Kishawarz and Kambaksh are reported to have left for Tehran but the [illegible] has been taken by Dr. Radmanish and Iraj Iskandari. The Soviet consul is active on their behalf and battle has now been joined with the two rival unions supported respectively by the mill owners and Daulatabadi. It is reported that Yezd is to be the next scene for Tudeh [illegible].

4. A reliable report discloses a strong Tudeh element in the Persian Broadcasting Department.

5. The Military Governor has published two proclamations concerning the suppression of four newspapers and the necessity for registration by immigrants. (It is thought that this last edict is directed against a number of Caucasians who it is rumoured have been imported by the Russians to swell the ranks of the Tudeh party.)

Gendarmerie

6. The headquarters of the Mekran Gendarmerie district has been transferred from Iranshahr to Zahedan.

7. Fifty Ismailians have been recruited into the Mekran gendarmerie. A hundred Bakhtiaris were enlisted in 1944 (see Intelligence Summary No. 42/44, paragraph 11), and Colonel Schwarzkopf has intentions of accepting Qashqai and, eventually, other tribesmen.

Economic

8. The Cabinet has received the report of the special commission set up to advise on the reorganisation of Persia's economic administrations. A bill embodying the commission's recommendations is to be presented to the Majlis at once.

9. The Minister of Finance has tabled a Bill to provide for the payment of the final two-twelfths of the budget to cover the period the 21st January to the 21st March.

Industrial

10. Strikes have been reported from Isfahan, Ahwaz and Yezd. In most cases the owners were prepared to grant benefits in the form of shorter hours and better hygienic facilities, but were not prepared to raise existing wages.

Educational

11. The first group of eleven Iranian students selected to study at Indian universities will leave Tehran shortly. Four will complete their training at Lyallpur Agricultural College (Punjab) and two at the Rangers College, Debra Dun, for forestry. Three of the group will take a course of high engineering at Delhi University while the remainder will study in the Textile Department of Delhi University. The entire cost will be borne by the Government of India.

Internal Security

Bakhtiari

12. Morteza Quli Khan has not yet obeyed the summons to come to the capital to discuss the proposed operations against the Bahmai and Tayebi. His excuse is that his absence from his district would be [illegible] as he has under his eye in that area all the leading kedkhudas having permitted none to remain in Isfahan during the winter.

The death is reported of Sardar Bakhtiar, son of the late Sardar Jang.

Ilias

13. Muhammed Hussein Qashqai is still in Tehran and his brother Khosro [illegible]. They have been advised that it is high time that Nasir Khan clarified his equivocal position and [illegible] His Imperial Highness the Shah. The added importance of this was stressed in view of Nasir Khan's often expressed desire to take his son abroad.

French Interests

14. The contract of M. Godard, Director of Archaeology and some time head of the Free French delegation, has been renewed.

Russian Interests

15. Lieutenant-General Yamuskevitch, Chief of Staff to General Sovietnikoff, has been killed in an aeroplane crash.

16. The following is the latest list of Soviet generals in Persia:

Kazvin—
[illegible] Sovietnikoff, Commander-in-chief.
[illegible] Sovietnikoff, second in command.
Major General Russov, staff.
Major-General Danilov, Chief of anti-aircraft troops.

Tabriz—
Major General Glinski, Commander of troops in Tabriz area.
[illegible] Lolov, Chief of Staff to Glinski.

Rezaieh—
Major General Smirnov, Commanding brigade.

Resht—
Major-General Shafranski, Commanding Resht area.

Gurgan—
Major General Tre[illegible], Commanding troops in Gurgan area.

Sari—
Major [illegible] Sokolov, Commanding brigade.
Major [illegible] Fomitov, Commanding brigade.

Tehran—
Major General Zorin,(1) Iran-Soviet transport.

(1) Proceeded to Moscow behalved on permanent transfer.

E 1516/70/34] (9

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden. (*Received 5th March.*)

(No. 49)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 7 for the period the 12th to 18th February, 1945, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 19th February, 1945.

Enclosure in (9)

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 7 for the Period 12th-18th February, 1945

Persian Affairs

Political

THE Tudeh party's activities in the provinces have been much in the news recently. In Yazd the anti-Tudeh party of Dr. Tahiri sacked and burnt the Tudeh headquarters, attacked the Tudeh leaders and chased them out of the town. The instigator of the strikes referred to in paragraph 10 of last Intelligence Summary, Abbas Ustadan, escaped from the first affray but was later caught and wounded. In Azerbaijan, as a result of the recent Tudeh conference, a Tudeh recruiting drive has started among the townsfolk of Tabriz, the peasants and the Kurdish tribes. The enthusiasm of the latter for the Tudeh cause has probably been much exaggerated by the wealthy burghers, who fear for their [illegible] Tudeh's Russian masters. In a separationist movement culminating, possibly in the formation of an Azerbaijan Soviet republic, the Kurds would hold no favoured place, but they would stand to benefit, temporarily, in a state of chaos between the withdrawal of Russian troops and the reassertion of Persian Government authority—a period during which they could indulge in their predatory habits to the full. The Shakkaq tribe has been the main recipient for Tudeh propaganda and is under the leadership of Taha Agha, son of the notorious rebel Simko, who was killed at Ushnu in 1930. In Hamadan the party [illegible], and, though Hamadan is not an industrial centre, a number of artisans recently thrown out of employment there by the diminution of [illegible] strikes and street fighting continue and Persian troops were recently called out in aid of the civil power. To offset these provincial activities, an unconfirmed report states that Tudeh membership in the capital has declined from 15,000 to 1,000 and that the weekly meetings are attended by only 150 as against the average of 500 of some months ago. The reason for this falling off is said to be the Russian-escorted Tudeh demonstrations of October last, as a result of which it became manifest to all Persians that the Tudeh was no longer (if ever it had been) a genuine Persian labour movement but a Russian-controlled political movement.

The Majlis

2. A press report gives the strength of the various Majlis groups as follows:—

Ittihad i Milli (National Unionists)	30
Democrats	8
Azadi (Freedom Front)	11
Independents	16
Tudeh (Labour)	9
Mihan (Fatherland)	23
Ungrouped	31
	127

American Financial Mission

3. [illegible] has been temporarily [illegible]

Mr. [illegible]

Mr. [illegible]

Dr. Millspaugh's [illegible] committee whose names are to be selected from among Hikmat, Dr. Amini, Dr. Sajjadi, Salih, Muqbil.

Appointments—Civil

4. (1) [illegible] Asghar Ittisam to be Farmandar (Governor) of Khoi.

(2) [illegible] Ishaqi to be Farmandar (Governor) of Ardebil.

Internal Security

5. [illegible] in this road since December 1943.

6. Smuggling into Afghanistan on a large scale of A.I.O.C. and Russian [illegible]

Qashqai

7. The Darashuri have been raiding recently [illegible] following representations by the A.I.O.C. have removed th[illegible] and promised compensation for losses inflicted.

Kuh i Giluyeh

8. The situation is still disturbed, where Muhammad Khan Ariani of the Boir Ahmad Sarhaddi is at loggerheads with his nephew Zargham Ariani. The Bavi tribe has joined in the fray by coming to the assistance of the latter.

Bakhtiari

9. Reference paragraph 12 of the last Intelligence Summary. Mortaza Quli Khan has refused to come to Tehran and gives as his re[illegible] the Bahmai and Tayebi. Mortaza Quli Khan has stipulated for a daily payment [illegible] and 30 rials respectively for every foot soldier and horse soldier which he provides. Their rations and arms are to be supplied by the Persian Government. [illegible] of the opinion that his own forces are inadequate and is, moreover, nervous about hostile repercussions among the Kuhgalu in his rear. It is doubtful whether the [illegible] of the General Staff will succeed in overcoming the objections now raised by Mortaza Quli Khan and General Humayuni.

British Interests

10. Three members of a British parliamentary delegation which has toured Soviet Russia [illegible] Tehran on their way home. They were Commander King Hall, Mr. Jewson and Mr. Manningham Buller. While in Tehran they met a number of newspaper editors and a representative selection of Majlis Deputies. The remainder of the British delegation, delayed by an extension of their tour in Soviet Central Asia, are expected to arrive in Tehran next week.

Chinese Interests

11. The Persian and Chinese Governments have raised their respective legations to the status of embassies.

E 1596/70/34) (10)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 7th March.)

(No. 55.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's [illegible] Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the [illegible] herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 8 for the period the 19th March to 25th February, 1945 [illegible]

Tehran, 26th February, 1945

Enclosure in (10)

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 8 for the Period 19th February to 25th February, 1945

Persian Affairs

The Majlis.

1. The chief business has been —

(i) [illegible] by the Minister of Finance of a Bill empowering Government to return to their rightful owners lands and properties [illegible] the most Persian legislation quite impracticable.

(ii) Passing of the Bill to provide credits for the months of Bahman and Isfand 21st January to the 21st March (two twelfths of the budget).

(iii) The tabling by the Persian Prime Minister of two Bills to provide for the formation [illegible] for the development of Persian agriculture. The text of the former has been received and will be published in this summary when the Bill is passed. It looks imposing enough on paper, but the lack of the necessary funds, energy and knowledge will probably prevent its ever being of any practical use.

Obituary.

2. By the death on the 24th February of Hassan Esfandiari Haji Muhtashim us-Saltaneh (F.O. 99, M.A. 125) a notable landmark of modern Persia has disappeared.

Appointments.

3. Sartip Gulbayan, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, to be a Military Governor in Tehran, vice Sartip Kazim Sharbaini. The reason for the change is said to be Sharbaini's inactivity in general and his neglect of duty in particular on the occasion of a riot at Muharram when he failed to visit the scene in person and finally despatched a force [illegible] was killed. The new Military Governor though [illegible] is not remarkable for his energy.

Persian Army.

4. The Conscription Law continues to be debated and amended. One criticism of the existing procedure seems justified. Owing to Government's [illegible] conscription in areas not under its control (i.e. the Russian occupied zone and the fringes of tribal [illegible] where it no longer runs) the annual call-up in other areas exceeds the army's requirements. Where a surplus exists [illegible] is effected by casting lots. Those who are not chosen only receive exemption for one year and may also in following years be [illegible] receive permanent exemption [illegible] The greater the number of persons [illegible] the greater is the [illegible] after payment of a small [illegible] and the chance of a person being selected rate.

Persian Navy

5. After repeated requests by the Persian Government for the return of all or some of their naval craft [illegible] the return of the admiral's barge and two motor launches after repair. While these, if efficiently handled, may go some way towards prevention of smuggling and frontier control in the Shatt-el Arab they will not suffice for other needs said by the Persian Government to be equally pressing, *i.e.*, general preventive duties and as a means of communication between the scattered garrisons along the whole Persian coast from Bushire to Jask.

Internal Security

Bakhtiari.

6. The Chief of the General Staff has decided to postpone till a more suitable occasion the operations for disarming the Bahmai and Tayeb for the reasons given in paragraph 8 of the last Intelligence Summary. According to a [illegible] report, General Humayuni has submitted an alternative proposal to [illegible] the Hajiwand sub-tribe of the Chahar Lang Division of the Bakhtiari. This alternative proposal has not yet reached the Persian General Staff. It will [illegible] examination for two reasons. Firstly, at this late season, the Hajiwand will [illegible] in upward migration to their summer grazing grounds near the Ushtarinan Kuh, thus putting themselves beyond the reach of their attackers. Secondly the Hajiwand live, both in their winter and summer grazing grounds, in close proximity to another sub-tribe of the Chahar Lang (also an off shoot of the Fuladwand tribe), the Hivedi, to whom it is believed the murderers of Mr. [illegible] and Harris and Dr. Griffiths and his son belong. His Majesty's Embassy has [illegible] pressing the Persian Government for more than two years to bring these murderers to justice, and their reply, so far, has been to the effect that their habitat is not under Government's control. If [illegible] against the Hajiwand are considered feasible [illegible] should be regarded as beyond the reach of a punitive column.

Tudeh.

7. A number of persons have been arrested by the Persian military authorities for smuggling arms. One of them was a member of the Tudeh party. One unconfirmed report says that vehicles of Transwitrans were used for the purpose. The above information is especially interesting in view of the numerous reports in the Tudeh press of late to the effect that "Mysterious Hands," "Fascists," "Imperialists" and "Reactionaries" were busy arming the tribes of the south.

8. On the 15th February some fifty members of the Tudeh ambushed a car containing Abbas Quli Dehesh, a factory owner, and Sarfpur Fatemi, the Majlis Deputy. On the timely arrival of a party of soldiers about twenty members of the gang were arrested, among whom was the local Tudeh leader, Bahrampur. The Soviet consul, Marchenko, demanded his release from the Governor-General and, [illegible] demanded the recall of the Governor-General and some other officials. The Governor-General, who seems to have behaved with admirable firmness, courage and impartiality throughout, has asked his Government to procure the recall of Marchenko. The situation is tense with Tudeh and anti Turkish factions spoiling for a fight.

Arab Tribes.

9. Some progress has been made in settling the disputes between Abdullah Khan Zarghampur and his half-brother, Khosro. The former was last reported to be near Behbehan, but to be reluctant to enter the town without some form of British guarantee.

Kurdistan.

10. On the 15th February a crowd of Kurds attacked the police station at Mahabad [illegible] Department's offices. Five policemen and a Kurd were killed. The ringleader of the Kurds, Aziz of the Faizullahbegi tribe, in an inflammatory speech, urged the expulsion of all Persian officials and claimed to speak as a pro-Russian, pro-Communist Nationalist. According to a Russian source the Kurds were enraged at the unfair distribution of monopoly goods. On the 14th February at a village a few miles north of Rezaieh a small detachment of Persian infantry on tactical training encountered a party of Herki Kurds. The latter opened fire and the

commander of the Persian detachment, a Major Mafi, rashly charged them and [illegible] killed. According to a Persian General Staff report, as yet unconfirmed from consular sources, the Persian detachment a day or two later located these same Kurds in position on a hill north-west of Rezaieh on the Rezaieh–Shahpur road and attacked them inflicting casualties of fifty killed and wounded with no loss to themselves. The Persian Government feel particularly sore with the Russians over the first incident because the Russians, though they withdrew their [illegible] from Mahabad some time ago, refused to allow the Persian army to [illegible] our own. A battalion of Persian infantry has been moved from Saqqiz to Bukan about 35 miles south of Mahabad and, if Russian permission is obtained this battalion will subsequently move on and garrison Mahabad.

Khuzistan.

11. A fairly reliable estimate of the arms recovered in phases 3, 4 and [illegible] of General Humayuni's operations against the Arabs of Khorramshahr, [illegible] Abadan, Shedgan and Khalafabad is 1,300, 750 and 400 respectively.

French Interests.

12. General Catroux, French Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., passed through [illegible] on his way to Moscow. He was [illegible] Majesty the Shah.

13. The Persian Military Mission referred to in paragraph 18 of [illegible] Summary No. 49 of 1944 is scheduled to leave Tehran on the [illegible] 1945.

Tehran, 25th February, 1945.

E 1750/70/34] (11)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 9 (Secret) for the Period 20th February to 4th March, 1945. (Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 66 of the 5th March, 1945, received in Foreign Office 14th March.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

DR. MILLSPAUGH left Tehran on the 28th February and, unless he is rash enough to try and write another apologia as a sequel to "The American Task in Persia," which he published after the completion of his previous [illegible] of office, the hubbub may be expected to die down.

2. Persia declared war on Japan with effect from the 28th February.

3. Hayat's position has strengthened slightly during the past two weeks. Inability among the Majlis parties to agree on a successor and a desire [illegible] to mar the festivities of the Nau Ruz, now approaching, [illegible] Dr. Musaddiq may have strengthened Hayat's position by a speech in which [illegible] referred to the current trend of thought in the Majlis with regard to [illegible] Government:—

> "For several days it had been quite clear that th[illegible] was not in very great favour with the Majlis, but reasons for opposition to the Government should be clearly stated. If the Government was bad then it should go, but if not then it should receive full support. If the Government had to go great attention should be paid to its successor. Persia of to-day found herself living in a period when the leaders of great nations gathered together, took important decisions and drew up world plans, and if Persian really gave serious thought to Persia's position in international politics at a time when the slightest negligence would bring down great misfortune on Persia, they would be bound to confess that it was necessary for the Majlis to be respected, and for a clear and permanent policy to be established which would settle disturbed public opinion on the one hand, and which would enable Persia to deal with current important international problems with success on the other. Exactly what the present Government had achieved good or bad, should be clearly defined; the Government had kept its promise to abrogate Millspaugh's powers and had thus rendered great service to [illegible] the Majlis should take care to avoid a political crisis and should not appoint an inefficient successor."

Financial.

4. The budget for the Persian year 1324—the 21st March, 1945, to the 20th March, 1946—is to be tabled shortly. Expenditure is believed to be round about 400 million tomans (approximately £31 million). [illegible] Treasury is empty and Government salaries are one month in [illegible]

5. (i) Jawad Sadr to be first Secretary and Consul at the Persian Consulate-General at Jerusalem.

(ii) Dr. Abul Qasim Sheikh has been presented to the Majlis as Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and M[illegible]

Persian Army.

7. The conscription bill is still being debated and one of the latest amendments proposed [illegible] from two years to one. With administration and training at their present levels this [illegible] scripts on joining know only Turki and take six months or a year to learn sufficient Persian to understand the orders given. The amendment is also very unpopular with officers who, quick to select as batmen the more presentable and intelligent and the handymen from each draft, thus secured for themselves two years' free domestic service.

8. Sarhang Khodadad, General Officer Commanding the 6th Khorrassan Division, has been recalled to Tehran to answer charges made against him [illegible] officers of peculation especially in the matter of certain recent disarmament operations near Kuchan. A commission had recently gone to [illegible] tigate these rumours. Sarhang Khodadad had been favoured [illegible] Majesty's Consul-General for Khorrassan, and it is known that he was [illegible] regarded with favour by the Russians. He was, moreover, a nominee of Gen[illegible] Razmara.

Persian Air Force.

9. General Ahmad Nakhchivan (F.O. 159, M.A. 193) and Colonel Shahpasd[illegible] [illegible] was a lengthy one and they were lavishly entertained. They are reported as [illegible] all with the war effort in general.

Internal Security.

Kurdistan.

10. The small force which the Chief of the General Staff had ordered to [illegible] detachment. General Hushmand Afshar has not yet assembled this column from his scattered command. Amir Asad of the Deboukri Kurds has been instructed by Afshar to collect his followers and meet him at Mahabad. Uncertainty as to the Russians' reactions, the known enmity between Ghazi Muhammad of Mahabad and Amir Asad, the evil reputation of General Hushmand Afshar among the Kurds and, lastly, the intention of Colonel Schwarzkopf to form a [illegible] tors which may produce some startling results in the neighbourhood.

Arab States.

11. Abdullah Zarghampur, according to a consular report, has arrived at Behbehan and, from a message sent in by General Humayuni, seems prepared to submit to the Government. It is to be hoped that General Hum[illegible] moderate outlook (moderate, that is to [illegible] Generals) and his knowledge of his own Government's weakness will induce him to propose terms which, while securing tranquillity for the area, will not prove too onerous for Abdullah's acceptance.

Isfahan.

12. The situation is reported as quieter and there have been no more disturbances.

13. The Russian Consul at Isfahan, Mr Marchenko, accompanied by the Assistant Russian Military Attaché and two agricultural experts, visited Shiraz [illegible] Mr M[illegible] [illegible] tions to the Persian officials [illegible] of subjects. He asked for inform[illegible] arms to them from [illegible] reconstitution [illegible] the cap[illegible] the number [illegible]

14. [illegible] persuade Nasir Khan to [illegible] His Imperial Majesty The Shah [illegible] member Nasir Khan will consider it as a trap. There are grounds for be[illegible] Nasir Khan regards Khosro with suspicion as attempting to undermine h[illegible] tority with the Qashgai and also as a convert to the Tudeh.

British Interests

15. The remainder of the British Parliamentary Delegation (see paragraph 10 [illegible] they were entertained at the Majlis, where they met the Cabinet Ministers and Deputies. This part of the delegation consisted of the following:

[illegible] Walter [illegible] M.P.
[illegible]
Mr Wilfred Roberts, M.P.
Lord Farringdon, M.P.
Mr T. Fraser, M.P.
Mr John Parker, M.P.

French Interests

16. The motion to renew for a further period of five years the contract of Mr Paul Godard, the Director of Archæology, has caused a stir. To most [illegible] Mr [illegible] genial savant, encouraged [illegible] xenophobia express itself in demanding [illegible] Mr Godard has been accused of selling improperly, smuggling out of the countr[illegible] and even converting to his own use articles of value excavated by him at various sites in Persia.

Armenian Religious Interests

17. A Soviet national, Vahar Kestanian, has been elected by the relig[illegible] authorities at Ete-Imiadzin to the vacant Archbishopric of Isfahan (Julfa). His see comprises all Persia (except Tabriz), India, Burma and the Netherlands East Indies.

Tehran, 5th March, 1945.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 10, Secret, for the period the 5th March to the 11th March, 1945. Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 79 of the 12th March.—Received in Foreign Office 20th March.

Persian Affairs

Political

1. Bayat, the Prime Minister, is expected to resign to-day. His supporters had been falling away rapidly. His relative and supporter Dr. Musaddiq, had [illegible] unfavourable notice on account of a speech in the Majlis and [illegible] out of it which is described in a later paragraph in this [illegible] The Tudeh party having achieved their object in getting rid of Dr Millspaugh, had no further use for Bayat. The Shah is reputed to be

very displeased with him for accepting the Presidency of the Irano-Soviet [illegible] tion in honour of the Red army at the premises of the Persian Officers' Club, to which not only Persians but members of the diplomatic corps and Allied officers were [illegible] to join forces to oppose the Government. Up to date there is no clear indicatio[illegible] already ruled out as unsuitable two possibilities in the shape of Soheili and Rajab Ali Mansour, at present Governor of Khorrassan.

2. On the 4th March, in the course of a debate on the submiss[illegible] by Majlis commissions, a Deputy objected to a previous remark by [illegible] to the effect that the Majlis Justice Commission had acquitted an embezzler acquitting Tadayyun, who had been impeached for accepting bribes in con[illegible] nexion with the last elections. Dr Musaddiq requested that Tadayyun's dossier should be placed at his disposal for fifteen days, by the end of which period he undertook to find ample evidence of Tadayyun's guilt. He was told that, as a Deputy, he had the right to study the dossier in the Majlis but not to remove it. [illegible] but was shouted down. In a fit of rage he left the chamber turning at the door to remark that the Majlis was a den of thieves. This unpalatable truth estranged many of his, and hence Bayat's, supporters. On the 6th March a crowd of young students, having heard of Dr Musaddiq's outburst and refusal to attend the Majlis, persuaded the hysterical demagogue to allow himself to be carried by them in procession to the Majlis. A posse of soldiers, drawn up at the gates to prevent the entry of this crowd, opened fire after, it is said, a shot had been fired at them by an unknown person in the crowd. In the insane fashion prevalent in the Persian army when called out in aid of the civil power the troops fired a few rounds over the heads of the rioters and thereby killed a young student who was peacefully watching the scene from the balcony of his [illegible] some distance away. An enquiry into the incident is being held and, in the meanwhile Sartip Gulshayan, the newly appointed Military Governor of Tehran, has been suspended and Colonel Shah Raia, his deputy, is officiating.

3. Some publicity has been given of late in the Persian press to the closing of the internee's camp at Rasht and deductions were drawn to show that, despite the Russians' magnanimity, the British continued to keep their numerous internees in Tehran. To counteract this mischievous propaganda a press communique has been issued by His Majesty's Embassy, which explains that internees are held jointly and that the British and Russian security authorities work in the closest co-operation.

4. H.I.M. the Shah, in an interview given recently to the representative of the *Evening Standard* newspaper, stated that the best course for Persia to pursue was to abstain from all negotiations or treaties leading to the according of economic, financial and commercial concessions with other countries as long as foreign troops were on Persian soil.

5. The Deputy Masudi asked for information in the Majlis on the 4th March regarding the rumoured arming of the Southern tribes. The Prime Minister, previously supplied with ample material by His Majesty's Embassy [illegible] a convincing answer, gave a much watered-down version in reply. He stated that such false rumours only served to weaken confidence in Government and were without foundation. He admitted that the tribes were plentifully supplied with arms which they had acquired on the disintegration of the Persian army at the time of the entry of British and Russian troops. Furthermore, a trickle of smuggled arms had always reached the tribes and would doubtless always continue to do so despite the vigilance of the preventive service. He assured the Majlis that the Government was pursuing a gradual policy of disarmament. He reassured the Majlis that the recent pact between certain tribal leaders made for added security and was not in any way directed against the Government.

Financial

6. *The Budget.*—The Finance Minister tabled a single article budget bill in the Majlis on the 4th March. Income was shown as 4,412,200,000 rials and expendi[illegible] 4,412 [illegible] this year's budget may meet a similar fate, it is reproduced for purposes of [illegible] the Ministry of War budget at 1,000,000,000 rials and Conscription Department at 1,400,000 rials, and "Ministry of War requirements from United States" at

96,000,000 rials, total 1,097,400,000 rials and represent 25 per cent. of the total expenditure. When 398,246,160 rials are added for the gendarmerie vote and 287,000,000 rials for the police vote there is some justification for the criticisms by Majlis Deputies that Persia is spending more than she can afford on her security forces.

[illegible]

7. Most of the members of the economic council (see paragraph 8 of Summary No. 6/45) have resigned, giving as their reason the unwarranted interference of the Ministry of Finance in the economic sphere.

Appointments—Civil

8. (i) Baqir Kazemi (F.O. 105/M.A. 142) to be Persian Minister at Stockholm. This appointment was announced in February 1944 (see paragraph 10, Summary No. 5 of 1944), but Kazemi did not proceed to his mission and the appointment was thought to have lapsed.
(ii) Mustafa Moqaddam to be Director of the Sipah (Army) Bank.
(iii) Taimureth Ademyat to be Third Secretary at the Persian Embassy in Moscow.

[illegible]

(i) Colonel Mahmud Imami to be Director of the Army Ordnance Department.
(ii) Colonel Dehimi from Officer Commanding Jahrum Brigade to be Military Public Prosecutor.
(iii) Colonel Majnoi from Chief of Staff 9th Fars Division to an appointment in Tehran.
(iv) Colonel Sarami to be Officer Commanding Saqqiz Brigade *vice* Colonel Bayendor.
(v) Colonel Bayendor to be Officer Commanding Kermanshah Brigade *vice* Colonel Shahrukhabadi.

Persian Army

9. The military mission (see paragraph 13 M.A.'s Summary No. [illegible]) which has left for a tour of the French battlefields consists of:

Sartip Reza Javadi—Head of Geographical Section, General Staff, accompanied Military Mission to Middle East in 1943. G.O.C. Tabriz. Chief of Personnel Bureau, General Staff.
Sarhang Abdul Hussein Hejazi—2nd in command Officers' Training College. Military Governor of Tehran.
Colonel Mazheri, Instructor Staff College—accompanied Military Mission to Middle East in 1943. Staff Officer General Staff.
Lieutenant-Colonel Musayyim—Staff Officer General Staff, brother of Sartip Muzayyim, General Officer commanding 2nd Division.
Lieutenant-Colonel Amini—Secretary H.I.M. the Shah's Military Cabinet.

10. The proposal to reduce the period of compulsory service for conscripts from two years to one year has been rejected by the Military Affairs Committee of the Majlis.

11. Colonel Atapur, C.B.E. (late military attaché in London), has returned from his tour of inspection in those areas of Khuzistan where disarming operations have recently taken place. This unbalanced and embarrassingly anglophile officer was warned before his departure against excessive zeal and the folly of saying what he believed, *i.e.*, that everyone of his countrymen was a thief, his country on the brink of disaster and that its only salvation lay in the immediate acceptance of a British mandate for an indefinite period. His report is couched in moderate terms and merely accuses General Humayuni of making reasonable profits out of the allowances for his troops' rations, out of the distribution of monopoly goods among the tribes and out of forewarning tribes of coming disarmament.

12. The Minister for War and the Chief of the General Staff state that they are determined to check and punish corruption in the army and that the summoning to Tehran to answer charges of peculation of Colonel Khodadad [illegible] and [illegible] from Kermanshah are the first steps in that direction. The appointment of Colonel Dehimi as public prosecutor

in place of the allegedly dishonest Colonel Shah Quli is, they say, another earnest of their endeavours. If these charges are proved and the officers punished the deterrent effect should be good, but the apparent impossibility [illegible] conviction in Persia and the fact that the two officers recalled and also the public prosecutor were friends of General Razmara (and hence enemies [illegible] at Arfa) detract from the value of the protestations of the Minister for War and the Chief of the General Staff.

Internal Security

[illegible]

13. A consular report states that there are signs that the Tudeh and Workers' Union have been told to draw in their horns by their Russian masters. Both have published notices condemning acts of violence committed in their names and announcing that unruly members will be expelled. A flag march of 1,200 Persian troops through Tabriz has had a steadying effect on local nerves and has done much to enhance the waning prestige of the Persian arm[illegible].

14. The newspaper *Iran* reports that Mehdi Dadvar (Vossuq-us-Saltaneh) has been recalled. It has been known for a long time that the Persian Government has been very dissatisfied at his feeble handling of the situation and his complete subservience to the Russians.

Khuzistan

15. A decline in [illegible] reported where the Ahmadi tribesmen [illegible]

16. General H[illegible] He has left a committee sitting on the settlement of the dispute between Abdullah Zarghampur and his half brother Khosrow. He is hopeful of a settlement by which Abdullah, in return for his submission to Government, will be recognised as Kalantar of the Beir Ahmadi Sarhaddi (lower) tribes only.

[illegible]

17. A reliable report states that Tudeh influence has suffered a severe [illegible] the Governor's firm handling of the situation and the [illegible] Another cause for the [illegible] practices, which is intent in all Persians.

18. *Correction*—see paragraph 17 of last Intelligence Summary. [illegible] Julfa.

British Interests

19. As from Nau Ruz (21st March) the time on the Tehran radio reserved for the past three years for the service "Voice of Britain" will be given up. It is hoped that this will assist the Persian Government in their return to normality. The Russians, therefore, will from that date be the only foreigners with a radio time reserved for themselves.

French Interests

20. The renewal of the contract of Mr. Godard for a further period of five years was passed by the Majlis by the narrow margin of 46 votes to 43. See paragraph 16 of last Intelligence Summary.

Polish Interests

21. Discussions with the colonial and other authorities concerned are in progress with a view to making one more and final transfer of Poles from Persia to the number of 2,200 distributed among Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Uganda.

Tehran, 12th March 1945.

Appendix

Detailed Revenue and Expenditure of the General Budget for the year 1324 (21st March 1945–20th March, 1946), tabled in the Majlis by the Minister of Finance 4th March 1945

REVENUE

		1324 Rials	1323 Rials
	Ministry of Finance		
	Direct Taxation		
1	Income Tax and Stamp fees	[illegible]	[illegible]
2	Inheritance and transfer tax	[illegible]	[illegible]
	Indirect Taxation		
3	Oil [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
4	Excise and manufacture of alcohol	[illegible]	[illegible]
5	[illegible] tax	6,000,000	[illegible]
6	[illegible] fee motorless vehicles and [illegible]	[illegible]	3,253,500
7	Misc. taxes gained from [illegible] stamped documents, &c.	16,000,000	19,000,000
	Tobacco and Opium Monopoly		
8	Opium Monopoly	201,000,000	410,000,000
9	Tobacco Monopoly	1,100,000,000	1,015,000,000
	Customs		
10	Customs Revenues	27,[illegible]	[illegible]
11	Sugar and tea [illegible]	105,000,000	220,000,000
12	Goods [illegible]	50,500,000	47,000,000
13	Port charges	2,400,000	[illegible]
14	4 per cent. tax on exports [illegible]	[illegible]	430,000
15	Lighthouse tax	120,000	300,000
16	6 per cent. tax on imports and 1 per cent. tax on exports [illegible]	120,000,000	87,200,000
17	Mines tax collected by Ministry of Finance	8,000,000	7,500,000
18	Profit on Government shares in Banks and Companies	44,224,000	64,000,000
19	Sources in [illegible]	6,615,000	7,464,000
20	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
21	[illegible] and unforeseen	1,592,000	[illegible]
	[illegible]		
22	[illegible] fees on fisheries and river [illegible]	2,900,000	800,000
23	[illegible] fees on telephones and revenues from other concessions and arrears	1,000,000	1,000,000
24	[illegible] of Government employees payable by A.I.O.C.	458,400	458,400
25	Concession fees from A.I.O.C.	[illegible]	40,958,160
26	[illegible] *Properties and Public Domains*	[illegible]	140,456,000
	Commercial Transactions, Economic Affairs and factories	[illegible]	
28	*Majlis*, Majlis Printing [illegible] and Baharistan garden	7,000,000	7,000,000
	Ministry of Justice		
29	Public Courts	7,400,000	6,000,000
30	Criminal and Profiteers' Courts	600,000	800,000
31	25 per cent. registration of documents and property	12,200,000	10,000,000
32	Registration of documents and property and percentage fee on executed warrants	50,000,000	40,000,000
33	Revenue on profit gained by owners of Notaries public	5,000,000	4,500,000
34	Sale of documents and books	4,000,000	2,500,000

		1324 Rials	1323 Rials
	Ministry of the Interior—		
35	Police revenues and passports sold in the provinces	[illegible]	3,500,000
36	Civil Status Department	[illegible]	1,500,000
37	*Ministry of Health* and Pasteur Institute	580,000	400,000
38	[illegible]	1,700,000	1,300,000
	Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones		
39	Post [illegible]	30,000,000	23,400,000
40	Telegraphs [illegible]	91,500,000	76,500,000
41	[illegible] company, &c.	500,000	100,000
	Ministry of [illegible]		
42	Tuition fees in schools other than primary	1,850,000	1,500,000
43	Stamp fees on permits, certificates, &c.	500,000	850,000
44	[illegible]	150,000	150,000
45	Sale of Year Books	15,000	20,000
46	Public entertainments	1,000,000	1,000,000
47	Hospital affairs	600,000	600,000
48	[illegible]	35,000	35,000
	Ministry of Commerce and Industry		
49	Ministry of Commerce and Industry	260,000	78,000
50	[illegible]	2,000,000	610,000
51	Titles and [illegible]	120,000	72,000
52	Fees for analysis and dyes	100,000	
	Ministry of Agriculture		
[illegible]	Sale of agricultural implements and tools and [illegible] experimental farms	8,500,000	1,000,000
[illegible]	Examination of [illegible]	1,500,000	1,500,000
[illegible]	Irrigation Department	2,500,000	
	Other Revenues		
[illegible]	[illegible] to 1322 account	70,000,000	70,000,000
		4,412,200,000	4,098,075,000

EXPENDITURE

		1324 Rials
1	Ministry of Court and Special Office	11,792,460
2	Upkeep of Royal preserves, palaces expenses and repairs	3,000,000
3	Majlis	23,500,000
4	Prime Minister and Prime Minister's Office	8,340,000
5	Radio Department and Pars Newsagency	3,200,000
6	Ministry of War	1,000,000,000
7	Ministry of War Requirements ex United States	96,000,000
8	Ministry of the Interior	35,444,000
9	Gendarmerie	308,246,100
10	Police	237,000,000
11	Statistics Department and civil status	39,950,000
12	Conscription Department	1,400,000
13	Ministry of Health	150,754,500
14	Pasteur Institute	4,000,000
15	Ministry of Justice	69,184,655
16	District Court Officials and Public Prosecutions	20,000
17	Criminal Court and Profiteers' Court	300,000
18	Registration of Documents and Property	42,740,000
19	Fees to Owners of Notaries Public	4,500,000
20	Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Representation	53,211,460

		Rials
2	Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs	145,018,000
2	Ministry of Education	303,038,000
2	Students sent abroad	2,500,000
1	Endowments	1,000,000
2	University and Hospital Affairs Department	[illegible]
2	Ministry of Agriculture	[illegible]
2	[illegible] the certification of meat in the slaughter [illegible]	[illegible]
2	Irrigation Department	[illegible]
2	Ministry of Commerce and Industry	[illegible]
	Ministry of Communication	[illegible]
1	Railway Construction Department	47,280,000
2	Port Affairs Department	12,686,000
2	High Roads Department	115,000,000
2	Ministry of Finance, including Customs and the Mint	[illegible]
2	Opium [illegible]	[illegible]
2	Tobacco Monopoly Department	[illegible]
7	Ceded Property and Public Domains Department	[illegible]
	Pensions and upkeep of [illegible]	[illegible]
2	Red Lion and Sun Society Tabriz and Meshed	[illegible]
1	Welfare Institution	[illegible]
41	Construction and preservation of slaughter houses	6,000,000
4	[illegible] exploitation and undertakings	6,000,000
1	[illegible] manufacture of weights	1,254,480
1	Construction of Government buildings	[illegible]
1	Interest on Treasury Bonds and debts, bank commissions and instalment on National Bank Debt	155,000,000
2	Foreign debts	[illegible]
1	[illegible] of former Government companies to Agricultural Bank and Commercial Bank	[illegible]
4	[illegible] and undertakings	15,000,000
2	Salaries of Government representatives with A.I.O.C.	402,441
2	[illegible] National Bank	[illegible]
2	[illegible]	[illegible]
2	Expenses of Government tourists	1,000,000
2	Government credits and undertakings	14,000,000
2	Instalment on purchase of Washington Embassy	1,430,000
	[illegible]	[illegible]
		1,412,170,000

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 11 Secret, for the period 12th March to 18th March, 1945. Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 53 of 19th March 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office 27th March 1945.)

Persian Affairs

Political

THE situation in the Majlis is obscure. Bayat has not yet resigned and refuses to do so. According to one report he has threatened, if further pressure is put on him, to [illegible] the Majlis the names of all those Deputies who have asked him for Government posts. He also stated that the fall of the Government and the long period which, in view of the approaching Nau Ruz holidays, would elapse before a new Government could be formed, would delay to Persia's disadvantage the selection of representatives for the forthcoming San Francisco

Conference. The wildest rumours are abroad. Some say that the Tudeh party are [illegible] his Cabinet. Some sixty Deputies are opposed to him, but their number may [illegible]

2. Dr. Musaddiq has apologised for his angry outburst reported in paragraph 2 of Intelligence Summary No. 10. He is variously reported as having explained that he did not refer specifically to the Majlis or that he did not mean to infer that all the Deputies were thieves. This apology, though hardly handsome, [illegible] make his a[illegible] Governor at the [illegible]

3. The Majlis has passed a single article bill empowering the Government to borrow 200 million rials from the National Bank to meet current [illegible] as to be repaid from sums set apart for this purpose in the [illegible] 21st March, 1945–20th March 1946).

4. [illegible] of the control of foreign trade has been removed from the [illegible] Section of the Ministry of Finance and placed under the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Mines.

5. Hussein Pirnia (Mo'aviru'l Mulk) (F.O. 171, M.A. 212) has refused to accept the Persian Prime Minister's invitation to lead the Persian delegation at the forthcoming San Francisco Conference. The following names have since been put forward by the Council of Ministers as representatives:

Nasrullah Intezam, Minister of Foreign Affairs (F.O. 92, M.A. 121).
Mustafa Adl (Mansur-us Saltaneh), Minister of Justice (F.O. 1, M.A. 1).
Hassan Taqizadeh, Persian Ambassador in London (F.O. 220, M.A. 294).
Majid Ahi, Persian Ambassador in Moscow (F.O. 4, M.A. 7).

6. The *Tehran Daily News* of the 10th March published an account of German Fifth Column activities in Persia in the form of a press article and not a [illegible] The Kurds and Qashgai are specifically mentioned as implicated [illegible] and the Deputy Naubakht are mentioned by [illegible] This article will persuade some Persians that the internees are not, as usually described in the Persian press, honest and patriotic individuals wrongfully detained on grounds of ill founded suspicion and hearsay.

7. The Minister of Finance has tabled a bill for the increase in stamp duties on bonds, cheques [illegible]

Economic

8. Musharraf Nafisi (F.O. 134, M.A. 190) has also resigned from the Government Economic Council.

Persian Army

9. Corrigendum. Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 10, 45, paragraph 8 (Appointments—Military) sub-paragraph (iii)—for "9th Fars Division" read "6th Fars Division."

Appointment

10. – (i) Dr. Fazlullah Mushawir to be a member of the Government Economic Council.
(ii) Hadi Jazayiri to be 1st Secretary, Persian Consulate-General, Delhi.
(iii) Abbas Mir Aslani to be Counsellor, Persian Embassy, Angora.
(iv) Mukhbir Farahwand to be Majlis representative on the bank [illegible] for the fiduciary banknote cover.
(v) Ardelan (Fakhr-ul Mamalik) to be Farmandar of Kashan vice Tiftah appointed special inspector to the Ministry of Interior.

Internal Security

Fars

11. In general security has improved. Three A.I.O.C. tankers were recently shot at near Kazerun, but this [illegible] and thought to be the work of Farajullah Kamaraji who is incensed at the detention of his brother by the Persian military at Kazerun.

British Interests

12. A party of ten journalists from India visited Tehran during the past week.

13. His Excellency the Ambassador left on the 12th March, 1945, for a week's tour in Bagdad, Khuzistan and the Gulf.

British Military Interests

14. The scheme whereby village headmen guarantee the security of Br[illegible] has not been introduced. Recently the area has been extended and now covers the stretch Kangavar Khasrori.

[illegible] *Interests*

15. Dr Benes and party passed through Tehran on their way to [illegible] Dr Benes was received in audience by His Imperial Majesty the Shah.

American Interests

16. [illegible] of the American financial advisers have resigned.

Tehran, 19th March, 1945.

CHAPTER IV.—SAUDI ARABIA.

[E 962/962/23] No. 16

Mr Jordan to Mr Eden.—(Received 9th February, 1945.)

No. 22.)

Sir, *Jedda, 27th January, 1945.*

IN accordance with the instructions contained in Viscount Halifax's circular despatch of the 4th November, 1939, I have the honour to transmit to you [illegible] report on Saudi Arabia for 1944.

2. I [illegible] to Mr M. C. C. Man for his assistance in the preparation of this report.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to the Minister [illegible] Middle East [illegible] Centre, Middle East.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 16.

Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1944.

Introduction.

1. In many respects the year 1944 heralded a new era in the history of [illegible] King Ibn Saud and His Majesty's Government continued unbroken and was [illegible] throughout the year in spite of the impact of new develop[illegible] among them being the prospect that His Majesty's Government [illegible] no longer agree to continue their financial assistance to the King on the same scale as during 1943. Ibn Saud's loyalty to his friends, however, remained steadfast and prevailed against the counsels of those of his advisers and [illegible] who began to turn to the United States as the goose that could lay the biggest golden egg.

2. Among the most significant events of the year was the emergence into the foreground of Saudi internal affairs of the United States, the closer if [illegible] participation of Ibn Saud in Arab unity discussions, his increasing [illegible] Yemen and King Farouk's request to visit His Majesty. [illegible] pilgrimage numbered some 42,000 pilgrims, approximately [illegible] Indian for the first [illegible] 1941.

Arab Affairs.

4. Throughout the year the King adhered closely to his policy of consulting His Majesty's Government on all matters relating to Arab affairs, particularly Arab unity, and gave further ample proof of his wisdom and foresight. As he [illegible] he was guided throughout by three principles: (1) to maintain his own position in the Arab world and accept domination by nobody; (2) to avoid embarrassing His Majesty's Government and their Allies in the prosecution of the war; and (3) to avoid the creation of a *bloc* of Arab States against him. His suspicions of Hashimite intrigues remained [illegible]

5. In March Ibn Saud sent Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to [illegible] to postpone the Arab Unity Conference and Nahas agreed. The King [illegible] a letter confirming this. He was deeply offended, however, when he [illegible] July that Nahas had double-crossed him and invited Iraq and Syria to attend the meeting of the Preparatory Committee of the Arab Unity Conference in Alexandria. He was incensed, too, that Nahas had not even bothered to answer his letter. In spite of a long apology from Nahas, Ibn Saud decided not to participate in the conference [illegible] terms. Finally, however, he agreed to send a delegate after the assembled Arab delegates had appealed to him in a joint telegram. Anxious not to commit himself, however, Ibn Saud instructed his representative Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to act as an [illegible] only, thereby reserving his agreement to any resolutions until [illegible] studied them carefully.

6. Ibn Saud considered the Alexandria Protocol went too far and objected to anything which might conflict with the religious principles on which his kingdom was founded. On His Majesty's Government's advice, however, he showed himself more accommodating, although maintaining his reser[illegible] Abdur Rahman Azzam Bey the Egyptian special envoy who came to persuade him to accept the protocol and at the end of the year there seemed a fair chance that he would do so. Later he agreed to allow his delegate to sign the protocol with certain reservations.

7. As regards the establishment of Arab propaganda offices in Washington and London Ibn Saud agreed in principle but here again was opposed to any precipitate action. He advocated that representatives of each Arab [illegible] be sent to London and Washington bearing letters setting out the A[illegible] to His Majesty King George VI, President Roosevelt and Mr C[illegible] in case these representatives advocated the establishment of propaganda offices would be agreed to it. His reluctance to agree to the establishment of these offices is probably due to the embarrassment he feels in not being able to contribute towards their expenses on a scale commensurate with his predominant position in the Arab and Muslim world.

8. Ibn Saud continued to pay the closest attention during the year to the Palestine question which in his own words he described as "the king pin of Arab unity." Though he himself admitted that as [illegible] to prevail over his conviction that it was not in the interests of the Arabs [illegible] raise this question during the war. One of the main reas[illegible] to participate in the Alexandria Conference wa[illegible] the various Arab leaders that the Palestine [illegible] acute form. Quietly and without fuss Ibn S[illegible] of Egypt, Syria, the Lebanon and the Yemen to [illegible] and avoid precipitating a crisis. The W[illegible] was by the [illegible] Republ[illegible] resolution [illegible] Arab [illegible] In [illegible] was in accordance with His Majesty [illegible] wishes the King at the end of the year asked His Majesty's Government to restate their views and agreed to be guided by them in future discussions on Arab unity.

9. In Syria and the Lebanon Ibn Saud did his best to pour oil on troubled waters urging their leaders not to take any action prejudicial [illegible] and her Allies while the war continued. Early in the year [illegible] the opportunity of visits from Jamil Mardam and Riy[illegible] this point of view. He was, as usual, in [illegible] Kuwaiti on whom he exercises considerable [illegible] when Shakri accepted Nahas' invitation to the [illegible] and tried [illegible] Shukri appealed to him to support his protest against the [illegible] of a treaty with France. The [illegible] to blame because of his intransigent attitude towards the French. He advised Shukri to follow His Majesty's Government's advice and warned him not to embarrass them in Syria. Although concerned over the question of a treaty with France Ibn Saud was reassured when His Majesty's Government declared that their policy regarding Syria remained unchanged.

10. The Imam Yehya, whom the King describes [illegible] with the world, came increasingly under his influ[illegible] and allow[illegible] himself to be guided by the King's wise counsels, not only over such seemingly remote issues as Arab unity but also over matters directly affecting the Imam as for instance, the Haudh al Ma dispute. As regards the former, the Imam on Ibn Saud's advice sent a delegate to the Alexandria Conference with the rôle of an "observer." Over the dispute with the Government of Aden he accepted the King's strong hint to climb down and evacuated Haudh al Ma[illegible]

Relations with Foreign Powers

11. King Ibn Saud continued to remain His Majesty's Government's firm friend and consulted them, as always in the past, on all major matters affecting the external and internal affairs of his kingdom. His trust in them remained unshaken, although anxiety about the future darkens the horizon. With the Americans he kept his relations on a friendly but not too intimate basis and, while naturally welcoming their increased assistance to his country, made it clear to his sons and officials and to the Americans themselves that he regarded His

Majesty's Government [illegible] as do so. Ibn Saud is [illegible] activities in the Middle East, on the other hand, he is prepa[illegible]

12. The great Allied victories of 1944, culminating in the [illegible] France, were sincerely welcomed by the King, who, as our staunche[illegible] the Middle East in this war, has stood firm even in the darkest hour [illegible] towards the end of the year, he [illegible] preferred to postpone the meeting until after the pilgrimage, i.e., towards [illegible] of January.

14. There was some tension in Saudi relations with Iraq at the beginning [illegible] prevent the smuggling of sheep from Iraq. Ibn Saud was highly [illegible] threatened retaliatory action but the measures were subsequently [illegible] to the [illegible] relations with other Arab States and the Great [illegible] Consulate-General in Damascus was raised to a [illegible] representative had yet been appointed to Saudi [illegible] head of the Syrian pilgrimage delegation [illegible] representative of his Government and issued visas for [illegible] subject. As regards the Lebanon, [illegible] Hussain al Uwaini, his trade agent in Beirut and a [illegible] at Saudi Minister to the Lebanon but on His Majesty's [illegible]

16. The [illegible] nearly provoked a [illegible] telegram from the Shah [illegible] the matter appeared [illegible] the mood they were in.

17. Evidence of Ibn Saud's keen interest in, and possible designs on, the Yemen [illegible] a special envoy to Sana' to advise the [illegible] on his return reported great [illegible] with the Imam's regime and a strong desire to place themselves under the rule of Ibn Saud.

18. With the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan the King maintained outwardly cordial [illegible] and there were no serious [illegible] disputes. The Amir however, indulged in some gratuitous criticism of the way Ibn Saud allowed American companies to operate on the soil of the Holy Lands. Ibn Saud sent the Amir a firm reply refuting his criti[illegible] to listen to false rumours. The King also had cause to com[illegible] to His Majesty's Government of some wild statements [illegible] reported to have made regardi[illegible] forces.

19. On His Majesty's Government's advice the King agreed to recognise the Provisional French Govern[illegible] Turkey were normal.

[illegible]

20. [illegible]

of economy would sweep over Great Britain and, indeed, over the whole of the United Nations, for His Majesty's Government to justify a subsidy on anything like the scale of that accorded in 1943. The Saudi Government were, therefore, advised to take measures for the reorganisation of their finances and economy in order to avoid any crisis likely to arise from a drastic reduction or, indeed, a cessation of subsidies in the immediate post-war period which might threaten the internal stability of the country. They were told that this could best be done by reducing their expenditure and increasing their revenue by the larger sale of goods and the sale of foreign exchange to merchants. They were reminded, too, that His Majesty's Government had only granted the subsidy to offset falling pilgrimage revenues, which were now accruing to the Saudi Government on something approaching the pre-war scale, thanks to the facilities which His Majesty's Government had created for pilgrims to visit the Holy Land.

21. [illegible] with him at Riyadh. His Majesty admitted the need for financial reform and showed his desire for improvement by dismissing Nejib Salha, his Druze Director of [illegible] pensions. He replaced him by Izzat Dia Shawa, a refugee Palestinian who enjoyed the King's confidence and has proved honest and reliable. The King also asked for a British Moslem financial adviser. At the same time, however, and while admitting the need for reform, the King pointed out that this was a [illegible] policy and could only be effected gradually, especially in a country like Saudi Arabia. He stressed the present penury of his realm and the need for immediate assistance, particularly as the last pilgrimage dues which had been paid abroad had not yet accrued to the Government.

22. At the end of March His Majesty's Gover[illegible] programme of assistance to the King. Its main points were a free gift of 200,000 sovereigns and the cancellation of the Saudi Government's debt of 20 million riyals to the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation against the revenue derived from the pilgrimage tariff items. While accepting it in principle Ibn Saud pressed for the payment to the Government of the pilgrimage dues, which [illegible] had now become a very sore point with him. In the meantime a useful bargaining counter had turned up in the shape of a generous America, which offered to make up any reduction which His Majesty's Government were for any reason obliged to make in their assistance to the Saudi Arabian Government. A group of the King's advisers and officials, notably Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman, realised that this was the easy and profitable way out and played on the King's natural anxiety for his country in order to get the best deal. Abdullah Suleiman, in particular, was opposed to any reform which would weaken the position of Minister of Finance, which he had successfully and most profitably held since 1932. He and many others feared the p[illegible] Arabia, and their attitude, though entirely censurable [illegible] shared by the majority of their fellows in Government positions [illegible] country, though not by the commercial community or the population in general.

23. The King's attitude towards His Majesty's Government's offer subsequently stiffened and it was clear that he felt that he could not manage with the [illegible] and when the British proposals were [illegible] American Mi[illegible] too drastic and argued that if the financial and economic stability of the country were to be maintained on a reasonable basis greater assistance was needed. Owing to the [illegible] discussion between the British and American Middle East Supply Centre authorities [illegible] Washington and London. From May to late July the matter was [illegible] the principles of friendly collaboration in Saudi Arabia, as in the whole of the Middle East, which had been agreed upon as a result of the visit of Wallace Murray to London, were to mean anything, a satisfactory agreement regarding joint Anglo-American assistance to King Ibn Saud was essential. Finally, the [illegible] Arabia should be a joint one shared equally between the United States and His Majesty's Government and that any approach to the Saudi Government on finance and supply matters should in future be made jointly. Accordingly a joint supply programme for 1944 was communicated to the King at Riyadh at the beginning of August. Briefly it consisted of an overall supply programme comprising supplies allocated to Saudi Arabia under the Middle East Supply Centre

programme, supplied through commercial channels and paid for by importing merchants. [illegible] His Majesty's Government and the United States in the form of a subsidy. In addition, His Majesty's Government undertook to provide £10,000 a month to cover the cost of Saudi missions abroad and the United States to provide 10 million riyals on credit Lend Lease. At first the King asked for still further help, but after some of his requests had been met, gratefully accepted the [illegible] It should be noted here that His Majesty's Government's contri[illegible] joint programme was additional to the sum of £450,000 paid by them to the Saudi Government as subsidy at the beginning of the year, the gift of 200,000 sovereigns, and the payment of the balance of the Saudi Government's debt to the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation after the deduction of the 1943 pilgrimage tariff revenue.

24. Anglo-American discussions regarding the 1945 joint subsidy had not yet begun at the end of the year as the State Department had not yet reached a decision on the matter.

25. The question of the financial adviser whom the King had asked for was finally dropped owing to the desire of the United States to create an Anglo-American economic mission under United States leadership, as they claimed that the United States [illegible] of the United Kingdom. This contention was refuted by His Majesty's Government.

26. Towards the end of the year it became apparent that the King had indeed begun to realise the necessity for re-organisation and reform of the finances and administration of the country and there were signs of this which augur well for the future. (See below, paragraphs 36 and 39.)

27. An agreement was signed in October between the Saudi Government and Messrs Gellatly Hankey and Company under which the latter granted the Government a loan of £100,000 against the security of the 1944 pilgrimage revenues. The purpose of this loan was to provide the Government with funds which, owing to the collection of the pilgrimage dues abroad, were not immediately available to them.

Activities of the United States

28. Much greater activity in Saudi affairs was displayed by the Americans during 1944 than in previous years. The staff of their Legation was [illegible] increased, and the former Minister Resident replaced by a full Minister, [illegible] William A. Eddy, a member of the Office of Strategic Services, with long experience of the Middle East and a good knowledge of Arabic. In finance and supplies the United States became an equal partner with His Majesty's [illegible] described above. In addition to the assistance granted to the Saudi Government under the subsidy, which included ten million lend lease riyals, some three [illegible] dollars were advanced by the Arabian American Oil Company (formerly the California Arabian Standard Oil Company). The United States Government also advanced to the Saudi Government, under Lend Lease, a further sum of 10 million riyals to meet the riyal requirements of the Oil Company, the Mining Company, and the United States Legation in Jedda. The dollar proceeds of [illegible] in Washington, 60 per cent. being retained to pay for the silver content and the minting of the riyals and the balance placed at the free disposal of the Saudi Government, with permission to purchase gold if required. The National City Bank of New York also began negotiating with the Government for the establishment of branches in Dhahran and Jedda. In all this the Americans' desire naturally enough, was to play mother bountiful to the Saudis in order to strengthen their position in the country. Notable among increasing American activities were:

Oil.—The construction of a refinery at Dhahran with a capacity of 50,000 barrels a day and a pipeline between Ras Tanura and Bahrain. In addition there was the proposal to lay a pipe-line across Arabia to the Mediterranean.

Aviation.—The United States Government early in the year asked the King for permission to construct airfields at Riyadh, Jedda and Dhahran to facilitate their ferrying service to the Far East, but he refused. The question of the Dhahran airfield was again raised later, but the Americans do not for the moment appear to be pressing it. A request to establish an air-train [illegible] in the Hejaz to train Saudi pilots was also refused by the King.

Military Training and Arms.—A joint Anglo-American gift of arms and equipment was made to the Saudi Government, the United States supplying mainly rifles, automatic weapons and transport. American insistence on equal participation with the British in training and equipping the Saudi army led to the establishment in Taif of an American and a British military training team. The idea of a British Moslem military mission which the King had requested earlier in the year was dropped. The Americans also offered to train Saudi personnel in Egypt.

Agriculture.—An American mission of eight experts was accepted by Ibn Saud in order to assist the development of agricultural pursuits in Saudi Arabia. The first members of the mission arrived at the end of December.

Roads.—The Americans made an aerial survey of the country during the year ostensibly to facilitate the alignment of the proposed north-south and east-west highways, which they had offered to construct, but in reality to gain a greater knowledge of the physical features of the country and to assist the oil company to ascertain the probable oil-bearing areas in Saudi Arabia. A ground party also operated for a short period from Taif.

[illegible] lists.—A request by the Arabian-American Oil Company to establish a wireless station at Dhahran for direct communication with America was referred by the King to His Majesty's Government, and at the end of the year was under discussion between Washington [illegible].

Consulates.—On His Majesty's Government's advice the King agreed to the appointment at Dhahran of an American consul to look after the affairs of the increasing number of oil company's employees.

Education.—The Americans offered facilities for a number of Saudi students to study at the American University, Beirut.

Propaganda.—Towards the end of the year there was a considerable increase in the distribution of material received from the Office of War Information and an Arabic speaking attaché of the Legation was put in charge of the work.

Pilgrimage

29. The number of pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz was about 42,000, as last year, and included for the first time since 1941 a token pilgrimage of some 4,000 pilgrims from India. No special financial arrangements were made by His Majesty's Government, as in 1943, to assist the Saudi Government, and the latter fixed their own tariff rates abroad, which were considerably higher than for 1943. As a result there was considerable criticism of the Government and only some 19,000 Egyptian pilgrims arrived, as compared with over 16,000 in 1943. Generally speaking, however, the pilgrimage was a success and there were no hitches in transport and supply matters. Shipping arrangements were as last year co-ordinated in Cairo by the office of the Minister Resident in co-operation with His Majesty's representatives in the various countries concerned. There was the usual close collaboration between His Majesty's Legation and the Saudi Government on all pilgrimage matters. As last year, these combined efforts played a large part in ensuring the smooth working of the pilgrimage.

30. King [illegible] instead by the Amir Faisal, who made no speech at the annual banquet for pilgrims at Mecca.

31. There were no incidents during the pilgrimage. As already stated, the Persian Government [illegible] the Hajj. Six Soviet Moslem pilgrims from the Central Asian Republics arrived in the Hejaz, the first to come from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics since 1927.

Middle East Supply Centre

32. 1944 saw a rapid expansion in the organisation and control of the Middle East Supply Centre in Saudi Arabia. As a concession to the Americans, an American head of the centre was appointed early in the year. An Anglo-American-Saudi Co-ordinating Committee was set up to deal with the demands of local merchants and regulate imports through merchant channels. The Middle East Supply Centre became the machinery for the supply to Saudi Arabia of all commodities included in the Anglo-American subsidised supply programme. As such it ensured the arrival before the end of the year of most of the essential commodities such as cereals, tea, sugar, vehicles and spare parts included in the joint programme. The shipment of cotton piece-goods was unfortunately delayed owing to technical difficulties with the Government of India and of the 1,000 tons programmed from that country and some 430 tons under Lend Lease from the United States of America only some 380 tons had arrived by the end of the year.

Royal Family

33. King Ibn Saud's health took yet another year, a year full of new developments and activities, in its stride without visible effort. He continued to show himself as able and energetic as ever in the conduct of the multitudinous affairs of his Kingdom. There were no tribal troubles and public security remained excellent. In May the Commander-in-chief, Middle East, General Sir Bernard Paget, visited the King at his hunting camp north of Riyadh together with His Majesty's Minister. At the end of December the King came down to Mecca to prepare for the meeting with King Farouk. The Amir Saud has been appointed Commander-in-chief of the Saudi army and the Amir Mansur Minister of Defence. The latter accompanied His Majesty's Minister on a visit to Khartoum to inspect facilities for training Saudi army personnel (see paragraph 34).

Miscellaneous

34. [illegible] Anglo-American [illegible] of Saudi [illegible] were [illegible] and Egyptian [illegible].

35. [illegible] large British locust mission which began operating in Saudi Arabia [illegible] of 1943 completed a successful campaign in June 1944. A second campaign was under way at the end of the year, but on a reduced scale owing to lack of transport. The Saudi Government are becoming more locust minded and are co-operating with the mission by furnishing regular locust and rainfall reports.

36. *Agriculture.*—Increasing attention was paid during the year by the Middle East Supply Centre to the question of agricultural development in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Government were represented at the Middle East Agricultural Conferences in Cairo and elsewhere, and a Middle East Supply Centre mission visited Saudi Arabia in March to study the possibilities of [illegible] Al Kharj, the Government agricultural centre near Riyadh. A report was drawn up with recommendations and submitted to the King later in the [illegible]. As a result, the administration of Al Kharj, which has long been an expensive white elephant, was cleaned up and efforts are now being made to place it on a sound economic basis.

37. *Education.*—Evidence of Ibn Saud's appreciation of the need for a wider education of the youth of his country was shown by his agreement to the proposed appointment of a number of British Moslem teachers in Saudi schools to teach English and to the education of selected Saudi students at Victoria College and in the Sudan. Unfortunately, Victoria College was at the last moment unable to accept them, but arrangements were subsequently made for the sons of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and a Jedda merchant to enter the college. Books and sports equipment were presented to the Saudi Education Department during the year by the British Council.

38. *Roads.*—A small party of Royal Engineers operated for some months in the Hejaz instructing Saudi road gangs in the work of repairing some of the worse stretches of the Jedda-Riyadh highway.

39. *Transport.*—The new Director of Mines and Public Works, Izzat Din Shawa, who is also Director of Transport, began on a large-scale reorganisation of the Government garage at Jedda. Corrupt officials were dismissed and a number of Egyptian technical experts appointed. As a result it is hoped that the transport situation will improve.

40. *Wireless.*—A number of Saudi operators were trained by the Eastern Telegraph Company [illegible] by the British Overseas Airways Corporation with a view to operating the new wireless telegraphy station which was erected in Jedda at the end of the year for communication with aircraft.

41. *Meteorological.*—A selected Saudi operator was trained in Iraq by the Royal Air Force. King Ibn Saud also agreed to operate at Saudi expense certain meteorological stations which had been established in Saudi Arabia as a result of the visit of a Royal Air Force meteorological party in 1943.

42. *Commercial.*—The Basra manager of the Eastern Bank visited Jedda to discuss with the Saudi Government the opening of branches at Jedda and Al Khobar. It was decided, however, to postpone definite proposals and await the outcome of negotiations between the National City Bank of New York and the

Saudi Government (see paragraph 28) Reference paragraph 25 of report for 1943 The Netherlands [illegible] the Netherlands Legation

43 *Concessions.*—Lieutenant-Colonel de Gaury visited Saudi Arabia at the end of the year on behalf of a British company in order to negotiate with the Saudi Government for the grant of a concession to exploit minerals other than oil. The Government agreed to grant him a preferential position for one year provided his terms were not less favourable than any others offered to the Government during that period

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E 1480/209/25] No. 17

Earl of Halifax to Mr Eden (Received 4th March.)

(No 1415)
(Telegraphic.)

Washington, 3rd March, 1945

MY telegram No. 1347

State Department informed us to-day that Saudi Arabia was formally admitted as a United Nation as from the 1st March

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E 7546/1154/25] No. 18

Mr. Grafftey Smith to Mr Eden.—(Received 9th March.)

(No. 42.)

Sir,

Jedda, 23rd February 1945.

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram No. 103 of to day's date, in which I reported the presentation [illegible] King Ibn Saud [illegible] Wednesday afternoon, the 22nd February Mr Jordan, who had travelled with me from Cairo on the 20th February, remained in effective charge of this legation until yesterday's ceremony

2. It is unusual for the head of a diplomatic mission to remain at his post [illegible] successor arrives to replace him [illegible] instructions in this sense to Mr Jordan, and by King Ibn Saud's return to Jedda from his visit to Egypt did not [illegible] accordance with any strict precedent of protocol I was willing to await Mr Jordan's departure before raising with the Saudi Ministry for Foreign Affairs the question of the presentation of my letters of credence but [illegible] to present them to himself during his [illegible] requested Shaikh Hafez Wahba [illegible] in attendance on King [illegible] His Majesty [illegible]

3. [illegible] from Mecca [illegible] that the Prophet [illegible] Quraish tribe by which he [illegible] twelvemonth Thither I proceeded yesterday afternoon in His Majesty's private car accompanied by the Commander of the Royal Bodyguard and by all members of the legation staff authorised to wear uniform. My own uniform was borrowed plumage, Mr Jordan being fortunately no slimmer a figure than myself

4. Having inspected a guard of honour which was to make frequent later appearances at various unexpected points, I was welcomed by Shaikh Hafez Wahba and by Shaikh Hamad Sulaiman and took the first of many cups of coffee in a tent placed at our disposal. I was then conducted with my staff to His Majesty's tent, outside which we were greeted by His Royal Highness the Amir Faisal His Majesty was alone except for a distant group of attendants. He rose to receive us and welcomed myself and my staff, whom I formally presented and he remained standing while I presented Mr Jordan's letters of recall and my own credentials, and delivered a short speech, the English text of which

is enclosed herein.(*) I delivered this speech in Arabic, which appeared to please His Majesty who listened with [illegible] at the appropriate pauses at the end of each paragraph.

5. In reply he expressed sentiments of admiration and sincere friendship for His Majesty The King and for His Majesty's Government, and made me warmly welcome to his dominions, offering the fullest measure of co-operation and assistance in my mission. We then sat down, and, after coffee and a further exchange of compliments, I withdrew

6. Mr Jordan and I were received again a little later and stayed talking with His Majesty, with Mr Man as interpreter for rather more than an hour We were by then in Arab clothes, which are the accepted wear for Europeans visiting His Majesty elsewhere than in Jedda, and at the banquet offered to us after sunset all of the Legation staff present were picturesquely enrobed I took my leave shortly after this meal and we returned to Jedda, accompanied by the Commander of the Royal Bodyguard, in time to celebrate George Washington's birthday at the American Legation

7. I had requested Shaikh Hafez Wahba, when we met earlier in the day to renew previous representations to His Majesty with a view to restraining his somewhat embarrassing tendency to shower presents on official visitors on such occasions, and I am glad to report that no gifts were made. It is, however possible that His [illegible] effective later, when the Minister Resident in the Middle East pays his visit to Riyadh King Ibn Saud [illegible] to be there during Sir Edward Grigg's visit

8. I cannot close this despatch without recording the extremely happy impression made upon me by this initial contact with King Ibn Saud It is indeed difficult to resist a charm so obviously uncalculated in which a salty intelligence and great natural generosity of mind combine with simple sincerity of speech and very great dignity of demeanour His manner of utterance and use of the unfamiliar Nejdi dialect of Arabic unfortunately prevent me, and will continue to prevent me for some time from completely intimate conversation with him [illegible] I feel that our relations will always be marked and made either easier or less easy as circumstances dictate, by His Majesty's manifest sincerity and by his no less manifest conviction that his confidence in the righteousness of British intentions is based on a correct reading of British character The frequent reflection of this attitude of His Majesty in his words and, indeed, in his acts, may be designed to render more difficult any contrary or unsympathetic action on the part of His Majesty's Government and the constant advertisement of King Ibn Saud's confidence in British intentions may itself be intended as an additional [illegible] The fact remains that His Majesty has been our most consistent propagandist and supporter among the rulers of the Middle East and will be judged by our actions as well as by his own

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Minister Resident in Cairo

I have, &c.

L. B GRAFFTEY SMITH

(*) Not printed.

CHAPTER V. SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

(A) Miscellaneous.

E 320 8 89) No. 19

Mr Shone to Mr Eden.—(Received 13th January, 1945.)

(No. 147)

Sir, *Beirut 28th December, 1944*

WITH reference to paragraph 9 of my despatch No. 148 of the 26th December I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a record of Colonel Furlonge's conversation with the Syrian President on the 23rd December

2 [illegible]

His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Cairo Bagdad His Majesty's Minister at [illegible]

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE

Enclosure in No 19

Record of Conversation with the Syrian President

THE Syrian President having expressed a desire to see me I arranged to visit him on the 23rd December He received me alone and explained that he [illegible] to talk to me freely and informally as he felt he could do in view of [illegible] acquaintance about the situation between the Syrians and the French The following is a résumé of the conversation —

2 He said he was much worried at the situation. The French officials in this country were not like the French in France or elsewhere, they had a colonial mentality, and were incapable of realising that the situation had changed here [illegible] could no longer act as though they were the governing Power. As a result, the Syrian Government spent their time in repelling French agressions, when, as he was fully aware, they ought to be getting on with the task of [illegible]

3 The immediate trouble was the stiff note which [illegible] had sent in to Jamil Bey Mardam demanding, with veiled threats, that press attacks on the French should cease. The particular article which seemed to have annoyed the French, was one in an obscure Damascus review entitled "Alameh," rebuking the French for having made Professor René Cassin acting head of State in General de Gaulle's absence because he was a notorious pro-Zionist. This, in his view, was perfectly fair comment, in any case. Paris newspapers like the *Figaro* had more than once printed virulent attacks on the States Governments (and, for that matter, on the British representative in this country). He had ordered his Council of Ministers to meet him that night to [illegible] to withdraw his note as being quite unacceptable: if he would not, they would reply to it in the terms it deserved.

4 I said that I knew the French were exercised over the lack of a French military censor in Damascus, and reminded him that we had ourselves told the Syrian Government that we thought the French had the right to have one He said he disagreed [illegible] Ninth Army, which he [illegible] British military censor and he could not [illegible] have one too. I had no doubt seen, he said [illegible] recommended the abolition of [illegible] the right of the Allies to impose purely military censorship, in these circumstances it was quite impossible for his Government to allow the French to install a censor who would undoubtedly try to do political censorship

5. He went on to give a series of examples, from all over Syria, of recent unwarranted or tactless actions by French officials, and concluded from all this that it was quite hopeless for his Government to try to make any agreement with the local French He reiterated the view that no general agreement was necessary since the Catroux Agreement of the 22nd December, 1943, had in effect terminated

the mandate by providing for the cession to the States of all the powers formerly held by the French

6. I said I had recently re-read this agreement, which seemed very vague in its terms and left unresolved certain important questions, particularly military ones. He [illegible] that the Troupes Spéciales question which was of the highest importance, was still outstanding In the view of the Syrian Government the Troupes Spéciales were part of the Intérêts Communs and should have been handed over One of their main grievances against [illegible] was that a satisfactory agreement for the transfer had been reached in July, the French had referred it to Algiers, and two months later they had been told that it could not be accepted except as part of a treaty settlement This question of the Troupes Spéciales, he repeated was vital, the Syrians did not particularly want them, and would be quite glad to see them disbanded but they could not allow them to remain under the French command He understood that General Beynet and Count Ostrorog were visiting Damascus on the 27th December presumably to resume talks on this subject I asked what he proposed to do if they did not bring what he regarded as an acceptable offer He said his Government did not want to start another 1925 revolution against the French, but what they could do was to announce that all the Syrian Troupes Spéciales could come over to them, or resign, failing which they would lose their Syrian nationality

7 As for the more general question of France's military rights, the President refused to admit that they had any, his Government would under [illegible] circumstances give them the right to retain military bases. If they did not [illegible] the Troupes Spéciales, they were determined to form their own army and to [illegible] in succession to Great Britain, the United States, the U S S R, Iraq, and [illegible] else they could think of for the necessary arms and equipment

8 I asked what he thought would happen if the French at any time wanted to send their own troops here, for example, to train He said that he considered the Allied High Command should keep them away, if, of course, the Allies took the view that Syria was still under mandate and that the French could send in as many troops as they liked this was quite a different matter, but he could not believe that this would happen He had been surprised to learn that the British naval authorities had allowed the *Emile Bertin* to come to Beirut alone. Had she come with British ships in attendance this would have been taken as a routine war measure as it was he feared for the effect on Lebanese public opinion

9. On the [illegible] general treaty question, Shukri said that public opinion in Syria was solidly behind him and his Government, no Deputy or other public man could stand up and advocate a treaty without being torn to pieces by the population The reason for this was that the Syrians were perfectly well aware what sort of treaty the French would wish to impose on them. I asked him (having in mind paragraph 5 of Foreign Office despatch No. 208) if the Syrians had ever asked the French what their terms were. He said that the French had asked for five different conventions, the only one actually produced was the "Convention Universitaire" which he was sure I would agree was a monstrous document, and there was no doubt that the others would be on the same [illegible] With this mentality amongst the French officials, treaty discussions were a waste of time.

10. I remarked that, whilst public opinion in Syria might be as he had related the situation was more difficult in the Lebanon, on account of the existence of the large party headed by Emile Eddé. He agreed, but said that the Eddists were quite unrepresentative even of the Christians, the Greek Orthodox for example, were solid with the Lebanese Moslems in objecting to future French domination of the Lebanon In any case, the Maronites had better be careful Syria had always claimed that the Lebanon should be united with her, or at the very least, that those provinces taken from Syria and added to the Lebanon in 1920 should be restored So long as the Lebanese pursued a policy of independence parallel with that [illegible] if any section of the Lebanese started to demand French protection, the claim would be pressed For the moment, not only were the Syrians doing nothing to embarrass the Lebanese Government, but they were doing everything to help them he instanced the recent Chtaura Economic Agreement, under which the Syrians had given the Lebanese concessions over the price of wheat and the allocation of quotas which the actual situation did not justify

11 At the end of the interview he again referred to his Government's determination to obtain a satisfactory solution of the Troupes Spéciales question by any means in their power short of the use of actual force. If and when they

obtained it, they would be satisfied. He made it clear, however, that he considered that, in that event, the French would have lost all right to military bases in Syria and would have to withdraw their troops at the end of the war when the British troops went.

2. Since [illegible] all he said [illegible] him so bitter, nor yet so resolute. He was obviously anxious [illegible] the knowledge of a long and hard struggle ahead than from any self-questionings as to the position which he had taken up.

E 7567/217/89 — No. 20

Mr [illegible] to Mr [illegible]

(No. [illegible] Telegraphic) — *Foreign Office, 10th January, 1945*

YOUR despatch No. 827 [of the 2nd December; French relations with the Levant States].

[illegible] M. B. [illegible] again for an immediate reply to the proposals [illegible]

2. [illegible] Minister for Foreign Affairs [illegible] French [illegible] [illegible] accept [illegible] in March [illegible] the gendarm[illegible] essential. [illegible] M. B. [illegible] a reply to the proposal[illegible] reminded twice.

3. [illegible] M. B. [illegible] that [illegible] acquiesce in any policy of force or intimidation by the French [illegible] States. [illegible] months, our force must be no attempt to impose a solution as this would have disastrous consequences not only in the Levant States but in far wider spheres.

E 362/14/89 — No. 21

Mr Duff Cooper to Mr. Eden.—(Received 14th January.)

(No. 73.)

Paris, 14th January, 1945

YOUR telegram No. 43.

I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 13th January and handed him [illegible] the substance of your telegram.

[illegible] the whole of the civil administration [illegible] not even good [illegible] It was very difficult [illegible] He made suggestions [illegible] Paris [illegible] troops should be removed [illegible] local governments that they would [illegible] but the government had refused to give any such undertaking.

No one [illegible] more than realize that this thorn in the flesh of Anglo-French relations [illegible] for a general peace which [illegible] and for the conclusion of an Anglo-French alliance which did in fact exist, but which in his opinion should at an early date be signed and sealed.

3. He revealed to me in confidence that his own views were much more accommodating than those of his government, and he gave me clearly to understand [illegible] government [illegible] Great. [illegible] was inclined to take the view that relations between France and the States were not the concern of Great Britain, and when it was suggested to him that special troops should be handed to the native governments he was inclined to reply with the demand that the British Army of Occupation should be withdrawn and should cease to build barracks which had a definitely permanent rather than a temporary nature.

4. I reminded the Minister for Foreign Affairs that we had given a guarantee to the States that their independence should be recognised. Therefore it would not be held that we were not concerned. He replied that France had quite definitely recognised their independence as was proved by the fact that both Syria and the Lebanon had now their representatives in Paris who were given full diplomatic privileges and treated as representatives of other independent countries.

5. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he himself would like to see the question of the Levant form part of a general Anglo-French understanding on the lines of what took place in 1904, and he thought the sooner such an understanding was concluded the better. At the same time, he warned me that he could not be sure that this view would recommend itself to his government.

6. I then warned him that lack of any reply to our various communications on this subject was producing an unfavourable impression and that I was afraid the situation was not improving. He said he did not think the situation was getting any worse and that in the Levant itself he felt the present extremist governments which were not permanent might quite possibly be replaced by more moderate ones. He excused himself for the delay which had occurred in replying to our notes, but said that no reply was better than a reply which might be totally [illegible].

Please repeat to Beirut as my telegram No. 3 and to Resident Minister, Cairo, as my telegram No. 1.

E 355/52/89 — No. 22

Mr Shone to Mr Eden.—(Received 15th January, 1945.)

(No. 146.)

Beirut, 26th December, 1944

Sir,

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 812 of the 21st December I arrived on that day at Beirut and took charge of His Majesty's Legation.

2. As weather conditions in Cairo were very uncertain, it was clearly essential to leave on the 21st December, despite the arrangements made for my farewell audience of King Farouk, in order to ensure that the presentation of my Letters of Credence to the Lebanese and Syrian Presidents should take place according to plan on the 22nd and 23rd December respectively. His Majesty was so good as to send one of his chamberlains to His Majesty's Embassy to bid me farewell, in place of the audience. I was thus enabled to leave Cairo and reach Beirut on the afternoon of the 21st December, in accordance with your wishes. [illegible] at my disposal for the journey.

3. I was met at the Beirut airport—in a downpour of rain—by the General Officer Commanding Ninth Army and a guard of honour. Also present at the airport were representatives of the Lebanese authorities and senior officers of His Majesty's navy, army and air force.

4. On the 22nd December I called on the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs before luncheon and I presented my Letters of Credence and my predecessor's Letters of Recall to the President of the Lebanese Republic at 4 p.m. The Staff of His Majesty's Legation accompanied me to the ceremony, which was less formal than usual as his Excellency had recently fallen and broken his arm. The Chef du Protocole remarked to me that the fact that the President had thus fallen almost immediately after the departure of Major-General Sir E. Spears from Beirut had been the subject of unkind comment in quarters ill disposed to the Government! His Excellency received me with great courtesy and amiability.

5. On the evening of the same day I and the staff of His Majesty's Legation went to Damascus. The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs entertained me and

[illegible] members of the staff [illegible] His Majesty's [illegible] at Damascus at an [illegible] to the [illegible] Hereupon [illegible] that the Syrians were [illegible] the President [illegible] me to [illegible] rn to Beirut as soon as possible. Jamil Mardam Bey returned my call and I then left Damascus again for Beirut.

6. There is no doubt that despite the announcement that the change of Minister here betokened no change of policy on the part of His Majesty's Government great [illegible] It was impressed upon me here with even more [illegible] statement in my speeches to the Pre[illegible] two republics that there was no change of policy would not suffice to restore confidence and that a specific referen[illegible] of both States was essential to the establishment of good relations with their Governments at the outset of my mission. This I conceive to be my primary duty and I trust that the speeches, of which I enclose copies (together with the replies of the two Presidents) will have your approval.

7. I was no less desirous of establishing as soon as possible relations of friendship and confidence with the French Delegate General but according to local protocol it is not usual, in view of his anomalous status, to call officially on him until a visit has been paid to the senior diplomatic representative accredited to the two republics (at present the Iraqi Minister). It was represented to me strongly that any departure from this procedure would be ill received by the local governments and by my diplomatic colleagues—notably the United States Minister. This is a good example of the ticklish little problems which arise here in the present situation. In view of the possible delay in making further official calls during the Christmas holiday I suggested to Lieutenant General Sir G. Holmes the possibility of arranging an informal luncheon party at which I could meet [illegible] during the next few days. In the end I was able to make my call on the Iraqi Minister on Christmas Day and on General Beynet this morning. I have reported thereon in my telegrams Nos. 817 and 818 of to-day.

8. From the first reports [illegible] gather that my prompt presentation of [illegible] and depression of the Lebanese and [illegible] length the interviews which [illegible] before presenting my letter [illegible] mination of their Governments not to conclude a treaty with France which would give the latter a position of predominance or privilege. Jamil Bey Mardam treated me to a long discourse on the history of Franco-Syrian treaty negotiations and took the line that it would only be possible now for Syria to conclude agreements with France as between one independent country and another. Fares Bey el Khoury spoke in a similar strain.

9. The Syrian President asked Colonel Furlonge to remain in Damascus until the following day in order to unburden himself on Syrian relations with the French. Colonel Furlonge's account of the conversation [illegible] being sent under cover of a separate despatch.

10. I have reported in my telegram Number 816 of the 25th December on the stiff note which has just been presented to the Syrian Government by the French delegate at Damascus, Colonel Oliva Roget, and on the despatch of twenty French tanks to the Syrian capital. A close watch is being kept on this situation.

I have, &c.
T. A. SHONE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 22

Speech by His Majesty's Minister to President of the Lebanese Republic

I AM very sensible of the honour done me by my august Sovereign in accrediting me to be His Majesty's Minister to the Lebanese Republic.

While I have hitherto had the pleasure of visiting your country only once, but in no official capacity, I have in the course of the last five years of my official

[illegible] other Ministers [illegible]

The policy of His Majesty's [illegible] with regard to the Lebanon has been clearly stated on many occasions. I am glad to take the opportunity of confirming to your Excellency that there has been, and there is now, no change in that policy, which continues to be based on the guarantees which have been given as regards the independence of the Lebanon. I shall be glad to cement with your Excellency the cordial relations of confidence and [illegible] which have so happily been built up between our two countries in the [illegible] and security depend upon the victory of the United Nations to play their part in contributing to that end, which is of paramount importance to the world in general. It is their desire, not least in so far as the countries of the Middle East [illegible]

Enclosure 2 in No. 22

Lebanese President's Reply to His Majesty's Minister's Speech on Presentation of his Credentials on the 22nd December, 1944

C'EST avec plaisir que j'accueille en votre personne le représentant de Sa Majesté britannique au Liban.

[illegible] trouve aujourd'hui.

Ainsi que votre Excellence vient de le rappeler, la [illegible] de Sa Majesté [illegible] garanties qui ont été déjà données quant à l'indépendance [illegible] pleine souveraineté du Liban. Une telle continuité est bien faite pour [illegible] de l'heureuse inspiration de votre éminent prédécesseur.

La collaboration de nos deux pays est appelée à [illegible] le rôle que le Liban a volontairement adopté, dès le début de cette guerre, aux côtés de la [illegible] Bretagne et des Nations Unies. Notre ferme désir est de poursuivre cet effort commun, jusqu'à la victoire complète des Alliés et l'organisation d'un monde où prévaudront la sécurité et l'harmonie entre les nations. J'ajoute que le Liban a apprécié à sa juste valeur l'aide qui lui a été déjà fournie pour la solution des divers problèmes surgis pendant ces dernières années et j'assure votre Excellence, dans l'accomplissement de sa haute mission, de mon entier concours et de celui de mon Gouvernement.

Enclosure 2 in No. 22

Speech by His Majesty's Minister to the President of the Syrian Republic

I AM profoundly aware of the honour done me by my august Sovereign in accrediting me to be His Majesty's Minister in Syria.

It is my hope that such experience as I have gained in the last five years during which I have served in a neighbouring country, may be of some help to me during my term of office here. Although I have only had the pleasure of seeing your country once, and that only as a visitor to your ancient and beautiful city, [illegible] of the Middle East, among which Syria occupies so historic and eminent a position.

The policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom with regard to Syria [illegible] opportunity of confirming to your Excellency that there has been, and there is now,

no change in that policy, which continues to be based on the guarantees which have [illegible] ards the independence of Syria. I look forward with pleasure [illegible] Excellency those cordial relations of confidence and friendship which now so happily exist between our two countries and to the establishment of which my predecessor contributed so much.

At present the world is still in the throes of a devastating and disastrous war. That the Allied nations will be victorious is now beyond doubt. But until victory is ours and the independence and security of all free peoples is secured it is in the interests of all these peoples to continue to play their part in the common effort.

His Majesty's Government desire, not least in so far as the countries of the Middle East are concerned, to assist, in so far as they can, in the solution of [illegible], understanding which [illegible]

Enclosure 4 in No. 22

Syrian President's Reply to His Majesty's Minister's Speech on Presentation of his Credentials on the 23rd December 1944

IT is with pleasure that, at the moment you present to me the letter of credence accrediting you as His Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary near the Syrian Republic, I express to you the great satisfaction I feel for this happy choice of a man like yourself with your long experience and wide knowledge of the affairs of the Middle East, in which, as you said, Syria occupies a historic and eminent position.

I am also glad to hear you confirm once more the statements which His Majesty's Government have declared on many occasions in regard to Syria and the guarantee of her independence. I am confident that the policy which inspired these statements will never suffer any change, for it has its roots in that noble tradition of liberty which your great country cherishes with such pride and holds to with such praiseworthy tenacity.

I have no doubt that the relations between you and the Syrian Government will continue to be animated by the spirit of sincerity, friendship and co-operation which existed during the term of your eminent predecessor, whose name Syria will always remember with fondest recollection. As to me, you can always count on my assistance in the discharge of your mission in Syria.

I certainly share you view that the present war will end in a great victory for the United Nations. All the free countries, whether participating in this war or in some other way affected by it, must do the utmost in their power to prompt the common effort so that victory might be attained in the shortest time and to solve their problems and overcome their difficulties in a spirit of mutual understanding based upon respect for the legitimate rights of nations and their sacred ideals and aspirations.

Syria has participated to the full in that effort and is determined to hold firm to those rights and ideals.

E 403 8 89]

No. 23.

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 17th January.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.)

Damascus, 16th January, 1945.

FOLLOWING from Sir Edward Grigg, Minister Resident.

It may be of use to you to have my impressions of the situation in the Levant States, where I have just spent some days and met leading personalities, including but [illegible]

2. As a result of my conversations I am deeply impressed by their quiet det[illegible] a privileged position. They are convinced (not without reason) that the position which France desires to claim in Syria and Lebanon is inconsistent with independence achieved by other Arab States, and with the recognition already accorded them not only by ourselves but by the United States and Soviet Union. The American Minister here entirely [! group omitted]s their views in this respect, and mentioned to me a letter written by President Roosevelt to Syrian President, which reinforces American note of the 5th October to French delegation.

3. Every representative man to whom I have spoken has emphasised the continued interference by French officials in matters now solely within competence of States Governments, and perpetuation of intrigues designed to undermine the authority of their Administrations. Evidence of this was reinforced by stories told me by foreign representatives, who themselves complained of tactlessness and overbearing behaviour in matter of protocol.

4. In Syria I was left in no doubt regarding strength of feeling on the [illegible] which His Majesty's Minister is reporting separately) reinforces the urgent claim of the Syrian Government to have gendarmerie adequately equipped with suffic[illegible] automatics and armoured vehicles, and for transfer to Meharistes com[illegible] which, in the view of Government and of 9th Army, should have been handed over with Controle Bedouin.

5. In his telegram No. 47 His Majesty's Ambassador, Paris, postulated that it was impossible to compel French to adopt British methods in dealing with native populations. It is clear to me that, unless they change their methods and manners, we shall find ourselves alone with them and completely at variance not only with Arab world but with our other principal Allies. In his conversation with me the Syrian President reported a conversation which General Beynet had recently had with Saudi Arabian Minister at Angora, the sense of which was that he (the General) was sick of trying to work with present Governments and that, if they continued [group undecipherable: ! unjustifiable] transfer of [illegible] les, it would lead to war. Fuller details of this story are contained [illegible]

6. Incidentally, and with reference again to above telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador, Paris, it is surely unfair to cast up against Arabs the part played by a clique in Iraq, and omit to mention the treachery of French in allowing German aeroplanes through Syria and, later, in resisting British forces sent to restore the situation in Levant. The memory of this page of history is very alive in Middle East, and it is accentuated by the fact that the great majority of French officers and officials are Vichistes, who do not attempt to disguise their dislike and suspicion of us. Having made a new appointment here to conciliate French sentiment, we are, I suggest, entitled to expect an equal consideration in the matter of French personnel.

7. I have met General Beynet himself, who does not impress me greatly, [illegible] of undesirable and [illegible] officials, who habitually mislead Home Government as regards real state of public opinion here.

8. As I see things gulf between local Governments and French is at present so wide that all the tact and persuasion in the world is unlikely to bridge it. Indeed, it seems impossible to gain confidence of one party without forfe[illegible] that of the other.

9. In Paris telegram already referred to it was suggested that we should tell the States that continued recognition of their full independence by us depends upon them according to France special position to which we alone have subscribed. But we ourselves made it clear in Lyttelton-de Gaulle exchanges that Fr[illegible] special position must be "without prejudice" to independence of States. [illegible] has happened since 1941, including [illegible] States by our two chief Allies [illegible] favour of France and will supplant us in friendship of States if the latter should have reason to fear a repetition of what happened after the last war. Syrian President and both Prime Ministers have made no secret to me of their anxieties [illegible]

10. Remedy lies in the hands of French Government and higher command who must somehow be induced to appreciate strength of feeling against them, and to clear out in their own interests a number of present French officials here. Shone and his staff will, I know, do all in their power loyally and competently to carry out instructions which they have been given, but they cannot achieve the [illegible]. Cannot the more enlightened of the French Ministers and higher officials be approached on these lines? I firmly believe it to be in their own vital interests to face facts as they really are, and to change their technique. Unless they do so, our continued support of them will undermine friendliness with which not only local Governments but the whole Arab world regard us, and which it is surely one of our own major interests to preserve.

E 564 6 89] No. 24

Mr Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd January.)

(No 15.)
(Telegraphic.) *Damascus, 23rd January, 1945*

THE Syrian President asked me to see him [illegible] der [illegible] He did [illegible]

2. He went over the history of Franco-Syrian relat[illegible] h [illegible] for S[illegible] recognised by man[illegible] for [illegible] the Lyttelton-de Gaulle letters had clearly stated that this would be without prejudice to independence. We had also made it clear that we would not seek to [illegible]

[illegible] Spe[illegible] Syria [illegible] Syria [illegible] for a treaty according to France [illegible] the question. As for treaty [illegible] French in Cilicia, coupled with the Anti-University Convention [illegible] ted, were more than enough to show that French aspirations in Syria were [illegible]

4. [illegible] strong and prosperous in Europe, but it was not right that Syria, whose future was bound up with Arab countries, should be a cat's-paw in European politics [illegible]

5. The President then said that he had received Ibn [illegible] telegram No. 27). He had great respect for the King who [illegible] Great Britain [illegible]

6. [illegible] any other Power on a basis of equality. In any case he would not make a treaty with a provisional Government in France. Before the war the French had [illegible] to [illegible] result of an election might be in France, and Syria would not tie her future to any country whose past behaviour had been so unsatisfactory and whose own future tendencies were so uncertain.

7. Speaking again of the Troupes Spéciales the President referred to Mr [illegible] last speech in Parliament on Greece regarding the right of every independent country to its own army. This, he said, surely applied also to Syria. He particularly wished me to report this to His Majesty's Government. He [illegible] gendarmerie, and he also emphasised that the Syrian Government and people had been patient for a long time. They could not wait indefinitely for satisfaction of a just demand.

[E 276 6 89] No. 25

Mr. Duff Cooper to Mr Eden.—(Received 11th January.)

(No 47 Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, 11th January, 1945*

HIS Majesty's Ambassador, Cairo, telegram No. 2713 and your telegram No 24 to Cairo.

The doubts which His Majesty's Ambassador, Cairo, expresses with regard to direction of British policy in the Middle East are deeply rooted in the minds of the French Government, where they create an even greater disquietude.

2. Arab union is a new fact in the political situation which has to be faced. Two European Powers are concerned: Great Britain and France. (I am unaware of what is intended with regard to the former Italian colonies.) Is it not possible for these two Powers to agree upon a common Arab policy?

3. In Syria and Lebanon His Majesty's Government are committed to the grant of independence by France to the native populations. His Majesty's Government are also committed to recognise France's predominant position in those territories. Native Government while urging that the former should be implemented without delay refuses to agree to the latter. Might it not be firmly explained to them that one depends on the other?

4. There is no reason why we should do so until we have reached complete agreement with the French on this and all other outstanding questions. It must, however, be borne in mind that after the war France may well be in a more belligerent mood than any other of the belligerents. She was the first nation to go to war after her defeat in 1815. The defeat of 1870 was followed by a phase of French colonial expansion. [illegible] neither British public nor British private soldier will favour a large permanent garrison in Middle East. Nor in my opinion will either of those important entities be prepared to go to war with France for the independence of the Syrians and Lebanese. The British have short memories, but none of them will not have forgotten the sorry part played in this war by the only Arab country to which comparable independence had been granted. The record of Iraq can hardly be used by us against the French, who are very proud of the loyalty of their empire in group undecypherable of their defeat.

5. We have to choose between two policies with regard to the French in Levant. Either we can turn them out or we can come to terms with them. The former would not present any great military difficulty after the war, but it would entail permanent embitterment and hostility to France. The latter may but need not antagonise a number of Arabs in many countries. The one policy which is quite impossible and towards which there sometimes seems a danger of drift is to attempt to compel the French to adopt British methods in dealing with native populations.

6. With regard to paragraph 4 of the Cairo telegram under reference, I gather that the visit of the French cruiser to Beirut passed off without any untoward incident.

E 276/6/G] No. 26

Mr Eden to Mr Duff Cooper

(No. 153.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, 20th January, 1945*

YOUR telegram No. 47.

I agree with your general theme that co-ordination of British and French policy in the Middle East is necessary and desirable. It is for that very reason that the Prime Minister and I raised Levant States questions personally when we were in Paris last November. We have constantly endeavoured to meet French views so far as we reasonably can, because, as you know, our post-war foreign policy will be founded on the assumption of a friendly France. I am

myself convinced that, provided France follows the policy she is committed to [illegible] run parallel and do not conflict in any major respect.

2. But it does not follow from this that we can allow the French to do as they [illegible] at the expense of the independence of the Levant States. You were right to point out to M. Bidault that we had given a guarantee to the Levant States that their independence should be recognised. But it is much more for us than a matter of pure obligation. Lord Killearn has pointed out, and I entirely agree with him, that Great Britain's whole position in the Middle East would be gravely threatened if the French followed in the Levant States a policy which was inconsistent with ours and with what the whole Egypto-Arab world has come to regard as essential and right. I am confident that we should meet with very great criticism both at home and in the whole Commonwealth and Empire if, by failing to keep the French up to their promises, we found our whole position threatened in the Middle East, where we have fought so hard to maintain it. We are entitled to expect the French not to put us in this position and I am sure that, were they to do so, not the Arab world alone, but also the United States [illegible] them, and that they would not be able to maintain their position. I shou[illegible] re-state the dilemma in paragraph [illegible] 47 as follows: whether the French are prepared to come to terms with the Levant States on conditions which the Arab world and the Great Powers can regard as acceptable, or they will be faced with a general attack on their position which must prove highly embarrassing to them in the [illegible].

[illegible] paragraph 3 of your telegram seems to be based on the [illegible] His Majesty's Government ought to assist the French to secure a predominant position in the Levant against the wishes of the local Governments. There must be no [illegible] two sides together there can be no question of our joining the French in an attempt to coerce the States if they maintain their refusal to agree to a French position [illegible].

[illegible] French must be made to see that there are limits [illegible] position in the Middle East on their behalf. I earnestly hope that you and your staff will make your influence felt in this respect. So far as I can see, that is the only hope of avoiding a head-on clash which will involve France in grave trouble [illegible] Anglo-French relations and incidentally [illegible] Imperial interests will suffer a grievous blow. [illegible] Levant States reasonable and I am [illegible] Mr [illegible] [illegible] the French do [illegible] Levant States [illegible] will [illegible].

5. From various reliable indications which have reached [illegible] concerned lest the French may feel that now Sir E. Spears has [illegible] the Levant States with less consideration. Noth[illegible] truth. I am quite sure that any att[illegible] the French effort of the Levant States to produce artific[illegible] them with troops or tanks would have t[illegible] difficult road ahead of us and I earnestl[illegible] counsel to avoid any surges of Gallic [illegible].

E 276 8 G]

No. 27

Mr Eden to Mr Shone (Damascus).

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, 26th January 1945

I HAVE considered your full and enlightening reports on the situation in Syria [illegible] The Syrian and Lebanese Governments refuse even to begin negotiations for a final settlement of their

relations with the French, while the French insist that they will only discuss making certain concessions within the framework of a final settlement. His Majesty's Government feel that they cannot allow the deadlock to continue without a serious risk of the situation deteriorating. There clearly must be a settlement of sorts between the Levant States and the French. The best course seems to be to endeavour to get discussions with the French started on the less contentious issues.

2. I should accordingly be glad if you would take an early opportunity of tackling the Syrian Government seriously on the necessity for arriving soon at an agreed settlement of their future relations with the French. Ever since 1941 we have made clear our expectation of a negotiated settlement of some sort between the French and the Levant States to regularise the situation. The States themselves seemed to acquiesce—see the Lebanese President's reply to Catroux's Proclamation of 26th November—and in our view the need has not been removed by the events of 1943. For a start, I should like you to press them to explain what it was in the French proposals made last autumn which caused them to fear [illegible] their [illegible] No. 209. If there is any real cause for this fear, I should like to know precisely what it is. But if it transpires from your representations that they do not even know what the French intended to suggest that the various proposed conventions should contain, you should urge them to find out forthwith and to consider the French proposals on their merits. It is not enough for them to say that the heads of conventions and the draft educational convention show that their independence is threatened.

3. There might well be something in the proposals which they may not like, as in the case of the proposals for the educational convention. But that is no reason for a flat rejection of all proposals altogether or for refusing to enter into any negotiations. The Syrians should at least make counter-suggestions or explain clearly to what points they object. It is not reasonable for the Syrians to continue to refuse to enter into negotiations with the French, and at the very least they should offer them as a basis of discussion the same rights as they have granted the Americans. When accepting American recognition recently, the Levant States agreed to apply in their relations with the United States the Franco-American Treaty of 4th April 1924, thus granting American citizens all the rights accruing to members of the League under the Mandate, as well as rights to maintain educational and religious institutions and to teach [illegible] the English language. They surely do not propose that the French should, for instance, have no security or understanding regarding their schools, commercial interests or the treatment of their nationals, *e.g.*, in taxation matters. Yet as long as they refuse to negotiate on these and other subjects requiring settlement, their attitude amounts to that. Syrians assume that any agreement must give French predominance. This is by no means necessarily so and at any rate they cannot know it until they have at least opened conversations. It is essential that the Levant States should drop their unpractical and uncooperative attitude, if we are to be in a position to do anything to help them.

4. Another question which will need an internationally agreed settlement in due course is that of the position of racial and religious minorities. We could not, for instance, agree that the Mandate should disappear without the Syrian and Lebanese Governments reaffirming their obligations not to discriminate against [illegible] [illegible] the [illegible] Government [illegible].

6. I [illegible] represent [illegible] this [illegible].

7. I [illegible] Spéciales.

8. See also my immediately following telegram.

E 1413 8 G]

No. 2

CAIRO CONVERSATIONS, FEBRUARY 1945

Record of Conversation with the President of Syria at the Minister Resident's Villa, Cairo, on 17th February, 1945.

Present

The Prime Minister (present at the later part of the conversation)
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
The Minister Resident Middle East
Sir A. Cadogan
Mr T A Shone, His Majesty's Minister to the Levant States
Mr R M A Hankey

M Shukri Kuwatli, President of Syria.

THE SYRIAN PRESIDENT in reply to a question by the Secretary of State said he hoped that the situation in Syria would improve and that the Syrian Government would enjoy the help and support of Great Britain so as to overcome the present difficulties. Their ambition was to have peace and tranquillity in their country but they had suffered much provocation, and though every effort had been and would be made to preserve tranquillity he was afraid that, if this state of affairs continued, the situation might get out of hand.

As regards the question of the Troupes Spéciales the President recalled that a special agreement had been on the point of signature in the summer of 1944 but the French had suddenly said that [illegible] the presence of the British Army in Syria. They were not prepared to be replaced in Syria by the British.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE emphasised that there was no question of the British replacing the French.

THE PRESIDENT said that the Troupes Spéciales [illegible] of Syrians, and the fact that they might be used against the S[illegible] was a standing provocation to them. There had bee[illegible] of future perturbation. The French Gov[illegible]ment had issued a statement recently that France was responsible for the maintenance of order in Syria. Later de Gaulle had said that France required a special pos[illegible], then more recently [illegible] had been [illegible] where the French had been encouraging [illegible] of Syrians. The Syrian Government had sent thr[illegible] to negotiate the incident and the French had then sent troops and [illegible] gendarmerie from carrying out the task assigned to them. The President said he was afraid of disorder if this type of provocation continued.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE said that Mr. Shone had [illegible] a commission with Syrian, British and French members. THE PRESIDENT said he [illegible]

MR. SHONE pointed out that the French had made [illegible] at the [illegible] was no French member the commission could not very well summon Frenchmen to give evidence. He very much hoped the Syrians would accept this solution.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE asked the President to discuss the [illegible] Mr. Shone.

Reverting to the fundamental question of the relations with France, the Secretary of State told [illegible] to communicate their proposals to the Syrian Government. If some points were inacceptable the Syrians should put forward counter-proposals and get down to details.

THE PRESIDENT thanked the Secretary of State for his advice. He was afraid that the French would not reply [illegible] the Syrian request for French proposals. The F[illegible] privileged position, and he emphasised that it wo[illegible] anything which could not be [illegible] other Powers.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE said he disliked words like "privileged position." It all depended on what they meant in practice.

THE PRESIDENT recalled that the French had produced a draft educational convention which would have given them a large measure of control over Syrian education. The Syrians, however, were not prepared to be bound hand and foot.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE said that individual French proposals might be inacceptable but that the Syrians should make counter proposals. Great Britain and America would then be in a position to support them if the counter proposals were reasonable.

THE PRESIDENT emphasised that the Syrian Government were [illegible] to co-ordinate their policy with that of other Arab States. They [illegible] prepared to link their fate with that of France. They would never hav[illegible] certainty what type of Frenchman might be in charge of France the next day and France might follow quite a different policy to Great Britain.

(Sir E. Grigg left the room at this point.)

THE SECRETARY OF STATE pointed out that Ibn Saud, the Iraqis and [illegible] Arab [illegible]. An agreement would not necessarily mean that Syrian foreign policy should be subordinate to French foreign policy. He [illegible] independence. Everything ought to be [illegible] of the Levant. He was quite sure that Monsieur Bidault wanted an agree[illegible] he was also sure that Monsieur Bidault did not believe that we were trying to replace the French.

(The Prime Minister entered the room at this point.)

THE PRIME MINISTER said he was anxious to convince the [illegible] we did not aim at replacing them. We wanted nothing for ourselves. France must recognise the independence of the Levant States, but if they made arrange[illegible] with the Syrians by which they got a somewhat better position than His Majesty's Government there we should not object. It was, of course, understood that this should not affect the independence of Syria or the Lebanon. In his opinion the Syrians should arrange something reasonably satisfactory. They should not throw the French out altogether.

THE PRESIDENT said he was grateful for the sympathy which the Prime Minister had shown to Syria. He was himself sure that it was not the British aim to replace the French.

As regards the French position in Syria he said the Syrians were unwilling to give the French any privileged position. They would guarantee them rights to [illegible] contrary to the interests of tranquillity in the country. He was afraid that we aimed at creating a zone of influence for the French in Syria. He emphasised that this was impossible.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE said he was glad to note what the President had said about giving rights to the French as regards schools and hospitals. He urged him to put his proposals in writing as soon as possible.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the French should say what they wanted, the Syrians should say what they were prepared to give. Then the situation could be examined and an agreement reached. He emphasised that the Syrians must give something reasonable to the French, the French must have a position of some sort.

THE PRESIDENT said the French would receive "most favoured nation" treatment.

Reverting to the question of the Troupes Spéciales the President said that the French must transfer them soon. They were Syrians and it was intolerable that the Syrians were liable to be attacked by their own children. This was a vital question. He emphasised that the Syrians hoped to participate in the war in the Far East. They would not like the war to come to an end leaving them with the feeling that they had not done their part to help the Allies, especially as this would be contrary to their interests at the Peace Table.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE said that M. Bidault would make no concession about the Troupes Spéciales without getting anything in return. This was one of many questions which needed to be settled.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he did not think that now that the war against Germany was nearing its end there would be many opportunities for Syrian troops to be used.

THE PRESIDENT said that the essential was to hurry up the French proposals and that meanwhile the French should not provoke the Syrians. If there were provocation he would ask for British help.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE agreed as regards hastening the French proposals but said that the President should, on his side, hasten the preparation of Syrian counter proposals and should give the French the maximum.

MR. SHONE pointed out that if discussions were beginning that would enable the President to reply to any Parliamentary criticism that the matter was under negotiation.

Discussing the question of the Troupes Spéciales further the PRIME MINISTER said that in view of the small number of French officers he felt sure that the Troupes Spéciales would be unwilling to take action against the Syrian Government. Surely if the French asked them to do that there would be a mutiny.

THE PRESIDENT agreed that they would be unwilling to take action. But the Syrian Government on their side would be unwilling to call upon the Troupes Spéciales to mutiny. He realised that that would produce a very serious situation.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE emphasised that the French had given every assurance that they would not try to take action of this sort. We had made repeated representations in Paris to this effect. He was quite sure that M. Bidault did not wish to provoke the Syrians. He was, however, afraid that he did not always get very good information in Paris and he thought that a visit by some prominent Frenchman might do good.

THE PRESIDENT agreed provided that there were no delay and provided that pressure were not put on the Syrians. Several times in the course of conversation he expressed fear of foreign pressure.

THE PRIME MINISTER in the course of conversation emphasised repeatedly that the Syrians should handle the question tactfully and settle it without serious quarrels. They should [illegible] *people* which had been greatly shaken by the war. They should maintain their rights but they should be confident in their friends and in the world organisation which would be set up. Consta[illegible] with the French were very important. [illegible] certainly be trouble. [illegible] foresee the outcome [illegible] He pointed out [illegible] building of [illegible] negotiations [illegible]

THE PRESIDENT said that it was essential, in their view, that the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales should be [illegible]

THE PRIME MINISTER said that where [illegible] as possible the Syrians should [illegible] term position was not a bad [illegible] Great Powers who would assure the peace of the world and whose orders would be obeyed. [illegible] the world [illegible] That would be the moment

for the Syrians to [illegible] There was no need to force the [illegible] Great Powers who would assure the peace of the world and whose orders would be obeyed.

THE PRESIDENT thanked the Prime Minister for his advice and said that the Prime Minister [illegible] But he earnestly hoped that there would be no undue provocation.

Annex

MINUTE BY HIS MAJESTY'S MINISTER, BEIRUT

When I took the Syrian President back to Zaafaran Palace last night after his interview with the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State he expressed [illegible] satisfaction at the conversation. In particular, he was pleased at the [illegible] that we should not impose agreements with the French on Syria and [illegible] Minister's apparent recognition that Syria could not be expected [illegible] a Treaty with France on the lines of ours with Iraq. (There have [illegible] suspicions of late in both Syria and the Lebanon that we and the French might have made or be contemplating some agreement behind their backs—this [illegible] night—and that our pressure on the Levant States to conclude agreements with France might amount to imposing terms on them.)

[illegible] of State. This, not merely from the language they had held to him but from their manner towards him.

As I felt that the President might be taking account mainly of the points which [illegible] received, and of making every reasonable concession possible. [illegible] Minister had told him that Syria's position before the future world organisation [illegible] I also emphasised that no time should be lost. To this the President replied that it was up to the French to make the first move; he was grateful for the action [illegible] If [illegible] were forthcoming about the Troupes Spéciales it would be extremely [illegible]

[illegible] asked what I thought of the question that the Syrian [illegible] I said [illegible] Secretary of State [illegible] Secretary of State [illegible] Unfortunately—a [illegible] the Syrians—the President does not speak English. Minister for Foreign Affairs (Jamal Mardam Bey).

TERENCE SHONE

18th February, 1945

E 1188 420 89]

No. 29

The Earl of Halifax to Mr. Eden.—(Received in Foreign Office, 18th February.)

(No. 1147.)
(Telegraphic.)

Washington, 17th February, 1945

[illegible] the Levant States.

"The Department of State is in essential agreement [illegible] regarding the situation in the Levant States, which is a source of [illegible]

"The American Minister at Beirut and Damascus has accordingly [illegible] similar to those being made by his British colleague with a view to persuading them to alter their present attitude of refusing to enter negotiations of any kind with the French. The American Ambassador at Paris is being instructed at the same time to urge the French Government to adopt an attitude of moderation and to take steps to meet the reasonable desire of the [illegible] *Specially* the equipment of gendarmeries and establishment of normal diplomatic representation at Beirut and Damascus."

E 1191 420 89]

No. 30

The Earl of Halifax to Mr. Eden.—(Received in Foreign Office, 18th February.)

(No. 1149.)
(Telegraphic.)

[illegible] 1945.

FOLLOWING is a paraphrase of instructions from the State Department to the American representative in the Levant States:—

This Government is obviously in no position to support the Syrian and Lebanese Governments in refusing to undertake negotiations of any kind with the [illegible] which provide for the recognition and the protection of the rights and [illegible] of the United States and its nationals in their territories.

[illegible] instructing the American Ambassador at Paris to discuss the [illegible] States with the French Foreign Minister. The text of this instruction is being repeated to you. You should inform the local Governments of these representations and urge them to adopt a more realistic and moderate attitude. Specifically you should propose that they consent to undertake [illegible] Powers and consistent with their independence, but which would [illegible] recognition and protection of French rights and interests in Syria and the Lebanon.

There is no intention on the part of this Government to diminish or retract [illegible] We desire to be helpful in every possible way, and in this spirit we informally advanced for the consideration of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments the suggestion that the [illegible] major Allied Powers would satisfactorily serve their purposes. The Department [illegible] proposal of this suggestion. In our view the explosive potentialities of the situation are limited to relations with the Levant Governments with France. This is the [illegible] however the developments may be with regard to the relations of the two States with other countries.

Foregoing has been repeated to the embassy at Paris.

E 1191 420 89]

No. 31

The Earl of Halifax to Mr. Eden.—(Received in Foreign Office 18th February.)

(No. 1148.)
(Telegraphic.)

[illegible] 1945.

FOLLOWING is a paraphrase of instructions from the State Department to the American representative at Paris about the Levant States:—

This Government continues to be concerned about the potentially explosive situation in the Levant States resulting from the conflicting and unyielding attitudes of the local Governments and the French with regard to problems connected with Lebanese and Syrian independence which still remain unsettled. It seems to us that all these issues could easily be settled by an [illegible] or arbitration in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Ch[illegible] United Nations Declaration. This Government therefore desires that both [illegible] show moderation and would regard with disfavour the use of military force in the present *impasse* either in the form of French-controlled native levies or of French troops. The Department therefore hopes that the French will instruct their representative in Syria and the Lebanon to seek amicable agreement and is instructing the American Minister in Beirut and Damascus to urge the Syrian and Lebanese authorities similarly to show moderation and specifically to undertake friendly negotiations for the conclusion of mutually acceptable agreements [illegible]

We can see no reason [illegible] the independence promised to the Levant States, why they should not agree:

(1) The conversion of French representation in Syria and the Lebanon to the status of diplomatic missions.

(2) The transfer to the loc[illegible] only [illegible] duration of the war in Europe and [illegible] Governments.

(3) The provision of reasonable equipment in accordance with the plan [illegible] by General Holmes, of the Lebanese and Syrian [illegible] We understand that this would call for only 33 [illegible] for automatic weapons.)

We appreciate at the same time the French desire to obtain assurances regarding the protection of reasonable rights and interests of France and of French nationals in the independent States of Syria and the Lebanon. The American Minister in the Levant is accordingly being instructed specifically to urge the Levant Governments to change their present negative attitude [illegible] their relations with the French which do not infringe the rights and interests of others, including those of this country. Departmental instructions to Mr. Wadsworth are being repeated to you.

We must state, however, in this connexion that we have seen the draft of a "Convention Universitaire" which the French are trying to conclude with the Lebanon and Syria and that a preliminary examination thereof indicates that the terms of this convention would seriously injure American cultural and educational interests in the Levant States and would provide discriminatory privileges for France. The Department will be prepared for the presentation of its views in greater detail following the completion of a study now being made. Meanwhile we assume that the French do not wish to promote their own interests at our expense and that appropriate modifications would willingly be made in the proposed text.

You should be taking this matter up urgently with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressing this Government's strong interest in seeing a solution reached which will confirm and ensure the full independence of the Levant States while adequately providing for the protection of French interests therein. If the occasion arises you should make it clear that our policy towards the independence of Syria and the Lebanon is in our view entirely distinct and independent of our policy towards France and the French Empire.

E 1771 1771 89 [illegible]

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 14th March.)

(No. 31.)

Sir,

Beirut, 1st March, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith (Enclosures 1 and 2) the most recent official statistics of the populations of Syria and the Lebanon divided according to districts and religious communities. These statistics which have been obtained from the two Governments, cannot be regarded as wholly reliable but at least form a useful indication.

2. The following points emerging from them are noteworthy:—

(a) *Christians.*

The total number of Christians in the Lebanon is 601,651, or 57 per [illegible] the total population. The great majority of the registere[illegible] emigrants are also Christians.

The Christians of Syria total 393,000.

[illegible]

The Sunni Moslems of Syria, according to the statistics, number [illegible]1,053; to these must be added some 400,000 nomad Bedouin who are not added to the official figures. Taking these into consideration the Sunnis [illegible]

The Sunnis of the Lebanon are 21 per cent. of the total.

[illegible]

[illegible] in Syria and 69,797 in the Lebanon, a total of 1[illegible]3,3[illegible]4. The greatest concentration is in Aleppo, Beirut and Mount Lebanon, and Damascus.

(d) *Jews.*

[illegible] 29,770 Jews in Syria and 5,666 in the Lebanon, a total of 35,[illegible] [illegible] are almost entirely concentrated in the three main towns of Aleppo, Damascus and Beirut.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch and of its enclosures to the Resident Minister at Cairo.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

Enclosure 1 in No. [illegible]

LEBANON.

Distribution of the population of the Lebanon [illegible] districts as on 31st December, 1943.

MUHAFAZAT.

	[illegible]	Mount Lebanon	[illegible]	[illegible]	Bekaa	Total
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	23,418	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	120,[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Latins	2,191	640	68	179	144	[illegible]
Armenian Orthodox	[illegible]	15,570	1,025	1,005	[illegible]	[illegible]
Armenian [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Syrian Catholics	[illegible]	275	109	9	442	[illegible]
Syrian Orthodox	2,070	209	100	23	1,852	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Chaldeans	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Total	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1,126,601

[illegible] No. 32.

SYRIA.

Distribution [illegible] and districts [illegible] on 31st December, 1943.

MUHAFAZATS.

[illegible]

E 1773 6 89] No. 33

Mr Shone to Mr Eden. (Received 14th March.)

(No. 34. Confidential.)

Sir, *Beirut, 2nd March, 1945*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith an extract from a report written by [illegible] Sir P[illegible] in the Levant States, regarding the present state of these two countries. Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, who [illegible] impartial and well-informed observer, and his conclusions are deserving of careful consideration.

2. I am in general agreement with Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill's remarks under the heading "Syria." As regards the section headed "Lebanon" I would offer the following comments on the statement in paragraph 13 [illegible] the Lebanese Christians would mostly welcome living under the French [illegible] It is undoubtedly true that a large section of the Maronites are still p[illegible] an underlying fear of the Moslems, [illegible] protection is preferable to the risk of Moslem domination, that these fears h[illegible] the administration of the Governments of the past 18 months has disillusioned many, and that the long standing sympathy of the Maronites for F[illegible] which flared out at the time of the crisis of November 1943 is far fr[illegible] and [illegible] the [illegible] whole [illegible] from [illegible] in contrast distinction to the Moslems who seek their protection in the Arab world, but unless and until they are convinced that this protection can only be obtained from France and that France is capable of giving it, I do not consider that the majority of these Christians would welcome a return of French domination.

3. Colonel Sir P[illegible] on the attitude and activities of the local French offi[illegible] only too well justified. General Beynet himself [illegible] undoubtedly, usually acts with moderation and good sense [illegible] lack of co-ordination between the different French services [illegible] of whom he [illegible] There [illegible] when [illegible] General Beyn[illegible]

4. [illegible] Minister [illegible] Baghdad, H[illegible] Majesty's [illegible] Aleppo.

I have &c.

TERENCE SHONE

Enclosure in No. 33

The Present State of Syria and Lebanon, 10th February, 1945

THIS paper is based on reports from all parts of Syria and the Lebanon except the M[illegible]

(A) *Syria*

1. Official relations between French and Syrian officials may be said to be non-existent. When they do meet, they are cold and formal. The French Délégués adjoints only address themselves to the Sy[illegible] letter when [illegible] Hon[illegible] M[illegible]

2. In Damascus relations with the Délégué are extremely bad. No conversations have reopened between the Government and the delegation on the vexed subject of a treaty and the F[illegible]

3. Nowhere is there any evidence of the slightest effort on the part of the French to get on good terms with their opposite numbers. Everywhere they hold themselves aloof and look down on the "sale Syrien" as being beneath contempt especially if he is a Moslem.

4. Only in the Alaouite State is there any large-scale attempt to get on terms with the population, and here intense subversive activity prevails with the object of uniting all the big local leaders against the Government and the maintenance of Alaouite independence. There is little reasonable ground for doubt that arms have been distributed in this area, or that the troubles culminating on the 10th February were the direct result of French instigation. In this connexion the unasked for presence of French troops on the scene, though it probably prevented considerable bloodshed and may have localised the disturbance, effectively prevented the Gendarmerie from imposing their will on the Murshid partisans and the re-establishment of the authority of the Syrian Government in that area.

5. In other parts of Syria French Political Officers concentrate on weakening the Government by making advances to opposition and minority groups and cultivating the gangster elements in the towns.

6. French propaganda, apart from subversive efforts in the Alaouites and attempts to curry favour with the underworld, is inept. It reveals three main lines: the first, addressed to the French themselves or French-speaking natives, extolling the efforts of General de Gaulle's Cabinet to place France on an equal footing with the Big Three and their firmness with collaborators; the second line is addressed to Christian minorities, pointing out France's historic rôle as their protector as opposed to British backing of Moslems; and thirdly that the British are behind all the unrest and the Army demonstrations as we desire to get the French out of the country before the end of the war—but France will stay as she is backed by Russia.

7. French policy is entirely Fabian and obstructionist. Their immediate object is to delay any settlement, except on their own wholly unacceptable terms, until after the war in Europe is over. Their hope is that the British will then be too preoccupied with difficulties in Palestine or will be forced by political pressure at home to withdraw from the Levant States, thus leaving them a clear field. They have no real intention of clearing out, except on their own terms and to their own good time.

8. [illegible] Syrians [illegible] that they have [illegible]

9. [illegible] and a general state of anarchy prev[illegible] would welcome [illegible] as an excuse to reoccupy the country militarily.

10. The only successes that French propaganda seem to have had is among the Alaouite chieftains, where by the renewing of subsidies—to the King family for one—and the distribution of arms, the normal separatist tendencies and dislike of the threat of control from distant Damascus naturally are highly receptive to such propaganda.

11. Otherwise it is considered the French position vis-à-vis the Syrian Government has weakened recently, partly owing to the deterioration in relations and partly owing to the strong stand the Government seems to be making in the matter of the treaty and the army.

12. The vast majority of Syrians are determined to be rid of the French. In this connexion it should be recalled that in the Anglo-Arabian negotiations from 1915 onwards, the Arabs always specifically refused to have the French in the country—so anti-French feeling is not only deep-seated, but of long standing. [illegible] of British troops, they would [illegible] their [illegible] would probably have been actively helped by Iraq.

13. The Syrians feel that they must win their point, at least over the army, before the end of the war as they fear that once the war is over, the British will withdraw, the French will bring troops in and their chances will be over, as England and the other Great Powers would not be prepared to risk a major dispute with France over Syria, their hands being full in the Far East and elsewhere.

14. At the moment the Syrians are pro-British and they pin their hopes of real independence on us. [illegible] quickly change if we showed we were not prepared to support their claims. Francophobia would then become Xenophobia.

[illegible] The broad conclusions are that the graph showing the tension between French and Syrians shows an ever steepening curve, the steepness of which will increase as the war in Europe approaches its end

[illegible] The two main factors are the French determination to let go of nothing and the efforts of the Syrians to achieve their full independence before Britain support in the shape of physical presence of our troops is withdrawn

B) *Lebanon*

1. All over the Lebanon the French are displaying intense activity in all directions, except in their relations with Government officials. In Beirut, when the President's illness was obviously serious, General Beynet had a conference with Emile Eddé. In the provinces the Service Politique is for ever making and receiving visits, making themselves accessible and affable, and endeavouring by every means to prove to all that the helping hand of France is essential to the Lebanon

2. They are being particularly attentive to the Maronite community, which is not surprising, but they are also reported to be making a good impression in [illegible] the Metwali Government and the turbulent Metwali tribes in the Bekaa—notably among the Dandash of the Hermel region

3. They lose no opportunity of denigrating the British as grasping imperialists playing the Pan Arab game, which spells ultimate [illegible] of the Lebanon, and as being responsible for all the local difficulties

4. The Communists are also getting more than their share of French attentions and favours

[illegible] is currently reported. Definite proof is lacking, but it is reasonable to suppose that here as in Syria there is no smoke without fire.

5. It is noted that the purely Sunni Moslem circles are not being courted by the French

7. Local reaction to this French drive, which is helped by the Solh family's disloyalty to the Karami regime, is mixed, but not entirely unresponsive, and the feeling is growing that unless the British put all their weight in support of Lebanese independence, it will be necessary to compromise with the French

8. In this connexion it is noteworthy that a leading Communist stated in a public speech [illegible] that is, the real French who have helped to drive the Germans out of France, but not with the "Vichy Embusqués of Beirut"

9. There is a working agreement between the Lebanese and Syrian Governments and all the appearance of solidarity, but it must constantly be borne in mind that there is a marked cultural difference, the Lebanese having been far more gallicised than the Syrians, there are more Christians who have genuine reason for gratitude for French protection in Turkish times, and most important, [illegible] Arabic. They are spineless compared to the Syrian and far more likely to give way under pressure

10. There are moreover considerable misgivings in Maronite and other Uniate circles of Arab federation

11. Generally, pro-French sentiments are on the increase and it is doubtful if another French *coup* on the November 1943 lines would unite the country so solidly against the French as on the former occasion

12. The French have no intention of giving up either Syria or Lebanon, but in the case of Syria they look upon the problem in terms of military force while to the Lebanese they are prepared to act as the benevolent and forgiving father to an erring child—though there would be no fatted calf at the reconciliation party

13. The broad conclusions are that the French have recovered much of the ground lost in November 1943 and that a large number of Lebanese would not seriously object [illegible] French rule. The Christians would mostly welcome it, the Metwalis would be relatively indifferent and only the Sunni Moslems would resent it implacably

14. With an apparent or real withdrawal of our support and a change of Government with more pro-French leanings, they would be quite capable of doing a deal with the French.

[E 1825 806 89] No. 34

Mr Shone to Mr Eden.—(Received 16th March.)

(No. 27.)

Sir, [illegible] 1945

IN paragraph 12 of the instructions to me contained in your despatch No 213 of the 20th December you asked to be kept informed regarding the Soviet attitude towards events in this [illegible]

[illegible] by Mr Mackenzie, setting out in detail [illegible] subject. Broadly speaking, the position [illegible] Russians are as yet making comparatively little [illegible] existing in the Levant States. M Solod the Soviet Minister, [illegible] preceded by a spate of stories of the enormous staffs, hoards of platinum and quantities of caviare that he was to bring with him appears to be a genial young man with only a small staff, who is so far not throwing his weight about and appears, as yet, to exercise little, if any, influence on the local governments. [illegible] M Solod as well [illegible] have addressed to the French Délégation Générale on controversial subjects. I have [illegible] the impression as yet that [illegible] great extent. As Mr Mackenzie remarks at the end of his memorandum, it is still a matter for speculation how far the Syrians and Lebanese would be prepared to go in soliciting the support of the Soviet Union. And in this connexion it must be borne in mind that there is undoubtedly a strong bias against the Soviet system and way of life at least amongst the more rigid Moslems and the privileged [illegible] States.

[illegible] may well be Soviet policy merely to hold a watching brief here at present and [illegible] British and French influence wanes, a vacuum may result which they themselves can fill. Here again the future is too speculative to warrant an expression of opinion, at all events on my part, as to [illegible] clusions to be drawn from Mr Mackenzie's memorandum, that this area offers tempting prizes to a powerful neighbour and [illegible] with a not a few elements which would facilitate a Russian penetration.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Moscow and Paris and to the Minister Resident, Cairo.

I have &c.

TERENCE SHONE

Enclosure in No. 34

Memorandum

ALTHOUGH it is less than half a year since the Soviet Government appeared [illegible] the press during these months that of the Soviet [illegible] may be useful to examine the reasons for this development [illegible] possible effect which it may have upon the future political situation, particularly [illegible]

2. [illegible] friendship with the [illegible] took little or no interest in the affairs of the Levant, and even the crisis of November 1943 in the Lebanon, which excited the press in even the remoter quarters of the globe, only aroused, as far as I am aware, the most perfunctory echoes in Russian newspapers. In the summer of 1944, however, when the two Governments were canvassing the recognition of various foreign Powers [illegible] M Novikov the Soviet representative [illegible] M Novikov [illegible] the Levant States, and last autumn, after exchanges of telegrams between the Lebanese, Syrian and Soviet Ministers for Foreign Affairs, M Daniel Solod was appointed Soviet Minister to the two countries, and legations were set up in Beirut and Damascus.

3. It was therefore a considerable time after [illegible] States and France were represented here that the Soviet Government began to evince a practical interest in these countries. Potentially, however, their influence [illegible] astonishing, and in some respects dismaying, fact is [illegible]

4. [illegible] t Power a stronger position in these countries than [illegible] of military exploits would otherwise assure her.

5. The most important of these elements is undoubtedly the Greek Orthodox Church. In countries such as these, where confessionalism is still a [illegible] Church with a large and homogeneous community, among Christian sects second only to the Maronites in size and probably wealthier, has an important part in the political scene. In the days of the Ottoman Empire, when each [illegible] and the protection of one of the European Powers, the Greek Orthodox Church had a peculiarly favoured position, for they enjoyed the diplomatic and [illegible] financial backing and the French found it politic to cultivate the favour of the Maronite Church, with the result that the prestige of the Greek Church suffered considerably. But they still hanker after the past and when the S[illegible] Government decided to recognise the existence of the Orthodox [illegible] Soviet authorities to endeavour to reinstate the Orthodox [illegible] prestige and to accord the Greek Orthodox [illegible] ion of the Soviet Union.

6. In different circumstances and for different reasons the minorities, particularly in Northern Syria, view the Soviet Union with much the same [illegible] minorities, in a somewhat irritating way. They feel that only in the protection of a strong Power lies their chance of a safe and settled future and that they have little now to hope from the French and will be able to count even less on their support in the future. As for the [illegible] the position of the French in the countries. It is, in the circumstances, not surprising that these minorities should be inclined to turn for support to the Soviet [illegible] through their [illegible]

7. Since the establishment of this legation sporadic re[illegible] of Soviet propaganda among the minorities in Northern Syria have been received, but despite careful enquiry it was never possible either to ascertain their origin or to establish their veracity. Such rumours are endemic in this part of the world, where persons and parties are only too apt to boast of foreign patronage or support in order to enhance their own prestige amongst their compatriots.

8. On [illegible] the [illegible] Minister [illegible] M [illegible] from whom he had no difficulties in the question and that, on the contrary, it was the Kurdish leaders themselves who had approached the Soviet authorities in Northern Syria with a view to obtaining their support. However that may be, and even if in fact it were nothing more than wishful thinking on the part of the Syrian Kurds [illegible]

9. The Armenians, too, constitute generally speaking a pro-Soviet element [illegible] the number of the Armenians in these two

countries, who settled here as refugees after their expulsion from the Soviet Union, were predominantly anti-Soviet and consequently Tashnag in sympathy. There is evidence now however to suggest that the majority of the Armenians are convinced that the best guarantee for their security lies in the support of the Soviet Union, and a tendency on the part of the young members of the community to look to the Soviet Union as their protector against Turkey, of whose persecution they also retain vivid memories. The bonds between the Armenian community here and the Armenian Republic in the Soviet Union were greatly strengthened by the visit paid to Armenian communities in these two States last summer by Dr. Aphramian of the University of Erivan. Although [illegible] claimed that his visit was solely to enable him to establish contact with the Armenian religious leaders in this country, and was devoid of any political importance, it was nevertheless interpreted by the Armenian community as proof of Soviet interest in their fate, and sympathy for their future.

10. The third element in these countries upon whose support the Soviet Government can count is certain Left wing para-Communist organisations, [illegible] the Communist party proper and two bodies styling themselves the Friends of the Soviet Union and the anti-Fascist League respectively. These parties have [illegible] following a comparatively restricted but attributed [illegible] in Syria and the Lebanon, not only amongst what might euphemistically be termed the youthful *intelligentsia*, but also amongst the labouring class in Beirut and Damascus, which is becoming more susceptible to Communist propaganda on account of the continuous rise in the cost of living. Their particular brand of communism consists much more of what would elsewhere be termed trade unionism than any plan and [illegible] of Marx and Marx. Although these parties have not in the past played any outstandingly conspicuous part in Syrian or Lebanese politics, Soviet military successes have stimulated interest in their activities and won them increased support. In the last two years their membership has more than doubled, [illegible] in the number of adherents. The Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Mount Lebanon, for instance, told a member of the legation that he was [illegible], dismayed by the number of Communist coteries which were springing up, at the instigation of the local para-Communist parties, in Lebanese villages which had shown no previous communistic leanings. It is not clear how far in the past these parties were in contact with or received directives from the Soviet Union (though the consensus of evidence suggests that they do), but they are certainly now in touch with the Soviet representative. They are also in touch with similar organisations in Palestine and there can be no doubt that they would welcome and support any [illegible] the Soviet Government to play a more conspicuous rôle in this country.

11. Not only are there these elements actively interested in Soviet participation [illegible] Government [illegible] the attitude which [illegible] Soviet [illegible] the [illegible] Soviet [illegible] M [illegible] Syria and Lebanese [illegible] while the Soviet Governments but also to the foreign [illegible] Government were in favour of the restoration of France to her former position as [illegible] they did not and would not recognise any privileged [illegible] would, in particular, be strongly opposed to any [illegible] blish her mandate. He was even reported to have [illegible] overnment could only recognise Syria's [illegible] other Power [illegible] M [illegible] ral here, has continually taken the same [illegible] ed terms, and even after General de Gaulle's visit to Moscow he informed the [illegible] Soviet policy towards the Levant [illegible] Lebanese Ministers [illegible] States remained unchanged, viz., support for their complete and untrammelled [illegible] intenance any contrary French policy [illegible] had [illegible] specifically instructed by his Government to make this [illegible] declaration, he added that M. Solod had repeated it several times as the official view of his Government and stated that the question of the Levant had not even been discussed at Moscow.

12. These assurances coming from the authorised representative of the Soviet Government here have naturally given the two Governments considerable

encouragement. In fact, since His Majesty's Government made it clear to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments that they favour the conclusion of a treaty with the provisional French Government, it is largely upon American and Soviet support that the two Governments count in their refusal to conclude any agreement enabling France to retain predominant influence here, and in view of their belief in the close identity between British and United States world policy they are doubtful of the extent to which they can depend on American support.

13. With regard to Soviet intentions in the future towards these two countries, it is difficult to form a clear or even precise impression. The Soviet Minister, for his part, has on all occasions gone out of his way to assure local authorities and diplomatic colleagues alike that his instructions are merely to watch the local situation without interfering in it, and if the Soviet Government have, in fact, an eye on these countries he has so far given no inkling of it.

14. Nevertheless, there are constant and widespread rumours of Soviet ambitions and intrigues, that Soviet agents are interested in the possibilities of oil prospecting in northern Syria (the Jebel Bichri district north-west of Deir-ez-Zor, and the Derik district in north-east Syria are particularly mentioned); that the Soviet Legation here is employing members of the Armenian community to wage a rumour campaign against the Iraq Petroleum Company and Syrian Petroleum Company suggesting that the Syrian Government are getting no return from the Iraq Petroleum Company pipe-line running through Syrian territory, and that the Syrian Petroleum Company are not exploiting its controlling concession in Syria; that the Soviet Government are arranging for Lebanese students to receive scholarships in Soviet universities; that the Soviet [illegible] acquire Tripoli as a treaty port; that they are proposing to start a shipping line between here and Black Sea ports.

15. While so far it has been impossible to ascertain how far, if at all, there is any truth in these reports, one of the most striking indications of a Soviet bid for popular favour here is the fact that, since the establishment of the Soviet Legations in Beirut and Damascus, there has been a marked increase in propaganda material coinciding with the appointment of a Tass Agency representative who keeps in frequent personal touch with the editors of the Arabic papers and the local Communist leaders. Some indications of the immense amount [illegible] to the local press is provided by the fact that, while last summer the Soviet Soupresse service was averaging about 8,000 words a day, it has now risen to over 12,000 words a day. Large quantities of books, newspapers and propaganda pamphlets in the Russian language are being imported, and recent issues of *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* figure prominently among the copies of the *Sphere* or *Life* on bookstalls. To all this should be added the propaganda pamphlets in Arabic extolling the life and social conditions obtaining in the Soviet Union, which the Friends of the Soviet Union (with the assistance of the Soviet authorities) are engaged in printing and distributing. They are, furthermore, organizing a large exhibition in Beirut covering Soviet activities in cultural, artistic, scientific and industrial spheres, which has received considerable publicity.

16. This increased interest is also confirmed by the little information available of the activities of Soviet agents in these two countries. I have been reliably informed that, while up to the end of 1943 the majority of N K V D (Narodni Komitet Vnoutrennix Dyel) agents here appeared to be acting as passive observers engaged primarily in collecting information, they are now taking a more active line.

17. The foregoing suggests that the Soviet Government are not disinclined to make their influence felt in Levant affairs and may well intend to play a larger part in them. In that case does the attitude of the Soviet authorities in opposing any attempt by the French to acquire a predominant position here betoken a desire on their part, as in Persia, to occupy such a position themselves? The scale on which propaganda is being carried out at present, coupled with the persistence of the rumours mentioned above, suggest that they may eventually, should a favourable situation develop, take advantage of the strength of their position and try to obtain the obvious advantages, strategic and commercial, which a hold over the Levant States would bring them.

18. The Syrian and Lebanese Governments are not, so far as I am aware, unduly (or even remotely) perturbed by the attentions of the Soviet Government; indeed they are inclined to be flattered by them. But they are far from being anxious to adopt the Soviet system here, and I feel reasonably sure that if these

Governments became convinced that their independent status was in fact being undermined by Soviet intrigues, they would do all in their power (even if it were not much) to frustrate such intrigues. The difficulty lies, as far as the local Governments are concerned, in the possibility that, if the Soviet authorities relied on a method of infiltration based on their propaganda and the active support of [illegible] before the Syrian and Lebanese Governments awoke to the realisation of the danger by which they were encompassed.

19. Although in the face of Soviet imperialism they would do all they could to defend their independence, it is still a matter for speculation how far the Syrians and Lebanese would be prepared to go in enlisting and even soliciting Soviet support if at any stage they felt their independence threatened from another quarter: if, for example, after the conclusion of hostilities and the withdrawal of British forces, the activities of the French seemed to [illegible] existence, or if they felt that His Majesty's Government and the French were forcing upon them a policy which they adjudged to be contrary to their own interests.

20. On the short-term view it would be poor consolation if, as a result of such pressure, the Levant States should open the door to the Soviet Union, who are avowedly pursuing a policy of their own towards these States, and should give [illegible] so long as for strategic reasons we attach importance to that group of countries [illegible] interests to pursue a policy which would do anything to encourage or assist the Soviet Union to increase her influence or position in these countries. It would afford her that free access to the Mediterranean which I believe it is popularly alleged the Soviet Government is anxious to obtain; it would bring an additional [illegible] in the Middle East has been so far consistently anti-Zionist in tone), and finally, it would constitute a permanent threat to the Suez Canal and the safety of our [illegible] communications with the Indian Empire, New Zealand, Australia, and our Far Eastern possessions.

E 1962/6/89] No. 35

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd March.)

(No. 38.)

Sir, *Beirut, 8th March, 1945.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 133 of the 28th February, I have the [illegible] speech(1) made by the Syrian President before the Chamber of Deputies on the 26th February.

2. Certain passages in this speech and in the speech made by the President on [illegible] have aroused [illegible] Damascus, Homs and Aleppo. The principal point to which objection is taken is his assertion that the Syrian people would favour a Greater Syria provided that it was a republic with its capital in Damascus. Critics have pointed out that the President had no right to lay down the law as to what form of Government Syria should have, this being a prerogative of the people. The President himself told me on the 6th March that he had spoken of Greater Syria as he had [illegible] establishment of a monarchy. He said he hoped something could be done to prevent the Emir Abdulla from "poking his nose" into Syrian affairs.

3. The President's call for "implicit obedience" from the people is considered unreasonable in view of his failure so far to produce tangible results [illegible] Troupes Spéciales. His advocacy of Arab collaboration is considered by extremists to be no substitute for the Arab unity which is their declared aim. And finally his reference to negotiations with the French have been taken as indicating that his attitude has weakened *vis à vis* the French.

4. Pamphlets on some of these points have been issued by two of the more extreme political parties in Damascus, and three lawyers from Homs have telegraphed to the President accusing him of "treachery" in declaring war without having obtained the army (a criticism also expressed, though more

(1) Not printed.

moderately in the Syrian Chamber), and demanding a Greater Syria under a monarchy. Attempts by the Government to suppress these lawyers had to be abandoned in the face of popular outcry. The tone of the press in Aleppo has been almost violent in its attacks on the President and the Government's policy.

While too much importance must not be attached as yet to these [illegible] ultra-nationalistic feeling, it seems clear that the position of the President and Government has weakened of late. This is due partly to their having been some time in office, the natural fickleness of the Syrians inclining [illegible] to prefer constant changes, and partly to the fact that they have signally failed in the last few months to "deliver the goods" in their relations with the French: not only is there no sign of the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales, but the people are now told that negotiations are being started for a settlement (popularly interpreted as a treaty) with the French, when the Government had [illegible] question. The Government's handling of the administration does, of course, [illegible] opposition on this score so long as they can rally popular support behind them [illegible] Government, at our behest, show signs of adopting an attitude of moderation, criticism at once and inevitably becomes vocal.

6. Apparently, in an attempt to appease the critics, the President has just added two new Ministers to the Government, Ahmed Sharabati taking over the Ministry of Education, and Sabri-el Assali that of the Interior, both portfolios previously held by the Prime Minister. This change has, however, given little satisfaction except in certain circles of Damascus: both men are Damascenes and both, particularly Sabri-el Assali, are known as personal adherents of the President. The Aleppo Deputies thus remain unsatisfied and their one representative in the Ministry, Dr. Kayali, is reported to be resigning.

7. The disquieting nature of these developments is that the President may, if they continue, before long be in a position to plead either that he cannot [illegible] the people any more, for example, over the question of the army, or that he cannot pursue his policy of treating with the French because he cannot take the Chamber and the country with him. This might be of less moment if there were [illegible] personality other than Shukri Quwatli who could take over in a crisis with greater hope of succeeding, but there is none in view.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, the High Commissioner at Jerusalem (2), and His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Baghdad.

I have &c.
TERENCE SHONE.

E 2003/5/891 No. 36

Mr. Duff Cooper to Mr. Eden.—(Received 24th March.)

(No. 498.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, 24th March, 1945.*

IN debate on estimate of Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Consultative Assembly the 21st March, M. Gorse, Overseas Resistance delegate, recently returned from visit to the Levant, made interesting speech about French relations with Syria and Lebanon. After usual references to British interference, he spoke with great frankness of fall of French prestige in the Levant and of mistakes made by French administration there over many years. He added situation had improved slightly since beginning of year and paid tribute to restraint of Syrian Government. He urged that France, instead of clinging desperately to last vestiges of her mandate, should make generous settlement with Levant States, welcome and support formation of Arab League and, in particular, should take initiative in securing representation of the two Levant States at San Francisco.

2. In course of his reply, M. Bidault made important statement about Levant States. "Attitude of France," he said, "though ill-understood occasionally by certain Frenchmen, is one of progress, good faith and independence. France is mindful of her mission, what she represents in world, of characteristics of her thought and of her history, without which her own sons would not recognise her. In Syria and Lebanon, you know situation in general terms. We [illegible] claimed independence of these States. There are now [illegible] representatives [illegible]

permit anyone to cast doubt on her faithfulness to promise she has given or to [illegible] representation of Syria and Lebanon at San Francisco Conference, he said:

> Assembly should know that decision, as it results from information which I have received in various ways, is characterised by certain obscurity. We have great difficulty in knowing what has been decided by one Government or another in our absence, all the more so because different versions have [illegible] constitution of list of invitations to San Francisco Conference. Consequently I am not in a position to give latest details on this point, but as French Government has to-day opportunity to do something to dissipate present obscurity, I am glad to make here clear statement. France raises no objection to presence of Syria and Lebanon at San Francisco Conference, and when I go there I shall be delighted to see their representatives there, if this is [illegible]

(B) Weekly Political Summaries.

E 5/5/89] No. 27

(1)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 141, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 13th December, 1944. (Received in Foreign Office, 1st January, 1945.)

1. *General.*

THE departure of His Majesty's Minister has been made the occasion, in [illegible] appreciation of the services which he has rendered to these countries during his tenure of office, and unprecedented marks of esteem have been bestowed on him [illegible] countries. The farewell ceremonies in Damascus on the 9th December included a luncheon given in his honour by the President, a reception by the municipality, during which the freedom of the city was conferred on him, and a dinner (the first to be given for twenty-five years in the Government Offices) by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, at which the President, in defiance of protocol, attended.

In Beirut on the 12th December the ceremonies included a luncheon given by [illegible] ment, receptions by the Chamber of Deputies and the municipality (during which the freedom of Beirut was similarly conferred on him), [illegible] dinner by the President. In addition, the Chamber, on the 11th December unanimously voted him an Honorary Citizen of the Lebanon.

The tone of the speeches made at these functions and of press comment generally bore testimony to the real sense of loss felt by both Syrians and Lebanese at his departure.

Reports from all areas stress the vigorous attempts made by French inspired circles to represent His Majesty's Minister's resignation as being due to French pressure on His Majesty's Government, and to convince the populations that Great Britain has now agreed to give France a free hand in the Levant States.

The official announcement in London that no change in policy was envisaged, and the tenor of the various speeches made by General Spears at his farewell celebrations, have done something to reassure the people, but uneasiness undoubtedly persists on this score.

The newspaper report (paragraph 1 of Weekly Summary No. 140) regarding a Greek Orthodox delegation to Moscow has been denied and appears to be at least premature.

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3. *Syria—Damascus.*

It has been rumoured for some time that it was the intention of the Prime Minister to broaden the basis of his Cabinet by the inclusion in it of several of the younger Deputies, the names of Sabri al Assali, Ahmed Sharabati and Michael Eliah being mentioned in this connexion. The Prime Minister, when questioned as to the truth of this rumour, stated that it was correct, but he mentioned no names and gave no date for the change.

An ugly quarrel occurred between the Syrian Government and the French over the question of a guard of honour of Senegalese troops outside the Orient Palace Hotel, where a Franco-Syrian Red Cross ball was in progress. The President of the Syrian Republic, who was intending to visit the ball, refused to do so unless the French guard were withdrawn [illegible] took place on the following day and the President refused to receive Colonel [illegible] Roget when he called to apologise that evening on the instructions of General Beynet. While this affair arose out of a matter small in itself it shows how small an incident can upset the existing state of unstable equilibrium.

A Bill has been passed by the Chamber establishing procedure for summary jurisdiction in cases of offences against supply regulations.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has issued a communiqué stating that the [illegible] Government has officially notified its recognition of Syrian independence [illegible] have stated their intention of accrediting a representative to the Sy[illegible]

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6. *Jebel Druze*

A French officer, Capitaine Rochat, commanding the Druze Squadron at Chahba, is reported to have spoken in public disparagingly [illegible] Syrian Government and Syrian independence. Demonstrations o[illegible] the following day and the kaimakam caused a written *mise en demeure* to be served on Capitaine Rochat warning him that, if he did not leave immediately he would be driven out by force. According to the Acting Muhafez, Colonel Olivia Roget, on hearing of the events, instructed the Délégué at Soueida to move troops into the area, and undertook, if they should prove inadequate, to send reinforcements of Senegalese. The Délégué, however, did not immediately act upon those orders and allowed the Acting Muhafez and the commandant of the gendarmerie an opportunity of calming the demonstrators. They were successful in doing so on the understanding, however, that Capitaine Rochat should be transferred. The French Délégué is understood to have agreed in principle to Rochat's removal, but insists that it must be deferred, as French prestige would suffer if he were transferred immediately as a result of the present incident.

A further incident occurred four days later, when a trooper of the squadron under Rochat's command, without authority, stopped and searched a car which was passing through Chahba. Demonstrations again followed in the town. According to the latest reports, the town is now quiet but feeling is running high and further trouble is expected if Rochat is not soon withdrawn.

The Muhafez has withdrawn his resignation (reported in Weekly Summary No. 140): there is general relief at his decision, even amongst his opponents, who realised that the possibility was slight of a new Muhafez [illegible] from amongst their number.

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8. *Euphrates and Jezireh*

The Muhafez of the Euphrates is planning to plant about 75,000 fruit trees [illegible] will become the property of the local landowners.

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11. *The Lebanon*

On the 10th December a murderous attack was made by a gang of six persons on Abdul Hamid Karami and his brother near Tripoli. Luckily both received only slight injuries, though their driver was seriously injured and their car riddled with bullets from automatic weapons. The driver, despite his wounds, managed to drive the car some 7 kilom. to the nearest hospital, thus undoubtedly saving the lives of the occupants. The Lebanese Government sent the Vice-President and Procureur Général immediately to Tripoli with strong gendarmerie reinforcements, and up to the present several persons have been arrested, though the assailants have not so far been identified. The town of Tripoli closed for [illegible] protest, but has now reopened. On the 11th December the Lebanese [illegible] unanimously passed a motion condemning the outrage and calling on [illegible] measures to punish those responsible.

[illegible] that the assailants were members of the Mokaddem family who were responsible for a similar attack on Karami's life during the 1943

elections, one member of this family, Mazhar el Omari, has ever since then been wanted by the Lebanese gendarmerie, but he has always succeeded in eluding arrest. It is said because he [illegible] by an officer of the Troupes Spéciales, in whose car he had been seen. This man's father and several other members of the Mokaddem family are amongst those arrested.

The Emir Jamil Chehab, the Director-General of Supplies, is understood finally to have resigned on the grounds that he was not being supported by the Government and was being excluded from their councils on supply matters. The Prime Minister has temporarily taken over charge of the Supply Department, the effective working of which is at present seriously impaired.

Although talk of an impending re-shuffle of the Ministry continues, there have been no further developments.

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E 203 5 89] (2)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 142, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, dated 20th December, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office 9th January, 1945.)

1. *General*

In both Syria and the Lebanon the arrival of Mr. Shone has been eagerly awaited in the hope that he himself will confirm the assurances already given concerning His Majesty's Government's policy towards the independence for the two States.

In a sitting of the Syrian Chamber held on the 11th and 12th December [illegible] bill proposed [illegible] the only language to be taught for the first five years (in the elementary schools) [illegible] Arabic and French, and during the last two (higher educational school) Arabic, French and English. After a heated debate in the Chamber the Bill was amended [illegible] the "Baccalauréat" schools and "two foreign languages" in the higher schools. As a result of the passing of the bill the teaching of French language in Syrian schools will be considerably diminished and opportunities created for an increase in the teaching of other foreign languages which in practice will almost certainly mean English. The final form in which the Bill was passed leaves no doubt of the Government's and Chamber's attitude to the French proposal for a Convention Universitaire under the terms of which the position of the French language would have been maintained and even increased and a considerable measure of French control would have remained over the Government's educational programme.

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3. *Syria—Damascus*

There is continued discontent in the Syrian civil service over the inadequacy of emoluments and the employees of the Ministries of Finance and Justice are agitating for higher salaries. The press reports that the Government are preparing a new wage scheme for civil servants, providing for considerable increases in the existing rates of pay.

It is understood that he [illegible] the Syrian gendarmerie is drawing up, on instructions from the President of the Republic, a scheme for an increase during 1945 of 1,000 men in the numbers of the local gendarmerie. Colonel Ioeb Azmeh has also asked the Iraqi Minister to Syria whether the Iraqi Government would be prepared to receive thirty Syrian cadets at the Iraqi police training school, and he and the chief of police will shortly leave for Iraq to inspect the school and to study police methods there.

The Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs has notified the International Postal Union that Syria is now independent and desires to become a member of the union.

4. *Aleppo*

Local economic matters have been the main preoccupation and unrest continues to exist about the movement of textiles. At the end of a month's trial of the official regulations by which the local spinning mills were to deliver cotton

[illegible] ment who in turn were supposed to deliver the yarn to the [illegible] mills started to deliver their own yarn direct to workmen [illegible] price, thus cutting out both the Ravitaillement and some of the middle men. This action has emphasised the bad official handling of the problem and has strengthened the general opposition to the present ministry.

The only event of political significance was the first appearance of an official of the Soviet Legation who on the 11th December attended a ceremony arranged [illegible] representatives were present. Speeches were mainly in praise of the Russian war effort, the Syrian welcome to Armenians and the early and complete Soviet recognition of Syrian independence.

5. *Homs and Hama.*

It is learnt from Fadeh Bey Atassi that the Government have refused to accept his resignation from the post of President of the Municipality (see Weekly Summary No. 141).

A meeting of the Homs Armenian Community was held to celebrate the 24th anniversary of their independence. No French or British officials attended but the Muhafez and Chief of Police were present. Meanwhile the Muhafez has received a request from the Council of the Armenian Greek Orthodox Church [illegible] functions. He belongs to the Tashnak party which is opposed to the party predominating in the Council Chamber in Damascus.

The Greek orthodox community published their decision to send their bishop in Homs, Bishop Djeha, to accompany the patriarch to Moscow in the new year. Bishop Djeha is also stated to have received a request from the Russian Government to give an account of the various properties formerly belonging to them in the Homs area. Presumably this is a reference to the school and religious properties owned during the Tsarist régime.

The textile position is still acute. The allocation of thread to Homs is less than a tenth of the amount required but it is hoped that some arrangement can be made to find work for the more desperate cases.

6. *Jebel Druze.*

The French have now withdrawn Capitaine Rochat from Chahba (see Weekly Summary No. 141).

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8. *Euphrates and Jezireh.*

A Bill was passed giving an increment of 25 per cent. on the salaries of civil servants serving in the Jezireh and Euphrates Mahafazats.

The four most northerly villages of the Assyrian settlement on the Khabour have been deserted for at least 5 6 years. This was partly because the Turkish authorities objected to them being so near the frontier and partly because of the high mortality of the villagers due to malaria. These villagers moved downstream to land at the southern end of the settlement. Since then the lands of these four villages, two on each side of the river, have been uncultivated. A move has now been made by the French to have the use of this land for some French sponsored agricultural company. Some of the chiefs of the Assyrians are also desirous of reoccupying these villages or at least of resultivating the land. The Muhafez of the Jezireh has been approached by Cmdt. Pommarede, French P.O. at Hassetché, but has stalled him off for the time being with the excuse that the Tehatchane tribe between Tell Tamer and Ras el Ain has a long standing claim on these villages which is at present being dealt with in the court at Deir-ez-Zor. Land which remains unpoughed for over three years automatically reverts to the State, so the Assyrians have no legal claim to these villages apart from the fact that they were asked to vacate them officially and did not do so wholly voluntarily but it is regrettable that this good land should not be in cultivation. The Muhafez of the Jezireh would prefer to favour the request of the Assyrians as they are hard-working farmers, but he fears that they in turn might come to some arrangement with the French and allow them the use of their land.

The Euphrates gendarmerie have now received some 400 British rifles in exchange for their existing arms, together with 250 rounds per rifle. Two more trucks have also arrived, but a third had an accident *en route* and is presumably being repaired.

9. *Tribal.*

The proposed settlement of outstanding differences between the Baggara and the [illegible] of the present session of the Chamber in Damascus, since it is impossible for [illegible] The differences between the Baggara and the Kikieh have now been settled by the payment of blood money by the latter. [illegible]

10. *Frontier.*

The arrival of an occasional Turkish deserter at a Syrian frontier post is quite a common occurrence, but last week eight deserters, including two armed and two Customs officials, crossed into Syria.

11. *The Lebanon.*

His Majesty's Minister left Beirut for Palestine on the 15th December. At a farewell ceremony held outside 84 Sub Area he inspected a Guard of Honour mounted by IXth Army in company with the army commander and senior naval military and air force officers. Most of the Lebanese Ministers and members of the diplomatic corps came uninvited but no French representative was present. [illegible] as to the intentions of His Majesty's Government. The Prime Minister is again speaking of resigning. There is, however, a tendency to postpone judgment until the attitude of the new Minister can be estimated.

The authors of the attempt on the life of Abdul Hamid Karami have still not been arrested despite vigorous efforts on the part of the Government. There is considerable dissatisfaction amongst the Karami adherents at the delay in bringing them to justice.

The President of the Republic has broken an arm through a fall in the street and will be confined to his house for some time, though he is still capable of transacting some business.

No successor to the Amir Jamil Shehab as Director-General of Supply has [illegible] and the supply services are consequently getting into an [illegible] unsatisfactory position.

The Government have officially denied the statement attributed by a news agency to their Minister in London shortly after his arrival to the effect that he recommended a conference in London to discuss the Palestine question. The report seems, in fact, to have been a fabrication.

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E 260 5 30'

[illegible] *dated 27th December, 1944. (Received in Foreign Office, 11th January, 1945.)*

1. *General.*

Mr. Terence A. Shone arrived at Beirut by air from Cairo on the 21st December to take up his post as His Majesty's Minister to Syria and the Lebanon in succession to Sir E. Spears. He was met at the airport by the general officer commanding Ninth army, senior naval, military and air force officers and members of the legation staff. On the 22nd December he presented his credentials to the Lebanese President and on the 23rd December to the Syrian President. The usual formalities were observed in both capitals, except that the Lebanese President, having recently broken his arm, was obliged to receive him seated and swathed in a black cloak.

There were no public demonstrations on either occasion, but indications are that this prompt establishment of contact with the two Governments has done something to allay the anxiety which they had been feeling since the departure

of his predecessor. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Prime Ministers of both States took advantage of the formal visits paid to them by His Majesty's Minister to stress the determination of their Governments not to conclude any treaty which would give a pre-eminent position to France.

His Majesty's Minister called on General Beynet on the 20th December and [illegible] General Beynet stated that he [illegible] to Paris in the near future as he had not been home for a long time, and that he had no fresh instructions regarding the negotiations with the States on the Troupes Spéciales or other questions. Count Ostrorog was, however, expected to return from France shortly and might have further news.

Anxiety continues, however, to be expressed in both States as to Great Britain's future attitude towards them, and this anxiety is constantly being exploited by the pro-French section of the press. An alleged message from the *Daily Mail* to the effect that the conclusion is expected of an Anglo-French pact regarding the Levant, following *The Times* article on a new era of Anglo-French relations in the Levant, are examples of disturbing factors on public opinion.

A French cruiser, the *Emile Bertin*, arrived at Beirut on the 23rd December on a four day visit with Admiral Aubonneau on board. The French Government and the [illegible] provocative behaviour by the admiral or crew of the ship during her visit, and, no doubt as a result of this, they behaved in the event with the utmost correctitude. [illegible] The visit passed off without any untoward incident, and the ship sailed on the 27th December carrying with her the Lebanese Minister Dougnate to Paris and his staff. Public opinion seems to have been largely unaffected by the visit. The Lebanese Prime Minister expressed to His Majesty's Minister his appreciation of the part which he attributed to us in ensuring that the visit passed off without any untoward incident on the French side.

The question of press censorship is coming to the fore in both States. The Syrian Chamber on the 20th December unanimously voted a resolution calling for the abolition of internal press censorship. They were informed on the following day by the Speaker that this was insufficient, and that they must pass a definite law abolishing the existing legislation on the subject. A law to this effect has already been tabled in the Lebanese Chamber, and it is expected that the Syrian Chamber will shortly follow suit. In the meantime, there have been difficulties in both States about Allied military censorship. In the Lebanon [illegible] attempts by the French to cut out articles which had no military significance, but which they regarded as derogatory to France or as merely contrary to local French policy—(the French censor unsuccessfully endeavoured, for example, to forbid the production of an interview given by General Spears to the *Sunday Times*)—have resulted in local newspapers tending to bypass both the French and British censors; all papers have, however, now undertaken to submit to British military censorship because they realise that it will not be abused. In Syria, there is a British military censor, but the Government have for several months resisted repeated French claims to install a French military censor as well, although these claims were supported by the British authorities. The French claim that as a result of Syrian press criticism [illegible] attacks on France. On the 21st December the French delegate in Damascus addressed a stiff note to the Syrian Government demanding, with veiled threats, that these attacks should cease. The Syrian reply, which has not yet been sent, is expected to be even stiffer.

Reshuffles of both Syrian and Lebanese Governments appear to be in the offing. It is reasonably certain that the Syrian Prime Minister has now offered himself as Syrian Minister in Egypt, while the Lebanese Government as a whole seem persuaded that they will have to resign early next year owing to progressive lack of support in the Chamber.

It now appears certain that a Greek Orthodox delegation will, in fact, proceed to Moscow for the enthronement of the Russian Orthodox Patriarch.

2. *Economic*

The German thrust in France has caused a marked rise in the prices of gold and textiles.

3. *Syria—Damascus*

The regular autumn session of the Syrian Chamber ends on the 31st December, but as many clauses of the budget have not yet been debated, the Chamber is

expected to reassemble in extraordinary session early next month. Until the budget is passed expenditure will be covered by Douzièmes Provisoires.

On the 18th December the Chamber resumed the debate on the Government draft bill to pay a 25 per cent. increase of salary to civil servants serving in the Euphrates and Jezireh provinces. Several Deputies criticised the bill as being bad in principle and as likely to affect the efficiency of the Civil Service, but the argument that only thus could a good type of official be obtained prevailed and the bill was passed.

The Council of Ministers has sanctioned the incorporation of the Jebel Druze into the Syrian administration to take effect as from the 1st January, 1945.

According to press reports, the Government have decided to publish an appeal encouraging retired officers of the Ottoman army to join the Syrian police and gendarmerie forces, the fusion of which into a single security service is stated to be imminent.

The Syrian Government, having informed the D.H.P. Railway that their agreement to operate the Hejaz Railway in Syria is terminated as from the [illegible] to take over the direction and operation of that railway.

On the 19th December the Government were briskly criticised in the Chamber because the Ministry of Finance has contracted with a Tel Aviv Zionist firm for the supply of paper. The Ministry was blamed both for dealing with Zionists and for indulging in commerce. At the same sitting the Chamber approved the underwriting by the Ministry of Finance of a loan of 1 million Syrian pounds for a waterworks at Hama.

4. *Aleppo*

The attitude of the public is reported to be one of expectancy as regards the line to be taken by His Majesty's Minister. Anti-treaty feeling in Aleppo [illegible] because of the very large minorities and because French interests have been well served by an industrious and very experienced French Délégué. Furthermore, economic interests largely outweigh politics in Aleppo, and it is generally realised that the present relative prosperity results from the Allied, particularly British, occupation rather than from any measures taken by the Nationalist Government. [illegible] nails and on the [illegible] dispersed. Shops remained closed in the town, however, and on the 27th December a further crowd was fired on, casualties resulting. The Government's action which caused the trouble appears to be largely due to local intrigue and the outcome depends on conversations which are to take place in Damascus between the President and the spinners.

Local officials of the Finance department struck on the 19th December for equality of treatment with their colleagues of Damascus, but their demand was [illegible]

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7. *Hama*

The Syrian President has stated that his Prime Minister has been instructed to prepare a Bill for presentation to the Chamber prolonging by six months the period during which appeals against land registrations may be made by persons domiciled in the Hadé area. This, while not mentioning Suleiman Murshid, will have the effect of allowing all peasantry whose land Murshid's family is alleged to have filched to re-open the registration cases and, in all probability to obtain reversals of the judgments concerned.

The President has also confirmed that, contrary to rumours which have been persistently circulating in Lattakia, his Government will not allow Murshid to return to the Alaou[illegible]

French Délégué and political officers in the territory have been carrying [illegible] extensive touring programmes, and the Mohafez, who has no direct contact [illegible] appears to be nervous of the effect of their activities in the mountain [illegible]

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11 *Lebanon*

See "General" above

The search for the authors of the recent attack on Abdul Hamid Karami continues. The assailants have definitely been identified as members of the Mokaddem family, and are understood now to have escaped into the Alaouite [illegible]rritory where the assistance of the Mohafez has been [illegible] their apprehension

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E 434 5 89

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No 144, Secret Syria and the Lebanon, 3rd January, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office, 19th January)

1 *General*

HIS Majest[illegible] discussions with members of both Governments In an interview in [illegible] the Syrian President and his Minister for Foreign Affairs asked whether [illegible]ply to give to the Syrian note of the 7th October, which [illegible] for British arbitration of the Troupes Spéciales question The President [illegible]nce at the action of France in breaking off [illegible]reement in principle had been reached in July, and pointed [illegible] the necessity for Syria to have her own armed forces. He made it plain [illegible] preoccupation of his Government was to remove these [illegible] control lest they should be used in the future as an instrument of aggression He indicated that if these Troupes were not to be transformed the Syrians would be ready to see them disbanded after which they could either raise their own forces or strengthen the gendarmerie. He stated categorically that the question could not remain in suspense much longer as the failure to achieve results was weakening the position of his [illegible]

At the same interview the President reaffirmed with every appearance of [illegible] of the Syrian Government to consider any treaty [illegible]ment position to France in wh[illegible] ment had the utmost [illegible] country as a whole [illegible] formed His Majesty's Minister [illegible]ed his Government whether they [illegible] Soviet Minister meant that his Government fully recognised the independ[illegible] since the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Pact, that this pact only concerns Europe [illegible] support for their complete independence and a refusal to recognise a pre-emptive [illegible]

In both Syria and the Lebanon there are many signs that changes in the Cabinet will shortly take place. The Syrian Prime Minister wishes to resign for reasons of health but has been persuaded to remain in office for the moment, since, with the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs in Cairo, the Chamber shortl[illegible] rite recess and the French authorities in th[illegible] would be ill timed. Discontent with the internal administration, especially in [illegible]nomic matters, is growing, but there is no sign that the proposed changes in the Cabinet are in any way a result of the recent French pressure. Lutfi Haffar and Jamil Mardam are being mentioned as possible Prime Ministers.

In the Lebanon a Cabinet reshuffle is now generally expected to take place, at latest in the middle of January Chief interest centres in whether any Moslem other than Riad Solh will be able to form the new Ministry or whether Riad himself, despite his loudly-expressed desire to be relieved of the cares of office, will nevertheless allow himself, or be forced by circumstances, to undertake the task of forming his third Ministry

No law to abolish press censorship has yet been tabled in the Syrian Chamber (see paragraph 6, section 1, Weekly Political Summary No 143) [illegible]

[illegible] however passed a Bill to this effect on the 30th December after a heated [illegible] with only one dissentient. All speakers admitted that the Allied military censorship must continue and the terms of the Bill specifically cover this point [illegible] the [illegible] with which [illegible] Foreign Affairs, after consult[illegible] principle, but substituting for the suggested proviso a me[illegible] most favoured nation treatment, which they propose shall be reciprocal

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3 *Syria—Damascus*

Franco-Syrian relations, which were not improved by the despatch of French tanks to Damascus simultaneously with the delivery of a staff note by the French [illegible] present very bad The Syrian Government have replied to the Délégué Général expressing astonishment at the tone of Colonel Olivi Roget's note and giving a [illegible] of anti Syrian actions alleged to have been perpetrated by the French since [illegible] of last year There seems little or no likelihood of an improvement in [illegible] unless the French Government and French officials in Syria revert to the [illegible]atory attitude adopted by General Catroux a year ago, though the [illegible] well doubt whether further concessions would induce such a change [illegible]ert in Damascus as would lead eventually to a treaty according France a [illegible]ged position

The Chamber on the 21st December held a brief discussion on the report [illegible]ted by the committee appointed to investigate the scandals in the Ministry [illegible]pply, the Deputies insisted that the report should be printed and discussed publicly by the Chamber On the 27th December a private members' draft Bill for the creation of a national army was read and passed into committee At the sittings on the 27th, 28th and 29th December the question was raised of the [illegible] to the present Government of article 92 of the Constitution, which [illegible] Minister shall be a member of a board of directors of any public company Dr Kayali, Khaled Azm and the Syrian Prime Minister all declared that they had severed their connexion with the public companies in which they [illegible] formerly been interested

A draft Bill has been laid before the Chamber incorporating the Jebel Druze into the Syrian Administration from the 1st January, 1945, and giving Druze religious courts a legal existence and the right to deal with the matters of Druze personal status

The Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has announced the appo[illegible] Najib Armanazi as Minister to London, Adnan Atassi Minister to Par[illegible] [illegible]n Quda as Minister to Washington

The adviser to the Ministry of Education, when questioned by the press as to whether it was proposed to institute Government control over foreign schools in Syria, replied that at the moment there was no such intention. He added, however, that the recent legislation passed by the Chamber on education made the Syrian baccalaureate the only legally recognised examination for admission to public offices

4 *Aleppo*

[illegible]rbances have continued in connexion with the closing of the Moudarres and Shabarek mills (see paragraph 2, Section 4, Weekly Political Summary No 143). The present trouble dates back to July 1944, when the Syrian Government sent an official to take over the mills. The project was, however, abandoned shortly but again in October the mills were requisitioned As the official team were unable to run the industry it was agreed that the mills should hand over to the Ravitaillement a quantity of yarn during a trial month. Only a small proportion of this yarn was, however, passed to local weavers, and none of the

cheap material promised by the Ravitaillement appeared on the market. In the [illegible] were not out to exploit the poor but they objected to partial and inefficient Ravitaillement control, and would themselves shortly provide cheap cotton material for sale in Aleppo. Soon afterwards the Government seized the raw cotton in the stores of the two mills on the grounds that the mills had taken [illegible] action within the ten days' time-limit regarding a claim for some £Syr 2 million [illegible] tax.

There is little doubt that the dispute chiefly arises from the enmity existing between the Moudarres family and Saadullah Jabri, President of the Chamber. But the latest information received is that an agreement has been reached in Damascus which will enable the mills to reopen.

5. *Homs and Hama.*

Khaled Agha Darwish Barazi has returned to Hama after a two year internment in Kamaran for wheat hoarding.

The first pilgrims returning from the Hajj arrived in Homs during the week. They are reported to be full of complaints about their tr[illegible] ceremonies in Mecca, and to be expressing resentment against King Ibn S[illegible] the slackness and corruption of his Administration, in particular as regards the appalling transport situation from Jedda to Mecca, the constant extortion of petty officials *en route*, and the filthy condition of the sacred square round the Kaaba at which they perform their principal devotions. They report also that there is considerable unrest among the Saudi population of the Holy Cities, and much complaint against the King both for his moral behaviour and financ[illegible] rapacity, that very few Shia pilgrims attended the ceremonies [illegible] to the extent on last year of a Shia for allegedly defil[illegible] according to Koranic law, this execution has been proved to be illeg[illegible] money has been assessed against the King at the sum of 15,000 gold pounds. Whatever the truth behind these stories, they point to a considerable anti Saudi propaganda.

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11. *Lebanon.*

In the Chamber on the 28th December the Government was attacked for not having yet passed the budget. The Minister of Finance explained that the budget had been held up by delays in the promulgation of the Income Tax Law and the new Land Tax, arrangements for executing which were in process of elaboration.

The first instalment of £Syr 2 million in respect of arrears of War Profits Tax was duly paid over by the Lebanese merchants on the 20th December. The other two instalments will be due at two months' intervals.

According to the Chief of Gendarmerie the members of his force are becoming increasingly discontented with their scales of pay and all his applications to the Government to secure increases have been left unanswered.

Considerable activity has taken place in clerical circles as a result of the suggestion that the Maronite Patriarch should convene an episcopal congress to discuss the general position of Christians in the Lebanon with special reference to the Alexandria Protocol. Opponents of the Government have been active in advocating the suggestion in the hopes that resolutions embarrassing to the Government would be passed, but the latest information suggests that the more influential archbishops have persuaded the Patriarch that the congress would be harmful to Christian Moslem relations and would therefore be inopportune.

A decree appeared on the 28th December organising the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It appears to have been quoted textually from a European model.

The President, who is still ill, was obliged to cancel his usual New Year's Day receptions. General Beynet received "the French colony and Friends of France" at a large reception at the Residence in the afternoon.

The assailants of Abdul Hamid Karami have still not been brought to justice and some of them are thought to have fled into the Alaouite territory. Gendarmerie have been displaying great energy and it is thought that their efforts will eventually succeed.

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E 631/6/89] (5)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 145, Secret. Syria and the Lebanon, 10th January, 1945. (*Received 27th January.*)

[illegible]

ON the 7th January the Lebanese Prime Minister, Riad Solh, tendered his resignation to the President of the Republic, who accepted it and charged Abdul Hamid Karami with the formation of the new ministry.

It had for some weeks become obvious that the Government was unlikely to survive much longer in the face of the steadily growing opposition both inside and outside the Chamber. There was increasing public dissatisfaction at the failure of the Government to check the constant rise in the cost of living, to effect economies or to improve the standard of efficiency of the Administration. In addition, a substantial section of the Christians had been persu[illegible] the Government's opponents that the Alexandria Protocol, which the [illegible] had signed, would place the Christians under Moslem domination. [illegible] as a whole was, in fact, ready for a change, though the immediate cause [illegible] Government's resignation was undoubtedly intrigue amongst Deputies, th[illegible] majority of whom had decided that their personal interests would be [illegible] served by a new ministry anxious to gain credit than by one which had now been in power for what, in the Lebanon, is regarded as a long period.

The new ministry cannot be considered strong and is particularly weak in administrative experience. Its composition was as follows:—

Prime Minister, Ministries of Finance and Defence: Abdul Hamid Karami (Sunni).
Vice President, Ministries of Commerce and Industry, and Posts and Telegraphs: Nicola Ghosn (Greek Orthodox).
Ministries for Foreign Affairs and Justice: Selim Taela (Greek Catholic).
Ministries of Supply and Agriculture: Dr. Jamil Talhouk (Druze).
[illegible] and Education: Wadih [illegible]
[illegible] Works, Health and Public [illegible]

On the morning after the formation of the new Government Selim Tae[illegible]

The French authorities were not consulted and took no part in the [illegible]sations which surrounded the fall of the old Government and the formation [illegible] new, although they and their agents had undoubtedly played a part in bringing about the downfall of Riad Solh by a systematic campaign of misrepresentation and of magnification of the Government's failings. Abdul Hamid Karami likewise made no approach to this legation, and the President [illegible] would be objectionable to His Majesty's Government.

No further progress has been made in the matter of the rearming of the gendarmerie. The Governments feel that the French are deliberately withholding their agreement to a further supply of arms in order to ensure that the central Governments will be unable to enforce internal security without calling in French assistance. British military authorities regard the issue of additional cars and automatic weapons as a matter of real urgency from the security aspect. Further representations in the matter have been made to London by His Majesty's Minister.

2. *Economic.*

Total purchases for the period the 23rd–31st December amounted to 432 tons, a daily average of 48 tons, which brings the total purchases for the 1944 crop up to 173,070 tons.

3. *Syria—Damascus.*

The political situation has not changed. The Prime Minister, though anxious to resign, will probably remain in office until the Chamber has gone into recess at the end of January. The Minister for Foreign Affairs left for Cairo on the 1st January and the various portfolios held by him were temporarily taken over by the Prime Minister, who was thus temporarily in charge of six

ministries. Owing to the delay in convening the Conference on Arab Un[illegible] in Cairo, Jamil Mardam Bey has since returned to Damascus.

The Judicial Committee of the Chamber has been studying the draft Bill on the formation of an army, but during the week reached the conclusion that it was useless to go further without ascertaining the views of the Government. The Syrian Prime Minister, therefore, attended one of the meetings of the committee and stated that the Government were thinking of resuming discussions with the French on the basis of the immediate cession of 5,000 Troupes Spe[illegible] Syrians, as had been previously agreed, and the subsequent hand[illegible] the rest by stages until the end of hostilities. He said also that it was impossi[illegible] for the Government to obtain arms from the Allies for the formation of a new army and expressed himself in favour of the principle of conscription as a means of raising additional revenue.

Orderly organised demonstrations in favour of the formation of an army took place at the beginning of the week in Damascus and in the other principal towns.

The first sitting of the extraordinary session of the Chamber, which was originally fixed for the 8th January, was postponed until the 13th, leaving only [illegible]teen days for the discussion of the budget, which must be passed by the 31st January; otherwise the draft budget submitted by the Cabinet will, according to the Constitution, be enforced by presidential decree, thus becoming law without the agreement of Parliament.

4. *Aleppo*

The mills partially reopened on the 9th January. Almost all the taxation claims have been paid, but the question of a 50 per cent. fine is still under consideration; the Government is in process of returning the cotton which it has seized.

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6. *Jebel Druze*

The Bill incorporating the Jebel Druze community in the Syrian State, after the abrogation of its administrative and financial autonomy, was passed in the Syrian Chamber. A further Bill has been passed under which religious courts of the Druze community are given power to decide cases of personal status in conformity with Druze custom.

The publication of these decrees is reported to have given great satisfaction amongst the Druzes.

7. *Alaouite Territory*

The Mohafez of Lattakia believes that it may be possible to make the port [illegible] important commercial harbour after the war, serving Aleppo, the whole of N[illegible] Syria and even Mosul. It was thought that the late Director of Public Works in Damascus would be a suitable man to visit Latakia and draw up plans for the work of enlarging the port. No action, however, was taken as the Mohafez understood that the Syrian Government had hopes of securing the services of a British port construction expert. Meanwhile a French naval lieutenant has been to Latakia recently, taken a number of soundings in the port and informed the Mohafez that it would be a simple matter to obtain the services of a capable port expert from France.

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11. *Lebanon*

Little work has [illegible] Government in the past few days. [illegible] progress [illegible] becomes operative as from the 1st January, but [illegible] required is still far from ready. The passing of the [illegible] further postponed.

M. Selim Taela told a member [illegible] Minister, had called on him to [illegible]

12. *Press*

During the week it became clear from the tone of the Lebanese press that the Lebanese Government was heading for a ministerial crisis. The [illegible]

The Syrian press expresses satisfaction with the Prime Minister's statement [illegible] by the M.E.S.C. has been reported [illegible] with lively satisfaction.

[illegible] press has taken up the question of Cabinet Ministers maintaining their interests in commercial enterprises.

The meetings of the Arab Preliminary Committee in [illegible] interest in the press and Arab unity is again being discussed.

Comment on the Zionist question has almost completely subsided.

The Syrian decision to enlarge the port of Lattakia has been prominently reported.

On the question of a treaty with France, the statement made by the British M[illegible] [illegible] of the Levant States press remains unchanged: complete independence and no treaty.

An Aleppo Armenian paper has made an attack on the policy pursued by Major General Spears, ex British Minister in the Levant States. It now appears that the article in question was inspired.

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E 364/5/89

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 146, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 17th January 1945. (*Received in Foreign Office, 6th February.*)

1. *General*

A slight increase of tension became perceptible in Syria during the week, chiefly as a result of a strong speech de[illegible] by Jamil Bey Mardam in the Syrian Chamber on the [illegible] that the Troupes [illegible] the Government would not conclude a treaty with France because [illegible] would impede the [illegible] he on the basis of equality without preference or privilege. The speech was probably designed mainly for internal consumption; a change of Government is expected before long, and both Jamil Mardam, and other Nationalist leaders may well feel it essential that the present Government should give proof of their resolution in defence of nationalist aims beforehand.

As however, [illegible] army in all the principal towns of Syria and came from the most moderate of all the Syrian leaders, it aroused considerable comment.

There have been no definite incidents between the French and either of the [illegible] especially the [illegible] lack of any progress in the matters of the transfer of the [illegible] the issue of arms and motor vehicles for their gendarmerie [illegible] serious clash sooner or later cannot, therefore, be ruled out.

The Lebanese Government has not yet issued its official programme, but it [illegible] its intention to remedy defects in the internal administration. Veiled attacks on the new Lebanese Ministry have already begun in the newspaper controlled by Riad Solh [illegible] opposition in the Chamber both from the opponents of the régime and from the ex-Ministers who seek to return to power.

Recognition of the Levant States by Turkey seems no nearer. The visit of a Turkish delegation to discuss an exchange of notes for the purpose was announced, but was then countermanded by [illegible] came to the conclusion that the Turkish Gove[illegible] ensnare them by the terms of the recognition formula, into accepting the Turkish [illegible] of the Hatay, as well as granting them the right to open schools for the teaching of Turkish and to have access for their nationals to the Mo[illegible] have now requested His Majesty's Government to use their influence to induce the Turkish Government to accord the recognition without linking it with acceptance of the annexation of the Hatay, to which no Syrian Chamber would ever consent in view of its commercial importance in North Syria.

2. *Economic*

Total purchases for the period the 1st 7th January 1945 amounted to 248 tons, a daily average of 35 tons, which brings the total purchases for the 1944–45 crop up to 173 318 tons.

3. *Syria—Damascus*

A Workers' Conference, to which all the principal tow[illegible] in Damascus on the 12th January and passed a number [illegible] these were political, including demands for the complete independe[illegible] country, the creation of an army, and the institution of an Arab Workers' Congress, while others dealt with purely internal affairs, such as indust[illegible] insurance against accidents, the limitation of hours and the [illegible] conditions of work.

It has been announced in the press that exit permits for persons wishing to leave Syria will henceforth be granted by the Syrian Sureté Générale.

4. *Aleppo*

There have been further demonstrations in the town and in outlying districts demanding the formation of a national army, the latest information is that the town is partially closed for fear of damage. In addition there has been a demonstration against the Government arising out of a ban on the publication in the press of certain stories concerning local Ravitaillement irregularit[illegible]

5. *Homs and Hama*

There is still no sign of an alleviation in the economic situation in H[illegible] where half the weavers are still idle or semi-employed for lack of thread, meanwhile numbers of the weavers continue to leave the city for work in Palestine and Iraq.

The investigation ordered by the Soviet Government into Russian-owned properties in Homs has resulted in a "nil" return. It appears that the Turkish Government did not allow foreign Governments to make purchases of property in their own name, and the purchases in Homs were made by a Russian financed [illegible] properties, now valued at about £S. 180 000 were lodged in the hands of the Greek Orthodox Ch[illegible]. It has been ruled that these now belong entirely to the Greek Orthodox Community.

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6. *Euphrates and Jezireh*

Demonstrations against the Government broke out in Deir ez Zor towa[illegible] to increase the salaries of those officials working in the Euphrates and Jezireh who are not natives of the[illegible] carried by some of the demonstrators, and speeches, meetings and telegrams were the order of the day.

Méhariste sources in Deir ez Zor report that the French officer commanding of the company there has asked his men to apply for French nationality, which will ensure greater permanency and more pay and promotion. The response among the Méharistes is stated to be negligible, but a similar offer to the Troisième Bataillon du Levant is thought to have had greater results.

9. *Tribal*

There has been a sharp outbreak of hostilities between the Agaidat and the Shammar. No official details are yet available, but the latest [illegible] raid by the Agaidat took place on the 13th January at Tchah, 5 kilom. east of the Iraqi frontier north east of Abu Kamal in retaliation for a Shammar raid earlier in the month. It is stated that it was led by Abdul Aziz el Hiffel with a force of about 2,000 horsemen, that a camp of 25 Shammar tents was completely looted together with 800 camels, and that about 30 Agaidat were killed and considerably more Shammar, including women and children. The Shammar are reported to possess machine guns. The Mohafez has received reinforcements of extra gendarm[illegible] from Aleppo.

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11. *Lebanon*

Selim Bey Taqla, who had been Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs since September 1943, and who was the only member of Riad Solh's [illegible] retain his place in the newly formed Ministry, died unexpectedly of [illegible] on the 10th January. His funeral the next day was attended by all Allied [illegible] sentatives except General Beynet (who is stated to have been ill). His [illegible] the Ministry was filled by Henry Pharaon, a rich banker related to the President and a consistent supporter of the present régime, who is, however, an inveter[illegible] political intriguer; he is indeed generally thought to have been largely responsible in bringing about the fall of the previous Government by marshalling opposition to Riad Solh amongst Deputies at the behest of the President, and his presence in the Ministry is likely to increase internal opposition to it.

The suggestion of a conference of Christian prelates under the presidency of the Maronite Patriarch was finally shelved at the instance of those who feared a recrudescence of Christian M[illegible] fric[illegible] on, but in substitution the Patriarch celebrated the anniversary of his enthronement on the 14th January by a large crowd at Bkerke. Speeches delivered were for the most part anodyne, but the usual reaffirmation of the devotion of the Lebanese Christians to France was made.

On the same day the Communist party held a mass meeting in Beyrut, at which the principal Communist leaders spoke. In addition to eulogies of Communist principles and condemnation of fascism, speakers stressed the determination of the party to support Lebanese independence and condem[illegible] Zionism. Criticisms were made of previous Lebanese Governments for not having suppressed profiteering or granted their rights to working classes, and some speakers exhorted the Lebanese to maintain their friendship with France, on the grounds that the new France differed from the old one.

12. *Press*

The Lebanese press, in the main, welcomes the change of government, but is doubtful whether, in view of the complex nature of the problems to be solved, Abdul Hamid Karami can succeed where his predecessor failed.

The Damascus press is insistent on the immediate transfer of the Hejaz Railway from French to Syrian control.

General Spears's alleged remarks in the United Kingdom on the two dangers [illegible] have been prominently reported. The pro-French Arabic press and a French language paper have commented sarcastically on these remarks.

The Lebanese Arabic press utters a warning that the Greater Syria plan is inspired by Zionists with a view to Zionist expansion.

The French-inspired papers have made capital out of an article entitled "France-Angleterre" written by Sir Edward Grigg in August last. One French paper urges close Franco-British co-operation in view of the tremendous power of certain "Leviathan" States. On the question of a treaty with France and the transfer of the armed forces, the Syrian press remains adamant, no treaty and the transfer of the armed forces to Syrian control, failing which Sy[illegible] will form her own army.

The nationalist papers express satisfaction that King Ibn Saud has authorised the signing of the Alexandria Protocol in his name.

Both the Syrian and Lebanese press announce the forthcoming arrival in the two Levant States' capitals of Turkish missions to discuss Turkish recognition of Syrian and Lebanese Independence.

The Syrian press welcomes the appointment of M. Othman Kaasen as Syrian press director, vice Dr. Shakib Jabri.

13. *Enemy Wireless Propaganda*

[illegible] the Free Arab Station said that General Spears had [illegible] the third danger threatening the Lebanon—the Maronite [illegible] always worked for French domination over the Lebanon.

On the 15th January, the Free Arab Station praised Henry Pharaon as a "brilliant Lebanese leader" who has always opposed French colonisation of the Lebanon.

E 1271/5/89

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 147, Secret. Syria and the Lebanon 24th January, 1945. (Received 22nd February.)

General

THE week has brought a sharp increase in tension between the Syrians and French, mainly over the question of the transfer of the Troupes Spé[illegible]. Following Jamil Mardam's strong speech in the Chamber on the 13th January, orderly student[illegible] other Syrian towns calling for the creation of a national army, but in some cases shouting anti-French slogans. There were few incidents, but the French took certain military precautions to defend their installations, and their delegate at Damascus on three successive nights broadcast a proclamation to the people reminding them [illegible] diplomatic represent[illegible] very stiff note to the French de[illegible] the streets of Damascus. On the [illegible] took place in Damascus. The Chamber also began a debate on the budget estimates for a national army, during which several Deputies made violent speeches demanding the transfer of the Troupes Spé[illegible] conclude any treaty with France. Jamil Mardam, as Government spokesman, [illegible] hopes of obtaining French agreement to the transfer. As a result of this, the [illegible] over what they described as the "Syrian troops under French command" at the earliest opportunity, and voted the necessary credits for the purpose; they then [illegible] on this question. The press has published several strong articles, one paper [illegible] independent State has a right to a national army and that he disapproved of private armies, as supporting the Syrian thesis over the question of the Troupes Spéciales.

In the meantime the Syrian Government have addressed three more notes to General Beynet, the first reiterating their previous demand for the Troupes Spéciales and asking for an early reply; the second asking that French repre[illegible] Allied nations which had recognised Syrian independence, and the third replying to a French protest against the passing of the recent Syrian Education Reform Bill by stating bluntly that this was a matter of purely internal concern, adding that the French proposals for a university convention were unacceptable as being an infringement of Syrian national sovereignty.

His Majesty's Minister [illegible]

General Beynet to prevent any of the defensive military measures which the French authorities might take from assuming an appearance of intimidation. Both sides have indicated their desire to avoid a clash, and the Syrian President stated that he had asked the students to return to work.

On the more general treaty issue the Syrians have on several [illegible] restated their categorical refusal to make any treaty giving France a [illegible] those States and Great Britain. It would, however, seem clear that some at least of the Syrian Ministers are coming to the conclusion that a complete refusal on their part to discuss outstanding questions with the French will get them nowhere, and are therefore considering the possibility, first put them so[illegible] ago by the Iraqi Foreign Minister and subsequently recalled to their m[illegible] the Syrian Minister, of themselves getting out a draft treaty for presentation to the Four Great Powers. Their view, however, still appears to be that satisfactory solution of the Troupes Spéciales question must precede any discussions on the treaty issue, and that in any case they could not consider making any concessions to France which they could not also make to the other three Powers.

The new Lebanese Government faced the Chamber for the first time on the [illegible] The former supporters of Emile Eddé did not attend, but sent a spokesman to explain that their abstention was caused by their objection to the Ministry having been composed on party lines. The Prime Minister, in a disappointing speech declared that the new Government was not a party Government, he expressed confidence that France would fully abide by her promise to the Lebanese and assured the Chamber that one aim was to safeguard Lebanese independence. After a short debate a vote of confidence was passed unanimously by the thirty [illegible] issued a statement to the press declaring that his Government would follow the same foreign policy as their predecessors, and that this would never vary whatever difficulties had to be faced.

The Turkish Consul General in Beirut has asked the Lebanese Government [illegible] Turkey over the terms of the formula by which Turkey is to recognise Syrian independence (see Weekly Political Summary No. 146).

Mgr. Alexandros Taban, Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch and all the East, and two of his archbishops, left Damascus by B.O.A.C. aircraft on the 18th January for Tehran on his way to take part in the enthronement of the Patriarch of all the Russias.

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Syria—Damascus

The demonstrations on the army question (see "General" above) were mild [illegible] population did not participate, and appears so far largely indifferent to the [illegible] ment in the stand they are taking. The French authorities, so far as can be judged, have done little which can be described as provocative, though at one time it was reported that the troops in charge of French military installations had orders to shoot at the slightest provocation.

Apart from the army issue, the Government's position is not strong and up to forty Deputies are now said to have been pressing the President for a change of Ministry. Present indications are that the President has been left a free hand to make the change whenever he considers the moment opportune.

Four sessions of the Chamber have been held during the week to discuss the budget estimates. The debate on the army estimates has been reported above. On the 20th January a motion to abolish the President's free disposal of his funds and to place these under the responsibility of a Minister was wholly defeated. On the 22nd January, on the estimates of the Ministry of the Interior, the Chamber abolished the credits proposed for the salaries of the French advisers, and also defeated a Government amendment that the services of certain French "technical advisers" should be retained. On the 25th January on the estimates of the Ministry of Justice, certain Deputies criticised the Government

for not having abolished the Mixed Courts. On a further debate on the estimates of the Ministry of National Economy, one Deputy criticised the O.C.P. on the remarkable grounds that it kept the price of cereals uneconomically low. The responsible Minister merely advised that the question should be brought up when the Ministry of Supply estimates were debated.

The Chamber has also decided to send a telegram to General Spears thanking him for his defence of the Syrian cause. A similar telegram will be sent to the House of Commons.

The Chamber has also voted £S 500,000 as a first contribution towards the proposed Arab Propaganda Bureau.

The Syrian Posts and Telegraphs Department have installed a private telephone system connecting the Presidency, the Ministers, and certain Government offices. It is proposed eventually to duplicate all important telephone lines throughout Syria. The existing telephone system is run by the French military authorities and the purpose of this new development is to ensure Government communications during times of political crisis.

Aleppo.

A further demonstration took place on the 20th January by students in favour of a national army, speeches uncomplimentary to the French were made and some leaflets distributed denouncing the idea of a treaty with France, reminding the people that France had gone back on her previous promises and blaming the French for having handed over the Hatay to the Turks.

The local press, with one exception, has continued to criticise the Government and the unpopular Ravitaillement Department.

The flatmen on the 22nd January began to sell 5-metre lengths of cotton material at less than 40 per cent. of last week's prices to impecu[illegible] of ravitaillement cards. It is intended that 100,000 such packets [illegible] sold in Aleppo, after which sales will continue in the surrounding dis[illegible].

Homs and Hama.

Further demonstrations took place in Homs by [illegible] crowds in favour of a national army. Most of the speeches we[illegible] but there were no dangerous developments. In Homs, however, demonstrations were of a more serious nature and the suq [illegible]mained closed for two days. A French ambulance was attacked with stones [illegible] a Syrian officer of the Troupes Spéciales was mistaken for a French officer and severely manhandled, an attempt by one section of the mob to attack the S.S.A. office and the Troupes Spéciales barracks was prevented by the wiser counsels of the leaders.

It is reported that Helmi Atassi, the Homs Deputy, a Monarchist and leader of the Government Opposition element, is proposing again to visit the Emir Abdullah in Amman in order to discuss the question of a Syrian monarchy. He [illegible] if this visit is made.

Jebel Druze.

Colonel Oliva Roget visited Soueida, where he is reported to have complained to the Mohafez of his close connexions with the Syrian Government and to have urged him not to forget his oldest and most sincere friends, the French. Colonel Oliva-Roget subsequently visited the head of the A'assali family and, in answer to a question put to him concerning the army, is said to have declared that there was no question of handing over the Troupes Spéciales to the Syrian Government as long as "a foreign army" was in occupation of the country.

Alaouite Territory.

Recent demonstrations in favour of the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales has resulted in some tension between members of this force and the local inhabitants, and there have been a few minor incidents.

The Mohafez considers that the soldiers are unnecessarily rough in dealing with civilians and are not sufficiently controlled by their French officers, but has instructed the gendarmerie [illegible] in dealing with [illegible] the minimum force necessary to keep the situation under control.

Contact between the Mohafez, who is an exceptionally level-headed and able official, and the local French *délégué* has now virtually ceased to exist. This lack of liaison may cause difficulties in case of serious trouble in the future.

No further developments regarding the union of the Alaouite Territory with [illegible] French authorities are encouraging certain of the Alaouite leaders to maintain a policy of separatism.

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Tribal.

No further incidents have been reported be[illegible] Shammar [illegible] of the [illegible] Ashi[illegible] [illegible] settle down in some inhabited locality.

[illegible] miles east of Abu Kemal between the [illegible]ces and the Kaimakam of Abu Kemal, accompanied by the [illegible] Euphrates gendarmerie and a French officer of the Contrôle Bedouin, but no official figures of casualties and lootings have yet been received. Iraqi mobile police are now reported to be patrolling the battle area between the [illegible]ries with armoured cars.

[illegible] located, though it is probable that [illegible] of the Amarat in Iraq should join with the Shammar, other semi-sedentary tribes in East Syria, such as the Bagarra and Afadla, will give help to the Agedat.

Sheikh Mohammed el Faraj of the W[illegible] has returned to his tribe, he paid an early visit to the British Consul in Aleppo [illegible] expressed his gratitude for good treatment and his intention of helping in any way possible.

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Lebanon.

Great interest is being taken in the Lebanon in the present excitement in Syria in connection with the Troupes Spéciales question and Franco-Syrian relations in general. The Syrian Foreign Minister paid an official visit to Beirut [illegible] January with the object of showing Syrian-Lebanese collaboration [illegible] representations they have recently addressed to the French. Whilst in entire sympathy with the Syrians, the Lebanese Government seem to consider that in the present [illegible] with the French and should content itself with showing passive support [illegible] number of corrupt officials are stated to have been arrested as a result of the Prime Minister's [illegible] and internal security have been held, but no important measures have yet been [illegible] papers to publish more or less open strictures on Riad Solh and other members of the [illegible] Ministry [illegible] during their term of office.

[illegible] several papers. The law is characterised as oppressing the poor and [illegible] Prime Minister. The law is not, so far as is known, yet being executed.

Abdul Hamid Karami's assassins are still at large and the gendarmerie are no nearer making any arrest.

[illegible] Hamid Karami's formation of the new Ministry, and the French appear to be encouraging the Christians to believe that the Karami Government cannot last, as the Christians of the Lebanon, particularly the Maronites, are unwilling to support it.

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E 1272 5 89

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 148. Secret. Syria and the Lebanon. 31st January, 1945.—(Received 22nd February.)

General.

THE appeals for calm made by the Syrian Government to the students were [illegible] 25th to 29th January. On the 28th January the students of Beirut, apparently inspired by emissaries from Syria, staged a demonstration which caused the town to close. Tripoli and Sidon closed on the same day. There was no disorder in Beirut, apart from a slight fracas at the French school, the principal of which endeavoured to prevent the students from joining the demonstration. On the 29th January there was more serious trouble in Soueida, where all the windows of the French Club were broken and the crowd at one time appeared menacing towards the French. Other demonstrations took place on different dates in Homs, Hama, Lattakia and Aleppo. News of these incidents was largely responsible for a recrudescence of [illegible] in Damascus [illegible] things returned to normal on the following day.

There was no lessening of tension between the French and the Syrian authorities. Count Ostrorog saw the Syrian President on the 27th January and had to listen to what appears to have been one of the strongest expositions of Syrian grievances against the French yet to be put to the French authorities. In reply, Count Ostrorog complained of Syrian insults to France. He later expressed the opinion that negotiations between France and Syria could not be started in the existing atmosphere.

Both the French and the Syrian authorities seem, however, convinced of the [illegible] which, in the present highly charged state of the atmosphere, might result in a serious clash. The efforts of His Majesty's Legation have been directed towards pressing both sides to display moderation.

Public utterances abroad have done nothing to ease the situation. Sir E. Spears's lecture before the Royal Empire Society and other public statements have infuriated the French and their supporters, but have, on the other hand, drawn a telegram of thanks from the Syrian Chamber [illegible] approving articles in the Nationalist press of both States. [illegible] ungracious reference at a press conference in Paris, to [illegible] between France and the States, have similarly provoked Nationalist opinion, which is particularly incensed at his assertion of France's determination to retain [illegible] pre-eminent position.

Rumours have begun to circulate regarding the state of health of the Lebanese President. It will be remembered that in mid December he broke his arm, whilst still suffering from the sleeplessness caused by this accident he had to undergo the strain of the Lebanese ministerial reshuffle, and directly after the formation of the new Ministry he suffered the loss of his life-long friend and collaborator, Selim Takla. For the last fortnight he has been confined to [illegible] and has been unable to attend to any business or to receive any of his Ministers, and it is being freely said that he is suffering from a form of melancholia so acute as to have affected his reason. Since the Lebanese Constitution does not provide for any delegation of the President's powers of signature in circumstances [illegible] It has now been decided that he shall spend two or three weeks recuperating in Palestine, if at the end of this period he cannot resume his functions, the Council of Ministers will be obliged to take a decision as to what is to be done.

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Syria. Damascus.

[illegible] as Egyptian Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the President of the Syrian Republic on the 21st January.

Aleppo.

The general situation deteriorated during the week, though no really serious incidents have as yet occurred.

On the 26th January at the Mosque services, there were speeches demanding the army, but the demonstrations that were expected to follow were prevented by the Syrian authorities. On the following morning however many schoolboys paraded the streets and some of the shops closed. There were shouts against the

French and a few for the British, a separate Armenian group was reported to have [illegible] threaten shopkeepers that they would suffer unless they closed, and most of the [illegible] normal work. Efforts were also made by the students to stop the tramway services. [illegible] kept out of sight and did not have to act.

Homs and Hama.

Half hearted demonstrations continued during the week in Homs and the shops were partially closed. In Hama there were no further demonstrations. Printed pamphlets were posted over the town signed "The Students of Syria." The most interesting of these contained the well known phrase of the late Emir Faisal: "Independence should be taken, not given."

Jebel Druze.

Demonstrations in favour of a national army took place in Soueida on the 29th January when school-children and older students, joined by some 200 of the general population, marched to the Serail, where the Mohafez made a speech promising to transmit the wishes of the population to the competent Syrian authorities. The demonstrators then proceeded towards the house of the French Délégué and *en route* stopped at the French Officers' Club, the windows of which were broken by stones. The demonstrators were driven back towards the Serail by French officers and French-commanded Druze troops. Shots were fired into [illegible] later some of the demonstrators broke several windows in the French Délégué's house. No serious casualties were reported.

When news of these incidents reached Damascus the President of the Syrian Republic ordered the Druze Deputies, the Inspector-General of Gendarmerie and the Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior to proceed immediately to Soueida and to use their influence to calm the population. A further manifestation took place the following day, but the demonstrators dispersed without incident.

The French Délégué placed guards on all French installations and houses occupied by French personnel.

If serious disorders occur elsewhere similar troubles may be expected in Soueida, and subsequently elsewhere in the Jebel Druze. There is undoubtedly strong feeling on the subject of the army, but the Druze are unlikely to play a lone hand unless their own interests are immediately at stake.

Homs.

Further demonstrations for the handing over of the army took place on the 27th and 28th January and assumed an openly anti-French tone. Although no incidents have yet taken place, their likelihood is increasing.

Euphrates and Jezireh.

Interest in the Communist party continues to grow, though there are no [illegible] the area are feudal and the Central Government enjoys little popularity, since it has brought no obvious advantages to the Euphrates and Jezireh areas, which is therefore ready to accept a new, and successful, political system.

Tribal.

As a result of the measures taken by the Iraqi Government and by the Syrian and French authorities no further clashes have taken place between the Agedat and the Shammar. The causes of the clash, however, will not be removed until such time as a settlement takes place of all outstanding claims between the two tribes.

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Lebanon.

The Lebanese Prime Minister has made no secret of his satisfaction that the Lebanese should have manifested sympathy with the demands of the States Governments for the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales. His Government has addressed a note to Colonel Beynet asking that the transfer of the Lebanese Troupes Spéciales should take place as soon as possible, a further note asked that [illegible] The despatch of these notes obviously followed the visit last week of the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Lebanese Government, though recognised as well intentioned and honest, [illegible] Solh and his partisans, who maintain that Abdul Hamid Karami's ministerial declaration was too weak in tone and that the Government is not capable of defending the cause of Lebanese independence. Riad Solh himself, whilst outwardly prepared to encourage and support the Government, is obviously anxious to return to power at the earliest possible moment and may be expected to spare no efforts to that end.

A communiqué published by the Lebanese Government on the 25th January announced that all Lebanese in foreign employ must within two months register their names, occupations and rates of pay with the Ministry of the Interior. The [illegible] accepting employment under foreign occupation without permission are liable [illegible] action is merely to obtain a record of such persons and to reserve the right to take action against them if the occasion arises.

The press reports that the Soviet Minister has visited the Prime Minister in order to discuss a project for sending Lebanese students to Moscow, Kiev and other centres of education in the U.S.S.R.

The Government have cancelled a decree passed by their predecessors which prohibited the transport of all food-stuffs within the Lebanon. The prohibition is maintained as regards the transport of food stuffs beyond the frontier.

The reinforcement of gendarmes sent to Tripoli after the attack on Abdul [illegible] withdrawn, with the exception of 100 men who are to be posted permanently at Tripoli as a special reserve. The Mohafez of Tripoli has been in constant touch with his opposite number in Lattakia in connexion with the Karami case and has asked that the local leaders in the Alaouite territory be approached with a view to assisting in the search for the assailants.

A free distribution of cloth is to be made to local orphanages and workmen's [illegible] ons in Tripoli by the directors of the Arida mills.

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E 1400/5/89

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 140, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 7th February, 1945.—(Received 28th February.)

General.

THE statement issued by the French Council of Ministers after the meeting of the 2nd February to the effect that France was responsible [illegible] internal security in the States caused a recurrence of large scale demonstrations throughout Syria on the 4th February. The Syrian Government continued to preach calm, and after two more days the towns returned to normal.

[illegible] His Majesty's Minister to the [illegible] Syrian Minister for [illegible] Syrians had was for the Troupes [illegible] had no instructions from the French [illegible] or so. He added that, in his view, [illegible] outstanding matters was for a representative of the Syrian Government to go to Paris in order to convince the French Government on the spot of the Syrian point of view. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, felt that it would be better for the French Government to put their proposals first, as a visit resulting in discord would only make matters worse.

Rumours about the state of health of the Lebanese President have continued to circulate. He left for Tiberias on the 14th January for a period of complete rest and reassuring bulletins have since been issued announcing that he is rapidly [illegible] ng, there are, however, some grounds for believing that these are over optimistic. No special arrangements have been made for dealing with major business during his absence.

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Syria—Damascus.

Reports current in Damascus on the 4th February that the Syrian Government had resigned proved to be unfounded. The Prime Minister had, in fact, apparently pressed for his resignation to be accepted, but the Government had decided that in the present tense state of relations with the French no change of Ministry could be envisaged.

On the 29th January the revenue side of the budget was passed, including additional taxes imposed to meet the expenditure of £S 15 million under the army vote. These included additional taxes on kerosene, benzine, entertainment, stamp duties, postal services, cigarettes, sugar, electricity, cattle and a new poll tax to be applied on men between the ages of 20 and 40. The budget was finally approved, four members only having voted against it.

The first sitting of the extraordinary session took place on the 1st February. A suggestion by the Speaker that the House should adjourn for fifteen days was not well received and the Government was invited to make a statement regarding the army. Jamil Mardam, in reply, stated that they were making every endeavour to assure that the result desired by the nation should be achieved and added that, if the Chamber would continue to give the Government its confidence for a few more days, he hoped that he would have good news. In a secret session [illegible] of the present Government should be widened, the Prime Minister is said to have replied that he and his colleagues had considered this, but were afraid lest any change should be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Referring to General de Gaulle's recent declaration on the subject of French pre-eminent position in [illegible] ter for Foreign Affairs said that the Government had already [illegible] position to any [illegible]

[illegible] Iraq Government is reported to have replied favourably to the Syrian [illegible] nt a suggestion that Syrian nationals should attend the military and police schools in Iraq.

A delegation of Syrian university students will shortly leave for Iraq and a group of law students are expected to leave for Egypt within the next few days. The technical adviser to the Ministry of Education has stated that the Futuwwa (Youth movement) will be included in the school curricula for next year.

On the 31st January the President gave a luncheon party in honour of Soltan Pasha Atrash which was attended by the Deputies for the Jebel Druze.

Aleppo.

The demonstrations and excitement in the town on the 29th January died away more quickly than was generally expected, but the statement of the decision of the French Cabinet has caused considerable resentment. It is noteworthy that [illegible] in their demonstrations, and though much sympathy for the French exists among the minorities, this has not been loudly expressed.

The French as a whole have shown sensible restraint under provocation in recent days.

Homs and Hama.

In general the situation in Homs and Hama has remained tense and demonstrations by students have continued, though there have been no actual clashes between demonstrators and French representatives.

The sheikhs of the two towns are reported to have decided to attack the French should the occasion arise, but to have declared that they would not act under Government orders, preferring to place themselves under Fawwaz Shaalan, they estimate that they could raise some 10,000 armed men with seventy [illegible] matic guns.

Jebel Druze.

There have been no further demonstrations and the area is at present quiet. Soltan Pasha Atrash has visited the President of the Republic and is thought to have urged him to sanction a national revolt, which he (Soltan Pasha) would be prepared to lead. The President rejected this proposal, but is reported to have told Soltan Pasha that, if the French had not given way on the question of the army before the 20th February, he would summon a conference of national leaders to decide what action should be taken. Meanwhile, Soltan Pasha is said

to have been instructed to return to the Jebel Druze to direct a campaign to foster disaffection amongst the officers of the French-commanded Druze squadrons. The civilian population is well armed with rifles (a large proportion of which are British), sub-machine guns and possibly a few machine guns, and the situation must be regarded as potentially dangerous, for, apart from the danger that the French may themselves provoke a clash, the possibility cannot be ruled out that Soltan Pasha and the Atrash clan may disregard the directions of the Government and decide to raise a revolt themselves.

Alaouite Territory.

On the 5th February fighting broke out in the Jobit Burghal area, home of Sulaiman Murshid whose followers are fighting the men of Hassan Abbud and other Alaouite chiefs of the Mkebe area. It is reported that this state of affairs has followed two visits to Imfatih, chief wife of Sulaiman Murshid, by Lieutenant Berge of the French Political Office on the instructions of Captain Boussiquet. The facts are not yet clear, but by pure chance a British major [illegible] behind Lieutenant Berge was stopped at a road block of stones by about ten armed Alaouites. On finding he was British the men allowed him to pass. In view of the recent French advances to Alaouite chiefs and the differences of opinion between the Délégué Adjoint, Lieutenant Colonel Gausot, and his Political Officer, Captain Boussiquet, which have resulted in the resignation of the former, trouble in the area was expected.

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Lebanon.

Beirut rapidly returned to normal after demonstrations of the 28th January, and a further demonstration announced for the [illegible]

On the 3[illegible] [illegible]

Mr. Churchill [illegible] that every State had the right to a national army and that he did not approve of "private armies" (translated as "Troupes Spéciales"), and applied them to the present situation in the Levant States. After the Prime Minister had [illegible] that the Government had set aside £Leb.5 million for the expenses of an army and were continuing to press the French for the transfer of the [illegible] support for the Government's policy in regard to the settlement of the Troupes Spéciales and all other questions outstanding with the French authorities.

The bye-election in Mount Lebanon to fill the vacancy in the Chamber caused by the death of Selim Taqla will take place early next month, and various parties are already nominating candidates. First in the field were the Phalangists, who [illegible] general secretary, but Riad Solh is understood to be oppo[illegible] grounds that their present hostility to the Alexandria Protocol shows that they are not good Lebanese Nationalists, and it is possible that the [illegible] this unimportant election may provide a forum for general and embittered expositions of the rival political theories in the Lebanon.

Communist leaders in the Bekaa are reported to be maintaining close contact with the French through the Sûreté aux Armées.

Mazhar Onari has recently been in contact with the Foreign Minister and Colonel Noureddine Rifai in Beirut and it is probable that, having quarrelled with the Mokaddem family, he will shortly surrender to the authorities together with other members of his gang and will furnish the gendarmerie with information which may ultimately lead to the arrest of the assailants of Abdul Hamid Kerami.

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E 1401/5/89 [1[illegible]

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 150, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 14th February, 1945.—(Received 28th February.)

[illegible] the return of the President of the Syrian Republic from his visit to Jedda and Cairo, and for the past week there has been [illegible] expectant lull in both Syria and the Lebanon. It is freely hinted that as a [illegible] of the President's discussions with King Abdul Aziz and with Arab statesmen in Cairo the Syrian Government will shortly be able to release good news. In addition, while no official statement has been made concerning the resumption of negotiations with the French, rumours have leaked out, and in consequence the students have been persuaded to refrain from renewing their demonstrations before the 20th February; on the surface therefore all appears to be quiet.

The Lebanese President is still in Tiberias; a bulletin issued on the 10th February, stated that his health was improving rapidly, and it is known that he has signed a number of decrees on routine matters. On the other hand, no one outside his own family has seen him since his departure, and the Lebanese Prime Minister has stated in confidence that according to his information the President cannot be expected to recover for two months at least. The Government seem, however, content to let the matter drift for the moment.

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments have issued communiqués in similar terms replying to the reported decision of the French Council of Ministers regarding internal security of the Levant States; they state that the Lebanese and Syrian Governments are alone responsible for internal security in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol signed in July 1944, and add that no other authority has the right to interfere in this matter.

[illegible] the period the 1st–7th February, 1945, amount to 326 tons, [illegible] which brings the total purchases for the 1944–45 crop [illegible]

It is reported from Aleppo that the local crop prospects are good, although unfavourable conditions may still seriously affect the ultimate crop.

Syria. Damascus.

[illegible] Inglin, Chef de Bureau and Captain Daghistani, A.D.C., left Damascus on the [illegible] news of his departure was communicated to the press the same day in an official [illegible]

[illegible] searching questions by the De[illegible] Minister made out a strong case that the [illegible] He [illegible] to transfer their allegiance; this last alternative was fraught with [illegible] and it was of vital importance that no disturbance should take place. He reminded the Chamber that the Allies had given assurances that the rights of Syria would be respected. He added that the Government were confident that [illegible] States. The Chamber then adjourned until the 20th February.

Jamil Mardam Bey, Minister for Foreign Affairs, left Damascus for Cairo on the 12th February to represent Syria at the Cairo conference of the League of Arab States.

Dr. Najib Bey Armanazi and his staff left for London on the 5th February. It is believed that he will be accredited to Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Lebanese Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and President of the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs visited Damascus on the 6th February when they are reported to have discussed with their Syrian opposite numbers the question of the army, the forthcoming meeting of the Arab League and economic relations between Syria and the Lebanon.

The town has remained quiet during the week one reason given by the M[illegible] Syrian unity were describing their protests and demonstrations as being made against the new taxes for the army rather than against the retention of the army the French

The Moudarres Filature continues to sell cotton material to the poor at much cheaper market rates. Dati Cation has extended even to Damascus, always under the President's patronage

Homs and Hama

Homs and Hama remained closed during the first part of the week, but partly [illegible] on the 9th February, following a report that negotiations were going on [illegible] the Hedjas and in Cairo on the subject of the Syrian army The town has remained out of bounds to French troops during most of the week, and as a result there have been no incidents

Jebel Druse

On his return to Soueida, Soltan Pasha is reported to have advised the more important notables to be patient at least for the time being, and a demonstration planned for the 10th February did not take pl[illegible]

The French Délégué has assured the poli[illegible] of drafting Senegalese troops into the area

Alaouite Territory

The fighting in the Jebel Burghal area (see Section 7 of Weekly Political Summary, No. 149) did not spread to other areas of the Jebel Alaouite. On the 5th February Colonel Bonnot, the new French Délégué Adjoint for Latt[illegible] called on the Mohafez and suggested sending French forces into the mountain[illegible] prevent further bloodshed. The Mohafez refused, explaining that he had 300 gendarmes advancing on the rebels and was confident of taking Jebel and crushing the revolt. Nevertheless on the 10th February three French companies in lorries with five armoured cars were sent up, arriving in Jebel on the same evening. In the early hours of the 11th February Commandant Rimac, the officer commanding the French force, sent word to Commandant Muhammad Ali of the Gendarmerie to the effect that if the Gendarmerie would cease fire the French would see that the rebels also did so. The commandant of the Gendarmerie accepted, the fighting stopped, the Gendarmerie withdrew and the French occupied Jebel and the positions previously held by the Gendarmer[illegible]

The Mohafez of Lattakia is convinced that the followers of [illegible] were egged on and provided with arms by t[illegible] Government, and there have been a number of incidents reported which support this theory. While there is little doubt that the intervention of the French [illegible] that as a result of their intervention the Syrian nationals in open revolt against Government forces received protection from French troops.

His Majesty's Minister and General Holmes discussed the incident with General Beynet and all agreed that a British French and Syrian commission of enquiry should be set up to investigate the causes leading up to the incident and the steps to be taken to prevent any repetition. His Majesty's Consul in Damascus pressed the President of the Council of Ministers to agree [illegible] tion, but Fares Bey maintained that the point of interest to the Syrian [illegible] ment was not the incident itself but the intervention of the French tro[illegible] he held was contrary to the Sûreté Protocol of the 22nd July 1944. He handed [illegible] the previous day to General [illegible] objecting to the interference of Captain Boussiquet, the French Political [illegible] Lattakia and members of his staff and asking for his removal

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The Lebanese delegation to attend the Cairo Conference of Arab Foreign [illegible] Foreign Affairs, two Moslem Deputies, Saib Salam and Abdullah Yafi, and two [illegible] magistrates. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, before leaving, stated

that his intention was to propose to the Congress the following three suggestions for the statutes of the future Arab League —

(a) that any signatory shall have the right to withdraw from the League at any time

(b) that the decisions of the League shall not become operative unless they have been unanimously approved by all the members of the [illegible]

(c) that each independent nation forming part of the League shall [illegible] to conclude treaties with any other State provided that such treaties are not unfriendly towards the other members of the League

[illegible] tion made to the London press by Camille Chamoun caused [illegible] Extreme Christian circles seized on one phrase which implied that signatories of the Alexandria Protocol could not conclude [illegible] with other Powers without the consent of the other signatories, and made [illegible] hostile comment. The Government under the influence of the M[illegible] Affairs, who has recently been displaying over anxiousness to placate these elements, on the 7th February issued a communiqué denying that this version of Chamoun's declaration was correct. For this precipitate action the Government has been bitterly criticised by Nationalist circles, amongst which Chamoun's prestige has risen high. An abusive article in the French controlled newspaper *L. Orient*, which has earned that paper its suspension, has also aroused sympathy for Chamoun.

It is reported from Bekaa that an attempt is being made to form a Communist party in Hermel and that the move is being inspired by the French Political Officer at Baalbek to counter the influence of the Najjade and Parti Populaire Syrien parties

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Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 151, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 21st February, 1945. (Received 9th March.)

1 *General*

THE Syrian President, whose return from Cairo had been eagerly awaited arrived at Mezze airport on the 18th February with Saadullah Bey Jabri in an aircraft provided by the United States Government and was received by members of the Government and Diplomatic Corps at [illegible] made a speech in which he referred to his discus[illegible] Farouk and with leading Arab states [illegible] representatives of the Great Powers. He said that he had received a [illegible] upport for Syrian aims, but that the way might be long, and he called [illegible] obedience from his people. His speech was widely reported in Syria and the Lebanon, and while it has done little to allay apprehensions about the future [illegible] events it has on the whole had the effect of discouraging any suggestion of precipitate action by the Syrians. The President is expected to visit Bagdad in the near future

A sitting of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies was held on the 22nd February at which the Government were questioned concerning the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales. The Prime Minister answering for the Government asked that the Deputies should remain patient and follow the advice of the President to take [illegible] to the effect [illegible] of the Levant States did not [illegible] In the [illegible] articles expressed varying degrees of criticism, one paper [illegible] the declaration as proving that Great Britain did not envisage any sort of control over the States, but other papers reproached the British Government for lack of frankness and suggested that Great Britain had no right to

use the States as a bargaining counter in her relations with France or to make secret agreements at their expense. The Communist newspaper, *Sout Ech-Shaab*, declared roundly that Great Britain was failing to support the States' independence, and that their hope, therefore, could only be placed in the U.S.S.R. Fears have been widely expressed in conversation that British policy was following the same lines as in 1919-20, and that Great Britain intended to let down the Levant States by withdrawing her support from them in their struggle to achieve liberation from French control, in the interests of her relations with France. Although the multiplicity of statements abroad on the Levant States during the past few weeks has confused public opinion to such an extent that this new [illegible] is not regarded too tragically, there is no doubt that confidence in Great Britain [illegible] has, for the moment at least, been shaken and the prestige of pro-French elements enhanced.

The Lebanese President is still in Palestine, and reassuring statements as to his improvement are still being made. It is understood that he has been able not only to sign but to discuss certain decrees taken down to him by his Ministers for his consideration, no indication has, however, yet been made as to the date on which he may be expected to resume his functions.

2. *Economic*

Total purchases during the period 8th-15th February, 1945, amounted to 285 tons, a daily average of 30 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1944-45 crop up to 174,862 tons.

On the 18th F[illegible] compared with [illegible] ure. Th[illegible] [illegible] eral feeling.

3. *Syria—Damascus*

There have been no student demonstrations or strikes and the situation returned more or less to normal in the commercial quarters and in the Suqs [illegible] supporters and their opponents, and the subsequent unsolicited [illegible] the Troupes Spéciales (see section 7 of this report [illegible] tion in Syrian Government circles, and the P[illegible] disbanded by the British authorities from [illegible] General Beynet. These incidents, serious in themselves, may well have an unfavourable effect on any negotiations between the French and Syrian authorities. Laudable restraint, however, was observed by the Syrian authorities as far as [illegible] for the intervention of the Government, but that the situation was now under control.

Dr. Nazim Kudsi, Syrian Minister to Washington, and Mr. Adnan Atassi, Syrian Minister to Paris, left Damascus on the 12th February for Egypt to take up their posts.

The conclusion of an Iraqi-Syrian trade agreement is reported in the press, as is also the Iraqi Government's request for six additional Syrian doct[illegible]

The Takaddum (Youth Movement) draft law has been approved by the Council of Ministers. Invitations to the Students' Congress, the date of which has been fixed [illegible] after his visit to Moscow for the enthronement of the Patriarch of all the Russias.

4. *Aleppo*

Aleppo has been quiet during the week though the journey [illegible] Pre[illegible] much interest and speculation. Incidents in the Alaouite territory (paragraph 7 of this report) [illegible]

The visit of a certain Najet Kassab from Damascus was made [illegible] for Constituent Assembly, in which it was reported that the indectiveness of the Government's ravitaillement administration came in for special criticism.

5. *Homs and Hama*

No further demonstrations have taken place during the week except for a short-lived strike of the Tajirz in Hama on the 13th February.

Villagers of the Keilani and Azem villages west of the Orontes [illegible] demanding protection or failing that arms. A raid by Alaouites has been reported from the Ain el Kroum area in which two villagers are said to have been killed.

6. *Jebel Druze*

Colonel Olivo Roget arrived at Soueida on the 15th February and [illegible] following day reviewed the Druze squadrons. He subsequently addre[illegible] officers and n.c.o.s and is reported to have thanked them for their loyalty to France during the recent disorders, and to have stated that the transfer of the [illegible] the control of the Syrian authorities was under discussion, but that an [illegible] tion was not to be expected; he asked them in the meantime to maintain [illegible] de of calm. He concluded by announcing that increases in p[illegible] consideration in Paris.

Colonel Olivo Roget asked Captain Hamad el Atrash, cousin of the Emir Atrash, about the morale of the Druze squadrons and the extent to which their loyalty to France could be relied upon in the event of insurrection breaking [illegible] the leadership of Sultan Pasha. Captain Ha[illegible] Colonel Olivo Roget that the morale of the squadrons was low [illegible] could not be relied upon to support the French cause in any dispute in which the Druzes were involved.

7. *Alaouite*

[illegible] pment in the situation in the Jebel Berghal area see Weekly Political Summary No. 150, section 7) though all reports state that fraternisation is taking place between members of the Troupes Spéciales and Murshid partisans and that the latter, inflated by French support, are actively [illegible] and another company arrived on the 18th February. The bulk [illegible] gendarmerie forces are at Meien east of Qerdeha, where they were withdrawn after the intervention of the Troupes Spéciales.

On the 21st February His Majesty's Minister and the Army Commander, in the course of a long conversation with the President of the Republic, p[illegible] the recent [illegible] gree in principle to a Tripartite Commission to enquire into the [illegible] Alaouite Territory (see paragraph 8, section 7, *Weekly Political Summary* No. 150). [illegible], however, maintained the attitude that [illegible] did not want any enquiry into the cause and origins of the trouble (which might have revealed that Suleiman Murshid had been detained for seven months although a deputy, without any [illegible] enquiry into his depredations). The President was urged to arrange imm[illegible] lication of all important claim[illegible] against Murshid and to discuss the Jebel situ[illegible] eral Beynet [illegible] who called upon the [illegible] troops would be withdrawn at once and the gendarmerie shortly afterwards. The General may have agreed to this action in view of the possibility that the [illegible] t facts concerning French encouragement of a separatist movement.

8. *Euphrates and Jezireh*

During the past three weeks there have been demonstrations on five occasions in support of Syrian independence in Deir-ez-Zor, but these came to an end after the Mohafez on the 3rd February had published notices calling on the people [illegible]

9. *Tribal*

A joint report by the Kaimakam of Abu Kamal and the Commandant of the Euphrates Gendarmerie has now been received giving details of the Agedat/Shammar clash referred to in a previous *Weekly Political Summary*. It appears that the Shammar Khrossa under Sheikh Jemmah el Ghait were camping at a place called Mghailat, some 20 kms. from the Syrian border inside Iraqi territory. On the morning of the 12th January they were attacked by [illegible] 1,700 Agedat footmen and horsemen. The Shammer Khrossa lost [illegible] amongst which was el Sharabi, son of Sheikh Jemmah el Ghait, and [illegible] about 70 were wounded, about 50 tents looted and 125 camels taken. The [illegible] of 69 dead Agedat have been found in the neighbourhood. The bodies of

the Agaidat were found naked with their faces turned towards the ground, many of them having received several bullets or had their heads cut off by a sword. Only one Agaidat was wounded.

The report adds that as a result of the killing of a gendarmerie corporal by [illegible] Shammar during their raid against the Agaidat on the 7th January, the Iraqi [illegible] authorities had sent two armoured cars to investigate the matter at the [illegible] encampment. It so happened that the arrival of these two armoured cars coincided with that of the Agaidat raiders. One of these cars withdrew but the other, which had broken down, took part [illegible] report concludes by saying that the Shammar are believed to [illegible] return raid against the Agaidat and in the circumstances it is in the interests of the two Governments to expedite an early settlement.

The Mohafez is reluctant to recognise that he has French forces to thank for putting an end to the fighting and for keeping the tribes apart, and has informed the Political Officer that once he is sure that the Iraqi authorities are maintaining their armoured car patrols, he will ask the French to withdraw their forces. [illegible] has applied to Damascus for more effective weapons for his gendarmerie [illegible] adds that if neither the Allies nor the Syrian Government will provide requisite arms, he himself will buy locally ten machine guns.

18. *Lebanon*

[illegible] the Lebanese [illegible] General Beynet gave a large tea party in his honour at [illegible] Diplomatic Corps, and many local notables were present. [illegible] one from this function was ex-President Naccache, who although counted amongst the French supporters in the Lebanon, has never forgiven General Catroux for having unceremoniously deposed him from the Presidency in 1943.

The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Henry Pharaon, [illegible] before his departure to represent the Lebanon at the Cairo Conference [illegible] Foreign Ministers, to have had interviews with the Maronite [illegible] the head of the Phalange party, during which he assured them that his policy was to ensure that the Lebanon should gradually drop out of the Arab orbit. Although he has taken two Moslems, as well as two Christians, with him, it [illegible] those do not form part of the Lebanese De[illegible] in fact in process of advoc[illegible] [illegible] It is, in fact, clear that Abdul Hamid Karami, although liked and respected, has not sufficient force of character to control his Foreign Minister and the chances of his Ministry being swept away by a wave of Nationalism are therefore increasing.

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E 1924/5/89] (12)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, No. 1[illegible] 28th February, 1945. (Received in Foreign Office, 16th March.)

1. *General*

[illegible] Deputies in the presence of the Diplomatic Corps. He first defined Syrian foreign [illegible] and assured the House that any agreement between France and Syria would be such as could be concluded with any of the Great Powers, and that no State would be [illegible] would welcome the formation of Greater Syria, provided that it was a republic with Damascus as its capital and that there was no Zionist infiltration. Lebanese independence within its present frontiers would, however, be guaranteed in accordance with the Alexandria Protocol. The President then thanked Great Britain, United States and U.S.S.R. for the recognition they had accorded to the

independence of his country. France, he continued, had merited gratitude in December 1943, and he hoped that the goodwill she had shown during recent negotiations justified the expectation that she would again [illegible] the Syrian people. The President finally stated that [illegible] submit a proposal to the House declaring a state of war between Syria [illegible] Germany and Japan. After a short debate the House passed a proposal for a declaration [illegible]

The Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on the 27th February unanimously passed a declaration of war on Germany and Japan.

General Beynet went to see the Syrian President on the 21st and again on the 25th February. Both had previously been urged by His Majesty's Minister not to miss the favourable opportunity created by the Cairo talks and by the advice tendered by the Allied Governments. In the course of these talks General Beynet informed the President that he would go to Paris to secure French proposals on all outstanding questions and that in the meantime an effort would be made to elaborate locally reasonable proposals on the *convention sur[illegible]*

The Lebanese Prime Minister visited his President [illegible] 25th February and on his return reported that the President's state of health had markedly improved; he had been able to discuss much business without fatigue and might be expected to have recovered sufficiently to return to Beirut before the end of March. This report, added to a further official communiqué, has largely allayed the doubts expressed as to the President's powers of recovery, and discussions as to the choice of a successor have consequently lapsed.

The Lebanese Prime Minister has been informed of the results of the talks [illegible] been urged, like the Syrians, to examine carefully any proposals for an eventual settlement which may be put to his Government by the French. He has agreed to do so, although expressing profound scepticism of the possibility that the [illegible] proposals would be reasonable or acceptable.

2. *Economic*

Total purchases for the period the 16th-22nd February, 1945, amount to 273 tons, a daily average of 39 tons, which brings the total purchases for the 1944-45 crop up to 175,135 tons.

3. *Syria—Damascus*

[illegible] a speech on the 27[illegible] doubt whether a [illegible] others enquired whether the [illegible] was had been made. The Syrian Prime Minister was also asked whether Syria would take part in the San Francisco Conference, and he explained that only signatories of the United Nations declaration would be invited to attend. The Syrian Minister in Washington was being instructed to take the necessary steps for Syria to sign the declaration. One Deputy asked why Syria should declare war since she had been at war since 1918!

The murder of the Egyptian Prime Minister was universally deplored in [illegible] and was the subject of a motion in the Syrian Parliament. Wide publicity has been given to the declaration made by him in the Egyptian Parliament that Egypt supported Syria and the Lebanon and would stand by them [illegible] to secure an agreement with France.

* * * * * *

5. *Homs and Hama*

Apart from a half-hearted strike of the schools and a demonstration by [illegible] Government are making their dispositions for a renewal of the disturbances. Members of the minority communities in the towns are reported to have been perturbed by the speech made in the Syrian Chamber of Deputies by the Hama

[illegible] in which [illegible] proposed legislation and penalties, [illegible] death, for the crime of high tr[illegible], it is feared that if any such [illegible] Moslem courts may [illegible] of non Mos[illegible]

Colonel Olivo Roget visited Homs on the 26th February and in a speech to the French and Syrian officers of the garrison announced that any officer leaving or attempting to leave his post would be court-martialled; those deserting or refusing to obey an order would be shot. He then announced rises in pay for all [illegible]

The Délégué of Homs tried to persuade the Syrian Government to ban the local newspaper "El Taufiq." The offensive article purported to describe semi-starvation in France, alleging that the French in certain areas were driven to eat cats. The editor of the newspaper later went to Damascus to see the Prime Minister and nullify the complaint.

6. *Jebel Druze*

Five men were killed and twelve wounded—four seriously—in a shooting affray at Loubbane in the Leja on the 18th February, but the trouble was prevented from spreading by the arrival of gendarmes. The incident arose out of a purely personal quarrel, and the Kaimakam of Chabba has persuaded the disputants to agree to a twenty day truce.

7. *Alaouite Territory*

The situation is still uneasy in the Alaouite district, though the tension is less. There has been some fighting in the Ain al Kroum area between Marshal followers and villagers of Mub[illegible] by the Marshal partisans fighting ceased by the 22nd February. All the [illegible] darmes taken prisoners by the rebels have been handed over to the French and released. A half squadron of French cavalry has arrived at Ain al Kroum via Musyaf with one mounta[illegible]

Following the talks in Damascus between General Beynet and the Syrian President—see paragraph 2, section 7, of Weekly Political Summary No. 151—Colonel Bonnot informed the Mohafez of Latakia that he had received orders to withdraw the French troops, it was agreed that the gendarmerie should reoccupy the police posts at Fakhourn and Maqras with ten men at each, but there [illegible] confirmation that this action h[illegible] been withdrawn.

8. *Euphrates and Jezireh*

There is a growing feeling of unrest both in the Euphrates and Jezireh areas and an invitation by the Mohafez, Wajih Azhari, to all political and religious leaders to remain calm in these difficult times had little effect, since he stressed Syrian independence too much for the liking of his hearers. There is little support in the Jezireh for Syrian independence and little respect for Government authority, and there are therefore opportunities for the French to fish in troubled w[illegible] supporting the Arab tribes in their efforts to assert themselves against [illegible] Government, assuring the Kurds of their protection from the Arabs, [illegible] playing up the line that they are the sole protection of the Christians against the oppression of an independent Moslem [illegible]

9. *Tribal*

Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis, Officer Commanding British Military Headquarters at Deir ez Zor, has discussed the settlement of the Agaidat Shammar dispute with military and civil authorities both at Mosul and Baghdad. At present the Délégué Adjoint is maintaining most of his forces in the battle area, and he has agreed, at a meeting attended by the French Officier Politique, Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis and the British Political Officer, to arrange for a reconnaissance aircraft to patrol the area in order to note any movement. Colonel Lewis reports that patrols are being maintained on the Iraq side of the frontier and that regular liaison between military authorities in Iraq and Syria has been arranged.

In a few weeks' time the Shammar would normally cross back into Syria. When that time comes the D[illegible] [illegible] that to the Shammar grazing zone in Syria.

[illegible] the Mohafez of Euphrates that a first [illegible] discuss the settlement of the

Agaidat-Shammar dispute, but the Mohafez replied that he considered this was too soon, as feeling was still running too high.

It is reliably reported from the Jezireh that Sheikh Meizer Ibn Aodal Muhsin of the Shammar Zor visited Iraq recently in order to persuade the Feddagha to return to Syria. News from the Jezireh is not encouraging and it is reported that the Shammar Zor are intriguing to attack the Ba[illegible]

Errata

Reference Weekly Summary No. 151 for week ending the 21st February, paragraph 9, third sub paragraph, first sentence:

Please delete the words from "is reluctant" to "the tribes apart, and [illegible]

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11. *Lebanon*

The campaign for the bye-election to fill the Greek Catholic vacancy in Mount Lebanon is being waged vigorously between the two candidates, [illegible] whom is the brother of the late Selim Tacla and the other the secretary [illegible] Whilst the Government have declared their neutrality Tacla has [illegible] Government [illegible] Opposition group [illegible] independence, a[illegible] nage a [illegible] party, have been affected by the propaganda put out amongst the Christians against the A[illegible]

The Lebanese Government has been concerned at reports that the French military authorities have disbanded the Lebanese Brigade of *Troupes* [illegible] have attached its various formations to French units. The French have [illegible] any change has taken place, but other reports suggest that the French [illegible] tion designed to nullify the protocol signed in June 1944 [illegible] these troops was placed at the disposal of the Lebanese [illegible] the maintenance of order in support of the gendar[illegible] tain where the truth lies in the [illegible] Générale on the subject.

It is reported from the Bekaa that Christian [illegible] over the result of the Arab talks in Cairo, which they believe to be [illegible] Moslem interests, and there is a recrudescence of Sunni Shia antagonism in the villages and the area to the east of the Rayak Hermel road.

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E 1914/3/89] **(13.**

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 153, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 9th March, 1945. (Received 21st March.)

General

GENERAL BAYNET has had a second interview with the President of the Syrian Republic with a view to finding a basis of Franco-Syrian agreement. The President agreed to discuss a revised University Convention which [illegible] Beynet is having prepared locally and stated that the Government [illegible] to conclude establishment and consular conventions with France in accordance with international usage. In reply to a question of General Beynet as to whether preference would be given to Frenchmen in the choice of technical advisers, the President said that his Government must be free to choose these where they liked. With regard to the *Troupes Spéciales*, the President said they were ready to take them as a whole, but not by stages, that they must be under Syrian command but would be placed at the disposal of the Ninth Army, and that the Syrian Government did not consider a military mission necessary as they would be taking over the troops as they were with French officers.

His Majesty's Minister and the Army Commander subsequently saw General Beynet, who confirmed that he was leaving for Paris during the next week to report on his conversations with the Syrians and to receive instructions, he indicated that he was ready to go to London as well if necessary. He also confirmed that discussions about a University Convention would be resumed. He evidently regarded the attitude of the Syrian Government as stiffer than that

of the President, but he considered that there were "elements" for a basis of agreement. He complained of the Syrian Government's decision to dismiss a number of French advisers (see below) which would inevitably make a bad impression in Paris.

[illegible] has been considerable unfavourable reaction in Damascus and other principal towns to the speech which the President of the Republic delivered before the Chamber on the 26th February (see Weekly Political Summ[illegible] the lines that the President should not have recommen[illegible] before Syria had regained control of its army and [illegible] Syria as a republic should be considered merely as an expression of his own personal opinion, since this was a matter to be decided by the people and not by [illegible]

It has been learnt that the Lebanese Foreign Minister, while in Cairo, arranged with the Egyptian Government for their Minister in Washington to put forward an application for the Lebanon to adhere to the United Nations Pact. Both Governments have strongly represented to His Majesty's Minister the desirability of the two States being invited to the San Francisco Conference, and have enquired the reason for their present exclusion. The press has be[illegible] publishing vehement articles on the subject, and the impression appears to be widespread that the Allies, in not extending invitations, have yielded to French pressure.

Mr. Churchill's speech in the House of Commons has been well received in Lebanese Nationalist circles, which take the view that the future position of the Lebanon has now been defined beyond all doubt. Pro-French elements are stated to be correspondingly depressed as they feel that after this speech it can no longer be maintained that Great Britain is prepared to give France a completely free hand in the Lebanon. On the other hand, there has been some attempt to exploit publication of the British White Paper in the contrary sense.

In Syria, however, the reaction seems to have been less favourable, the [illegible] aspirations, and at a demonstration in Homs (see paragraph 5 below) shouts against Mr. Churchill and the British Government, which are very rare these days, were heard.

Economic

Total purchases for the period 23rd–28th February total 28, daily average of 4 tons, which brings the total purchases for the 1944–45 crop up to 175,171 tons.

Syria Damascus

The criticism of the President and of the Government, referred to in paragraph 3 of section 1 above, is a symptom of the general dissatisfaction felt at the apparent lack of progress made in negotiations with the Fre[illegible] A very large proportion of Syrians, particularly the Moslems, are determ[illegible] to ensure the end of the French privileged position, and are prepared to [illegible] wholeheartedly any régime and any Government which vigorously pursues this aim, but the moment it appears that no progress is being made they begin to express dissatisfaction with the shortcomings of the [illegible] tion. Accusations are being made that the President of the Republ[illegible] [illegible] showing more concern for their own interests and for [illegible] National *Bloc* than they are for the independence of [illegible] over of the *Troupes Speciales*.

[illegible] appointments were announced of Sabri el Assali and Ahmed Sharabati as Ministers of the Interior and Education respectively. Both the new Ministers are Damascenes and strong supporters of the President [illegible] of Public Works, have been mentioned.

Decrees have been signed terminating the services of the following French Counsellors:—

M. Grellet, Adviser to the Ministry [illegible]
M. Martin, Adviser to the Ministry of Supply.
M. Delbes, Adviser to the Ministry of National Economy.
M. Wendling, Adviser to the Ministry of [illegible]
M. Mauche, Legal Adviser.
M. Colet, Adviser to the Ministry of [illegible]

A further decree term[illegible] mary advisers to the municipalities of Dam[illegible] Aleppo and Deir ez Zor has also been published.

A protocol was signed on the 1st March, between the Syrian Government [illegible] Government of the Syrian section of the Hejaz Railway, which has been under the management of the D.H.P. since 1924. This section consists of the line to Deraa and the extensions to the Jebel Druze, the Palestinian frontier and the Transjordanian frontier, and it will now be operated by a board composed of the directors of Finance, National Economy, Public Works, Wakfs and two non-official experts under the Minister of Public Works. The railway is at present operated at a deficit of some £S.100,000 a month and, although the Director-General has given assurances that for the time being existing arrangements with the Palestine railways will be maintained, it is possible that in view of the unsound financial state of the railway the Syrians will seek a revision of the existing tariff rates.

The Director-General and Director of the Damascus Police have [illegible] their resignations following the appointment of Sabri el Assali as Minister of the Interior. These officers are said to have resented the interference of the President of the Republic in the administration of their departments, and to have believed that this interference would be increased rather than diminished by the new appointment.

The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs was asked while in Cairo to contact the Swiss and Swedish representatives there with the object of arranging for one [illegible] Governments to accept the protection of Syrian interests in Germany [illegible]

M. [illegible] presented his letters of credence to the Syrian President on the 22nd February as Persian Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

Aleppo

A leading editor has been assaulted in the streets of Aleppo; a similar incident occurred last month. In each case the editors had previously criticised the administrative failings of the Government.

During the week there have been demonstrations and partial market strikes at several centres, notably Idlib, Azaz and Jerablous, to protest against the effort made by the O.C.P. to collect taxes on black market grain when it was presented for milling.

The textile industry is still in an uncertain position. The local spinning [illegible] some yarn, though the effectiveness of the control [illegible] still doubted.

Hom[illegible] and H[illegible]

A [illegible] Bedouin informant reports that a group of five French officers with [illegible] and about fifty Meharistes are at present touring the desert visiting the tribal sheikhs. They have already visited sections of the Ruwalla, the Sbaa, the Beni Khaled, the Hadidiyeen and various tribal leaders and are reported to be proceeding eastwards towards Deir ez Zor and the Jezireh. The Bedouin are said to be somewhat sceptical of a story disseminated by this group that during the last disturbances in Damascus the Russian consul called on Shukri Kuwatli and threatened that if the mob's insults to the French nation were not stopped Russian parachutists would be dropped in Damascus.

The Syrian President's speech before the Chamber on the 26th February was badly received in this area, being considered too moderate, and anti-Government feeling noticeably increased. Three Homs lawyers telegraphed to the President, the Prime Minister and the Arab consuls accusing the President of being a "traitor" for [illegible] protesting against Mr. Eden's declaration. The Government sent instructions for the arrest of these lawyers, but their colleagues stood firm with them and in the face of incipient disorder the Government yielded and released them.

Jebel Druze

The commandant of gendarmerie at Soueida has informed the political officer there that there is serious disaffection amongst the personnel of the Druze squadron stationed at Salkhad. He states that when demonstrations took place in Soueida at the end of January the Chef de Poste was asked by many members of his squadron for permission to overpower the French officer and occupy the citadel for the Syrian Government. He added that, while he discountenanced this

[illegible] French installations in Soueida a month ago are still being maintained.

Alaouite Territory

There has been no further fighting in the Alaouite Territory, but French troops are still in occupation of the area of the recent disturbances, in which the Government's writ does not now run, although two of the vacated gendarmerie [illegible] Murshid's partisans are stated to be all heartily tired of the present situation the tribesmen in particular are anxious to return to their crops. The situation has been further discussed between the Syrian President and General Beynet but no progress appears to have been made.

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Tribes

[illegible] to Shammar territory in view of the blood feud [illegible] since Sheikh Sfaq was killed in 1941. The Mohafez of Deir ez Zor has made a counter suggestion that the meeting should take place in Ramadi, but the mutesarif is said to hold the view that this would involve too many complications for him since he would have to obtain special authority to proceed out of his liwa. All the conditions for a resumption of hostilities between the two tribes are present and the precautions taken by the authorities on both sides of the frontier must be continued until such time as a meeting can be arranged and agreement reached.

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Lebanon

The Lebanese declaration of war has been received without popular excite[illegible] questions of [illegible] There has been much press comment on these points, pro-French papers suggest[illegible] being conveniently forgotten), whilst pro-Government papers [illegible] Lebanon is already giving all the assistance in her power to the A[illegible] not be excluded from any conference in which her future might be [illegible]

The bye-elections in Mount Lebanon passed off without [illegible] 4th March [illegible] The latter's defeat, despi[illegible] statement, made in a speech in Emile Eddé's place of origin, that he followed Eddé's policy. Riad Solh displayed great activity in organising Tueni's campaign, and he and his partisans are elated by the result, which they consider shows that even this traditionally pro-French district of the Lebanon is now [illegible] despite certain complaints by the Phalange that the Government were entirely [illegible]

The Government's position in the Chamber appears to be weakening. Riad [illegible] weakness on certain matters affecting the independence of the Lebanon, and cannot be entrusted with the representation of Lebanese interests if vital issues are at stake. It seems probable that he is now marshalling his followers with a view to a general assault on the Government in the Chamber when a suitable occasion arises. He is stated, however, to wish to await the return of the President, no firm date for which has yet been fixed, before taking action.

The French Délégation Générale have replied to the Government's enq[illegible] brigade has been broken up, for reasons which they describe as purely military but state that it has been arranged that each of the three battalions shall be held at the disposal of the Government for four months at a time in each year. They also admit that the Lebanese flag has been removed from the barracks formerly occupied by the Lebanese Brigade Commander, whose appointment has

been terminated with the dispersal of the brigade, but state that a Lebanese flag will continue to fly over the barracks of the battalion which is at the Government's disposal. The Lebanese Government have formally protested to the Délégation Générale, stating that this measure, which vitally affects Lebanese troops formed with Intérêts Communs money, should not have been taken without their consent, especially since the whole question of the *Troupes Spéciales* is still outstanding between the French and Lebanese.

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E 2065/5/89] (14)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 154, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 13th March, 1945. (Received 27th March.)

General

[illegible] the week both the Syrian and Lebanese Governments were asked [illegible] what steps they were taking to obtain invitations to the San Francisco Conference, and the matter has been the main topic of political discussion in both countries. The general attitude of the Chambers, the public and the press is that many other countries which have received invitations to the conference have contributed less to the war effort than Syria and the Lebanon and that the question of participation is a plain test of whether or not the independence of the two countries is a reality. It is freely stated in conversation that it is His Majesty's Government who have obstructed the issue of an invitation at the instance of the French.

Both Governments authorised the Egyptian Minister at Washington to sign the United Nations pact on their behalf; the Egyptian Minister was, however, informed by the State Department in reply to his *démarche* that no reply could be given until the United States Government had consulted their "principal associates." The Governments have also made representations to Great Britain, the United States, the U.S.S.R., China and the Arab States to support their applications to sign the United Nations declaration and to participate in the San Francisco Conference.

All this created in the local mind a state of alarm and despondency which [illegible] British elements to represent the British White Paper in Syria as [illegible] some new and adverse statement of British policy towards the Arab world. In order to put an end to this idea, which was very widespread and doing us a lot of harm, His Majesty's Legation issued a communiqué to the press stating that in view of the misapprehensions existing in regard to the White Paper it seemed advisable to state that its contents consisted solely of statements and correspondence of 1941, the headings then followed. Copies of the White Paper were also given to the local Governments.

A new draft of a Franco-Syrian Cultural Convention was presented to the Syrian Government by the French authorities on the 7th March. At first sight it appears very much more reasonable than the previous document and to contain much that could reasonably be accepted by the Syrians, who have at least not rejected it out of hand.

General Beynet left by air for Paris on the 9th March after what appears to have been an inconclusive conversation with the Syrian President, during which he indicated that he did not expect to be absent more than a fort[illegible] Before leaving he informed His Majesty's Minister that the texts of the establishment and consular conventions could not be produced locally but would have to be drafted in Paris.

Both the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs have made public statements on the recent Cairo Conference of the Arab States. They have, however, confined themselves to generalities, stating little more than that the statutes of the future Arab League had been drafted and would be submitted to the full conference on the 17th March, after which they would have to be ratified by the legislature in each country.

Economic

Total purchases for the period the 1st–7th March, 1945, amount to 225 tons, a daily average of 32 tons, which brings the total purchases for the 1944–45 crop up to 175,393 tons.

The Lebanese Government on the 8th March sent gendarmes to occupy the two principal Lebanese spinning factories, and subsequently issued a decree requisitioning them. This action was necessitated by the refusal of the owners to conform to certain instructions issued by the Government in pursuance of an agreement recently reached with the Syrian Government to control the price of locally produced yarn and textiles. Under the terms of this agreement, the Lebanon was bound to hand over to Syria a certain proportion of the cotton yarn produced in the Lebanon, and the price of this yarn was fixed at a figure which, whilst giving the spinners a generous margin of profit, was still [illegible] to date. The spinners got together with the weavers (who claimed that as a result of this agreement they would not obtain sufficient supplies of yarn to keep their plants occupied) and also with certain merchants who had recently been charged by the Government with having profiteered on American textiles imported by them under the quota. Together they tried to enforce the closing of Beirut. Their efforts have not, however, so far been successful, as the public seems generally to recognise that the Government's measures, although taken somewhat [illegible] and without adequate publicity, are in fact designed to benefit the [illegible]

Syria

The President of the Syrian Republic left by air on the 10th March for Baghdad, where he will stay for a few days as the guest of the Reg[illegible]. He was accompanied by Tahsin Qadri, the Iraqi Minister at Damascus, [illegible] Jabiri, President of the Syrian Chamber, Lufti H[illegible] members of his personal staff.

Sabri el Assali, the newly appointed M[illegible] to the effect that th[illegible] ment. He subsequently ordered the arrest of a certain Salal[illegible] having published a signed pamphlet criticising the President's recent speech. These actions have aroused much local criticism.

Abrogi bey Lahham and Subhi Omari, director general and director of the Damascus Police respectively, whose resignation was reported in last week's summary, have agreed to continue in office for a few days to enable the Government to find successors.

Aleppo

It has been a quiet week and the celebration of Syrian independence on the 8th March produced little sign of activity.

On the 9th March there was a large meeting in a cinema organised by the friends of U.S.S.R. in honour of the Soviet Revolution. No officials are known to have been invited, the main speaker was Dr. Kamil Ayad, a Damascene [illegible] who is stated to be in charge of the Aleppo branch of the society.

Homs and Hama

Independence Day was celebrated on the 8th March in Ho[illegible] by a demonstration by the Boy Scouts in the morning and a meeting [illegible] in the afternoon at which violent anti-French speeches were made; all the H[illegible] functionaries and representatives from Hama were present.

Two murderers, Saleh and Adnan Barazi, were released from gaol last week. Although they had for years pursued a career of murder, theft and abduction, their release was effected through the intervention of the Deputies, Hani Sebai and Farid Murhege. The Government's influence and prestige has been weakened by this apparent miscarriage of justice in which large sums of money are said to have changed hands on high levels.

* * * * * *

Alaouite Territory

There have been no further disturbances in this area but the situation has not yet been resolved and is still very unsatisfactory. French troops have not [illegible] although they have allowed the gendarmerie to reoccupy two [illegible]. General Beynet has visited Latakia and the local French delegate has told the army commander that he hopes to obtain the agreement of the Mohafez to a settlement by tribal law of questions connected with destruction of property. The French authorities are understood to have

indicated to the Syrian Government that the withdrawal of the French troops must be arranged between the local French Délégué and the Mohafez. The latter is now in Damascus and has been granted a month's leave. But even if French troops are now withdrawn it is evident from reports received from Latakia that the prestige of the Syrian Government in the Alaouite territory has suffered a severe setback and that separatist elements have been correspondingly encouraged.

* * * * * *

Iraq

Discussions are still continuing for the [illegible] a meeting to settle the dispute between the Ag[illegible] agreed upon as a suitable meeting place by both the Iraqi and the Syrian Government, but Sheikh Aboud el Hafel, son of the paramount Sheikh of the Agaidat, has stated categorically that the Agaidat representatives will not attend a conference in Shammar territory.

* * * * * *

Lebanon

The Prime Minister, speaking in a debate in the Chamber of Deputies, declared that no decision taken either at San Francisco or at any other conference could bring the Lebanon to sign a treaty according a privileged position to anyone, nor could the Lebanon be bound by any decision concerning her which was taken without her consent.

The Prime Minister is to leave for Egypt for the forthcoming Arab Conference on the 15th March. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who should have accompanied him, is staying behind as the vice-president of the Council is not considered capable of being left in charge of the Government. There is still no news of the President's return, and rumours regarding his condition [illegible]

The Hadange newspaper issued a number [illegible] newspaper [illegible] ing a violent attack on the Government for their action [illegible] recent bye-election. The newspaper has in consequence been suspended *sine die*.

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CHAPTER VI.—GENERAL.

E 7878/28/89] No. 38

Lord Killearn to Mr Eden.—(Received 25th December.)

(No. 2713.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, 25th December, 1944*

ARAB Union discussions are likely to acquire momentum in the near future and I am not sure whether the picture is quite clear in London.

2. We seem to me to have been pursuing two diametrically opposing policies [illegible] and on the other hand we have been promoting Zionism in Palestine and French [illegible] It seems a safe bet that our Syrian, Palestinian and our Arab [illegible] conflict before long. As regards Syria and the Lebanon I understand that our policy is to press these States to conclude treaties with France which would give the latter a preferential position and [illegible] by Syria or even by the Lebanon however much internal division French may be [illegible] signing any treaty with France which would make the Lebanon a French military bridgehead against Syria and they would hardly dare to incur the open hostility of the surrounding Moslem world by breaking this agreement and siding with France.

3. In some British quarters there seems to be an idea that we can more or [illegible] with the hare and hunt with the hounds, namely, that we may, in order [illegible] French, press Syrians and the Lebanese to sign preferential treaties [illegible] if they refuse we may then sit back and say that we can do no more. This, I submit with all deference, is a dangerous illusion. If we support the French in the matter of a treaty, the French are bound to go ahead energetically with the business and if opposition is encountered the chances are that General de Gaulle, with his well known inclination towards drastic methods, will use force at least against the Lebanon to impose a treaty unless we stop him from doing so. Very little force would be necessary in the Lebanon. A naval demonstration with landing parties would be sufficient. If we allow the French to impose a treaty on the Lebanon by force we shall become involved in a conflict with about 90 per cent. of the Arab world, and sooner or later we shall end by losing the Middle East unless we are prepared to keep very large forces scattered throughout the Middle East to hold the population down. It will be remembered [illegible] y troops between the two wars were required in Egypt, Palestine, Syria and Iraq to suppress the succession of revolts when these countries were far less united than they are to-day; now a revolt in one country would provoke violent [illegible]ction in others. I doubt very much whether in a future flare up in the Middle [illegible]st we could indefinitely hold these populations down with less than nine divisions. Is it likely that the British public or British Tommy is going to acquiesce in such a large permanent garrison in the Middle East for the *bonne yeux* of the French and Zionists? Moreover can we, while involved in repressive action in liberated territories such as Greece, undertake in the near future repressive action in Egypt Arab world? All sorts of nationalist problems are boiling up in the Middle East and even without the millstones of France and Zionists around our neck we shall have quite enough to handle in straightforward clashes between ourselves and nationalist elements in the Middle East.

4. I have thought it permissible to sound this warning note in view of ominous signs of French truculence since de Gaulle's visit to Moscow. According to a report from a usually well informed agent in touch with the French here the latter are speaking quite openly against us as the principal enemy and breathing [illegible] group omitted] and thunder against Syria and the Lebanon. This visit of a French cruiser to Beirut may well be the first step in a French campaign of menace which may end in violence.

5. In any event it is important that we should be ready with our publicity to defend ourselves with arguments not too *jejune* for local digestions if our present policies in the Levant States and Palestine lead to outbreaks which will require repressive action by British troops similar to that in Greece.

E 7876/28/89 No. 39

Mr Eden to Lord Killearn (Cairo).

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, 5th January, 1945*

YOUR telegram No. 2713 [of 25th December: British policy in the Middle East].

I am grateful for your appreciation of prospects in the Egyptian-Arab world and for stating your anxieties. These matters have been much in our minds, and we are alive to the fact that divergent elements in British policy will need to be reconciled. I am hopeful, however, that we shall be able to steer a line that will have regard for our strategic needs both in the Middle East (notably the Suez Canal and access secured by agreement to Abadan) and in our relations with France. We fully agree that in formulating our policy we must regard the Middle East as a whole.

2. As regards Arab unity, I think you are in agreement with our present policy, which is one of general sympathy with the desire of the Arab States to reduce the barriers between them. To put the issue in its crudest form, I feel sure that if we were to adopt any other policy, we should very quickly be condemned by the whole Arab world as responsible for the breakdown of their discussions which might or might not have had useful results. We should arouse all the latent xenophobia of the Arabs. In general, we cannot ignore the ideals and aims of the Arab Unity Movement and in view of our great strategic and other interests in the area, we must try to guide it into spheres where we can co-operate.

3. In antithesis to the question of Arab unity you refer to our attitude towards Zionism in Palestine and the French position in the Levant. As regards Palestine I can assure you [illegible] be borne in mind when the time comes for decisions to be taken. Both the Arabs and the Jews of Palestine have, of course, a very strong claim to be consulted before final decisions are taken.

4. As regards Syria and Lebanon, I think you have somewhat misconstrued our policy. Having underwritten the French promise of indep[illegible] we have no intention of pressing these States to sign it away. We [illegible] reach agreement with the French as to the nature of their future relations. I concur in your view that if there is no agreement, de Gaulle might be temp[illegible] to use force to secure a decision. Such a situation would be even more serious than that which occurred in November 1943 in Lebanon. We intend to do our best to prevent it arising, and should it occur would have to deal firmly with it. But the possibility of it is precisely the reason why an agreement seems to us so necessary. We have not said that the Syrians and Lebanese must concede everything or indeed any specific thing, which the French ask. But they are not facing the need for any agreement at all and do not even know what the French proposals are. I cannot at present see any satisfactory alternative to our policy of facilitating an agreed settlement between the French [illegible] Levant States, though this will clearly not be easy to arrange and will [illegible] It will require an active line on the part of His Majesty's Minister in Beirut who is well aware that His Majesty's Government do not intend to sit back themselves nor wish him to sit back once he has acquired the confidence of the parties with whom he has to deal. This policy does not appear to me to be inconsistent with our attitude towards Arab nationalism generally, unless or until it becomes clear that the agreed settlement between the Levant States and the French would involve some real derogation from their independence. There seems to be no inherent reason why an agreement need prevent Syria and the [illegible] Arab States as foreseen in the Alexandria Protocol, as they are likely to wish to do.

[illegible] to sum up, we [illegible] that [illegible] towards [illegible] Egyptian Arab world embraces many points of major importance to us and that it [illegible] to be reconciled with our obligations under the Balfour Declaration and with our policy towards the new France [illegible] that there are undoubted difficulties and even dangers to be overcome. In the first place we require to gain or retain the confidence of the Governments and peoples concerned and in this connexion I entirely endorse the emphasis that you have laid on the need for planned and expert publicity.

E 402 3 65] No. 40

Lord Killearn to Mr Eden.—(Received 17th January.)

(No. 7 Saving.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, 9th January* 1945

THE Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this morning [illegible] Ibn Saud has agreed to the Arab Conference Protocol signed at Alexandria, [illegible] Council of League of Arab States will go [illegible] within the next week or so. The intention is that meetings will eventually be held at intervals of three months in each Arab capital in turn, the Prime Minister of each country presiding seriatim. This should prevent the Conference being dominated by say Egypt. He mentioned the possibility of the eventual [illegible] of the Organisation [illegible]

2. His Excellency explained his intention of keeping both the Turkish and Persian Governments fully *au courant* their goodwill being most desirable seeing that their territories lay between the Arab States and Russia. Both these States had so far shown a fair [illegible]

3. Nuri Said Pasha had asked his Excellency to dinner a few nights [illegible] to meet Ali Maher Pasha. The latter had questioned him whether Great B[illegible] Iraq assuring that such was our tenden[illegible] Foreign Affairs had replied to the contrary but [illegible] had long realised how important it was in the interest of [illegible] he advice [illegible] of the British Ambassador

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E 506 15 G] No. 41

Sir A. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th January.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) *Baghdad, 19th January*, 1945

LORD GORT arrived here yesterday and has had the opportunity of meeting the Regent and other leading Iraqis.

2. In conversation with Lord Gort and myself last night the Iraqi Prime Minister expressed the view that the situation in Palestine had reached the stage which precluded the establishment of either an Arab or a Zionist State.

3. He was very strongly opposed to partition and showed himself to be [illegible] apprehensive of Zionist strength and Zionist ambition [illegible] described as being limitless. If partition State were [illegible] he thought, be a large influx of immigrants [illegible] Zionists would not be content with the [illegible] with their resources they would be al[illegible] object of conquering first Palestine and then the Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. His Excellency feared that the Arabs, with their more slender resources, would not be able to withstand such an onslaught, since war to-day was not a question so much of bravery and numbers as of wealth and science. For this reason, and for reasons of justice because Palestine was a land of Arabs, he could never [illegible] to its being partitioned.

4. His Excellency went on to say he thought the only solution was for Great Britain to continue to rule Palestine for the next twenty five or thirty years. If His Majesty's Government were willing to do this and at the [illegible] time to prohibit Jewish immigration, he would advocate for the same period a [illegible] tion and Great Britain.

5. The Prime Minister urged strongly that no action which might be unwelcome to the Arabs should be taken in the near future. The Arabs needed time. Their case was imperfectly understood in Great Britain and America but he hoped that would soon be remedied when the proposed Propaganda Bureau were established.

6. Lord Gort laid stress on the widespread sympathy which had been aroused in both countries by Jewish sufferings in Europe, and said that as soon as the immigration quota laid down by the White Paper of 1939 was exhausted in about six months' time, there would be strong pressure to permit more Jews to enter Palestine. He asked the Prime Minister whether he thought it would

be possible to arrange for say 2,000 to enter every month. His Excellency thought some such arrangement might be made provided it was purely temporary and intended only to tide over an awkward period.

[illegible]

strengthen their friendship with Great Britain, and he earnestly hoped no decision would be taken which might spoil their mutual relations.

8. The Prime Minister said much that I expected about partition and the desire of the Arabs to strengthen their friendship with us, but I was surprised at his openly expressed fear of the Zionists. I have not heard any other Arab voice this so frankly.

9. Lord Gort has seen and agrees to this record.

E 1419 8 G [illegible]

CAIRO CONVERSATIONS, FEBRUARY 1945

RECORD of Conversations with King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud in the Fayoum [illegible] 1945

PRESENT

The Prime Minister.	Ibn Saud.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.	Sheikh Hafez Wahba, Saudi Arabian Minister in London.
Mr. S. R. Jordan, His Majesty's Minister at Jedda.	
Sir W. Smart, His Majesty's Embassy at Cairo.	

THE PRIME MINISTER thanked His Majesty for having come from his country to meet him in Egypt. HIS MAJESTY replied that he had come with the greatest pleasure.

After an exchange of compliments and mutual good wishes, THE PRIME MINISTER asked His Majesty for information regarding his conversation with President Roosevelt. HIS MAJESTY produced the attached English record of [illegible] which had been compiled by Mr. Eddy, the United States [illegible] Jida (Annex). THE PRIME MINISTER [illegible] that President Roosevelt had expressed further views to him on [illegible] Palestine. HIS MAJESTY explained that his position [illegible] The Jews in Palestine were continuously increasing in number, they [illegible] Prime Minister and a Minister of Defence. They also had formed a military force of 30,000 men with modern arms and equipment. They had thus become a great danger to the Arabs. If it was only a question of Jews and Arabs the Arabs would fight the Jews and even if they were not victorious, they would not mind because they would go to Paradise. He had continually counselled moderation to the Arabs in this question, but he feared that a clash might [illegible] he would be in a great difficulty. He did not wish to get involved in such a conflict, which would also bring him into conflict with us.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that we would not allow the Jews to attack the Arabs [illegible] armed forces. We had control of the seas and could easily deprive [illegible] At the same time the Jews must have a place to live in: that [illegible] Palestine. He had never been in favour of Palestine being a [illegible] State, but of a National Home in Palestine. At the same time the Prime Minister pointed out that the Jews' work in cultivating desert areas in Palestine was advantageous to the Arabs, whose population and welfare were increased thereby. The Prime Minister hoped that he might count on the assistance of His Majesty to promote a definite and lasting settlement between the Jews and the Arabs.

HIS MAJESTY enlarged on the difficulty he would have restraining his own people if conflict occurred between the Jews and the Arabs. He said that he counted on British friendship with the Arabs and on British justice. THE PRIME MINISTER assured him of our friendship with the Arabs and pointed out that we had done a lot for the Arabs since the last war in establishing Arab States in Iraq and Transjordan. The Prime Minister added that, in the event of any decision being taken regarding Palestine, we would keep Ibn Saud informed beforehand.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he felt that he could not altogether satisfy Ibn Saud regarding Palestine and that he wished now to turn to the [illegible] and Syria. He said that we were determined to maintain the indepen[illegible] of the Lebanon and to prevent the French from using force to upset [illegible] considered it necessary that the Syrians and the Lebanese [illegible] with France giving the French some privileges. HIS MAJESTY [illegible] that there would be no difficulty about giving them certain privileges regarding education, culture, railways and commerce, but the trouble was that the French would want much more. It was impossible to give them in the Levant States a position similar to ours in Egypt and Iraq, where our soldiers could be stationed without their in any way interfering in the administration of the country. If French troops were in the Levant States they would be utilised by France to interfere in the administration. HIS MAJESTY suggested that we should ask the French to say exactly what they wanted in the way of privilege. THE SECRETARY OF STATE remarked that the French had already been asked to formulate their requirements and we were waiting for their answer. The Secretary of State mentioned that His Majesty had already given good advice to the Syrians in this matter of a treaty with France.

During the conversation IBN SAUD expressed his satisfaction at the defeat of Germany, but rather cryptically expressed apprehensions of some other [illegible] was being attacked by the wolf and took refuge with a man, whom he attacked [illegible] the wolf had been driven off. Presumably [illegible] the Russians. THE PRIME MINISTER said [illegible] friendly and he [illegible] would in future prevent either wolves or snakes from [illegible].

IBN SAUD expressed satisfaction with the conversation up to this stage but said that there were two points which he wished to talk about, *i.e.*, immigration into Palestine and land sales there. At this moment the meeting was interrupted by lunch, and His Majesty did not return to these particular points when the conversation was renewed for a short time after lunch.

After lunch THE PRIME MINISTER asked His Majesty whether he had any particular point he wished to discuss. HIS MAJESTY referred to the Hashemite question. He sketched briefly the relations between himself and the [illegible]. He said that he had every regard for them as descendants of the [illegible] that, as we know, the Amir Abdulla was a talkative person and [illegible]. This did not trouble him, but the important thing was the question of the tribes of Saudi Arabia and Transjordan. At present Glubb Pasha kept the tribes in order and all was well. If he were not there there would probably be considerable trouble between the tribes of the two countries (owing presumably to Hashemite intrigues). THE PRIME MINISTER expressed the hope that Transjordan would not make difficulties for Saudi Arabia.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he would on his return tell Parliament of his meeting with His Majesty and of the friendly conversation he had had with him. HIS MAJESTY also expressed great satisfaction at the meeting.

ANNEX

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY ABDUL AZIZ AL SAUD KING OF SAUDI ARABIA, AND PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, 14TH FEBRUARY 1945 ABOARD THE U.S.S. "QUINCY"

I

The President asked His Majesty for his advice regarding the problem of Jewish refugees driven from their homes in Europe. His Majesty replied that [illegible] the Jews should return to live in the lands from which they were [illegible] the Jews whose homes were completely destroyed and who have no [illegible] of livelihood in their homelands should be given living space in the Axis countries which oppressed them. The President remarked that Poland might be considered a case in point. The Germans appear to have killed 3 million Polish [illegible] the resettlement of many homeless Jews.

His Majesty [illegible] in their lands, and stated that the Arabs and the Jews could never co-operate neither in Palestine nor in any other country. His Majesty called attention to the increasing threat to the existence of the Arabs and the crisis which has resulted from continued Jewish immigration and the purchase of land by the Jews. His Majesty further stated that the Arabs would choose to die rather than yield their lands to the Jews.

His Majesty stated that the hope of the Arabs is based upon the word of honour of the Allies and upon the well known love of justice of the United States and upon the expectation that the United States will support them.

The President replied that he wished to assure His Majesty that he would do nothing to assist the Jews against the Arabs and would make no move hostile to the Arab people. He reminded His Majesty that it is impossible to prevent speeches and resolutions in Congress or in the press which may be made on any subject. His reassurance concerned his own future policy as Chief Executive of the United States Government.

His Majesty thanked the President for his statement and mentioned the proposal to send an Arab mission to America and England to expound the case of the Arabs and Palestine. The President stated that he thought this was a very [illegible] he thought many people in America and England are misinformed. His Majesty said that such a mission to inform the people was useful but more important to him was what the President had just told him concerning his own policy toward the Arab people.

II

His Majesty stated that the problem of Syria and the Levantine was of deep concern to him, and he asked the President what would be the attitude of the [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible] French Government [illegible] of the [illegible] of Syria [illegible] the [illegible] French [illegible] should [illegible] United States Government would [illegible] Syria [illegible] the use of force.

III

The President spoke of his great interest in farming [illegible] himself was a farmer. He emphasised the need for developing [illegible] the land under cultivation as well as to turn the wheels which do the [illegible] work. He expressed special interest in irrigation, tree planting and water power, which he hoped would be developed after the war in many countries, including the Arab lands. Stating that he liked Arabs, he reminded His Majesty that to increase land under cultivation would decrease the desert and provide living for a larger population of Arabs. His Majesty thanked the President for promoting agriculture so vigorously, but said that he himself could not engage with any enthusiasm in the development of his country's agriculture and public works if this prosperity would be inherited by the Jews.

A SURVEY OF THE OIL RESOURCES OF THE MIDDLE EAST

With map and graph.

INDEX

For Middle [illegible] production from 1931 to 1943, see the graph at the end of the [illegible] production areas in the Middle East on [illegible]

A SURVEY OF THE OIL RESOURCES OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Introduction

1. There is good reason for believing that the Middle Eastern countries will, in the course of a comparatively short space of time, contribute a very much larger proportion of the world's oil supplies than they do at present. In 1939 their production amounted to nearly 16,000,000 tons, representing no more than 6 per cent of the world total. Although much prospecting work yet remains to be done, enough has already been accomplished to demonstrate the great richness of the oil reserves of certain of these countries. The extent to which their oilfields could be developed will, however, depend upon a number of factors, namely: (i) the final lines that the Anglo-American oil agreement will take, (ii) the oil policy of the U.S.S.R. and whether or not she becomes a party to the above-mentioned agreement, (iii) whether or not early steps are taken to define and demarcate the frontiers of these countries, wherever this has not already been done, (iv) internal security in the countries concerned.

2. Of the above factors, the first is really beyond the scope of this survey. All that can be said under this head is that, when, as is expected, there is a serious falling off in the exportation of oil from the United States, arrangements

will doubtless be made for the Middle Eastern countries to play an important part in making up the deficiency. They would be in a favourable position to do so not only because of the richness of their fields, but also because their internal requirements are likely (except in the case of Egypt) to keep far below their output level, thus leaving large quantities of oil available for export. Of the remaining factors, the one that seems most in need of attention is the question of undefined and undemarcated frontiers.

3. Of all the regions dealt with in this survey, the most promising appear to be those situated on each side of the Persian Gulf. Persia, the largest oil producing country in the Middle East at the present time, draws the bulk of her oil from the areas to the east and north-east of the head of the Persian Gulf. Less is known as yet of the potentialities of the western littoral of the Gulf and of the prolongation of this area to the south and south-east across [illegible] to the Indian Ocean in the neighbourhood of Masira island. [illegible] however, been [illegible] Kuwait to the south of Qatar holds out much promise and that it may in time turn out to be even richer than the producing areas on the Persian side of the Gulf. The question of inter-State boundaries is most acute in Arabia, where it [illegible] set up trouble and so interfere with development (¹).

4. The effect of oil discoveries in the Middle East is already manifest, and very soon it will be profound. Western industrialisation has come with a sudden impact upon regions that have hitherto been untouched by the West, and it has had a noticeably stimulating effect upon those parts of the Middle East where contact had already been established.

5. In order to meet the requirements of the oil companies [illegible] development of the oil bearing regions, numerous satellite [illegible] have been formed, while others are coming into being. Apart from this development [illegible] scale of rentals and royalties paid by the oil companies to the rulers and Governments who had hitherto been, in the majority of cases, poor. In Iraq, for example [illegible] from the oil companies amounts to over a quarter of the income of the State at the present time, while in Bahrain the percentage is much higher. The Persian Government receive no less than £4,000,000 annually in royalties from [illegible] company together with an additional sum in respect of income tax. This company employs nearly 60,000 Persians, the majority of whom were, until comparatively recently, nomadic tribesmen; many of these men have now become skilled artisans.

6. In Sa'udi Arabia, where developments [illegible] are now over 8,000 men on the pay roll of the Ar[illegible]

7. The general standards of health, living and workmanship are being raised to a marked extent by the example set by the companies for their workmen [illegible] of better means of communications and the development of roads, in many cases in districts where, up to ten years ago, a motor car had never been seen. In this way the relations and outlook of the peoples of these countries are being profoundly altered.

8. It is inevitable that, as long as oil is required [illegible] Middle Eastern fields, these regions will have a vastly increased [illegible] contentment, they will [illegible] a matter of [illegible] concern to statesmen. [illegible]

[illegible]

9. Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields, Ltd., an associated company of the Royal Dutch Shell and Anglo-Iranian groups, has been operating in Egypt since 1911. During the period 1911-43 it produced 10,114,000 tons of oil. Production was first from the Gemsa field, which is now exhausted, then from Hurghada and [illegible] 1938 from that field and the newly discovered structure at Ras Gharib. In 1943 production from Ras Gharib was 1,189,348 tons and from Hurghada 71,871 tons. The Hurghada field is now almost exhausted; the structure at Ras Gharib has been very extensively developed owing to abnormal wartime requirements, and it

(¹) For a detailed study of this question, see the Foreign Office memoranda entitled "Ibn Saud's Claims in respect of the South-Eastern Frontiers of Sa'udi Arabia" and "The South-Eastern Frontiers of Sa'udi Arabia." Both memoranda bear the reference E 2203/2203/25 and are dated the 30th June 1940.

is now showing signs of having passed its peak. All these areas are on the west coast of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Suez.

10. After the revision in 1937 of the provisions of the Egyptian Mining Law relating to petroleum exploration and development, a large number of exploration permits were granted to British and American oil companies and their subsidiaries over areas along the east side of the Gulf of Suez, two areas (Ruwaisat and Maghara) in the Sinai desert south of the Mediterranean coast, and in the western desert. Prospecting was suspended, with the consent of the Egyptian Government, during the campaign in the western desert, but activity has now been resumed and several test wells are to be drilled. Until this test drilling has been carried out it is obviously impossible to say anything in regard to the prospects.

11. Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields has a refinery at Suez with an annual capacity of 1,250,000 tons; there is also a small refinery there belonging to the Egyptian Government with a capacity of about 60,000 tons per year. The oil processed is royalty oil from the Anglo-Egyptian Oilfields Ltd.

12. Except for some asphalt, the whole of the Egyptian production is consumed in the country. It is possible, however, that a small proportion might in peace time become available for export, provided that production can be kept at its present level of some 1,250,000 tons a year.

II.—*Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*

13. In 1923-24 geologists of the A.I.O.C. and Royal Dutch Shell group carried out a joint survey of the area between the coast and the watershed of the Red Sea mountains, covering an area of some 10,000 square miles. The geologists came to the conclusion that there would be little or no chance of discovering oil and did not recommend any test drilling.

III.—*Eritrea*

14. On the whole, Eritrea has but little attraction to offer. The only area of probable interest is that of the Dahlaq islands which lie to the east of Massawa. The Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli began drilling operations on one of these islands two years or so before the outbreak of war. Some traces of oil were found but the war caused operations to be abandoned before conclusive results could be obtained.

IV.—*British Somaliland*

15. [illegible] of the A.I.O.C. in 1918-1920 and of the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. in 1931 made surveys of British Somaliland. In both cases it was decided that, although there were some seepages and a small anticlinal structure at Daga Shabell, some 30 miles south of Berbera, the prospects of commercial success were too remote to warrant drilling.

16. In October 1944 however the Somaliland Oil Exploration Company, an associated company of the Royal Dutch Shell group, obtained an oil exploration licence covering 27,000 square miles of the Protectorate (between one third and one half of the total area), including the Daga Shabell structure. The company is required to carry out a geophysical and topographical survey within two years.

V.—*Turkey*

17. Indications of petroleum are fairly widespread in Turkey, there being seepages in European Turkey near the Sea of Marmara, in central and eastern Anatolia and in the southern and south-eastern parts of the country.

18. Drilling near the Sea of Marmara rendered only negative results, but the Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitusü (M.T.A., the Institute of Mineral Research) has achieved a slight measure of success at Raman Dağ, 10 miles south of Beshiri in the Siirt vilayet, in south-eastern Turkey. There are some geological structures there which are superficially promising, and one of the wells sunk by the M.T.A. has produced some oil. It is possible that oil may be found in other test wells in the neighbourhood, but the prospects of finding a reasonably large field cannot be said to be very encouraging.

19. The Turkish press has expressed the view that production from the Raman Dağ field will be sufficient to meet home requirements, but this is open to doubt.

VI.—*Cyprus*

20. Petroleum Development (Cyprus), Ltd., an associated company of the Iraq Petroleum Company, has been granted several prospecting licences for Cyprus, but the exploration work so far carried out has not been encouraging. Owing to the war operations have been suspended.

VII.—*Palestine*

21. Petroleum Development (Palestine), Ltd., an associated company of the Iraq Petroleum Co. (with the same shareholding interests), has a capital of £122,100. It holds 29 licences under the Palestine Mining Law covering in all 5,295 square miles. The survey obligations under the licences were all fulfilled and arrangements to begin drilling had been made before war broke out. Owing, however, to war conditions, the company could not obtain the necessary drilling equipment, and the Palestine Government have agreed to the postponement of drilling until after the war or until materials can be obtained, whichever is the earlier.

22. Haifa is now of great importance as the Mediterranean terminal of the southern branch of the I.P.C. pipeline from Kirkuk. There is a large tank farm and there are ample loading facilities for tankers.

23. In addition, the large refinery operated by Consolidated Refineries Ltd. (in which all the shares are held jointly by the A.I.O.C. and the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co., a Shell subsidiary) on the outskirts of Haifa treats crude oil from the I.P.C. field at Kirkuk; its capacity is being increased from 2,600,000 to 3,800,000 tons a year. The Shell and a number of other concerns have storage installations at Haifa. The extensions to the Haifa Refinery were completed some time ago, and the plant is now processing 4 million tons a year.

VIII.—*Syria*

24. The Syria Petroleum Company, Ltd., an associated company of the Iraq Petroleum Company, has a capital of £1,250,000. It holds a concession from the Syrian Government dated the 26th February, 1938, which was ratified by the French High Commissioner on the 25th March, 1940.

25. The concession area covers the whole of the Syrian Republic north of the parallel running through Damascus (36° 18'); it is approximately 63,000 square miles in extent. The concession provides for "dead rent" payments beginning at £15,000 (gold) per annum and rising to £80,000 (gold) per annum over a period of 15 years. Should oil be produced in sufficient quantities, royalties will take the place of these "dead rent" payments. At the expiration of the 15 year period, the company must either begin to export oil or abandon the concession.

26. Drilling operations were started in 1939 and continued until 1941, when the military situation in Syria brought the work to a standstill. Most of the drilling equipment was destroyed by the British military forces in order to deny its use to the enemy. The Syrian Government have granted the company a moratorium on drilling obligations which is to last until two years after the end of the war with Germany.

27. The results of the small amount of test drilling carried out were inconclusive, but encouraging.

IX.—*Tripoli*

28. The Syria Petroleum Co. holds prospecting licences covering over 193 square miles near the Tripoli terminal of the I.P.C. pipe-line. By agreement [illegible] licences has been postponed until the necessary drilling and other equipment [illegible].

29. Tripoli is the Mediterranean terminal of the northern branch of the I.P.C. pipe-line [illegible] loading facilities for tankers. There is a small and somewhat inefficient topping plant with a capacity of under 200,000 tons a year. It is operated by the Compagnie Française des Pétroles, the French company which owns 23¾ per cent. of the shares of the Iraq Petroleum Company (see under "Iraq"). It is reported that the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company and the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey have each obtained concessions from the Lebanese Government to erect and operate refineries at Tripoli. No details in regard to these refineries are yet available.

X.—*Transjordan*

30. Petroleum Development (Transjordan), Ltd., an associated company of the Iraq Petroleum Company, applied for 37 prospecting licences covering 7,000 square miles under the Transjordan Mining Law of 1940. This application was properly lodged and duly acknowledged, but the issue of licences has been postponed until after the war because no British company could carry out the exploration obligations under war conditions; there is also a possibility that the Transjordan Government may wish to amend the royalty provisions under the L[illegible]. The application of Petroleum Development (Transjordan) has priority over other applications for licences covering the same area, if any are received.

31. Such geological work as has been carried out has failed to give promising results.

XI. [illegible]

32. [illegible] employment to many thousands of Iraqis, the oil industry furnishes the Iraq Government with a very substantial part of their revenue. In 1938/39 the last normal year before the outbreak of war, the total sum received in oil royalties amounted to I.D. 1,977,458, representing 34 per cent. of the revenue for that year.

33. The Turkish Government have, for 25 years from the 18th July, 1926, a 10 per cent. interest in all royalties paid to the Iraq Government on oil produced in the former vilayets of Baghdad and Mosul.

34. Iraq oil may be said to be of decided international consequence. The large amount of capital invested in the Iraq oil industry by the British, American, French and Dutch interests concerned and the value to them of the oil produced make the preservation of the rights and property of the I.P.C. and its associated concerns a matter of international importance.

(i) *The Iraq Petroleum Company*

35. The origin[illegible] he River Tigr[illegible] is valid until the 14th M[illegible] 2000. The [illegible] £14,500,000 [illegible] (through D'Arcy Exp[illegible] Anglo-Saxon Petrole[illegible] Near [illegible]

36. [illegible] a n oilfield, which is in the Kirkuk area, is some 60 miles long. Its potential capacity is very great, but production is limited by the capacity of its pipe-line to some 4,000,000 [illegible] Kirkuk by a double pipe-line to Haditha, on the Euphrates. There the line bifurcates: one branch going to Haifa in Palestine (818 miles in all) and the other to Tripoli in Syria (581 miles in all). The capacity of each branch is 2,000,000 tons per annum.

37. Plans are now under consideration for increasing the capacity of the [illegible] enable the output of the fields to be raised to a corresponding extent. The Iraq Petroleum Company will shortly increase the capacity of the southern (Haifa) branch of its pipeline by slightly over 4 million tons per annum. When that work [illegible] by a similar amount. The total capacity of the pipe-line will then be ov[illegible] 12[illegible]

38. Except for topping plants for meeting its own requirements, the I.P.C. [illegible] shareholding interests mentioned above for treatment and ultimate disposal.

39. Royalties are at the rate of 4s. (gold) per ton, with a guaranteed minimum annual payment of £400,000 (gold).

(ii) *Mosul Petroleum Company operating Concessions granted to British Oil Development Company Ltd.*

40. The British Oil Development Company Ltd., obtained a concession from the Iraq G[illegible] May 1932 for the [illegible] which the I.P.C. had relinquished in the previous year; this area covers some 43,500 square

miles. The B.O.D. company represented a combine of certain British, French, Italian and German interests. Mosul Oilfields, Ltd., was formed in November 1932 to acquire the shares of the B.O.D. Company.

41. The Germans did some shallow drilling near Qayyara, during the last war, obtaining some heavy, viscous oil. The B.O.D. Company prospected and drilled in a number of areas, but although oil was struck at Qayyara, it was viscous and had a high sulphur content. The terms of the concession, which included royalty at 4s. (gold) per ton, with a minimum annual payment of £200,000 (gold) (payable as "dead rent" until production started) and the obligation to construct and operate a pipe line with a capacity of 1,000,000 tons a year or the provision of alternative means of transport, proved so onerous that the B.O.D. Company in 1937 disposed of its concession to the I.P.C. A new company, the Mosul Petroleum Company, was formed to operate this concession. Until the outbreak of war the company had not succeeded in producing sufficient quantities of oil to justify the construction of a pipe-line, although oil of better [illegible]ity than the Qayyara crude had been struck at Ain Zala, 42 miles [illegible] west of Mosul. Up to 1941 about 100 wells had been drilled, all of which, except one, were plugged as part of the denial measures undertaken by the British Military Authorities in 1941.

42. In 1943, an agreement was signed by the Mosul Petroleum Company and the Iraq Government, under which a moratorium was granted from May 1941, to a date two years after the end of the war between Great Britain and Germany and Japan, whichever is the later, on all drilling and production obligations.

(iii) *Basrah Petroleum Company Ltd.*

43. This company, which was formed and is controlled by the Iraq Petroleum Company, Ltd., has a capital of £1,000,000. On the 22nd July, 1938, it obtained from the Iraq Government a concession for 75 years giving it [illegible] exclusive right to prospect for and exploit petroleum in all parts of Iraq over which similar rights had not already been granted to the I.P.C., B.O.D. Co., and the A.I.O.C.

44. The company was to start drilling operations within 3 years and exporting of oil within 7½ years from the date on which the concession was granted. Royalty is at the rate of 4s. (gold) per ton, with a guaranteed minimum annual payment of £200,000 (to be paid as "dead rent" until production starts).

45. The moratorium agreement of 1943 also waived the drilling and production obligations of this company.

(iv) *Khanaqin Oil Company Ltd.*

46. The Khanaqin Oil Co. was formed in 1925 in order to acquire from the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. (as it was then called)(*) the oil-bearing area known as Naft Khaneh. The area in which this field is situated formerly belonged to Persia and formed part of the D'Arcy concession, but it was allocated to Turkey, together with a larger area north-east of Khanaqin, by the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission in 1913/14. The concessionary rights of the A.P.O.C. in these two areas were recognised first by the Turkish Government and later by the Government of Iraq.

47. The capital of the Khanaqin Oil Co. is £1,000,000; all the shares so far issued are held by the A.I.O.C.

[illegible] from 3 high pressure wells, and is at the rate of 200,000 [illegible] per annum. The potential output is much higher. The crude oil is pumped [illegible] the field through a 25-mile pipe-line to a refinery at Alwand, 3 miles S.E. of Khanaqin. The products are marketed throughout Iraq by the Rafidain Oil Co., another A.I.O.C. subsidiary.

49. Oil has also been found at Chah Surkh, in the northern area that was transferred to Turkey, but the Khanaqin Oil Co., is not exploiting it at present.

XII. [illegible] Arabia

(i) *Al Hasa and North Eastern Nejd*

50. The Arabian American Oil Company (formerly known as the California Arabian Standard Oil Company), of Delaware, U.S.A., was granted by Ibn Saud a concession valid for 60 years on the 27th M[illegible] 19[illegible] [illegible] of some

(*) The name was changed to Anglo-Iran [illegible]

249,000 square miles in the eastern portion of his realm. The Standard Oil Company of California and the Texas Corporation jointly own all the shares in this company in equal proportions.

51. On signing the concession, the company paid £30,000 [illegible] Ibn Sa'ud, together with £5,000 (gold) annual rent, payable until [illegible] commercial quantities was found. In 1934 another "lump sum" payment of £20,000 (gold) was made. When oil was struck in large quantities in 1938, the company paid the Government £50,000 on account of royalties, and made another [illegible] £50,000 a year later. Royalty is at the rate of 4/- (gold) per ton of oil [illegible]

52. It is possible that, in due course, rising oil production will, by increasing the royalties, put the finances of the country on a sound footing.

53. On the 29th May, 1939, the company and Ibn Sa'ud signed a supple[illegible] secured the extension of its concession area over parts of Sa'udi Arabia to the west of its original zone, together with "all right, title and interest of the Government now or hereafter" in the two neutral zones between Sa'udi Arabia on the one hand and Iraq and Kuwait on the other.

54. After carrying out prospecting work over a wide area, the company sank successful test wells at Dammam, on the coast of the Persian Gulf south-east of Qatif, and proved the existence of a very rich field [illegible] at the rate of 600,000 tons a year, but the potential production is believed to be at least ten times as large. Oil has also been struck at Abu Hadriya, 90 miles north-west of Qatif and 12 miles west of the inlet of Musalle [illegible] 35 miles south-west of Dammam. There are understood to be other promising structures in the concession area.

55. A pipe-line has been constructed from the Dammam field to Ras at Tanura, on the coast, where there are facilities for loading tankers. Some of the crude oil produced is treated at a local topping plant with a capacity of 120,000 tons a year, while the rest is taken to Bahrain for processing in the refinery of the Bahrain Petroleum Company. A refinery with a capacity of 2,000,000 [illegible] a year is under construction 5 miles from Ras at Tanura.

56. [illegible] not only a cause of friction between Sa'udi Arabia and her neighbours, but also a serious handicap to the smooth and rapid development of the oil resources in those countries, is the almost total lack of demarcated frontiers between [illegible] where the true frontier lies between [illegible] and Qatar has already given rise to a dispute regarding a possible oil prod[illegible] area in the south of the Qatar peninsula.

(ii) *The Hejaz*

57. In 1926 the Idrisi, the th[illegible] Mr. Cooper covering the Farasan islands. Cooper was [illegible] the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co., a subsidiary of the Royal Dutch Shell group, which formed the Red Sea Petroleum Company to work it. Some drilling was done on Zifaf island but the company encountered such difficulties with the Idrisi that it abandoned the enterprise in 1928.

58. In 1938 Petroleum Development (Western Arabia), Ltd., an associated company of the I.P.C., obtained a concession from Ibn Sa'ud covering the western part of the Hijaz to a depth of 100 kilometres from the coast, together with the Farasan and some other islands in the Red Sea. The company drilled a number of wells on Zifaf and on some of the other Farasan islands, but failed to find [illegible] The concession was abandoned in 194[illegible]

59. According to a recent press report (as yet unconfirmed), American interests are now negotiating for a concession covering the Hijaz.

(iii) *Asir*

60. In 1931 geologists of the A.I.O.C. examined Asir. They considered that the prospects of finding petroleum, though not entirely non-existent, were remote. Drilling would be very speculative.

(iv) *The Neutral Zone between Sa'udi Arabia and Iraq*

61. The treaty of Mohammerah which Iraq and Najd (now Sa'udi Arabia) concluded in 1922 provided *inter alia* for the rhomboid known as al Tawwal, which is situated between the two states, to be neutral ground. This area, which covers approximately 2,750 square miles, was defined (but not delimited) by

straight lines joining the Shaib Auja and the wells of Amghar, Uqubba and Ansab.

62. Anyone wishing to obtain exploration and exploitation rights within this area has to get the said rights from the Governments of both Sa'udi Arabia and Iraq. The Arabian American Oil Co. has already, as stated above, obtained the grant of Ibn Sa'ud's rights in that area, but it is not known whether the company has also approached the Iraq Government.

63. Any company obtaining a concession over this area would encounter difficulties because its boundaries have never been demarcated.

64. In view of recent discoveries of oil in the province of al Hasa, it is thought that oil may also be found in the neutral zone.

N.B.—For the neutral zone between Sa'udi Arabia and Kuwait, see paragraphs 70-72 below.

(v) *Trans-Arabian Pipe-line*

65. The United States Government, the Arabian American Oil Company and the Gulf Exploration Company had under consideration the ambitious scheme of constructing a 1,200-mile pipe-line from Jabal Dhahran right across Arabia to the Eastern Mediterranean to either Haifa or Alexandria, with a feeder line from Kuwait and a possible branch to the Red Sea. If this project had been carried out, the Petroleum Reserves Corporation, a concern formed and controlled by the United States Government, would, by agreement with the two [illegible] have constructed, owned and maintained the main [illegible] as themselves would have constructed the gathering lines. [illegible] ger likely to participate in [illegible] it is nevertheless possible that the companies concerned may themselves put it into operation at a later date.

66. Although the construction and maintenance of such a pipe-line would be feasible from the engineering point of view, it is clear that, unless a very large quantity of oil (minimum 6,000,000 tons per annum) could be guaranteed, the pipe-line would be unable to compete with the alternative means of transport provided by tankers.

67. From the strategic aspect, the construction of the pipe-line would have the following advantages:—

(i) It would provide an alternative to the already existing I.P.C. pipe-line from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean.
(ii) In time of war it would save sea transport and reduce escort duties.
(iii) It would probably render the United States more inclined to participate in the defence of the Mediterranean sea route.

XIII. *Kuwait*

68. Attempts to obtain an oil concession covering Kuwait date [illegible] as 1911, but none proved successful until 1934. On the 23rd De[illegible] latter year the Shaikh of Kuwait granted a concession valid for 75 [illegible] whole of his territory (6,000 square miles), but excluding the neutral zone (see paragraphs 70-72 below), to the Kuwait Oil Company, Ltd. This company, which [illegible] registered in Great Britain, has a capital of £200,000, the shares are held in equal proportions by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. and the Gulf Exploration Company, a subsidiary of the Gulf Oil Corporation of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. The British Government have, by agreement with the concessionaire, a pre-emption right over any oil produced during an emergency.

69. After an abortive attempt to find oil at Bahra, on the northern shore of Kuwait bay, two successful wells were drilled in 1938 at Burgban, 20 miles south of the town of Kuwait. Other productive wells were subsequently drilled, but operations were curtailed at the beginning of the war and were discontinued in 1942, when the British military authorities plugged the wells in order to deny their use to the enemy. It is now proposed to rehabilitate the wells and later to resume drilling operations. The reserves are known to be very large. Two oil jetties have been constructed at Shuwaikh, 2½ miles west of Kuwait, and a refinery may be built.(*)

(*) It is now planned to export crude oil through a sea terminal 1 mile in length at Fahahil (a village on the coast 21 miles S.S.E. of Kuwait town) a[illegible] (about 4,300 tons) a day, as from April 1946.

70. To the south of Kuwait is a neutral zone covering 1,800 square miles [illegible] of the treaty of Mohammerah of 1922. As oil has been found in large quantities immediately to the north, in Kuwait, and to the south in even larger quantities, in the province of al Hasa in Sa'udi Arabia, it seems very probable that it may also be struck in the neutral zone.

71. As stated in the section of this report dealing with Sa'udi Arabia, the supplemental agreement of the 20th May, 1939, between the Arabian American Oil Company and the Sa'udi Arabian Government gave the former all the latter's rights, titles and interest in the Kuwait neutral zone. It is known that, besides the Arabian American Oil Company, Petroleum Concessions, Ltd., an associated company of the Iraq Petroleum Company, and the Eastern Gulf Oil Company are desirous of obtaining a concession in this zone. The Shaikh of Kuwait, however, has refused to discuss with anyone the question of his rights in that region. In this connection, it is to be borne in mind that Kuwait is a British-protected state which has special treaty relations with the British Government in virtue of which the ruler undertakes not to cede, sell, lease or give for occupation any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of any other Power without the previous consent of His Majesty's Government.

72. An obstacle to the working of a concession for the neutral zone would be the difficulty of administration occasioned by the fact that, whereas there are no capitulations in Sa'udi Arabia, they, together with reservations in regard to mixed courts, still exist in Kuwait.

XIV.—*Bahrain*

73. The Bahrain Petroleum Company, Ltd., though [illegible] British concern (it was incorporated in Canada in 1929), is owned jointly [illegible] States companies, the Standard Oil Co. of California and the T[illegible]

74. The company purchased from the Eastern and General Syndicate in 1930 a concession which the latter had acquired in 1925 covering 100,000 acres [illegible] and until the 29th December, 1989. By agreements between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the company, the area covered by this concession was extended in 1934 and again in 1940, and it now covers all the Shaikh's territory, [illegible] surrounding the islands. Conflict [illegible] by the Shaikh of Bahrain and the [illegible] may if not prevent, attempts by the company to examine and exploit these islands. It is perhaps worth noting that the Persian Government protested to the United States Government in 1934 when the company's concession was first extended, on the grounds that Bahrain was Persian territory (this claim, which has no valid basis, has often been made to, and refuted by, the British Government).

75. Oil was first struck in 1934 on the structure at Jabal Dukhan, on Bahrain Island. Since that time, the field has been greatly developed. Production in 1939 was 1,034,000 tons; it was reduced in subsequent years for reasons connected with the war. There is reason to believe that the field has reached its peak, but further producing wells may be discovered by drilling on the outlying islands and in the territorial waters.

76. In the [illegible] royalties from the Bahrain Petroleum Com[illegible]

77. The refinery, which is on the eas[illegible] of Manama, has a capacity of 2,750,000 tons per annum; the excess refinery capacity over local production is utilised for the treatment of crude oil from the neighbouring oilfields in al Hasa (Sa'udi Arabia). An aviation spirit plant is a recent addition to the refinery.

XV.—*Qatar*

78. [illegible] of the I.P.C. with the same shareholders, has a capital of £760,000. It holds a concession from the Shaikh of Qatar which is valid for 75 years from the 17th May, 1935. A sum of Rs. 4,00,000 was paid to the ruler on signature, and annual rentals of Rs. 1,50,000 were fixed for the first 6 years and of Rs. 30,000 thereafter. Royalty is at the rate of Rs. 3/- per ton; royalty payments will in time take the place of the rentals. This concession was originally granted to the A.I.O.C., but it was transferred to Petroleum Development (Qatar) on the 16th July, 1937.

79. This concession gave the holder the sole right to develop oil in the Qatar peninsula and throughout the Shaikh's territory (4,000 square miles).

80. In 1935 His Majesty's Government and the concessionnaire signed an agreement whereby the former obtained pre-emption rights over oil produced in Qatar in war time.

81. Drilling began in 1939 and continued until August, 1942, by which time 3 test wells had been completed in the Dukhan area near the west coast of the peninsula; promising shows of oil were obtained in two of these wells. Further operations were prevented by the measures taken by the British military authorities to deny oil to the enemy.

82. A scheme to resume drilling with two rigs and to produce oil at the rate of 1,000,000 tons a year is now under consideration, but it seems doubtful whether anything beyond the rehabilitation of the existing wells will be possible until after the war.

83. [illegible] are promising indications of petroleum in the southern part of the Qatar peninsula adjoining the Sa'udi Arabian border, but difficulty in the development of this region has already arisen, because of conflicting cl[illegible] as to the precise frontier between the two states. This frontier has never been delimited.

XVI.—*Trucial Coast*

84. Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast), Ltd., an associated company of the I.P.C. with a capital of £224,000, has obtained concessionary rights in the shaikhdoms of Abu Dhabi, Dibai, Sharja, Ajman, Ras al Khaima and Kalba [illegible] states, which are all British-protected, have special treaty relations with the British Government.

(i) *Abu Dhabi.*

85. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. obtained from the Shaikh in 1936 a 2-year option over the whole of his territory (23,400 square miles). This option was later transferred to Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast), Ltd., which on the 11th January, 1939, obtained a concession valid for 75 years over the whole area. Rs. 3,00,000 were paid on signature. Annual payments are Rs. 1,00,000 [illegible] ton with a minimum payment of Rs. 2,50,000 per annum for 2 years and Rs. 5,00,000 annually thereafter.

86. No work has yet been carried out.

(ii) *Dibai.*

87. [illegible] 22nd May, 1937 [illegible] Rs. [illegible] per [illegible] Rs. [illegible] with a min[illegible]

88. No exploratory work has [illegible] yet been [illegible]

(iii) *Sharja.*

89. The Shaikh granted the company a concession for [illegible] on the 17th September, 1937, over an area of 164 square miles. Rs. 60,000 were paid [illegible] commercial quantities, whereupon Rs. 2,00,000 will be paid down and a royalty [illegible]

90. Drilling is to begin before 17th September, 1946, failing which the Concession will become null and void.

(iv) *Ajman.*

91. The company obtained a prospecting licence over 230 square miles for 5 years on the 23rd March, 1940, on payment of Rs. 1,000. This licence was extended later to the 23rd March, 1949, and such period thereafter as to assure the company 5 complete years for prospecting after the conclusion of hostilities between Great Britain and Germany; the rental was fixed at Rs. 12,000 per annum.

(v) *Ras al Khaima.*

92. The company obtained a prospecting licence over an area of 300 square mile[illegible] 7 [illegible] 1939 [illegible] was [illegible] extended for a further period ending one year after the cessation of host[illegible] Great

Britain and Germany. Rs. 40,000 were paid on signature, and Rs. 30,000 [illegible] This licence applies to prospecting only, a further agreement giving the right to drill would have to be concluded.

(vi) *Kalba*

93. The company has a concession for 75 years from the 20th December 1935 over an area of 600 square miles. Rs. 60,000 were paid on signature, with annual payments of Rs. 24,000 until oil in commercial quantities is found; then a sum [illegible] annual payment of Rs. 90,000.

(vii) *Umm al Qaiwain*

94. In 1939 the company approached the Shaikh with a view to obtaining a concession, but he was then unable to negotiate on account of tribal troubles and disputes with neighbouring rulers. These troubles and disputes are now over, so it is proposed to approach him again in the near future (*). The area covers some 300 square miles. The Shaikh of Umm al-Qaiwain granted Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. a 75 year concession at the beginning of April 1945. The concession covers the whole of the Shaikh's territory (some 300 square miles). The company made an initial payment of Rs. 60,000 and is to pay an annual rental of Rs. 24,000 until oil in commercial quantities is found. In the event of oil in such quantities being discovered, the company will make a lump sum payment of Rs. 200,000 and will pay royalty at the rate of Rs. 3/- per ton, with a minimum annual sum of Rs. 50,000.

There are no drilling or other operational obligations.

95. Prospects are said to be reasonably good in all these Trucial [illegible] but difficulties are likely to arise unless and until the frontiers [illegible] are properly defined and demarcated.

XVII.—*Oman and Dhofar*

96. On the 24th June, 1937, the Sultan of Muscat granted Petroleum Development (Oman and Dhofar), Ltd., an associated company of the I.P.C., two separate concessions, one covering Oman and the other Dhofar, the total area is 52,000 square miles. Each concession contained an option period of seven years during which the company could either take up the concession or [illegible] of Rs. 1,80,000 in the case of Dhofar were guaranteed. The company took up both the concessions in 1944 and duly paid the above-mentioned sums. In article XII of both agreements the company recognised "that certain parts of the Sultan's territory are not at present safe for its operations. The Sultan undertakes on his part to use his good offices with a view to making it possible for the representatives of the company to enter such parts, and will inform the company as soon as such parts become safe." His Majesty's Government and the company entered into a pre-emption agreement in 1939.

97. Annual rental increased from the time of the taking up of the options in 1944 to Rs. 84,000 in respect of Oman and Rs. 48,000 in the case of Dhofar. Royalty is Rs. 3/- per ton, with a minimum in each case equivalent to the annual rental.

98. Geological surveys were carried out in Oman and Dhofar in 1937–38 and aerial surveys were made of the whole Trucial coast and the strip of Oman to the west of the Jabal Akhdar and the mountains running northwards to Ras Musandam in 1938–39. Arrangements for further surveys had to be cancelled [illegible] work is now contemplated, but progress will depend upon (i) ability to engage [illegible] or not the rulers concerned can arrange for the safety of the parties in the remoter areas, (iv) proper demarcation of the frontier with Sa'udi Arabia.

XVIII.—*Aden Protectorate*

99. Petroleum Concessions, Ltd., an associated company of the I.P.C., holds an exploration licence from the Governor of Aden, dated the 12th January, 1938. The area covered the Western Aden Protectorate and the Hadramaut, a total of some 110,000 square miles.

(*) Since the paper was written, information has been received that the Shaikh granted the concession at the beginning of April 1945. No details are available.

100. The main provisions of the permit provide for geological surveys, the submission of geological reports to the Government, the right to drill shallow wells for geological data and the right to a prospecting licence.

101. In 1937–38 the company carried out an aerial survey of the Hadhramaut and also made a ground survey. The results were not very promising, but the company is desirous of making a further examination, particularly of the Shabwa salt domes, when conditions permit this to be done.

102. On the outbreak of war the company informed the Governor of Aden that it was unable to continue surveys, as such work was not likely to further the war effort, and it therefore applied for a renewal of the licence (which was valid only for two years). The Governor accepted this plea, and has since granted further renewals of the licence.

XIX.—*The Yemen*

103. So far as is known, no oil concessions covering any part of the Yemen have ever been granted by the Imam Yahya. He is extremely averse to any foreign penetration into his country, and is therefore unlikely to grant any concession; he is, however, an old and sick man, and his successor may prove less obdurate. Prospects of finding oil are regarded as extremely poor (it will be recalled that a geological survey of Asir yielded disappointing results).

104. If any company succeeded in securing a concession in the Yemen, it would find it difficult to carry out prospecting or exploitation work in the eastern [illegible] the Yemen and Sa'udi Arabia.

XX.—*Persia*

105. At the present time Persia is producing far more oil than all the other Middle Eastern countries combined, and her reserves of petroleum are known to be extremely large; they may, however, be rivalled in time by the reserves in the oil-bearing regions of Kuwait, Sa'udi Arabia and Qatar bordering the western side of the Persian Gulf. So far, only the western and south-western regions of Persia have been extensively prospected and developed, and all the present production is from them. It is possible that the northern areas may also be found to contain important oilfields.

(i) *Western and South Western Persia*

106. The Persian Government granted the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company its present concession, which is valid until 1993, on the 20th April, 1933. This concession was subsequently approved by the Majlis and the Shah; it replaced the D'Arcy concession which the Persian Government had cancelled in 1932.

107. The A.I.O.C. was bound by the terms of the new concession to select by the end of 1938 one or more areas aggregating not more than 100,000 square miles [illegible] to the south of a line drawn from the Perso-Iraqi frontier near Sulaimaniya to the Perso-Baluch frontier near Irafshan. The company selected [illegible] some 870 miles long and has an average width of 100 miles, extends from the Iraq frontier north of Qasr-i-Shirin to the entrance to the Persian Gulf; it includes all the company's existing oilfields, namely the older fields of Masjid-i-Sulaiman [illegible] Haftkel, Pazanun, and the small oilfield of Naft-i-Shah (the last [illegible] under A.I.O.C. [illegible] 19[illegible] [illegible] 9,000 [illegible] [illegible] in the future.

108. The oil is conveyed by pipe-line from the main producing fields to the refinery at Abadan, which is one of the largest and most up to date in the world; the present capacity is over 11,000,000 tons a year. There is a large plant at Abadan for the production of aviation spirit. Most of the oil processed at Abadan is exported, but some is distributed in Persia. Most of the oil requirements of the west, north-west and north of the country are, however, met by the small Kermanshah refinery, which treats crude oil piped from the Naft-i-Shah

[illegible] The company is bound by the terms of its concession to sell products for [illegible]al consumption at a special basic rate. The present capacity of Abadan Refinery is over 15 million tons per annum.

110. Royalty is at the rate of 4 [illegible] per ton of petroleum sold for consumption in Persia or exported from that country. The company is also bound to pay the Persian Government a sum equal to 20 per cent of the distribution to its [illegible] these heads is to be £750,000 a year. The company's royalty payments to the [illegible] important source of revenue and are likely to become still more important in the future.

111. The A.I.O.C. provides employment for 58,000 Persians, many of whom have become skilled artisans.

112. As soon as the A.I.O.C. had selected its areas for exploitation, it relinquished the remainder of the territory lying to the south of the line forming the northern limit of the exploration area. It then became possible for other interests to apply for oil concessions covering the territory in question. In 1944 representatives of the Royal Dutch Shell group and of certain United States companies were negotiating in Tehran for the grant of concessionary rights in the south-east of the country, but these negotiations were broken off when the Persian Government decided early in September 1944 to grant no oil concessions during the war.

(ii) *Northern Persia*

113. There are many indications of petroleum in northern Persia, but, until more prospecting and, in particular, test-drilling have been carried out, all that can be said is that the prospects of finding oil in commercial quantities, though reasonably good, are speculative.

114. Numerous attempts have been made to secure concessions and exploit oil in the northern provinces, but they have all, so far, proved unsuccessful. The main, but not the only, cause for this failure has been the attitude of Russia. In 1901 it was Russian influence which prevented Mr. D'Arcy from securing the inclusion of the five northern provinces in his concession and which, in fact, all but brought about the failure of his negotiations for the concession covering the rest of Persia.

(a) *The Khostharia Concession and the A.I.O.C. and S.O.C. Negotiations*

115. In 1916 a Georgian adventurer named Khostharia acquired a small concession in the province of Mazandaran based upon a *farman* (royal decree) granted in 1896. In the same year Khostharia obtained from the Persian Government a much more extensive concession covering the rest of Mazandaran and the whole of the neighbouring provinces of Gilan and Astarabad. In 1917 this concession was extended to cover the district of Ardabil, in Azarbaijan. The A.I.O.C. acquired this concession in 1920 and formed a company named North Persian Oils, Ltd., to operate it. The A.I.O.C. thereupon notified the Persian Government of the completion of the transfer. On the 20th June, 1920, the Persian Government informed the company that the Khostharia concession was for several reasons regarded as null and void. The situation took on a new aspect when the Persian and Soviet Governments signed a Treaty of Friendship at Tehran on the 26th February, 1921. By article XII of this treaty Soviet Russia declared that all concessions (with certain exceptions specified in the treaty) obtained by force by the Tsarist Government and its subjects were null and void and that the said concessions were therefore restored "to the Persian Government as representing the Persian people." By article XIII the Persian Government, for their part, promised "not to cede to a third Power or to its subjects the concessions and property thus restored to Persia, and to maintain these rights for the Persian nation."

[illegible] 1921 [illegible] New Jersey applied to the [illegible] with the Persian Government on behalf of the A.I.O.C., but was informed in reply that the Khostharia concession was no longer valid. Meanwhile, the Standard Oil Co. continued to press for its [illegible] the grant of the [illegible] rights in the northern provinces to that concern. Immediately this action became known [illegible] of the alleged infringement of the A.I.O.C.'s rights and [illegible] of the terms of the 1921 treaty. In order to surmount the difficulties [illegible]

treaty, the Persian Government addressed a note on the 12th December, 1921, to the Soviet Diplomatic Representative at Tehran to the effect that the Majlis desired the retrocession of Russian concessions to be without reserve or condition, and therefore asked for the treaty to be revised accordingly. On the same date the Soviet Diplomatic Representative sent a purposely vague reply. After stating that his Government had "never sought to place any restriction upon the progress and prosperity of Persia," he went on to say: "I would be prepared should friendly relations be maintained between the two nations, to promote negotiations with a view to a total or partial revision of these articles on the lines desired by the Persian Government as far as the interests of Russia permit."

117. As matters had reached a deadlock, the A.I.O.C. and the Standard Oil Company agreed to act together on a footing of equality, with the result [illegible] The two companies then sought jointly to secure the grant of a new concession, but the Persian Government refused, partly because of the difficulty with Soviet Russia and partly because a new competitor, the Sinclair Oil Corporation, had appeared on the scene (see paragraph 119 below).

118. Although North Persian Oils, Ltd. has never renounced its claims in northern Persia, it is now many years since it last attempted to press them. In 1935 the name of the company was changed to North Iranian Oils, Ltd.

(b) *The Sinclair Concession*

119. While the A.I.O.C. and the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey were [illegible] Corporation opened negotiations with the Persian Government and successe[illegible] in securing a concession. This company failed to proceed with the ma[illegible] because (i) it was unable to raise the necessary money for a loan to the Persian Government, (ii) charges of bribing certain Persian officials were brought against it, and (iii) the company's prestige had been very adversely affected by its implication in the Teapot Dome scandal in the United States.

(c) *Société Franco-Persane de Recherches*

120. A Franco-Belgian group began negotiating for a concession in northern Persia in 1927 and formed the Syndicat des Etudes Franco-Persanes [illegible] out some prospecting work, the results of which were [illegible] to lead to the formation, in 1930, of the Société Franco-[illegible] Recherches. The new company sent out a party of geologists [illegible] engineers and sank a shallow well at Naft Chal, in Mazandaran, a [illegible] from the Caspian coast. Late in the same year, however, all opera[illegible] were abandoned because of difficulties encountered with the Persian and Soviet Governments.

(d) *The American Concession.*

121. In 1936 the Seaboard Oil Company of Delaware, U.S.A., with a view to possible operations in Persia, formed a subsidiary, the Am[illegible] Company, in which it took up 50 per cent. of the shares, the remaining 50 per cent. being allocated to the Texas Corporation.

122. On the 3rd January, 1937, the Persian Government granted the Amiranian Oil Company an oil concession valid for 60 years in north-eastern and [illegible] terms, which followed very closely those of the A.I.O.C. concession of 1933, bound the company to select within 3 years exploitation areas not exceeding 100,000 square miles in the aggregate from an exploration area covering 200,000 square miles. Although the greater part of this exploration area was in Khurasan, [illegible]

123. [illegible] they lodged a protest, but instead of basing this protest, as might have been expected, on the infringement of article XIII of the 1921 treaty, they objected on the grounds that the existing good neighbourly relations between the two countries, and the benefits conferred on Persia by the Soviet Government, had entitled them at least to be informed in advance of the granting of the concession, which, if granted to the nationals of certain other countries, might have been a matter of serious concern to them.

124. The company's geologists examined some very promising indications of petroleum in the province of Astarabad and some less encouraging seepages

in the neighbourhood of Zahidan. As a result, the company intended for a time to drill in Astarabad, but it subsequently decided to abandon the concession because of the difficulty and expense of developing such a relatively remote area [illegible] would probably have rendered the enterprise uneconomic.

125. In the course of its operations the company spent $2,000,000.

(e) *The Pipe-line Concession*

126. At the same time as the Amiranian Oil Company obtained its concession, the Iranian Pipe-Line Company, which was formed by the same interests, secured a 60-year concession from the Persian Government giving it the non-exclusive right to construct a main pipe-line to any part of Persia, together with tributary lines to connect it with other lines in Persia or in neighbouring countries (i.e. Afghanistan). The existing rights of other companies (that is the A.I.O.C.) were to be respected. The company's lines were authorised to carry oil from wells in Persia and/or Afghanistan produced by the Amiranian or other companies. This concession was surrendered in June, 1938, when the Amiranian and Inland Exploration companies abandoned their concessions in, respectively, Persia and Afghanistan.

(f) *The Kavir Khurian Company*

127. Khostharia, having acquired certain of the rights conferred by a *farman* which had been granted many years previously to a Persian known as the Amin al Mulkin, registered the Kavir Khurian Company in Tehran in 1925 in order to exploit the oil deposits in the desert region (*kavir*) to the south of Semnan, some 120 miles to the east of the capital. The fact that the company was registered does not necessarily imply that it has any valid claim to concessionary rights.

128. As soon as the A.I.O.C. heard of the registration of this company, it protested to the Persian Government on the grounds that Semnan lay within the area of the D'Arcy concession. The Government, however, maintained that Semnan was in the province of Khurasan and that it was therefore not within the A.I.O.C.'s concessionary area.

129. Although the company was established on a somewhat flimsy basis, Khostharia, who was on its board, showed great activity on its behalf. He persuaded the Russian Bank to furnish the bulk of the capital, and distributed a number of shares in a judicious manner to certain influential Persians. At a later date Khostharia offered a holding in the company to French and Italian interests, with the result that the former sent a party of geologists to examine the company's area. It is believed that their report was unfavourable; on the other hand, a leading Soviet geologist named Golubiatnikov is said to have formed a different opinion.

130. Up to the present only two wells have been drilled, and commercial production has not been obtained.

131. Shortly after the Allied entry into Persia in the autumn of 1941, the question of this company was, it is believed, discussed by the Persian Government and the Soviet Embassy; the former is said to have maintained that the company's title was not valid and that a new agreement would have to be negotiated before the area could be exploited. When M. Kavtaradze, the Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, arrived in Tehran at the beginning of September, 1944, the ostensible object for his visit was the study of the position of the Kavir Khurian Company.

(g) *The N.V. Algemeene Exploratie Maatschappij*

132. On the 11th August, 1939, the Persian Government granted the N.V. Algemeene Exploratie Maatschappij, a Dutch concern connected with the Royal Dutch-Shell group, an exploration concession, valid for two years, for minerals (including petroleum) in western and north-western Persia. This area, which covered some 32,000 square miles, was an elongated quadrilateral of irregular shape running from near Tabriz in the north-west to a point south of Kashan in the south. The length was 420 miles and the average width was 80 miles. An extension of this concession up to April 1944 was later granted when this extension was on the point of expiring the company started negotiations for a further extension. No extension or renewal of this concession has yet been granted, doubtless because of the decision of the Persian Government to shelve such matters until after the war.

(h) *The Soviet Government's Request for an Oil Concession*

133. It soon became apparent after the arrival of M. Kavtaradze in Tehran that the real object of his visit was to negotiate for the granting of an oil concession in northern Persia. When M. Kavtaradze made his official request for this concession, the Persian Prime Minister informed him that the Government had already decided to postpone until after the war the question of granting oil concessions covering any part of Persia. M. Kavtaradze and the Soviet Embassy thereupon put such pressure on the Persian Government that it was forced to resign, despite the fact that it had the backing of public opinion. The new Cabinet followed the same policy as its predecessor in regard to the oil [illegible] of the Deputies to prevent the Prime Minister or any other member of the Government from entering into negotiations with any foreign Government or company or from signing any concession or agreement relating to oil.

134. Foiled in his attempt to secure the concession, M. Kavtaradze left Tehran for Moscow on the 9th December. It now remains to be seen whether the Soviet Government will return to the charge.

135. From a survey of the long and extremely complicated history of north Persian oil, certain points clearly emerge:—

(i) If any [illegible] north, it seems extremely probable that the Soviet Government would put such pressure on the Persian Government as to render it most difficult, if not impossible, for its application to be granted.

(ii) The [illegible] any firm attempting to exploit the concession would, if it discovered large quantities of oil, be confronted with the difficulty of finding a satisfactory way of transporting this oil. The only natural outlet for north Persian oil is via the Caucasus, and it seems in the highest degree unlikely that the Soviet Government would agree to such oil being transported to western markets via Baku and Batum, since it would thereby be competing with products from those centres. The only alternative would be a long and very costly pipe-line over the Elburz and Zagros mountains to the Persian Gulf.

(iii) The petroleum requirements of northern Persia would not, in themselves, be sufficient to justify the heavy expenditure on drilling and on the erection of a refinery that would be required; moreover, it must be borne in mind that most of the marketing for this region is already being done by the A.I.O.C. with products from its Naft-i-Shah field which are refined at Kermanshah. Furthermore Soviet-Russian competition in this market might at any time be revived.

(iv) It would thus seem that north Persian oil could be exploited only by the Soviet Government or by some Persian or other concern in which they had a large interest.

XXI.—*Afghanistan*

136. In 1927 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (as it was then called) was unofficially offered a [illegible] on the grounds that the Tirpul area near Herat, where there were oil indications, was in the Russian economic sphere and that the inaccessibility of the area made it commercially unattractive. The Burmah Oil Company and the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company likewise considered the possibility of taking up a concession in Afghanistan [illegible] from [illegible] extremely costly [illegible] oil were found, the cost of a pipe-line to some point on the coast of Makran or [illegible] would be very [illegible].

137. Undeterred by these objections, two United States companies, the Seaboard Oil Company of Delaware and the Texas Corporation, formed a joint concern [illegible] for the purpose of negotiating for and exploiting a concession in Afghanistan. A concession agreement was signed by representatives of the Afghan Government [illegible] was modelled [illegible] the provisions of the Amiranian Oil Company's concession in Persia, which were more favourable to the Government.

138. The exploration area covered the whole of Afghanistan, but the company was bound by the terms of its concession to select within 3 years five provinces for exploitation, the rest of the area being abandoned.

139. [illegible] a promising area near Khanabad, 40 miles south of the river Oxus, and another near Sar-i-Pul, 65 miles south-west of Balkh and about the same distance north-east of Maimana. Both these areas were not far from producing fields in the Shirabad region in Soviet Central Asia, on the further (north) side of the Oxus. The Afghan Government refused to allow the company to put down test wells in this northern territory. The company also examined the Tirpul area, which was found to be disappointing, and it started to survey some districts further to the south, but the Afghan officials prevented it from carrying out a thorough examination.

140. Owing to this obstructiveness and to the remoteness of the more promising regions examined, the Inland Exploration Company abandoned its concession in June 1938.

XXII.—U.S.S.R.

141. In order to complete this survey of the oil resources of the Middle East, it is necessary to describe briefly the very rich Soviet oilfields in the Caucasus and the less important fields on the eastern side of the Caspian sea, although most of these fields are not, strictly speaking, within the area covered by this survey.

(i) *Baku.*

142. The Baku oilfields are by far the richest in the whole of the Soviet Union. Before the war they produced 24,000,000 tons of crude oil a year, and production in 1944 is estimated at some 26,000,000 tons or 70 per cent. of the total output (37,000,000 tons) of the Union. Baku oil is dealt with as follows:—

(a) *Crude Oil.*—The bulk of the crude oil produced is refined in Baku, of the remainder, some is piped to Batum for treatment there, while the rest is taken by sea to Makhach-Kala whence it is sent partly by pipe-line and partly by rail to Grozny for refining.

(b) *Finished Products.*—Part of the kerosene refined at Baku is conveyed to Batum by pipe-line. The rest of the kerosene and the other finished products are disposed of in the following manner: (i) Rail to Batum, (ii) Rail to Grozny, Rostov and beyond, (iii) Tanker to Makhach-Kala and thence by pipe-line and rail to Grozny and beyond, (iv) Tanker to Astrakhan and thence by river tanker and barge up the Volga. The Baku crude oil refined at Grozny is similarly dealt with, some being piped or sent by rail to Rostov and beyond and some being piped to Makhach-Kala, whence it is shipped to Astrakhan for onward transport by Volga tanker (there is a short pipe-line from the Volga roadstead, near the mouth of the river, to a point just to the north of Astrakhan).

(ii) *Grozny.*

143. The Grozny fields seemed at the outset to offer great possibilities, and refineries of very large capacity were therefore erected to treat the oil produced. Production, however, fell very far short of the estimates, and the surplus refining capacity at Grozny has since been used to deal with Baku oil.

144. Before the war Grozny production amounted to 2,700,000 tons a year or 8·5 per cent. of the total for the Soviet Union; production in 1944 is estimated at 2,500,000 tons.

145. In pre-war days there was a pipe-line from Grozny to Rostov and Trudovaya. It is not known whether this pipe-line is again in operation along its entire length (667 miles).

(iii) *Maikop.*

146. The Maikop fields produced some 2,500,000 tons of good quality oil before the war. This oil was refined partly at Krasnodar and partly at Tuapse. The Maikop fields suffered very severely as a result of military operations in that area, in consequence, production in 1944 is estimated at only 100,000 tons.

(iv) *Emba-Dossor.*

147. Production in these fields rose from 650,000 tons in 1938 to an estimated total of 1,000,000 tons in 1944. The crude oil is conveyed by pipe-line to the refineries at Orsk and Guriev.

(v) *Tuva Caspian.*

148. The field at Nefteda to the south-east of Krasnovodsk produced 436,000 tons in 1938; production in 1944 is estimated at 1,800,000 tons. The oil is conveyed by rail to Krasnovodsk and thence by tanker across the Caspian to Baku and Makhach-Kala for treatment.

149. The Baku oilfields have now been exploited for over 60 years and fears of their approaching exhaustion have often been entertained. However, new wells drilled in the shallow waters of the Caspian near Baku have proved successful and further drilling elsewhere in that region has revealed more extensive [illegible] the exhaustion of the Baku fields within a measurable period of time and the not unnatural desire to avoid having "too many eggs in one basket" have caused the Soviet Government to make strenuous efforts to discover "a second Baku." The Grozny fields have proved very disappointing and the extensive deposits in the Emba-Dossor-Ufa regions, though promising, have not yet come fully up to expectations. In addition, there is the Soviet desire to discover and exploit oil in regions to the east of Baku, in view of the general development of Soviet industry in the east.

150. For all these reasons, the Soviet oil experts have for long had their eyes on a number of hitherto unexploited regions in the Soviet Union and also in northern Persia, where there are, as already stated, extensive indications of petroleum.

Research Department, Foreign Office,
28th February, 1945.

E 2091/2/65] No. 44

Lord Killearn to Mr. Eden.—(Received 28th March.)

(No. 80. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, 23rd March, 1945.

OLD rivalries between Arab States have become accentuated during discussions leading up to the constitution of the Arab League, and in these rivalries Egypt has entered as a new element. The rivalry between Egypt and Iraq for the leading rôle in the Arab Union became evident from the beginning of the discussions. The Hashemites and Nuri, so intimately associated with the Arab Movement from [illegible] by a newcomer from the major rôle. By a natural process Ibn Saud aligned himself with Egypt against his old enemies, the Hashemites and Nuri. The Lebanon, which was fearful of domination by a still uneuropeanised Moslem hinterland, [illegible] than Syria and Iraq. Memories of Ibrahim Pasha were even evoked to promote closer relations between the Lebanon and Egypt. Syria, which at the beginning was not enthusiastically pro-Egyptian, has gradually evolved towards Egypt owing to the desire of the present governing elements in Syria to preserve the republican regime and their apprehensions of Hashemite designs on Syria. King Farouk has always feared [illegible] and there is no love lost between them. Moreover inevitably a Hashemite Emir with his dreams of a Syrian throne would find himself in the opposite camp to that of the present Syrian rulers. It was equally inevitable that in spite of rivalries between [illegible] Syria, the two Hashemite Powers should find themselves standing together against the Egyptian *bloc*.

2. The latest phase of these developments is [illegible], the movement towards the conclusion of treaties between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, with the suggested adherence of Syria, and between Egypt and the Lebanon. The Hashemites are thus tending to be isolated in the Arab League.

3. The movement towards Arab Union, encouraged by our declaration of sympathy towards any attempt of the Arabs to get together, started with the

[illegible]

[illegible] throne by assuming a similar role. King [illegible] opposed [illegible] the idea of Arab Union because he feared it would mean a Hashemite [illegible] the Fertile Crescent with the consequent danger to his own position [illegible] the Hejaz. Hence his determination to *subotee* any northern combination. The Lebanon was determined to preserve its complete independence in order to avoid absorption in a Moslem *bloc*. The attitudes of the Lebanon and Ibn Saud led to the emasculation of the corporate idea of the League and that of the Lebanon to the [illegible] of any [illegible] of the League such as that involved in compulsory arbitration. Ibn Saud and the Lebanon were kept within the League largely by the influence of Egypt, whose support in the Council they regarded as a guarantee against the dangers which they saw in it to their [illegible] under the rule of Damascus, acquiesced in the maintenance of the present divisions [illegible] fear that prosecution of the idea of a Greater Syria would drive the Lebanon back into French arms. Syrian acquiescence was no doubt also partly due to the influence of Egypt, whose assistance it needed for its emancipation from France and for support against Hashemite designs.

5. It is clear from all this that the influence of Egypt is a determining factor in the present evolution of Arab States. It is also clear that the Hashemites are being relegated to the background, largely owing to Egyptian manipulation [illegible] their rivals. This is not a happy state of affairs. We are under obligations to the Hashemites for the role they played in the last war and for their stabilising influence in Transjordan and Iraq. As things are at present in the Arab world it is not in our interest that Hashemite prestige should be weakened in these countries. I submit therefore that our efforts should be directed against [illegible] of the Hashemites within the Arab League. If we make representations to Ibn Saud against exclusive treaty making, we should make similar representations [illegible] and to remove the danger that the present discords may [illegible]

6. Arab Union has now been realised [illegible] Egypto-Arab *bloc* of independent units preserving their [illegible] pre-League period. There will no doubt be [illegible] members of the League and without our [illegible] argued by some on the principle of divide and rule, that such disintegration would [illegible] the Egypto-Arab world should not be [illegible] conflicts which will expose it not only to British but also to Russian [illegible] as far as our Imperial interests permit. These aspirations, though often obscured by rivalries such as I have described, nevertheless constitute a permanent factor [illegible] Great Britain [illegible] stability of the whole Middle East.

7. At present it may be said that the only aims on which [illegible] are united are those of getting rid of the French from Syria [illegible] the Zionist domination of Palestine. Whatever [illegible]

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TREATY

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Further Correspondence

respecting

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 61

April to June 1945

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CONFIDENTIAL

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PART 61.—APRIL TO JUNE 1945

CHAPTER I.—AFGHANISTAN

E 2105/67/97 No. 1

Mr Squire to Mr Eden.—(Received 30th March.)

No. 21.

Kabul, 16th March, 1945

SIR,

IN my despatch No. 12 of the 10th February last, I promised a fuller report [illegible] the visit of the recent Afghan Military Mission and I have now the honour to [illegible] military attaché's letter and enclosures on the subject.(1) The report has been prepared in great detail largely for purposes of record and for general purposes it will be sufficient to read only the main report of the tour along with Appendices C and D which deal with the supply of war material from India, though the whole report contains much [illegible] 1944 [illegible] 1945, and took the mission from Peshawar to Delhi, Dehra Dun, [illegible], Calcutta and the Burma Front and back via Calcutta, Ahmednagar [illegible] Agra, Delhi and Lahore. The only serious contretemps was the [illegible] of Brigadier Md. Arif Khan the second in command of the mission, who [illegible] incapacitated by tonsilitis at Dehra Dun and had to remain there in hospital [illegible] 16th December and was only able to rejoin the mission at Calcutta [illegible] the 5th January [illegible] unqualified success, chiefly owing to the meticulous [illegible] for the whole programme had been made and [illegible] shown to the mission throughout [illegible] inferiority complex so usual in small countries, [illegible] attention which the [illegible] mission itself and on the Arakan [illegible] received expressions of gratitude from many quarters. In my previous despatch I reported that the head of the mission had called on the American Minister and myself in person to express his gratitude and that the Minister of Defence [illegible] given a dinner party for the same purpose. The Afghan Foreign Minister similarly expressed the gratitude of himself and his Government and after making informal enquiries whether an official letter from himself or from the Minister of Defence would be more appropriate, has now written officially on behalf of his Government requesting me to convey their sincere thanks to His Majesty's Government and the Government of India for the kindness and hospitality shown to the mission.

3. From a military point of view the results may be classified under two heads, psychological and material. The friendliness shown to the mission

(1) Not printed.

throughout their journey the readiness to show them all sorts of modern [illegible] and training and, finally, the generous offer of weapons and [illegible]ities for training in their use made a great impression on the [illegible]rs comprising the mission, and may be counted on to have an even more [illegible]rtant effect on the outlook of the Afghan army as a whole. They have been [illegible]ght up to look on the British as their hereditary enemies and to regard the Indian army with the gravest suspicion. The treatment they have received will [illegible] a long way to remove these suspicions. Of the material results of the [illegible] it is as yet too early to speak. As mentioned at the end of paragraph 6 of the general report the Afghan Government are considering the offer of arms and equipment that has been made and I expect to be consulted about the whole [illegible] very shortly.

4. The success of the mission should have an even wider effect on opinion in the country as a whole. The Afghan Foreign Minister has spoken to me [illegible] than one occasion. He regards the actual agreement regard[illegible] any arms and equipment that may eventually be supplied as of mino[illegible] importance in comparison with the fact that now for the first time in [illegible] His Majesty's Government have given clear proof of their readiness to trust the Afghan Government and to give them the substantial help they require [illegible]

[illegible]tion with you, Sir, while he was Minister in London some [illegible] which in reply to the sympathy which you had expressed on behalf of His Majesty's Government with Afghan aspirations, he had asked where his country could look for the material help she needed, and had received [illegible]ngement! The effect of our new attitude would be and be of inestimable value, and already the tendency to blame the British for all the difficulties that the country was experiencing, and had experienced during the last 100 yea[illegible] [illegible]been in evidence, not only among older people but also, and far more important among the younger generation. He looked for a rapid extension of this new feeling of friendship and confidence. Such an opinion may be exaggerated but I do not think that it is devoid of foundation. That the Afghan Government are genuinely doing their best to foster such friendly sentim[illegible] is shown by the appreciative references in the Afghan press d[illegible] Appendix E.

5. In the last paragraph of his general report Colonel Lancaster has touched on the question of Russian reactions. When it had been finally decided to welcome the mission I had, as instructed in your telegram No. 104 dated the 13th August 1914, informed the Soviet Ambassador in general te[illegible] [illegible]et had also been mentioned both by the British and American m[illegible] to Major Raitzev. No particular interest was shown at the [illegible] as soon as the mission had returned both the Soviet Ambassador and his military attaché evinced the liveliest curiosity and some suspicion. They seemed to think that the mission had actually brought back with them a large quantity of arms and ammunition. They were surprised but at first by no means convinced when they heard that the only arms brought back with them consisted of two rifles presents to the head of the mission from the British and American military authorities. These suspicions we endeavoured to counter by explaining frankly the position and emphasising that the problem which was of main interest to [illegible] M. Najibullah Khan spoke himself to the Soviet Ambassador [illegible]at Afghanistan, in her backwater had been anxious to obtain first [illegible] information about the trends of modern warfare and also to acquire [illegible]dern weapons such as would enable her to exercise more effective control over her tribes. He added, that they had no need of such weapons as anti-aircraft guns, as they had no fear of attacks from without,(1) but that they did need more efficient weapons suitable for mountain warfare. Colonel Lancaster and I have also explained to our Russian opposite numbers that we have offered to supply Afghanistan with a certain amount of modern equipment as soon as the war is over and that these offers are now being considered by the Afghan Government. It seems that the ambassador's suspicions have been to a large extent allayed and when I last saw him he told me that M. Najibullah Khan had given him an account of the mission's activities in India. He added that [illegible] had also been much interested to read in a recent number of the *Indian Chronicle* (a paper published in Russian in Delhi) an article on the North West Frontier and that he felt that he now had a much better understanding of the difference between the administrative frontier and the Durand Line and of our problems in this area.

6. In paragraph 5 of his general report Colonel Lancaster has paid a tribute to American co-operation. It is a fact that the good relations existing between our two legations in Kabul have enabled us throughout to present a united front to the Afghan Government, and the co-operation afforded by the American military attaché, Major Fox, throughout the tour has contributed in no small measure to its success.

7. Finally, I cannot close this despatch without paying a tribute to the work of Colonel Lancaster on whom has fallen the principal burden of shepherding the mission throughout the Indian tour. His intimate knowledge of the Afghan character and understanding of the Afghans' point of view has enabled him to be guide, philosopher and friend to the chief of the mission and to have steered him past the many pitfalls into which he might easily have fallen. That the difficulties which he encountered were by no means small is shown by his comments on the detailed tour in Appendix B and are well instanced by his account of the trouble which he had at Imphal on the 2nd January. That the pitfalls were all successfully avoided is in itself the highest tribute to Colonel Lancaster's invariable good temper, patience and [illegible]

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
G. F. SQUIRE

CHAPTER II IRAQ

E 2177 195 93] No. 2

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 3rd April.)

(No. 117.)

Sir, *Baghdad, 19th March, 1945.*

I HAVE the honour to submit, with reference to my despatch No. 28 of the 15th January last, the following summary of principal events in Iraq since that date.

2. The rumours of changes in the Cabinet mentioned in the second paragraph of my despatch under reference proved completely baseless and the Government of Hamdi al Pachachi remains in office with, however, the possibility of changes before the Regent leaves in April on his official visit to the United States. The storms which arose during the long debate on the reply to the speech from the Throne have died away as suddenly as they came. Speeches in Parliament have recently been less concerned with personalities, have kept to the point under discussion, and have been less unconstructively critical than heretofore. There is also a salutary tendency for members to ask questions on matters affecting their [illegible] constituencies. One reason for the improvement of the general standard of Parlia[illegible] the publication of their proceedings in the press, which now has far more [illegible] to comment than formerly. At the instance of a group of Bagdad place-holders, the important new Liwa Administration Bill, which has been under consideration for so long, was referred by the Chamber back to a Committee, but the Government were determined not to allow it to remain on the shelf, and it [illegible] now been passed and will shortly become law, though it will be a year before [illegible] effect will be to decentralise the administration and, I hope, to revitalise the [illegible] provinces.

3. One event of minor political note occurred on the 3rd February when [illegible]al Beg al Madfai resigned his seat in the Senate. No reason was given for [illegible] publicly, but it is generally assumed to have been due to his bitterness at being removed from the presidency of the Senate, as the result of a plot sponsored by the Regent and Nuri Pasha. However this may be, Jamil Beg is no longer in Parliament and no serious effects have so far been observable.

4. Some weeks ago I was visited by a Shaikhly Deputy from Diwaniya Liwa who sought my opinion on a scheme which he and others of his kind [illegible] hatching. This was the formation of a tribal party in the Chamber of [illegible] membership of which would be forbidden to Effendis and to [illegible] I said that I saw no particular harm in the idea [illegible] "[illegible]ary *bloc*," as it is called, was (with the Regent's approval [illegible] on wondering world on the 10th February. After all the rec[illegible] political parties in the press and in Parliament, one cannot [illegible] it should have been the Shaikhs, even though led by the armchair [illegible] Suhail, who should have shown the Effendis the way. Abdul Aziz Beg al [illegible] al Suhail the secretary of the *bloc*. Its guiding principles are stated to be loyalty to the throne, friendship with Britain and preservation of the faith of Islam. I scarcely expect that the new party will have very much influence on affairs, or indeed that it will hold together very long. Its formation, however, as the first political party to come into existence since 1931, is worth recording.

5. There has been continued interest in Arab Unity. Nuri Pasha has come and gone from point to point with tireless zeal. His public statements have not [illegible] decision to leave the handling of Arab Unity affairs very largely to Nuri Pasha, though not without some measure of protest from the Senate, which was rather hurt that it had not first been consulted on this matter. Interest in Arab unity [illegible] been sustained in the press, which has combined the usual attacks on [illegible] perialism" with dissertations on Palestine and Syria; but it has, at the same time, remained clear that the Arabs, like the peoples of the west, find it hard [illegible] policy which they conceive menaces the Arab States individually or collectively.

6. The meeting of King Ibn Saud and Farouk at Yenbo revealed an immediate divergence of opinion, and emphasised the continued existence of rival

ambitions within the Arab world. Messages about this meeting were for the most part published without comment in the Iraqi press. On the other hand, the meeting of the Regent of Iraq with Amir Abdullah of Transjordan was hailed as an important event in Arab affairs. The Regent and the Amir Abdullah were clearly disturbed that Saudi Arabia and Egypt should show such solidarity and were apprehensive of the effects of the discussions between the two kings on Hashimite claims to Arab leadership, and perhaps also on Hashimite claims to more material things, like the throne of Syria. The press, voicing what is now, I think, the feeling of most of this country, clearly expressed its support of the House of Hashim and refrained from attaching any significance to the Farouk–Ibn Saud Conference which might appear to conflict with the interests of Iraq's ruling dynasty.

7. The fear that Hashimite claims might be overlooked, or passed by, was unfortunately strengthened in the minds of the Regent and his Ministers when they heard that Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt had met King Ibn Saud in Egypt and had conveniently found in the same country the President of Syria. [illegible] necessary to do more than just mention the matter in this despatch.

8. Kurdish affairs have, on the whole, been quiet during the period under report. Mulla Mustafa after some further touring seems inclined for the moment to take no initiative in attacking the Government. The rôle of *reconciliateur* has been temporarily assumed by his elder brother Shaikh Ahmad and Beg Mahmud Agha Zibari, while Mulla Mustafa sits back and disclaims any responsibility for what these two may do. Mulla Mustafa was persuaded to meet the Mutasarrif of Erbil, to whose charge Barzan has now been transferred, at Walash on the 17th January, and the results of the meeting are said to have been satisfactory. An amnesty for Mulla Mustafa and his followers for the events of 1943–44 will shortly be laid before Parliament, and is expected to be passed without much opposition. Apprehension in the Rowanduz–Barzan area is stated to be growing as a result of rumours of approaching Iraqi army manœuvres in the north in which British troops are to participate and highly-coloured rumours are circulating of when and where the army will attack and of "counter measures" being taken by the Kurds. Much of this agitation can be discounted, but there is no denying that tension exists and the situation will require careful handling. I propose prior to my departure to address a farewell letter to Mulla Mustafa in which I shall not only explain clearly that the coming military exercises will neither threaten nor impinge on his territory, but will also tender him some good [illegible] is largely a conflict of wrong. In the past, the Bagdad Government has been neglectful and vindictive in dealing with its Kurdish areas. On the other hand, the Kurdish Aghas are ignorant, rapacious and reactionary. Their time is up, and they know it. They are now fighting a delaying action with all the weapons at their command, of which bluff and blackmail are two. In the end, Bagdad will win, but it is our duty to see that, if possible, the victory shall be bloodless.

9. Tribal affairs have been more turbulent than in previous months. In particular, there has been renewed trouble between the Shammar Khurassa tribe of Iraq and the Agaidat from Syria. On the 11th January a force of Agaidat numbering, it is said, some 1,000 men, with a similar number of followers, attacked an encampment of the Shammar at Bir al Bugharin north-east of Abu Kemal. In the ensuing fight about 120 of the Agaidat were reported killed and eleven of the Shammar also fell. The Agaidat, however, carried off considerable booty which the Iraqi police, who claim to have intervened and stopped the fighting, were unable to recover before the raiders had recrossed the border. Police patrols are now out on both sides and the Shammar have been ordered well away from the border. A meeting between the Muhafiz of Deir ez Zor and the Mutasarrif of Mosul has been arranged, but until they agree on a settlement and carry out its terms there will continue to be a danger that similar large-scale raids will [illegible]

10. The newly formed trades unions are showing a certain fairly discreet activity. Notices appear in the Arabic press from time to time stating that this or that union has sent a petition to some Government department or other asking that the workmen of the trade concerned should be granted a stated favour or concession such as an issue of Government cloth or new sugar ration cards. "Get-together" parties have even been arranged between the workers of one part of Bagdad and another.

11. I have not noticed that the unions have displayed much leaning towards communism," but as a subject of conversation this is still much to the fore. The arrival of M. Krikori Titovitch Zaitzev, the new Russian Minister, has inevitably led to much propaganda and many rumours. Not the least of the latter was to the effect that you and I, Sir, had opposed the establishment of diplomatic relations between Iraq and the Soviet and that the Russians had refused to appoint a Minister until I had been removed. The news of my resignation, coming as it did with M. Zaitzev, appeared to some to confirm this ridiculous theory. It is perhaps, at the same time, a small pointer to the power with which the Russians are credited by some of the uninformed in this country: *Omne ignotum pro magnifico.*

12. The Russian Minister himself is a pleasant young man, but not apparently a very outstanding personality. He has a capable Counsellor (formerly the Russian Consul at Kermanshah) named Kimov who has established friendly contact with my staff and it is thought in Iraqi circles that Kimov is the real brain in the Russian Legation. So far, there is little to report on their activities and such information as I have received shows that only the known "communists" have gone out of their way to flaunt their dutiful belief in the Soviet system.

[illegible] to Baghdad as Egypt an Minister. I knew him when he was here before in 1941 and find him an agreeable and friendly colleague.

14. A Syrian by the name of Baha ud Din Bakri, married to a daughter of Yasin Pasha al Hashimi, arrived here on the 8th February in the capacity of Syrian Chargé d'Affaires. Though he has secured a house for the legation, he has not yet begun to function as official Syrian representative, and Syrian visas are still being granted by His Majesty's Consulates and Embassy here.

15. M. Bakri has nonetheless had a busy time for the President of Syria, Shukri Bey Quwatli, has just been here on an official visit, accompanied by Sa'adullah Jabiri and others. The President and his party travelled in aircraft [illegible] and were very grateful for this courtesy. As I have reported by telegram, the visit cannot be regarded as an outstanding success. In the first place, as you are aware, the [illegible] between the Syrian Republic and the Hashimites, never easy, since the latter regard Damascus as by rights a Hashimite capital, have been strained ever since the Amir Abdullah was refused permission to visit Syria last August. More recently, the fact that President Quwatli flew to Jedda without informing the Iraqi Government of the object of this visit, caused a good deal of resentment here because it is felt locally that this country did far more for Syrian independence than any other in the Arab world. The Regent was by no means pleased to see President Quwatli, and had even talked of being out of Baghdad when he arrived. The general atmosphere therefore lacked cordiality and the receptions were formal and languid.

Shukri Quwatli himself and his colleagues were cast down by the failure of the United Nations to invite Syria to attend the San Francisco Conference. It cannot be said that this visit has done anything to advance the prospects of [illegible] of the personal, sectional and dynastic rivalries which obstruct the path to federation, of which mention has already been made in paragraphs 5 and 6 above.

16. The Minister Resident in Cairo accompanied by Lady Grigg and his private secretary honoured me with a visit from the 5th to 8th March. During [illegible] Sir Edward Grigg [illegible] the Regent, the Iraqi Prime Minister and Foreign Minister [illegible] visit to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company refinery at Abadan. His visit was most opportune [illegible]

17. While he was here the invitations to the San Francisco Conference were issued and Sir Edward and I had to receive the Iraqi Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and two ex Prime Ministers to record their protests that Syria and the Lebanon had not been invited. Comment in the press on this omission has been blunt and even bitter. There has even been criticism that Transjordan was not invited, though I do not think this has been meant very seriously.

18. On the 31st January Hamza Nafi' Agha the Iraqi member of German parachute expedition which landed in Iraq in 1943, and who was captured by the [illegible] was [illegible] court martial and sentenced to twenty years penal servitude under chapter 12 of the Baghdad Penal Code. The two parachutists mentioned as being at large in paragraph 20 of my despatch under reference have yet to be detained.

19. On the 3rd March a new list of twenty two persons released from internment at Amara was published. They are all men of no account, largely persons interned on criminal charges who should normally have been sent to the common jail.

20. Some of the members of the Iraqi delegation to the recent Conference of Chambers of Commerce at New York have returned. They visited other cities of [illegible] Commercial Secretariat of His Majesty's Embassy at Washington. One of them, Abdul Hadi Chelabi, has spoken a little to a member of my staff of his impressions of America, and did not seem to be unduly impressed with the advantages of trading with that country. He reported that in many cases, such [illegible] than the British, and no better. In luxury articles such as radios, refrigerators and cars the Iraqis could not do better than turn to the United States, but for other things he felt that the United Kingdom was still the best source of supply. He was surprised to find that the highest class of poplin and woollen cloth to be bought in America comes from Great Britain. He said that the Americans appeared to want to buy Iraqi dates, and he had actually been approached by [illegible] Ford Company for a deal involving a thousand tons of dates. The Americans [illegible] said, somewhat resented the way in which we had monopolised the date trade during the war. It is to be regretted that Abdul Hadi Chelabi's public comments have been far less constructive. In the vernacular press and elsewhere he [illegible] expansion between this country and America, and has aroused expectations of dollar credit on an impressive scale.

21. Dates have, I am afraid, been a sore point for the last two months, so far as growers on the Tigris and Euphrates are concerned. These growers have bitterly complained of the treatment they have received at the hands of the concessionary company, Messrs. Andrew Weir & Co. Ltd., who have perhaps been rather inclined to stand very strictly to the letter of the concession. The Date Board also appear to have helped in creating misunderstandings. In short, the growers of Zehdi dates outside the Basra area find themselves with large quantities of dates on their hands which Andrew Weirs refuse to take, for technical reasons, and which they are unable to sell elsewhere by reason of the concession and of the lack of transport. I hope, however, that the problem will be satisfactorily solved shortly, for it is one which is of concern to many Shaikhs and notables.

22. Discussions with the Iraqi Ministry of Finance looking to an agreement for the supply of United States dollars and other scarce foreign exchange for the present needs of this country during the current year are still in progress, and at last show signs of being successfully concluded. After some blunt speaking on the part of this embassy, Saleh Jabr has finally agreed to the surrender of such exchange to the sterling pool and to our other main desiderata. [illegible] writing, the main question still outstanding is that of "invisibles," *i.e.*, [illegible] provision of dollars for the Regent's visit to the United States, for Iraq's part in Arab propaganda, for students and so on. If as now seems likely, the present Minister of Finance is dropped from the Cabinet in the near future and replaced by the more knowledgeable and conciliatory Abdullah Hafidh, the last stages of these difficult negotiations should proceed smoothly and with reative speed.

23. There is little change to report in the economic situation in general. The country continues to suffer from an inordinately high price level and a striking shortage in consumer goods. Cotton textiles have, however, been arriving in reasonable quantities and distribution has now taken place in most areas. United Kingdom Commercial Corporation purchases of barley under last year's contract have been going well, and look like being completed before the end of May. Thanks to abundant rain during the winter, crop prospects are excellent and a barley surplus of 350 to 400,000 tons is confidently predicted. This has led me to recommend to you, Sir, the desirability of an early decision on the part of His Majesty's Government on their policy towards this crop surplus this year. I have represented that while we control all shipping and other transport serving this country, we cannot divest ourselves of interest in the disposal of surplus grain, which in turn foreshadows a continuation of "political buying" if serious political complications are to be avoided. While comparisons between local and world prices are unreal owing to the continued existence of special conditions in this and other Middle Eastern markets, prices this season should show a marked [illegible] than those paid in 1943.

24. Throughout the period under review the press has been more free and therefore more interesting than formerly. On the whole, its growing freedom has not so far been greatly abused. It is only occasionally, as for instance over Syria or the release of internees, that I have found it necessary to suggest moderation. So far as political detainees are concerned, the murder in Egypt of Ahmed Maher by a pro-Fascist fanatic he himself had caused to be released from internment, did not escape notice here. Compared with the vernacular press of Syria, Egypt and Palestine, the Bagdad papers are temperate and although from time to time articles do appear which can be construed as criticism of Britain, it must not be overlooked that day after day newspapers print articles which are very much in our favour. An interesting development is that the Bagdad Radio has taken of its own initiative to broadcasting a daily translation of "the Watchtower," the leading article in the *Iraq Times*.

25. The British Council has continued to function satisfactorily, and has made a preliminary selection of six research students who are to [illegible] to England at the Council's expense for the next academic year.

26. At the beginning of this month Shakespeare was performed in Iraq [illegible] cinema, but the production of "Romeo and Juliet" recently at the King Faisal Hall was the first English presentation on the stage. It was performed by the "Hassan Players," a group of military amateurs under the direction of a medical [illegible] Flecker's "Hassan," some eighteen months ago. They have also performed a translation of Sophocles' "Antigone" and T. S. Eliot's "Murder in the Cathedral." It was very noticeable that on the first [illegible] performances the majority of the audience were young Iraqis.

27. The "Brotherhood of Freedom" recently arranged an exhibition called "Iraq Know Thyself," the purpose of which was to bring home to the people of Iraq by means of cartoons and diagrams the principal hygienic deficiencies of the [illegible] has been remarkably successful and called forth official commenda[illegible] Minister of Education. The exhibition is now touring the provinces. On its return to Bagdad it is to be shown at the Iraq Army Officers' Club, at the request of the Minister of Defence.

28. An important series of changes has taken place or is taking place among the British Advisers [illegible] Mr. C. J. Edmonds, Adviser to [illegible] Mr. A. T. Dechburn, formerly [illegible] will take over shortly. Mr. K. J. Ritchie, Adviser to Education, has left after only a few months' work on doctors' orders, and he will shortly be succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel C. H. O. Scaife, formerly associate professor of English at Fuad al Awwal University in Cairo. Mr. E. T. Caparn has become Technical Adviser to the Ministry [illegible] Engineer. Mr. [illegible] the [illegible] Mr. [illegible] company [illegible]

29. [illegible] Political Agent at Kuwait, the Political Intelligence Centre in the Middle East and to His Majesty's Consular Officers in Iraq.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS

E 2431/195/93] No. 3

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 16th April.)

(No. 154.)

SIR, *Bagdad, 30th March, 1945.*

ON the eve of my departure from Bagdad it may be of interest if I briefly review the situation as it stands to-day at the end of the four years during which I have had the honour to be head of this mission.

2. When I arrived in April 1941 Rashid Ali al Gailani had established a strong hold on administration throughout the country. His chief supporters were a clique of ambitious politicians and army officers who had been brought up [illegible] Rashid Ali was not a popular leader but by

methods which by now have unfortunately become only too familiar, he established an armed dictatorship, and the people, cowed into acquiescence, could offer no resistance. Few Iraqis dared to visit me during that month.

3. The fundamental reasons for this state of affairs were four. First must be put the gradual weakening of the administration and of the authority of the [illegible] Next was the fact that, with the death of King Faisal in 1933, the country [illegible] its chief unifying force. His son, King Ghazi, was wild and unbalanced and [illegible] he met his death in 1938 the Crown passed to a child of 4. The latter's uncle, the Amir Abdul Illah, who became Regent, was completely inexperienced, a stranger to the country, and hampered by shyness and hesitancy. Nor had he any sensible or capable supporters to help him in establishing his position. He thus fell an easy prey to an unscrupulous gang. Thirdly there were the [illegible] Their old plans for eastern expansion were being revived, and they sent here as their minister a most industrious, experienced and energetic propagandist in [illegible] sought to guide the footsteps of a mercurial people on to constructive paths, his [illegible] assisted by the growing might of Germany and by the dynamism that emanated [illegible] Fourthly, to crown all, came the Arab rebellion in Palestine, and the harsh, but ineffective, measures which we were taking to suppress it. Day after day the German and Italian radio would denounce our actions, and day after day we made no attempt to justify them. Our foreign policy in general was weak and vacillating and our prestige sank steadily.

4. At the same time the contrast between Iraq and other parts of the Arab world was striking. In Saudi Arabia a strong man was in control of a kingdom which he himself had made, a kingdom which had never been the object of German ambitions. In Egypt and in Palestine we had maintained appreciable military forces for strategic reasons. In Syria the people were under control of the French army. In Iraq, however, despite its paramount importance, there were a few British aircraft but no British troops and no effective organisation to fight enemy [illegible] our influence decline. It was small wonder that, comparing our apparent weakness and ineffectiveness with the dominating position we had held only ten years before, the people of Iraq considered that, much as some might regret it, our time was done.

5. It was obvious in April 1941 that Rashid Ali hoped by feigning loyalty to the Anglo-Iraq Treaty [illegible] time as the Germans were able to send forces to Iraq. The prompt decision of His Majesty's Government to [illegible] Rashid Ali [illegible] on the help of his secret ally. The arrival at Basra from India of a second brigade forced his hand and he decided to attack while our forces were still weak. The tribes which had wavered and watched during April continued inactive during May, deaf to all his exhortations.

6. When Bagdad was freed at the end of May 1941 by a small column that could scarcely have reached here had the desert tribes thrown in their lot with Rashid Ali, it became clear that the country in the main was with us, and was much relieved to see the last of that traitor and his gang. But many pro-German pockets still existed, especially in the towns, and there was still the danger of German invasion—invasion from two sides, for at the end of 1941 the enemy stood both upon the frontiers of Egypt and in the foothills of the Caucasus. In these circumstances my aim was—

(a) To secure full facilities for our war requirements and unimpeded opportunities for training and defensive measures by our navy, army and Royal Air Force.

(b) [illegible] position by making people realise the advantage of alliance with us [illegible] influence the administration as far as possible, but not to the extent of causing a crisis and so jeopardising (a) and (b). Owing to my personal knowledge of the working of the governmental machine and my old friendship with Ministers, shaikhs and others, I happened to be favourably placed for this.

[illegible] to ordinary [illegible] increase knowledge of Britain and the British by the establishment of reading rooms, the operation of travelling cinemas, and above all by establishing personal contact with people in all walks of life. The Ikhwan al [illegible] with the people not only in Baghdad but in provincial towns [illegible] valuable contribution in bringing about a better understanding of our country and [illegible] lly, tribute must be paid to the work of the British military mission. [illegible] advisers and many other of the Iraqi Government officials, and of the [illegible] officers under the orders of Combined Intelligence Centre, Iraq. Nor [illegible] tion be omitted of the British army, which by its traditional straight [illegible] and good behaviour has done a great deal to heal old wounds. It is, [illegible] a source of gratification to me, and a real tribute to the personnel con[illegible] that all these different bodies have worked closely and amicably together [illegible] possible [illegible] Britons [illegible] far more than they e[illegible] that Iraqis as a whole were not with Rashid Ali, and that his revolt came [illegible] profound shock to them. They were ashamed, and wanted to make amends. Consequently we received full co-operation, both from the Government and from the people as a whole, even in the most difficult days of 1941 and 1942. [illegible] proof of this, it is to be noted that suspects of all kinds were energetically rounded up and interned, that the Iraqi authorities themselves, of their own motion, tried and hanged three of the four members of the Golden Square who fell into their hands, and that al. Rashid Ali's Ministers who are not in exile are in prison. Not a murmur has been heard from anyone against the execution of these drastic sentences.

As regards the question of influencing the Administration, it is not perhaps always realised how difficult Iraq is to govern. Unlike Egypt and the Levant before the British occupation Iraq had been subject to almost no Western influences. The country consisted in fact of three of the most neglected provinces of a moribund empire. In addition it was and is divided by feuds and differences, the Shia still nurtures his 1,000-year-old res[illegible] [illegible] e of the Moslem majority. Townsmen have little [illegible] t, who are heavily armed and accustomed from [illegible] force any encroachment on their privileges. This [illegible] ety calls for the highest standard of administration. Moreover, [illegible] hundred miles of wild land frontiers, with potentially trouble[illegible] Turkey, Persia and Saudi Arabia. Even in peace-time it [illegible] a difficult country to govern, but with the dislocation, mostly ex[illegible] the war has inevitably brought with it, it is small wonder that t[illegible] felt discontented with their Government. To deal with this situation the Iraqi Government had at their disposal a corps of officials, few of whom had received a Western education, and most of whom had been corrupted by ten years of mismule. Working with them was a very small group of British officials. Fortunately the Iraqi Government realised their own shortcomings and applied [illegible] officials in the Government than for many years past. Indeed, we cannot supply all the officers that are wanted. Of their own volition the Iraqi Government have, since 1941, placed Britons in executive charge of Imports and Exports, Irrigation, the Veterinary Service and the Transport Service, and we have also Britons as heads of the Port and of the Railways administrations. In all the

Ministries where they are employed British advisers are now effectively consulted. This has applied particularly to education, which before was a focus of anti-British agitation. On the whole, therefore, in spite of much corruption and inefficiency, it is only fair to record that the Iraqis have risen well to the occasion. Everywhere public security is good and taxes are collected. There is naturally grumbling about the high cost of living, the shortage of textiles and other commodities, but it is not serious. Only in Kurdistan to-day is there a potentially dangerous tension.

10. While the position is therefore comparatively satisfactory, it would be most misleading to pretend that it will automatically remain so. The problem of government without experienced assistance is too difficult for these people in their present state of development. This is clear now. It will become even clearer when British troops, which have done so much to steady the situation during the last four years, are withdrawn after the war. Besides the inherent stresses which I have described in paragraph 9, there are too many personal hates and rivalries, too little mutual confidence and public spirit, and too much intrigue to ensure stability and continuity, without some external influence [illegible] 1941 [illegible] although [illegible] He has many of the qualities and defects of his father. With [illegible] (most of whom are British) he has an easy, natural manner, [illegible] is liked by the Iraqi army, whose exercises he constantly attends, and which [illegible] he finds his public duties a very heavy burden, largely because there is no Iraqi in whom he feels he can place implicit confidence. He therefore needs prop[illegible] on all the time. There is no present alternative to him, and in any case anothe[illegible] change in the head of the State would be most unfortunate. It must alwa[illegible] every [illegible] administrated [illegible] national w[illegible] whom, for some few years more, mus[illegible] individualists. When they get into office their chief preoccupation is to score off their opponents, and to undermine hostile combinations in the Senate. N[illegible] Cabinet can endure long enough to produce continuity or stability. I [illegible] who should provide the latter, and I fear that we must do it for some [illegible] come because the rising generation, while it has produced many ardent critics, has hitherto furnished no men of courage or action. So far as the educated class is concerned, it is a generation of Hamlets. The malcontents of the so-called *intelligentsia* have pretended in this country, as in others, to be attracted to Russian political ideas. Th[illegible] probabl[illegible] less than a score of people in [illegible] Some old Nazi wolves, wearing Communist [illegible] past [illegible] To some extent we [illegible] [illegible] best we can [illegible] occasions, a violent clash between [illegible] inevitable in time.

11. If Iraq were not important to us, it might pay us to get out, but it is, in fact extremely important. In addition to its strategic position, its oil and its communications, we have a th[illegible] reason. We cannot afford to neglect Iraq in view of the interest which Russia [illegible] in the Middle East. We no longer hold the [illegible] maintain our position! What means can we [illegible] Middle East countries is, as you are a[illegible] treaty. In Iraq extremists are [illegible] so far signifying any single particu[illegible] In such an atmosphere it is obvious th[illegible] any idea of [illegible]

or of keeping permanently larger forces than those defined in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, is completely out of date. Nevertheless, it is possible for us to maintain our place here, and indeed, to enhance it, because there is no doubt whatever that Iraq is fundamentally far more friendly to us than to any other Power now or at any other time, and it is worth while to keep it so. In his speech of farewell to me last week the Minister for Foreign Affairs publicly declared that the policy of the Iraqi Government was to continue to employ "British scientists and experts in various branches and to train Iraqis in Great Britain to [illegible] friendship with Britain is the cornerstone of her policy." This statement, which would have been branded as "treachery" four years ago, has been widely acclaimed, both in public and in private. This feeling rests on a sound basis for more and more people in Iraq are coming to see that the treaty, which at the time when it was signed was by many regarded as a bond of servitude, [illegible] in fact, a guarantee of freedom. They realise that by granting us concessions as regards oil and communications (from both of which Iraq materially benefits) they have engaged us to maintain their frontiers; and they acknowledge that in a war in which so many frontiers have been obliterated we have held these inviolate without ever, even after 1941, encroaching on Iraq's internal independence.

12. The desiderata I consider for the maintenance of our present relations are:

(a) Sympathetic and understanding treatment of Iraq's problems by His Majesty's Government, especially of economic problems and those connected with the change over from war to peace in the next few years. Such treatment will make these people feel that, apart from other considerations, their close associations with us redound to their material benefit. I have been told that some departments in London are antagonistic to Iraq because they think Iraqis are grasping. They are, and so are all Orientals, and perhaps some Westerners too. As Bismarck said of the Balkans: "Liberated nations are not grateful—they are exacting." But it is of British interests that we should think, and we should realise that by downing Iraq we injure ourselves. We should not be weak, but we should be fair and just, and we should avoid like the plague adopting a "tough line" just to be tough. Above all, we should avoid any action which might injure the *amour propre* of the country and its citizens. They are a small people, at the beginning of their independent existence, and it is natural that they should have an adolescent sensitiveness. Almost over night public opinion can change. An inconsiderate act or speech produces an exaggerated dep[illegible]

(b) The officials we send here should be of sound character and knowledge. An ambassador's influence must always be limited by the nature of his office. Our real influence should be inside the Government, through British officials. If we provide good men, there is no reason why Iraq should not ask for more, but there is nothing to gain in forcing officials on the Iraqi Government, and we must always remember that Iraqis are very critical of foreigners, whom they pay so very much higher than their own Ministers, and are quick to spot a second [illegible] assured by the creation of a Middle East personnel pool, embracing the Foreign Office, Colonial Office and India Office, from which trained and competent men [illegible] I trust that some such plan may soon materialise.

(c) It is most important that we should maintain the personal contacts which we have created. We should therefore keep on the organisations of Political Advisers and Public Relations for as long as possible. When the time comes to give them up, we must hope that there will be some administrative inspectors or land settlement officers in the districts. Failing this, we should consider the establishment of more consulates whose duties would be mainly politico-social. The British Institutes must be encouraged and the more British officials we can get into the Education Department, both in the towns and in the districts, the better. The Oriental Secretariat of this embassy will become more important as the other organisations change or disappear, and it must place high value on personal contacts.

13. A relationship between Iraq and Britain has developed w[illegible] us in a strong and enviable position. It will, I consider, be our own [illegible] we allow that position to deteriorate. We must be continually on our guard and [illegible] Iraqi. Finally we must take into account in all our actions the new feeling of

solidarity and unity which animates the whole Arab world. The Arabs themselves have publicly acknowledged that it is we who have sponsored it and that it is we who have made its realisation possible. It is all the more important therefore, to consider the Arab world as one, and not as various units on the map, to be handled individually or in sections by different Government departments. Our policy towards the Middle East as a whole, it seems to me, requires [illegible] for his. But such an incident can have serious consequences as implying favouritism. And, as Lord Killearn has stated, we must be on our guard against the painful gibe that the only way to get anything out of the British is to kick them.

14. Any action which we take in regard to Syria or Palestine, for instance, will, as I have often emphasised, have a direct and immediate bearing on our position, influence and prospects in Iraq, and it is to the maintenance of British interests and British influence that our efforts should be primarily and consistently devoted. It is creditable to any man that he should feel moved to pity and sym[illegible] but you cannot govern by sentiment. Political laws of force do not change, and the laws of geography and history cannot be revoked. Our interests in this part of the world have been identical for more than 200 years. Originally those interests were selfish. They are no longer so, for, whether we will it or not, the lives and fortunes of all the inhabitants of the Middle East are as directly bound up with the maintenance of our position as were those of their ancestors with the existence of the Roman Empire. Were we to be driven from our paramount position here, the Middle East would dissolve in a chaos such as that which enveloped it when the Roman Empire decayed. In time it may well be other nations will be willing to share our responsibilities, as they are already eager to share our privileges. But that day has yet to come. Until it dawns, it is for us to maintain our own, and by so doing to preserve and enhance the tranquillity [illegible] and historic land.

[illegible] not close this last despatch without recording how much I owe to my own staff. I have endeavoured to show that such success as has been achieved during the last four years has been due to the united efforts of a good many departments and people working in harmony to a definite end. In this concerted plan, the embassy staff had a vital and essential part to play, and I cannot speak too highly of the manner in which, one and all, they have acquitted themselves. I owe them a deep debt of gratitude.

16. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Minister Resident, Middle East.

I have, &c.
KINAHAN CORNWALLIS

(E 2542/1719/93) No. 4.

Mr. Stonehewer-Bird to Mr. Eden. (Received 21st April.)

(No. 149).

Sir, *Baghdad, 10th April, 1945.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 8th April I was received in audience by His Royal Highness the Regent of Iraq and presented to him my Letter of Credence and the Letter of Recall of my predecessor.

2. The ceremony followed the usual lines. The Chief of Protocol of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and his assistant called at the embassy with a [illegible] for the Palace. The passage of the cortège through the streets attracted considerable crowds of Iraqis of all classes who appeared thoroughly to enjoy the spectacle and applauded intermittently in a manner which was clearly unrehearsed. There were also cries of "God give you victory!" I am informed members of my staff that this show of enthusiasm, ingenuous and ragged as was, is most unusual among those normally undemonstrative people and that it affords a remarkable illustration of the rise of British popularity that has taken place in the past four years.

3. A Guard of Honour was awaiting me at the Palace and after it had been formally inspected I was ushered into the Ambassadors' reception room

where I was met by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Shortly afterwards I was received by His Royal Highness. The Regent's reception of me was most friendly. There were no set speeches, but I told His Royal Highness how proud and honoured I felt to have been chosen to succeed Sir Kinahan Cornwallis. I realised how difficult this succession would be, but I felt sure I could count on the help of His Royal Highness and of a friendly Iraqi Government and people. [illegible] audience on my appointment, he had spoken in warm terms of His Highness and had said that he was looking forward to seeing him on his return from the United States. His Highness spoke in terms of the warmest affection and admiration for The King and Queen and is obviously much looking forward to his visit to England. The Regent assured me, in conclusion, that I could count, at all times, on his friendship and collaboration.

4. At the close of our conversation I presented the members of my staff to His Royal Highness. The Oriental Counsellor, who knew him well, said that he was obviously in a good mood and had been pleased by what I had told him. We [illegible] and returned to the embassy. The ceremonies were well organised and passed off without a hitch. I was particularly impressed by the friendliness of the officials with whom I had conversation, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Presidents of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies on whom I paid formal calls during the course of the same day.

5. I have sent a copy of this despatch to the Minister Resident, Cairo.

I have &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER BIRD.

E 3664/162/93 No. 5

Sir H. Stonehewer Bird to Mr. Eden

(No. 211. Secret.)

Sir, *Baghdad*, 21st May 1945

As I had the honour to report to you in my telegram No. [illegible] of the 15th May, the Regent expressed to General Renton his very grave concern at the [illegible] His Highness had said that not only was this delay a source of great disappointment and disheartenment to the young officers, who were keener and more efficient than ever before, but it was exposing both him and His Majesty's Government to dangerous criticism. It was being said that His Majesty's Government were deliberately withholding the equipment as they did not wish to see a well-equipped and efficient Iraqi army. As regards himself, there were two forms of criticism [illegible] influence with them to obtain a few tanks and armoured vehicles, or alternatively he too preferred a weak and ill-equipped army as presenting less danger to himself. His inability to obtain this equipment for his army made him appear, and indeed feel, completely ineffectual, and perhaps the best solution was resignation.

2. The General Officer Commanding Paiforce, who accompanied General Renton when the latter called to report the conversation, suggested that, if I [illegible] the Regent [illegible] the reasons for the delay. I readily agreed to this proposal as the Regent has, I know, a great esteem and liking for Sir Arthur Smith. The latter warned me that he was afraid it would be impossible to keep the conversations on a purely military level but he would, as far as possible, steer the Regent off the discussion of matters within my preserve. An account of the interview, which took place yesterday, is contained in the accompanying copy(*) of a personal letter addressed to me by General Smith.

3. I saw the Regent myself (not after General Smith had left him). After a short talk about His Royal Highness's coming visit to the United States, [illegible] The Regent repeated the reasons why, as he had explained to General Renton, he

(*) Not printed.

[illegible] the matter as one of grave political concern both to himself and to [illegible] Government. I replied that I had reported to you by telegram [illegible] of the problem. His Highness must not think for a minute that [illegible] Office or the War Office were unsympathetic or had been dilatory. [illegible] Government did not, as General Smith had doubtless explained [illegible] alone in this matter. His Highness said that he himself now understood [illegible] position, but the difficulty was to get it across to his people, and even to his Ministers. I replied that it might perhaps help if I gave him simply and briefly my own understanding of the British position in the matter. There was, I said, a period when we had spent in the prosecution of the war practically the last dollar not only which the Government but which each individual Briton had possessed. Not only had we done this but, by concentrating almost exclusively on the production of war material at the expense of our industries which had been reduced to something like 30 per cent. of pre-war level, we had temporarily undermined our power to earn more dollars. Fortunately for us a solution of our difficulties was found by the United States Government in lend-lease. But this arrangement, most generous as it was, yet placed upon us certain natural obligations one of which was that we could not re-export lend-lease war material or war material of a similar nature produced by ourselves except in pursuance of the war effort. His Highness would agree that it was not possible to argue that the supply of equipment to the Iraqi army was an urgent war time military need. The position might, of course, have been modified by the cessation of hostilities in Europe, and I had made a further appeal to you in the hope that this was the case. The [illegible] thanked me and said that he had never before so fully appreciated our [illegible]es. He would, he hoped, be able to make his Ministers understand His Majesty's Government's position, but the general public might remain ignorant. I said that my counsellor and I had decided that, when the recently drawn up exchange agreement was published it would be well to call in representatives of the Press and give them some background material thus forestalling uninformed criticism. His Highness thought this an excellent idea.

4. I then asked the Regent if he would, as this was my last opportunity of seeing him before his departure, give me a brief exposé of the situation as [illegible] been here long, but I had been struck by a rather curious phenomenon. Most of the leading Iraqis with whom I had spoken, or whose conversations with members of [illegible] Government play a much greater rôle in Iraq. On the other hand there was a great deal of talk, so I was told, about Iraq achieving complete independence, about freedom to choose her own markets, about release from the stranglehold of British directorates (port and railways), and about the British political advisers.

5. The Regent said that Iraq needed and wanted British assistance. Those who objected to British direction of the port and the railways were merely stupid: they must realise that there were no Iraqis capable of doing the jobs efficiently. What Iraq wanted from us was good advice and good guidance. The country wanted British advisers but they must be of the highest standard, able not only to advise on current affairs, but men of vision who could plan for the future. He instanced Mr. Swan, British adviser to the Ministry of Finance, who he said, could carry out his daily duties satisfactorily but was not a man who could usefully evolve a long term financial policy for the country. The best way to stamp out communism, of the spread of which he thought there was some fear, was to find employment for the working classes. This could be done by the promotion of large agricultural and other ventures and for this the country must employ really high grade specialists and was willing to pay high salaries. As regards the political advisers His Highness said that they were doing valuable work which could not be done as well by Iraqis, whose judgment in a dispute [illegible] There was no criticism of the officers themselves, "especially the younger ones" (this, Mr. [illegible] and Mr. Lithgow, who were believed to be unduly pro-Kurdish). There was criticism of their carrying on their duties in British pay as advisers to the embassy in military uniform, and I asked whether His Highness meant that he would welcome their services after the war as civilian district inspectors, or with some other such title in Iraqi Government pay. If so, His Majesty's Government would certainly like to know in good time as the future of these younger men had to be considered. It was manifestly impossible to ask a young man to accept employment with a foreign Government unless he had security of tenure for a very considerable number of years or unless he were a member of the British foreign or colonial service

seconded for special duty. My predecessor had, I know, been very much concerned on this point, and the matter was, I hoped and believed, receiving earnest consideration at home. His Highness said that I could quote him as saying that the Iraqi Government would want to employ young district inspectors. When Nuri came back with him from England and formed a new Cabinet he would take the matter up with me officially.

6. His Highness asked me always to be quite frank with him, and not to hesitate to criticise him or his Ministers if I felt they were on the wrong lines. He wanted to feel that he had the full confidence and backing of His Majesty's Government and to avoid that feeling of isolation from which he had suffered in 1939 and 1940. I promised to do my best, but pointed out that I had much to learn before I could personally be of much help, but as His Highness had given me this opening there were points on which I could perhaps usefully speak. I had heard with real consternation that His Highness had once again spoken of resignation. This was unthinkable for the reasons which Sir Kinahan Cornwallis had given him in March. I could obviously not speak with my predecessor's weight of the full effect which such a step would have locally, but I had seen proof with my own eyes of the charmingly affectionate relations which existed [illegible] to take an ever more sympathetic interest in Iraq and its development, his resignation would be a profound shock to my Sovereign, who had told me how highly he valued him, and to His Majesty's Government, who had confidence in him. All the British here, army and civilian, from General Smith downwards, liked him. I was sure that his mention of resignation had been made at a passing moment of depression. He admitted that this was the case. He had a sense of duty to the King and his country, and would remain at his post, but it [illegible] how to set about providing it; that was why it was so vital for him to have the best possible advisers in all spheres. I asked His Highness at this point whether [illegible] that he should have a first-class Iraqi adviser. He replied that the question had been exercising his and Nuri's mind. The difficulty was that a Court Chamberlain, if a sufficiently big man for the job, wished, sooner or later, to become a Cabinet Minister. I ventured to suggest that the best answer was to give it [illegible]

7. Another criticism which I had [illegible]

10. Iraqis fully realise that they are not yet fit either to administer or develop their country without a large measure of outside assistance; they want [illegible] from [illegible]. The Regent [illegible] his Ministers agree, wants a strong and efficient army, loyal to the throne, and [illegible] administrative help should be given by officials in the pay of the Iraq Government; we should not oppose the appointment of an ambassador in London. We must, at all times, avoid the appearance of greater generosity towards other countries in our sphere, especially towards Egypt.

11. [illegible], I venture to stress once again most strongly that the [illegible] only, means of maintaining our influence and prestige in [illegible] country is by the supply of advisers of the highest quality.

12. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and the Air Officer Commanding.

I have
HUGH STONEHEWER BIRD

[E 4269/195/93] No. 6

Sir H. Stonehewer-Bird to Mr. Eden.—(Received 18th June.)

[No. 233.]

Bagdad, 2nd June 1945.

IN my despatch No. 211 of the 21st May I reported my farewell audience with the Regent before his departure for America, and also, in the latter paragraphs, summed up my first impressions of this country, its people and our relations with them. Since writing that despatch I have had the opportunity of [illegible] report to you my impressions. To be precise, it was not my first journey outside Bagdad; I had planned to spend three days in Basra during the second week of May, but the very day on which I arrived brought the announcement of Victory [illegible] I had to return to Bagdad. Nevertheless, during even the few hours I spent [illegible] I could not help feeling that the reception accorded me was indicative of a real desire to see His Majesty's representative in this country take an active interest in its affairs, and of pleasure that I should wish to establish personal relations with its citizens.

2. I selected for my next journey the liwas of Kut and Amara because I was advised that these were tribal areas of considerable importance which could conveniently be visited before the great heat of the summer made journeys in the south out of the question. I was particularly anxious to visit tribal areas, because almost as soon as I arrived here a succession of tribal leaders from the north and from the south, Arabs and Kurds alike, came to call on me, and all expressed the hope that the close ties which exist between the embassy and the tribes would be maintained. These were not mere words of courtesy, but obviously indicated anxiety lest, with the departure of my predecessor and the approaching end of the war in the west, British policy towards Iraq were going to change, or rather to be frank, relapse into its former apathy and disinterestedness. I was informed by members of my staff that this anxiety was very widely felt. I have therefore made it my business to assure one and all whom I have met that His Majesty's Government will continue to interest themselves actively in the welfare of this country and its inhabitants, and I have good reason to believe that these assurances have given satisfaction.

[illegible] ker with [illegible], Amir Rabia, at his [illegible] Tl ance I was able to make [illegible] ollowing day to Hai, on the [illegible] kindly placed at my disposal [illegible] down the Tigris to Amara, which [illegible] The following day, owing to the necessary rearrangement of programme, was exceptionally crowded, but it was possible to fit in official calls, the inspection of the Amara Secondary School, a luncheon, accompanied by a regatta [illegible] tion, and a moonlight dinner-party with swimming regatta as the guest of [illegible] by air on Friday morning, the Air Officer Commanding having very kindly placed a machine at my disposal.

4. I need not weary you with the details of the programme which I have outlined above, but there were certain recurring aspects of my reception which I it is worth while to record. In the first place, the officials of the Iraqi Govern t, mutessarifs, kaimakams, commandants of police, mayors and directors all made it quite clear that they wished to give me as cordial a is their resources permitted. Not only in the provincial capitals, but the same spirit prevailed. By day, I was greeted with triumphal arches, flags, mottoes, palm fronds, flowers, cheers, addresses and poems; by ght, with elaborate illuminations and sumptuous banquets. At every reception speech I was informed both privately and publicly that it is the wish country to be associated as closely as possible with Great anifestations of official cordiality are genuine, as I believe re, then clearly they represent a spirit which must be regarded as a sterling Iraqi Government thought it worth while to conciliate a powerful ally in doing my best to maintain and increase it.

5. My second impression is that of the tumultuous and overwhelming ion accorded me by the two sections of the Abu Mohammed tribe, of whose sheikhs I was the guest. The entertainments were on the most lavish scale. The beasts roasted in my honour could be counted by the score, the guests invited to meet me by the hundred and, on at least one occasion, by the thousand. These "guests," were not only smiles, but rifles as well, and the object of their assembly was no doubt to impress both me and the representatives of the Iraqi Government, with their friendliness, certainly, but also with their power and potential mi

6. We are sometimes accused of undue preference for the romantic and the unique, and there is often force in this accusation. It is useless to conceal that the life which is lived by these tribesmen does not belong to this century any more than their beautiful river craft or their strange and fantastic tribal dances. They are survivals, we must admit, but we must also admit that a survival which is armed to the teeth with magazine rifles is one with which it is better to be friends than enemies.

8. My third impression is that of the [illegible] have created among these tribal leaders, enormously enriched by [illegible] profitable market if only we can exploit it. Undoubtedly, they will prefer to "buy British," and it is much to be hoped that it will prove possible to place British agricultural and domestic goods on sale here soon, before we lose the trade to our competitors.

7. My final impression is a reinforcement of the feeling which I referred to in the last sentence of paragraph 1 above. My e[illegible] goes back nearly a quarter of a century and, whether in Morocco or Saudi Arabia I have found that paper and protocol mean little to the Arab. Personal infl and confidence mean everything. I am informed that the fact that I un this trip, and the fact that I made it clear that I intended my policy to of personal acquaintance with all classes of citizens, have been very favour received.

8. The full rigours of the summer will soon be upon us: noonday shade temperature has already reached 110 degrees—and it will not be practicable to make further tours into Southern Iraq until the autumn. I feel, however, that it is important that I should have some acquaintance with Kurdistan as soon as possible, and I hope with your approval to spend a week in the north at the end of this month.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and the Air Officer Commanding.

I have, &c.
HUGH STONEHEWER BIRD.

CHAPTER III.—PERSIA.

(A) Miscellaneous.

[E 2445/239/34] No. 7.

Mr. Wall to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).—(Received in Foreign Office, 16th April.)

(No. 4.)

Sir,

Tabriz, 16th *March*, 1945.

IN accordance with your circular despatch No. 38 of the 10th June, 1944, I have the honour to submit an appreciation of conditions in this consular district during the six months ended on the 28th February, 1945.

2. *Relations between Soviet and Persian Authorities.*—Relations between the local representatives of the Soviet and Persian Governments emerged from the crisis of the oil question fundamentally unchanged. [illegible] the Russians a jealous control of administrative authority [illegible] prevent any repression of the Left wing elements to whom the R[illegible] to provide them with the ap[illegible] interests [illegible] in some cases with a sup[illegible] at the end of [illegible] have grown great in their shadow [illegible] of the [illegible] by the [illegible] prompt end to any action the Soviet [illegible] official who takes it. There [illegible] intervention, which was seen at its directest in the expulsion of the Commandant of the Third Division, Sartip Khosrovani last November, and which appears from time to time in an almost absent-mindedly [illegible] Russian town-commandant last December. Indirect intervention through [illegible] and guided by the Soviet consulate-general, mainly through the intermediary of the two Caucasian vice-consuls, MM. Gubiev and Cassanov. All Left wing pressure is believed by Persian officials to be an expression of the will of the Soviet authorities, they resent it the more as being an affront not only to their national pride but to their personal dignity, as a man reso[illegible] authorities, finally, by withholding their approval of the appointment of a[illegible] official of any energy and moral fibre in the whole of Azerbaijan is Sarhang Durakhshani, who, though he has lost his post of Governor General of Western Azerbaijan, continues to command the Third (Tabriz) Division of Persian troops. That he has done so, so far, without loss of credit, is a tribute to his diplomacy. But the result of this supervision of appointments is a spineless administration which, while it does nothing against Russian interests, does nothing at all in the interests of the country.

3. *Objects of Soviet Policy in Azerbaijan.*—Nothing has occurred in the last six months to modify the view expressed in the last appreciation (dated 22nd August, 1944) that Soviet practice aims at maintaining a fluid situation [illegible] was then seems best to the Soviet Government. It is certainly difficult to escape [illegible] due to Soviet policy, for with a very little encouragement from the Russians [illegible] Azerbaijan from Persia and sponsoring its union with the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic. Indeed, on all public occasions—and they are many—when the highest [illegible] they are careful to emphasise that it is to Persia, not to Azerbaijan, that they speak. Moreover, there has been, in the latter half

of the period under review particularly, a noticeable absence of separatist propaganda from the public speeches of leaders of the Freedom Front. Some have displayed their Persian patriotism in the most theatrical way. At the same time the materials for a separatist movement exist in plenty in the communal and racial aspirations of the Kurdish, Assyrian and Armenian minorities well as in the language barrier between this province and the rest of Persia and its corollary of greater sympathy with the republic across the northern frontier. Nor can it be denied that below the surface Soviet officials and soldiers of Caucasian race carry on a good deal of propaganda for a Greater Azerbaijan. If these people are not encouraged by higher Soviet authorities, they do not seem to be very actively discouraged. It can scarcely be doubted that, in whatever form Soviet policy may be expressed, its underlying object is to ensure that Soviet al and economic influence remain dominant in this province. Not uralty, the Soviet authorities seek to achieve this object by the methods hey feel most at home.

et Propaganda.—The past six months have been marked by a steady vehicle—leaving aside the Freedom Front, which is something more—is the Iranian Soviet Cultural Society. This organisation, which has spacious equipped with a cinema projector, holds meetings on an average twice a week. It is served with indefatigable zeal by a number of local people who are either genuine admirers of everything Russian or have a strong interest in appearing so. Its meetings, which are usually packed, run often to inordinate length beginning with speeches translated *in extenso* into two languages, and ending either with a film or with a concert of Azerbaijani and Russian music. Its joint chairmen are the Governor General and the Soviet Consul-General, and there branch under the presidency of the Governor-General's wife. The doubtedly a success, for while everyone recognises that its motives are purely propagandist and that it may not survive the occupation, it does meanwhile both provide entertainment of a better sort than anything el Tabriz and it offers a welcome outlet for a good deal of local organising, art and literary talent.

5. A well-stocked Russian bookshop was opened in the town last October. Besides this, there is a recently enlarged reading room from which the news is broadcast and where news photographs are displayed and the progress of the Russian armies tracked on a large map. The Russian school, which was opened last November, flourishes. There are evening classes in the Russian language for adult students and much talk of scholarships to Russian universities for local boys and girls. The Soviet hospital, also opened last year, is another institution of obvious propaganda value. Performances by Red army concert parties, visits of artistes from Soviet Azerbaijan, soirées organised by the Armenian community and other enthusiasts, ensure that no occasion for celebration goes unexploited. Naturally, the Red army itself plays an impressive part in Soviet propaganda: its spiritual force of intense patriotism, Stalin worship and consciousness of its own worker-peasant origin overflows abundantly its displays. A vein of commercial enterprise runs through some of this propaganda: the charges of the Soviet hospital, for instance, are high, and there seems to be little or no free treatment (the indigent are sometimes referred to the American or Seventh Day Adventist medical missionaries), while the frequency with which merchants of the town are laid under contribution by the forced purchase of expensive tickets for concerts in aid of this or the other Russian cause is leading to diminishing returns in cash but an increasing exasperation. On the whole it may be said of propaganda in Azerbai where it is accompanied by some material attraction such as a free show or feast it is eagerly lapped up; for the rest it is tolerated as one of the necessary nuisances of war, and at least provides material for the old oriental pastime of finding the hidden motive.

6. *Persian Administration.*—A constant theme in local speculation during the last six months has been the coming removal of the Governor-General of his position, apparently through a policy of offering no resistance to anyone in any circumstances. His compliant attitude towards the Russians would, it might be thought, have earned him at least the tolerance of the Left wing, but they are as bitter in their criticisms of his supineness as are the soldier citizens. He has, however, escaped any accusation of gross corruption. If weak, he would seem to be reasonably honest, and perhaps his one object is to hold his job down with a

minimum of trouble until he can comfortably retire. The Governor (Farmandar by Muhammad Hussein Muhtasham) Roshani, a man with long experience in the Persian Foreign Service and enjoying a reputation for honesty, competence ness, was looked upon by most people in Tabriz as the last hope not to have the confidence either of the Governor-General or the Russia s duties and the g Zabegneh, a ly as an administrator ian troops in Azerbaijan nce by the g that he will not truckle to the rabble-rousers. He Western Azerbaijan was perfectly peaceful during his recently earned applause by organising a demonstration march of Persian troops through Tabriz—the more effective for its being the sole reminder for many after all, Persian its head, Ghulam Reza joke and devoted his serious able in spite difficul Commandant of Tabriz has small isolated posts trols will operate Jangling Kamal, the of Gendarmerie in Bezaneh. Meanwhile nothing has occurred to sweeten the relations between the gendarmerie on the one hand and the villagers of all the charges of oppression, extortion and corruption that are daily made the Tudeh party an ally against them. The Kurds still prefer to shoot their own.

8. Mr. Thomas Allen, American head of the Supply Department, and of the Finance Department, too for a time under the Millspaugh régime, failed to make much impression on the muddle and malpractices attending the d of monopoly goods. The task was more s d in spite of his ferocious zeal, which eing made in Tabriz to meet responding roughly with the population, while in the Shahabad. A Persian head of the Supply Department has now been appointed but it is too early yet to judge his ability.

9. *The Freedom Front and Tudeh Persia.*—The Left wing made steady progress during the six months and has become, aft authorities, the most active force in the affairs of Azerbaijan. It before. The series of demonstrations organised to protest against S police showed the leaders how many men they could put on the street, a

clash with the police on the 30th October and the subsequent disarming of the police by the Soviet authorities convinced them that, in a "good cause" at least they could have matters pretty much their own way. In the later stages of this agitation there began to be seen the rudiments of a party discipline which were later to be developed. When the oil question was dropped there followed a month of comparative inactivity, but during this time a new theme was being built up—the demand for provincial councils (Anjuman Iyalati), for which provision was made in the Constitution of 1906, but which have never been formed, although it would appear that some such council did function for a short time in Tabriz about 1906. At the same time party propagandists were trying to interest the peasants [illegible] On the 1st December a "monster" meeting was held which was supposed to be attended by large numbers of peasants. In the event few country people turned [illegible] Tudeh party and trade union could bring pressure. On the 11th January the "First Regional Conference of the Azerbaijan branches of the Tudeh Party was held at Tabriz. It gave rise to alarming rumours among the more nervous of the propertied citizens, but the resolutions it published contained nothing but what the party spokesmen had been urging for months past. The most interesting feature was a bid to attract Kurdish support. The party claimed that they were promised support by certain chiefs of the Shaikak tribe, but the precise [illegible] ture of these promises is unknown. It can only be said that whatever those particular chiefs may have promised, they can be relied on to carry out their promises only if it suits their own personal interests. Since the conference there has been an intensified recruiting drive and an effort to tighten up party organisation and discipline.

[illegible] It is difficult to see any clear distinction between the Freedom Front [illegible] who is not also a member of the latter and there would appear to [illegible] for the formation of a second organisation, unless, indeed, the object be to absorb [illegible] to the old name and making a wider appeal. The last six months [illegible] great many meetings and discussions about the organisation of them [illegible] the publication of rules and regulations and orders for the election of a bewildering number of sub committees. But through the fog of resolutions and proclamations may be dimly discerned the lineaments of some scheme in which the Freedom Front stands as the supreme programme-drafting body and co-ordinator of al[illegible] [illegible] a programme in [illegible] Ittihadiyehai [illegible] the shorter name [illegible] Muttahidei Iyalati Azerbaijan) which endeavours to put into practice the Freedom Front's economic and industrial programme. But in practice the functions of the three bodies constantly overlap, and the same group of leaders appears to dominate them all.

11. The programme-drafters have laboured to such purpose in recent months that their latest published effort at generalisation comes to nothing more precise than saying that the aim of the party is to improve things in general. But from the speeches of the leaders more particular points can be picked out: The preservation of the integrity and independence of Persia, the establishment of a [illegible] safeguard local interests, agrarian reform, economic development, punishment of "traitors", firm friendship with the Soviet Union. On the face of it there is [illegible] conservative part of the population to see the published progamme as a cloak for more sinister goings-on inspired by the Soviet Consulate-General. According to this view, the Freedom Front aims, at worst, at an independent, bolshevised Azerbaijan, at best, a prolongation of the Russian occupation. It is true that both the language and the actions of the Freedom Front belie the seeming mildness of their pogramme. "Reactionaries" in the Central Government, such as Seyyid Zia ud Din Tabatabai, and the local representatives of the Persian Government are attacked in the most violent terms, and in the recruiting drive in both Eastern and Western Azerbaijan the methods of intimidation used have included assault and threats of murder.

12. It [illegible] had no ideological content. As regards its usual propaganda among the workers

and peasants, this remains true, but it would be wrong to think of all the party leaders in Azerbaijan merely as Russian-paid tools without any principles of their own. While immediate self interest may be, as in any other Eastern political [illegible] the chief motive, some of the leaders, like Shabistary and Isfahani, have a [illegible] of Communist theory, and the party has attracted a number of young men [illegible] genuinely intent on social reform. Among them [illegible] Mohamed Mohamedilugi Abbasi, who has already translated some [illegible] works of Marx and Lenin into Persian. It is not in any case to be [illegible] any attempt would be made to preach theoretical communism to such an ignorant and backward proletariat as this. The party seems to have chosen in practice the shrewder way of trying to make the economic and social life of [illegible] conform to a [illegible] adventurers of all kinds. Its organisation is muddled and its policies ill defined, yet there are increasing signs that it is becoming self conscious and is trying to bring some order and discipline into its ranks, perhaps, as recent proclamations would indicate, by the expulsion of the gangster element. It has moreover adopted recently a more patriotic attitude, and even its worst enemies admit that it talks sound sense on a number of local problems. Set against the corruption and incompetence of the local government and the profiteering of the wealthy its influence is not wholly evil.

14. *Trade Union Movement.*—[illegible] what [illegible] the [illegible] Moscow. In [illegible] faces a problem of [illegible] of pay and working conditions, only to find that the beginning of the industrial slump in Azerbaijan is threatening unemployment on a large scale. The weapons [illegible] to wrest [illegible] things were going well—strikes and intimidation of individual owners—are [illegible] forces. A factory owner may still be imprisoned by union officials, but that does not solve the problem of where to find the money to pay the workers. There is some talk of the workers taking over the factories themselves, but the same factors that make it impossible for the owners to run them will, of course, continue to operate, and there is every sign that the workers' exasperation will find the obvious outlet of violence. Meanwhile the last six months have seen a steady extension of the influence and membership of the Workers' Union: trades previously unorganised, such as the porters, have been drawn into the fold, rates of wages have been fixed at higher levels, and the union's authority made pretty well absolute. There have been one or two feeble attempts to set up rival unions, but these have been crushed as soon as announced. Such Government machinery as did in theory exist for the settlement of trade disputes—the Chamber of Industry and the industrial powers of the Farmandari—seems to have fallen out of use entirely. Only in the matter of the Union of Civil Servants has the Government reacted: orders have apparently been received [illegible] But it is most improbable that these orders will be carried out here.

15. *Kurdish Affairs.*—Little has been heard during the period under review of the Kurdish autonomy movement. Gazi Mohamed, who is generally thought to be its champion in Azerbaijan, has been absent most of the time in Tehran. There have nevertheless been a few rumours of increasing membership of the "J K" (Young Kurd) Society and of Russian interest in it. The operations conducted by Sartip Hushmand Afshar against Hama Rashid at Baneh in September-October had few repercussions in this Consular District, though the subsequent tour of [illegible] provided [illegible] the "J K" Society and individual chiefs to put their point of view before the Persian Government and to declare their loyalty to the Shah. These professions of loyalty were probably genuine; there is nothing to show that the Kurds of Azerbaijan are prepared to co-operate even with each other, let alone with those of Iraq and though there have been one or two reports of the coming and going of Kurdish

agents across the Iraq frontier these visits would seem to have produced no tangible results. While the Kurds are no more consistent in their outlook and no more uniform in character than any other of the races that make up the population of Azerbaijan, it may be said that, in general, what they want is not political independence so much as a square deal from the Persian Gove[illegible] The chiefs, being big landowners, have everyth[illegible] which will enable them to obtain the maximum profits from the cultivation of wheat, tobacco and fruit. But old tradition and bitter experience make them [illegible] any attempt to impose this security by Persian bayonets. A policy of extending medical and educational facilities to the Kurdish districts, of ensuring just distribution of monopoly goods and granting assistance for town and village improvement, carried out by sympathetic and honest officials, while leaving responsibility for public security largely to the Kurds themselves—in brief fewer gendarmes and more sugar—would probably remove most of the grievances the Kurds at present nourish.

16. For most of the period, being winter, the peace of the Kurdish districts has been broken only by minor incidents of robbery or assault. But in February a chance encounter between a small body of Persian troops and a few Kurds of the Herki tribe in Raize Chai near Rezaieh led to the death of a Persian officer and a punitive expedition against the Kurds of the district in which about five [illegible] said to have joined the Tudeh party, this incident seemed at first as if it [illegible] be the curtain raiser to more serious attacks on Persian authority in Western Azerbaijan but it now seems probable that it arose out of nothing more than the traditional hostility between Kurd and Persian soldier. At about the same time there was an attack by Kurds in Mahabad against the police station there. Five policemen were killed and the station sacked. There is even less political significance in this incident. The most likely explanation is that it was caused by dissatisfaction with the way monopoly goods were being distributed. It seems, however, both to have spurred the Persian Government to make a show of authority in that district and to have convinced the Soviet authorities that such a show is necessary. Preparations are now afoot to establish a Persian garrison in Mahabad and it is reliably reported that the Russians have given their assent.

17. Fifteen Shakkak and Herki chieftains, among them the young son of the late Ismail Agha (Simqo), came to Tabriz for the Tudeh party conference and the party claimed that they had offered their support. Only one of them, however, Rashid Beg Herki of Targivar, seems in fact to have joined the party. Both Persian officials with experience of Azerbaijan and Kurdish informants alike are emphatic that the Kurds would never make common cause with the Tudeh party, but at the same time there are well authenticated reports from Western Azerbaijan of Kurdish chieftains using the threat of raids to force Persian villagers to join the party. The explanation is probably that one or two chiefs [illegible] the activities of the Tudeh party a promise of unrest and a weakening of [illegible] most unlikely that any part of the Tudeh social and economic programme would appeal to these feudal highlanders. The visit of these chieftains to Tabriz, the Tudeh party's flirtation with them and the marked increase in Tudeh party activity in Western Azerbaijan led some Persian officials, as well as the more easily alarmed merchant classes, to believe that some kind of *coup d'Etat* was being plotted by the Tudeh party in conjunction with the Kurds and that the spring would see a serious attack on Persian authority in Western Azerbaijan. Nothing has occurred to confirm these fears and they seem now to a great extent to have been allayed.

18. *Economic Situation.*—The near approach of Allied victory in Europe is having precisely the effect on Tabriz trade and industry that was long ago predicted. It is doubtful whether anything could keep the costly local industries [illegible] the deeply rooted conviction of the dealers that the defeat of Germany will immediately open the flood-gates of plenty, and that Persia will be at once deluged with cheap imported commodities with which the high priced stocks of the local merchants cannot compete. Over the last six months there has been an increasing willingness to sell and an increasing reluctance to buy. Wholesale prices have reflected this tendency, but with a certain hesitation. Retail prices, except for the month of October, when there was a fall in nearly all food stuffs, have remained substantially unchanged. The Russian Trade Agency has continued to import goods for the local and Tehran market, the chief commodities being

cotton piece-goods, sugar, crockery and glass-ware, cod liver oil and small [illegible] imports have done nothing to lower prices and force the release of hoarded stocks which is so desirable, as the Russians have shown as much determination to get the highest prices as the local merchants. Their purchases both of grain and dried fruits have declined. The Irano-Soviet Oil Company has made a bid—not always by means of legitimate persuasion—to capture the retail trade in paraffin to the disadvantage of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Business in dried fruits, the principal export of the province, has not been brisk: after the ceasing of the autumnal demand from India in December there was practically no export except a consignment of about 50 tons bought by the Russians. The carpet trade has fluctuated: direct export to Syria, Iraq and Egypt has dwindled to a trickle, but there have from time to time been purchases on some scale for the Tehran market, destined, no doubt, for ultimate export. Prices have fallen but costs in the industry have risen, and failures of small factories, noticed in the last appreciation, have continued. Stocks of Tabriz carpets are said to be ge[illegible] very low.

19. As observed in paragraph 14 above, the inevitable slump in Tabriz [illegible] one textile factory is virtually bankrupt and the others are nearing the verge. It is difficult to see how they can survive. The disproportionate cost and poor quality of their products closes the export market to them and the same costs prevent them from satisfying the local market. With two well-equipped cotton and woollen mills and two modern tanneries in the city half the population is in rags and unshod. The factories could only carry on by cutting down the number of their operatives to less than half and by reducing wages. The existing labour agreement (the Sheikh award) prevents them from dismissing employees, and the strong trade union, arguing incontrovertibly from the high cost of living, rigidly opposes any wage cuts. In this dilemma an increasing number of factor[illegible] and shareholders are seeking to rid themselves of their liabilities and migrate to Tehran. The shares of the two tanneries and one of the textile mills are quoted at present at 10, 5, 9 and 3, 4 rials. There has for long been a flight of capital from Tabriz; the price of real property is low and there are no buyers.

20. *Local Attitude to Great Britain.*—The agitation over the oil question was singularly free from references to Great Britain. But this was probably due to directives which later fell into disregard: for in the later months of 1944 Left wing journalists began to assume a tone of righteous indignation over British policy in Greece, and events there were quickly made the excuse for open attacks on British policy in Persia, where, it was represented, we were intent on "colonisation," using as our tool "Mister Zia ud Din the Englishman." Since January, no doubt as a result of the joint action of His Majesty's Ambassador [illegible] references to Great Britain in the local press. While the Left wing picture Great Britain as the big bad wolf of imperialism, the attitude of the merchants, landlords and officials towards us is one of disappointment and reproach. Unreasonable as it may seem, there is a belief among this class that if the Russians and the Tudeh party behave badly it is because the British let them. Great Britain, they argue, brought the Russians into Azerbaijan; she ought both to keep them in order and see to it that they depart at the proper time. But they rather fear she won't.

21. The principal vehicle of British propaganda in this province is the printed word. Publications in Persian, supplied by the Public Relations Bureau at Tehran, sell steadily, and over the past six months there has been an appreciable increase in the demand for the more attractive magazines, such as *Shaipur*, and others produced by United Publications, India. Distribution in the various towns of the province is in the hands of local newsagents, who find the trade profitable. Publications in English have only a restricted sale, as the knowledge of the language is not widespread but there is evidence of a desire to learn and text-books have sold comparatively well. A good teacher of English would be a most useful adjunct to our propaganda here. The travelling cinema van, though its activities were somewhat restricted by the delays in obtaining passes from the Soviet authorities, put in some good work up to the end of October when the weather became too bad for outdoor shows. The Soviet authorities have in general shown themselves well disposed towards our propaganda. Red army [illegible] exist with the manager of the Russian propaganda shop, who takes from us a [illegible]

Persian over the P.R.B. shop wireless continue to attract a regular band of listeners.

22. *Conclusion.* As the European war draws towards its end the question that is uppermost in the minds of the official and propertied class of muslims in Azerbaijan is whether the Soviet Government will in fact terminate the occupation on the date that has been laid down. That there should be, in spite of consistent Soviet declarations, any doubt about this is a measure of the suspicion of Soviet intentions entertained by this class—suspicions which, deeply rooted in religious and racial prejudice, have unfortunately been reinforced by the dubious conduct of Soviet officials at various times during the occupation. While the constant complaint of the local Persian Government is that the Russian occupation makes a strong administration impossible, whatever preparations it [illegible] obstacle is removed are not discernible in this province. On the other hand [illegible] efforts being made by the Left to increase membership of their organisation [illegible] strengthen their authority should undoubtedly be interpreted [illegible] preparation for the day when Russian protection is wit[illegible] certainly be trouble on that day for if the natural [illegible] class will be to revenge themselves on the pro-Russian element for all the [illegible] oppression and injury real or fancied—which they have suffered during the occupation, the reaction of some at least of the Left wing leaders will [illegible] struggle for the retention of the hopes of social betterment they have [illegible] the Russian connection. If the Persian Government can find a [illegible] disciplined and co-op[illegible] administration, there is a hope that [illegible] adjustment may be brief and not too painful, indeed, a hope that the lessons learned during the occupation may be turned to the permanent benefit of this province.

23. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Foreign Office, the Minister Resident, Cairo, His Majesty's Ambassador, Angora, His Majesty's Ambassador Moscow, His Majesty's Consul, Kermanshah, the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India, General Headquarters, New Delhi, and C.I.C.I. Sub Centre, Tehran.

I have &c.
R. W. BULLARD

(Z 2832 464 34) No. 6

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 4th May.)

(No. 129.)

Tehran, 20th April, 1945.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 28 of the 30th January 1945, and to enclose herewith copy of a further report prepared by the financial counsellor to this embassy on the financial situation in Persia.

2. Copies of this despatch and the enclosure are being sent to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, Moscow and Baghdad, the Minister Resident in the Middle East and to the Government of India, New Delhi.

I have &c.
R. W. BULLARD

Enclosure in No. 6

PERSIA.

Financial Situation.

ON leaving Persia, after a year's stay, I report as follows on the country's present and prospective financial position. My previous (and more detailed) reports are dated the 3rd July and the 23rd October, 1944, and the 30th January, 1945.

I.

1. In recent years the deficit on the Persian budget has been:

	Hundred Million
1940–41	[illegible]
1941–42	[illegible]
1942–43	[illegible]
1943–44	[illegible]

3. The figures for 1944–45 are not yet available. For the first [illegible] months they are as follows. Figures for the first eleven months of 1943–44 and for the whole of that year are given for comparison:—

	1943–44.		*1944–45*
	(*Millions of Rials*)		
	First Eleven Months.	*Whole Year.*	*First [illegible] Months*
Ordinary budget—			
Revenue	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Expenditure	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	689	[illegible]
Commercial budget—			
Revenue	[illegible]	2,132	[illegible]
Expenditure	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Net deficit	1,074	1,052	424

4. The ordinary budget covers normal administration. The commercial budget covers [illegible] types of [illegible], viz. (a) administration of the Government factories and (b) the purchase, transport, distribution and sale of food-stuffs and certain other goods. Although the provisional position for 1944–45 is better than that for the preceding year, it will be seen that the small surplus on the ordinary budget is not sufficient to [illegible] for the deficit on the commercial budget. This deficit is caused chiefly by (a) food subsidies and (b) wasteful and corrupt management of the State factories.

5. The ordinary budget for the year 1945–46 balances at 4,419 million rials, but only by the optimistic transfer of a surplus of 500 million rials from the commercial budget, which has not yet been prepared. It will be noted that the commercial budget has shown a [illegible] deficit over the last [illegible] years.

6. The figures of note circulation and bank deposits over recent years are:—

	Notes	Deposits
	[illegible]	[illegible]
August 1939	1,008	500
June 1941	[illegible]	[illegible]
June 1942	[illegible]	1,222
June 1943	[illegible]	[illegible]
June 1944	[illegible]	[illegible]
September 1944	[illegible]	[illegible]
December 1944	[illegible]	[illegible]
January 1945	[illegible]	[illegible]
February 1945	[illegible]	[illegible]
March 1945	[illegible]	8,[illegible]71

(*) (a) The Persian financial year, like the calendar year, begins on the 21st March.
(b) Under the Anglo-Persian financial agreement the value of the rial [illegible] to the pound sterling. This deficit is thus equivalent to rather over £8 million.

(*) Estimated.

7. [illegible] wholesale prices and cost of living are as follows:

	Wholesale	Cost of
June 1941	[illegible]	[illegible]
June 1942	[illegible]	[illegible]
June 1943	[illegible]	[illegible]
June 1944	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
December 1944	[illegible]	[illegible]
January 1945	[illegible]	[illegible]
February 1945	[illegible]	[illegible]
March 1945	[illegible]	[illegible]

8. The internal debt of the Government (to the National Bank) is 1800 million rials. There is only one item in external debt, viz., a loan from Great Britain of which about £750,000 is outstanding.

II

[illegible]

difficulty in collecting taxation; by the expectation of increased imports from abroad, which will result in an over-sudden fall in prices within the country; and by the handicap to exports of the still high internal level of production costs. Unemployment will be increased by the withdrawal, in due time, of the [illegible] military forces; and there may well be civil disturbances, possibly on a [illegible] scale.

III

13. If Persia were competently governed she could be financially self-supporting, and could provide a considerably higher standard of living for the [illegible] impoverished and ragged millions of her population. Under the ordinary budget at the present time some 35 per cent. of expenditure (both in 1944-45 and 1945-46) is allocated to the army, the almost useless plaything of Reza Shah Pahlavi and the present monarch, instead of to irrigation and agricultural development. Another 15 per cent. is spent on the gendarmerie and police. [illegible] per cent. goes on the management of the monopolies and the, at [illegible] bortive administration for the collection of taxes. Education and public health account for no more than 6 per cent. and 4 per cent. of total expenditure. On the side of receipts, 15 per cent. is estimated but it is [illegible] taxes are without conscience in their evasion of [illegible] rooted in corruption that it would persist to [illegible] if they were adequately paid. Successive Cabinets do not expect to remain long in office and have no incentive towards reform: in the last year there have been four Ministers of Finance.

14. If a new dictator, endowed with a keener financial sense than Reza [illegible] and exercise the ruthlessness that is required, [illegible] the State factories, cutting down the Government officials [illegible] ent, reducing corruption and so letting taxes from the rich [illegible] the situation ought perhaps be retrieved. There are however [illegible] political obstacles to the rise of a dictator so long as foreign troops are [illegible] the country, and the remedy must be sought for elsewhere. The only alternative, in my view, is the engagement of another and a better Dr. Millspaugh, preferably from the United States, to take charge of Persian financial administration. This is a particularly unfavourable moment for such a suggestion, since the one good deed with which the late Cabinet is credited by the majority of the vocal part of the Persian population, is the liquidation of Dr. Millspaugh. Unless, however, something drastic is done, Persia will fall into a state of chaos and thereby play into the hands of her northern neighbour.

Tehran, 28th April, 1945.

[illegible] TAJAR

E 3278/31/34] No. 9

[illegible] R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(*Received 22nd May.*)

Tehran, 25th April, 1945.

With reference to my despatch No. 21 of the 23rd January, 1945, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on Persian affairs during January, February and March 1945.

Internal Politics and Relations with the Soviet Union.

1. At the beginning of the year the Government, under the pressure of [illegible] campaign demanding that steps be taken to [illegible] the passing of measures leading up [illegible] provincial councils, the improvement of the condition of rural [illegible] agriculture and industry and for the exploitation of underground resources.

2. At the same time the Prime Minister, in an effort to placate the Russians in connexion with the oil concession dispute, informed the Soviet Ambassador that the Persian Government intended to form a Persian company for oil

exploration, employing if possible Persian experts for the work. If these were not available, then "neutrals" were to be engaged, and failing them, the Persian Government would apply for experts to the Soviet Government. The Soviet Ambassador was reported to have shown little enthusiasm over these proposals, but to have promised reluctantly to inform his Government.

3. Under the new oil law the Prime Minister should have informed the Majlis of these proposals, but he did not do so for fear lest the ensuing controversy might wreck any chance of an agreement. It was not long, however, before rumours that he had been in negotiation with the Soviets began to arouse [illegible] far in his promises to the Russians. Many Deputies, indeed, believed that Bayat, on assuming office, had made two definite promises to the Russians (1) that he would get rid of Dr Millspaugh and (2) that he would induce the Majlis to reconsider [illegible] give an oil concession to any foreign Government or company. On the whole, [illegible] there were some Deputies who subsequently considered that by depriving Millspaugh of [illegible] "[illegible] Deputies who opposed [illegible] joined by others who, having used Bayat to get rid of Millspaugh, were ready to turn Bayat himself out. As a result there was a realignment of "fractions" [illegible] Minister had himself belonged, split into two groups, one in support of and the [illegible] opposed him. Of the other fractions, the "Democrats" also opposed Bayat, whereas the "Mustaquill" and many of the independents and even the Tudeh were inclined to support him. Bayat had in fact lost the support of the more conservative elements of the Majlis who had chosen him as Prime Minister [illegible] keep him in office. But his position had become very shaky in the process, and there was much talk of his imminent departure. Among those men [illegible] possible successors were Qawam es Saltaneh, who is always a candidate [illegible], who, however, has not yet been exonerated from charges of corruption, [illegible] influence, &c., and Mehdi Quli Hayat, who is eighty. But the Deputies fa[illegible] agree about the choice of a new Prime Minister and Bayat firmly refused to resign.

4. Various incidents which occurred during this period were [illegible] by Bayat's opponents as evidence that he had gone over to the Soviet side. [illegible] for instance, severely criticised for allowing the Irano-Soviet Cultural [illegible] to broadcast from Radio Tehran a translation of an article in the [illegible] attacking Seyyid Zia ud-Din Tabatuba'i (the former Persian Prime M[illegible] who [illegible] the scarcely veiled calumny that he was the tool of the British. Much un[illegible] able comment was also aroused when the Prime Minister held an official [illegible] to celebrate the 27th anniversary of the Red army and invited the diplo[illegible] corps to attend. A story that two of his Ministers attended a memorial ce[illegible] at the grave of the Communist, Dr Irani, though subsequently denied by one of them, gave ground for adverse criticism. In the matter of the press, too, B[illegible] was considered, with some reason, to lean to the Soviet side. Nevertheless [illegible] he was inclined to truckle to the Russians in small matters there was no de[illegible] evidence that he had given way on the oil or any other [illegible] supporters in the Majlis in fact claimed that he had [illegible] way on non-essentials, succeeded in [illegible] Persia [illegible] to some [illegible] to agree with Bayat [illegible] to [illegible] His Majesty was [illegible] influenced by the fact that in reply to a protest made [illegible] about Soviet [illegible] the Soviet Embassy and the Persian Government a [illegible] note disclaiming any intention to interfere in Persia's internal affairs.

5. Little serious business was transacted by the Majlis during this period. [illegible] two Deputies, one of whom accused the other of [illegible] for himself and to the adoption by the chamber of a Bill authorising the appointment of a committee of five members to examine all accusations made in the press or Parliament against individual Deputies. Two Bills tabled by the Minister of Health were passed, one empowered the Ministry of Health to enforce health regulations previously

[illegible] the M[illegible] [illegible] ded a Bill for [illegible] confiscated from tri[illegible] agriculture and the [illegible] Bill for the prohibition of the use or cultivation of opium [illegible] period under review. The Tudeh intensified their propaganda particularly in the south. Their leaders indeed openly said that as their activities in the north were attributed to Soviet instigation they intended in future to improve their organisations in those parts of Persia not occupied by Soviet troops. They therefore established a centre in Shiraz where they published two papers and began an active campaign against those whom they believed, or professed to [illegible] Ahwaz, too, the arrival of a new Soviet consul was followed by a strike in the local factory. But it was in Isfahan and Yezd that the Tudeh made their most determined efforts. Tudeh Deputies from Tehran visited Isfahan in January and February to try to strengthen their domination over the local trades unions. In this, however, in spite of the energetic support of the Soviet Consul, they were remarkably unsuccessful. Anti-Tudeh interests, mostly mill-owners, succeeded [illegible] and clashes between supporters of the rival parties, the local Persian authorities, [illegible] upshot of it all was that the bulk of the workers declared themselves, at least for the time being, definately anti-Tudeh. At the end of March there was further trouble and during an anti-Tudeh demonstration the crowd wrecked the Tudeh offices. At Yezd, too, the Tudeh suffered a reverse when their agents were attacked and driven out of the town by the crowd, who also set fire to the Tudeh headquarters. The Azerbaijan branches of the Tudeh held their first congress at Tabriz in January. This was followed by a Tudeh recruiting drive among the townsfolk of Tabriz, the peasants and the Kurdish tribes. In Hamadan and Kermanshah, too, there was an attempt to gain adherents to the Tudeh but without great success.

In Tehran the general opinion was that the Tudeh had lost ground ever since the demonstration of October last had revealed that the Tudeh was not altogether a genuine Persian Left-wing movement but a political organisation [illegible] Tehran for the 2nd March, the Military Governor showed a bold front, and the demonstration was called off. In Azerbaijan, too, there were signs towards the end of March that the local Tudeh leaders were drawing in their horns and trying to restrain the activities of their more unruly followers. But in Meshed towards the end of March there was renewed Tudeh activity when their leaders harangued the crowds in the streets after scores of Soviet tommy gunners had been patrolling the streets.

In February Seyyid Zia published the programme of his party, called the "National Will" party, which he now declared open. In spite of violent attacks in all the Soviet inspired press and in many other newspapers Seyyid Zia and his cause appeared to be making good progress, at least in [illegible] where it was claimed that by the end of March the party had between [illegible] ten thousand adherents.

9. On the 4th March Dr Musaddiq, one of Bayat's principal supporters, [illegible] the Majlis of condoning corruption and left the Assembly declaring he would not take his seat again. Two days later, however, he allowed himself to be escorted to the Majlis by a crowd of students who tried to force their way in. In the ensuing disturbance one student was killed and a few people were hurt. [illegible] widely assumed of [illegible] supported Bayat and to request His Majesty to advise him to resign. The Shah was, however, reluctant to dismiss Bayat, and expressed the opinion that his Government should continue in office at least until after the No Ruz holidays.

10. Bayat and his Government in fact were still in office at the end of March, owing largely to the lack of cohesion and determination of his opponents and the Majlis, having adjourned for the No Ruz holidays, did not meet again before the end of the period under review owing to the lack of a quorum.

Soviet Oil Claim and the Yalta Conference

11. Towards the end of March the embassy were authorised to make to the Persian Government, in reply to their numerous enquiries as to the extent to which Persian affairs had been discussed at Yalta, an unofficial and oral communication in the following terms:—

> Persian affairs, though not on the agenda of the conference, were discussed briefly, and while there was no sign that the Russians had abandoned their desire for an oil concession, there was such complete agreement as to the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Persia that it would have been superfluous to repeat the declarations already made on this subject."

12. In point of fact the Russians at Yalta had adopted a very unforthcom [illegible] earlier into statements regarding the circumstances of the oil concession crisis and [illegible] theless the brief discussions on this subject probably served to convince the Soviet Government that any overt pressure with a view to securing a reversal of the oil decision would adversely affect their relations with Great Britain and the United States, and, while of course they hotly denied that any such pressure was being exercised, it was noticeable that a short while after the close of the conference the Persian newspapers controlled by the Soviet Embassy gradually ceased their agitation for the cancellation of Dr. Musaddiq's oil law.

Anglo-Soviet Persian Censorship

13. The Anglo-Soviet censorship "war" waged throughout the greater part of the period under review with increasing intensity, resulted in a complete victory for the Br[illegible]

14. Late in the summer of 1944 a proposal had been made in general terms to [illegible] "ideological censorship". British retaliatory measures had at that time hardly begun to inconvenience the Russians, and although M. Maximov undertook to transmit the proposal to Moscow for consideration on it is doubtful whether he did so.

15. On the 26th January the proposal was reiterated in a more detailed and concrete form. It was suggested that both sides should cease to censor all incom[illegible] intermediary of officially approved agencies, by publishing firms in the United Kingdom and British Dominions, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Sta[illegible]

16. Meanwhile retaliatory pressure was maintained on the British side. This was never comparable to the Russian censorship activity in extent, and was indeed confined largely to the protection of the Polish Government in London from the more outrageous of Soviet slanders. It involved, however, the holding up of several issues of the *Pravda* and one of the *Izvestiya*—actions which the Soviet Ambassador evidently regarded as unspeakably shocking and difficult to explain to his colony without loss of face. Although the Soviet section of the censorship and the Soviet Embassy had met all protests on our side with a consistent refusal to justify or explain their actions, M. Maximov protested strongly against these British counter measures and demanded explanations. He was merely informed that his protests had been referred to Lon[illegible]

17. On the 6th March the Soviet censor agreed orally to the proposals described above, and large quantities of British, American and Russian printed matter, previously held up, were thereupon released. He announced moreover his intention of interpreting his responsibilities liberally in respect of publications in languages other than English and Russian, with the possible exception of Polish. So far he has been as good as his word, and we have followed suit. Relations between the British and Soviet censors were immediately restored to the highest level of cordiality, the Russians, true to their national psychology, having accepted defeat without the slightest trace of resentment.

18. Unsuccessful attempts were made to extract from the Soviet Ambassador a written acceptance of the British proposal. It is always very difficult to [illegible] anything in writing from the Soviet authorities, but M. Maximov was probably embarrassed by the fact that he had stipulated in conversation for the continued suppression of attacks on Heads of States (a stipulation to which there is of course no objection so long as it is reasonably interpreted), and did not wish to put this point in writing because—presumably—it was not contained in his instructions.

19. It proved impossible, during the period under review, to obtain a square deal for the Polish legation in the matter of broadcasting over the Tehran radio; the Russians continued to reject the legation's material submitted for censorship, and to evade censorship of the so-called Polish Patriots' radio propaganda by sponsoring it themselves. Until the closing down of British broadcasting from the Tehran station it might have been possible to redress the balance [illegible] adopted by the Polish Government after the Yalta Conference made it inadvisable to adopt a form of drastic retaliation which would in any case have been effective for a short period only. The Poles, however, discovered a solution of their own when the British broadcasts from Tehran ceased. They found that the Persian radio authorities were willing to allow the Poles to broadcast official Polish bulletins that had not been censored by the Russians (or by the British) and two or three such bulletins have in fact been broadcast without the Russians raising any objection. The Poles have promised not to be provocative, so we are turning a blind eye to the broadcasts.

Aid to Russia

20. The total "Aid to Russia" cargo carried during the period under review was:

	Long tons
[illegible]	
[illegible]	102,000
[illegible]	36,045
	138,012
[illegible]	
[illegible]	83,779
[illegible]	50,728
	134,507
[illegible]	
[illegible]	60,766
[illegible]	20,927
	81,693

The tonnages shown for trucks are the weight of the assembled trucks plus their cargo.

21. Overseas cargo for Russia via Persia has diminished very rapidly, so [illegible] so that it is now being carried as part cargo on occasional ships from the United Kingdom, United States, India and Ceylon. Aviation spirit and alkylate (material to convert ordinary into aviation spirit) from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company refineries at Abadan now form an important part of the traffic. Thus, of the 60,000 tons carried by rail in March, 47,000 were Anglo-Iranian Oil Company products.

22. 3,000 tons per month of fuel oil has continued to be supplied from Abadan to the northern (Soviet operated) section of the Persian railways to make up the quantities not supplied from Baku.

23. During March the general truck assembly plant at Khorramshahr was [illegible] Persia [illegible] Wa[illegible] Se[illegible] The one remaining assembly line at Khorramshahr closed down in mid April.

24. The American Persian Gulf Command is shipping to another war theatre fifteen out of the total of fifty seven diesel locomotives imported to assist in moving "Aid to Russia" traffic.

25. The total number of Soviet prisoners of war returned to the Soviet Union via Persia between the 27th October, 1943, and the 25th February, 1945, was 13,003. No more will pass by this route.

The Question of Withdrawal of Allied Troops

26. This question continued to form the subject of correspondence between His Majesty's Embassy and the Foreign Office. As stated in paragraph 19 of the last quarterly report, the embassy's original suggestion was that British troops should be evacuated at least from Tehran as soon as the opening up of

supply routes other than the Persian should render this practicable. It was hoped here that such action would lead before long to a corresponding Russian withdrawal from Tehran, since the Russians could hardly afford to face the odious comparisons which their continued presence in the capital would invite. Their propaganda in Persia depends negatively for its effect on the lip-service which they pay to the joint Allied guarantee of Persian sovereignty, and positively on the belief which they surreptitiously foster that this sovereignty is menaced only by "the capitalist Powers."

27. His Majesty's Government were not, however, in favour of even a partial British evacuation as a gesture, and considered that British troops could only be withdrawn on a *pari passu* basis.

28. While remaining of the opinion that even the evacuation of Tehran alone by Allied troops would be better than nothing, the embassy became more and more convinced as time went on that a far more radical withdrawal was required, and required soon, if Persia were to be saved from administrative paralysis and progressive disintegration. The Russians had steadily increased their hold over the rich northern provinces within their "zone." The longer process was allowed to continue, the smaller the chances would become of ever dislodging them, and unless they were dislodged no Persian Government could be expected to function as a Government should. The possibility was therefore mooted of negotiating a British withdrawal to the oilfields area in the extreme south-west with a corresponding and simultaneous Russian withdrawal of equal importance in the north.

29. At this stage, however, a complication arose. The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Paiforce, considered it essential for the health of any troops retained for the protection of the oilfields that the Indian rest camp at Karind should be maintained, and that there should be a summer training camp (on which work had already been started) at Bisitun, with southward lines of communication through Khorramabad. But Karind, Kermanshah (which is 20 miles *west* of Bisitun) and Khorramabad lie along the northern and eastern perimeters of the British "zone" as defined in the letters exchanged with the Persian Government after the occupation in August 1941. The arrangements proposed by the general officer commanding-in-chief would no doubt have meant a genuine reduction in the quality or intensity of the British "occupation" within a large part of this zone. British troops would be much less in evidence [illegible] requiring a corresponding change on their side. They would undoubtedly have claimed—and not without some show of logic—that the most they were called upon to do in these circumstances was to withdraw to "their" zone as defined at the same period. And this zone was only smaller than their present zone by an unimportant area of mountain and forest covering the central part of the Elburz range and the coastal fringe to the north of it. (The area is contained approximately within a line drawn north-east from Qazvin to another at Khorramabad, thence eastward along the Caspian coast through Alishad to Babul, and thence south-south-east to Semnan.) On this basis they would have remained in full control of Azerbaijan, Gilan and the north-eastern corner of Persia, with garrisons on the Tabriz and Meshed roads within 100 miles of [illegible] occupation of the country, but on the strength of an oral declaration made by the Soviet Ambassador at that time troops were stationed on the Meshed airfield, and a moral influence was thereby established over the town which became in the course of time the practical equivalent of inclusion within the Soviet zone. The Russians would therefore in all probability have claimed to treat Meshed as part of their original zone for the purposes of any new arrangement based on the sacred principles of "equilibrium."

30. Confronted with this dilemma, the embassy put forward the only proposal which seemed at all likely to solve it, viz., the negotiation of a total withdrawal on both sides with special arrangements for the protection of the oilfields area, in the absence of British troops, by a police force on the lines of the [illegible] this proposal might well appear too drastic to the military authorities responsible [illegible] by the Japanese would be very much less than the risks of sabotage by the Germans had been in the difficult days before the occupation of South Persia, and that in the last analysis a continued Soviet occupation of the north until six months

after the peace with Japan was likely by bringing about the complete disintegration of Persia, to deprive us of the use of the oilfields for good and all—among other and still more serious consequences.

31. This proposal was telegraphed to London on the 31st January, and there had of course been no time to consider it when the Yalta Conference took place a week later. At this conference Persian affairs, though not on the official agenda, were touched upon, and more than one attempt was made to persuade the Russians to agree [illegible] should be adhered to and that there was consequently no advantage in [illegible]

32. Commenting on this unsatisfactory result, the embassy pointed out at [illegible] was wide publicity, or at least the threat of it, if the Russians [illegible]

33. Such publicity was not sanctioned during the period under review, but [illegible] authorised to inform the Persian Government that His Majesty's Government, so far as they were concerned, "were not opposed to Allied examination" to see whether some withdrawal could not be made before the treaty date for total withdrawal, *i.e.*, the six months' period following armistice with Japan. This [illegible] undoubtedly did something to hearten the Persian Government [illegible] in time to confirm in the mind of the Persian public the general [illegible] alone who were opposed to the early withdrawal of foreign troops. Obviously, however, the full benefit of publicity could only be obtained by revealing that His Majesty's Government had actually proposed a withdrawal to the Soviet Government and had met with an uncompromising [illegible] revelation—but nothing short of it—would completely deflate the [illegible] propaganda of the Soviet authorities in this country [illegible] entirely fanciful picture of the attempts of "foreign capitalists" to detach and swallow the south.

Security

34. The most important recent development has been an outcry in the [illegible] Persians, for which the British authorities have been almost exclusively [illegible] The clamour has taken the line that the internees should be released [illegible] Persian law and that in any case the security danger is over and it is time for release.

35. [illegible]

36. In the Majlis, on the 1st February, Dr. Musaddiq questioned the Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the [illegible] authorities [illegible] with [illegible] power for a reply received a [illegible] inconclusive answer, which did little or nothing to damp down the agitation [illegible] published [illegible] German spies, [illegible] revoked further [illegible] leged endeavour [illegible] to deny her the [illegible] believe the story [illegible] the [illegible]

promise to reduce to the rank of major an internee who had been promoted to [illegible]

[illegible] the Russian Ambassador concurred in protesting against the futility of the Foreign Minister's reply to the agitation against it, he seemed to be disposed [illegible] in the Sultanabad Camp, except the dangerous, and very anti British mullah, Seyyid Abul Qasim Kashani, were transferred to the Persian Internment Camp in Tehran. Kashani was later removed to Kermanshah.

41. The progressive release of the Persian internees in Tehran, except for a few who may have to be detained until the war with Japan is over, is now proposed by the British security authorities, and the Soviet Embassy have been asked to approve the release of the first eight.

42. On the 10th March thirteen German, Czech and other internees were removed from Sultanabad to a camp in Iraq and the Sultanabad camp was closed.

43. On the 18th March, Sheikh Abdul Majid Shirazi, whose name has been on the Anglo-Soviet list of enemy partisans in connexion with the Mayr conspiracy, was arrested by the Persian police. And on the 2nd April Constantine [illegible] at Shah Reza by the gendarmerie at the request of the British authorities and handed over to the latter.

British Army Interests

44. In the course of the last twelve months the British combatant troops in Persia (which were about 11,000) were reduced by 800 men.

45. Thefts of signal wire still continue in spite of strong protests by His Majesty's Embassy against what amounts in effect to sabotage of Allied military communications. The Persian army has taken over the protection of wire over an additional stretch west of Tehran and south of Tehran and are now responsible for some 150 miles.

The Press and Public Opinion

46. During the early part of the period under review the press and public opinion were chiefly occupied with the crisis over the demand by the Soviet Union for an oil concession in Northern Persia. The press, over this question was divided into two main groups, namely the Freedom Front (*i.e.*, the papers influenced and controlled by the Tudeh party) which in effect supported the Soviet demand, and the Independence Front papers which opposed the demand [illegible] able interference in the internal affairs of the country. Certain papers, chiefly [illegible] porting Seyyid Zia, made vigorous and telling attacks on Soviet policy. [illegible] the Soviet Ambassador suggested to His Majesty's Ambassador that they [illegible] the Persian Government to oblige the press to moderate its tone. On the 27th January the two ambassadors therefore presented a joint memorandum to the Persian Government protesting against press attacks on the Allies and requesting the suppression of the worst offenders and the prosecution of their editors. At the same time the Military Governor of Tehran published a notice reminding the press of his powers and threatening to prosecute those responsible for attacks on the Government, or on Government officials, or for upsetting relations with the Allies, or endangering security. The Prime Minister [illegible] to take similar action in their districts. Subsequently, a number of papers were suppressed for brief periods, but with little effect, as each suppressed newspaper immediately reappeared under another name.

47. As the oil crisis developed there was a marked deterioration in the attitude of the Freedom Front papers towards Great Britain. The disinterestedness of the Soviet Union was asserted in contra-distinction to the machiavellian policy of British Imperialism. The columns in this section of the press were

full of virulent attacks on "Imperialism" and "international reaction" and the agents of these forces, in particular Seyyid Zia, and anti-British innuendoes. The opportunity to attack British policy offered by events in Greece was, moreover, not missed by the Freedom Front papers. The Freedom Front press continued its attack on Dr Millspaugh. Criticism of the Government persisted [illegible] the period under review the formation of a Government based on a coalition [illegible] for reform. The Yalta Conference was fully reported; surprise was expressed in the press and public that there was no mention of Persia in the communiqué issued after the conference. A certain amount of pique was shown at the declaration of war by Egypt and Turkey and fear lest, by their last-minute declaration these countries should obtain a position at the peace conference equal to Persia. The approach of the San Francisco Conference has been the occasion for a spate of articles on Persia's alleged sacrifices to further an Allied victory and the importance of her rôle in the war. In some minor papers there has been a tendency to recommence attacks on the Shah for alleged unconstitutional interference in political affairs. Other topics discussed by the press include Arab federation, the progress towards the formation of which is regarded as a British diplomatic [illegible] tion of the country by Allied troops, on the grounds that the Dardanelles are [illegible] Allied shipping. The Freedom Front papers carefully refrained from such demands, which were clearly not in the Soviet interest.

48. There has been a relative improvement in Anglo-Persian relations [illegible] British Government of the Persian Government's decision to defer the grant of concessions until after the war, and the fact that this attitude contrasted favourably with the Soviet attitude.

American Affairs

49. On the 19th February the United States Senate confirmed the appointment of Mr Wallace Murray as ambassador to Persia, in replacement of Mr Leland Morris, who has been here only since last August.

50. Mr Morris has been a disappointment. Although not mischievous like his predecessor, Mr Dreyfus, but on the contrary frank and honest, he has been inert and has carried no influence whatever. In particular he was unable to co-ordinate the activities of the American advisers or to curb the intransigence and obstinacy of Dr Millspaugh.

51. As is known, Mr Murray has hitherto been very mistrustful of British [illegible] to him by Soviet machinations in this area is serious (see paragraph 84 of my [illegible] instead of the mediocrity of his two predecessors.

Declaration of War on Japan

52. On the 28th February, Persia set the seal on Japan's fate by declaring war on her.

Indian Affairs

53. By the end of March the Indo-Iranian Cultural Society succeeded in overcoming the inertia of and other obstacles presented by the Persian Ministries of [illegible] four Persian graduates for the Government of India's scholarships for the three-year course at the Lyallpur Agricultural College in the Punjab, (2) two for the two years' Forest Rangers' course at the Imperial Forestry College at Dehra Dun, and (3) five for the Delhi Polytechnic courses in textile and ordinary engineering. The offer of six scholarships at the [illegible] unexpectedly solved by the welcome offer of accommodation in an Indian army motor convoy which happened to be crossing Persia from Iraq at the beginning of April.

54. In March the Society was "At Home" and lectures on "The Philology of Persian, Sanskrit and Russian Works" and "The Effect of Persian Lit[illegible]

in India" were given by Pandit Rahul Sankrityayana (Professor of Sanskrit at the Moscow University) and M. Bahar (the Persian Poet-Laureate) respectively. At this gathering some excellent films produced by "Information Films of India" were shown and much appreciated.

55. The English classes at Meshed, Kerman and Yezd had teething-troubles [illegible] winter which kept students away from these classes. An Indian teacher is now on his way to Ahwaz.

56. The Indian Trade Commissioner elect (Major M. Hasan) was detained in India by ill-health but is expected in May.

57. The Indian Troops' Welfare Association continued to entertain the Indian troops of the small garrison in Tehran. The coming spring and summer will enable the association to co-operate with the Army Welfare Services in the organisation of excursions to beauty spots in the mountains near Tehran.

British Propaganda Activities.

58. No new activities have been commenced during the three months under review. Our publications continue to circulate with varying degrees of popularity; the *Daily News* sales have declined slightly—probably because of the decrease in the numbers of British and American troops in Persia; the [illegible] as in the past to Persian notabilities and newspapers.

59. With the possible cessation of the German war British propaganda activities are being directed firstly towards emphasising the Japanese war and secondly towards stressing the importance of British trade.

60. On the 21st March a large party was held at Victory House to mark the closing down of the "Voice of Britain" on the Tehran Radio.

British Council.

61. The number of pupil[illegible] quarter from 4,000 to 4,500. [illegible] Persian institutes operating in Persia (Tehran, Isfahan and Shiraz). The [illegible] cultural activities continued during the period under review, the high [illegible] being the first performances in Persia of plays by Shaw ("Candida") [illegible] Priestley ("The Long Mirror"). The concerts of the Tehran Symp[illegible] (which are sponsored by the Council) continued to be packed to [illegible].

62. A notable visitor was the actress, Miss Marie Ney, who [illegible] presentation of Shakespeare's Women before a large and distinguished audience and was honoured by a command performance before the Persian Co[illegible].

Tribal Affairs.

63. During the first quarter of 1945 the tribes have, on the whole, remained quiet and have given no trouble. The Persian Government, while doing nothing to improve the condition of the tribes, has also refrained from annoying them by ill-timed military ventures.

64. *Fars.*—The continued presence of the Qavam ul Mulk in Shiraz and his opposition to the Tudeh party has kept alive the attacks in the Soviet-inspired press against the tribal *bloc* and the danger to the Central Government which is [illegible] the south. Nasir Khan Qashgai made some efforts to increase his influence in [illegible] Tehran to see the Shah and thus put an end to his equivocal position.

65. *Kuh-i galu.*—The long-drawn-out quarrel between Abdullah Khan Zarghampur and his half-brother, as also the lawless activities of Abdullah himself, seem, temporarily, at least, to have been settled by his ma[illegible] submission to government. The Persian Government has not [illegible] pardon, but some sort of assurance that his past sins would [illegible].

66. *Khuzistan.*—General Humayuni has completed his disarmament operations against the Arabs. A high estimate puts the number of rifles collected at 5,000. Most of the rifles handed in were obsolete patterns and some of great antiquity. Complaints have been made by the tribes that they have been placed in a dangerous situation *vis-à-vis* their Iraqi neighbours and other Persian tribes who have retained their arms. Such complaints will persist until the Persian

Government can, as in Raza Shah's days, guarantee them from attack by their neighbours. The Persian Government is also placed in a difficult position in that it has not the requisite force at its command to tackle the problem in the right sequence, by disarming the more powerful tribes first, but must start on the weaker tribes.

67. *Bakhtiari.*—Morteza Quli Khan continues to preserve order though naturally incurring the odium of the other branch of his tribe who see the plums of office going to his relatives and their influence waning. The proposed operations against the Bahmai and Tayyebi tribes were postponed. Morteza Quli Khan had asked in return for the provision of tribal infantry and cavalry, more than the Government were prepared to give or could afford to give. General Humayuni also advised against the operations on account of the lateness of the season and the impending upward migration of the tribes to areas inaccessible to his troops.

68. The murderers of Mr. Vice-Consul Harris and Dr. Griffiths (who were killed in the Bakhtiari country in 1942) still remain at large, and the Persian Government has taken no steps to effect their capture.

69. *Kurdistan.*—The tribes of Southern Kurdistan have remained quiet. The fifteen Rogzaideh Jaf tribesmen have been set free at last and have returned to Iraq. No acts of brigandage have occurred to constitute a serious menace to [illegible] is not so satisfactory [illegible] to [illegible].

Persian Forces.

70.—(a) *The Army (including the United States Military Mission).*—During [illegible] War or Chief of the General Staff, though Ibrahim Zand has been prevented by ill-health from attendance at the ministry since mid March. There have been many changes in the senior appointments. A new head of the Military Tribunal and a new Public Prosecutor have been appointed. It is to be hoped that their reputed honesty and energy will enable some of the more flagrant cases of corruption to be dealt with. A new deputy Chief of the General Staff, a new Departmental Director and a new Director of Transport have been appointed. A divisional commander has been deprived of his command and summoned to Tehran to answer charges of corruption. A brigade commander has also been changed for the same alleged reason. While General Arfa's reforming zeal merits all [illegible] that all the outgoing officers were friends of [illegible] that all their replacements are [illegible] which General Razmara allowed to lapse [illegible] Though not a body of great weight or author[illegible] the Minister for War and the [illegible] of favouritism. The M[illegible] army has been [illegible] 1,400,000 rials and 96,000,000 rials has been allotted for purchases of military equipment in the United States. These three items amount to approximately 25 per cent. of the total budgeted expenditure. When 398,246,100 rials are added for the gendarmerie vote and 237,000,000 rials for the police vote, there is some justification for the statements by Majlis Deputies that Persia is spending more than she can afford on her security and defence forces. The Persian army has

[illegible] taken no [illegible] of [illegible] past three months. Brief references to military activity are given in the section dealing with tribal affairs. [illegible] that General Ridley's mission would be withdrawn on the 1st March when the period of their contracts expired. The Persian Government then requested the United States Government that the mission should remain for some time longer. The United States Government have cancelled their orders for the recall of the mission, but nothing has been settled as to the period for which they will remain.

71.—(b) *The Gendarmerie (including the United States Gendarmerie Mi[illegible]*. [illegible] as has been noticed in the capital is offset by the frequent reports of inefficiency, corruption and even connivance at highway robberies which have been received from consular sources in the provinces. Colonel Schwarzkopf still keeps his mission too centralised, and seems to busy himself more with future plans for organisation than with those frequent tours of inspection which alone can have any effect on checking corruption and combatting inactivity in a force split up into so many small packets over so wide an area. Two reforms recently introduced [illegible] platoon in strength. The second is to move his Persian gendarmerie officers round every two years—the minimum period, he estimates, in which a local [illegible]

72.—(c) *The Police.*—Brigadier Saif remained as Chief of Police during the first three months of 1945. No further steps have been taken to obtain a fo[illegible] been noted. Shortage of personnel and shortage of money are advanced as excuses for every failure and the whole force is rapidly sinking into decay.

Persian Air Force

73. Early in the year the Shah outlined to the Air Attaché his idea for a grandiose expansion of the Air Force on very modern lines. His Majesty had [illegible] would be necessary before his goal could even be seen over the horizon. No more [illegible] this quarter than the last, owing partly to natural inertia, partly to internal dissension and partly to inept interference by the General Staff of the Army.

74. General Nakhchivan has returned from his mission to the United States bringing, it appears, no sheaves with him. He discharges in a desultory fashion the duties of Inspector of the Air Force, an appointment which he does not seem ever formally to have accepted.

Civil Air Lines in Persia.

75. The Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones has taken delivery of the third and last Dominie aircraft bought from His Majesty's Government. The commercial company which is trying to establish air lines claims that this Ministry has agreed to its proposals, which are stated to be under consideration by other departments, but there are no visible results so far.

The End of Dr. Millspaugh

76. It was stated in the last report that there was a growing [illegible] to dismiss Dr. Millspaugh [illegible] dissatisfaction [illegible] sale of [illegible] Majlis passed a Bill depriving [illegible] Although efforts were made [illegible] with [illegible] at his treatment by the Persian Government and its ingratitude for the very [illegible] qualities and defects please see paragraph 64 of the Annual Political Review conveyed in my despatch No. 78 of the 9th March, 1945. [illegible] staff have also resigned, but most of them are rem[illegible] reduced to that of advisers. (The principal ones are Mr. Pixley and Dr. Black.) They are not, however, of very high calibre or of sufficiently strong personality to influence the Persian Government towards setting its house in order; and unless an adequate successor to Dr. Millspaugh is appointed (which at the present stage appears improbable) the financial situation is likely to become even more serious.

Finance

77. The budgetary out-turn for the first ten months of the current financial year, *i.e.*, up to the 20th January, 1945, has been as follows. (Figures for the same period in the year 1943-44 are given for comparison.)

	1943-44.	*1944-45*
	(Million rials.)	
Ordinary revenue	3,649	3,183
Ordinary expenditure	3,124	3,200
	+ 525	− 17
Commercial revenue	1,745	2,857
Commercial expenditure ..	3,193	3,396
	1,448	539
Net deficit	923	556

The payment of salaries to Government servants is, however, a month in arrear, and about 200 million rials should therefore be added to the deficit on the ordinary budget on this account.

78. It is most improbable that Dr. Millspaugh's hope of balancing the governmental accounts for 1944-45 will be realised, mainly owing to the passive resistance on the part of the taxpayer to the payment of income tax, the inadequate [illegible] Receipts from income tax for the first ten months of the year have been less than for the corresponding period in the previous year, when the rates were considerably [illegible] Dr. Millspaugh [illegible] his departure, the Government would abolish the income tax. It is expected that a Bill will shortly be tabled in the Majlis at any rate reducing the rates of tax for the future; and it is hardly likely that any sufficient steps will be taken to collect arrears. In the meantime, the Government has reached its statutory limit of borrowing from the National Bank, and its internal debt stands at 4,800 million rials.

79. The ordinary budget for the year 1945-46 (beginning on the 21st March 1945) was recently presented to the Majlis, which has not even yet approved the [illegible] for 1944-45. [illegible] 4,112 [illegible] with the help of the transfer of a surplus of 500 million rials from the commercial [illegible] thinking, as the deficit on the commercial budget was 1,741 million in 1943-44 and has been 539 million in the first ten months of the current financial year. The estimated receipts from income tax for the year 1945-46 are 644 million, compared with the estimate of 895 million for 1944-45, but are still almost certainly too high.

80. Note circulation and bank deposits are still increasing. The former, which was just under 1,000 million in 1939, was 6,040 million in December 1944 and 6,709 million in February 1945. Bank deposits, about 500 million in 1939, were 9,003 million in December 1944, and 9,800 in February 1945. The wholesale price index, which was 497 in December, decreased slightly to 488 in February while the cost of living index rose from 624 in December to 693 in February.

81. As anticipated in the last report, sales of gold for the account of His Majesty's Government have been [illegible] For the period from the 1st to 15th January, when they ceased sales, amounted to the equivalent of £235,880, and for the whole period during which sales were carried out, viz., from the 26th June, 1943, to the 15th January, 1945, to £6·8 million.

Economic Situation

82. The [illegible] Dr. Millspaugh [illegible] Bill [illegible] as the [illegible] will [illegible] are [illegible]

[illegible] Another factor responsible for an important change, at any rate super[illegible]y in the economic outlook is the removal of Middle East Supply Centre [illegible]trol over a large number of imported commodities. This resulted in great activity by merchants, who are trying to import goods by all means within their power both honest and dishonest. The goods (Group "C" commodities), which are no longer under Middle East Supply Centre control, still officially require a Persian Government import licence. Merchants are, however, endeavouring to get goods shipped without licences in the hope that they will be able to clear them through the customs on arrival. This attempted evasion of the import licensing regulations is the result of the increased difficulties encountered in obtaining licences, for which larger sums have now to be paid in bribes to the various officials concerned. Nevertheless, the relaxation of Middle East Supply Centre control has been very welcome both to importers and to exporters as a first step towards freer trade after the war.

84. With the approaching end of hostilities a number of public works schemes are being planned by private companies and administrative bodies. In [illegible] negotiations are taking place for similar works in Isfahan and Shiraz. Power station equipment is required for an extension to the Tehran power station and for a new generating station in Isfahan. A piped water supply and drainage are planned for Tehran and a new water system for Shiraz, and there are proposals to equip Tehran with trolley-buses, a modern street lighting system and an electric railway to the summer resort of Shemiran.

85. Soviet commercial activities steadily increased during the period under [illegible] goods passing in transit through Persia. The principal commodities concerned are silver, silk, cotton yarn and skins.

Economic Warfare

86. Merchants are still anxiously awaiting the conclusion of hostilities in [illegible] free for all trade without the restrictions to which they have become accustomed but which they nevertheless would wish to see removed. In the majority they are not hostile to these restrictions as they realise that they are an essential part of the war effort and would not continue to be enforced unnecessarily.

87. The easing of facilities for the passage of carpets to Switzerland and of lambskins and other commodities to Turkey should bring a certain measure of relief, and already the fact that liberated territories are coming once more into the sphere of economic activity is producing a spate of enquiries as to the *modus operandi* of correspondence and trade questions. With this liberation are also coming an increasing number of queries about the remittance of monetary and to persons of not nationality other than Persian residing in those countries. Facilities already exist for Persians and monetary grants are made regula[illegible]

88. During the quarter it was decided by agreement between the countries [illegible] declarations as between Syria-Lebanon, Iraq and Persia.

89. No removals from the Statutory List have been made although one recommendation for deletion has gone forward to the responsible authorities in London.

Cereals and Agricultural Development

90. The departure of Dr. Millspaugh might have upset the cereals collection system, but [illegible] should remain at their posts and work as long as it was seen that the newly appointed Persian officials refrained from interfering with or upsetting their [illegible] and barley due for harvesting in the summer of 1945.

91. At the end of March the stock of food-grains in the Tehran elevator amounted to 36,000 tons of wheat and 22,000 tons of barley, enough for 221 days for Tehran City at the current rate of adulteration which has been increased from 7 per cent. to 10 per cent. of barley, while the total stock held by the Persian Government was 251,241 tons of bread grains, well distributed throughout the country.

92. It is forecasted that the excellent snow and rain this winter will give [illegible] from the existing stocks and another 50,000 tons after the harvest. Enquiries are being made of the Soviet Embassy as to whether they need any of it for Russia

before it is offered to the Middle East Supply Centre for other areas in which food-grains are deficient. If, however, the threatened locust invasion (see below) takes serious proportions, all this may have to be reconsidered.

93. At long last the Khuzistan Agricultural Society is to be wound up and a commission is at Hamidiah Farm for this purpose. As might have been expected, the Persian Ministry of Finance seemingly went out of its way to do the wrong thing by hoodwinking their American "advisers" and by allowing [illegible] incorrectness had to be pointed out to the Persian Minister of Finance and a promise extracted that another emissary would be sent to complete the taking-over [illegible] manager for the past two years and more.

Transport

94. [illegible] Dr. Millspaugh's economic powers and the [illegible] Mr. Shields, Director of the Road Transport Administration, also resigned. The Persians then tended to leave most of the work in the hands of the British officers lent to the administration to such an extent that the tendency had to be checked. So despite the change the department has, on the whole, continued to work with less confusion than was anticipated, largely because of the strenuous efforts of the British advisers. Tyre stocks are low, but every endeavour is being made to ensure that the few available are being distributed only to essential consumers. It has been decided to convert three-quarters of the lorry chassis imported under the 1944 procurement programme into buses, so that communications between the capital and provincial towns may be imp[illegible]

95. The transport of oil, coal and cereals by road and the transport of goods by rail proceeded satisfactorily.

Locust Control

96. It appeared at the beginning of the quarter that the campaign of the Locust Officer for Persia, as far as the desert or migratory locust was concerned, was destined to be superfluous. However, in the early days of March Cairo reported that flights could be expected to invade the Persian coast in the Gulf. Indeed, by the middle of March several swarms in the ovipositing stage made their appearance on the coast, and by the end of the quarter the locusts had infested considerable areas of the coastal belt.

97. The success of the campaigns against the invasion is not yet substantiated, and the position is viewed with considerable concern by the British, Soviet and Persian authorities. The Bandar Abbas area, where a joint Anglo-Persian effort is being made, is heavily infested with ovipositors and widespread areas are reported to be covered with eggs and there is likelihood that these will increase in magnitude. Khorramshahr area is also reported to have received an attack, but the seriousness of the infestation has not been confirmed.

98. The Moroccan or non-migratory locust did not emulate the tardiness of his travelling cousin. By February in the province of Shiraz, in the Fasa, Jahrum and Darab districts, 4,000 hectares were covered with eggs. Unfortunately the Persian authorities in the area were poorly equipped with transport, so the British Locust Officer lent two of his trucks to assist in this campaign, which appeared to be reasonably successful.

U.N.R.R.A. and the Polish Refugees

99. On the 3rd January Mr. Galusinski arrived in Tehran as representative of the Displaced Persons Division of U.N.R.R.A. Since his arrival all Poles in Persia have been registered. The result was as follows:—

[illegible]	... ...	1,360
[illegible]		950
[illegible]		
[illegible] No. 3	585	
[illegible] No. 2	81	
[illegible] No. 3	46	
[illegible]	152	
[illegible] People's Home	2	
[illegible]	868	
Total for Tehran		1,706
Total		4,172

100. Since the 1st January, 408 Poles have left for Syria, 12 for the United Kingdom and [illegible]

101. Copies of this despatch are going to His Majesty's Consular Officers in Persia, His Majesty's representative in Moscow the Government of India, the Persia and Iraq Command the Minister Resident in Cairo and the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East

I have, &c
R W BULLARD

(E 3890 464 34) No. 10

Sir R Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 7th June)

(No. 169 E)

Sir, *Tehran, 26th May 1945*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 129 of the 26th April, 1945 I have the honour to transmit the following figures obtained from Mr Johnson, the American Treasurer-General to the Persian Government, relating to the Persian budget for the year 1323 (21st March, 1944—20th March, 1945) The budget is divided into [illegible] expenditure, and the Commercial budget, which relates to the operations of Government commercial enterprises, factories, &c

2 The results for the Ordinary budget were as follows —

		Rials
Ordinary Revenue	..	3,024,078,000
Ordinary Expenditure	..	3,844,532,000
Surplus	..	80,146,000

The results of the Commercial budget were as follows —

		Rials
Commercial Revenue	..	3,459,572,000
Commercial Expenditure	..	4,001,853,000
Deficit	..	542,281,000

The total deficit on the two budgets was therefore Rials 462,135,000

3. For the sake of comparison I append the corresponding figures for the previous year 1322 (21st March, 1943 20th March, 1944

	Million Rials
Ordinary Revenue	4,360
Ordinary Expenditure	3,697
Surplus	659
Commercial Revenue	[illegible]
Commercial Expenditure	[illegible]
Deficit	1,741
Total deficit	[illegible]

4. The results in 1323 therefore show some improvement over those for the previous year, for which a great deal of credit must go to Dr Millspaugh and to the efforts of his mission to restore order to Persia's finances. The deficit in 1323 was due to the uneconomical operation of the [illegible] enterprises and monopolies and there is little doubt that if this [illegible] not hang around the neck of the Persian Government the public [illegible] country would be in a much healthier condition. Stocks of goods in the possession of the Government are thought, however, to amount in value to at [illegible] be expected now that the war in Europe is over the value of these goods will in the future become progressively less.

5. The Government's budgetary difficulties, reflected in the delay in the payment of the salaries of civil servants and in the inability of the Government

to settle its current debts to the Allies (particularly to the British) and its other claims, are due mainly to the shortage of liquid cash. Government expenditure is being met on a hand-to-mouth basis, and there is no reserve available from which to meet any unexpected outgoings in addition to the outstanding liabilities referred to above, if the need should arise suddenly For example, it is hard to see where the Persian Government would find the money with which to buy expensive surplus military installations such sales would almost certainly have to be on a credit basis if the Persian Government is to be the buyer

6. There would seem to be only one obvious solution to these difficulties and that is the more efficient and determined collection of taxes. There is plenty of money in the possession of private persons and with normally efficient taxation the Government should be able to meet its current obligations easily The foreign exchange position is strong, so there is no justification for a foreign [illegible] For the last two years the Persian Government has come to rely increasingly on the A I O C. royalties to help it out of difficult situations, and there are indications that this year also the Persian Government will expect to keep itself going by receiving royalty payments before the due dates, if possible free of interest This, of course, is no satisfactory substitute for obtaining sufficient revenue from taxation as the royalty payments are made in sterling and the subsequent conversion into rials increases the quantity of notes in circulation and merely adds to the already unsatisfactory position in that respect

7. The prospects for the future are not particularly bright. It is reported in the press that owing to the clamour against the present rates of income tax, the Government has proposed to introduce a new income tax Bill. No mention has yet been made of the nature of this Bill but there seems to be little doubt that the rates will be lower and the conditions easier. Nor has there yet been any proposal to counter balance this probable loss of revenue by the imposition of extra taxes in other directions, though it seems possible that the Government will look rather to import and monopoly dues to provide revenue than to any form of direct taxation

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors in Washington, Moscow and Baghdad, the Minister Resident in the Middle East the Government of India, New Delhi, and to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c
R W BULLARD

(B) Tehran Intelligence Summaries.

E 2254 70 34) No 11

(1)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No 12, Secret, for the Period the 19th 25th March, 1945. (Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 92 of 26th March, Received in Foreign Office 6th April)

Persian Affairs

Political

1. Owing to the Nauruz holidays there has been little political activity in the capital Just before the holidays representatives of the Majlis groups Milliyun Mustaqil, Democrat, and Ittihad-i Milli had an audience of the Shah and informed him of their discontent with the present Cabinet and their desire for a change. They claimed to have the support of the majority of the Deputies It is still, however, uncertain whether the Prime Minister will resign. It is understood that the Russians oppose a change at present, since the next Prime Minister, who is unlikely to be the Russian favourite, Qavam es Sultaneh, might be less amenable and more energetic—he could hardly be less—in the interests of Persia than Bayat. It is rumoured that the Shah at Russian instigation has instructed the Prime Minister not to resign.

2. The account of the activities of the German organised Fifth Column in Persia published in the local British paper, the *Daily News* (see Summary No. 11 45. paragraph 6), has aroused a storm of criticism in the Persian press which angrily demands proof of the association of any important Persians with German agents, denies the existence of any plot, maintains the innocence of the

majority of the Persians arrested and attributes the publicity given at this juncture to alleged activities some two years old to a malevolent British design to prejudice Persia's standing at the San Francisco Conference and later at the Peace Conference.

3. The following have been definitely selected to represent Persia at the San Francisco Conference:—

Nasrullah Intezam: Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Mustafa Adl: Minister of Justice.
Dr. Siassi: Minister without Portfolio.
Hassan Taqizadeh: Ambassador to London.
Majid Ahi: Ambassador in Moscow.

It is understood that it is doubtful whether Taqizadeh will consent to go. The delegation will be joined in Washington by the Persian Ambassador in Washington, Mohammad Shayesteh, and the Persian Trade Representative in the United States, Dr. Nasr.

Economic

4. In more responsible Persian circles anxiety is being created by the chaos [illegible] commonly said to have followed on the departure of Dr. Millspaugh and the withdrawal of American control in the whole financial and economic administration of the Government. The Treasury [illegible] of the coming harvest or to ensure a very necessary and justifiable (having regard to the bumper harvest expected) reduction in the price of bread.

5. A recent survey of motor transport owned privately or by the Government, available for civilian purposes in Persia, has resulted in the following figures:

Trucks of approximately 2½ tons capacity	3,757
Above 2½ tons "	1,941
Total	5,698

These figures include approximately 981 buses but no touring cars. They are considered to be accurate within 10 per cent. [illegible] a 3 per cent. increase on the price at which the Government retails monopoly goods, the [illegible] are now in most cases bankrupt and in debt.

Medical

7. Some half a dozen mobile dispensaries have been equipped by the Persian [illegible] probably inspired by the success of the mobile dispensary provided by Pasteur which for the past two years has been touring extensively among the Kurdish, Lur, Bakhtiari, Qashgai, Khamseh and Arab tribes.

Appointments—Civil

8. (i) Rukneddin Ashtiani to be First Secretary to the Persian Legation in Switzerland.

(ii) Bihjat Nuri to be Secretary to the Persian Consulate-General in Jerusalem.

(iii) Muzaffer to be Farmandar of the newly created Shahrestan of Sirjan (Kerman Province).

Persian Forces

Army

9. General Ridley states that the United States Government some time ago informed the Persian Government that his mission would be withdrawn on 1st March, when the period of their contracts expired, and that the Persian Government then requested that the mission should remain for some time longer. The United States Government have cancelled their orders for the recall of the mission but nothing has been settled as to the period for which they will remain. Owing to lack of funds to make the necessary bulk purchases the supply administration organised by the American Mission is functioning irregularly and with

difficulty, and, due to inefficiency and to labour troubles in the textile mills, it seems likely that the cloth required for summer uniforms will not be available in time.

Air Force

10. It is learnt from secret sources that Colonel Khosrevani of the Persian Air Force, who was sent to America in October to attend the International Air Conference (see Summary No. 40/44, paragraph 4), has requested the Westinghouse Electrical International Company of New York to make a project for the equipment of the Qaleh Morghi airfield at Tehran with all devices necessary for air services, and subsequently to make a survey of the whole of Persia with a view to assessing requirements for radio communications and radio navigation for internal air services.

Internal Security

Kurdistan

11. As reported in Summary No. 9/45, paragraph 10, and Summary No. 8/45, paragraph 10, the Persian Government, after the disturbance at Mahabad, ordered the despatch to that town of a column from the Saqqiz Brigade. [illegible] Bokan the co[illegible] Mahabad [illegible] tion of the town by the Persian troops. W[illegible] to ignore this warning a Russian officer intervened and forbade the further advance of the column. This order was obeyed. Negotiations are now in progress with the Russians through diplomatic channels. It is understood that the Russians are insisting that any troops required for the garrisoning of Mahabad must be taken from those already in Azarbaijan.

Fars

12. There has been a further case of shooting at travellers on the Shiraz-Bu[illegible] road resulting [illegible] But [illegible] generally remains good.

Russian Affairs

13. The *Bost-i Iran*, the Persian paper published by the Publicity Department of the Soviet Embassy, has printed an article, alleged to be based on American sources, which is offensively critical of British policy in Greece. It will not tend to convince the public of the reality of Anglo-Russian [illegible]

Tehran, 25th March, 1945.

E 2468/70/34

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 13, Secret, for the period 25th March to 1st April, 1945. (Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 102 of 4th April. Received 17th April.)

Persian Affairs

Political

There has been no meeting of the Majlis since the Nauruz holidays, so the Prime Minister remains in office. The election of a new President of the Majlis and office-bearers is shortly due, and the Prime Minister hopes that the disagreements that are likely to arise over those elections may disrupt the unity of the Majlis groups now combined in opposition to him. Moreover, there is as yet [illegible] Dashtiari and Bader are the most talked-of candidates.

2. For some time past Seyyid Zia has absented himself from sessions of the Majlis. He has been occupied with the organisation of this party under the name of Iradeh-i Milli (the National Will). The party has published an admirable programme of reform and has gained some adherents in Tehran, who do not, however, include any persons of present or likely future political [illegible] the [illegible] party [illegible] supported financially by some merchants and millowners. Little progress, if any, has as yet been made with the organisation of branches in the provinces.

3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nasrullah Intezam, has resigned. This [illegible] to send the Persian delegation to the San Francisco Conference. Taqizadeh's refusal to go is said to be due to his objection to being second fiddle to Intezam. The composition of the delegation may now be changed.

4. Active opposition to the Tudeh party is increasing. In Isfahan the [illegible] the Soviet Vice-Consul and the firm action of the Governor-General against Tudeh disturbers of the peace, have for the time being welded the elements opposed to the Tudeh party into some unity, with the result that the Tudeh [illegible] members of the anti-Tudeh Union after an exchange of stone-throwing which took place during a demonstration organised by the latter. In Azarbaijan, in the districts of Ardebil and Maragheh, agents of the Tudeh party have been meeting with rough treatment. In Shiraz, too, active opposition is being organised. The Tudeh press has been fulminating with hysterical anger against the Fascists, reactionaries and agents of imperialism whom it blames for these manifestations of dislike of the Russian fifth column.

5. The killing of five Persians, apparently intending to steal Allied [illegible] the Tudeh party paper *Rakhar*. After asserting the illegality of the action of the Indian troops, the article goes on to express sympathy with the "poor, dirty illiterate" Indians, who were not the persons really to blame.

Appointments—Military

6. The following Sarhangs have been promoted to Sartip:—

(i) Hussein Atapur, C.B.E. Inspectorate Department
(ii) Nasrullah Bayendor, head of Army Engineer Department
(iii) Muhammad Mazheri, Director of 4th Bureau, General Staff
(iv) Ali Akbar Darakshani, G.O.C., 3rd (Azerbaijan) Division
(v) Mehdi Qoli Alavi Muqaddam, Army Veterinary Services
(vi) Seifullah Parsa, head of No. 1 Military Hospital, Tehran.

Internal Security

Kurdistan

7. In spite of the assurance of the Soviet Embassy that a reduced Persian column from the garrison at Saqqiz, reinforced by a battalion from Tabriz which [illegible] to Mahabad, the local Russian military authorities still refuse to permit the column to advance. See Summary No. 12/45, paragraph 11.

Kuhigalu

8. Malik [illegible] has [illegible] to the Government and it has been accepted. He has been given some assurance that his sins of the [illegible] He has undertaken not to interfere in the affairs of the other chiefs of Kuhigalu [illegible] The chiefs [illegible] be assured that they are not being abandoned by Government and that they can count on the support of Government against any attempt by Abdullah Khan to interfere with their rights or to impose himself as overlord of Kuhigalu. The question is whether the Boir Ahmadi, having agreed now not to loot each other, will be able to refrain from looting their neighbours.

Russian Affairs

9. [illegible] the Soviet [illegible] land near Rezaieh, Tabriz and Mianeh, ostensibly for the purpose of growing their [illegible] Tehran apparently by members of the Tudeh party but really by the Russians. To the [illegible] villages will be given cause to appreciate Soviet methods. Both reports require [illegible]

10. On the 2nd Mar[illegible] Soviet troops [illegible] numbers to prevent interference by the Persian police with crowds which were being harangued by Tudeh orators.

11. It is reported, but requires confirmation, that the Russians are making a new airfield at Khoi in north-west Azerbaijan.

12. The new Archimandrite of the Armenian Church in Julfa (Isfahan) is reported to be telling Armenians that the time has come for them to return to their native land and that arrangements for this are being made by the Soviet Government.

13. A Society of Armenian-Soviet Cultural Relations has been formed in Isfahan.

American Affairs

14. An American military survey party is now making preliminary arrangements for the making of an aeronautical chart which is to cover Persia south of a line somewhere between the 28th and 29th parallels of latitude and west of the Shiraz-Isfahan-Tehran road. It seems that the country affected is to be covered fairly thoroughly by survey parties, since points are to be fixed by ground survey every 50 miles.

Czechoslovak Affairs

15. M. Masaryk, Foreign Minister in the Czechoslovak Government, has arrived in Tehran on his way to London and San Francisco.

Tehran, 1st April, 1945.

E 2470/70/34] (3)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 14. Secret, for the period 2nd April to 8th April, 1945. (Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 106 of 9th April. Received in Foreign Office 17th April.)

Persian Affairs

Political

1. On [illegible] as to whether some of the papers marked "Tabatabai" referred to the [illegible] president or to Seyyid Muhammad Tabatabai, also a candidate for the [illegible] were also raised on the score that some of Seyyid [illegible] had been brought into the Majlis from [illegible] that Seyyid Muhammad Sadiq Tabatabai ha[illegible] by 49 votes to 48 cast for Mehdi Farrukh. On the 5th April Dr. Malek Madani(*) was elected as first vice-president, receiving 74 votes out of 94. Dr. Moazemi(*) was then elected second vice-president with 71 votes out of 101. Some minor members of the Majlis presidential body, such as recorders, tellers &c., were elected at the next session.

2. [illegible] has achieved since it came into office. This recital should not take long.

3. Taqizadeh, Abi, Ala and Mustashar ud Dowleh are all reported to have refused to head the Persian delegation to the San Francisco conference. The first two have pleaded ill health. M. Ala makes no secret of his dread of the perils of a sea or air voyage, and Mustashar-ul-Dowleh is said to have alleged advancing age as his excuse.

The Court

4. The Agence Pars has, "on good authority," contradicted the news broadcast by the B.B.C. in their Arabic transmission from London at 2115 hours [illegible] April to the effect that His Imperial Majesty The Shah and Queen [illegible] Egypt towards the end of April in order to be present at the wedding of Queen Farizeh's sister Princess Faiza, to Prince Muhammed Ali Raouf.

(*) Short personality notes on these two are given in an Appendix to this Summary.

Appointments—civil

5. Amir Khosru Afshar to be second secretary at the Persian Legation in Paris.

Appointments—military

6.—(i) Sartip Atapur, C.B.E., Inspector at the Ministry of War, to be head of the Persian Army Transport *vice* Sarhang Mir Jalali relieved.

(ii) Sartip Zarrabi(?) to be Chief of Police, Tehran, *vice* Sartip Saif.

(iii) Sartip Darrakhshani, General Officer Commanding 3rd Azerbaijan Division, to be officiating Governor General of Ustan 3 (Eastern Azerbaijan) vice Mehdi Dadvar (Vossuq es-Saltaneh) recalled.

Persian Army

7. His Excellency Ibrahim Zand, Minister for War, has gone to Palestine for medical treatment. He had been ailing for several months.

Persian Air Force

8. The Persian Air Attaché in London has requested the loan of two n.c.o. instructors to train the Persian Air Force in the wireless and navigation equipment supplied with the Anson aircraft recently delivered.

Internal Security.

9. Constantine Jacob, alias Kassakowski, the last German remaining at large in Persia, has been captured at a village near Shahreza (Qumisheh). It will be recalled that he made his escape into Boir Ahmadi territory when his companions were handed over to the British Security authorities by Nasir Khan Qashgai in March 1944. The arrest was effected at the request of the British Security authorities by the Officer Commanding gendarmerie at Isfahan, previous knowledge having been obtained that Kassakowski was in hiding near Shahreza with the connivance of the local gendarmes.

Baluchistan.

10. The troubles reported in Intelligence Summary No. 4, paragraph 12 [illegible] officials in Mokran. Eighty Reki and Ismailzai volunteers have been dismissed from the 11th Khosravi Camel Regiment and government grants to several [illegible]

Fars

11. The Qashgai upward tribal migration has started and the tribes are reported as being already of Shiraz. The grazing is said to be the best for many years. No acts of brigandage have as yet been reported.

Khuzistan.

12. In this province, as in Azerbaijan, local enthusiasm for politics and rivalry between the Tudeh and anti Tudeh factions seems to be on the decline and the attention of the populace or at least the mercantile community, turns to the war news and the approaching slump of which signs can be detected. A wool factory, a cotton oil seed factory and a carpet factory have closed down as the owners can no longer pay the employees' wages.

13. The Russian garrison at Meshed is now estimated to be no more than 4,000 of all arms including administrative services. There are only small detachments at Sabzawar, Nishapur, Turbat-i-Haidari and Turbat-i-Sheikh Jam.

Azarbaijan

14. The Pashmineh wool factory and the Khosravi leather factory are reported to be in financial difficulties and may soon close down or go bankrupt. The Governor-General, Mehdi Dadvar, for some days refused to obey the order from Tehran for his recall but is now reported to be leaving in a few days.

15. Russian opposition to the entry into Mahabad of the small column [illegible] Kurds, as may be supposed, are also opposed to the establishment of this garrison. The

(*) A short personality note on the former will be found in the Appendix to this summary.

situation described in Intelligence Summary, No. 8, paragraph 10, has not been cleared up. A number of Rashid Beg's men of both Herki and Shakkak tribes are in the neighbourhood of Ushnava awaiting, doubtless, the outcome of the discussions between the Persians and Russians as to the establishment of a garrison at Mahabad.

British Interests

16. His Excellency Sir Reader Bullard, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.I.E., left Tehran on the 31st March to attend the Mid East Economic Conference and returned on the 6th April.

17. Professor S. J. Davies, Professor of Engineering at London University and adviser on engineering subjects to the British Council, has arrived in Persia on a short v[illegible]

18. Some deserters of the Arab Gulf R.A.F. Levies who mutinied at Jask [illegible] in the Lar district and have disposed of their arms to a local chieftain of Bastak. Two others with six rifles have been caught in Shiraz and are now in custody there.

Egyptian Interests.

19. His Excellency Mahmud Sabit Bey, the new Egyptian Ambassador to Persia, presented his credentials to His Imperial Majesty the Shah on the 4th April.

American Interests

20. Four editors of Tehran newspapers have been invited by the United States Government to visit America. They are as follows:—

Abul Qasim Amini of the weekly *Umid*
Majid Muwaqqar of the daily *Mihr Iran*.
Dr. Meshahizadeh of the daily *Kaihan*
Abbas Masudi of the daily *Ittelaat*

Tehran, 8th April, 1945

Appendix

Short Personality Notes

(a) *Reference paragraph 1 of Summary*

(i) *Dr. Malek Madani*.—Born about 1890. A landowner who married into an influential family of Malayir which constituency he represents. Has been a Deputy since 1927. Belongs to the Mihan faction and is closely allied with Sipahbod Ahmed.

(ii) *Dr. Moazemi*.—Born about 1900. Educated in France. Deputy head of the faculty of law. Was first elected to the 13th Majlis. Owns some [illegible] as the Shah's nominee. He carries some weight among the younger intellectuals.

(b) *Reference paragraph 6 (ii) of Summary*

Sartip Ibrahim Zarrabi.—Born about 1903. Trained in Gendarmerie under Swedes. A brother-in-law of the landowner and ex-Deputy for Ahwaz, Nasiri.

Officer Commanding 6th (Khuzistan) District of Gendarmerie—1942.
Promoted to Sartip—June 1942.
Officer Commanding 14th Brigade (Ahwaz) Persian army—July 1942.
General Officer Commanding 5th (Kermanshah and Luristan) Division—December 1942.
Was relieved and recalled to Tehran—August 1943.
Appointed Chief of Police, Tehran—April 1945.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 15. Secret for the Period 9th April to 15th April, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 117 of 18th April, Received 23rd April.)

Persian Affairs.

[illegible] The Cabinet has approved the statutes of the Supreme Economic Council [illegible] are published as Appendix "A" to this summary.

[illegible] The Cabinet has drawn up regulations governing the sale of "foreign" goods with special reference to the sale of surplus stores by the Allies and the collection of customs dues thereon. They are published as Appendix "B" to this [illegible]

[illegible] Minister of Finance has tabled a Bill in the Majlis to govern the sale of public domains and ceded properties. The text has not yet been published.

4. The four secretaries of the Majlis have been elected. They are Sadi[illegible] Hashimi, Jawad Masudi and Tusi. Thus there has been no change in either t[illegible] central body or the secretaries of the Majlis. The various Majlis [illegible]ions for Finance, Interior, Education, Agriculture, Industry and Mines, [illegible] Affairs, Communications, Health, Military Affairs and Posts and Telegraphs were also elect[illegible]

5. As considerable time may elapse before the budget for 1324 (March 1945–March 1946) is passed, the Majlis has prepared a "two-twelfths" Bill to cover the period the 21st March–20th May.

6. Almost every day new names have been announced in the press for the Persian Government's selection of representatives for the San Francisco [illegible]ence. Whether Taqizadeh and Ahi have maintained their refusal to go is [illegible] yet confirmed. The latest list of starters from Persia comprises the following:

[illegible] as military representatives. The Majlis representatives are Dr. Abdoh, Dr. Shafaq and Dr. Ilchar. Dr. Ali Akbar Daftari (legal adviser), Ahmad Ardeshir (counsellor and interpreter), Dr. Suratgar (counsellor and interpreter), Muazzami and Gandarzi (secretaries) are also said to have been selected.

7. Muhammad Hussein Jehanbani has resigned from the directorship of the [illegible] Interior and, for a brief spell, as Chief of Police) of garrulous ineptitude and bribe taking on a scale sufficient to make even a Persian gasp, he will be no loss to that body.

Persian Gendarmerie.

8. Colonel Schwarzkopf, American chief adviser to the gendarmerie, left for the United States on the 5th April to arrange for further purchases of equipment. He will be absent from Persia for about two months.

Persian Army.

9. The Chief of the General Staff told the British Military Attaché that 380 Persian military trucks out of a total of 700 were off the road awaiting repair [illegible] haos and widespread peculation. While the repair service [illegible] Staff of the present poor state of the mechanical transport is the total lack of any system of regular periodical inspection.

Appointments—C[illegible]

10. Hassan Karimi to be an inspector of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Internal Security.

Isfahan.

11. M. Krutchkov, the titular Soviet Consul at Isfahan, has returned to his post. It remains to be seen whether he interferes in local affairs with the same precipitancy and stupidity as the egregious Marchenko. Tudeh and anti-Tudeh activity has, for the moment, died down. The new Armenian Archimandrite at Julfa is reported as having told his flock that they should consider the wisdom of migrating from Persia and returning to their coreligionists in Soviet Armenia.

Makran.

12. Further acts of highway robbery are reported. Two trucks were recently held up 8 miles north of Zahidan and the passengers were robbed of their cash. Baluchis are suspected.

Azerbaijan.

13. The Persian column which tried to reach Mahabad and which was turned back by the local Russian commander is still at Saya. It has been told to stand fast there in the hopes that the Russians will subsequently permit its entry into Mahabad and that the Kurds will realise what is coming to them when the Russians depart. Meanwhile negotiations between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Soviet Embassy are at a standstill. The Russians still insist that any garrison required for Mahabad should come from Tabriz, be limited to one battalion of infantry and should not be replaced in Tabriz.

British Interests.

14. His Excellency Sir Reader Bullard, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.I.E., left Tehran on the 9th April for Andimeshk, Khorramshahr and Bushire. He is due to return on the 16th April.

French Interests.

15. The Persian Military Mission which has been visiting the Western Front at the invitation of the French Government left France on the 10th April [illegible]

Polish Interests.

16. The [illegible]ber of civilian Poles in Persia on the 6th April, 1945, was:—

	Men	Women.	Children	Total
Tehran ...	308	1,181	300	1,849
Isfahan	71	442	417	930
Ahwaz .	172	758	317	1,247
			Grand Total	4,026

Tehran, 16th April 1945.

Appendix "A"

Statutes of the Supreme Economic Council approved by the Cabinet (Hayat)—April 1945.

1. The Supreme Economic Council shall be composed of twenty-five persons to be elected by the Cabinet on the proposal of the Prime Minister from among [illegible] affairs, their election to be ratified for a period of three years. The Ministers of Finance and Agriculture, the heads of the Government Economic Organisation, the National Bank, the Mortgage Bank, the Agricultural Bank, the Iran Insurance Company, the President of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, and the head of the Tehran Municipality shall be members as long as they retain their posts.

Note.—Should the number of members fall to less than the twenty-five mentioned in this article through resignation or other causes other persons shall be elected on the proposal of the council, that proposal to be ratified by the Cabinet.

2. The honorary president shall be the Prime Minister in person.

3. The president and vice-president of the council shall be elected by absolute majority of the members of the council.

4. Cabinet Ministers shall be allowed to attend the sittings and take part in the discussions. Should circumstances demand, the council shall have the right to call on any Minister for consultation and an exchange of views.

5. The members of the council shall be divided up into the necessary commissions according to their special qualifications. These commissions shall study the questions involved and shall report results to the council. These commissions shall also have the right to call upon intelligent and informed persons who are not members of the council or commissions to study special matters, or to form special commissions from those persons.

6. Internal statutes and regulations connected with the running of the council shall be put into effect after ratification by the council.

7. Ministries and Government concerns shall be bound to put at the disposal of the council any information which the council may require for its investigations [illegible] opinion of the council on matters affecting the national economy, before taking a [illegible] submit a comprehensive report for their information.

9. The fundamental duties of the council shall be to draw up an economic programme on the following lines and to submit it to the Government :—

(a) To stabilise prices.
(b) To investigate matters of money and prices.
(c) To encourage and increase agricultural and industrial products, and to make full use of their products.
[illegible] cultural and irrigation, and to draw up profitable and prac[illegible] through technical experts.
(e) Matters connected with Government factories and lands.
(f) To encourage an increase of the population, to increase people's capacity for work and to educate the people in economic matters.
(g) To create order and equilibrium in the economic and financial affairs of the country, to ensure a minimum standard of living, to make hygiene universal and to create public works.
(h) To preserve good relations between workers and employers, landlords and peasants, and to look after the rights of both parties with a view to agricultural and industrial progress.
(i) To attract the necessary capital in order to make the maximum use of the mines and water in Persia.
(j) To reform the general system of the country's external and internal trade, and to define the principles according to which foreign trade should be conducted.
(k) To complete the internal and external means of communications policy.
(l) To co-ordinate the economic actions of the Ministries, banks and other Government concerns.
(m) To put into practice the principles of social insurance.
(n) To make provision for the return to normal immediately after the war of the economic and financial situation.

Appendix "B"

Regulations Governing the Sale of "Foreign" Goods, proposed by the Ministry of [illegible] approved by the Council of [illegible] 1945.

Article 1.—When foreign military authorities desire to sell worn out goods and equipment or articles which they no longer require they must inform the local customs or the nearest customs department, to enable that department to take steps to collect import dues and charges payable by the purchaser.

Note.—Should it be desired the seller may first carry out the customs formalities in respect of the goods to be disposed of, and hand over to the purchaser a special certificate bearing the number and the date of the customs clearance document.

Art. 2.—Before the payment of import dues and charges has been guaranteed by the purchaser or seller, the purchaser will not take possession of the pur[illegible] punishment according to the law laying down penalties for smug[illegible]

Art. 3.—Regardless of the type of goods the customs [illegible]

Art. 6.—Goods of which the import is legally forbidden, *i.e.*, arms, war equipment, sporting guns, and explosive material will not come under this type of transaction except with the special permission of the Government.

E 2753/70/34] (5)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 10 for the Period 16th April to [illegible]
—(*Received 1st May, 1945.*)

Persian Affairs

Political

[illegible] respite by pandering to the capitalists and crooks who stood to lose by economic and financial stability. Some flirtations with the Tudeh earned him another breathing space by placating the Left. The Nau Ruz holidays, the election of the Majlis President, Presidential body and sub-committees, and a sitting suspended out of respect to the late President of the United States served to postpone the [illegible] Seyyid Zia-ed-din Tabatabai was only withdrawn on the understanding that on the 17th April Bayat would address the Majlis on the subject of his Government's [illegible] speech, which received a very mixed reception and during which he was [illegible] Prime Minister gave an account of the Government's position and its activities during its tenure of office. This, he said, had been forced upon him by the spreading of false rumours about the Government by certain people, rumours which had found their way into the press. Instead of taxing the Government in [illegible] the Majlis those persons had spread unfavourable propaganda which had only resulted in a weakening of the Central Government's position. He had been ready to answer his critics for some time past, but a necessary delay had been imposed by the Nau Ruz holidays and the election of Majlis officials. He spoke of the conditions under which his Government came into power and of the difficulties which had arisen, especially over plans for internal reorganisation. The speed with which the Millspaugh problem was settled came in for special mention, and he stressed the fact that Millspaugh's departure had done nothing to [illegible] United States. Persia's relations with the [illegible] based on established [illegible] and mutual under[illegible] the Great Powers [illegible] not only safeguarded but confirmed and strengthened. He repeated statements made in previous sessions of the Majlis about the rumoured arming of the tribes and the formation of a Tribal Union, and denied that there was any [illegible] Americans leaving Persia were destroying all the installations they had built or that they were dismantling such installations and shipping them out, no installation had ever been destroyed or removed, and negotiations for the transfer of such material had already been [illegible]. He was happy to say that Persia's foreign policy was clear and that a perfect understanding with her Allies was enjoyed; any statement to the contrary

could only be attributed to those ill intentioned persons who wished to stir up troubled waters. It was the duty of all legislative powers in Persia and of the Government to work in the closest collaboration to ensure Persia's future in a manner worthy of her ancient civilisation and historical prestige, and conforming to the part played by Persia in the Allies' victory and the sacrifices she had borne. [illegible] Government and their opponents. A proposal made by Deputy Dashti that the vote of confidence in the Government should be taken was approved. Of the ninety-two members present only forty-five cast their votes in favour of Bayat, with three against and forty-three abstentions. The Prime Minister thanked the [illegible] His Imperial Majesty the Shah has sent a message to the Majlis urging them to lose no time in choosing a successor and putting an end to the crisis.

2. The names of Ali Mansur (Mansur-ul-Mulk), C.B.E. (F.O. 128/M.A. 164), at present Governor General of Khorrassan, Mahmud Bader (F.O. 40/M.A. 51) [illegible] successors to Bayat. There are some grounds for belief, however, that the various Majlis factions have not been able to come to an agreement over the choice of one of these and may choose a nonentity incapable, either by past reputation or future activity, of incurring the displeasure of anyone.

3. The following names were announced in connexion with the Supreme Economic Council (see paragraph 1 of Intelligence Summary No. 15/45): [illegible] Prime Minister—honorary President; Dr. Moazzami—President, Imami—vice-President, Nasir Quli Ardelan—Secretary.

4. Fahimi, Minister without portfolio, has been charged with the preparation of a bill to amend Dr. Millspaugh's income tax law.

5. According to the Minister of Court, the Soviet Ambassador has complained about an attack by Persians on a Russian officer in Tabriz which resulted in his death, an assault by Persians on a party of Russian school children in Tabriz and the posting up of anti-Communist slogans on the walls at Isfahan.

Appointments.

6. Abdul Ahad Dara to be Persian Consul in Istambul.
Jamshid Khabir to be Deputy Director of Department General of Supply.
Mustafa Quli Raei to be Director of the Road Transport Board, *vice* Muhammad Hussein Jehanbani resigned.

Resignations, Retirements.

7. Sartip Gulshayan, the late Military Governor of Tehran, suspended from his duties on account of the fracas outside the Majlis on the 6th March, has been placed *en disponibilité*.

Colonel Shahrats, acting Military Governor of Tehran since the suspension of Sartip Gulshayan, has submitted his resignation to the Ministry of War.

Persian Army.

8. A battalion [illegible] in Ahwaz [illegible] Khorramshahr. They will take over the guarding of the port installations and stores at Fahliyeh creek. This has been done at the request of His Majesty's Embassy, whose desire it is to see the Persian Government and Persian Army's authority re-established in areas where the British forces have been in occupation and also to [illegible] bilities, as Allies, for the safeguarding of our communications in Persia.

9. The Chief of the General Staff, General Arfa, is uneasy about the situation which will arise in the North when the Soviet troops are withdrawn. [illegible] envisages their stealing silently away overnight and then returning to "restore [illegible] insurgation. To forestall this he is busy assembling and training a brigade to occupy Gurgan (where the Yamut Turcomans have come heavily under the influence of the Soviets) and a mechanised brigade which, plus the column ordered to stand fast near Bukan, will be required to occupy Azerbaijan.

Tehran, 22nd April, 1945.

E 3370/70/34] (6)

[illegible]

Persian Affairs.

Political.

No successor to Bayat has been found and Persia still lacks a Government. H.I.M. the Shah has sent a further message urging the Deputies to come to a [illegible] the war in Europe might end at any moment and Persia would be faced with the readjustment of her internal life.

2. A further batch of seven Persian internees has been liberated. Two military officers are included.

Economic.

3. The various sub-committees of the Supreme Economic Council (see paragraph 3 of last Intelligence Summary) have been selected. They are as follows:

Finance: Bader, Muqbil, Sadiqi, Ardelan and Dr. Zanganeh.
Commerce: Wakili, Khosrowshahi, Imami, Kooros and Namazi.
Industry: Amin, Farrar, Pannahi, Dr. Ittehar and Buzurgniya.
Agriculture: Adl, Dr. Shafaq, Mustaufi, Bayat and Bushehri.
Works: Dr. Moazzami, Dr. Aghayan, Dr. Bahrami, Fateh and Dr. Nandar.

Appointment.

4. Muhammad Hajib Davallu, Persian Consul at Mosul, to be counsellor at the Persian Legation at Stockholm. He is a pleasant mannered and honest man of about 45 years of age. He married, and was recently divorced from, the younger daughter of the late Baqir Azimi, under whom he served when the former [illegible]

Internal Security.

Fars.

5. A consular report states that Nasir Khan Qashgai will probably stay in [illegible] Mansur and Khosro will accompany the tribe to its summer grazing-grounds.

Khorassan.

6. Further acts of highway robbery are reported on the roads between Meshed and Farman and near Tabas.

Mekran.

7. Six of the seven Baluchis who were guilty of a highway robbery in November last and who were subsequently captured have been convicted by a military court and shot in Zahidan.

Isfahan.

8. No further demonstrations have been held. A Mill Council has been formed, consisting of owners, managers and foremen. If this body takes its duties seriously and looks after the welfare of the workers it should make for [illegible] which hitherto has treated labour disputes as a field for political manœuvre more than a field in which they should work for reforms.

Financial.

9. The National Bank has been authorised to mint 200 million silver coins of various denominations.

British Military Interests.

10. An interesting summary of "Aid to Russia" cargoes carried across Persian roads is [illegible] appendix to this [illegible] was prepared in London.

Turkish Interests

[illegible] the Turkish Consulate at Rezaieh has been raised to a consulate-general

Russian Interests

12. According to a press report, the Soviet military authorities have asked the Persian Government to appoint representatives to take over the port installations at Nau Shahr which, owing to the decrease in Aid to Russia supplies, are no longer required by the Soviet military authorities. The terms of the transfer are not mentioned but, in any case, during the time of their occupation the Soviet military authorities have not made any considerable alterations or improvements to the port or its installations.

The Russian papers *Trud* and *Red Fleet* have published articles on Persia [illegible]tly based on information supplied by Tass Agency. The articles have [illegible]tly attacked Seyyid Zia and accuse him of bringing about the fall of Bayat. The articles also warn Persia against "reactionary" tendencies.

Appendix

Summary of the "Aid to Russia" Cargoes Transported by Road through Persia in Metric Tons, October 1941 to September 1944, inclusive.

Names of Transport Agencies and Routes Operated

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Khorramshahr Andimesh Kasvin	Khanagin [illegible] Pahlevi [illegible] Zahedan [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	319 438	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	45 4[illegible]	23 11[illegible]	[illegible]

Note

[illegible] shown under Soviet Transportation represent the cargoes loaded and [illegible] on the newly assembled trucks, the driving and conveying of which were undertaken by the Soviet Trans[illegible] directorate. Where loads were carried on trucks [illegible] been included under [illegible] 5 per cent. of the U.P.T. Compan[illegible]

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 15 Sent by the Persian Staff for the Period 1st to 6th May, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 145 of 7th May. Received in Foreign Office, 18th May.)

Persian Affairs

Political

THE Deputies, having been unable to agree on any man of character, have [illegible] Prime Minister [illegible] Hakimul Mulk), an old deaf man who has played no important part in Persian politics for many years. In past history he was physician to Muzaffer ed Din Shah and was subsequently a Cabinet Minister in several Governments before Reza Shah's

reign. He is said to be honest and is known to be ineffective. He obtained sixty-four votes from the Deputies, Sadiq Sadiqi (Mustashar ed Doulch) (F.O. 193; M.A. 248), who was preferred by the Russians, finding twenty-four supporters. Rumours that Hakimi intends in the choice of the members of his [illegible] of the Soviet Embassy have already raised doubts in the minds of those who voted for him whether their choice was wise, and hopes of his having a stable majority are not high.

2. On the advice of His Majesty's Ambassador the Persian authorities decided to suspend for the 1st May the order forbidding public gatherings and [illegible] show their admiration for the Red army. The party was consequently allowed to hold a May Day procession on condition that orders given by the Military Governor to party leaders regarding the route to be followed and the avoidance of offensive slogans were obeyed. A crowd of 4,000–6,000 men and women was collected for the occasion, mostly Armenians, Assyrians, refugees of some years ago from Russia and Turks from Azerbaijan. The proceedings were entirely orderly.

Economic

3. The personnel of the commissions which according to the Statutes of the Supreme Economic Council—see appendix to Summary No. 15 1945—are to be charged with responsibility for studying and reporting to the Supreme Council on questions connected with finance, agriculture, labour and commerce have now been appointed. The presidents of the commissions in the above order are Mahmud Bader (F.O. 40, M.A. 51); Ahmad Hussein Adl; Dr. Aghayan and Mohammad Mehdi Nimazi.

Appointments—Military.

4.—(i) Sarhang Ahmed Vusuq to command the 8th (Khorassan) Division *vice* Sarhang Khodadad, relieved.

(ii) Sarhang Seyyid Hussein Hashimi Ha'iri to command the Independent Mechanised Brigade (Tehran).

(iii) Sarhang Keshan to be head of the Army Transport Department *vice* Sartip Atapur, resigned.

Internal Security

Western Azerbaijan

5. Disturbing reports are reaching the Persian authorities regarding the [illegible] No. 12 1945, [illegible] No. 14 1945, [illegible] Persian troops, [illegible] Soviet [illegible] Kurdish [illegible] Mahabad [illegible] Kurdish [illegible] Soviet Consul had recently arrived from the Caucasus to encourage the [illegible] These reports are possibly exaggerated, but there is little doubt that there is some truth in them—unfortunately, because they serve to embitter the attitude of the Persian authorities towards the Kurds in general. According to a circumstantial report received by the Persian Government the Soviet Consul from Rezaieh recently visited Mahabad and promised full Russian support to the movement for Kurdish independence. The truth of this requires confirmation. Some reports say that the movement is spreading to the Herki, the Shakkah, the [illegible] Kurdistan on whose loyalty the Persian Government can rely is Qurami Agha of the [illegible] tribes. Southern Kurdish [illegible] have as yet shown no signs of being seriously affected.

Eastern Azerbaijan

6. A few days ago the Soviet Ambassador informed the Persian Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs that, unless the Persian authorities began within five days the disarmament of the Shahsavan tribes of the Ardebil district and of the "brigands" of Mianeh, the Soviet military authorities would undertake the operation themselves. The Shahsavan tribes are anti-Russian, and their

principal chief in the Ardebil area, Sardar Nusrat, has recently been taking [illegible] into the tribal territory. By the "brigands" of the Mianeh district the Soviet Ambassador means the followers of Sabir Muzaffer, a prominent landowner who has also recently been hunting Tudeh agents from his district. The reply given to the ambassador is said to have been that the Persian troops would be [illegible]ructed to begin disarmament operations in the towns of Mianeh and Ardebil (where, according to the Chief of the General Staff, Tudeh sympathisers have been issued with arms by the Russians), and that further operations would be carried out in accordance with the Government's general programme in which the disarmament of the Kurds of Mahabad had priority.

Kashgai.

[illegible] re-establishment of correct relations with the Persian authorities that followed on his submission reported in Summary No. 13, paragraph 8, to convert the responsible Persian Army commander General Humayuni, to a belief in his (Abdullah's) virtues and in the unreliability of all the Kuhigalu chiefs lately [illegible] Hussein Taheri and Malik Mansur Bashti, who were, [illegible] Abdullah, strongly supported by General Humayuni. The latter is now accusing them of preparing to create trouble at the instigation of agents of the Tudeh party who have, it is true, recently visited Behbehan and Hussein Quli Rustami of the Mamassani. He has suggested that Abdullah Khan should be used to arrest Khosrow and disarm his followers. The Chief of the General Staff has expressed to General Humayuni his surprise at this sudden change of attitude and has asked for more precise information to justify it. It is unlikely that this will be forthcoming.

Russian Affairs.

8. About a dozen persons of the landowning class of Mianeh in Azerbaijan were recently deported to Tabriz by the Soviet military authorities, their crime apparently being opposition to the Tudeh party. Some have since been allowed to return to Mianeh.

9. The incidents at Tabriz of which the Soviet Ambassador, as reported in Summary No. 10, [illegible] out to be an assault by Persian policemen on a Russian in civilian clothes, who, however, was not killed, and a much more serious incident where it is alleged an assault was made by seven Persian civilians on two Russian youths and a Russian girl of 15 was raped. The suspected assailants in the latter case were arrested by the Persian authorities, but the Russians insisted on their being handed over to them and they are still in Russian custody.

10. In the course of an obviously inspired article in one of the Persian papers subsidised by the Russians commenting on a suggestion made in an article in the *Washington Post* to the effect that Russia did not really need Persian oil, the statement [illegible] that Russia certainly requires more oil since she wishes to conserve her own oil supplies for the needs of national defence and "military [illegible] the [illegible] French and Italian fleets. Her home consumption was increasing. Russia was relying in increasing degree on mechanised agriculture. The oil of North Persia would be transported via the Volga to Central Russia for internal consumption.

Chinese Affairs.

11. The Chinese Minister, Mr. Li Tieh-tseng, has returned to Persia after an absence of two months and will shortly present new letters of credence on his elevation to the rank of ambassador.

E 3434/70/34] (b)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 19, Secret, for the period 7th to 13th May, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 149 of the 14th May, 1945, Received in Foreign Office, 28th May.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. The following Cabinet has been presented to the Majlis:—

Prime Minister and Minister for the Interior: Ibrahim Hakimi.
Foreign Affairs: Anushirwan Sepahbudi (F.O. 205—M.A. 282).
War: Ibrahim Zand.
Health: Dr. Ismail Marzban (Amin-ul Mulk) (F.O. 128).
Agriculture: Nasrullah Khalatbari (Ittela-ul Mulk).
Finance: Abdul Hussein Hajir (F.O. 79—M.A. 104).
Roads and Communications: Nadir Arasteh.
Commerce and Industry: Abul Qasim Najm (F.O. 150—M.A. 192).
Education: Ghulam Hussein Rahnema.
Ministers without portfolio:—
Hassan Ali Kamal Hidayet (Nasr-ul Mulk) (F.O. 107—M.A. 140).
Mustafa Adl (Mansur us-Sultaneh) (F.O. 1—M.A. 1).
Justice: Dr. Khushbin (Acting).
Posts and Telegraphs: Not yet appointed.

The selection appears to have been mainly on a desire to appoint Ministers with no political bias or convictions. It is, consequently, not remarkable that with a few exceptions they are colourless. Hajir is able, but will be obstructed [illegible] Turkey. Khalatbari has for years suffered from senile decay and has been long [illegible] his appointment. Rahnema is a new comer to political life. He is a professor of mathematics and vice chancellor of the university. The Minister for Justice is likely to be offered to Alahyar Saleh (F.O. 198—M.A. 253), who is now at the San Francisco Conference.

2. [illegible] about the length of its life are gloomy. It meets with the approval of no group in the Majlis, and it is unlikely that it will command a sufficiently stable majority to enable it to undertake any effective measures of government. The parliamentary [illegible] have fallen apart again, and dissensions have appeared even within individual groups [illegible] the Majlis [illegible] associated [illegible] formed outside the Majlis—the Iradeh-i-Milli. The small Tudeh group still remains unique in having some party discipline and in following a consistent programme, and in opposition to alleged sympathisers with Seyyid Zia or with the [illegible] number of Deputies who for reasons of private interests find it advisable to court Russian favour.

3. Persia celebrated the victory of herself and her Allies over Germany with restrained elation. A salute of 101 guns was fired, Government buildings were ordered to display the flags of the United Nations, bands played martial [illegible] the people [illegible] Tehran was apathetic. In the Shah's broadcast to the Persian people, in the speeches made in the Majlis by the Prime Minister and the Speaker the great part played by Persia in the victory was given due prominence. When the hour was darkest for the Allies Persia, it was claimed, threw her weight on their side by declaring war on the Axis. Even before that she had, at great sacrifices to the Persian people, placed her roads, railways and communications at their disposal. How greatly then should she be rewarded by her grateful Allies. The Shah has already called attention to the great services rendered by the Iranian State Railways by conferring on the Railway Administration the Order of Merit.

Economic.

4. The policy for the collection of this year's harvest has now been approved by the Economic Council. Substantial reductions are to be made in the price at which grain will be purchased by the Government, the number of buying centres is to be greatly reduced, and Government will not buy grain

in deficit areas (of which the Tehran district is the most important). Purchases of barley will be limited to those made by the Ministry of War and the [illegible] locusts can be prevented, the harvest should produce a considerable surplus over the requirements for internal consumption.

5. Locusts have appeared along the Persian Gulf littoral, notably at Bushire and Bandar Abbas, and at Birjand, Kerman and in the Farrash[illegible] and Lar districts of Fars. In the north they have appeared at Gurgan and on [illegible] efficiency are being taken, in the south with the assistance of British, and in the north of Russian experts.

6. There is now a weekly air service, once each way, between Tehran and Bushire calling at Isfahan and Shiraz, operated by de Havilland Rapide or Dominie machines, the property of the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs.

Appointments—military.

7. (i) Sarhang Sarimi to command the 11th (Saqqiz) Brigade.
(ii) Sarhang Kamal to be Officer Commanding Gendarmerie in Kermanshah.

Internal Security.

Khaigatu.

8. It is reported that the rival Boir Ahmadi chiefs, Abdullah Zorghampur and his half brother Khosrow, have signed an agreement which may for a time eliminate one of the possible causes of trouble in that turbulent area.

Russian Interests.

9. The Tudeh press has been voicing Russian displeasure with the Persian delegates at San Francisco who dared to vote in opposition to Russia in favour of the Argentine being invited to the conference. They, it says, are obviously merely tools in the hands of certain Great Powers. The campaign against Seyyid Zia and his "masters" continues without pause. Shameless attempts [illegible] action for defamation brought by Seyyid Zia against one of the Tudeh papers.

10. The May Day celebrations of the Tudeh party in Meshed went on for two days. Mounted Russian officers and about sixty soldiers with tommy guns were on duty in the streets for the protection of party members.

11. Recent manœuvres by British troops in the area Behbehan—Gach Saran, during which a number of the chiefs of Kuh-i-Galu and Mamassani were entertained by General Lochner, have, as was to be expected, aroused the suspicious curiosity of the Russians. The Russian vice-consul and two members of the Ahwaz Consulate recently visited Behbehan and Gach Saran where, since Persians will usually tell the kind of tale that they think will be welcome to their visitor, they have doubtless collected much information to confirm their suspicions of British encouragement of tribal chiefs in their desire to return to an autonomous and feudal tribal system and of British support for the [illegible] the Tudeh party and Russian interests, and perhaps even the distribution of arms to the tribes.

French Interests.

12. M. Herriot has arrived in Tehran from Moscow and imprisonment in Germany. The Persians were at some pains to do him honour and to express to him their attachment to France in terms of fulsome flattery. M. Herriot's replies were highly pleasing to Persian vanity.

Turkish Interests.

13. A Turkish commercial mission has arrived in Tehran to investigate the prospects of trade between Persia and Turkey and more particularly the purchase of Persian tobacco.

Vatican Interests.

14. Mgr. Marina has relinquished the appointment of Papal representative in Persia.

Tehran, 13th May 1945.

E 3796/70/34. (9)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 20, Secret, for the Period 14–27th May, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 172 of 28th May. Received 5th June.)

Persian Affairs.

I[illegible]

1. More than a fortnight has passed since the Cabinet was presented to the Majlis and it is not yet known whether it will stay or fall. On the 14th May the Prime Minister announced his programme—the consolidation of friendly relations with Persia's allies, based on the Tripartite Treaty, the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of Tehran; revision of taxes; attention to economic problems and to agricultural reforms; reform of the security forces, improvement of conditions for workers and peasants. Since then the Deputies have resorted to various tricks to postpone the taking of a vote on the programme. The Tudeh party declared its opposition to the Government as a matter of principle, since it did not stand for that radical reorganisation of society which the party desired to see. All its representatives in the Majlis and some ten to twelve other members notified their intention to speak against the Government's programme, and these speeches, alternating with those of supporters of the Government, have filled up the last ten days. In addition to the Tudeh representatives there are many Deputies who are not content with the Government. They are chiefly interested in having in the Ministries of War and Interior Ministers who can be induced to secure their re-election, and they do not see in the present Cabinet those with the necessary qualities. They are therefore attempting to reconcile their divergent views as to a suitable alternative to Hakimi as Prime Minister and to make up a coalition of groups that will form a majority in the Majlis. It seems that at best Hakimi can hope for only a small majority and it is doubtful whether in the circumstances he will be willing to continue in office.

2. There is a very prevalent demand that, now that the war with Germany is over and Persian communications are no longer required for the transport of munitions to Russia, Allied troops should evacuate Persian territory. In his [illegible] the hope that the Allies would substitute more normal relations for those based on the Tripartite Treaty, and other speakers defined this more precisely as a hope that Allied troops would leave the country. The same hope is expressed over and over again in the press, combined very frequently with a demand for the release of the remaining internees.

3. One of the numerous political parties in Persia, the Adalat, a party with a programme of reform by persuasion, opposed to the Tudeh because of its Russian connexion, staged a demonstration on the 18th May to celebrate the Allied victory and also to demand the evacuation of Persia by Allied troops and the release of the *détenus*. The meeting was broken up by an attack staged—there is little doubt—by the Tudeh party. One of the Adalat party was killed and several injured by bricks thrown by the attackers, with whom the police made no attempt to interfere. For their inactivity the Government is largely to blame since, at Russian insistence, they suspended the Chief of the Isfahan police for taking action against Tudeh rioters. Subsequently, some eight arrests were made. It is reported that the Soviet Ambassador made a strong verbal protest against the matter of the withdrawal of Allied troops being allowed to be made the subject of a popular demonstration.

4. In the speeches of the Tudeh members in opposition to the Government attacks were made on the whole of the present social system, on the present [illegible] although the Tudeh [illegible] politically educated), on the servants of the imperialists and on the alleged support by the reactionaries of the feudal tribal system. The usual accusation was made that the tribes were being supplied with arms in the interests of imperialism. Better relations and a new treaty with Russia were advocated. Seyyid Zia came in for much abuse, and on several successive days his supporters organised demonstrations in his favour at the entrance of the Majlis.

5. Seyyid Zia's party, the Iradeh-i-Milli, [illegible] activity and, perhaps, prestige. It is preparing to open up branches in the towns of the South wherever the Tudeh [illegible]. Attempts are being made to bring about a reconciliation between Seyyid Zia and the Shah, whose relations have been embittered by the incessant criticism of the Shah and the Court in

[illegible] *Imrouz*, whose editor, Muzaffar Firuz, a Qajar prince very hostile to the Shah on account of the murder of his father, Prince Nusrat ed Douleh, by Reza Shah, was one of Seyyid Zia's earliest and most ardent supporters. Seyyid Zia is now reported to have broken with Muzaffar Firuz since he considers that the forces of resistance to Russian penetration should not be dissipated by attacks on the Crown.

6. Dr Musaddiq has again been in trouble with his fellow members of the Majlis. Not content with calling them a pack of thieves he accused them of doing nothing for the country and hinted that the country would be better without them. This provoked some reaction since it is known that Dr Musaddiq is in close contact with the Shah and that the Shah would gladly be relieved of this troublesome Parliament.

7. A personality note on the Prime Minister, Hakimi, is attached as an appendix to this summary.

[illegible]

8. The fall in prices that followed on the news of victory in Europe has not been maintained. Reports of world-shortages of commodities and of discord between Great Britain and Russia have caused prices to rise again.

9. Although the Persian financial year begins on the 22nd March the budget for the current year has not even been prepared, much less considered by the Majlis. Consequently, all departments of the administration are living from hand to mouth with a complete absence of foresight, planning or provision.

10. The present population of Persia according to the estimate of the Persian Government is 16,549,837 but according to estimates made by British consular officers for their various districts the total is 12,975,600. The latter figure may be assumed to be nearer the correct number.

Appointments—Civil.

11.—(i) Hormuz Qarib to be First Secretary at the Persian Embassy in Turkey.

(ii) Ali Akbar Furuhandi to be Second Secretary at the Persian Legation in Syria.

(iii) Ismail Usanlu (Modir ul Douleh) to be Farmandar of Meshed.

Retirements—Military.

12.—(i) Sartip Ghulam Ali Qadar—dismissed from the service for corruption.

(ii) Sartip Hussein Qoli Setvate.

(iii) Sarhang Ali Yazdanfar—dismissed from the service.

(iv) Sarhang Majid Ghaffari.

(v) Sarhang Ahmad Tahir Niya.

Internal Security.

[illegible]

13. The leader of the anti-Tudeh Labour Union of Isfahan was murdered [illegible] May [illegible] on the return from Tehran to Isfahan of the Tudeh leader, Bahrampur. He brought a large sum of money, and his intention presumably was to endeavour to regain the ground recently lost by the Tudeh. [illegible] Tudeh sympathisers and ruffians of the town. There had already been a fight between the Tudeh and their opponents on the 22nd May. The town is now being patrolled by Persian troops, and the Governor General has recommended that a Military Governor should be appointed so that military law can be applied. The Chief of Police, a relatively efficient man, had been recalled to Tehran some time previously at the insistence of the Russians who [illegible] action be had taken against Tudeh agitators. The acting Chief of Police is believed to be in Russian pay.

Fars.

14. Nasir Qashgai has sent to the Prime Minister and the Majlis an excited telegram protesting against the movement of Persian troops into Qashgai territory, apparently to garrison places that to some extent control the lines of migration. Nasir pretends to regard these moves as provocative, likely to alarm the tribes as to the intentions of Government and unjustified in view of the good order maintained by the tribes during their upward migration. It is true

that [illegible] the Qashgai and Khamseh tribes have moved from their winter [illegible] with comparatively little disturbance to roads and villages. [illegible] for sale to Yazd. In the ensuing fracas the gendarmerie opened fire and killed some sheep.

Kurdistan.

15. It is reported from Kermanshah that early in April several important Kurdish chiefs came from Iraq and met representatives from the Persian Kurdish tribes of Kalkhani, Waladbegi and Qubadi to discuss plans for Kurdish independence. This meeting was followed by an anonymous petition to His Majesty's Consul complaining of the oppression of the Iraqi and Kurdish Governments, and urging the establishment of an independent Kurdistan to include the Kurds of Syria, Iraq, Persia and Turkey.

Russian Interests.

16. In commenting on rumours to the effect that present disagreements [illegible] inspired Persian papers says that these rumours are being put about by persons interested in maintaining and increasing high prices. There was no possibility of Great Britain fighting Russia. In one stroke the Red army could sever the vital arteries leading from Great Britain's oil supplies in Persia and Iraq.

17. A Society for the Promotion of Cultural Relations between the [illegible] (Isfahan) and Soviet Armenia has been organised in Julfa. [illegible] message to Stalin from the people of Soviet Armenia published in the Russian press of the 17th May is not without interest in this connexion. [illegible] as returned to Armenia for a short visit. His Majesty's Consul reports that [illegible] abstains from expressing political views in secret he encourages the Tudeh party.

18. An eminent Moslem priest from Soviet Russia, styled by the Persian press the Sheikh ul Islam of the Caucasus, has arrived in Tabriz and is to visit Qom and Meshed. [illegible] to convince the Persian priest [illegible] Soviet principles are not injurious to Islam.

[illegible] Russian [illegible] Russian [illegible] Persian press. The theme generally is: How can it be said that victory [illegible] brought freedom while the people of India and Africa are captive and [illegible]

Polish Interests.

20. The number of civilian Polish refugees still remaining in Persia on the 9th May was—

	Men, Women and Children
In Tehran	1,793
In Isfahan	938
In Ahwaz	1,131
	3,862

Iraqi Interests.

21. Abbas Mehdi Beg, Iraqi Minister in Persia, has left Tehran on relinquishment of his appointment.

Swiss Interests.

22. M. Edouard Barrier has arrived in Tehran as Swiss Chargé d'Affaires in relief of M. Bucniker who is returning to Switzerland.

Turkish Interests

23. The Turkish Economic Mission has now left Persia. As far as is known it achieved little definite result.

24. Kamal Kuparlu, the newly appointed Turkish Ambassador to Persia, has arrived in Tehran.

American Interests

25. According to the Persian press Brigadier-General Besson of the Persian Gulf Command was presented with a decoration by the Shah in appreciation of his collaboration with the Persian authorities in the operation of the Persian railways. Brigadier General Besson has now left Persia.

26. Mr. Leyland Morris, American Ambassador to Persia, has left Tehran on relinquishing his appointment.

Tehran, 27th May 1945.

Appendix to Enclosure

Dr. Ibrahim Hakimi Hekmat al Mulk

Short biographical note

An Azarbaijani with long official experience, aged about 72. Deaf. Highly respectable but of very weak character. Was Court Physician in Qajar times as was his father before him. Claims to have been bearer of the bubble bubble to the last of the Qajars. Associated before the invasion of Persia with Qavam, Yazdan panah, Mustaubaru'd Dawla [illegible] apparently less deeply impl[illegible]

Lived in retirement thr[illegible] for some years past.

Deputy in first Majlis 1908. Minister of Finance 1910 and 1911. Minister of Education in seven different Cabinets between 1914 and 1920. Minister for Foreign Affairs January 1922. Assistant Prime Minister to Qawam August 1942. Minister without portfolio February 1943. On National Bank Advisory Council in March 1944.

Appointed Prime Minister 2nd May 1945, chiefly because all other candidates were opposed by one faction or another in the Majlis.

fo.

E 4117/75/34 (10)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 21, Secret, for the Period 26th May to 3rd June, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 185 of 4th June. Received in Foreign Office, 13th June.)

Persian Affairs

General

SUMMARY. [illegible] with the programme or qualities of the Government but almost entirely with [illegible] ment, and indeed some of those nominally for the Government, were the Tudeh members and their sympathisers, and they made good use of their opportunity to attack the many prevailing abuses, the present ruling classes and their alleged one-sided policy in foreign affairs. Some spirited rejoinders were made by their opponents. The debate, however, did not materially affect the views of the Deputies about the Government. The opposition of the Tudeh party and of those who from consideration of their personal interests feel bound to vote in accordance with the party dictates was certain. The fate of the Government depended on whether a sufficient number of the other Deputies would agree that a different Government would give them a better chance of re-election. That, it seems, was their conclusion, for when the vote was taken on the 3rd June only a small number supported the Government. It could not be contended that it was a good Government, but it fell not on its demerits but because the majority of the [illegible] Prime Minister [illegible]

induce him to appoint Ministers to their liking to the Cabinet posts that can exert great influence on the elections. Their obvious lack of concern for anything but their personal interests has further discredited the Majlis and strengthened the hands of those, notably the Shah and the Russians, who would like to see it dissolved.

2. The Persian Government has addressed notes to the British, Russian, and American Embassies requesting the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia, since with the end of the war in Europe the reasons for which those troops entered Persia no longer exist. The announcement that His Majesty's Government were giving sympathetic consideration to this request has given pleasure [illegible] and Majlis debates. Claims are made that even if the treaty does allow British troops to remain in Persia until six months after the end of the war with Japan [illegible] war with Japan, and that Allied troops have no longer legal claim to the rights as regards censorship and the use and control of aerodromes, means of communica[illegible] Treaty, [illegible] against [illegible] detained sol[illegible] a number m[illegible] Japanese or [illegible]

Economic

4. The financial year March 1944–March 1945 ended up with a deficit in the Government's finances of 462 million rials. Ordinary revenue was 3,024 million rials and commercial revenue 3,459 million rials. Ordinary expenditure totalled 3,844 million rials and commercial expenditure 4,001 million rials. The deficit for the previous year (1943–44) was 1,082 million rials.

Army

5. General Razmara, the previous chief of the General Staff, is being put on trial, on a charge of accepting a bribe from a tribal leader, much to the delight of his successor, General Arfa, to whom he is a dangerous rival.

Internal Security

General

6. Remarkably few incidents of tribal lawlessness have been reported in recent weeks from the tribal areas of South and West Persia. This is probably due to a variety of causes: improved economic conditions, less provocation by Persian officials, in a few areas better security measures, and the conversion of some tribal leaders to the belief that at the present time good behaviour is the best policy for the tribes.

Tehran

7. A large number of arrests—some reports say as much as a hundred—have been made in connexion with the murder of the anti-Tudeh Labour leader reported in Summary No. 20/45, paragraph 13. No further disturbances have occurred although the instigators of the murder are still at large.

Western Azerbaijan.

8. The situation at Mahabad is still very obscure. Even the Persian authorities have little information that is reliable. There is undoubtedly a movement for Kurdish independence, known as the J.K. Society, which according to Kurdish sources receives its inspiration from Iraq. There is little doubt, too, that the Russians are giving some encouragement to this movement. There is some competition for members, however, between the J.K. Society and the Tudeh party which the Russians may find it difficult to reconcile. The Kurds are generally hostile to the Tudeh whose principles are contrary to their religious ideas and to their tribal system.

Russian Interests

9. The Russian-inspired Persian press has, now that Russia is no longer being supplied with petrol from Abadan, begun the expected campaign against the A I O C with the object of fostering discontent among Persian workers. The strike at Kermanshah, reported in paragraph 14, is its first success. The justice of the Persian claim to Bahrein and the iniquity of the continued detention of the internees are also being pressed in some of these papers.

10. The Soviet Government recently invited a party of Persians to Baku to attend a celebration of the 25th anniversary of the "independence" of the Soviet Azerbaijan Republic, and on their return to Tehran the House of Culture (V O K S) held a reception to give other Persians the opportun[illegible] impressed by their sycophantic descriptions of their experiences.

11. The Soviet Ambassador is pressing the Persian Government to send [illegible] of Persian troops to Mahabad. This battalion must, however come f[illegible] it must not be replaced, so leaving Tabriz with no troops other [illegible] ra ned recruits. To the protest that it would [illegible] nwise to despatch to Mahabad, occupied and surrounded by armed Kurds, as small a force as 400 infantry soldiers, the ambassador replied that the Soviet authorities would guarantee their safety. It looks as if the Russians wished to reduce the Persian garrison in Tabriz and have a Persian battalion interned by the Kurds at Mahabad as the small Persian garrison is practically interned at Reza eh. The refusal of the Russians to allow the Persian Government to send an adequate force to Mahabad has been referred to in Summary No. 18/45 and previous Summaries.

American Interests

12. The Persian Gulf Command will cease to operate the Persian Railway at the end of June. The Persian authorities are taking over by stages and by the end of the month they will be in full control of the railway from [illegible] to Ahwaz and Bandar Shahpur.

13. Mr. Wallace Murray has arrived in Tehran as American Ambassador.

British Interests

14. There has been a general strike of Persian employees of the Kerman[illegible] Petroleum Company, instigated by agents of the Tudeh party. Some of the strikers have already gone back to work.

Tehran, 3rd June, 1945.

E 4316/70/34. (11)

Military Attache's Intelligence Summary No. 22 for the period 4th June to 10th June, 1945. (Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 193 of 11th June. Received 20th June.)

Persian Affairs

Political

1. [illegible] the Imperial Bank of Persia, Seyd Mehdi Seyd Ashraf) (F O 194/M A 249) for appointment as Prime Minister, and he has been charged by the Shah with the formation of a Government. He is already in difficulties with the Deputies over the selection of his Ministers. In the session of the Majlis held to elect a Prime Minister he was supported by 60 of the 67 members present, but his supporters are already at loggerheads with each other regarding the choice of Ministers for the Ministries of the Interior and of W[illegible] Ministries that have most influence on the elections. Consequently he [illegible] able to present the Cabinet to Parliament. It is understood that he has decided to retain Anushirwan Sepahbudi as Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nadir Arasteh as Minister of Roads and Communications, and to include Mahmud Bader (F O 40/M A 51), Abdul Hussein Hajhir (F.O. 79/M A. 104), Dr Said Malek (Lughman-ul Mulk).

The Tudeh party has already declared itself to be in opposition, and another thirty Deputies are unlikely to support the Government whatever its

composition. While the Deputies are concerned almost entirely with attempting to secure their re-election the business of administration is falling into serious arrears. The budget for the current year has not yet been discussed, the control of economic affairs is in abeyance and there are many important questions for decision, notably the arrangements to be made for the financing of the railway when it passes to the control of the Persian administration, and British contributions to make up the difference between revenue and expenditure cease on the 1st July.

2. The [illegible] for a complete withdrawal. It is perhaps affected by [illegible] put forward in some quarters that even if the British have some just [illegible] for staying the Russians have none. The Russians probably feel safe in advocating complete withdrawal, having good cause to expect that the British intend to remain in Khuzistan at least.

3. All internees have now been released with the exception of fourteen. For this the Minister for Foreign Affairs has gained some much-needed credit.

Economic

4. Discussions to settle the details of the transfer of the railway south of [illegible] and the amount of rolling stock to be handed over by the British and Americans have been held and the decisions [illegible] The Persian [illegible] 30th June. The Americans have agreed to allow a number of their technical staff to remain to help the Persians in the transition period. The present financial arrangement whereby the British Government makes good the difference between revenue and expenditure ceases to be effective on the 30th June. Some economy can be effected by a reduction of staff, now considerably in excess of the requirements of normal Persian traffic, but even then a considerable increase in freight rates will be necessary if revenue is to balance costs. And the discharge of a large number of employees will swell the ranks of the unemployed and the Tudeh party.

British Interests

5. The employees of the Kermanshah Petroleum Company have returned to work with the exception of some 350 who, having been absent for a week, were dismissed in accordance with the ordinary rules of the company. The Tudeh press, which had been inciting the employees, made a sudden *volte-face*, perhaps realising that the strike was doomed to failure, and the official organ of the Tudeh labour organisation published a statement to the effect that the strike had not had its prior approval and that in view of the necessity for not hindering the prosecution of the war against Japan it should be ended as soon as possible.

Russian Interests

6. It seems that the Persian authorities made some pretence of complying with the Russian demand, reported in Summary No. 18/45, paragraph 6, that the Shahsavan tribes of the Ardebil district and the "brigands" (*i.e.* the landlords) of Mianeh (both areas where Tudeh agitators had been meeting with rough treatment) should be disarmed. The gendarmerie collected five rifles from Mianeh, and a military detachment was sent to the Shahsavan camps to search [illegible] deserters against the Shahsavan chief Amir Arslan, and insisted on his removal to Tabriz.

7. The two Persian policemen accused of assault on a Russian civilian (see Summary No. 18/45, paragraph 9) have been sentenced by Persian military court to imprisonment for several months. The Persians accused of assault and rape against Russian students are still in Russian custody.

Tehran, 10th June, 1945.

(E 4636/70/34) (12)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 23 for the Period 11th June to 17th June, 1945. (Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 204 of the 18th June, Received in Foreign Office, 29th June.)

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Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE new Cabinet, composed as under, was presented to the Shah on the 12th June —

Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior: Seyyid Muhsin Sadr [illegible]
Ministers without portfolio: Mustafa Adl(') (Mansur-es-Sultaneh)
Hassan Ali Kamal Hidayet(') (Nasr-ul-Mulk)
Finance: Mahmud Bader (F O 40—M A 51)
Justice: Amanullah Ardalan (F O 27—M A 33)
Industry and Mines: Abbas Quli Gulshayan
Public Health: Dr. Sa'ed Malek (Loghman-ul-Mulk)
Posts and Telegraphs: Ahmad Etebar
War: Ibrahim Zand(')
Foreign Affairs: Anushirwan Sipahbudi(')
Agriculture: Dr. Nakhai.
Education: Ghulam Hussein Rahnema( )

All the above have at one time or another in the past been Cabinet Ministers. Gulshayan not since Foroughi's Cabinet. He was Mayor of Tehran in 1944.

2. The Cabinet has not yet been presented to the Majlis. The Opposition which consists of the eight Tudeh [illegible] leg[illegible] [illegible] Majlis [illegible] that the necessary quorum was not present, some of the Deputies of the majority coalition being absent from Tehran. The Shah also, although he authorized [illegible] his to his influence that Etebar and Ardalan have already resigned. The Shah's opposition is mainly due to pique and a desire to get even with the majority of the Deputies for having rejected Hakimi's Cabinet which included some Ministers of his own choice. The Deputies of the Opposition, but not including the Tudeh representatives, have issued a manifesto announcing their intention to obstruct the Government by all means in their power, since they believed that Sadr had not the qualities necessary for the solution of the problems facing the Government [illegible] The Tudeh party had previously announced their opposition. The Prime Minister is being vigorously abused by all the press under Russian influence, history of nearly forty years ago being raked up to provide charges against him. Representatives of the majority and minority groups have met and are to meet again to attempt to solve the deadlock. It is understood that the minority, less the Tudeh Deputies, have stated that they will support a Cabinet formed by any of the following, but by no other: Sadiq (Mustaghar-ul-Dowleh), [illegible] object to Hakimi and wish to include Qavam es Sultaneh.

3. The increase of Russian influence in the Majlis is causing some alarm to those Deputies who have hitherto for various reasons opposed Russian transgressions and the Tudeh party because of its Russian direction. In addition to the eight Tudeh representatives there are now some twenty Deputies who will often vote in accordance with Russian instructions. The fear that this coalition inspires in the remaining hundred Deputies arises from their belief that it is [illegible] action by the fortunate Soviet and from a recognition of their own lack of unity of leadership and of common purpose. The British, some of them think, should play a more active part: support their friends, threaten the wavering, bribe the needy, inspire and subsidise the press and give clear directives of policy. The British they say treat their friends no better than their enemies. The Russians reward their friends and murder their enemies—in Persian eyes a sensible and effective manner of acting.

(') In previous Cabinet.

4. The Persian Government has issued invitations to the Governments of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, the United States, France, China, India, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Turkey and Afghanistan to send representatives [illegible] Tehran. The date for the opening session was [illegible] The Persians themselves have no great enthusiasm for this congress having [illegible] qualified representatives. The suggestion came from the Russians, and the Persians gave way to Russian pressure and insistence on an early date, the Russian object being apparently to ensure that they, being more conveniently situated, will make a better show than any other Power.

Economic.

5. The Road Transport Department, which was set up [illegible] Dr. Millspaugh's tenure of office to control the operation of motor [illegible] imported for the Persian Government by the Allies or hired by the [illegible] now been dissolved. Control over the issue and use of tyres will be exercised by the newly formed Tyre Control and Distribution Department.

Appointments—Military.

6. Sarhang Ahmad Baharmast to be Military Governor of Tehran.

Internal Security.

Isfahan.

7. For the time being the situation in Isfahan town is quiet. The [illegible] of the anti-Tudeh leader Sarafian shocked public opinion and rallied it against the Tudeh. But if the Government shows weakness in proceeding against those implicated in the murder or in supporting the officials in Isfahan who have taken measures to preserve order it is likely that the Tudeh party will take heart. The public is disturbed by fears that they are already making plans to continue their campaign of intimidation and assassination.

Azarbaijan.

8. On the 6th June the unemployed of Tabriz paraded the streets carrying [illegible] "We [illegible] What is the Government doing for us?" There was, however, no disturbance.

British Interests.

9. The statement recently made in the House of Commons by the Govern[illegible] [illegible] tunity to the Russian-inspired Persian press and to other enemies of Great Britain to give colour to the accusations they have been making for some time of the sinister designs of British policy in South Persia, which are to be achieved [illegible] the arming and support of the tribes and the creation of autonomous [illegible] to be converted, as opportunity offers, into a British colony, however disguised. Moreover, the defence of British interests, these papers say, requires [illegible] should be infected by the ideas of the liberty lovers of Persia.

Russian Interests.

10. A party of some twenty Russian soldiers has arrived in Isfahan for the ostensible purpose of erecting a monument to the Soviet airmen who were killed last year in a crash in Chahar Mahal. Persians, however, are unable to avoid connecting their presence with the desire of the Tudeh party to re-establish [illegible]

11. [illegible] Russians have [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] not been confirmed [illegible] reliable sources.

12. The Russians continue to prevent the despatch of recruits for the Persian army from Azarbaijan.

Iraqi Interests

13. The press announces the appointment of Tahsin Qadri as Iraqi Minister in Persia.

Swedish Interests

14. M. Sven Herald Poussette has vacated his post as Swedish Chargé d'Affaires in Persia on his return to Sweden. Dr. Gunnar Jarring has assumed charge of the Swedish Legation.

Polish Interests

15. M. Bader has vacated his post as Polish Minister in Persia on recall to London. M. Okonski has assumed charge of the Polish Legation.

Tehran, 17th June, 1945.

CHAPTER IV.—SAUDI ARABIA.

E 4519/17/25] No. 12

Mr. [illegible] Smith to Mr. Eden.—(Received 26th June.)

(No. 104.)

Sir,

Jedda, 9th June, 1945.

With [illegible] your telegram No. 274 of the 1st June and relative correspondence relating to the Viceroy's visit to Ibn Saud, I have the honour to inform you that his Excellency, accompanied by Sir Evan Jenkins, private secretary, and Captain Henderson, aide-de-camp, arrived in Jedda by [illegible] Cairo on the 3rd June. Conflicting reports from Egypt had left us in [illegible] as to the expected time of arrival of the Royal Air Force Lodestar in which the Viceroy travelled. In the event the party arrived rather in advance of the earlier of the times indicated, but, fortunately, the Emir Mansour was already at the airport to welcome his [illegible].

2. It is conventional to wear Arab clothes when travelling in the interior of Saudi Arabia, especially when visiting the King. I had suggested to Lord Wavell before he left Cairo that he should conform with this practice, and his willingness to do so gave great pleasure in this country. In the King's private apartments at the Khuzam Palace, where the visitors rested briefly before continuing their journey, a carnivalesque atmosphere of private theatricals reigned while *arwals* and *thobs* were distributed and assumed. Arab cloaks draped, [illegible] white head-dresses fastened with a gold fillet. Breakfast, when it came, was more of a masquerade than a meal.

3. The King had made it clear that he expected me to accompany the Viceroy to Riyadh and, with your permission, I gladly did so, having ascertained that this would not inconvenience his Excellency. Lord Wavell invited the Emir Mansour to join his party in the Royal Air [illegible] a private aeroplane [illegible] on his flight across the desert [illegible] including the In[illegible] to the V[illegible] was [illegible]

4. We arrived at Buwath, a landing ground some 50 kilom. from Riyadh, three and a half hours after leaving Jedda. There the Emir Khaled, various Court dignitaries and a spare set of Arab robes sent by the King awaited the Viceroy. Another hour and a half's drive brought us to Riyadh, where the Badia Palace had been organised for our stay. The Crown Prince, the Emir Saud, bade us welcome, and all hopes of a wash had to be postponed until after luncheon. It was by that time 4 o'clock in the afternoon. It was [illegible] that I recorded my twentieth coffee of the day.

5. Audience with His Majesty had been arranged for 5 o'clock, and for this we proceeded to the Emir's Qasr al Muraldia, some miles from our palatial [illegible] welcome [illegible] Viceroy [illegible] thought [illegible] the first occasion were—except for an urgent enquiry whether Mr. Churchill would win the elections—limited to the formalities of greeting, the happiest atmosphere of mutual regard and goodwill was instantly [illegible] Viceroy's greetings to the King, which Lord Wavell delivered were [illegible]

6. [illegible] was served on the palace roof an hour or so after the sunset prayer. It was a simple meal, as Royal banquets go, and blessedly short for those unexercised in oriental sedentary attitudes. For music we had the reed like voices of five blind devotees, chanting the Koran on a near by roof, and the drone of a distant water wheel. For the [illegible] Ibn Saud [illegible] their bravery of silks and gold [illegible] funnel out were [illegible] we could look down into his private [illegible] produced a batch of about twenty of his sons, [illegible] Viceroy.

7. [illegible] Mansour asked me whether it would be incorrect to speak of [illegible] Wavell during his visit, and I had assured him to the contrary. What he, in fact, asked was that India should help to relieve the great shortage of consumer goods in this country, and that various purchases made by

two of his sons in a raid on India in 1943 should be licensed for export. Neither [illegible] itself to the Government of India, but Lord Wavell was good enough to say that he would see whether anything could be done.

8. The Viceroy then persuaded Ibn Saud to tell the story of his capture of Riyadh from the garrison of Ibn Rashid forty-odd years ago. His comments reminded the King that he had a field-marshal for an audience. "Soldiers always understand each other," [illegible] the Emir Nasser, Governor of Riyadh, to show us, [illegible] in the citadel door and blood-stains, still sta[illegible] from the night when young Abdel Aziz ibn Saud won the first of many [illegible] victories.

9. The King's gifts were sent to the Viceroy and his party, including the Royal Air Force officers of his aeroplane, after they had returned to the Badia Palace. Lord Wavell's presents to Ibn Saud, which I took to him next day, included a beautifully illuminated manuscript of the Koran. "He could not have given me a gift more precious," the King remarked.

10. The Viceroy made an early start on the 4th June, as he had to join the Sunderland flying boat at Bahrain at 9 a.m. I remained in Riyadh at the King's request [illegible] with him Godspeed on their father's behalf.

11. The Viceroy's visit was, I think, a complete success. I fear that the circumstances of Arabian hospitality in June were occasionally arduous, but Lord Wavell took all discomforts in his stride and, if I may say so, matched the King's simplicity and natural dignity with his own. The establishment of immediately friendly relations was, perhaps, natural, but it was none the less pleasant to observe.

12. Some credit for removing the barriers of race and language must certainly go to Shaikh Izzedin Shawa, Director of Mines, Public Works and Transport in Jedda, who, at my suggestion, accompanied the party as interpreter when Mr. Moss, on doctor's orders, was unable to travel. Shaikh Izzedin Shawa, a Palestinian political exile and Cambridge graduate, reserves his anti-British mood for the Zionist problem. His interpreting was supple and impeccable.

13. I am reporting in a separate despatch such developments as occurred after the Viceroy's departure from Riyadh.

14. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Secretary to the [illegible] of India in the External Affairs Department and to the Minister Resi[illegible] the Middle East.

I have &c.
E. B. GRAFFTEY SMITH.

CHAPTER V.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

(A) Miscellaneous.

E 1737/1737/86] No. 15

Mr Shone to Mr Eden.—(Received 13th March.)

(35.)

Sir,

Beirut, 3rd March, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on leading personalities in the Lebanon.

2. Owing to the political evolution of the Lebanon since the crisis of November 1943, many new personalities have come into prominence and it has therefore been found necessary virtually to rewrite the report furnished in June 1943.

3. In view of the large number of religious communities in the country, the report has been drawn up in two sections, the second dealing with the leading religious personalities of the different communities.

4. Riad es-Solh's Government fell and the present Government was formed while these notes were being typed. It has, however, been f[illegible] Alterations to the notes on members of the former Government will be found in an annex to the report (¹).

5. For the compilation of these notes I am indebted to the Political Officer, Beirut.

I [illegible]
[illegible]

(¹) Alterations incorporated in main report to Foreign Office.

Enclosure in No. 15

Index of Leading Personalities in the Lebanon

[illegible]	Alfred Naccache	76.	Alfred Skaf
[illegible]	Adib Nahas	77.	Raid es Solh
[illegible]	Gibran Nahas	78.	Samir es Solh
[illegible]	Wadih Naim	79.	Dr. Aroub Tabet
[illegible]	[illegible] Moussa Nassimour	80.	Emile Tabet
[illegible]	[illegible] Nasser	81.	Georges Tabet
[illegible]	Sulaiman Noufal, Colonel	82.	Jacques Tabet
[illegible]	[illegible]		Dr. Jamil Talhouk
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	Salim Tawata
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Mr. George Sabbagha	89.	Gibran Tueni
[illegible]	Ali Saiaso	90.	Mr. Adel Osseiran
[illegible]	Saib Salam	90.	Mr. Abdullah Yafi
	Joseph Salem	91.	Yousef es Zein

1. *Khaled Abdel Khader.*—A Sunni Moslem landowner and one of the leading Beys of the Akkar. North Lebanon, born 1898. Ex Deputy and a supporter of Emile Eddé. Is actively engaged in smuggling. Unsuccessfully contested the 1943 elections.

2. *Abboud Bey Abdel Rezzek.*—A Sunni Moslem, born 1891. The principal Bey of the Akkar (North Lebanon) and the largest landowner in the Lebanon. A former Deputy and a supporter of Bechara el Khoury. A sly and crafty individual, whose sole interest is personal gain.

3. *Mohammed Abdul Rezzek.*—Son of No. 2. A Sunni Moslem, born 1904. Elected a Deputy for the second time in 1943 on Abdul Hamid Karami's list, but has since turned against him. Secondary education and mediocre intelligence, would do anything to become Premier.

4. *Me Habib Abi Chahla.*—A Greek Orthodox lawyer of Beirut, born 1903. Holds the Paris degree of Doctor of Law. Several times a Minister. Was formerly a supporter of Emile Eddé but broke with him before the 1943 election in which he was successful. Vice-President and Minister of Justice and Education from 1943 to January 1945. Remained staunch to the Government in the crisis of November 1943. Able, energetic and [illegible] and venal, consequently not much respected [illegible].

5. *Me. Joseph Abou Khater.*—A Greek Catholic lawyer of Zahlé, born about 1905. Studied law in France. A leader of the anti Skaf faction in Zahlé. Is extremely intelligent and ambitious and may have a political future if he becomes less mean and more accessible.

6. *Me Boulos Abou Nader.*—A Maronite lawyer of Beskinta, born 1883. Several times a Deputy and twice a Minister, supports Emile Eddé. Influential in the Metn district, but somewhat discredited on account of his exceptionally low morality.

7. *Ashraf Abdah.*—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut. Born 1894. Has for some time been an official of the Lebanese Administration of the Finance Department. In November 1943 was made Director in succession to Naim Haddad, Director General in 1944. Honest and quiet, not particularly intelligent, does not mix in politics.

8. *Ibrahim Abdah.*—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut, born in 1902. Was a contractor and engineer until appointed in February 1944, as Lebanese repre[illegible]. Honest and intelligent but indecisive.

9. *Amir Majid Arslan.*—A Druze from Shwarfat, born about 1908. Ex Minister, a member of Béchara el Khoury's Constitutional party. The most influential of the Lebanese Druzes on account of his family name. Unlike most Arslans, has never been pro-Axis. Minister of Health, National Defence and Agriculture, September 1943–January 1945. During the crisis of November 1943 headed a resistance group in the mountains. A cheerful, uneducated and highly venal feudal chieftain.

10. *Amir Rafik Arslan* (cousin of No. 9).—A Druze, born about 1898. A Director in the Lebanese Administration and many times a Deputy. Appointed Muhafez (Governor) of Beirut in October 1943. Not unintelligent but weak and ineffective.

11. *Ahmed el Assad.*—A Shia Moslem from Taibé (South Lebanon), born 1905. A feudal chieftain whose influence is paramount in the Jebel Amil [illegible] over the Palestine frontier. Was a Minister in the first "independent" Lebanese Government in 1941–42, but was displaced when it fell in July 1942 owing to British objections. Has since been wooed by the French, but would still prefer to play with the British if given any encouragement. Re-elected a Deputy in 1943. Appointed Minister of Public Works and Minister of Health and Public Assistance in January 1945.

12. *Me Taufiq (Toto) Awad.*—A Maronite lawyer of Hasroun, born 1908. Belongs to an influential family of North Lebanon and is a relation of the Maronite Patriarch, to whom he acts as legal adviser and land broker. Contrived by doubtful methods to become a Deputy in the 1937 Chamber. By constant intrigue succeeded in 1942 in securing a reconciliation between the Maronite Patriarch and both General Catroux and President Naccache. Was appointed Assistant Secretary of State in the interim Lebanese Government in July 1943 but failed in the elections. A professional go-between, who is universally disliked and despised for his dishonesty and mendacity.

13. *Me Ibrahim Azar.*—A Maronite lawyer of Sidon, born 1906. A member of the Constitutional party and a former Deputy. Not over-intelligent and very cautious, but sound and reliable.

14. *Amir Khalil Bellama.*—A Maronite from Bikfaya, born about 1888, belongs to a well known family. For many years practised as a lawyer in Cairo. Twice a Minister. Exceptionally stupid and rather a laughing-stock.

15. *Dr Raif Bellama.*—A Maronite bacteriologist of Beirut, born 1897. Is a professor at the American University of Beirut. Has so far taken no part in political life but has political ambitions. Has strong pan-Arab leanings. [illegible] and a good orator, but not an outstanding personality.

16. *Abdullah Beyhum.*—A Sunni Moslem from Beirut, born about 1873. Was Secretary of State in 1934, in 1939–41, and in the interim Lebanese Government appointed in July 1943. Honest but colourless and past his prime.

17. *Umar Beyhum.*—A Sunni Moslem landowner of Beirut, born 1907. [illegible] so far held office, but is considered one of the most prominent younger Moslems, and is likely to emerge as a political figure. Is nationalist and anti-French in his views.

18. *Mohammed Ali Beyhum* (brother of No. 19).—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut, born 1889. Prominent in Moslem political circles, but has never been a Deputy. Well-meaning and pleasant but ineffective.

19. *Omar Beyhum.*—A Sunni Moslem proprietor of Beirut, born 1881. A former Deputy. Has great influence in Beirut Moslem circles, particularly over the Najjade party, in whose formation he played a large part and by whom he is constantly consulted. Brusque and uneducated, but honest and consistent in his Nationalist views.

20. *Salah Beyhum.*—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut, born 1895. Has so far held no office, but is prominent in Moslem circles. Professes pan-Arab ideas and is anti-French. Honest and principled but not very bright.

21. *Me. Jawad Boulos.*—A Maronite solicitor of Tripoli, born 1900. Ex Deputy, was Minister for Foreign Affairs in the provisional Lebanese Government of March 1943, but was eliminated with it in July. A servile tool of the French, to whose support he owes his position. Unsuccessfully contested the 1943 elections.

22. *Me Philippe Negib Boulos.*—A Greek Orthodox lawyer from Koura (N. Lebanon), born 1902. Has held various magisterial offices. In 1941 was appointed by the Vichy authorities a member of President Naccache's administration, and held office in the first two "independent" Lebanese Governments, in the

second of which he was Minister for Foreign Affairs. Weak and ineffective, but honest and likeable. Failed in the 1943 elections, and resumed his post of judge of the Court of Appeal.

23. *Me Camille Chamoun.*—A Maronite lawyer from Deir el Kamar, born 1901. Once a Minister, a prominent member of the Constitutional party. Strongly pro British and for this reason viewed with suspicion by the F[illegible]. Very influential in the Chouf district. Honest, able and extremely likable. Appointed Minister of the Interior and Posts and Telegraphs in September 1943, one of the Ministers arrested by the French in November 1943. In July 1944 appointed first Lebanese Minister in London.

24. *Joseph Chamoun.*—A Maronite from Deir-el Kamar, born 1896. Was chief clerk of Beirut Governorate up to 1929 when Emile Eddé, then Prime Minister, made him Acting Director of Public Health. Became Director of Public Works in 1931 and was transferred in 1935 to be Director of Economic [illegible] he was appointed Director of Public Works, became [illegible] 1944. Honest, clever and hard working, does not mix in politics.

25. *Yusef Charbel.*—A Maronite of Hesh-el-Nemar of the Bekka. Born 1896. Made his career as a magistrate specialising in the examining branch. Attorney General in 1943. Honest and well educated, but brusk and may well be an opportunist. Often consulted by Ministers on political matters.

26. *Amar Jamil Chehab.*—A Maronite from Beirut, born 1898. Belongs to the Christian branch of a leading Lebanese family. Director of Finance from 1941-42, and from September 1943 senior Lebanese member on the Conseil Superieur des Interêts Communs. Was delegated by Riad Sohl in 1944 to run the Ministry of Supply but resigned at the end of the year and now holds no public post, though still technically Secretary General to the Presidency. A hard working and conscientious but exceedingly obstinate and narrow-minded official who periodically quarrels with his superiors.

27. *Amar Khaled Chehab.*—A Sunni Moslem from Hasbaya, born 1891. Belongs to the Moslem branch of the Chehab family and is very prominent in South Lebanon. Has been Prime Minister and President of the Chamber; was a member of Dr. Ayoub Tabet's interim Government appointed in March 1943 but has since retired from politics. Honest and respected but weak and easily led.

28. *Michel Chiha.*—A Roman Catholic banker of Beirut, born 1893. A member of the Board of Administration of the Banque de Syrie. Was Deputy in 1926, at which time he assisted in the drafting of the Lebanese Constitution. A supporter and adviser of the Constitutional party. Advocates a Christian Lebanon protected against Moslem and Jewish domination. A shrewd and cautious financier who is highly respected. Is brother in law to the President.

29. *Ahmed Daouk* (brother of No. 30).—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut, born 1889. After many years in the Beirut Municipality was appointed Secretary of State in the Administration appointed by the Vichy authorities in 1941. Became Prime Minister of the first "independent" Lebanese Government in December 1941, but resigned in July 1942. While in office proved himself incompetent and servile and has lost much of his influence in Moslem circles. In July 1944 was appointed first Lebanese Minister to France.

30. *Omar Daouk.*—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut, born 1865. President of the Chamber of Commerce and a highly respected proprietor who is prominent in Moslem charitable activities. Ex-Senator, nowadays takes no active part in politics but is often consulted, and has much influence. Honest and shrewd.

31. *Badr Dimishkieh.*—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut, born 1878. Has been president of Beirut municipality. Has relations with Palestine Jews through his son in law, who is a merchant of Jaffa. Venal and a hypocrite.

32. *Me Emile Edde.*—A Maronite lawyer of Beirut, born 1888. President of the Republic from 1936 to 1941, has also had much ministerial experience. A fanatical exponent of the concept of an independent Lebanon separate from the Ar[illegible] to [illegible] 1919 [illegible] ask for a French mandate, and has always had close relations with the French authorities, who regard him as their chief Lebanese supporter but would support

any Power whose policy furthered his designs. Elected a Deputy in 1943, but failed to obtain sufficient support to run for the Presidency. Accepted office as [illegible] in the planning of which he participated. Was consequently expelled from the Chamber in March 1944. Very intelligent and persuasive, but is impulsive, lacks judgment, and is none too scrupulous in his methods of enlisting support.

33. *Mohamed el Fadel.*—Born 1912, landowner from Nabatieh. Minister from July 1944, to January 1945, with portfolios of Commerce and Industry, and Posts and Telegraphs. Received a primary education only. Has little character and is thought to be completely under the influence of Ahmed el Assad.

34. *Nassouh el Fadel.*—A Sunni Moslem, born 1883. A landowner of the Danieh district (N. Lebanon), where his influence is predominant. A former Deputy.

35. *Dr. Sunich Fakhoury.*—A Sunni Moslem of Beirut, born 1881. Ex Deputy. Inconsistent in his political allegiances. A relative of the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, who stayed with him on his flight from Palestine, but is not unfavourable to the Allied cause.

36. *Me Hen[illegible]* [illegible] *persona non grata* to the French. The most prominent Christian [illegible] North Lebanon, in general agreement with the Constitutional party. Intelligent, honest and able, though not always sound in judgment, well qualified to become a political force in the future. Re-elected a Deputy in September 1943. Minister of Finance July 1944-January 1945.

37. *Pierre Gemayel.*—A Maronite from Bikfaya, born about 1909. Leader of the Phalange party and affects extreme Lebanese Nationalist and pro-Christian views. Although subject to Jesuit influence, is nowadays strongly critical of the French, and wholeheartedly supported the Government during the crisis of November 1943. A hot headed and rather unbalanced demagogue, whose influence outside his followers is limited.

38. *Nicola Ghosn.*—A Greek Orthodox landowner of Kouba, N. Lebanon, born in 1892. Has three times been a Deputy but has not, so far, held ministerial office. Until 1943 was a follower of Emil Eddé and considered wholly under French influence, but rallied to Abdul Hamid Kerami for the 1943 elections. Uneducated and speaks no foreign language. His honesty is questionable and he has little influence even in his d[illegible]

39. *Nasri Haddad.*—A Roman Catholic of Beirut, born 1898. Served for many years in the Finance Department of the French High Commission. In [illegible] he still holds. Honest and capable but wholly under French influence.

40. *Ibrahim Haidar.*—A Shia Moslem from Labwé (Bekaa), born 1888. Several times minister, his last such post in 1937 terminated owing to his alleged connexion with a hashish racket. A leading member of one of the two principal Shia families of the Bekaa. Shrewd, but shifty and dishonest. Re-elected a Deputy in September 1943.

41. *Subhi Haidar* (cousin of No. 40).—A Shia Moslem from Labwé (Bekaa), born 1893. A director in the present Lebanese Administration. Unintelligent and not over honest.

42. [illegible] Secretariat from 1920 to 1943 and served successive masters faithfully. Inclined to favour Emile Eddé and was consequently transferred to become a Director of Education when Bechara el Khoury became President in September 1943.

43. *Sabri Hamadé.*—A Shia Moslem proprietor of Hermel (Bekaa), born about 1903. Is head of the most prominent Bekaa family and claims 60,000 adherents, but has strong rivals in the family. Brother in-law of Ahmad el Assad, No. 11. Was elected Deputy at an early age and was a minister in 1939. Has little education and is wholly unprincipled, but has always been pandered to by French and Lebanese authorities on account of his nuisance value in the remote

North Bekaa region, and is consequently arrogant. Elected speaker of the [illegible] October 1944

44. *Sayed Ahmed el Husseini.*—A Shia Moslem from Akoura (Bekaa), born 1888. Has several times been minister but has usually resigned on personal grounds after a short time in office. An honest, old school official, influential in Shia circles and generally respected, but uneducated and muddle-headed. Re-elected Deputy in September 1943.

45. *Aref Bey Ibrahim.*—A Moslem Circassian from Smyrna. Born 1887. Chief of Police since 1943. Was in the Turkish police at the end of 1914–18 war. Appointed Head of Judicial Police in Beirut on first Allied occupation, was dismissed in 1932 and spent one and a half years in prison under accusation of bribery, acquitted when tried. A clever police officer, comparatively honest and (only) loyal.

46. *Sheikh Sayed Istephan* (brother of No. 47).—Maronite, born 1892. Owes his position to his brother's influence, and is on good terms with Abdul Hamid Karami (No. 49). Influential in Maronite circles in North Lebanon.

47. *Sheikh Yusef Istephan.*—A Maronite of Kafar Saghab (N. Lebanon), born 1886. Was once a minister and a supporter of Emile Eddé, but is nowadays associated with Hamid Frangieh (No. 36). Very influential in his d[illegible] successfully toured Anatolia, where many of his family are settled. [illegible] Deputy in September 1943 and is a very critical supporter of the Government.

48. *Joseph Karam.*—A Maronite of Zgorta (N. Lebanon), born 1891. A rather weak character who is overshadowed by Hamid Frangieh and Jawad Boulos, both of the same district. Pro-French and a supporter of Emile Eddé. Entered the Chamber on a bye-election in April 1944.

49. *Abdul Hamid Karami.*—A Sunni Moslem of T[illegible] 1891. [illegible] one time Mufti of Tripoli but was dismissed by the F[illegible] has hostile attitude towards the French Mandate. [illegible] Amin Husseini but, unlike some members of his family, is not pro-Axis. [illegible] of the vast majority of Moslems in Tripoli on any major issue, such as pan-Arabism or the demand for union with Syria. Is wealthy and possesses much [illegible] Syria. Refused to co-operate with any Lebanese Government but in 1943 modified his views to the extent of entering the Chamber. Strongly supported the Gove[illegible]ment of Riad Solh, and was arrested by the French during the crisis of November 1943. Was appointed Prime Minister in January 1945, also taking portfolios of Finance and National Defence.

50. *Rafaat Kazanon.*—A Sunni Moslem of Qalb Elias (Bekaa), born about 1906. Suspected of Axis sentiments, but probably merely ambitious and fanatical. Elected a Deputy in September 1943.

51. *Sheikh Farid el Khazen.*—A Maronite landowner of Jounieh, born 1895. A smuggler in his younger days and nowadays a gambler. Ex-Deputy. A member of the Constitutional party and influential in the Kesrouan district. Shrewd and amusing but uneducated and unscrupulous. Re-entered the Chamber on a bye-election in April 1944.

52. *Michel Khattar.*—A Greek Catholic manufacturer from Deir el K[illegible] born 1889. President of the Silk Growers' and Industrialists' Associations. Has held no office but has much political sense, which causes him often to be [illegible] with us. Very likable, with an unusually strong and independent character.

53. *Sheikh Bechara el Khoury.*—A Maronite lawyer from Beirut, born 1891. For many years a bitter political rival of Emile Eddé, by whom he was beaten for the Presidency in 1935. Leader of the "Constitutional party" and several times Prime Minister. Achieved his consuming ambition by becoming President in 1943. Behaved with firmness and dignity when arrested by the F[illegible] weakness and hesitancy and has comparatively little influence on public opinion.

54. *Kabalan Issa Khoury.*—A Maronite proprietor of Aitanta (Bekaa), born 1915. Is a nephew of the Maronite Patriarch, whose influence he uses freely. Resides in Beirut. Used to grow much hashish on his properties. An active and ambitious young man, but wholly unprincipled.

55. *Sami el Khoury.*—A Maronite of Beirut. Born 1895. Chief Clerk in the Lebanese Directorate of Justice until 1926, when he was appointed Director of Justice, in 1937 appointed by Emile Eddé as President of the "Conseil d'Etat"; became Director-General of Foreign Affairs in 1944. Honest and disciplined but of medium intelligence.

56. *Jamil Mikkawi.*—A Sunni Moslem lawyer of Beirut, born 1911. Was leader of the Najjadé party, in which capacity he had a certain nuisance value, until July 1943, when his failure to conform to the attitude of the Moslem leaders on the electoral issue lost him most of his popularity and the majority of the party seceded to a rival leader. A pretentious young coxcomb, who is not unintelligent but lacks stability. Married to a Frenchwoman. Appointed Counsellor to the Lebanese Legation in London in July 1944.

57. *Moussa Moubarek.*—A Maronite of Aitoura. Born 1903. Member of the staff of the French Delegate to the Lebanon from 1923–1941, during which [illegible] between. Director of Public Instruction 1941, became "chef de Cabinet" to [illegible] Commans" in 1944. Of doubtful honesty, clever and intelligent, pro-French. A personal friend of the Preside[illegible]

58. *Gabriel Murr.*—A Greek Orthodox Deputy for Mount Lebanon, born 1890. Originally of Bhgrin and now of Beirut. Lived in the United States for ten years and served during the first world war in United States army. Returned to Lebanon in 1922 and started a cinema business which is still flourishing. Entered political life for first time in September 1943, when he was [illegible] Deputy for Mount Lebanon on Emil Eddé's list. On good terms with United States Legation, patriotic, not very intelligent, honest and well meaning; is in opposition only as far as internal policy is concerned.

59. *Alfred Naccache.*—A Maronite of Beirut, born 1889. An unsuccessful lawyer who [illegible] the Court of Appeal. Was unexpectedly nominated head of the Lebanese Adminis[illegible] post. Continued in office after the Allied occupation and was nominated President of the Republic by General Catroux in November 1941. Much under Jesuit influence, and widely unpopular. Very honest, but impulsive, volatile, and incapable. Accepted dismissal by General Catroux in March 1943. Elected a Deputy in September 1943, and has since been a silent member of the small pro-French opposition group.

60. *Adib Nahas.*—A Greek Orthodox of Tripoli. Born 1903. Comes of a leading Christian family in North Lebanon. A senior government official who has filled many posts, including that of Director of the Interior in 1940, Mohafez of South Lebanon during the 1941 campaign and rendered great assistance to the British; reappointed Director of the Interior in November 1943. Probably the best of the Lebanese civil servants, honest, intelligent and capable.

61. *Gibran Nahas.*—A Greek Orthodox of Tripoli, born 1891. Was formerly Mohafez of North Lebanon and is a prominent figure in that district. Ex-Deputy. Under French influence and of mediocre intelligence.

62. *Wadih Naim.*—A Maronite lawyer of Chiah near Beirut, born 1886. A former leader of the Beirut Bar, took no part in politics before the 1943 elections in which he became a Deputy for Mount Lebanon on the Constitutional list. Bears a good reputation, but is considered of mediocre intelligence.

63. *Me Moussa Naamour.*—A Maronite lawyer from Mualaka (Bekaa), born 1883. Minister of the Interior in the second "independent" [illegible] Government, has held many previous Ministerial posts. He has alwa[illegible] keep a foot in all camps without owing allegiance to any party, and as a result the Government will have no confidence in him. Was unsuccessful in the 1943 [illegible]tions and, being in financial straits, is now a leading anti-Government [illegible]triguer.

64. *Alfred Nasser*—A Greek Catholic merchant and insurance agent of Beirut, born 1878. President of the Merchants' Association. So far has taken no part in political life, but has political ambitions. A typical shrewd, grasping, short-sighted Beirut merchant

65. *Sulaiman Naufal, Col.*—A Greek Catholic of Merjayun. Born 1900 Spent two years at the French Ecole de Guerre, was an officer in the Chasseurs Libanais until 1941, when he became head of the Lebanese gendarmerie. During the Lebanese crisis of November 1943, worked with the French and was consequently removed from his post. A capable officer, strongly pro-French in sympathy in upbringing and temperament

68 *Mukheddin Nsouli.*—A Sunni Moslem journalist and merchant of Beirut born 1900. Proprietor of the newspaper *Beirut* Ex Deputy During the 1928 Palestine troubles wrote violent anti British articles and in 1941 was interned as an Axis sympathiser, but while interned wrote strongly pro-Allied articles and since his release has continued to collaborate effectively

[illegible] *Izzedin Umari.*—A Sunni Moslem of Iraqi origin, born about 1887 Was for several years a judge and has been governor of various districts. Was Chief of Police from 1935 to 1937 when he was retired as a result of a scanda[illegible] reinstated in the same position in 1942, but again dismissed in October 1943 Active and a disciplinarian, but venal and subservient, consequently not respected

68. *Henri Pharaon.*—A Greek Catholic banker of Beirut, born 1902 Socially prominent and a leading racehorse owner Popular amongst the middle and lower classes, especially Moslems, and is a promoter of the Najjadé party also believed to finance the Constitutional party Ostentatiously generous and hospitable Bought himself into the Chamber in September 1943 and now has considerable influence. Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in January 1945

69. *Dr Moustafa Rifai.*—A Sunni Moslem of Baalbeck, born about 1895 A well-educated and strict Moslem of an old Syrian family, descendants of the Prophet. Kind, simple-hearted, and much respected. Formerly reputed to be pro-German, but his views have changed and in 1942 he gave two talks on the Jaffa radio comparing the democracies to Islam. His political tendency is towards Damascus and the National *Bloc*

70. *Amin Saad*—A Maronite of Ain Traz, born 1896. Nephew of a former President, by virtue of which relationship he became a Minister in the first "independent" Lebanese Government, but proved a complete failure and is unlikely to hold further office. A foolish and negligible character. Re-elected a Deputy in 1943 and has not spoken since

71 *Mr George Sabbagha.*—A Greek Orthodox lawyer and journalist of Beirut, born 1893. Proprietor of the Arabic newspaper *Sout al Ahrar* A mediocre journalist. Has close relations with the Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Beirut

72. *Ali Salam.*—A Sunni Moslem proprietor of Beirut, born 1897 The eldest of the eight sons of the late Salim Salam, a follower of King Feisal professes pan-Arab and pro-British ideas and has some influence A bumptious and rather tiresome person, who has, however, never wavered in his support for the British cause

73. *Saib Salam.*—A younger brother of No. 72, less forceful but more reasonable. Elected a Deputy in September 1943, and is now regarded as the most prominent of the younger Moslems

74 *Joseph Salem.*—A Greek Catholic of Tyre, born 1895. Manager of the [illegible] Ex Deputy Has [illegible] influence in South Lebanon Has Nationalist leanings and keeps on good terms with the Moslems, but belongs to no party Honest and intelligent, with an unusually well-balanced and far-sighted outlook, but not over-courageous Re-elected a Deputy in 1943, was an unsuccessful candidate for the Speakership in October 1944, and accepted the appointment of first Lebanese Minister in Cairo in November of that year

75 *Ramez Sarkis.*—A Protestant journalist of Beirut born 1891 Owner of the Beirut newspaper *Lisan ul Hal* Was Minister of Education in the first "independent" Lebanese Government, but proved exceptionally incompetent

and is unlikely to hold further office Professes pro-British sentiments, having had an Anglo-Saxon education, but is a colourless personality who carries no weight

76. *Alfred Skaf.*—A Greek Catholic of Zahlé, born 1907. Member of a prominent Bekaa family His appointment as Minister in the first "independent Lebanese G[illegible] was [illegible] Minister of Supply he tried hard, but found the problems involved too great for his mediocre intelligence and did not retain his office when the Government fell. Not over-scrupulous Was unsuccessful in the 1943 election, and has temporarily abandoned politics for agriculture

77. *Riad es Solh.*—A Sunni Moslem of Sidon, born 1898 Early became known as a fanatical adherent of the Arab cause, but escaped internment by the Turks in 1914 18 because his father had been a Turkish official Governor of South Lebanon for a few months in 1919 Refused all collaboration with the Mandatory authorities and was exiled by them for two months in 1935 Constantly advocated the cause of Arab independence and unity; acquired much influence amongst Moslems in the Lebanon and elsewhere, but was feared and distrusted by many Christians Until 1943 held no Government office and generally effaced himself, to emerge periodically as a Moslem leader in a crisis Entered the Lebanese Chamber in September 1943 and was appointed Prime Minister and Minister of Finance At once adopted a bold Nationalist programme which, unhesitatingly pursued brought his Government into violent conflict with the French, the November crisis resulting Since then has proved himself an adroit negotiator and forceful debater but with no aptitude for, or interest in, administration. A strong personality, unscrupulous, supple and shrewd. Fundamentally xenophobic, anti French in particular, flirted with the Germans between 1938 40 and has since courted the British, but has no loyalty except to his own not wholly disinterested aspirations. Resigned the Premiership in January 1945

78. *Sami es Solh*—A Sunni Moslem of Sidon, born 1891 Educated in Istanbul In 1920 was an official of the Hejaz Railway. Cousin of N[illegible] sequently entered the Lebanese magistrature and held several posts [illegible] that of president of the Court of Cassation. His appointment as P[illegible] of the second "independent" Lebanese Government in July 1942 was [illegible] introduction to political life. A well mean[illegible] foolish man whose extreme vanity [illegible] character On first appointment plunged into a variety of [illegible] and defied the French, but was soon brought to heel After his dismissal [illegible] March 1943 returned to his magisterial post. Elected a Deputy in September 1943 and dreams of supplanting his cousin

79 *Dr Ayoub Tabet* A Protestant of Beirut, born 1881 A doctor of medicine of the American University of Beirut, but does not practise Lived in the United States before and during the First World War, during which he was an active French propagandist Was a Minister in 1928 and Secretary of State [illegible] W[illegible] M[illegible] 1943 [illegible] arrange elections, but had to be dismissed in July for having exceeded his powers in initiating a series of ill-considered measures. A strong and excitable protagonist of the concept of an independent Christian Lebanon obstinate opinionated and full of muddle headed good intentions Re-elected a Deputy in September 1943, but his health is now failing

80 *Emile Tabet*—A Maronite proprietor of Beirut, born 1879 Brother of No. 82, but was long estranged from him Has strong pro-British views, which he has expressed to any British official who would listen during the last twenty five years. Ex Deputy. Not nowadays taken seriously Rich and avaricious, but good hearted

81 *Georges Tabet.*—A Maronite landowner of Beirut, born 1891 Several times a Minister and a candidate for the Presidency President of the recently formed Maronite Council and of the Maronite Charitable Association. Influential amongst middle and lower class Christians but notoriously untruthful and not trusted

82. *Jacques Tabet.*—A Maronite landowner of Beirut, born 1887 Very rich, and socially prominent, holds views on economic problems but plays no part in political life. Unpopular on account of his meanness but not ill-intentioned

83. *Dr. Jamil Talhouk.*—A Druze landowner of Aley, born 1887. Ex-Deputy. Comes of a leading Druze family which has a traditional friendship with the British. Of mediocre intelligence, shrewd and obstinate. Re-elected a Deputy in September 1943. Appointed Minister of Supplies and Minister of Agriculture in January 1945.

84. *Salim Tajera.*—A Sunni Moslem proprietor of Beirut, born 1887. Ex-Mayor of Beirut and has held several Municipal posts. Has much influence amongst the Moslem middle classes. Honest but mediocre.

85. *Fozi Trabulsi, Lieutenant-Colonel.*—A Maronite of Dair-el-Kamar, born 1901. Lebanese gendarmerie officer until 1939 when, having quarrelled with his French chief, he left the service. Re-instated on the 10th November, 1943, as Inspector-General of Lebanese gendarmerie and police. Later became Officer Commanding Public Security Forces of the Lebanese Republic. Honest and loyal, but tactless, excitable and of mediocre intelligence.

86. *Habib Trad.*—A Greek Orthodox banker and landowner of Beirut, born 1885. Has held no office but is a prominent social figure who wields some influence in political and commercial circles. Not over-intelligent.

87. *Me. Pierre (Petro) Trad.*—A Greek Orthodox [illegible] 1873. Was for many years Speaker of the Lebanon Chamber. Appointed provisional Head of State in July 1943. Vain and of limited intelligence, but prides himself on keeping on good terms with all parties and communities and has the reputation of being skilful in settling disputes.

88. *Gibran Tueni.*—A Greek Orthodox journalist of Beirut, born 1891. Owns *Le Nahar*, the leading Arabic daily, and is the best Lebanese journalist. Once a Minister. Formerly belonged to the Constitutional Party but now independent. An intelligent and outspoken critic with strong Nationalist ideas.

89. [illegible] A Shia Moslem [illegible] born 1903. One of the two strongest personalities of South Lebanon. Has relations with the Constitutional Party but does not belong to it. Elected a Deputy in September 1943, and was appointed Minister of Supply, Commerce and Industry, but was eliminated from the Ministry in July 1944, and has since been very critical of Riad el Solh. A strong Nationalist and very anti-French, but at present well-disposed to the British with whom he co-operated well when in office. A blunt and uncompromising lawyer who revels in political argument.

90. *Me. Abdullah Yafi.*—A Sunni Moslem lawyer of Beirut, born 1899. Was Prime Minister in 1936, re-elected a Deputy in September 1943. Formerly the most prominent Moslem follower of Emile Eddé, but has broken with him and supports the present Government. A somewhat colourless, though well [illegible] person.

91. *Yusuf ex-Zain.*—A Shia Moslem from Nabatiyeh, born about 1873. Ex-Deputy, has some following in South Lebanon. Shifty and venal.

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6. Mgr. Augustin Bustani.
7. Mgr. Boutros Feghali.
8. Mgr. Abdullah Khoury.
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Religious Personalities

Maronites

1. *Mgr. Antoine Abed.*—Maronite Archbishop of Tripoli, including the Lattakia district. Born 1901. Became archbishop in 1931. Moderately cultured, interested with his brothers in commercial enterprises, very pro-French.

2. *Mgr. Boulos Akl.*—Maronite Archbishop of Laodicea (Lattakia)—at one time second vicar to the Patriarch, born 1884, resides at Shamat in the Jebel [illegible]. Quarrelled with the Patriarch in 1936. Intelligent, low mentality and rarely tells the truth; an intriguer with a reputation for dishonesty.

3. *His Beatitude Antoine Pierre Arida.*—Maronite Patriarch, born 1886 from Becharré (North Lebanon), the largest landowner in the Lebanon, a [illegible] Deputy and supporter of Béchara el Khoury, sly and crafty, sole interest [illegible] own personal gain.

4. *Mgr. Boulos Awad.*—Maronite Archbishop, at one time Archbishop of Cyprus, but at present holding no title. Born in 1860 from Hasrun, resides at Kornet Shahwan, near Bikfaya. In his younger days had a bad moral reputation.

5. *Mgr. Francis Ayoub.*—Maronite Archbishop of Cyprus, residing at [illegible] Shahwan, near Bikfaya. Born about 1894, well educated and wealthy. [illegible] Maronite Archbishop [illegible] born 1872 [illegible] Maronite [illegible] always been a close [illegible] National [illegible] anti-unfriendly feelings towards the British.

7. [illegible] Maronite Archbishop covering no special diocese [illegible] well off but venal. Pro-French tendencies not intelligent.

8. *Mgr. Abdullah Khoury.*—Maronite Archbishop. First vicar to Patriarch residing at Bkerke. Born about 1872, from Haifa. Is an uncle of President Bechara-el Khoury. Very intelligent and highly educated, an opportunist and a clever diplomat. Is the only prelate who has some influence on the Patriarch and is considered to be a likely successor.

9. *Boulos Meoushi.*—Maronite Archbishop of Haifa residing at Tyre. Born 1892, from Jezzin, has been in the United States and speaks English, sensible, devout and respected, takes no part in politics.

10. *Mgr. Ignace Moubarak.*—Maronite Archbishop of Beirut. Born 1876. [illegible] See in 1919. Impulsive, courageous and somewhat quarrelsome when thwarted, critical of his Patriarch, with whom he is on indifferent terms, and has not [illegible]tated on occasions publicly to attack the French authorities, usually for not accepting his suggestions in political matters. While determined to further his community's interests, is more practical and realist than most local prelates in his political outlook. Has made approaches to the British, but will support any authorities who will favour his community.

11. *Mgr. Elias Risha.*—Maronite Archbishop of Baalbeck but resides in Bkorki. Born 1874. Uneducated, wealthy, venal and stupid.

Greek Catholic

12. *Mgr Youssef Kallos.*—Greek Catholic Archbishop of North Lebanon residing in Tripoli. Born about 1878, well educated—has a reputation for honesty, with no particular political leanings

13. *Mgr Youssef Malouf*—Greek Catholic Archbishop of Baalbeck and [illegible] Was appointed by Rome Intelligent and ambitious aims at becoming the next Greek Catholic Patriarch

14. *Mgr Nicolaos Nabha.*—Greek Catholic Archbishop of Saida and Deir el Kamar. Born 1892. Hypocritical and venal. On good terms with French authorities Publicly supported the French during the crisis of November 1943 and is now trying to rehabilitate himself

15. *Mgr Aghabius Anoum*—Greek Catholic Archbishop of Sour Born 1882. No particular tendencies.

16. *Mgr Maximos Sayegh.*—Greek Catholic Archbishop of Beirut. Born 1878, from Aleppo. Was appointed Archbishop of Tyre in 1919 and of Beirut in 1939. Well liked by his community to whom he devotes himself Has a tendency to mix in politics in which he has not always shown sound judgment On the whole pro-French, but advocates an Anglo-French-American guarantee of an independent Lebanon

17. *Mgr Antimus Youakim*—Greek Catholic Archbishop of the Bekka, residing at Zahlé Born about 1894, well educated, on good terms with the French

Greek Orthodox

18. *Mgr Elia Karam*—Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Mount Lebanon, residing at Hadad, near Beirut. Born in 1896 from Bhamdun. Speaks no foreign language other than Russian, intelligent but venal and hypocritical. Is said to have bribed his colleagues to elect him as archbishop. Studied in Russia before 1914-18 war On good terms with all foreign authorities

19. *Mgr Theodotos Abu Rizk*—Greek Orthodox Archbishop of South Lebanon residing at Jdaidit-Marjeyun. Born about 1887 from Marjeyun, well educated and intelligent but a bit of a twister, if anything, is pro-British

20. *Mgr Nephon Saba*—Greek Orthodox Archbishop of the Bekka, residing at Zahlé Born about 1884 from Hasbaya cultivated, has nationalist sentiments, but on the whole an opportunist

21. *Mgr Elie Salaby*—Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Beirut. Born 1870 from Senk el Gharb. Appointed archbishop in 1935 on the death of his predecessor to whom he had been assistant. Opportunist and is considered dishonest in his handling of the large Wakf of his community by a large section of which he is distrusted and criticised Professes staunch friendship for Great Britain

Syrian Catholic

22. *Mgr Ephrem Hikary* Syrian Catholic Archbishop attached to Cardinal Tapouni Born about 1884 in Mosul Reputed venal

23. *Mgr Ignatios Noura.*—Syrian Catholic Archbishop of Bagdad, attached to Cardinal Tapouni Born in [illegible]

Syrian Catholic

24. *Cardinal Ignace Gabriel 1st Tappouni.*—Syrian Catholic Cardinal and Patriarch Born 1879, from Mosul. Appointed Bishop of Sroug and Patri[illegible] Patriarch in 1929 Made Cardinal in 1933 at the instance of the French Hig[illegible] Maronite Patriarch. Very pro-French and devoted to the Jesuits, detested by all Moslems, especially those of Syria, for his protection of the Christians in the Jezireh Considered fanatical and venal

Syrian Orthodox

25. *Mgr Ohanes Kandour* Syrian Orthodox Archbishop of Beirut and the Lebanon Born about 1884 from Mardin No political tendencies

Armenian Orthodox

26. *Mgr Arsavat Surmeyan*—Armenian Orthodox Archbishop of Lebanon and Syria residing in Beirut. Born 1889, good education, intelligent; friend of Cardinal Tapouni, pro-French

Armenian Catholic

27. *Gregoire Pierre XV Aghapassian.*—Armenian Catholic Patriarch of [illegible] and acknowledged as Patriarch by Armenian Catholics throughout the world Originally from Tiflis, but now resident in Beirut Born 1895 Became a priest in 1917, bishop in 1935 and patriarch in 1937 Studied and taught at Rome Highly cultivated, speaks several languages a clever diplomat and very pro-French Elevated to rank of Cardinal December 1945.

28. *Louis Batanian* Armenian Catholic Patriarchal Vicar-General of Beirut Born 1899. Became a priest in 1921 and bishop in 1933. Worked successively in Egypt, Iraq and the Lebanon Highly cultivated, speaks several languages, pro-French

Protestant

29. *Mufid Abdul Karim*—Calls himself Chief of Superior Council of Protestant Community in Syria and the Lebanon Born 1877 in Beirut and was for several years a teacher in American schools, has been a Protestant pastor for the past twenty-five years. Not very well educated (Anglo-Saxon education), respected by his community and does not mix in politics

Jew

30. *Shabetai Rhabut* Grand Rabbi of Lebanese Republic Born in Beirut 1876. Has very little education, and possesses little prestige and influence amongst [illegible]

Sunni

31. *Sheikh Muhammed Taufiq Khalid* Sunni Mufti of the Lebanese Republic. Born about 1878 from Beirut. Became anti-British over the [illegible] question in Palestine and earlier in the war was strongly pro-Axis, had [illegible] contacts with the German and Italian Armistice Commissions Nowadays, like many Moslems, has much modified his views with an Allied victory in sight Formerly considered not sufficiently energetic in defence of Moslem interests and consequently not highly thought of by his community, but enhanced his prestige in the summer of 1943 by his advocacy of the Moslem case on an electoral [illegible]

Shia

32. *Seyyid Abdul Husein Shorafeddin*—Chief of the Shia Ulema (Mu[illegible]tidin) Born about 1867 resides near Tyre, of which his son is Mufti. Was a student at Najaf Strongly anti-Christian and Xenophobe during the 1936-38 Palestine troubles preached the Jihad against the British, but likewise refused to support the Vichy authorities against the British in 1941 because no Moslem interest was involved Tried to play off the British authorities against the French after the Allied occupation. Enjoys considerable prestige in Moslem religious circles

Druze

33. *Sheikh Hussein Hamadi*—Grand Druze Sheikh-ul-Akl Born about 1868 from Baakline (Mount Lebanon). Was given this title after the first World War by the French authorities who used him to demonstrate Druze attachment to France. Very venal and not respected by his community His two sons were [illegible] father was in close touch with the Italian Armistice Commission, but nowadays professes pro-Allied sentiments

34. *Sheikh Mikhem Hamdan.*—Qadi of the Madhab for the Lebanese Republic Born about 1867 from Batar. Inspector of Justice in the Lebanese Government from 1929 to 1932 when he was made Druze Qadi Has little education, an opportunist who professes pro-British sympathies.

35. *Sheikh Hussein Talib.*—Druze Sheikh ul Akl Born 1855 from Jdeideh ech Chouf (Mount Lebanon). Intelligent, honest, and has pro-British tendencies Takes no part in politics.

Mr Shone to Mr Eden.—(Received 11th April.)

No. 51.)

Sir,

Beirut, 26th March, 1945.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 37 of the 5th March, 1945, I have the honour to report that the Central Committees of the Syrian and Lebanese Communist parties held a meeting at Beirut on the 5th March "to discuss political matters interesting both countries and to adopt towards them a uniform line of conduct." After the meeting the two parties issued a long statement which is not of sufficient interest to reproduce in full, but of which the following are the salient points:—

2. After paying tribute to the efforts of the Red Army, the statement deals first with Arab affairs. The Arab question, it states, is primarily one of "collaboration among all Arab States in their fight against fascism and the principles of despotic colonisation." It goes on to condemn in the strongest terms the Greater Syria project, the collapse of which it welcomes.

3. Turning to the subject of relations between the Levant States and the French, the statement declares that the Syrian and Lebanese desire that their right to national sovereignty and freedom shall be respected, "that they will never yield that right to anyone, and they refuse to serve the aims of colonisers whatever they are, and they have no desire to free themselves from a certain foreign influence in order to get under another foreign influence." The statement [illegible] satisfaction at the progress of relations between the Levant States [illegible], and hopes that the discussions now proceeding will lead to the [illegible] of all outstanding affairs and to the establishment of [illegible] the Levant States and the French on a solid basis. It warns against "all irresponsible elements, and against all introduced elements, internal and external, which try to disrupt the negotiations because they would like to preserve an atmosphere of tension [illegible] foreign to the national interest." The two parties express their belief that an alliance and a state of friendship between the Levant States and the French would be in the interest of both parties "provided such friendship be true, and one concluded between two independent sides enjoying equal rights, and not a veil for a new form of colonial exploitation." All Fascist and colonial-minded French who refuse to recognise the right of the States to independence, who try to create [illegible] allies, and engender feelings of hatred and [illegible] the reputation of France, should be removed [illegible] that they deals with relations with Russia [illegible] by virtue of their principles and for their own security are the natural friends of all small nations. Lebanese and Syrian national interests dictate that the States should do all they can to establish a firm friendship with the great U.S.S.R.

5. As regards internal affairs the statement attacks the "shameful policy of leniency adopted towards those Fascist elements which are trying to unite under new names in the Lebanon." Persons of Fascist mentality, it continues, should be swept away from power and the constitutional rights of citizens should be respected.

6. It is noteworthy that this statement is given considerable publicity in the French controlled *L'Orient*, which affirms that the sentiments expressed in the manifesto represent the wishes, not only of the local Communists, but of every good Lebanese.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Moscow and Paris.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

(E 2237 6, 89)

No. 15

Record of Conversation between His Majesty's Minister at Beirut and the Syrian President. Communicated in Beirut Despatch No. 53 of 29th March, 1945.—(Received 11th April.)

I HAD an hour's conversation with the Syrian President this morning. He told me that Count Ostrorog had been to see him recently and from a general conversation about Franco-Syrian relations, he had had the impression that

Count Ostrorog's attitude was reasonable. I mentioned Monsieur Bidault's and Monsieur Gorse's recent statements in the French Consultative Assembly and also France's attitude as regards the invitation of the Levant States to San Francisco; the President agreed that these were hopeful signs. But all would of course depend on what General Beynet brought back from Paris. The President had gathered from a talk he had just had with General H[illegible] (who had come to see him for the first time in 18 months or more) that General Beynet would not be back until the second week in April.

I said the new draft University Convention was a very different docu[illegible] [illegible]. The President agreed and said that he had not [illegible] [illegible]re so as the Prime Minister and Minister for [illegible] [illegible]y in Cairo), there were certain things in it which the Syrians could not accept, amongst which was article 1; but it ought to provide a basis for negotiation.

As regards the Alaouite situation, the President said he had told Count Ostrorog [illegible] if the French troops and the g[illegible] [illegible] Colonel Bonnot and the other French authorities ought to make it clear to their Alaouite adherents that if they had cause for complaint, it was to the Syrian authorities that they should have recourse. The President said Count Ostrorog had promised to give instructions accordingly, but would he do so, and if he did, would the instructions be obeyed.

I said it was at any rate all to the good that the French authorities here were now in personal contact again with the President and the Syrian Government; it gave opportunities for discussing matters at [illegible] [illegible] surely a better spirit than had existed lately. The President [illegible] in various parts of the country, who tried to make the people believe that the [illegible] authorities. He hoped this was not part of French policy but rather the work of irresponsible elements, not under the proper control of the Délégation Générale. He remarked that the Syrians, too, had their irresponsible elements. [illegible]

[illegible] forward the argument [illegible] should step into [illegible] [illegible] Syria [illegible] [illegible] Druses [illegible] [illegible] Druse leaders

[illegible] Murshid's case. I said it was no part of my business [illegible] Syria's internal affairs, but I believed I could speak to him as a friend about the feeling which I had sensed, especially during my recent tour of part of Syria, that the Government was too much in the hands of Damascenes. The French clearly felt that they still had some obligation to the Alaouites in view of their promises of "home rule" in the past. Might it not be wise if the Syrians could make some gesture to the Alaouites, *e.g.*, by choosing an Alaouite as Mouhafez somewhere, if not as a Cabinet Minister? I asked, too, whether it was true that Dr Khayali, the only member of the present Cabinet who was not a Damascene and the only representative of Aleppo in the Cabinet, had resigned? And I said I had also heard recently that the Druses felt they were being left out in the cold. (This was based on information given to me last week by the Political Officer at Soueida, to the effect that the Druse leaders

were disgruntled with the Government and that monarchist feeling was strong amongst the [illegible]

[illegible] dent, who took all my remarks in good part, seemed disposed to [illegible] the Alaouites, though not with some satisfactory arrange[illegible] is the withdrawal of the French troops. With [illegible] not actually resigned, though he was not [illegible] ng the chamber. As for the Druses, the President maintained stoutly [illegible] they were not disgruntled; only a day or so ago he had had a message from Sultan Atrash that they were satisfied and asking him not to pay any [illegible] way, the President [illegible] nited and the best [illegible] at be chosen wherever they could be found. If an Alaouite or a Druse were chosen (and he evidently seemed doubtful as to their capabilities for Cabinet rank) there would inevitably be hard feeling amongst other Alaouites and Dru[illegible]

[illegible] the President nor his Chef du Cabinet seemed much perturbed by [illegible] critical attitude to the Government, which they ascribed mostly [illegible] (Nor, indeed, were the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign [illegible] I saw yesterday.)

Nevertheless, the fo[illegible] will resign before long [illegible] Chamber on th[illegible] [illegible] nt, has been considerably weakened of late—partly because of his recent speech to the Chamber (my despatch No. 188) and largely because of the feeling that he and the Government may [illegible] too forthcoming a line with the Fre[illegible]

LEARNE SHONE.

E 2358/3/89 No. 16

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 11th April.)

(No. 230.)
(Telegraphic.) *Beirut, 11th April* 1945

I WENT to Damascus yesterday to see Syrian Prime Minister before h[illegible] for San Francisco and to introduce Sir A. Overton to some of Syria [illegible] I spoke to Prime Minister on the lines of your circular telegram No. 9 [illegible] Prime Minister said he was greatly looking forward to meeting you San Francisco and he hoped I would recommend him favourably to you. I said I would. He is well disposed to us and if obstinate and legalistic has, I think [illegible] and although a Christian was, I understand, generally regarded as the best man to carry on Government. He paid a special tribute to your support of Arab unity at His Majesty's Embassy in Cairo after the recent Cairo Conference. Being well over (group undecypherable) his enterprise in going to San Francisco is widely commended.

2. I asked the Prime Minister how things were going with the French. He referred to what Count Ostrorog had told me yesterday, that the Syrians and French have agreed to set up a joint committee to examine the new draft convention. He said that there were several points which Syrian Government could not accept as they stood but if they could agree with the French on a text, it would be initialled and put aside to form part of general settlement of all outstanding matters. The Prime Minister clearly appreciated the importance of such a convention from the French point of view and said it would also have advantages for Syria.

3. Prime Minister appeared to think that French were now generally inclined to be more reasonable. I reminded him of the efforts we have been maki[illegible] the importance which Syrian Government attached to the handing over of "Troupes Speciales" and he believed the French might agree to this if they could secure a French military mission. I said that this did not seem unreason[illegible] [illegible] would surely want assistance in training their armed forces, if they really had need of more than gendarmeries and "gardes mobiles." (group undecypherable) Prime Minister said that Syrian Government might prefer British or American officers but he added that provided French proposals and attitude in general were

reasonable and the Syrians could be sure that their independence was [illegible] reality and that there would be no continued interference in their affa[illegible] military mission might be a small price to pay for the handing over of the [illegible]

5. Prime Minister repeated that Syria could not conclude a treaty giving France a privileged position. He said in confidence that he would like to conclude with Great Britain and also with United States agreements similar to those concluded with France. They need not be identical: the three countries had different interests here, but he hoped it would be possible for Syria to stabilise her relations with all three on a similar basis. I replied that I could not answer him on this point now, but I would report his remarks to you. He said he hoped to speak to you and also to the United States Secretary of State on these lines at San Francisco. I asked the Prime Minister whether he also envisaged agreements with Soviet Union. He replied not at present, Syria was too uncertain as regards Russian policy.

6. I suggested that it would also be very useful to have the opportunity of talking to the French Foreign Minister. I presumed the Prime Minister would be in touch with his Government while negotiations with the French authorities here were in progress, he and M. Bidault might be able to find ways and means of solving any difficulties that might arise. The Prime Minister agreed.

7. Finally the Prime Minister mentioned report (see my immediately following telegram) that the French Ambassador in London had approached His Majesty's Government with the suggestion that French troops in the Levant States should be removed from the British command and that British troops should be withdrawn. This, he said, might be good or bad: but he feels th[illegible] could only be good if Syria secured the "Troupes Spéciales" and if Fran[illegible] Syrian relations were established on a basis of real confidence and of full recognition of Syrian independence and sovereignty. I would know, he s[illegible] my experience here how antagonistic the Syrian people were towards the French and how difficult it would be to convince them that they could trust the French. The proposals which General Beynet would make on his return should provide a test of French intentions. Any agreements with France would naturally have to be approved by the Syrian Chamber of Deputies.

E 2426/3/89] No. 17

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 16th April.)

No. 17
S[illegible]

Beirut, 22nd March, 1945

WITH reference to my despatch No. 38 of the 8th March, I have the honour to report that Sabri el Assali, the new Syrian Minister of the Interior, has since his appointment been taking a strong line with the critics of the Government and the President.

2. His first notable action was to arrest a certain Salah eddin Bittar, the author of one of the pamphlets referred to in my despatch under reference, and to send him to a distant village for detention. The pamphlets in question had accused what is described as the "Government clique" of having an isolationist [illegible] also accused the President of pursuing a pro-French policy and warned the nation that a treaty with France would inevitably mean a pre-eminent position [illegible] would not be swayed from this course by British interference. The President was also accused of attempting to set himself up as a "leader," in contravention of the rights of the Chamber.

3. The Minister of the Interior then issued a communiqué, a French version of which is attached(1); this has been checked with the original Ar[illegible] It will be observed that this communiqué refers to the "President Zaim"; the word "Zaim" ("leader") is the same as that to which Bittar's pamphlet objected. The communiqué, coming as it does from a Cabinet Minister in a democratic State, is remarkable in tone, and smacks more of the pronouncement of a Head of State—and a totalitarian at that. The reference to the tribes as the corner-stone of Syrian independence seems also ill-advised, as it is likely to encourage these turbulent elements to exaggerate their own importance.

(1) Not printed.

[illegible] After the publication of this communiqué a deputation of university students called on Sabri el Assali to protest against its tone and against the arrest of Bittar. They reminded the Minister that he held his present position under a democratic régime which entailed freedom of speech and suggested that, as a young man, he should appreciate their point of view. The Minister [illegible] him. One of the students, Jamal Atassi, objected to the word "impertinence" and asked for its withdrawal. The Minister thereupon called upon the police to eject the deputation from his office. Jamal Atassi then circulated a pamphlet giving his version of the interview. He was promptly arrested [illegible] pamphlet, this time by the League of National Action, has [illegible] ned. It follows much the same lines as previous pamphlets, but stresses the interdependence of Syria and the Lebanon. Its author [illegible] Mahayri, Secretary-General of the League, has also been arrested.

4. Sabri el Assali's appointment has also caused trouble in t[illegible] security services. The Director-General of Security, Ahmed Bey Lakhani, and the Director of the Damascus Police, have both tendered their resignations on the grounds that political appointments in their services have already started and will undoubtedly take place on a wider scale with Sabri el Assali. They have been persuaded to continue in office for the time being, but not [illegible] finitely. The loss of Ahmed Lakhani will be felt by the British milit[illegible] authorities, with whom he has been outstandingly co-operative and wh[illegible] der that he has done his best to ensure efficiency in the forces under his [illegible]

[illegible] c. &c.
TERENCE SHONE

E 2706 B 39

Mr Shone to Mr Eden.—(Received 25th April.)

No. 77

Damascus, 25th April, 1945

[illegible] Syrian President gave yesterday for me and the entire staff of His Majesty's Legation, he and the Acting Syrian Prime Minister spoke [illegible] well how bad the situation had been early in the year and how it had been no easy matter to calm down public opinion and bring about the present rumours of a *détente*. It was essential to make use of this opportunity to settle things with the French but General Beynet had not yet returned with the French proposals although he had now been absent since the 9th March. Jamil Mardam Bey said he intended to speak frankly to Count Ostrorog this morning and it was agreed that I should call on him afterwards to receive his account of the conversation [illegible] a letter dated the 17th April which he had to-day received from the Syrian Minister in Paris, Atassi. This letter described a dinner given by M. Bidault on the 12th April, for the Syrian and Lebanese Minister in Paris at which General Beynet and other French officials had been present. After the dinner M. Bidault had opened up by saying that he was looking forward to meeting the Syrian delegation in San Francisco and discussing current problems wit them. He remarked that Syria was now for the first time entering into the inter[illegible] ust as much trouble and that the local problem which was [illegible] Government above all else was that of the army. [illegible] Troupes Spéciales.

[illegible] M. Bidault after [illegible] suggestion, which had already been denied, that there was a secret [illegible] between Mardam himself and the British. He could only repeat his d[illegible] most formal terms and request Count Ostrorog to telegraph it to Paris. [illegible] remarked that since the Syrians had certainly not made up this story either the French or the British must have done so, and he could see no reason why the British should have spread so manifest a falsehood. Count Ostrorog had promised to telegraph to Paris in the sense desired.

4. Jamil Mardam had gone on to discuss Franco-Syrian relations with Count Ostrorog. He had first raised the question of the presence of French troops in the Alaouites which had still not been withdrawn. (See my immediately following telegram.) He had made it clear to Ostrorog that whilst there was no [illegible] M. Bidault, they were not and would not be empowered to conduct negotiations which must be done here as arranged. He had gone on to tell Ostrorog that he had just received the Chinese Minister in Iraq who had come to tell him that the Chinese Government not only did not recognise a pre-eminent position [illegible] one in Syria but fully supported the Syrian claims for complete independe[illegible] How then, he asked, could the French expect the Syrians to concede to the[illegible] privileged position when no other State (except Great Britain) recognised their [illegible] standing questions in a reasonable spirit provided that it was clearly underst[illegible] that they were free to accord to any other Power any privileges they might give to the French. If the French were to call in the British to support their point of view the Syrians would call in the Americans or some other Power to support theirs. Things could not drag on indefinitely. Beynet had now been [illegible] out several weeks and there was no news of his return. The Syrian Govern[illegible] ment were being pressed by their Chamber and the people to make some progress particularly as regards the "Troupes Spéciales" and they could not go on indefinitely awaiting General Beynet's return. M[illegible] occupation in [illegible] Syrian point of view and seeing w[illegible] be expected.

5. Jamil Mardam had lastly discussed the "Troupes Spéciales" question in greater detail. He said that the French had argued that the Syrians did not requ re all these troops; this might be so, but it was for the Syrians to decide how many they wanted of those they had transferred and to disband the rest. The French had also suggested that they could not transfer these troops wh le the British occupied the country. Jamil Mardam had pointed out that it [illegible] not the Syrians who were maintaining British troops in Syria; in due course they would expect both them and the French troops to quit. If the French handed over the "Troupes Spéciales" and withdrew their own troops the Syrians would certainly ask the Brit sh troops to leave also. But the French must understand that the Syrians requ red to have control of the "Troupes Spéciales". The French were claiming that they would uphold the rights o[illegible] San Francisco; they had better set the example by giv[illegible] otherwise the Syrians would call on the Americ[illegible] would not say the British since he knew the British were "suspect [illegible] eyes) to support their point of view.

6. Jamil Mardam said that the [illegible]

E 2706 B/39]

No. 19.

Mr Shone to Mr Eden.—(Received 28th April.)

No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.)

Damascus, 27th April, 1945

SYY telegram No. 77

[illegible] Beynet does not [illegible] French proposals for general settlement, we are now approaching the crucial stage in

relations between the Levant States and France, and I feel that the time has come to put the following considerations before you

3. We must be under no illusion as to the nature of the present *détente*. If a good deal has been achieved in the way of promoting a better atmosphere for discussions between the two parties, their fundamental positions have not been [illegible]ally changed. The French *desiderata*, in so far as they have been divulged, and French activities here, go to show that they are determined to preserve as much of their present position as they can. Both States Governments are, if anything, more determined than ever to concede no preference or privilege to [illegible]. If the Syrians are taking the lead in this respect, the Lebanese are following suit, and the hardening of the attitude of the Lebanese Government is, if anything, more marked because they are weaker and more susceptible to attack by Nationalist elements which will make capital out of anything which can be represented as a surrender of independence and sovereignty

[illegible] In Syria, where the potential troubles are greater and where dete[illegible]n to get rid of any form of French control is more wholehearted than in [illegible] the Government have only been able to keep the Chamber at bay by [illegible]tera[illegible]ng the conviction that the forthcoming negotiations with the French will [illegible] surrender of any of the attributes of sovereignty (By this they mean that they [illegible] mistrust France too deeply to give her even such privileges as we possess in Ira[illegible] at nonmement of their readiness to negotiate at all. If the negotiations result in disappointment of Syrian hopes, it is only to be expected that the more extreme elements will come into power and that the President will be forced to conform to them In the Lebanon matters are not so far advanced since the French have not yet made any proposals, but in the present state of feelings events there would be likely to follow similar course

4. At present there is confide[illegible] would be so severe that it m[illegible] countries to tolerate

While we are still looked upon as the most important factor in the [illegible] largely because of the continued presence here of the 9th Army, the formation of the Arab League the successive recognitions of the States' independence by the other Powers and their admission to the United Nations and acceptance at San Francisco are inevitably leading the Government and the population to feel that we are not their only friends and supporters and that in any clash with the French they can find powerful allies elsewhere

6. [group undecipherable] opinion here is alive to the fact that so far as we are the only Power to have admitted and even advocated a pre-eminent position for France, that we have played the leading rôle in bringing Syria to the point of resuming negotiations with France, that we have been unable to move the French to give satisfaction to the States over the transfer of the "Troupes Spéciales" or the rearmament of the gendarmerie, and that we are not in a [illegible] Government to such as those in Alaouites. On the other hand, there is a general belief and not without reason that the States Governments can count on Arab and United States representatives here and possibly also the Soviet representative to advocate the support of their Governments against French claim for pre-eminence. While the two Governments still have confidence in us and the populations still consider us as sympathetic to their cause and powerful enough to aid them, the sands are running out They have looked to us more than anyone else to induce the French to be reasonable and if they are now confronted with demands which they have told us so often that they will never willingly accept, [illegible] led them up the garden path. If the attitude of the other Powers in regard to a privileged position for France is, in fact, what it appears to be we may soon get [illegible] we must avoid, viz., being left with the French on one side of the fence, while the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the other Powers are on the other

7. In the light of the above I submit that it now behoves us to consider very carefully our attitude towards the situation here, particularly in relationship to

the forthcoming negotiations. In these the crux will undoubtedly be military questions, "Troupes Spéciales" on one side, bases for France on the other In the prevailing state of feelings I do not see how the French can hope, except by sheer force, to maintain the right to station forces here (unless it is imposed on the States by all the Great Powers or by whatever World Security Organisation is set up). If the French refuse to transfer the "Troupes Spéciales" except as the price for bases, the States will certainly appeal to us and also to all the Powers which have declined to recognise a pre-eminent position for France. They will as certainly be supported in their appeal at least by the Arab States if not also by the United States and the U.S.S.R. Agitation much more formidable than that over the invitation of the States to San Francisco would probably follow. In such circumstances (which on present [illegible] by ourselves, to be backing France in taking any other line with the States? If not, is it not desirable that we should warn the French in advance that we have done much to bring the States to discuss matters with them again and that while we will continue to do all we can to make things as easy as possible we cannot alone support them in demands which are unacceptable to the States, and others? In all this I have in mind your telegram No. 153 to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris and the Prime Minister's words in the House of Commons that too much must not be placed upon the shoulders of Great Britain

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E 1319/8/G

(1)

Mr. Eden to Mr. Shone (Damascus)

(No. 37 Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, 22nd February, 1945

IT would be helpful for us to receive in due course an official despatch giving your considered views on the question to what extent we have been justified in regarding Syria and the Lebanon as viable States, reasonably mature and capable of maintaining a healthy national existence of their own We recognise that ability of the Central Government in each State to maintain its authority will inevitably depend to some extent on the efficiency and equipment of the national forces at its disposal for keeping order, collecting taxes, protecting minorities, and so forth, and that this is still an uncertain factor But the question has obvious importance in connexion with the eventual withdrawal of British troops and the future of Franco-Levant relations

Matter is not urgent. We are telegraphing so that you can discuss it with Hankey

E 2780/8/89]

(2)

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd May.)

(No. 63 Secret.)

Sir,

Beirut, 19th April, 1945

IN your telegram No. 37 of the 22nd February to Damascus you requested me to give in an official despatch my considered views on "the question to what extent we have been justified in regarding Syria and the Lebanon as viable States, reasonably mature and capable of maintaining a healthy national existence on their own."

2. This question is not easy to answer, for more than one reason. Firstly, although we and other Powers have recognised the independence of the two countries, it is only for a bare fifteen months that their Governments have in fact been in a position to exercise anything like real control over their affairs. Secondly, war conditions have given rise to problems here, not least that of inflation which would have taxed the powers even of a highly efficient administra[illegible] While, during the war period, Allied organisations, such as the Middle

East Supply Centre and the Office des Céréales Panifiables, have been of great value in meeting a number of such problems they—not to mention French and British military headquarters, with their attendant services—have also limited the free exercise of power by the local administrations. Thirdly, I fear it is undeniable that, since the French authorities, during the first half of 1944, made a real advance towards giving the States self government by surrendering control of the *intérêts communs*, they have not merely failed to help the Governments further on the path to independence, but have sought to maintain in various ways what remains of their former position here and even to instil the belief amongst the local populations that their position will be strengthened. Indeed, it may broadly be said that, while the other Great Powers represented here have been encouraging the States towards self government, the French have been directing their efforts in a contrary sense. This, in addition to creating difficulties for the local Governments, has—as more than one Minister has said to me—served to distract their attention from the task of improving internal administration. The conditions on which an estimate of the States' capacity up to now to maintain a healthy national existence must be based are therefore far from normal. And the future—if we are to look to that, as I think we should—is complicated by many imponderables.

3. Apart from this, there are two questions which are germane to the [illegible] problem, namely, what are the minimum requirements for "viability" and by [illegible] *coups d'État* [illegible] made to me I [illegible] administrations are riddled with corruption and nepotism [illegible] point which we ourselves would regard as intolerable. It [illegible] in fact, essential to avoid setting the standard of "viability" too high [illegible] above all, not to be influenced unduly by preconceived notions of what constitutes good government.

4. The last despatch which my predecessor addressed to you from this post [illegible] 1941 [illegible] contains a succinct expression of his views on the subject of your enquiry. My own relatively brief experience of these countries and reports from a number of experienced officials which I called for on receipt of your enquiry (and of which I am sending copies under separate cover, as they are all of interest) tend, in general, to bear out Sir E. Spears's appreciation. I will return to it at the end of [illegible] despatch, after attempting to develop the picture in greater detail, [illegible] with the above considerations in mind, that the Levant States, to be considered "viable," should be able to maintain, over a period of years, at least—

(a) a sufficient stability of régime to allow the essential functions of government to be carried on, and

(b) [illegible] tly even balance of payments to prevent insolvency and depre[illegible] of their currency.

[illegible] departments during the man[illegible] ned until the end of the war, [illegible] have recently [illegible] to train up a civil service, as we did in Egypt before that country became independent. While both local [illegible] a point I often make to them—they are all too prone to appoint officials for political expediency or family reasons rather than for administrative competence. In any case, the establishment of a proper civil service will take time, and it is clear that, if administration is to be efficient, both Governments will have need of foreign advisers and technicians for many years to [illegible] The Governments maintain that they will not give preference to France in this respect, but must be free to choose the best men where they can find them.

6. For the rest, conditions in the two States differ so considerably that it will be well to consider them separately from the political angle. I will take

Syria first. Although comparatively homogeneous in race, religion and language, [illegible] far [illegible] The [illegible] Damascus, the Damascenes form too large a proportion of the Government and administration. Except in opposition to the French, there is little community of interests between the out-districts and the capital, and the tribal and provincial leaders complain of systematic governmental neglect. The French have success[illegible] so. Unless the President and the [illegible] their present tendenc[illegible] share of [illegible] will [illegible] the [illegible] tasca power [illegible] States.

[illegible] The country lacks competent junior officials, there is no tradition of [illegible] amongst her leading families the scions of which if they work at all generally enter one of the liberal professions. But if foreign advisers and technicians are made available and properly used, and a better sense of public duty is developed amongst the younger generation, there is hope [illegible] their religious sheikhs are amongst the most reactionary and bigoted of Islam are not themselves fanatical and will have too great a need of foreign Powers to risk thus alienating them. The minorities themselves, however, would have to play their part; the French have in the past spoilt them by extending to them a [illegible] gree of protection which amounted to favouritism, thus breeding in them a feeling of superiority which often causes them to exaggerate their rights or [illegible] consider themselves first and foremost as Syrians, they should have little or nothing to fear.

9. The police and gendarmerie, given adequate equipment (including a mobile striking force) should suffice to keep [illegible] semi-sedentary population in normal circumstances, as the populations, although they contain unruly elements in both the urban and rural districts, are usually amenable to a show of force. They should also be able to enforce the processes of law, the collection of taxes, &c. Only in a severe political or economic crisis, such as might in any country lead to the employment of troops, would there be a likelihood of a complete loss of control. Such occasions would probably be rare.

10. Democracy in Syria works no better than in other Arab States; democracy combined with republicanism is still more unsuited to the fickle self-seeking hypocritical Syrians. The feudal organisation of the country and the ignorance and illiteracy of the masses are at present effective bars to any real popular representation: the Chamber of Deputies is ranged according to personalities, not policies, and the manifest lack of civic spirit amongst even the more enlightened leaders will always form a serious obstacle to the promulgation of legislation calling for sacrifices from the population. A benevolent autocracy would probably suit the country far better, but in present circumstances the establishment of such a ruler seems remote. If the present régime continued it could probably rub along much as at present in normal times, with Governments succeeding each other at short intervals and the administrative machinery creaking but turning, but the impact of an economic blizzard or other severe crisis might well prove too great a strain.

11. In the Lebanon the problem is different, and more complicated. The population structure is split by confessional fissures. Christian-Moslem hostility resulting partly from history and partly from the clash between their respective Occidental and Oriental cultures, is not always outwardly apparent, but smoulders beneath the surface and breaks out on occasion. The more enlightened Christian families intermarry to some extent. Christians with Moslems seldom or never. The Maronite Patriarch and other Christian prelates jealously guard their communities' real or fancied interests, and still wield more power than any Government have up to the present felt able to defy. The impression in the [illegible] that all communities must be [illegible] in the [illegible] Moslems [illegible] gendarmes [illegible] so as to preserve the present [illegible] of such posts among the communities. A [illegible]

formidable obstacle to the emergence of a true national consciousness or an efficient administration can hardly be imagined.

12. Republican democracy is even less successful in the Lebanon than in Syria: the country is too small, the ruling classes too level in calibre and too much inter-related. Chamber debates, and politics in general, are squabbles between cliques. Centuries of domination or protection, and a common consciousness of minority status, have deprived all but a few Lebanese of any civic spirit or true nationalist feeling. The Lebanon, even more than Syria, requires to be ruled, but it is difficult to conceive what type of ruler could impose his authority on these conflicting elements.

13. The Lebanese are widely regarded as the most intelligent of all Middle-Eastern peoples, and have some officials and politicians of a relatively [illegible] in Syria, but it manages to keep going somehow in present conditions. Serious disturbances are rare and short-lived, and a small display of force quells them: there can hardly be a minority problem in a State where no community has a [illegible] and so far the security services have sufficed for the normal [illegible] vernment. But it is even more likely than in Syria that a serious crisis would produce a complete breakdown in an unaided administration.

14. To turn now to the economic and financial aspect. Between 1936 and 1940 the Levant States, as a unit, had an unfavourable balance of trade of some £S 323,000,000. Their combined payments were balanced by the following [illegible] remittances from emigrants, (iii) the expenditure of foreign tourists, and (iv) the proceeds of hashish grown and smuggled out. Of these (i), like so much else, depends on future relations between the States and France, (ii) and (iii) apply rather to the Lebanon, and (iv) is an unknown quantity, the continuance or disappearance of which would depend on many extraneous factors.

15. Syria has no major source of wealth such as the oil of Iraq or the cotton of Egypt. Since the excision of the Hatay she has no satisfactory port [illegible] y an exportable surplus of cereals and other agricultural products, wool, &c., if markets can be found for them in the face of world competition, and her textile industry, which has developed under sheltered conditions [illegible] silk (if it can survive post-war Far-Eastern competition), and the somewhat doubtful tovisible exports referred to in the preceding paragraph.

16. Both States built up large budget reserves during the war, at the end of December 1943 these were: Syria, £S 25,000,000, Lebanon, £S 19,600,000. The Lebanon at least, is, however, believed to be dissipating her reserves by loans [illegible] per cent. of the revenue of both States comes from indirect taxation, the end of the war and the withdrawal of British troops is likely to cause revenue to shrink more rapidly than expenditure, and the process will be accentuated if in addition the Troupes Spéciales are transferred to the States and if French military forces no longer garrison the States. Budget deficits are therefore to be foreseen after the war.

17. Furthermore, there is little local confidence in the currency, in view of the several devolutions it has suffered during the last twenty-five years. If the French guarantee of it were withdrawn and were not replaced by some other, a rush on foreign currency, with consequent deflation of the countries' reserves of foreign exchange and ultimate depreciation of the currency, would almost inevitably result.

18. On present showing, there are few signs that the legislatures of either State would show the necessary sense of responsibility to initiate unaided any drastic measure which such a situation might call for, or that the ignorant electorate would support them if they did.

19. On the other hand, the situation described in paragraph 17 above is unlikely to occur for some time after the war. At present the two States together have large holdings of foreign exchange (£41,650,000 in francs and sterling on the 31st December, 1944). This, plus the proceeds of exports, should enable them to pay their way for a considerable period. Neither State has contracted foreign loans, neither has any internal debt. Much would depend on the manner in which the post-war situation, complicated as it would be by internal politics and factors arising out of the struggle for liberation from French control, was tackled by the Governments. Much, also, would depend on imponderables, such as the world economic situation, the international arrangements made for dealing with

it, and the extent to which the two States could succeed in marketing their relatively uninteresting products. During this period, disinterested foreign advisers would be of the greatest service.

20. [illegible] assumption that Syria and the Lebanon will continue to function as a unit for [illegible] relations. This, however, is not necessarily true; there is bitter mutual rivalry between Syrian and Lebanese commercial interests which is at present generally being subordinated to the desire of the two Governments to form a common front against the French but which in normal times might easily result in serious differences on such issues as tariffs. In 1937 the two States not only failed to reach agreement on the division between them of the *intérêts communs* revenues [illegible] trators (in which I would include efficient civil servants), she ought, with reasonable luck, to make a good enough showing, in comparison with other Middle Eastern countries, provided she will accept and properly use the foreign advice [illegible] provided that advice and assistance is given in a truly co-operative spirit and [illegible] period help of this kind will be particularly necessary; and it seems clear, from what has been written above, that either a French or some other guarantee of Syrian and Lebanese currency will be essential. Like Sir E. Spears, I doubt whether the above degree of assistance would suffice in the case of the Lebanon which is so much less a nation even than Syria and where conditions seem such as to call, in greater measure, for support and guidance from outside sources.

22. [illegible] the Arab League is likely to be of help to the States and, above all, the future position of France as regards the States. It is too early to forecast with any confidence the results which may flow from the Arab League, but if it were to bring about intelligent measures in the economic sphere, [illegible] abolition of customs barriers and other economic impediments, the "viability" of the Levant States would be enhanced. Unfortunately, it seems more likely that the chief preoccupations of the League will be political rather than economic and its utility, from the point of view of the problem now under consideration will depend on the extent of its readiness to co-operate with and be guided by such international organisations as may be set up after the war. If it were to serve merely as a political umbrella under which the nationalistic tendencies of the Arab States would be encouraged, the Levant States would no doubt seek to use it not only as cover for stiffer resistance against any French attempts on their political or economic position [illegible] advice and assistance from foreign sources, whether French or other, which they so plainly need.

23. As regards France's position and attitude, which must to so great an extent be the determining factor in this and any other [illegible] Levant States, there appear to be three main possibilities:—

(1) that the French will withdraw, or be forced to withdraw, any measure of control from the States, leaving only diplomatic representation and normal cultural and commercial interests;

(2) that the French will retain some control, but will achieve relations with the States Governments broadly similar to those which characterise our own relations with Iraq;

(3) that the French, while retaining some control, will remain on the same terms of mutual suspicion and dislike with the States as at present.

It is clear that a continuance of (3) would not only not enhance the "viability" of the States but would sooner or later lead to an explosion which would have grave effects throughout the Middle East. (2) appears to be what the French

Government are aiming at, and (1) what the States are hoping to secure from the forthcoming negotiations with France. Whether or not (2) would work would depend on the establishment of relations of real confidence between the States and France and on French behaviour in the future. Such relations do not exist, and many competent observers consider that they never can. Until General Beynet [illegible] States Governments and how far the latter are likely to accept them, there is little more that can be said. There is for the time being a *detente* in the relations between France and the States, and there may perhaps be some ground for hope that a settlement of outstanding questions between them, together with a change in French mentality towards the States, may lead to better relations. If this should come about, it may be that the fact that the system of administration in the States is in many respects based on the French model, coupled with the realisation of the hold which the French have over finance, may eventually convince the local Governments that they can ill afford to dispense with French advice and assistance altogether.

24. But for the moment it seems clear from statements by Syrian political leaders—notably by the Prime Minister, as reported in my telegram No. 239 of the 11th April—that they regard the present *detente* as a prelude to the recognition by France of their full independence and sovereignty, which would mean the abandonment of any French claim to predominance. They continue to state that they will not accord her a position analogous to ours in Iraq, and if any attempt were made to compel them to accept such a position against their wi[illegible] they would certainly resist it tooth and nail and would invoke the aid of the Arab League and of the Great Powers, especially those which have given unqualified recognition to their independence. It is only to be expected that any Government representative of the present Greater Lebanon would take a similar line, but it is impossible to exclude the possibility that the French, if they failed to secure their desiderata in Syria or the present Lebanon, might try, by hook or by crook, [illegible] Lebanon. The wider effects of such a venture lie beyond the scope of this despatch; it will suffice to say here that, in so far as can be seen, such a State would only be "viable" as a mere appanage of France.

25. I [illegible] My excuse must be the complexity of the subject. In so far as it is possible to sum the matter up, having regard to the position of France as well as conditions in the States themselves, I would say—

(1) that both States will need help from outside sources—and the Lebanon help in large measure—for some time to come,

(2) that although France may seem, at least in her own eyes, to be the Power indicated to give such help, her past record still inspires such mistrust in the States that they will not willingly accept it from her alone,

(3) that the States themselves, and especially the Lebanon, probably do not now appreciate fully how much help they will need and that nationalist fervour may well incline them rather to muddle along in their own way,

(4) that if they do come to realise their need, they will, on present indications, seek help from other sources than France, though it is possible that the establishment of better relations with her may make them more ready than they now are to accept something from her,

(5) that of the Great Powers, they would prefer to look to us or to the United States of America, but that Syria at least would hotly resent any attempt to force help upon her or to impose any form of "trusteeship."

I have, &c.
TERENCE SHONE

E 2781/14/89] **No. 21**

Record of Conversation with the Syrian President on 19th April, 1945. (Communicated in Beirut Despatch No. 64 of 20th April, Received in Foreign Office, 2nd May.)

I CALLED on the Syrian President this afternoon. He sympathised of the long delay in General Beynet's return. The [illegible] of a week or ten days when he left, it was now over a month. I said the President that these

things inevitably took time in European capitals where there were so many pressing problems to deal with. The President, however, continued to maintain that the French were deliberately spinning things out. They were now putting it about that they would not hand over the Troupes Spéciales as long as the British troops remained here. The President said he believed it was the intention that British troops should come here for rest and training as long as the war with Japan went on. The Syrians for their part wanted to make any contribution they could in the way of facilities for us. The above was the latest French argument for putting things off.

2. M. Bidault, the President went on, had also now suggested that the Syrian Prime Minister should discuss outstanding questions with him at San Francisco. This, the President believed, was only another device of a similar kind. Why could not General Beynet come back and discuss matters here, as arranged? The French, he said, were not taking the independence of these countries seriously. They clearly did not want a settlement until after the San Francisco Conference and the end of the war. They thought time would be on their side, but he was not so sure.

3. The President then spoke at some length about the French desire for a military mission, if and when the Syrians obtained their national army. If the Troupes Spéciales were passed to the States as they were, with the existing French officers, &c., what need was there of a military mission? Moreover, the Syrians did not wish to be bound to France in a military sense; they were members of the Arab League, Syria formed with the other Arab countries, which had treaties with us, a common area of defence. He did not think it wise that Syria's armaments, training, &c. should be different from those of the other Arab States. He would far prefer a British military mission, if one was necessary at all. And what of the expense? Syria had no real need of an army; gendarmerie, properly armed, *gardes mobiles*, and special formations for Bedouin control were all that were necessary. (This, of course, bears out what we have always said, that the Syrians do not really want the Troupes Spéciales as a national army but want to get them away from French control.)

4. The President went on to say that military missions like we had in Iraq or Egypt were all right, but the French would never behave as we did if they had one here. They would always seek to control things as far as they could and to maintain their old position as long as there were any of them left in the Levant States. He did not believe they were capable of changing their mentality or their methods. An Englishman was always an Englishman, wherever he was, and could be trusted to carry out his undertakings; the French were quite different when they were abroad. Their Sûreté aux Armées here was mainly concerned with espionage and putting spokes in the wheels of the Government. A military mission would, he believed, be no better.

5. I told the President again of the constant efforts we had made to urge on the French Government the need for speed and moderation in every respect, but he clearly remained unconvinced. He also argued that a French military mission would mean a privilege for France. What would the Americans and the Russians say to that?

6. Lastly, the President referred to the long delay—particularly over the Troupes Spéciales—as embarrassing to the Government. "We shall inevitably be attacked," he said, "and our people will be right to attack us if we fail to secure the Troupes Spéciales."

7. Altogether rather a gloomy conversation, especially as we have reason to believe that the French will not merely want a military mission and a [illegible] base here.

TERENCE SHONE

E 3122/5/89] **No. 22**

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 17th May.)

No. 66.)

Beirut, 30th April, 1945.

Sir,

IT is now some four months since I took up my appointment in the Levant States and I [illegible] the relations between France and the States will [illegible] since my arrival. A stage has thus been reached at which it seems opportune to review the events of the period in a despatch with special regard to those relations.

2. When I reached the Levant States just before Christmas, their Governments were in a state of depression and anxiety owing to the departure of Major-General Sir Edward Spears. His remarkable personality, his great talents—not least his aptitude for public speaking in French as well as English—his tireless energy his gift of personal appeal to people in these countries in all walks of life and, above all, his championship of the cause which is closest to their hearts—their independence—had won him a position here which was altogether exceptional for a foreigner. The Governments turned to him for advice in a multitude of matters, great and small The people often acclaimed him in the streets. The tributes paid to him and Lady Spears, who had also gained the esteem and affection of the States to a remarkable degree, when it was known that they were about to leave, were quite unusual. Streets in capital cities have no doubt often been named after distinguished soldiers or servants of the Crown, but it must be rare for one of His Majesty's representatives to be made an honorary citizen of the countries in which he served. Sir E Spears had indeed set the prestige of Great Britain high in the Levant States where the French alone showed no regret at his departure. His place here was not easy to take [illegible] in British policy was widespread in the States. In the autumn of 1944 Sir E. Spears had impressed on both Governments the need for settling outstanding questions with France; but the subsequent negotiations had ended, almost at once, in a deadlock. The French had firmly refused to concede the principal demand of the States, namely, the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales, [illegible] proposed to the local Governments the heads of a number of conventions of which the Governments fought shy. In this attitude they were influenced by the text of a "convention universitaire," which the French had put forward earlier on and which contained demands so extravagant in the whole field of local education that the Governments would not even consider it as a basis for negotiation. Thereafter relations between the Governments and the French had steadily deteriorated. With Sir E Spears's departure the States inevitably felt that they were losing a great strength and stay; the Governments were apprehensive lest His Majesty's Government might be about to exert stronger pressure on them to make concessions to France which they would regard as derogatory to their independence, so recently recognised by the United States and the Soviet Union without the qualification we had made concerning a privileged position for France, and the fear that we might be about to leave the States in the lurch evoked, not infrequently, memories of 1919 and 1920

4. My arrival at Beirut coincided with that of a French cruiser, the *Emile Bertin*, flying the flag of Admiral Auboyneau, whose demeanour on a previous visit had aroused considerable feeling in the States. This time, thanks to prior warnings given to the French, the visit passed off without incident. But nerves were highly strung and relations between the States and the French were daily becoming more strained Personal contacts between the local French authorities and members of the Syrian Government had virtually ceased, they [illegible] punted by the despatch of a number of French tanks to Damascus—about the same time as the arrival of the French cruiser at Beirut If relations between the French Délégation Générale and the Lebanese Government seemed outwardly somewhat better—the Lebanese notes were at least couched in more diplomatic language than the Syrian and there were still personal contacts between members of the Government and French officials—the difference existed only on the surface A change of Government in the Lebanon, entailing the replacement of Riad Solh as [illegible] was made no secret of his antipathy for the French, seemed unlikely to result in any improvement in this respect. The sudden death of the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Selim Takla [illegible] in the new [illegible] the Administration of a man who had some experience of affairs and who was notable for having no private fortune. Another serious development in the Lebanon was the grave illness of the President, who was to all intents and purposes to remain incapable of transacting public business for the next three months

5. The procedure for selecting a successor to Salim Takla provided, for a newcomer to the Lebanon, a striking example of the curious system under which adequate representation must be assured to the various religious communities, not only in the Cabinet but also in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Administration generally I have alluded to this in my despatch No 63 of the 19th April about the "viability" of the Levant States. Under this system the choice of Selim

Takla's successor in the Cabinet (though not necessarily as Minister for Foreign Affairs) was limited to the Greek Catholic community. The only two candidates considered suitable were M. Henri Pharaon, a millionaire banker whose main interest was the turf, and the the Lebanese Minister in Cairo. The former was chosen and in fact became Minister for Foreign Affairs.

6. In view of your instructions to me concerning the importance to His Ma[illegible] that the Levant States should be conscious of the value of our support, my efforts were primarily directed in these circumstances to restoring, in so far as I could, the confidence of the local Governments. In establishing relations with them their knowledge that I had just served for nearly five years in Egypt and was not a stranger to the Middle East was undoubtedly a help. As you had also instructed me that one of my principal duties would be to assist in the final settlement of the questions outstanding between the States and the French, I [illegible] Délégation Générale. "By all means start your mission here, if you like, by being Francophile," said the Syrian President; "How pleasant your mission here would be if it were not for the French," said the Minister for Foreign Affairs. In my early interviews with them—and also with the Lebanese political leaders—I [illegible] settling matters with the French. These, I am bound to say, were not too well received. The Syrians and Lebanese treated me to long discourses about the [illegible] anxiety to which I have referred above; and the main theme, throughout their talks with me, was that, come what might, they would never again consent to French predominance or privilege in any form. Sir Edward Grigg, who visited these countries shortly after my arrival, was deeply impressed by their determination in this respect, as indeed I was myself

7. Circumstances led me to devote my attention at the outset mainly to Syria, where the situation was more disturbing than in the Lebanon. There the burning question of the Troupes Spéciales was leading to a rapid deterioration in relations with the French There was little doubt that the Syrian Government who were under severe criticism in the Chamber of Deputies and in the country [illegible] from their administrative shortcomings. Demonstrations, mainly of students and school-children, calling for a national army and giving vent to anti French slogans, took place up and down the country and eventually got so much out of [illegible] The French, on their side, made some show of military defence measures for their installations in the principal towns, particularly in Damascus. The Syrian Government complained to us of these as likely to inflame public opinion still further A somewhat serious incident took place at Soueida in the Druse country where the windows of the French Officers' Club were broken by demonstrators Even if the situation was at no time grave, there was always the danger that in such an explosive atmosphere a spark, like that of Soueida, might start a fire. In these circumstances the Army commander and I did all in our power to urge the Syrian President and Government to suppress the demonstrations and keep their people quiet. We also impressed on the French authorities the need for avoiding any provocative action. M Georges Delcoigne, the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires, was of great assistance in urging moderation on the Syrians, as were also the representatives of the Arab States, not least, I believe, Hakki Bey, the newly arrived Egyptian Minister

8. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris had been instructed to make strong representations to the French Government about the situation in the Levant States. He was to inform them of your grave concern at the complete lack of progress over the questions of the Troupes Spéciales and the further armament of the gendarmeries and to point out how essential it was that the French should adopt a more realistic attitude towards the States if serious trouble was to be avoided In your telegram No. 153 of the 26th January to Mr Duff Cooper [illegible] that, provided France followed the policy to which she [illegible] French and British interests there ran parallel and did not conflict in any major respect. It did not, however, follow from this that we could allow the French to do as they wished in the States or that we could make a bargain with them at the expense of the States' independence. Great Britain's whole position in the Middle East would be gravely threatened if the French followed in the States a policy which was

inconsistent with ours and with what the whole Egypto-Arab world had come to regard as essential and right. We should meet with very great criticism both at home and in the Commonwealth and empire if, by failing to keep the French up to their promises, we found our whole position threatened in the Middle East where we had fought so hard to maintain it. We were entitled to expect the French not to put us in this position, and were they to do so, not the Arab world [illegible] the side of the Syrians and Lebanese against them and they would not be able to maintain their position. If the French were not prepared to come to terms with the States on conditions which the Arab world and the Great Powers could [illegible] which must prove highly embarrassing to them in the coming year. There must be no misunderstanding as regards [illegible] Majesty's Government could give to the French [illegible] States. While we were [illegible] seemed to exercise all too little control. There was certainly ample justification for the frequent complaints of the local authorities about French pretentions and intrigues, and one of the [illegible] status of the normal diplomatic mission.

[illegible] early in February I received your instructions to press the States' [illegible] at least to find out what the French wanted in the way of a final settlement and not merely to remain entrenched in their attitude of refusing to discuss anything with them. There seemed to be indications both in Syria and the Lebanon that certain Ministers were beginning to feel that this attitude would get them nowhere and that they would be better advised to take some initiative themselves, such as preparing a draft treaty for submission to all the four Great Powers. They realised that this would in no way satisfy the French claim for a "special" position, which General de Gaulle had recently reaffirmed—with [illegible] against France—but they felt that if there were any chance of the other three Powers [illegible] proposals this would [illegible] the nature of the French demands on them and would therefore strengthen their position *vis-à-vis* world opinion. The Lebanon, as regards foreign policy, was tagging along behind Syria without taking any initiative of its own. The Lebanese Government were weak and were being hampered by the artificial agitation, created largely by French propaganda and the manœuvres of Opposition Deputies, to the effect that the promulgation of the Alexandria Protocol on Arab unity would have the effect of selling the Christians down the river. Both Syrian and Lebanese Governments seemed determined, however, to walk hand in hand, at least outwardly.

11. Neither Count Ostrorog, General Beynet's second in command, who took the opportunity on his return from Europe to pay some courtesy visits to Syrian personalities and had been treated to some plain speaking by the Syrian President, nor my United States colleague, who was expecting instructions from the State Department to support our efforts to bring the local Governments and the French together again for discussion, considered that there was any prospect of success if negotiations were resumed at the moment. And so indeed it seemed to me. But you pointed out the danger of allowing the present state of tension to continue, and early in February I pressed the Syrian President and the Minister

for Foreign Affairs strongly to resume discussion of outstanding questions with [illegible] badly wanted and which the Syrians could perfectly well concede without infringing their independence, and that, in the view of His Majesty's Government, the best way to start negotiations would be to tackle the easier questions first, in the hope that when these had been cleared out of the way it would prove possible to go on to the more difficult ones.

12. [illegible] consider anything that would not infringe their sovereignty. After a long [illegible] would ask the French for theirs. This they did, Count Ostrorog came over two [illegible] for Foreign Affairs, as a result of which he agreed to suggest to General Beynet [illegible] Mardam Bey emphasised that the Syrians had only one demand, the immediate transfer of the Troupes Spéciales, and only one condition, that they would not give France a pre-eminent or privileged position. The French were undoubtedly appreciative of what had been done to bring the Syrians to a more reasonable frame of mind and of our repeated efforts to prevent the spread of disorder. The Syrian Government for their part did their best throughout this time to calm down the students and to keep the Chamber of Deputies quiet. The Syrians and Lebanese were at this point contemplating sending a statement of their case to the "Big Three" in anticipation of their forthcoming meeting, but as discussions with the French had now started I headed them off and they did not pursue the idea.

13. In February the Syrian President received an invitation from King Ibn Saud to visit him in the Hedjaz, and a Royal Air Force aircraft was provided for the journey as it was clear that their meeting might be useful. The French authorities were informed: in Paris they appeared to think that the President ought to have travelled in a French aircraft, which only showed how little they knew of the strong feelings of the Syrian President. The King and the [illegible] reasonable in negotiating with the French. Shukri Quwatli's attitude does not seem to have been much influenced by this meeting.

14. Meanwhile it had been learned that King Ibn Saud was going to Egypt to meet the Prime Minister and yourself, and as the Syrian President was paying [illegible] King of Egypt about the same time, it was arranged for Mr [illegible] to meet him. This meeting, which I attended, took [illegible] 17 [illegible] The Syrian President had the satisfaction of stating his case to the British Ministers who, in return, explained British policy to him. Shukri Quwatli said he hoped that the situation in Syria would improve and that the Syrian Government would enjoy the help and support of Great Britain in overcoming the present difficulties. The Syrians' ambition was to have peace and tranquillity in their country but they had suffered much provocation, and although every effort had been and would be made to preserve tranquillity he was afraid that if the present state of affairs continued, the situation might get out of hand. He pressed for the transfer to Syrian control of the Troupes Spéciales, who were composed of Syrians, the fact that they might be used against the Syrian Government was a standing provocation. And [illegible] The French Government had issued a statement that France was responsible for the maintenance of order in Syria. General de Gaulle had repeated [illegible] position [illegible] there had [illegible] the Syrians to [illegible] where the French had [illegible] the Syrian [illegible] The Syrian Government [illegible] the [illegible] and the French [illegible] troops [illegible] prevent the [illegible] The President emphasised that the Syrians would not grant France [illegible] privileged position [illegible] with that of the other Arab States and they were [illegible] fate with that of France.

15. You [illegible] the French [illegible] their proposals to the Syrian Government. If some points were unacceptable, the Syrians [illegible] proposals [illegible] the French all they could. Great Britain and the United States would be in a position to support them if the counter proposals were reasonable. An agreement would not

necessarily mean that Syrian foreign policy would be subordinate to French foreign policy. You were not asking for anything contrary to Syrian independence. Everything ought to be arranged before the British troops left the Levant. We had made repeated representations in Paris concerning French relations with the Levant States, you were sure that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs wanted an agreement, that he did not believe we were trying to replace the French in the States and that he did not wish to provoke the [illegible]. But he would make no concession about the Troupes Spéciales without [illegible] in return.

16. The Prime Minister said he was anxious to convince the French that we did not aim at replacing them in the Levant States. We wanted nothing for ourselves. France must recognise the independence of the States but if she made arrangements with Syria by which she got a somewhat better position there than His Majesty's Government, we should not object. It was, of course, understood that this should not affect the independence of Syria and the Lebanon. The Syrians, for their part, must give something reasonable to the French, who must have a position of some sort. They should handle the question tactfully and settle it without quarrels, which were very annoying to His Majesty's Government. They should not trample on French *amour-propre*, which had been greatly shaken by the war, they should be confident in their friends and in the world organisation which would be set up. They could afford to be generous to France. His Majesty's Government were friends both of the French and the Arabs, they would be pleased with any arrangement which could be made and an arrangement which gave France a somewhat better or different position from ourselves need not affect Syrian independence. He had said publicly that the situation of the French in the Levant States might be similar to ourselves in Iraq; as he understood the position the Syrians were not prepared to go so far. (The President confirmed this.) Nevertheless, they should go as far as possible. If they remained intransigent there would certainly be trouble. British troops would not stay in the Levant States indefinitely. Negotiations should begin soon but the Syrians should not try to force the issue prematurely. Their long term position was no bad one.

17. The President thanked the Prime Minister for the sympathy which he had shown to Syria and for his advice. He was himself sure that it was not the British aim to replace the French. It was essential in the Syrian Government's view that the question of the Troupes Spéciales should be settled before the British troops left. The Prime Minister could count on him to handle the situation carefully. But he earnestly hoped that there would be no undue [illegible].

18. This interview was particularly useful in view of a statement by the Minister of State in the House of Commons that His Majesty's Government had [illegible] but not "guaranteed" the independence of the States, to which [illegible] disproportionate publicity was given in the States. The position of His Majesty's Government with regard to the Levant States and France was [illegible] by Mr. Churchill during his speech in the House of Commons on the 27th February, in the following terms:—

> "I must make clear, once and for all, the position of His Majesty's Government in respect of Syria and the Lebanon, and in relation to our French allies. The position is governed by the statements made in 1941, in which the independence of these Levant States was definitely declared by Great Britain and France. At that time, and ever since, His Majesty's Government have made it clear that they would never seek to supplant French influence by British influence in the Levant States. We are determined also to respect the independence of these States and to use our best endeavours to preserve a special position for France in view of the many cultural and historic connexions, which France has so long established with Syria. We hope that it may be possible for the French to preserve that special position. We trust that these States will be firmly established by the authority of the world organisation, and that French privilege will also be recognised.
>
> "However, I must make it clear that it is not for us alone to defend by force either Syrian or Lebanese independence or French privilege. We seek both and we do not believe that they are incompatible. Too much must not be placed, therefore, upon the shoulders of Great Britain alone. We have to take note of the fact that Russia and the United States have recognised and favour Syrian and Lebanese independence, but do not favour any special position for any other foreign country."

19. Meanwhile an unpleasant situation had developed in the Alaouite territory. I have reported on this at length in my despatch No. 45 of the 19th March but as the matter was of importance because it raised in a somewhat acute form the question of French rights under the territorial command recognised in the Lyttelton–de Gaulle Agreement, and of interest as throwing light on French behaviour in an area where the Syrian Government were under difficulties, some [illegible]. The fundamental cause of trouble in the area was the acquisition of other people's property by [illegible] Alaouites and was, according to their doctrine, regarded as semi-divine. [illegible] had for years enjoyed at least the tacit support of the French. In the Spring of 1944 the Syrian Government felt it was time to put a stop to Murshid's depredations which had given rise to many complaints and constant disturbances in the [illegible] against him. Murshid, fearing that this would result in the loss of all his property, retracted his consent to arbitration and refused to give evidence before the Court. The Syrian Government thereupon placed him in forced residence in Damascus, although he was a Deputy, and no further progress was made in settling his claims. In January 1945 the Syrian Government received information that French officers, particularly one Captain Boussquet, were stirring up [illegible] at early in February Colonel Gaussot, the French delegate at [illegible] and made no secret of the fact that he had done so because [illegible] forces, sent up against the wishes of the Syrian authorities, arrived on the scene and formed a screen between the Murshidites and the Gendarmerie. The Syrian Government appealed to the Army Commander and me against this action on the part of the local French authorities which they regarded as an infringement of their prerogative to maintain law and order.

20. Public opinion in the Levant States had recently been inflamed by a statement by General de Gaulle to the effect that France was responsible for maintaining order in the States. It had been agreed in 1944 between the British and French military authorities that, the maintenance of law and order being the responsibility of the States, these should, when reinforcements were required for the purpose, make application to the French Territorial Commander, who would meet these requests so far as his operational commitments permitted, and that the decision as to how many troops were maintained for the purpose of maintaining law and order was one for the Governments of the States in conjunction with the French military authorities. In the present case the Government maintained that the Gendarmerie, if left to themselves, could have dealt with the insurgents, and how, they asked, could they be expected to invoke the help of the French, who, on [illegible] General Holmes and I discussed the matter with General Beynet, who agreed to the establishment of a Syrian-Anglo-French Commission to enquire into the causes and circumstances. This the Syrians would not accept, mainly because they did not wish to admit French participation. You, Sir, pressed the Syrian President in Cairo to agree to the proposed Commission, but on my return here, it proved impossible to draft terms of reference acceptable to the parties concerned. Moreover, General Holmes and I had to explain to the Syrian President that as the territorial command was in the hands of the French, military intervention on our part was impossible in such cases, unless a major conflagration occurred. This resulted in a change of attitude on the President's part and he agreed in a subsequent interview with General Beynet that the French troops and Troupes Spéciales as well as the Gendarmerie should be withdrawn from the area. Negotiations between the Syrian and French authorities have so far failed to result in effect being given to this decision, nor has any action yet been taken by the Syrian authorities to settle the claims against Murshid, despite constant pressure on our part to find some means of doing this. The position in the Alaouite territory thus remains thoroughly unsatisfactory. The writ of the Syrian Government does not run in the area of the disturbances, which is to all intents and purposes under French control. The rising prestige of the Syrian Government in the area has again been reduced almost to vanishing point and other chieftains

are showing signs of setting themselves up against the Government and of admit- [illegible] Syria is ever to be established as a fully sovereign State, these developments are retrograde, the [illegible] their holding of the territorial command as an argument for intervening directly without consultation with the Government, in an area of disturbance the possibility that such disturbances may be fomented by French political intrigue as a pretext for subsequent armed intervention and the ultimate creation of French controlled areas, particularly along the Littoral, has not been lost on the Syrian Government; and relations between the Syrian Government and the French authorities have been exacerbated at an unfortunate moment

21 On the 18th February the United States Government instructed their Minister in Paris to represent to the French Government their view that the matters at issue between France and the States should admit of an amicable solution, that both sides should show moderation, and the French, if sincere in their professed intention of granting independence to the States, should agree to the conversion of their representation into the status of diplomatic missions, to the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales, and to the modest scale of rearmament for the Gendarmerie recommended by General Holmes. He was to explain that the State Department appreciated the French desire to obtain assurances for the future protection of their rights, and that their Minister in Beirut was being instructed to urge the States Governments to enter into negotiations with the French, but to point out that the State Department had seen the first French draft of a University Convention, which in their opinion would injure American cultural interests. If necessary he was also to state that United States policy towards the independence of the Levant States was entirely distinct from their policy towards [illegible] taneously instructed to inform the States of these representations in Paris and to urge them to adopt a more realistic attitude and to consent to undertake negotiations for a treaty with France which would not discriminate in favour of any third Power but would guarantee legitimate French interests. Mr Wadsworth was also authorised to suggest informally that the two Governments might consider submitting treaty proposals simultaneously to France and to the [illegible] retraction of United States recognition of the States' independence, but that, in the view of the State Department, the explosive potentialities of the situation were the relations of the Levant Governments with France which constituted the fundamental problem to be solved in the last analysis. Mr Wadsworth carried out his instructions in Damascus on the 20th February, in an interview with the Syrian President.

22 On the following day, after I had again seen the Syrian President and [illegible] They appear to have reviewed the whole situation and General Beynet decided to go to Paris in order to discuss matters with the French Government and prepare [illegible] the draft [illegible] by the "Convention Universitaire" which had given so much offence to the States Governments last year

23 [illegible] His Majesty's [illegible] to press the [illegible] forwarding them promptly and in as moderate a form as possible Similar representations were made to the French authorities here. General Beynet left for Paris on the 9th March, and at the time of writing has not yet returned. The Syrian Government have constantly complained of the long delay and maintain that the French are trying to spin things out. Meanwhile the "Convention [illegible] points in it which the Syrians will not accept, but arrangements have been made for the draft to be discussed by a Franco-Syrian committee. General Beynet is expected to bring back with him particulars for Consular and Establishment Conventions, but there is as yet no detailed information as to French proposals with regard to the really important and difficult questions, namely, the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales to the [illegible] of France in the Levant States. The French Government appear not only to attach great importance to a satisfactory convention on cultural matters, but also to desire precedence for their representative here over all other diplomatic representatives and a military and air base

24 The declarations of war by Egypt and Turkey and the Turkish Prime Minister's announcement of the decisions of the Yalta Conference caused both

Syria and the Lebanon to decide to declare war at all costs before the 1st March. Both Governments were warned on instructions from you that their names were not on the list of States agreed at Yalta, and that their entry into the war did not mean that they would be invited to the San Francisco Conference. Nevertheless, both decided to go ahead. Having declared war they put forward through the Egyptian Minister at Washington applications to join the United Nations and also asked to be invited to the Conference. Their case was strongly taken up by the other Arab States and by a group of British Members of Parliament. The French indicated to His Majesty's Government that they saw "danger" in their being invited, presumably because they thought the States would raise at San Francisco the question of their relations with France. The United States Government, however, felt that they should come and China and the Soviet Union, on being approached, agreed. It was not, however, desired to invite them without French concurrence in view of the delicacy of their relations with France, and the fact that attempts were still being made to induce France to become an inviting Power We, therefore, in agreement with the Americans, suggested to the French that they might improve their relations with the States if they took the initiative in asking for an invitation for them. Meanwhile the French authorities here, having been approached by the States' Governments, supported their candidature in Paris On the 22nd March, M Bidault announced publicly that France would welcome their presence, and the decision was taken to invite them after they had been accepted as United Nations. For a time, we had appeared to be the main [illegible] the French had had a golden opportunity to exploit the position in favour of [illegible] States towards France, but the States certainly seized upon it as further evidence of French acceptance of their full independence

25 During March inter-Arab relations were much to the forefront as a consequence of the pan-Arab Conferences in Cairo, which resulted in the signature [illegible] in Cairo has reported so fully on the Conference that I need only mention it briefly here. From the beginning, the old rivalry between Egypt and Iraq for leadership of the Arab League became evident The Hashemites and Nuri Pasha, as initiators of the Arab movement, were piqued at being ousted by Egypt, a newcomer, Ibn Saud naturally aligned himself with Egypt the Lebanon, fearful of [illegible] and Syria gradually evolved in the same direction because of her rulers' desire to preserve the Republican régime, and of their fears of Hashemite designs [illegible] although inexperienced played a considerable rôle, succeeded in securing the [illegible] disputes between any two, and the insertion of a clause allowing any State to secede from the League on a year's notice. The clause in the Alexandria Protocol providing that no State could make a treaty with an outside Power against the interests of the other signatories was also deleted. The resulting League was therefore more loose in form than enthusiasts desired, and has disappointed the Moslems in both Syria and the Lebanon, although the extreme Christians are appeased. In his telegram No. 60 Saving of the 23rd March Lord Killearn stated: "At present it may be said that the only aims on which all these States are united are those of getting rid of the French from Syria, and of preventing the Zionist domination of Palestine. Whatever discords may weaken the Arab League in the immediate future, we must count on its being united on these two issues."

26 After the Conference, a tri-partite treaty between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria was suggested, but we discouraged it as tending to disrupt the League at its inception The Syrian President went to Bagdad on the 10th March [illegible] the Iraqis were angry after what they considered they had done for Syria in the past, that he should have been to King Ibn Saud first, and treated him with marked coldness.

27 Meanwhile the internal situation in Syria had worsened since the easing of tension with the French. The Syrian President had taken the unprecedented step of addressing the Chamber of Deputies in person on the occasion of Syria's declaration of war. In his speech he also referred to the project for a Greater Syria, to the need for obedience to the Head of State, and to relations with the French. His statement that if there were to be a Greater Syria, it must be a republic with its capital at Damascus—made, no doubt, because of the widespread feeling in Syria in favour of a monarchy which there was every

evidence that the Hashemites were seeking to exploit—gave much offence and was seized upon by the Government's opponents, who pointed out that it was for the people, and not for the President, to choose the type of régime they preferred, and that Arab confederation was no substitute for Arab union. His statement about obedience was criticised as undemocratic but his conciliatory references to the French were of all his remarks the most unpopular. A shower of anti-Government pamphlets was distributed on the principal Syrian towns, and various demonstrations, ostensibly anti-Zionist but actually an[illegible]

28. In April it became clear that the Syrian Government were at their last legs, and on the 7th April a new Cabinet was formed. The Prime Minister, Fares el Khoury, retained his position as did the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jamil Mardam Bey, and the new Cabinet received an almost unanimous vote of confidence in the Chamber, largely because it was considered advisable to make a show of solidarity on the eve of the departure of the Syrian delegation to San Francisco.

29. In the Lebanon the President returned to Beirut early in April from Palestine, where he had been receiving treatment during his long illness. He appeared to be in reasonably good health, but the Prime Minister complained to me that he had difficulty in inducing him to take decisions. The Government have gained more popularity by energetic action in the economic field, notably by implementing, as their predecessors had failed to do, the plans for controlling [illegible] While the Riad es Solh group are obviously animated solely by the desire to return to power, the effect [illegible] a nationalistic line; and Riad es Solh's aim is probably to seize any weakness [illegible] in this respect to return to power on a wave of nationalist and anti-[illegible] feeling. A hardening of public opinion in this sense has been perceptible [illegible] Bey, on his return from Paris, makes proposals for an eventual settlement which the Lebanese regard as incompatible with their national sovereignty.

30. Long as it is, this despatch is by no means a complete record of the period under review. For instance, I have not touched upon the States' relations with Turkey or with the Soviet Union. As regards the latter I have at present little or nothing to add to my despatch No. 37 of the 5th March. Nor have I considered here financial and economic matters; these however are [illegible] covered in my despatch No. 63 of the 19th April, concerning the [illegible] of the States. The present despatch is primarily intended as a review of events affecting the relations between the Levant States and France and as a background against which to set the conclusions drawn in my telegram from Damascus No. 83 of the 27th April.

31. In conclusion, I wish to pay my tribute to the General Officer Commanding, Ninth Army. I had the [illegible] Lieutenant-General Sir George Helmes when he was General Officer Commanding British Troops in Egypt and when I was appointed to this post I was indeed glad that it was [illegible] that I should be working again. His great knowledge of these countries, the universal esteem in which he is held here, and his personal influence with the Governments of both States have enabled him to render signal service to His Majesty's Government, while from my personal point of view the wise counsel which he has given to me in many problems, has been inval[illegible]

32. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Resident Minister, Cairo, His Majesty's Ambassador, Cairo, His Majesty's Ambassador, Baghdad, the High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, and His Majesty's Minister, Jedda.

I have &c.

TERENCE SHONE

E 3167/6 89] No. 23

Mr. Eden to Mr. Duff Cooper (Paris)

(No. 810)

Sir, *Foreign Office*, 18th May, 1945

M. MASSIGLI asked to see me this morning, when he showed considerable anxiety about R[illegible] He said that he had gathered from telegrams that he had seen that M. Bidault had shown anxiety for still closer relations with us. Was this correct?

2. I was not enthusiastic, but I contented myself with saying that in certain respects Anglo-French co-operation had certainly improved at San Francisco. On the other hand, I continued, there were directions in which French policy was causing me deep anxiety. This applied in particular to the Levant States. I had only just recei[illegible] telegrams. None the less, it was already clear that the French Government was pursuing a most dangerous policy. We had done our utmost in recent months to [illegible] M. Massigli acknowledged [illegible] Yet the French were now deliberately raising that temperature again. The first cruiser which had been sent in with reinforcements had brought a like number of troops away, but now I understood that a fresh ship had arrived with more reinforcements. It was difficult to judge the local situation, but it seemed quite possible [illegible] If so, it would be felt not only by the French but by ourselves, and we felt it a very poor return for all our efforts that the French Government should be pursuing such methods. I asked M. Massigli when he went to Paris to do all he could to restrain French policy, which, if pursued, might have most serious consequences for both our nations in the Middle East.

3. M. Massigli, who was clearly uneasy at the situation, said that he would certainly do what he could in Paris. He mentioned that he thought that the Russian attitude in the Syrian States was not helpful.

I am &c.

ANTHONY EDEN

E 3204/6 89. No. 24

Mr. Geoffrey Smith to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th May.)

(No. 238 Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) *Jedda*, 19th May, 1945

IBN SAUD has sent me the text of telegram which he proposes to send to General de Gaulle about the situation in the Levant States.

2. The King refers to his own advice to the Levant States to strive for good relations with France, and appeals to de Gaulle to accept the fact and implications of Arab States' [illegible] This war has been fought by France and her Allies for unshaken ideals which the Levant States now seem to see realised, and France in parts that, having tasted the bitterness of a foreign occupation, will appreciate the States' longing for freedom.

3. Message is dignified and not provocative. I have not considered it advisable to attempt to prevent its despatch [illegible] I have suggested a minimal opening reference to message of friendship recently sent by de Gaulle [group undecypherable: I to] the King. This may check the otherwise inevitable lasting repercussion that we have prompted the King's *demarche*. The text will be sent you by bag.

4. The King was certainly [illegible] not approve Emir Faisal's impending official visit to Paris unless events take a favourable turn.

(Repeated to Beirut.)

[E 3596 979 89] (2)

Mr Jordan to Mr Eden.—(Received 1st June.)

(No. 89.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, with reference to Jedda telegram No. 238 of the 18th May to the Foreign Office, has the honour to transmit to him the text of the proposed telegram from King Ibn Saud to General de Gaulle regarding the situation in the Levant States.

British Legation,
Jedda, 18th May, 1945.

Enclosure in (2)

(Translation.)

To his Excellency General de Gaulle, President of the French Government, Paris.

In view of the incidents which have occurred in the last few days the traditional firm friendship between the Arabs and France prompts me to reveal to your Excellency how great my anxiety and concern is to maintain this precious friendship, which I have no doubt your Excellency shares with me, so that we may both manifest it clearly to all the world and thereby dispel doubts and anxieties from men's hearts.

I have latterly sent messages to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments asking them to strive to reach a satisfactory understanding with France and to maintain friendly relations with her as we did during the dark days of the war.

In the meantime I am sending your Excellency this letter trusting that you will view with sympathy and [illegible] spirit of equity the situation of Syria and the Lebanon [illegible] save their freedom and independence, which is the natural right of [illegible] d for which France and the Allies have fought and [illegible] of the war.

France, which has tasted the bitterness of occupation and its tragedies during [illegible] Syria and Lebanese brothers.

All Arab peoples, who consider Syria and the Lebanon as part of themselves, watch closely and with anxious hearts what developments the fates will bring about. As a friend, I wish the friendship between the Arabs and France to continue as I have already said above, and, your Excellency, I wish all Arab nations to have confidence in the adherence of the Arabs to this friendship by France's sympathy for Syria and the [illegible] existing between you and these States which leaves no loop-hole for dissension. Thereby we may be grateful to you for the hopes which we have placed in France and thank your Excellency [illegible] new spirit which prevails among the Arabs. Thus our minds may be at rest.

I have pleasure in conveying to your Excellency on this occasion my best greetings and sincere good wishes.

ABDUL AZIZ

E 3197 68 89] No. 25

(1)

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th May.)

(No. 367.)
(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, 18th May, 1945.

LEBANESE Minister for Foreign Affairs, who visited Damascus yesterday and returned to-day, has given member of my staff the following account of what happened there during his visit:—

2. He was [? group omitted] informed by Syrians on arrival that General Beynet had asked for an interview with him to-day to present his proposals. Minister for Foreign Affairs had understood that Syrians felt as

he did that, in view of the arrival of the cruiser and reinforcements, the two Governments should refuse to receive proposals. He found, however, that Syrians now favoured hearing them and he therefore agreed in order to keep the common front. He attended meeting between General Beynet and Syrians this morning.

3. At this meeting Minister for Foreign Affairs described to General Beynet moderation which his Government had shown in face of repeated French provocation culminating in the arrival of troops in Montcalm. They had fully demonstrated their willingness to be reasonable and to negotiate settlement. Now, however, despite their note regarding the right of foreign troops to enter Lebanese territory, more troops had arrived in *Jeanne d'Arc*. General Beynet repeated the story of another British division having entered Lebanon. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that no such move had been reported to him since he had issued note in question and that British authorities whom he had specifically asked about it had categorically denied it. General Beynet attempted to argue the point, but Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that he regarded it as settled.

4. [illegible] notes containing French proposals. Main points of text are as follows:

(*a*) After recalling how France was responsible for independence of the States by her 1941 declaration, note states French Government without [group undecypherable] to this independence, wished to safeguard legitimate French interests in the Levant States.

(*b*) These interests are cultural, economic and strategical.

(*c*) French Government propose that cultural interests shall be safeguarded by a university convention, economic interests by agreements on the lines [group undecypherable: ? of] the international procedure *e.g.*, establishments and consular conventions and commercial agreement, strategical interests by basis which will guarantee lines of communication between France and her Far Eastern possessions.

(*d*) [illegible] French Government [illegible] Troops [illegible] States with [illegible] Mandatory [illegible] transitories do not allow for exercise of authority [illegible]

5. Notes contained no reference to immediate transfer of a brigade of Troupes Spéciales, which General Beynet has not so far mentioned.

6. Minister for Foreign Affairs stated no discussion took place on these notes, but it would appear that he and Mardam may have indicated to General Beynet that, in view of arrival of reinforcements, they would not negotiate. Mardam is, I understand, seeing General Beynet again.

7. Questioned as to what the two Governments now intend to do, Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that they were in process of drafting notes to the French. These will [illegible] the effect that the Lebanese [illegible] to negotiate under threat and that, in any case, French proposals are unacceptable. Copies of these notes will be sent to the Allied Powers. A meeting between the two Presidents, which will be attended by the Lebanese Prime Minister and the two Ministers for Foreign Affairs, will take place to-morrow. The Presidents will probably address telegrams of protest to the heads of all Allied States. The two Governments are asking that Arab League Council shall be summoned in June to discuss Lebanese and Syrian questions. Statements will be made in both Chambers in the next three or four days. Minister for Foreign Affairs had suggested three-day strikes of protest in towns of both States, but Syrians had declined on the grounds that they would not guarantee to control them. He agreed a complete deadlock would now ensue, but said it was quite impossible for the States even to consider these proposals under menace of the French reinforcements. Had it not been for these, he himself might have been prepared to present counter-proposals.

8. Ninth Army have just been officially informed by French military authorities that a further ship with reinforcements is expected in the next few days. Two senior French officers have said they appreciate efforts made by myself and my staff to keep things calm, but that the position here is ugly and that despatch of troops now is most inopportune.

[E 3643/8/89] (2)

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd June.)

(No. 81.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Beirut presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, with reference to Beirut telegram No. 367 of the 18th May, has the honour to transmit to him a copy of an aide-mémoire from the French delegate dated the 18th May concerning the protection of French interests in the Levant States.

British Legation, Beirut,
21st May, 1945.

Enclosure in (2)

Aide-mémoire.

LE premier geste des autorités de la France Libre lorsqu'elles arrivèrent au Levant en 1941 fut de proclamer l'indépendance de la Syrie et du Liban. C'est par suite de ce geste que cette indépendance est maintenant acquise. La France se félicite que l'initiative prise par elle est heureusement aboutie. Elle souhaite que les Gouvernements syrien et libanais exercent leur pleine autorité sans entrave ni obstacle d'aucune sorte.

C'est dans cet esprit et sans qu'aucune réserve soit apportée à l'indépendance de la Syrie et du Liban que le Gouvernement français désire assurer, en ce qui le concerne, la défense des intérêts essentiels que la France conserve en Syrie et au Liban. Ces intérêts sont de trois ordres : culturel, économique et stratégique.

Les positions culturelles intéressant la Syrie et la France seraient définies et garanties par une convention universitaire.

Les positions économiques respectives seraient définies et garanties par les accords divers que prévoit en pareille matière la procédure internationale habituelle (convention d'établissement, convention consulaire, accord commercial, etc.).

Quant aux positions stratégiques, elles consisteraient en bases permettant de garantir les voies de communication de la France et de ses possessions [illegible].

[illegible]

Le 18 mai 1945.

[E 3205/8/89] No. 26

(1)

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 20th May.)

(No. 369.)

(Telegraphic.) *Beirut, 19th May, 1945.*

MY telegram No. 367.

[illegible]

2. [illegible] May that they [illegible] no longer allow foreign forces to enter or pass through their territory without previous consent, must protest against the disembarkation of French troops on the 17th May without such consent. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking in the name of the Lebanese and Syrian Governments, had notified General Beynet that, in the event of the arrival of fresh French troops without consent, the two Governments must take such measures as the circumstances demanded. General Beynet has promised to inform his Government and communicate their reply. No reply has come and fresh troops had arrived. Hostilities in Europe having ended, there was no justification for the arrival of these troops, which in the circumstances constituted not only an infringement of Lebanese independence and sovereignty [illegible] pressure at the moment when negotiations were envisaged. Before this protest had been received by the French, the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs was given by General Beynet an aide-mémoire indicating the basis of future negotiations and expressing the hope that both Governments should exercise their authority without reserve of any sort. The arrival of French troops against the wish of the Lebanese Government was contrary to this indispensable condition and evidently constituted a threat.

In these circumstances the Lebanese Government could not negotiate under threat of armed force and, while deploring what might occur, could only disclaim responsibility. The French memorandum showed a spirit incompatible with the independence and sovereignty of the Lebanon. The Lebanese Government renewed its solemn protests and reserved its attitude completely.

See my immediately following telegram.

[E 3205/8/89] (2)

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th May.)

(No. 370.)

(Telegraphic.) *Beirut, 19th May, 1945.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Lebanese covering note to me emphasises restraint shown by the Lebanese authorities, especially during victory celebrations, on which I myself had commended the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and contrasts this with French acts of provocation. It reaffirms that entry or transit of foreign troops should only take place with Lebanese consent, and states that the present arrival of French troops constitutes a grave menace to [group undecypherable] negotiations which the Lebanese Government has envisaged. Only after the arrival of further French troops on the 17th May had General Beynet given any indication of French *desiderata*, which [group undecypherable ? took] no account of Lebanese independence, or of engagements concerning it or of the international position of the Lebanese, but which subordinated Lebanese independence to gratify French *desiderata*. The Lebanese Government is sure that its point of view will be shared by His Majesty's Government and that "it can expect, if necessary, the most effective aid from His Majesty's Government."

[E 3206/8/89] (3)

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 20th May.)

(No. 377.)

(Telegraphic.) *Beirut, 19th May, 1945.*

AFTER returning from meeting the two Presidents yesterday, Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs summoned me and handed me copy of his note of protest to the French and covering letter to me. Aforesaid as reported in my telegrams Nos. 369 and 370. Minister for Foreign Affairs is making similar, though not identical, communication to my United States colleague this morning most probably, as reported in my telegram No. 371. I understand that he has already made communication to my Soviet colleague. Syrian Government are taking similar action, but I have not yet received their communication.

2. Syrian President, after returning from the meeting, was taken seriously ill, apparently with recrudescence of the trouble from which he nearly died last year. British military doctor, at the request of the Syrian Government, has been sent urgently to Damascus with the necessary apparatus for blood transfusion.

3. It may well be that news of the presentation of the notes of protest and of President's illness may have at least temporary calming effect on Syrians. Lebanese Government are confident that they for their part can prevent disorders in Lebanon. To-day Beirut and Damascus are still closed. Demonstrations are continuing in the latter, but are so far orderly.

[E 3644/12/89] (4)

Mr Shone to Mr Eden.—(Received 2nd June.)

(No. 82.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Beirut presents his compliments to the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, with reference to Beirut telegrams to the Foreign Office Nos. 369 and 370 of the 19th May and No. 377 of the 20th May, has the honour to transmit to him (1) a copy of a note, No. 436, from the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Minister dated the 19th May, 1945, and (2) a copy of a note, No. 433, from the Lebanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs to French dated the 19th May, 1945, concerning the protest against the arrival of French reinforcements in the Levant States.

British Legation, Beirut
21st May, 1945.

Enclosure 1 in (4)

M. Henri Pharaon to Mr. Shone

(No. 436.)

M. le Ministre, *Beyrouth, le 19 mai 1945.*

J'AI l'honneur de me référer à la note de ce Ministère en date du 5 mai dernier qui a été transmise à votre Excellence sous le No. 385 et de vous prier de vouloir bien trouver sous ce pli le texte d'une note que j'ai remise à la Délégation Générale à la date du 19 mai 1945.

Ainsi que votre Excellence voudra bien s'en rendre compte, le Gouvernement Libanais y définit sa position sur le plan des rapports libano-français à la suite de l'introduction répétée sur le territoire libanais de forces armées françaises et notamment du débarquement à Beyrouth de nouvelles troupes françaises arrivées sur un navire de guerre le 17 mai 1945.

Le Gouvernement, pleinement conscient de ses responsabilités, a déployé les plus grands efforts en vue de maintenir le calme au cours des déplorables événements de ces derniers jours et, d'une manière plus générale, au cours des mois écoulés pour créer un climat favorable à des conversations avec les autorités françaises.

[illegible] entretiens votre Excellence elle même a bien voulu porter sur l'action pondérée et sage des autorités libanaises.

Le Gouvernement regrette de constater qu'à la bonne volonté constamment manifestée de sa part, aucune disposition correspondante n'a répondu du côté français, et que bien plus on a pu observer récemment une recrudescence [illegible] la population auraient pu être extrêmement fâcheuses, si le Gouvernement, [illegible] avait répondu par des mesures appropriées d'apaisement à l'opinion publique.

[illegible] son territoire de troupes étrangères sans son consentement préalable et exprès. Il considère plus particulièrement que l'arrivée de troupes françaises dans les circonstances actuelles constitue une grave menace pour la liberté des négociations amicales qu'il envisageait d'ouvrir avec les autorités françaises en vue d'une solution des litiges en souffrance entre le Liban et la France.

Cette inquiétante considération trouve, au demeurant, dans la succession des faits tels qu'ils se sont produits depuis le retour du Général Beynet au Liban, le plus solide des fondements.

En effet, rentrant de France, où il avait pris contact avec son Gouvernement, le Général Beynet m'avait rendu à l'occasion de son retour une visite au cours de laquelle il ne m'avait fourni aucune indication sur les grandes lignes éventuelles d'un règlement des problèmes pendants.

Ce n'est qu'après le nouveau débarquement des troupes françaises intervenu [illegible] Gouvernement Libanais les conceptions françaises à cet égard, conceptions, je tu empresse de le dire, qui ne tiennent aucun compte de l'indépendance du Liban, [illegible] internationale du Liban, mais qui subordonnent au contraire l'indépendance du Liban à la satisfaction des désirs français.

Le Gouvernement Libanais en conclut logiquement que, loin d'être nécessité par des [illegible] Liban est manifestement destiné à exercer sur lui une pression.

[illegible] britanniques et qu'il puisse attendre en l'occurrence l'aide la plus efficace du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté.

Veuillez agréer, *&c.*
HENRI PHARAON.

Enclosure 2 in (4)

Note remise à la Délégation Générale le 19 mai 1945.

(No. 433.)

[illegible]

Bien plus, sans tenir compte de l'effet regrettable produit par les [illegible] visés, le Gouvernement Libanais était encore disposé à entrer en négociations avec les autorités françaises.

Il doit réaffirmer aujourd'hui la position qu'il a déjà prise en ce qui [illegible] l'introduction de troupes étrangères sur son territoire et préciser, une fois de plus, qu'il tient pour hautement inopportune l'arrivée de nouveaux effectifs militaires au Liban.

Le Gouvernement Libanais a clairement fait connaître le 3 mai qu'il ne pourrait pas admettre à l'avenir que des forces étrangères entrent ou passent sur [illegible] Il leva en conséquence une vive protestation contre le débarquement à Beyrouth de troupes françaises arrivées le 17 mai 1945 [illegible] qui y [illegible] probablement consenti, alors que cependant, en remettant à son Excellence le Comte Ostrorog la note du 5 mai 1945, et ultérieurement au cours de l'entretien qu'il a eu avec son Excellence le Général Beynet le 14 mai suivant, le Ministère des Affaires étrangères avait bien précisé à nouveau de vive voix aux représentants de la France le point de vue du Gouvernement Libanais en la matière.

Parlant au nom du Gouvernement Libanais et au nom du Gouvernement Syrien, son Excellence M. Henri Pharaon avait ajouté que, dans le cas où de nouvelles troupes françaises seraient amenées au Liban et en Syrie sans le consentement des Gouvernements intéressés, le Gouvernement Libanais et le Gouvernement Syrien prendraient telles mesures que dicteraient les circonstances.

Son Excellence le Général Beynet avait promis de saisir son Gouvernement de ce point de vue et de faire connaître sa réponse.

Aucune réponse n'a été fournie et de nouvelles troupes sont arrivées.

Le Gouvernement Libanais souligne que, la guerre en Europe ayant pris fin, [illegible] ne justifie l'arrivée de nouvelles troupes françaises au Liban. Il estime au contraire que l'arrivée de ces troupes, dans les circonstances [illegible] bien, constitue non seulement une atteinte à son indépendance et à sa souveraineté, mais encore une pression inadmissible à l'heure où sont envisagées des négociations entre le Liban et la France.

Avant que cette protestation n'ait été remise au représentant de la France [illegible] M. Henri Pharaon [illegible] Gouvernement Syrien, a été saisi au cours d'une réunion au Ministère des Affaires

étrangères de Syrie le 18 mai 1945, réunion à laquelle il prenait part avec le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Syrie et le représentant de la France, par son Excellence le Général Beynet d'un aide-mémoire du Gouvernement Français indiquant les grandes lignes des négociations éventuelles. Ce document comporte [illegible] sans entrave ni obstacle d'aucune sorte

Il est manifeste que cette condition indispensable ne saurait s'accorder avec les [illegible] l'accord du Gouvernement Libanais et contre sa volonté a très évidemment le caractère d'une contrainte et d'une menace

Dans ces conditions le Gouvernement Libanais déclare qu'il n'est pas en [illegible] ne peut que dégager entièrement sa responsabilité.

Il doit ajouter que l'aide-mémoire tel qu'il se présente révèle un état d'esprit et des propositions incompatibles avec l'indépendance et la souveraineté du Liban

Le Gouvernement Libanais fait à ce sujet, en renouvelant sa protestation solennelle, les plus expresses réserves

Beyrouth, le 19 mai 1945

[E 3645/12/89] (5)

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd June.)

(No. 84.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Beirut presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, with reference to Beirut telegram No. 377 of the 20th May, 1945, has the honour to transmit to him a copy of a letter from the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning the arrival of French troops in the Levant

British Legation, Beirut, 22nd May, 1945.

Enclosure in (5)

Jamil Mardam Bey to Mr. Shone

M. le Ministre, *Damas, le* 20 mai 1945

J'AI l'honneur de faire parvenir sous ce pli à votre Excellence copie d'une note que j'ai adressée au Général Beynet à la suite du dernier débarquement de troupes françaises arrivées à Beyrouth le 17 mai 1945, sur un navire de guerre, et en réponse à un aide-mémoire remis par lui au Gouvernement Syrien

Le Gouvernement Syrien croit devoir à cette occasion réaffirmer la position qu'il a prise en ce qui concerne les troupes étrangères dont il ne saurait admettre l'entrée ou le passage sur son territoire sans son consentement préalable et exprès. En ce qui concerne les troupes françaises en particulier, il estime que leur arrivée au Liban et en Syrie constitue une grave menace pour la liberté des négociations envisagées pour le règlement des problèmes en suspens entre la Syrie et la France

Le Gouvernement Syrien voudrait signaler que pleinement conscient de ses responsabilités [illegible] au cours des déplorables événements de ces derniers jours et d'une manière générale, au cours des mois écoulés pour créer un climat favorable à des conversations avec les autorités françaises

Il regrette de constater qu'à la bonne volonté constamment manifestée de sa part [illegible] bien plus on a pu observer récemment une recrudescence d'incidents à caractère provocatoire dont les conséquences sur l'état d'esprit de la population auraient pu être extrêmement fâcheuses, si le Gouvernement, soucieux de ses devoirs et de sa dignité, n'y avait remédié par des mesures appropriées d'apaisement à l'opinion publique.

L'inquiétude suscitée par le débarquement des troupes françaises trouve au demeurant, dans la succession des faits, tels qu'ils se sont produits depuis le retour du Général Beynet, les plus solides des fondements.

Le 17 mai 1945, le Général Beynet, au cours d'un entretien qu'il a eu à 17 heures 30, au Palais de Monbajrine, avec son Excellence le Président de la République Syrienne, en présence de son Excellence M. Jamil Mardam Bey

Président du Conseil p.i., Ministre des Affaires étrangères, avait déclaré qu'il était chargé par son Excellence le Général de Gaulle d'informer le Gouvernement Syrien que la France était disposée à céder à la Syrie et au Liban les troupes dites spéciales tout en se réservant d'étudier les modalités de leur transfert. Il a [illegible] en outre que la France demanderait la concession de bases navales au Liban et aériennes en Syrie ainsi que la garantie de ses intérêts matériels et ses intérêts moraux, auxquels se rattacherait la conclusion d'une convention universitaire

Son Excellence le Président de la République et son Excellence le Président du Conseil p.i., tout en faisant remarquer que c'était pour la première fois que la France formulait de telles demandes, en ont souligné le caractère inacceptable

Le lendemain, vendredi 18 mai, à onze heures, le Général Beynet devait remettre à leurs Excellences les Ministres des Affaires étrangères de Syrie et du Liban une note relative au sujet ayant été l'objet de l'entretien.

Il leur a remis, en effet, un aide-mémoire énonçant les demandes françaises formulées la veille

Or, non seulement cet aide-mémoire subordonne le transfert des troupes spéciales à l'acceptation par la Syrie et le Liban de l'octroi des bases demandées et à la conclusion d'accords universitaires et économiques, mais il les maintient sous le haut commandement français pour une période indéterminée, dépendant des circonstances à venir

Le Gouvernement Syrien en conclut logiquement que, loin d'être nécessité [illegible] Liban et en Syrie est manifestement destiné à exercer une pression sur les deux Gouvernements.

Il s'empresse de déclarer, en outre, que les conceptions françaises exposées dans cet aide-mémoire ne tiennent aucun compte de l'indépendance de la Syrie, des reconnaissances dont cette indépendance a été l'objet et de la position internationale de la Syrie, mais elles subordonnent, au contraire, l'indépendance de la Syrie à la satisfaction des désirs français

Le Gouvernement Syrien ne doute pas que son point de vue soit parfaitement admis par les autorités britanniques et qu'il puisse attendre en l'occurrence l'aide la plus efficace du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères,
JAMIL MARDAM BEY

Note remise au Général Beynet le 20 mai 1945

Le Gouvernement Syrien [illegible] calme favorable pour régler définitivement les problèmes en suspens entre la Syrie et la France, avait été conduit à déplorer que les incidents provoqués par certains éléments militaires des forces françaises eussent singulièrement réduit la portée de ses efforts.

[illegible] en ce qui concerne l'entrée des troupes étrangères sur son territoire et préciser, une fois de plus, qu'il tient pour hautement inopportune l'arrivée de nouveaux effectifs militaires en Syrie et au Liban

Le Gouvernement Syrien a clairement fait connaître le 4 mai qu'il ne pourrait admettre à l'avenir que des forces étrangères entrent ou passent sur son territoire sans son consentement préalable et exprès. Il élève en conséquence une [illegible] arrivées le 17 mai 1945, sur un navire de guerre, sans qu'il y ait préalablement consenti, alors que cependant, en remettant à son Excellence le Comte Ostrorog la note du 6 mai 1945, le Ministre des Affaires étrangères lui avait bien précisé le point de vue du Gouvernement Syrien en la matière

Ultérieurement, parlant au nom du Gouvernement Libanais et au nom du Gouvernement Syrien, son Excellence M. Henri Pharaon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Liban, avait bien mis en relief dans le cas où de nouvelles troupes françaises seraient amenées au Liban et en Syrie sans le consentement préalable des Gouvernements intéressés, le Gouvernement Libanais et le Gouvernement Syrien prendraient telles mesures que dicteraient les circonstances

Son Excellence le Général Beynet avait promis de saisir son Gouvernement de ce point de vue et de faire connaître sa réponse. Or aucune réponse n'a été fournie et de nouvelles troupes sont arrivées.

Le 17 mai 1945 le Général Beynet, au cours de l'entretien qu'il a eu à 17 heures 30 au Palais de Moukhajrine, avec son Excellence le Président de la République Syrienne, en présence de son Excellence M. Jamil Mardam Bey Président du Conseil p.i., Ministre des Affaires étrangères, avait déclaré qu'il était chargé par son Excellence le Général de Gaulle d'informer le Gouvernement Syrien que la France était disposée à céder à la Syrie et au Liban les troupes dites spéciales tout en se réservant d'étudier les modalités adéquates de leur transfert.

Il a déclaré qu'en outre, la France demanderait la concession de bases navales au Liban et aériennes en Syrie ainsi que la garantie de ses intérêts matériels et moraux auxquels se rattacherait la conclusion d'une convention universitaire.

Son Excellence le Président de la République et son Excellence le Président du Conseil p.i., tout en faisant remarquer que c'était pour la première fois que la France formulait de telles demandes, en ont souligné le caractère inacceptable.

Il fut convenu qu'à l'issue de l'entretien son Excellence le Général Beynet, muni d'une note écrite sur le sujet ayant été l'objet de l'entretien, se rendrait le lendemain, vendredi 18, à 11 heures au Ministère, où son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires étrangères le recevrait en présence de son Excellence M. Henri Pharaon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Liban.

Le lendemain, son Excellence le Général Beynet, au cours de sa visite susdite, a remis à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires étrangères un aide-mémoire énonçant les demandes françaises formulées la veille.

Or, non seulement cet aide-mémoire subordonne le transfert des troupes spéciales à l'acceptation par la Syrie et le Liban de l'octroi des bases demandées et à la conclusion d'accords universitaires et économiques, mais il les maintient sous le haut commandement français pour une période indéterminée, dépendant des circonstances à venir.

Devant ces faits, le Gouvernement Syrien, qui pourtant avait apporté à plusieurs reprises la preuve tangible de son esprit de conciliation et de son désir réel de résoudre les problèmes en suspens entre la France et la Syrie, déclare que [illegible] l'indépendance et la souveraineté syrienne, et il ne peut donc engager sur ces bases des négociations avec la France.

Il affirme, en outre, qu'il considère l'afflux des troupes françaises en Syrie et au Liban, sans le consentement préalable des deux [illegible] constituant une atteinte flagrante à la souveraineté et à l'indépendance du pays et revêt le caractère d'une pression inadmissible.

Aussi le Gouvernement Syrien demande-t-il avec insistance que toutes les troupes étrangères soient retirées de son territoire et que ses propres forces lui soient transférées dans le plus bref délai.

No. 27

Mr. Duff Cooper to Mr. Eden. (Received 28th May.)

(No. 789.)

Telegram. *Paris, 28th May, 1945.*

WASHINGTON telegram No. 5899 to Foreign Office.

The representative of the United States Embassy today showed Mr. Stoner the text of the telegram dated 26th May from the State Department [illegible] the United States Ambassador here to take a [illegible] with the Legal Minister for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Stoner saw [illegible] the telegram [illegible] of the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States on the [illegible] at [illegible] to Syria and Lebanon. [illegible] report in the United States to that the French are using the threat of force against Levant States [illegible] of political [illegible] would give France a strategic post of [illegible] French warship was [illegible] forces in Beirut. The Levant States [illegible] United States. In support [illegible] other nations are now assessing merits for recognition [illegible] is being set up [illegible] be [illegible] conformity with the [illegible] organisation. The United States Government [illegible] the French Government to review their policy in the Levant and to seek a way to make it clear that France in her dealings with the Levant States intends to treat them as fully sovereign and independent members of comity of nations.

Note was communicated by United States Embassy to Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning without any prior consultation with this embassy. Reason given for this was that instructions contained nothing to that effect.

E 3624/3/89] No. 28

Extract from House of Commons Debates, 31st May 1945.

Syria and Lebanon (British Intervention).

Mr. Eden. I had to inform the House last night of a very serious situation which has developed in Syria, where there is fighting between Syrians and French troops, and I promised to keep the House fully informed as early as I [illegible] that there was heavy firing and shelling during the night, and that two great fires were burning in the centre of the city, about 1 mile apart but spreading. All telephone communication has been cut between Damascus and the sea coast and we are only in touch with His Majesty's Minister by wireless. An armistice was arranged with the French military authorities yesterday afternoon and British and United States civilian colonies were evacuated from Damascus. After that the centre of the city was subjected to the heaviest and most concentrated shell fire yet directed upon it. It was also bombed from the air. [Hon. Members: "Shame."] The Governor of Hama has appealed to the [illegible] may be evacuated.

The fighting has spread to other parts of Syria, notably Jebel Druse, where French officers have been taken prisoner. The President and the Government of Syria have sent an urgent appeal to His Majesty's Government reminding us that we have endorsed the promise of independence and that we have also said that the treaty negotiations with France should be conducted freely and not under duress. The greatest concern has been caused throughout the Middle East and [illegible] in that area if a vital line of communication to the Far East is not to be disturbed. Every possible effort has been made to enjoin calm on both sides and I do not think that a further appeal in this sense would have any effect. In all the circumstances, His Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that they cannot any longer stand aside, and the Prime Minister has accordingly to-day sent the following message to General de Gaulle:

> "In view of the grave situation which has arisen between your troops and the Levant State and the severe fighting which has broken out, we have, with profound regret, ordered the Commander-in-chief, Middle East, to intervene to prevent the further effusion of blood in the interests of the security of the whole Middle East which involves communications for the war against Japan.
>
> "In order to avoid a collision between British and French forces, we request you immediately to order the French troops to cease fire and to withdraw to their barracks. Once firing has ceased and order has been restored, we shall be prepared to begin tripartite discussions here in London."

I feel sure that the House will agree with me in deploring these events, and will share my hope that once order has been restored we shall be able to resume the diplomatic initiative which I mentioned last night, and to arrange a peaceful settlement which will be satisfactory to the parties concerned. We also have in mind, of course, arrangements by which the Syrian and Lebanese Governments will be associated with these discussions. We are in closest touch with all the Governments concerned, including the United States Government, but I would not wish to say more about the diplomatic arrangements which we contemplate at this stage. I feel sure the House will also share my hope that nothing shall be said at this stage which would make that diplomatic initiative more difficult.

Mr Attlee: I am sure everybody will agree in deploring these events and the [illegible] with our responsibilities but to endeavour to restore order. We all hope that negotiations may be resumed, and I would ask the Foreign Secretary—I am sure he will agree—that if we can get this settled, the sooner we can get both the French troops and our own out of Syria the better.

Mr Eden: I am much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for what he has said, and I am in entire agreement with everything that he has said. Our desire throughout has been to get a settlement of this troublesome business, and I think it is abundantly clear to all—and I am glad he has underlined it—that we desire to withdraw our troops the moment a settlement can be reached.

Mr Gallacher: I would like, if I have any influence, to use it to get the French Government—the strong Government in this situation—to ease off. It is a terrible thing that there should have been such a situation, and I hope the effort to get the French Government to ease off and to allow negotiations to take place will succeed, but I would like above everything else to impress on the Leader of the House, arising out of the letter sent by the Prime Minister—which I hope [illegible] the conflict in the form of the British forces coming into conflict with the French forces. That would be very terrible.

Mr Eden: I think the House, which has watched the events for some weeks, and especially in the last few days, will understand how immensely anxious we have been to avoid this very situation. We have not acted until our over-all responsibility was so serious that we simply had to act, or stand by and see a situation develop which would have shamed us all. I need not tell the hon. [illegible] does not result in any serious injury t[illegible] friends will do as we have asked and asked them repeatedly to do, to resolve these difficult issues, they will be welcomed in London and we shall do our utmost to make those conversations a success.

E 3862/3/891 — No. 29

Record of Conversation between the French Ambassador and Mr. Eden

THE French Ambassador called at his request on the Secretary of State this evening. His first remark was to ask why Mr. Eden had published the text of the message from the Prime Minister to General de Gaulle who, he said, had not received it at the time Mr. Eden made his statement in the House of Commons.

The Secretary of State said that he had felt that the situation [illegible] according to reports received this morning had become so bad that nothi[illegible] be left undone which might stop the fighting. He had felt that the announcement [illegible] the French troops and the Syrian population to cease the strife. General Paget would not receive his instructions before this evening and in the meantime worse things might have happened. The Secretary of State emphasised that the great thing for [illegible] French Government to do now was to say at once that they would take part in the proposed conversations in London, and it was open to them in saying this to state that they disapproved of the action taken, but that they were ready to discuss matters with His Majesty's Government and the Americans in the interests of a solution of the problem.

The Secretary of State gave to the Ambassador the text of Mr. Attlee's remarks in the House of Commons and of his reply to these and to Mr. Gallacher's intervention, calling attention to the tone of his remarks and the emphasis laid on the desire of His Majesty's Government to engage in conversations and make them a success.

In reply to a remark of the Secretary of State, M. Massigli referred to British officers (not always British by blood or nationality) who he considered were really making trouble and acting as "agents of General Spears." The Secretary of State said that if there [illegible] allegations he would be glad to know the names of the officers and the activities laid to their charge. In any case, if conversations with the French Government took place all cards should be laid on the table and all parties should state anything they had to complain of.

The Ambassador left saying that he would at once telephone the texts the Secretary of State had given him to his Government, and asked to be told as soon as any reply was received by the Prime Minister to his message to General de Gaulle.

The Secretary of State called the Ambassador's attention to his remarks in the House of Commons about the association of the Governments of Syria and the Lebanon with the Anglo-Franco-United States discussions in London. He explained that it had been essential to say this and that he contemplated that the Levant States Governments should be kept in close touch with what took place in the conversations.

R. I. CAMPBELL

Foreign Office, 31st May, 1945.

E 3648/420/89 — No. 30

Mr Duff Cooper to Mr Eden.—(Received 2nd June.)

(No. 573. Secret.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Paris telegram to the Foreign Office, No. 783, has the honour to transmit to him a copy of Note No. 518, dated 28th May, from the United States Ambassador, Paris, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, concerning Syria and [illegible]

Paris, 30th May, 1945.

Enclosure in No. 30

Mr. Caffery to M. Bidault

(No. 518. Secret.)

Paris, 28th May, 1945.

Excellency,

I HAVE been instructed by my Government to convey to the Government of France the deep concern which my Government feels with regard to recent developments in Syria and Lebanon.

An impression has been created in the United States and elsewhere that French representatives have been using the threat of force to obtain from Syria and Lebanon concessions of a political, cultural and military nature. It is understood [illegible] presenting to the Governments of Syria and Lebanon proposals which, if accepted, would give France special position in those countries, a French warship was landing fresh armed forces in Beirut.

Syria and Lebanon are recognised by France and the United States as independent countries. They are also members of the United Nations whose repre[illegible] discussing in San Francisco means for guaranteeing world security and for combatting aggression.

It is important, at the very time when the International Security Organisa[illegible] confidence in its future effectiveness, all nations, both great and small, refrain from any act which might give rise to a suspicion—however unjustified—that a member of the future organisation may be pursuing a policy not in uniformity with the spirit and principles which that organisation is being established to defend.

The United States places a great value upon the historic friendship which since its founding, has bound it to France. It considers that France and the United States, which share the inheritance of common democratic past, have a particular responsibility for the vitality and influence of the democratic tradition, and that the extent to which that tradition will continue to influence the course of history depends upon the manner in which the great nations which are [illegible] their power and upon their willingness to co-operate with one another.

The Government of the United States, therefore, in a most friendly spirit earnestly urges the Government of France carefully to review its policy towards Syria and Lebanon with the purpose of finding a way to make it clear to those [illegible] world that in its dealings with the Levant States, France [illegible] is fully sovereign and independent members of the family of nations.

I [illegible]
THOMAS JEFFERSON [illegible]

E 3681 6 89 No. 31

The Soviet Ambassador to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd June.)

M. le Ministre, *1st June, 1945*

On the instructions of the Soviet Government I have the honour to convey to you the following:—

According to information received, fighting is at present taking place on the territory of Syria and the Lebanon, and the French troops have come into conflict with the Syrians and Lebanese, firing with artillery and mortars on Damascus, the capital of Syria. Damascus is being bombed from the air. Armed conflicts are [illegible] that the three States in question—France, Syria and the Lebanon—are members of the United Nations, and are participating in the conference now in session at San Francisco.

The Soviet Government considers that the events in Syria and the Lebanon are not in accordance with the spirit of the decisions taken at Dumbarton Oaks or with the aims of the Conference of the United Nations now in session at San Francisco for the purpose of [illegible] peace and the security of the peoples. The Soviet Government therefore considers that urgent measures should be taken to bring the fighting in Syria and the Lebanon to a conclusion and to settle by peaceful means the conflict which has arisen.

The Soviet Government has [illegible] the Provisional Government of the French Republic with this proposal [illegible] the Governments of Great Britain, the United States and China [illegible] founding the post war organisation of peace and international security.

I am, &c.
F. T. GOUSEV

E 3686 6 89 No. 32

Mr. Duff Cooper to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd June.)

(No. 814.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, 2nd June, 1945*

MORNING papers the 2nd June publish following communiqué issued by Presidency of Council:—

[Begins.]

Since the 8th May French troops of certain Syrian garrisons, in particular Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Damascus, as well as several French military and civilian establishments, have been sporadically attacked by armed bands, at head of which were often elements of local gendarmerie and police subordinate to Syrian Government.

2. These disorders began the day after General Beynet, delegate-general and plenipotentiary of France, had invited Syrian and Lebanese Governments to begin negotiations on basis of instructions which he had received from French Government. Our troops had to react and mastered situation everywhere, except in Jebel Druse territory which was only held by few locally recruited squadrons. Our losses amounted in all to about twelve killed. At Damascus it was necessary to use artillery.

3. In the desire for *détente* and [illegible] with respect of British Government alleging its apprehension that Syrian incidents would produce repercussions in other areas in the Near East, French Government at 11 p.m. on the 30th May

(some newspapers give earlier official version, namely, the 31st May) ordered [illegible]

4. Aim of French Government was to create, if possible, atmosphere more favourable for conversations with American and British Governments and eventually, with Governments of various Arab States, covering whole of situation in Near East, and of which, moreover, Soviet Government should at least be informed.

5. On the 31st May at 4·30 p.m. Mr. Holman, counsellor of British Embassy, brought to Presidency of Government text of message addressed by Mr. Churchill to General de Gaulle, which had been read at 3·45 by Mr. Eden in House of Commons.

6. As this telegram, drafted in tone and form that it was, had been thus published, it could only involve public reply, which President of Provisional Government of Republic has judged it preferable not to address to British Prime Minister.

7. Orders given to French troops by French Government are to cease fire and hold their position. [Ends.]

8. Press states that Council of Ministers yesterday heard report from Bidault about international situation and Syrian incidents. Government approved instructions given to Beynet with view to avoiding any pretext for new agitation, while holding positions occupied by French troops. Minister of War was requested [illegible] ment adds that official circles state that to judge by most recent reports incidents of last few days have been seriously exaggerated. Further, according to latest reports of delegate general, situation in Levant is evolving towards return to calm. Government took note of artificial character of agitation.

9. Press states that de Gaulle will give press conference at 3·30 p.m. this afternoon, at which he will define position of French Government as regards Syria [illegible] This evening, at hour not yet fixed, he will broadcast [illegible] discussed Levant situation yesterday.

There was evidently considerable criticism of Government. Committee have asked to be received by de Gaulle before his press conference.

No. 33

Mr. Duff Cooper to Mr. Eden.—(Received 3rd June.)

(No. 823.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, 3rd June, 1945*

My telegram No. 814.

Following is summary of General de Gaulle's press conference on Levant situation on 2nd June:—

After referring to the long history of the Syrian problem, the Sykes Picot agreement and the settlement after the last war, he said that difficulties had arisen since France and Britain were established side by side in the Near East. France's aim had never changed, namely, to lead Syria and Lebanon to independence and the greatest possible economic development. The task was complicated both by the political and geographical structure of the Levant States and by the British attitude. The British had often said, and perhaps believed, that they wished to leave France to act in the Levant as she thought best, but unfortunately they had not always done so. He would not describe all the incidents resulting from this attitude, but only those which had arisen and grown more serious since the temporary misfortunes of France immeasurably increased opportunities for British encroachments. In 1941 Free France took the initiative to enter Syria, leading Britain with her. To avoid difficulties which he foresaw he signed the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement. He then summarised agreement, adding that France at the same time proclaimed the independence of Syria and Lebanon and declared herself ready to negotiate with them the practical conditions of enjoyment of this independence.

2. In spite of difficulties, all the attributes of independence had been given successfully to the Levant States. France now retained only one power given by mandate. Namely, military command over Troupes Spéciales employed precisely for the maintenance of order. Since nearly all French troops in Syria had been withdrawn to fight from Bir Hakim to France, and only 4,000 to 5,000 remained. British had retained in whole of Near and Middle East

(Orient) considerable land, sea and air forces amounting at present to 800,000 men.

3. The general continued [illegible] possession of certain bases such as British and also for the moment United States possessions in this area, with a view to preparing international strategic co-operation in this traditional area.

4. [illegible] Levant Governments, found himself informed that these proposals were not acceptable and that it consequently appeared useless to negotiate. At same time incidents began to break out everywhere from 8th May and spread to several Syrian towns, particularly Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Damascus. Armed bands, often helped by Syrian police and gendarmerie, which forces unfortunately carry arms supplied to them by British authorities, in spite of all our long standing warnings on this subject, attacked various French military and even civilian establishments. There were some killed and French troops had to react and re-establish order which except in Jebel Druse, they did everywhere, often with some difficulty as in Damascus, where certain French establishments were surrounded by crowds and gendarmes, and artillery and one aircraft had to be used to disengage them.

5. [illegible] this to renounce French rights [illegible] instructed them to cease fire, to ho[illegible] and [illegible] troops. [illegible] was carried out [illegible] 31st May.'

6. General then referred to the receipt of Prime Minister's message at 1630 hours on 31st May after your statement in the House underlining reference [illegible] as between French and British troops. He said that this message had changed and would change nothing in orders to French troops. He had thought it better not to reply to this public message. Situation was most unsatisfactory and indeed dangerous. It would be monstrous absurdity if, after ending war against Germany, bloody incidents between two Allies now occurred [illegible] withdrawal of the troops in the Levant and is keeping them on their positions pending clarification of the situation.

7. General [illegible] 'To get out of this situation which is evidently very bitter for France and for international co-operation, various solutions appear [illegible] proposal [illegible] that she is ready to negotiate but only over the whole matter and not only about the Levant States, which are only part of the whole of Arab States. As between Britain and France and as regards the Levant, the question is already settled by Lyttelton–de Gaulle agreement which it only remains to apply. Matter must be treated as a whole, *i.e.*, on the basis of whole Near and Middle East. Further, the British have always justified their action in the Levant by their interest in repercussions on other Arab States. Conversely, events in Arab States such as Palestine, Iraq or even Egypt evidently interest France and not only France. United States have made known their position by advising restoration of order and Soviet Government have just issued a communiqué indicating their interest in this region. The solution, through none of our doing, can no longer be a Franco-British one and now passes [illegible] There would then be many interested parties, great Powers, Arab States and others. Near Eastern question could then be handled in a normal and I hope [illegible] manner on the basis of international co-operation where it would have been [illegible] I do not know what will be the solution finally adopted but France is ready to negotiate with all those concerned and, if possible, in common, on the basis of international co-operation. Perhaps this will be the first sphere in which true international co-operation such as we are now trying to establish at San Francisco can at last come about."

8. After stating that neither he nor the French people felt any [illegible] towards the British nation, for whom they had the highest regard, the General continued: "There are, however, interests which are opposed to ours in a way which we cannot accept. The interests of both sides must be reconciled and their positions defined. We must put an end to 'dictate' and crises. Such is the desire of France who is doing all she can to achieve it and will continue to do so but only to the limit of her endurance."

9. The General concluded by saying that the whole French people were united behind its Government on this issue. They were equally united in the desire to see such matters settled by sincere international co-operation. Finally he said that the system of trying to settle matters without participation of those concerned could not have good results.

10. The General then replied to questions. Asked whether he proposed to refuse the invitation to negotiate in London he said that unforgettable as had been their reception there in 1940 they preferred to be invited otherwise than they had been. The invitation would then be more likely to be accepted.

11. He welcomed the Soviet Union's interest in pacific settlement of the present difficulties in the Near and Middle East.

12. Asked whether Spears' departure had meant a change in policy he replied that he could not suppose that for three years Spears had followed a policy other than that of his Government.

Asked whether French had requested the recall of other senior British officials as well as Spears, he said that any list of those whose recall was desirable would have been endless. Much friction would have been avoided if in accordance with Lyttelton–de Gaulle agreement no attempt had been made to replace French by foreign personnel.

13. Asked whether His Majesty's Government had advised against the despatch of reinforcements, he said that ever since His Majesty's Government established themselves in the Levant they had opposed increase of French forces. Certain most painful incidents had resulted. As soon as the German war ended France no longer allowed those encroachments and sent troops to area where she is responsible for order and rightly foresaw outbreak of troubles.

14. [illegible] Prime Minister's message he said that correspondents in Syria telegraphed the order immediately and it was certainly known to British Command. He repeated that the Prime Minister's message changed nothing which made its publication all the more regrettable.

15. He did not think the damage at Damascus was very great but a number of shots had been fired and he regretted there were several hundred killed and wounded. One battery and one aircraft had been used.

16. He denied that any Fascist French had contributed to the disorders. But there were certainly strong German influences in the area and on 8th May first incidents in Lebanon had consisted of a march of Palestinian troops with swastikas through the streets of Beirut.

17. The French troops in the Levant had no American lend lease material.

18. [illegible] refusal to negotiate had been concerted or suggested by other Powers, the General repeated "the Levant Governments have a horror of solitude."

19. Questioned about British suggestions that French had used excessive force, he said that like the British in Greece, the French had defended themselves and as economically as possible.

20. In conclusion he said: "I do not wish to end without saying that however painful, bitter and unjust the present situation is for us, I would like to hope that it will not have too far-reaching consequences. There are such vast common interests between all those concerned that everything which could lead to collisions should be excluded completely from relations between great States. There is peace to be made in the interests of the whole world and of our civilisation and I do not think there is on earth one man or woman who can fail to recognise that if this peace is not made well and quickly, by reciprocal concessions and in a real spirit of international solidarity, the future of the world would be disquieting. We must have peace. A new war would be the end of the world and the world wishes to live. We must have peace and you will see that we will make it."

E 4364 6 89. No 34

Conversation between Sir R. I. Campbell and the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers

THE Syrian and Lebanese Ministers called this morning at their request and handed me the attached *note verbale*. When asked whether they were acting upon instructions from their Government, I got a rather vague reply in the form "Yes, we are in agreement with our Government." Asked whether they purported to speak for the Arab League and whether this was part of any instructions they had, they replied that they were only setting out what were the known decisions of the League in the matter of the controversy between France and the Levant States (I made a point of putting this question as I would have shown unwillingness to receive a communication from them on behalf of the League in a corporate capacity. But I think they took the point.)

The ministers began their remarks by saying that there seemed to be in the last fortnight or so a campaign in the British press which they much deprecated. The object of this campaign seemed to be to convey the idea that the Arab countries were the enemies of all European countries, that the European countries should stand together to protect their position and that if it was the turn of France to be ejected now it would be the turn of Great Britain to-morrow. The ministers argued that it was not the moment to talk of Arab hostility for [illegible] in when, in contrast to the situation which had developed in the Middle [illegible] between 1918 and 1940, British prestige was particularly high. They urged that mistrust should not now be sown between the Arabs and the British when the latter's recent acts had produced confidence. The press articles to which they had referred, coupled with the remarks of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on the 14th June, would be reproduced in the Middle East and sent from country to country. There would be repercussions there which in turn, would be telegraphed back to Europe, and misunderstanding and mistrust would result. The Middle East would not understand the purport of this alleged press campaign wh[illegible] League was towards co-operation with Great Britain and a policy consonant with British policy. The articles particularly mentioned by the ministers were its last week's *Observer* and *Economist*, and in the *Whitehall Letter* of the 16th June. The ministers stated that they had noticed in the *Monde* also [illegible] of the argument that France and Great Britain should stand together [illegible] their interests *vis-à-vis* of the Arab countries. The whole line of [illegible]nt and the suggestions favouring any maintenance of the French influence [illegible] Levant States gave the impression of being based on the idea of separate treatment for the Levant States and other Arab States, and the preservation of [illegible] ation in the one and British domination in the other. They w[illegible] that this was not the policy of His Majesty's Government, but people less well informed in the Middle East would receive that impression.

The Lebanese Minister referred to the Prime Minister's remark that His Majesty's Government would support French influence in Syria, and I explained to [illegible] the significance of the words "but only in counsel." Both m[illegible] on to say that any chance of maintenance of any special French influence was excluded, but, on being pressed, expressed a readiness to have due regard for French interests.

I called attention to what might appear at first sight an inconsistency in the *note verbale*, viz., that while it was stated in the first paragraph that the Levant States were unwilling to conclude any treaty with France, in the second paragraph they spoke of establishing their relations with France on such bases of international law as ordinarily govern the relations between States. It did not seem to me that the second question excluded the conclusion of a treaty, and I regretted that the method of establishing relations with France on these bases and of regularising the position left over from the past should not be effected by a treaty which would have been not unnatural and perhaps the simplest way. The ministers said that a treaty with France alone was quite impossible after all that had happened, and that no treaty was needed for the establishment of relations on the ordinary basis of good neighbourliness such as was customary between countries without treaty relations. The Syrian Minister remarked that he had noted from the press that M. Bidault was unwilling to enter a conference of the kind that had been talked of, but wished to refer the whole matter "to San Francisco." That was all right by him (the Syrian Minister).

On the subject of the French demand for a base, they said this would not have as its object the protection of French possessions in the Far East. It could only be designed to make possible the domination of the Levant States.

After some rather dramatic remarks from the Lebanese Minister to the effect that the Levant States were not prepared to barter away their liberty in any treaty but were, on the contrary, prepared quite calmly to die for it, and after further deprecating the alleged campaign in the British press, the ministers left.

Apart from the assertion of the firm position of their Governments, the ministers' *démarche* may perhaps show a certain nervousness that the [illegible] healthy as far as it goes. At the same time, it shows that we must not suppose [illegible] of Arab opinion turning against us if we appear to that opinion to be giving to France support which it thinks derogatory to the full independence and sovereignty of the Levant States.

[illegible] the ministers' remarks [illegible] into the question of the press campaign which they alleged to exist.

A copy of the *Economist* article referred to by the minister is attached (¹).

R. I. CAMPBELL.

Foreign Office, 19th *June*, 1945.

Enclosure in No. 34

Note Verbale

THE Syrian and Lebanese Ministers, while expressing their high appreciation of the action of His Majesty's Government in the recent violent crisis in Syria, find it necessary to avoid any misunderstanding, to affirm to His Majesty's Government that the Syrian and Lebanese Government and the League of the Arab States as a whole are not willing to concede any influence to France or to conclude any treaty with her. Twenty-five years of struggle, ending in the latest crisis, have proved that a policy based upon the concession to France of any influence or the conclusion of a treaty is doomed to failure and leads only to bloodshed and disturbance of the peace.

Syria and the Lebanon are therefore determined to put an end to this tragedy and to establish their relations with France only on such bases of international law as ordinarily govern the relations between States.

(¹) Not printed.

E 4242 6 89] No. 35

Lieutenant-Colonel Forester to Mr. Eden.—(Received 18th June.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Damascus presents his compliments to the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith (1) a copy of note on interview between B.G.S., Ninth Army, Lieutenant-Colonel Jackson, American Legation, Colonel Coghill and General Humblot, on the 30th May, 1945, (2) a copy of note on interview between B.G.S., Ninth Army, Mr. Young of British Legation and Lebanese Prime Minister on the 30th May, 1945, regarding internal security in Levant States.

Damascus, 6th June, 1945.

Enclosure 1 in No. 35

AT 1350 hours on the 30th May, 1945, B.G.S., Ninth Army, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Jackson of the American Legation and Colonel Coghill of the B.S.M., interviewed General Humblot, G.O.C., F.T.L.

B.G.S. said that owing to the indiscriminate shooting by the French in Damascus it had become necessary to evacuate the British and American colonies to a place of safety. The sub area commander asked General Oliva Roget for an armistice from midday to 1400 hours for this purpose. At 1200 hours the firing died down. At 1215 hours French lorries filled with troops overran all the main

streets firing wildly and indiscriminately at everybody and everything they saw. The evacuation could not be carried out. The army commander must insist that an armistice to effect this evacuation be arranged and he called upon General Humblot to issue the necessary orders to General Oliva Roget and to see that they were obeyed.

General Humblot said that he knew nothing of this but promised to issue the necessary instructions and to give Ninth Army two hours' notice of the arranged time.

B.G.S. said further that the G.O.C., Ninth Army, wished to appeal to General Humblot as a soldier to stop the inhuman and unjustified slaughter which was going on in Damascus. French troops had been shelling and mortaring the town since daylight apart from rifle and machine-gun fire. There could be no possible [illegible] Palace Hotel had been badly damaged and two British officers inside it had been wounded, one of whom had since died. This was intolerable and it was necessary that some restraint should be put upon those who were directing it.

General Humblot said that the outbreak had been provoked by attacks by the gendarmerie on French barracks and installations and they must take the consequences of it. He complained that Ninth Army situation report had said that the outbreak was due to the French firing on some deserters. This was quite untrue and had been broadcast to many addressees.

B.G.S. said that it was Ninth Army's business to report the facts as they could see them from the different sources available. He thought that General Humblot might be comforted to know that his own statement on the situation issued at 2145 hours on the 29th May had been communicated *ad verbatim* to general headquarters. It was not for us but for the world to judge whether the massacre which was going on in Damascus could be justified by the events which preceded it. The world would know the facts as they would also know that General Humblot had been personally appealed to to stop this inhuman slaughter.

Lieutenant-Colonel Jackson said that he had instructions from the American Minister to associate himself entirely with everything that Brigadier Feere had said. The Americans were interested in the safe evacuation of their nationals and must support the demand for a proper armistice. He was also instructed to appeal to General Humblot as a soldier to give orders in the interests of humanity for some restraint on the shooting which was being carried on.

General Humblot said he would do what he could to modify the shooting, but if the Syrians attacked the French they must take the consequences.

Enclosure 2 in No. 35

AT 1215 hours, 30th May, 1945, B.G.S. Ninth Army, accompanied by Mr Young of British Legation, interviewed the [illegible] Prime Minister.

Mr Young gave a message from His Majesty's M[illegible] the Prime Minister to prevent his country breaking out into viol[illegible] He said that there was a military as well as a political aspect and so the B.G.S. had come to explain to him.

B.G.S. said he had come on behalf of the army commander to ask the Prime Minister from a military point of view to restrain any violent action for at least a few days. He gave the Prime Minister a statement of the events of the last 24 hours in Damascus without committing himself to any view as to who was responsible for starting it. He went on to say that he had absolutely no authority for giving any expectation that the Allied Powers would intervene, nevertheless, it seemed common sense that events such as those which had occurred at Damascus would have a great influence on world opinion. It would take time for world opinion to be transformed into action and he suggested that it would be in the best interests [illegible] any violence which might form a pretext for the same sort of action as the French were taking in Damascus and elsewhere.

The Prime Minister said that all his life he had been a fighter and a leader of revolutions. It was only his national duty and the advice which he believed had been tendered by the British in a friendly spirit which had kept him behind his desk for so long. He would much rather be using a rifle in the cause of Syria the blood of whose people was being shed on behalf of Lebanon as well.

B.G.S. said it was a question of time and again emphasised that neither he nor anyone else here could possibly say whether the Great Powers were going

to act or not, it would be far better for the Lebanese to hold their hand for the time being and so save unnecessary bloodshed. Moreover, should the Powers decide to intervene, which, of course, he did not promise, it would be easier for them to have one problem for them to deal with instead of two. If the French took the same action in Beirut as they had in Damascus on account of violence offered by the Lebanese there would inevitably be great bloodshed and disaster. Surely it was worth waiting two or three days to see if this could be avoided.

The Prime Minister said that, although it went against the grain and he felt a sense of shame that the Lebanese were not already fighting at the side of the Syrians, he would take notice of the army commander's views. He gave his word of honour that as far as he could prevent it there would be no immediate violence, although he did not guarantee it. There were bound to be large and peaceful demonstrations throughout the country during the next few days and it was always possible that some untoward incident might spread to a general disturbance.

B.G.S. thanked him and said that if the Prime Minister at any time wished to know the facts of what was going on Ninth Army were keeping the legation fully informed and he was sure that the legation would always pass the information on if required.

Mr Young agreed to this and also offered to send any message to the Syrian Government which the Prime Minister might like.

The Prime Minister replied that he would be grateful if the Syrian Government could be informed of his extreme sympathy in their hour of disaster and that he was only holding his hand for the time being because he had been pressed to do so by the British.

(B) Weekly Political Summaries.

E 2278 5 89] No. 36

(1)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 155, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, 20th March, 1945—(Received 9th April)

General.

The question of invitations for Syria and the Lebanon to the San Francisco Conference has continued to be the main topic of public interest. The general belief that invitations will be forthcoming has been increased by French intimations that there was no objection from their side. As the United States, U.S.S.R. and China are believed to favour the issue of invitations, public suspicion tends to centre on His Majesty's Government as the obstructing Power.

The Syrian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs left for Cairo by air on the 17th March to attend the Arab League meeting, accompanied by a number of Government officials and Deputies. The Lebanese Delegation, headed by the Prime Minister and four Deputies, left Beirut for Cairo on the 15th March.

The President of the Syrian Republic and his party returned from Bagdad on the 14th March.

Pending the return of General Beynet, there have been no further developments in the negotiations with the French.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period 8th-15th March, 1945, amount to 100 tons, a daily average of 23 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1944-45 crop up to 173,356 tons.

Last season's crops in the Jezireh and Euphrates area fell much below expectations and there is a genuine shortage of cereals in the area, the O.C.P. [illegible]

The Government have issued a communiqué explaining their motives for imposing control on the Lebanese spinning factories, and the attempts of the owners to raise opposition to the measure have come to nothing. Asseili, one of the two owners in question, has now accepted the Government's conditions, and the requisition of his mill has accordingly been lifted. Arida Brothers, the other

mill concerned, have not yet accepted and they endeavoured to stage a lock-out, which was, however, prevented. They have also enlisted the help of the Maronite Patriarch and various other Opposition elements, but the Government have stood firm. It is probable that the owners will eventually give way.

Syria—Damascus.

The position of the President and Government has undoubtedly deteriorated. The President's stock, which had been lowered by his speech on his return from Cairo (see Weekly *Summary* No. 152) fell still further when it became known that he had met with a cool, if not chilly, reception at Bagdad. Nor was he helped by his Minister of Interior's reference to him, in a declaration on the 11th March (see Weekly *Summary* No. 154, paragraph 3), as "President Zaim" (President Leader). The Minister himself seems determined to proceed on his authoritarian course. Not only did he give no satisfaction to a deputation of students who protested on the 12th March against his declaration and against the arrest of Bitar, but he arrested one of their number, Jamal Atassi, who published a pamphlet giving an account of the interview. (Atassi was later released.) Another factor which has weakened the Government's position is [illegible] nationalist elements would be prepared to [illegible] President or Government which appeared to them to savour of truckling to the French. The prospects of future Franco-Syrian [illegible]

Khaled Bey el Azm, Minister of Finance and Minister of Supply, has announced the suppression of the latter Ministry. He explained that it had not [illegible] been decided to attach its various departments to other Ministries.

Ahmed Lahham and Sabri Omari continue to exercise their functions as [illegible] General of Police and Director of the Damascus Police respectively, though it is believed that the Government have agreed to nominate the former as Director General of Defence as soon as the Army Law is passed and to appoint the latter for the time being to the vacant post of Assistant Director-General of Police.

Aleppo.

The declaration by the Minister of the Interior referred to above has roused general comment in the local press.

The suppression of the Ministry of Supply has been much welcomed.

Dr. Kiyali, Minister of [illegible] imminent resignation. One of his main anxieties is probably the severing of his lucrative connexion with the cotton mills.

Homs and Hama.

The arrest of Saib Eddin Bitar and the temporary arrest of Jamal Atassi (see above) have had a considerable reaction in Homs. The latter is reported to have been released only on the personal request of his uncle, Hashim bey Atassi.

A number of pamphlets were issued in Homs during the week including a secret plan [illegible] at the house of Fikri Atassi. The pamphlets contained a plan for [illegible] Syria to include Transjordan, Palestine and the Lebanon. There are [illegible] that the document was printed in Transjordan.

Alaouite Territory.

There is no progress in the Alaouite situation. His Majesty's Minister discussed the [illegible] 4th March [illegible] confirmed that it had been left to the Acting Mohafez to make such arrangements as he could with the local French delegate for the gradual withdrawal of French troops; there is no evidence that this has yet begun.

The Prime Minister [illegible] Commission of Enquiry on the recent disturbances. He said that in his view the only important point was whether the French had been within their rights in sending troops into the area of disturbance when the Syrian Government had said [illegible] His Majesty's Government [illegible] upheld the French view that they were within their rights, his Government could say no more than that they felt keenly that this was not in accordance with independent status.

His Majesty's Minister pressed the Prime Minister to find some solution for the land cases between Suleiman Murshid and the surrounding peasantry which are one of the basic causes of the trouble. He replied that he could see no solution as Murshid's position in law over the disputed lands was unassailable even though he might have obtained them by intimidation. Murshid himself now refused to accept arbitration.

The Nationalists have been disturbed by the manifest weakness of the Government as shown by recent events in the Alaouite territory and they have therefore been all the more easily upset and discouraged by garbled versions in Arabic papers of recent statements by British statesmen regarding Arab affairs.

A manifesto was issued in Damascus by Suleiman Murshid to all the Deputies giving his account of his dealings with the Syrian Government concerning various [illegible]

An all-Alaouite company of the *Troupes Spéciales* is being formed in the Mohafazat under Capitaine Quwwas. It is understood that it will be stationed at Lattakia.

Euphrates and Jezireh.

French representatives continue to work hard to gain the sympathies of the inhabitants and their influence is growing. They have recently circulated privately to some fifty notables of Deir-ez-Zor extracts in Arabic of speeches by Mr. Churchill and other purporting to show that Britain is committed whole-heartedly to a policy of supporting French authority in Syria.

Tribal.

There has been no development in the settlement of the Shammar Agaidat dispute. The mutessarif of Mosul is understood to be still insisting that the meeting should take place at Mosul while the Agaidat refuse to enter Shammar territory.

Frontier.

The question of frontier passes is still causing friction between the Syrians and the French. Although an Allied military check has been retained on the frontier of Turkey the Mohafez has again instructed some of the kaimakams to issue frontier passes.

Some fifty Turkish deserters crossed the frontier into Syria during February, most of them being Armenians and pioneer units.

Lebanon.

The decision to leave the Minister for Foreign Affairs out of the Arab Conference Delegation was probably due partly to reluctance to leave the country in the incompetent hands of M. Nicolas Ghosn, and partly to the Prime Minister's annoyance at what he felt to be the excessively pro-Christian line M. Pharaon [illegible] Prime Minister presumably took into account the risk of leaving such a notorious intriguer free to make trouble while his master's back was turned. Whether he was [illegible] on the 20th March Henri Pharaon entertained to dinner Riad Solh, Sami Solh and Habib Abu Chahla, who are generally believed to be plotting the overthrow of the Karameh Government at the first convenient opportunity.

In spite of the pro-Christian sympathies ascribed to M. Pharaon, the extreme Christian opponents of the Government are still endeavouring to raise the bogey of Islam as an inducement to the Christians to oppose the Government policy of participating in the new Arab League. On the 17th March a deputation composed [illegible] Tabet, accompanied by Moussa Nammour, proceeded to Bekerké in the hopes of inducing the Maronite Patriarch to send a telegram to Cairo expressing disapproval of the Arab League and disavowing the Prime Minister's signature of the protocol. Their mission was, however, unsuccessful; the Patriarch said that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had shown him the modifications made in the original Alexandria Protocol, which in his view constituted sufficient protection for the Maronites. Messrs. Naccache and Tabet, after discussion, agreed with him and the deputation withdrew.

Fauzi Hoss, one of the Lebanese delegates at the Chicago Air Conference, has now returned and reported on the results of his mission to the United States and Great Britain. The Governments are expected to charge him with missions

to investigate the possibility of air lines between the Lebanon and the surrounding [illegible]

Controversy between the Phalange and the Government over the recent by-[illegible] newspapers of a statement attributed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that some of the Government officials in Mount Lebanon might have exceeded their instructions during the election. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has now officially denied having made this statement [illegible] the well known American University of Beirut professor, as their first Minister to Washington.

The Finance Committee of the Chamber have at last started the examination of the budget, which is even more overdue than usual.

Mazhar Omari left for Beirut during the week to surrender to the authorities [illegible] the Minister of Justice, M. Henry Pharaon, was duly notified, but it was subsequently decided that it would be preferable to postpone this case until after the Prime Minister's return from Egypt, and as it was not intended to detain Mazhar for [illegible] pardoned if found guilty, in order that he may assist in bringing about the arrest of [illegible]

M. Pharaon has come in for considerable adverse comment as a result of his dismissal of the head of the [illegible] an order given to him by M. Pharaon in his capacity as Minister of Justice. Colonel Traboulsi maintained that only the Minister of the Interior could give him orders. The matter was ventilated in the press, and the Cabinet ultimately [illegible] of a conflict of personalities, is generally regarded as unfortunate and reflecting little credit on M. Pharaon.

[E 2381 & 89 2

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 156, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 27th March, 1945.—(Received 12th April.)

General.

[illegible] declaration would [illegible] be invited to San Francisco. [illegible] His Majesty's Government [illegible] have [illegible] San Francisco the communiqué will add that France took the initiative in proposing that the Levant States should be invited. The United States Minister [illegible] that these developments must be kept absolutely confidential until a public statement had been made. Public opinion is, however, tending to take it for granted that an invitation will in fact be extended in view of the declaration by the French Foreign Minister and the intervention of the Arab nations on behalf of the Levant States. The French are undoubtedly making capital out of the situation, and in a French-inspired article in *Le Matin* of Damascus on the 20th March it was stated that Transjordan [illegible] the Lebanon but also Transjordan and Palestine are most particularly interested."

The formation of the Arab League has been on the whole [illegible] in the Arab press, it is possible, however, that questions will be raised in the Chamber of Deputies after the return from Cairo of the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. In the Lebanon in general the more extreme Christians are relieved that the Lebanon should, in their view, have kept clear of any entanglements with the Moslem Arab States, and attribute this to the efforts of their Minister for Foreign Affairs whilst the Moslems as well as the more moderate Christians are disappointed that the League should have been constituted in so loose a form and consider that it cannot thus be effective. There is a tendency to consider the result as a set-back to British policy on the grounds that Great

Britain, in view of her special relations with most of the Arab States, could have dominated a closely-knit League.

Count Ostrorog had an interview on the 21st March with the Acting Syrian Prime Minister, Khaled el Azm, but no progress in the negotiations has been [illegible] the draft University Convention still being under examination by the Syrian Government.

According to reports from Cairo relations between the Syrian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs are none too cordial and it is suggested that when they return Fares Khoury will insist on resigning. Dr. Kayali, the Minister of Justice, though present in the capital, did not attend any of the sittings of the Chamber of Deputies held during the week and rumours of his resignation persist. It is strongly rumoured that a new Government will be formed before long.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period 16th–22nd March, 1945, amount to 90 tons, a daily average of 13 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1944–45 crop up to 175,640 tons.

Syria—Damascus.

In the absence of the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs at the meeting of the Arab League in Cairo, Khaled el Azm has been acting as Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Charabati has been in charge of the Ministry of National Economy and Acting President on the Higher Cereals Commission.

At the fifth and last sitting at the extraordinary session of Parliament on the 19th March, a written question was submitted regarding the non-invitation of Syria to the San Francisco Conference. Deputies from Homs and Hama complained that no decision has been reached in connexion with the army, although the extraordinary session had been called in this connexion; another Hama Deputy said that, in addition to the question of the army, matters of internal policy such as [illegible] Political Summary No. 154) and the Alaouite question called for discussion. The Acting Prime Minister accepted in principle that the questions mentioned should form the subject of a debate, but it was agreed to await the return of the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. At a sitting of the Chamber on the next day another Hama Deputy enquired what were the Government's views in connexion with President Roosevelt's declaration regarding Palestine. The speaker suggested that the matter should be left over for discussion until the Minister for Foreign Affairs had returned.

An anti-Government demonstration for which the Arab Resurrection party was largely responsible took place on the 24th March. Students of the Tajhiz school cried, "Down with the Syrian dictator"—a reference to Sabri el Assali, Minister of the Interior—"Down with the unjust policy of the Government," "Down with France and the traitor de Gaulle," "There will be no army without revolution," "Long live Greater Syria," and "Long live Feisal II." Speeches were made by students at the Sérail accusing the Government of trampling on the Constitution and calling for the transfer of the army, the return of the Hatay, and the formation of Greater Syria.

[illegible] March to make an unofficial protest against an article in the Damascus newspaper *Al Fashna* quoting statements by the German general Guderian that the Red Army were responsible for the atrocities in occupied territory. He also protested against the anti-Soviet tone of certain other articles in the Syrian press though he did not give details. As a result of his protest the *Fashna* was suspended for five days on the direct orders of the President.

Two Damascus lawyers have left for Egypt to attend the Arab lawyers' conference.

Cotton-spinning mills are to hand over all their yarn to the Government and their private arrangements for the selling of cheap cloth are to cease. There is however a general lack of confidence in the proposed distribution by the Government of locally produced yarn or of imported piece-goods.

Aleppo.

The signing of the Arab League agreement was well received in the local press and welcomed by the Nationalists.

The Soviet denunciation of their treaty with Turkey created considerable interest, particularly amongst the Armenians, who envisage the possibility of an enlargement of Soviet Armenia at the expense of Turkey.

Homs and Hama.

The week has seen an increased feeling of exasperation against the Government amongst the Opposition elements in the area. The return of Shukri Quwatli from Iraq and the absence of any clear or definite statement by the Government on the results of his visit had given rise to a shower of pamphlets emanating mainly from Damascus and Beirut.

A Communist leaflet has been distributed in Homs and Hama complaining against the efforts made to disturb Franco-Syrian relations and drawing attention to the necessity of strengthening Syrian relations with Russia.

Jebel Druze.

The Atrash clan have strongly expressed to the Political Officer their disappointment at having been passed over in the selection of new Syrian Ministers. The Emir Hassan recently delivered himself of a violent diatribe against the Government and openly avowed his intention of working henceforth against Shukri Quwatli—and for the Emir Abdullah. They reject the argument that if a Ministry were given to the Jebel Druze the Alaouites and the Jezireh would expect similar recognition, since they maintain that the Jebel Druze's contribution to the struggle for independence has been greater than that of any other province.

Alaouites.

The return of the Mohafez from Damascus on the 20th March enabled discussions to be resumed between him and the Délégué Adjoint regarding the [illegible] By noon on the 23rd March, however, little change had occurred, the French still having 490 and the gendarmerie 380 men in the "rebel" area. The establishment of Ninth Army of British liaison officers in a camp, one at Jobit and one at [illegible]

Lieutenant Berge of the French Political Office is continuing to pay visits to notables in the neighbourhood and to treat the gendarmerie officers with scant courtesy. The opinion has been expressed to the Political Officer by a reliable source that but for the interest the British have shown in the Alaouite question a general rising of the Alaouites would have been engineered by the French.

Lebanon.

Conflicting reports regarding the health of the Lebanese President continue to reach [illegible] are indications that he will continue to live in retirement and attend only to the most pressing business.

The Lebanese Government's control of the spinning industry appears to have achieved success, as the Arida factories have now accepted the Government's conditions and are co-operating with them.

The Lebanese Communist party, profiting by the weakness of the Minister [illegible] speakers. The party have also revived their long standing feud with the Parti Populaire Syrien and are understood to have addressed a manifesto to the Government calling for the suppression of this "Fascist organisation." Much criticism is being directed against the Government for what is considered to be the unnecessary licence given to the Communists.

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 157, Secret, Syria and Lebanon 3rd April, 1945.—(Received 17th April.)

General.

THE Lebanese and Syrian Governments were informed on the 29th March by the United States Minister of their invitation to participate in the San Francisco Conference. Both Governments have subsequently published a communiqué announcing their adherence to the United Nations Pact.

On the 31st March the Syrian Chamber of Deputies unanimously ratified the signature of the Arab League Pact, though one Deputy stated that his vote was subject to the reservations that acceptance of the pact was not contrary to the unification of Syria, and that it did not recognise the mandate of Palestine.

The Lebanese Cabinet approved the pact on the same date and it will be submitted to the Chamber for ratification on the 7th April.

The Lebanese President returned to Beirut incognito on the 31st March and has now started to receive visitors. His state of health appears to be much improved, though he is still a tired man.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 23rd–31st March, 194[illegible] 472 tons, a daily average of 52 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1944–45 crop up to 176,118 tons.

Syria: Damascus.

The Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs returned to Damascus from Cairo on the 27th March. There have been strong rumours of the Prime Minister's resignation and a consequent Cabinet reshuffle, but it seems that the Prime Minister is anxious to attend the San Francisco Conference and has decided against resignation for the moment.

It has been reported that the United States will offer five scholarships to Syrian students for courses in American universities; in this connexion it will be recalled that the British Council are offering two scholarships to be taken up at British universities.

Homs and Hama.

Count Ostrorog visited Palmyra on the 24th March and addressed a [illegible] of sheikhs on the subject of France's love for Syria, which had recently manifested itself in her demand that the Levant States should be included in the San Francisco Conference. His visit appears to have had little reaction.

Jebel Druze.

Two gendarmes were wounded and one soldier killed in a disturbance which took place on the 31st March in Soueida. The Mohafez and his supporters accused the French of engineering the incident, but there is little evidence to support this opinion. It does, however, indicate an unfortunate state of indiscipline amongst the Druze squadrons.

Alaouites.

It is reported that two companies of Troupes Spéciales, which had been sent [illegible] squadrons from Jebel Druze. The délégué of Soueida has informed the Political Officer there that they will not be replaced by non Druze troops from elsewhere.

Lebanon.

The mention in the United States communiqué that the invitation to the Levant States was due to French initiative was badly received by the Lebanese Government, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs subsequently issued a communiqué denying that he had endorsed it in a public declaration. There has been little local comment on the invitation, which had been generally expected.

The Lebanese Prime Minister has recently forwarded to the United States Minister [illegible] for his support to the Arab cause. The Prime Minister pointed out that the Lebanon as a limitrophe country with Palestine was particularly concerned at a possible development of Zionism, which might overflow the borders of Palestine.

Dr. Charles Malik has now been appointed first Lebanese Minister in Washington and is being hurried off there with his staff in order to be ready for San Francisco.

There is little internal political activity. What there is seems to be confined to rivalry for a place on the delegation to San Francisco. The Government have [illegible] increased popularity. Reductions in wholesale prices, though not in general reflected in the retail market and probably caused more by the war situation than the Government's efforts, have nevertheless enhanced the Government's prestige, and the opposition elements have not yet found the moment propitious to begin a general assault on them.

E 2663/5 89] (4)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 15b Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 10th April 1945.—(Received 20th April.)

General.

ON the 7th April the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies unanimously ratified the Arab League Pact, though one of the Deputies wrote a letter to the President of the Chamber saying that he was in favour of bilateral treaties between the Lebanese and Arab nations.

The Prime Minister, in a speech in the Syrian Chamber of Deputies on the 4th April, replied to the various criticisms which had been levelled against the Government during the past few weeks, and said that the primary aim of the Nationalist leaders had been independence; this consideration had influenced them in their attitude to the Lebanon, but it was now agreed that a Greater Lebanon which was independent was preferable to a smaller Lebanon under the influence of a foreign Power. The Prime Minister went on to deny that the Government had declared that they would not conclude treaties with foreign Powers; it was, in fact, inevitable that they should do so. The Government, however, declared that they would not negotiate a treaty which would be detrimental to Syrian sovereignty or which would give a pre-eminent position to any foreign Power. He then announced the decision of the Cabinet to resign, [illegible] end through the [illegible] Arab League [illegible] in the San [illegible] was [illegible] the [illegible] the trust which had been deposited with him.

The President, after consulting with the outgoing Mi[illegible] Haffar, invited Fares Bey Khoury to form the new Cabinet [illegible] of which is as follows:—

President of the Council of Ministers: Fares el Khoury
Foreign Affairs and National Defence: Jamil Mardam Bey
Justice, Wakfs and Acting Minister of Supply: Said Ghazzi
Finance: Naim Antak
Interior: Sabri Assali
Public Instruction and Acting Minister of National Economy: Ahmad Sharabati
Public Works: Hikmat el Hakim

Opposition elements will find a certain satisfaction in the absence of Khaled el Azm, but Deputies from the north are not likely to be satisfied by the inclusion of only one of their number, Hikmat el Hakim. It is reported that the Prime Minister was anxious to include Khaled el Azm in his new Ministry, but that Khaled el Azm himself declined to accept the portfolio. It is interesting that throughout the negotiations for the formation of the Cabinet all sections were apparently agreed that Fares el Khoury should remain Prime Minister.

At a sitting of the Syrian Chamber on the 9th April, at which the Prime Minister outlined the policy of his new Government, he said that it was essential for relations between France and Syria to be settled without delay. The Syrians must consider that their problems with France had been solved. Both Syria and France now cherished towards the other friendly feelings based on the recognition of rights and sovereignty. The matters in suspense could be summarised as follows: [illegible] (b) no agreement had so far been concluded between Syria and France regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations as had been done in the case of other Arab Powers; [illegible] with regard to financial relations with France, with whom the Syrians had a current account of long standing. France possessed [illegible] cultural institutions and schools; they had previously proposed a form of agreement in connexion with these which the Syrian Government had, however, not considered to merit discussion. The French had now proposed a different convention which the Government thought might serve as a basis for discussion; both parties would shortly appoint three experts each with a view to discussing the new draft. The Government would submit for approval to the Chamber of Deputies any agreement reached.

There has been much political activity in both capitals during the week in connexion with the selection of the delegations for the San Francisco Conference. The Syrian delegation consists of Fares el Khoury as president, Naim Antaki and Nazim Kudsi (Syrian Minister in Washington) as members, with Farid Zein ed Din and Nur ed Din Kahhah as advisers, and Tewfik Hunaidi as [illegible] as president, Joseph Salim, Abdullah Yafi and George Malik (Lebanese Minister in Washington) as members, with Sobhi Mahmassani as legal adviser.

The Syrians and French have agreed to set up a joint committee to examine the new draft University Convention.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period 1st–7th April, 1945, amount to 473 tons, a daily average of 67 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1944–45 crop up to 176,591 tons.

Syria—Damascus.

Telegrams have been addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Foreign Secretaries of Great Britain, the United States of America, China, Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, expressing the appreciation and thanks of the Syrian people for the support which they received in connexion with their request for participation in the San Francisco Conference. A similar telegram but in rather more tepid phraseology was sent to M. Bidault.

Abdul Karim Aidi, Kaimakam of Douma, has been appointed Director of the [illegible] service in succession to Sobhi Omari, who has been appointed [illegible] Algeria; he has so far refused the appointment [illegible] to the rank of full colonel. Ahmed Lebbou [illegible] has suspended himself from his office for two days in [illegible] with Sobhi Omari, but was persuaded by the President to return to duty.

The Futuwwa Committee will be composed of the Director-General of Education, a representative from the Gendarmerie Department, a representative from the Ministry of Defence and two representatives from the Ministry of Education. Major Abdul Razzaq Qadi has been made responsible for military training.

A draft Labour Law has been prepared by the Ministry of National Economy which, according to the press, will provide for the establishment of reconciliation machinery on which labour and employers will be represented in addition to the Government and will regulate child labour and hours of work.

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Homs and Hama.

A meeting of the leaders of the Homs Monarchist party was held on the 4th April.

The security situation in Hama has continued to deteriorate, and on the 5th April a severe clash occurred between members of the Barazi clan and a large number of the Haurani family. Fighting occurred in the open fields, and it is estimated that at one time about 800 persons were involved. Police intervention was ineffective but the participants finally dispersed at nightfall taking their casualties with them so that the actual numbers are not yet known.

The Hama civil authorities do not hesitate to connect the fresh Barazi outrages with the clandestine visits lately paid to Khalid Agha Darwish Barazi by the Délégué adjoint of Homs-Hama.

A squadron of Druze troops reached Homs on the 2nd April *en route* for the Alaouite area, but refused to continue the journey as they did not want to enter the Alaouites. They have been placed under the command of Commandant Hassan Atrash, who is trying to find them accommodation in Homs. It is clear that the French dare not use force to oblige the men to continue the journey for fear of them dispersing.

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Alaouite Territory.

On the 5th April, after repeated requests from the Mohafez, Colonel Bonnot informed [illegible] the Druze [illegible] the withdrawal of troops. Commandant Raysse's headquarters and the company of Moroccans are to remain in Jobit. The cavalry squadron of Cherkess in the Jobit area are to be

replaced by a squadron of Druze cavalry which will detach one troop to replace the cavalry squadron in the Aimab area. The latter squadron will return to Hama, the net withdrawal from the Jebel area, the seat of the original disturbances, is, therefore, one troop of cavalry, though it has been reported that the cavalry troops covering the re-established gendarmerie posts at Nzeirsa and Fakhoura have been called in to Jebel.

It is reported that 240 men already have been recruited for the new Alaouite [illegible] Officer that certain of these men are called "avenantaires," and have signed an undertaking to serve General de Gaulle and to go wherever he sends them. The Mohafez added that two-thirds of the Troupes Spéciales have also signed similar documents, which there is evidence to show are in French and signed by the men without knowledge of their meaning.

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Frontier.

The Syrians have again invited a rebuff from the Turks and the French over the question of frontier passes. The Kaimakam at Harim, in the temporary absence of the French frontier officer, issued a pass for a Syrian to cross to R[illegible] man was put across the frontier elsewhere by the Syrian gendarmerie, only to be sent back by the Turks at French request on the 30th March because the signature on his pass was unacceptable.

Lebanon.

There is no great enthusiasm for the delegation finally selected to represent the Lebanon at the San Francisco Conference, though its members are drawn from the Maronite, Greek Catholic, Sunni and Greek Orthodox communities. The Minister for Foreign Affairs intends that the delegation shall later tour the Lebanese communities in North and South America.

[illegible] Beirut [illegible] present [illegible] murders feeling [illegible] between the tr[illegible] the Shamans [illegible] asked [illegible]

[illegible] the disposal of the Lebanese Government, arrived in the area, and a number of gendarmes estimated now at more than 400. A demand was sent to the Jaafar for the surrender of the wanted men and, when this failed, an unsuccessful attempt was made to arrest them. The gendarmerie and the Chasseurs Libanaise are now dispersed between the two tribes, but there is little doubt that they would be unable to prevent a serious clash if either of the two parties decided to make a general attack.

The Political Officer for the Bekaa has been reliably informed that on the day prior to the murders a French officer visited Fadlalah and Sadalah Hamadi at Hermel. These two are leading members of the Hamadi family which has considerable influence over both tribes, though they are hostile to the interests of Sabri Hamadi, the Lebanese Deputy.

The Turkish delegation to the San Francisco Conference passed through Beirut [illegible] 9th April. Official calls were paid on the Lebanese Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 159, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 17th April, 1945.—(Received 4th May.)

General.

THE death of President Roosevelt has been sincerely regretted in both countries, though in Syria, where his alleged support of Zionism has more than once caused irritation, there is some apprehension lest Mr. Truman may show himself to be even more pro-Zionist.

The Syrian Minister in Paris reported to his Government on the 11th April that he had learnt that M. Massigli had been instructed to propose to His Majesty's Government that British troops should be withdrawn from the Levant States and that the French troops in the country and the Troupes Spéciales should be removed from British operational command. It has been ascertained that no such proposal had been received in London up to the 12th April.

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Certain members of the Turkish delegation who recently passed through Aleppo on their way to San Francisco told Syrian journalists that the recognition [illegible] to the Turks (presumably by the French Embassy at Angora) that recognition at [illegible] to be seriously considering making Iskenderun a free port, though probably from a wish to gain financially rather than from any fear of Syrian agitation.

At the sitting of the Syrian Chamber on the 9th April, referred to in paragraph 4 of section 1, Weekly Political Summary No. 158, the new Government obtained a vote of confidence with two Deputies voting against and one abstention.

The Syrian and Lebanese delegations to the San Francisco Conference left Damascus and Beirut on the 12th and 13th April respectively.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period 8th-15th April, 1945, amount to 569 tons, [illegible] up to 177,159 tons.

[illegible] hases by the O.C.P. of all cereals from the 1944-45 harvest amount to 170,591 tons, and the stocks on hand are 35,168—distribution in Mar[illegible] figures the Commission des Céréales Panifiables decided to negotiate for the purchase of U.K.C.C. stocks in Syria and a further 4,300 tons of wheat were purchased last week.

A meeting was held under the presidency of Jamil Mardam Bey at which the position was discussed. It was considered that the O.C.P. would be successful in purchasing another 5,000 tons from last year's harvest which, with the stocks [illegible] from the 1945-46 harvest can be made, although reports suggest that the new harvest will be late. A slight fall in prices is reported from Damascus, Homs and Aleppo.

Damascus.

On receipt of the news of the death of President Roosevelt the Syrian Government gave orders that the Syrian flag should be flown at half mast throughout the country for three days. Telegrams of sympathy were addressed [illegible] President to Mr. Truman and Mr. Roosevelt [illegible] Bey Mardam to Mr. Stettinius. The Chamber adjourned its sitting on the 14th April [illegible] Chamber had expressed their sympathy at the loss of "Roosevelt the Great" and Jamil Bey Mardam had referred to Syria's debt of gratitude to the President for the country's independence.

In the absence of Fares el Khoury and Naim Antaki at the San Francisco Conference Jamil Bey Mardam and Said Ghazzi will act as Prime Minister and Minister of Finance respectively.

The question of censorship of the press has been raised twice during the past week. [illegible] Chamber of Deputies has been published in all newspapers, it complains that in spite of the "decision" of the Chamber to abolish censorship no action has been taken. The same point was also raised when the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs received journalists on the eve of the former's departure for San Francisco. The Prime Minister indicated that instructions for the relaxation of censorship regulations had already been given.

Fares el Khoury and Naim Antaki will represent Syria at the conference to be held in Washington in connexion with the establishment of the Court of International Justice.

The Emir Talal of Transjordan arrived in Damascus on the 12th April. He was met on the frontier by the "chef de protocole" and by the Transjordan and

Iraqi consuls, and on his way to Damascus was greeted by a number of notables and senior Government officials. He called on the President and on Jamil Bey Mardam, leaving for Beirut the next day.

An Egyptian Military Mission headed by El Ferik Atallah Pasha arrived in Damascus on a so-called private visit on the 13th April and was entertained by Saadullah Jabri and Jamil Bey Mardam. Atallah Pasha was received by the President.

Aleppo.

A petition about the Hatay was despatched early in the month by a certain M. Medin Stamboulie to the Syrian delegation to the San Francisco Conference and to the secretariat at the Arab League. M. Stamboulie claims that the petition was sent on behalf of 60,000 refugees from the Hatay to ask for help in [illegible] to the Hatay, maintaining that the separation of 1938 was contrary to the wishes of the League of Nations' Commission and to the plebiscite figures.

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Jebel Druze.

The Amir Talal, the principal notable of the Chebba region, has sent telegrams to the Mohafez and to the President of the Republic protesting against the activities of "foreigners" (*i.e.*, French) in an independent country and assuring the President and the Government of the loyalty and support of the inhabitants of the Caza.

The French have completely dismantled the telephone line Soueida–Salkhad–Intan, which they allege had been previously damaged by a storm. [illegible] that they also intend to dismantle the Soueida–Chebba line. If th[illegible] would be no telephonic communication available to the Syrian authorities to any place in the Jebel Druze other than Soueida.

Lattakia.

The situation in the Alaouite territory remains thoroughly unsatisfactory. No further withdrawals of French troops have been reported and fighting broke out near Ilob Abdulla between followers of Suleiman Murshid and Ali Buddour; twelve gendarmes from Slenfe were fired on as was also the British observer patrol. The gendarmes were unable to reach the village and reinforcements have been despatched to Slenfe.

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Tribal.

The Mohafez of Deir ez Zor is reported to have settled all outstanding cases between the Afadla and the Fedaan Khrossa which have been outstanding since 1939 and which have cost some 500 lives.

A quadrilateral exchange of telegrams between the Mohafez of Deir ez Zor, the Syrian Government, the Iraqi Government and the Mutessarif of Mosul has [illegible] date of the Shammar Agedat Conference or for the place and date of a preliminary unofficial meeting between the Mohafez and Mutessarif.

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Beirut.

There are indications that Riad Solh and his group are on the point of initiating an assault on the present Lebanese Government, with the object of [illegible] power. The immediate target selected is the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has laid himself open to attack by a series of ill-advised excursions into matters outside [illegible] elements hitherto deemed to be wholly opposed to the present régime and under French influence, such as Alfred Naccache and Tewfik Awad. A group of newspapers under the influence of Riad Solh has now begun openly [illegible] the Prime Minister [illegible] the Ministry. Riad Solh is also suspected of covertly working up the Beirut merchants to protest against the Prime Minister's anti-profiteering campaign. So far it would not seem that Riad Solh has gained the sympathy of the majority of the Deputies, but his position is growing stronger whilst that of the Government grows weaker. A point may soon be reached when Abdul Hamid Karami will be forced to choose between dropping his Foreign Minister or resigning

himself, but even the former course would not suffice to divert the attacks of his opponents. The President, who under the Constitution should be in a position to direct the course of events, is plainly still in no condition to do so, and his weakness continues to represent a serious obstacle to the establishment of a stable régime.

The Communist newspaper, *Sout Ash Shaab*, has begun a series of articles intended to stiffen the population against all types of foreign interference in Arab affairs. Treaty revision in Iraq and Egypt is spoken of; in addition to the liberation of the Levant States from French control and the termination of the mandates over Palestine and Transjordan, and it is clear that this paper, whether [illegible] of the Soviet Legation [illegible] of avowed xenophobia.

Lively criticism of the weakness of the Lebanese delegation to San Francisco has been expressed in all quarters, though it is recognised that the Government's political opponents, by their refusal to participate, share some of the responsibility in the choice of so unrepresentative a team.

The new Egyptian and Persian Ministers to the Lebanon have now presented their credentials to the President, the former after several months' delay caused by the President's illness. The press reports that the Brazilian Consulate-General is shortly to be transformed into a legation.

The Amir Talal of Transjordan arrived in Beirut on a private visit on the 13th April. He called on His Majesty's Minister, who returned his call before leaving for Damascus.

The enthronement of a new Armenian Catholicos on the 8th April gave rise to yet another squabble over protocol between the Lebanese and French authorities. The latter wished to follow the precedent of previous years, under which the Lebanese and French official representatives would rank level, ahead of the other diplomatic representatives; this the Lebanese Government refused to accept and as a result the French were not represented at the ceremony.

The Shamma–Jaafar dispute referred to in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, Section II of Weekly Political Summary No. 158, is still not resolved and the Chasseurs Libanais and the gendarmerie remain in the field. The latter have arrested thirty-five persons for interrogation in connexion with the further killing of one of the Shamma tribe. It is reported that the Lebanese Deputy Sabri Hamadi is making a new attempt to arrange a settlement by negotiation between the two tribes.

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'E 3121/5/89'

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 160, Syria and the Lebanon, 24th April, 1945.—(Received 17th May.)

General.

DISSATISFACTION is being freely expressed in both countries at General Beynet's prolonged absence, and the President of the Syrian Republic and members of both Governments have expressed their conviction that the French are [illegible] Minister in Paris that the Syrian delegation at San Francisco should be [illegible] added to the growing impression that the French have no intention of making any immediate concessions to either of the local Governments. The Syrians, in agreement with the Lebanese, have made it clear to the French that, while there is no objection to exchanges of views at San Francisco, actual negotiations must take place, as originally arranged, in this country.

The Lebanese Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs met the [illegible] Minister [illegible] April [illegible] was officially described as a cordial discussion. The Syrians are understood to have stated that, in the negotiations with the French for a university convention, their representatives had instructions to agree to nothing which would give any pre-eminence or privilege to the French or the French language; the Lebanese appear to have [illegible] regarding the appointment of representatives to the Arab Propaganda Bureaux.

On the economic side, however, the Syrians and Lebanese had more controversial subjects to discuss. The Syrians had recently published an order that all goods destined for Syrian merchants should be imported through Syrian

customs posts, to this the Lebanese objected as dealing a blow to the *entrepot* [illegible] which the Syrian Government were carrying out the recent textile agreement they claimed that, whilst all the Lebanese cotton-yarn due under the agreement [illegible] exchange was of such poor quality as to be useless. They appear to have [illegible] whole agreement.

The presence of locusts has been reported between Deir-ez-Zor and pipe-line [illegible] National Economy has asked Ninth Army for assistance in the shape of transport, [illegible] and locust fighting appliances.

[illegible]

Total purchases for the period the 15th-21st April, 1945 amount to 209 tons [illegible]

Syria—Damascus

A committee has been formed to consider the new French proposals for a [illegible] convention the Syrian members are Faidi Atassi a former Minister of [illegible] Sami Midani, dean of the Law College, and Dr Zaki el Jabi. Syria [illegible] should be allowed some [illegible] has been fixed for the 25t[illegible] Syrian delega[illegible] show that the Syrian [illegible] cultural agreement with the French, [illegible] Hassan Jabbara Director-General of Finance, has been appointed Minister of [illegible] present Syrian Prime Minister has told a member of the legation staff that he has been offered and accepted the post of Syrian Minister in Moscow, the Russian [illegible] appointment, and if the answer is favourable an official request will be made by the Syrian Government.

Two detachments of Druze Troupes Spéciales reached Homs early in Apr[illegible] (see paragraph 4 Section 5 of Weekly Political Summary No. 158). One detachment was eventually persuaded to continue, but the second [illegible] through dissatisfaction over trans[illegible] of the Jebel Druze who promised the [illegible] gendarmerie. On their outward jo[illegible] received by the villages through which they had passed, but on the return journey though still wearing French uniforms, they were warmly welcomed. The Syrian Government appear subsequently to have arranged for them to be medically examined. The French civil authorities begged the Governments not to allow the men to enter Damascus, and the Government being quite prepared to show themselves reasonable in this matter agreed to keep them out. Later, the French stated that they did not wish to charge the men with desertion, for fear of repercussions in the Jebel Druze, but would be compelled to do so if the Syrian Govern[illegible] no early opportunity of warning the Acting Syrian Prime Minister against taking any precipitate action.

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Tribal

The Iraqi and Syrian authorities have agreed to hold the Shammar-Ageidat Conference in Bagdad on the 3rd May. A report has been received from Mosul that there was a further Shammar-Ageidat clash near Baaj on the 23rd April, [illegible] since been denied although there is said to be tension in the area.

Frontier

The problem of frontier passes is again giving trouble. The Mohafez of Aleppo, on the 23rd April, according to French reports that have not yet been [illegible] the frontier to holders of Turkish frontier passes because of the Turks' unwillingness to recognise passes [illegible] ment of a matter which affected the whole frontier, but apparently the closure was ordered without further reference.

Beirut

The Lebanese Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs [illegible] nervousness and irritation at the campaign which is being directed [illegible] likely to be to force the present Government to adopt a more nationalistic line. Raid ed Solh's aim is probably to seize any weakness of the present Government in their attitude towards the French and to return to power on a wave of nationalist and anti-French feeling, a hardening of public opinion in this sense is already perceptible.

In the field of internal policy the Government continue to derive credit from the slightly downward trend of prices which has now become evident, and the Prime Minister's efforts to check profiteering are generally appreciated, as is his own rectitude. Public opinion is not therefore yet ready for any change of Government.

The Prime Minister, who, in his capacity of Minister of Finance, is now studying the budget, is much concerned at the continued heavy deficit in the [illegible] He complains, as have his predecessors, that this department is saddled with a large number of redundant and useless officials, but he finds, again as did his predecessors, that the President of the Republic remains an insuperable obstacle to any retrenchment, on the grounds that dismissals of employees would create opposition to the régime at a time when solidarity is essential. The budgetary position appears, indeed, to be somewhat disquieting; the collection of the newly instituted income tax has not yet been begun, the Beirut merchants are making difficulties in paying up the instalments of the arrears of War Profits Tax which is now due from them, and the expenses of the Five-Year Plan and other public works have turned out to be substantially greater than the estimates.

There has been no development of importance in the Shammar-Jaafar dispute referred to in Section 11, paragraph 7, of Weekly Political Summary No. 159.

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E 3177 5 89

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 161, Secret. Syria and the Lebanon 1st May, 1945.—(Received 18th May.)

General

IT was learnt during the week that the French wished to move three North African battalions from North Africa and France to the Levant in two cruisers to "relieve and reinforce" the French troops in the Levant.

General Humblot, on instructions from the Commander-in-chief, Middle East Force, was informed that as the whole of the Middle East, under the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreement, is a single operational command, the commander-in-chief alone can decide on the needs of the different armies under his command, and expects to be consulted in advance before any question of reinforcements is considered. He was not prepared to authorise any increase in French forces in the Levant States at this time unless the proposals and reasons for them were placed before him. If the battalions in question were intended as a relief for the

present French regular troops, he did not wish that the actual relief should take place in the Levant States and suggested that the actual exchange should take place in Alexandria or some other agreed port. General Humblot replied that he did not wish to discuss the matter, as it was one for discussion between London and Paris, but that he personally did not agree with the commander-in-chief's view. He considered that the Lyttelton–de Gaulle Agreement did not specify that the commander-in-chief had any control over the number of French troops. Since the French were responsible for security they alone should judge the number of troops necessary.

Acting on instructions from the Foreign Office, His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris discussed the matter with General de Gaulle on the 30th April. General de Gaulle said that he did not understand why the matter should concern the commander-in-chief since he could not suppose that there was any German menace in the Middle East. Throughout the interview he showed most clearly his conviction that the policy of His Majesty's Government was to weaken the position of France in Syria and finally to take over French responsibilities, he complained of the continued presence of British troops in the Levant States, and added that if His Majesty's Government were prepared to withdraw all troops from Syria he would withdraw all French troops, though he would not consider it wise to do so. But so long as His Majesty's Government retained forces there he was not prepared to reduce the number of French troops, which he would be doing if he handed over the Troupes Spéciales. His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris assured him that it had never been the policy of His Majesty's Government to diminish French prestige in the Levant and insisted that His Majesty's Government [illegible] would result in French reinforcements arriving at Beirut at a moment when Franco-Syrian discussions were due to be resumed.

It is now known that one of the cruisers, with 800 [illegible] troops on board, will arrive at Beirut on the 5th May and should sail about [illegible] away a composite battalion of troops who are being [illegible] uncertain whether the other two battalions will be sent or if so, when.

Locusts are reported to be steadily advancing westwards in the Deir-ez-Zor area and north-west from the Transjordan frontier. Ninth Army are providing the Syrian Government with assistance in the shape of [illegible] equipment, and a locust expert from the M.E.S.C. [illegible] to estimate what additional assistance may be necessary.

Reports from Political Officers in both Syria and the Lebanon suggest that greater quantities of hashish have been sown this year than ever before.

Economic.

Total purchases for the season to the 30th April, 1945, amount to 298 tons, a daily average of 36 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1944–45 crop up to 177,000 tons.

Certain changes in the organisation of the work of the M.E.S.C. in Syria and the Lebanon have been agreed by the British and American authorities concerned.

Hitherto the work of the M.E.S.C. in Syria and the Lebanon has been carried out by the staff of the Economic Section, Spears Mission, in conformity with arrangements made in other Middle Eastern territories separate M.E.S.C. representation has now been established in Syria and the Lebanon on an Anglo-American basis.

The British and American Legations have informed the two local Governments of the establishment of the Anglo-American M.E.S.C. unit, and have requested them to agree to the attendance of M.E.S.C. representatives at meetings of the Joint Supply Council and the local Advisory Boards. It is proposed that the representatives [illegible] to be accepted. In that event the Joint Supply Council and each of the subsidiary boards will comprise, in addition to the Syrian, Lebanese and French members, representatives of the British and American Commercial Secretariats and of the Anglo-American M.E.S.C. unit. The M.E.S.C. representatives will however confine themselves to giving advice in respect of goods which still remain under M.E.S.C. control.

Both the Syrian and Lebanese Governments have now been informed that the Allied authorities wish the O.C.P. to continue for a further year. No objections were raised by the Governments, but the Syrians made it clear that they wished to take a larger share in the general administration of the office.

The French are expected to [illegible] for the coming year as previously but with the Syrian and [illegible] Governments [illegible] per cent [illegible] of the Syrian Government to a lowering of cereal prices. This, however, will certainly be opposed by the Syrians.

Syria—Damascus.

The Acting Syrian Prime Minister, at a meeting with Count Ostrorog on [illegible] April, referred to the [illegible] in General Beynet's [illegible]. He also made a formal demand for the withdrawal of French troops from [illegible] on the ground that the Syrian Government were responsible for the maintaining of law and order, and added that when the withdrawal had been effected he would make a commission for the settlement of the land disputes involving Suleiman Murshid. The French must understand, he said, that the Syrians [illegible] control of the Troupes Spéciales.

On the 25th April [illegible] were held in Damascus in [illegible] were prevented by police intervention from approaching the Serail; no incident occurred and the [illegible].

His Majesty's Minister [illegible] the Syrians [illegible] men from the disbanded Druze squadron referred to in Weekly Political Summary No. 160, section 3, paragraph 2. It is understood that the Syrians neither now intend to employ them as watchmen in different parts of the country [illegible] that [illegible] are held responsible for the mutiny, are, however, to be the subject of judicial proceedings.

At a sitting of the Chamber on the 24th April laws were passed abolishing press censorship except in regards military matters, and authorising the Ministry of Finance to issue silver and nickel coinage to the value of L.S. 14 million. [illegible] raise the question of the return to Syria of Syrian [illegible].

The Iraqi Minister, Baghdad, visited Syria during the week. According to [illegible] of the Syrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs [illegible] at present of the Syrian Government to appoint a representative to Chungking [illegible] Minister in Teheran [illegible].

The Commissariat d'Affaires of the U.S.S.R. has informed the Syrian Government of his Government's [illegible] of Fuat Khoury as Syrian Minister in Moscow.

Aleppo.

There have been two unimportant demonstrations during the week in Aleppo. The general political situation is unchanged though the present period of outward [illegible] reflect any improvement in Franco-Syrian relations which remain strained.

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Jebel Druze.

The Emir Hassan el Atrash and the Qaimaqam of Chaliba are incensed by the [illegible] of the Syrian Government regarding the recruitment into the gendarmerie of the men of the Druze squadron referred to in section 3, paragraph 3 above. It is felt that the men had been dismissed because they had refused to accept terms which would have brought them into conflict with the Syrian government, and that the Government, far from having recognised this patriotic gesture, are abandoning the men. The Emir maintains that, if the Government do not take [illegible] French demonstrations may be expected in the Jebel Druze, together with widespread mutiny among the French-commanded troops there.

Alaouites.

The Political Officer, Lattakia, reports a deterioration in the situation in the French-occupied parts of the Alaouites mountains but that so far this has not led to further disturbances.

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Lebanon

The Lebanese Prime Minister has been making persistent efforts either to stifle or to compound with the Opposition to his Government. He has suppressed several of the more vociferously critical newspapers, and he and his Minister for Foreign Affairs have spent many hours arguing with their critics. As a result, a "reconciliation" between the Government and the Riad Solh group was arranged, and the Prime Minister obtained a unanimous vote of confidence in the Chamber on the 1st May. It is probable, therefore, that the so-called crisis will not now come to a head, as Riad es Solh and his partisans are well aware that they do not yet command a majority in the Chamber.

Camille Chamoun, the Lebanese Minister in London, returned to Beirut by air on the 26th April. The ostensible purpose of his visit is to procure a prolongation of his leave of absence from the Chamber, of which he remains a Deputy; the real reason, as he has admitted in conversation, is to investigate the local political situation and to ascertain whether the present Government are pursuing a policy compatible with the ideal of Lebanese independence. He has also stated his view that the policy of His Majesty's Government is evolving in a manner satisfactory to the States. He was given a demonstrative welcome staged by Riad es Solh and his party, but there is no doubt that his published declarations while in London in support of the aspersions of the Levant States have much increased his local reputation, which now stands very high.

The Lebanese Chamber on the 30th April were given a somewhat gloomy picture of the financial situation of the Lebanon by the committee on the financial accounts of the 1943 budget. The committee report pointed out that while the year's working showed a surplus of 2 million Syrian pounds, two-thirds of the expenditure went in the form of salaries and allowances, and some 2 million Syrian pounds on various other unproductive expenses, leaving only 4 million Syrian pounds for [illegible] financial policy and recommended various methods of retrenching administrative expenditure. In the course of the ensuing debate the Banque de Syrie came in for sharp criticism by several Deputies, and the cancellation of its agreement in favour of a juster one was advocated. The Prime Minister admitted an annual deficit of between 8 and 9 million Syrian pounds in the supply services, and spoke also of the unhappy results of the inflationary policy of the Banque de Syrie. He said that the Government were looking into these matters and realised the necessity for drastic action if the country's finances were to be safeguarded. A committee from the Chamber was to be appointed for the purpose.

The Chinese Minister in Iraq has visited the Lebanon as the guest of the Lebanese Government. The press announced that he had come to discuss the question of the establishment of a Chinese Legation, but he himself denied that his visit had any special object.

Four bankruptcies have occurred among local firms and considerable [illegible] downward trend in wholesale prices, which threaten severe losses to speculators and hoarders.

[illegible]

[illegible]

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[E 3461/5/89] (5)

Extracts from the Weekly Political Summary No. 162, Secret: Syria and the Lebanon, 8th May, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 20th May.)

General

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments were informed on the 4th May and 3rd respectively by the French and British authorities that the cruiser *Montcalm* would be arriving on the 6th May, bringing 800 Senegalese

troops, who were destined to relieve another Senegalese battalion which would be repatriated by the same ship. It was explained to them that the relief was a normal military measure which had been known to be under consideration for some months past, and that although we considered the move to be untimely and should have preferred that the French did not use a warship for the purpose, we were aware that they had no civilian shipping available. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs proceeded to Damascus to consult the Syrian Government on the situation and as a result both Governments have addressed a note to the French, with copies to Allied representatives, stating that in their opinion the time has come when the ordinary international usages in regard to the [illegible] should be applied to their countries. The Syrian note is worded in rather stronger terms than the Lebanese. Telegrams have also been sent to the delegations at San Francisco instructing them to bring the incident to the notice of the Allied representatives there. It is believed that the Lebanese will be instructed to take a more moderate line than that which the Syrian Delegation will be asked to follow.

The *Montcalm* arrived on the morning of the 6th May, bringing 800 Senegalese troops and 100 French sailors. The troops, who disembarked without their arms, were immediately sent to Tripoli, whence the battalion to be relieved is also being brought. No incidents attended the arrival, and the normal courtesies [illegible] ments are, however, extremely uneasy that this move may presage further [illegible] of troops and rumours are already widespread amongst the popula[illegible] anything up to 50,000 troops may be expected in the near future. These rumours, some of which are undoubtedly of French origin, will be exploited by the Lebanese opponents of the present régime. The situation at present is very tense.

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Syria—Damascus

At a sitting of the Chamber on the 1st May, the draft law for the establishment of the Ministry of National Defence met with considerable criticism on the [illegible] before the question of the army had been solved.

The Acting Prime Minister informed His Majesty's Consul that the French had agreed to the Syrian Government employing the other ranks of the recently [illegible] and not put into uniform (see Weekly Political Summary No. 161, Section 3, [illegible] French cruiser and after discussion with the Lebanese, the Government had decided to enlist the Druze squadron in the gendarmerie and that he intended to make a plain statement of the situation in the Chamber. He added that he thought there would certainly be demonstrations in the town when the facts became known. As a result of further representations from His Majesty's Consul in the form of a personal message from His Majesty's Minister, the Acting Prime Minister agreed to go back on the decision to enlist the Druze squadron though it is understood that they are being taken on to the Government pay roll and paid from police funds but are not being armed or given uniforms and are being sent to their home villages.

Many well wishers visited the Russian Legation on May Day to congratulate the chargé d'affaires. A meeting was held by the Communist party at which about 1,200 persons were present, Zionism and Greater Syria were attacked and the transfer of the army demanded.

Aleppo.

The French as well as the Syrians in the Aleppo area appear to be uneasy at the delay in General Beynet's return. The French officer commanding in Aleppo echoed the views which Count Ostrorog had expressed to His Majesty's Consul the previous week that there were common Franco-British interests in the Near East and that close Franco-British collaboration was essential. He went as far as to say that unless Britain intervened on behalf of France, the French would be unable to obtain satisfactory terms from the Syrians.

Homs–Hama

The [illegible] reports that he has received instructions from Damascus [illegible] Hama [illegible] the Mufti [illegible] to be almost [illegible] state.

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Alaouites.

On the 3rd May a fight occurred between gendarmes and inhabitants of [illegible] the former [illegible] way to relieve the posts at Fadloutra and Mzeiraa. The gendarmes fought until their ammunition was exhausted and then surrendered, three of them being wounded. A passing Druze officer and five men made the villagers return the [illegible] arms and equipment. The French informed the Syrian Government on the 7th May that French troops [illegible] would be withdrawn within three days.

Euphrates and Jezireh.

The main topic of interest is the threat presented by the presence of locusts which have [illegible] of the river. Hopers of the Moroccan species are widespread east of the line Deir [illegible] Hassetche. Winged locusts also present in the latter area. Ten British army lorries are helping the local authorities in counter-measures.

Tribal

The Mohafez of the Euphrates left for Baghdad on the 1st May accompanied by the kaimakam of Abu Kemal and the commandant of the gendarmerie in the Euphrates. The Director of Syrian Tribal Affairs is also expected to be present. At the last moment Shaikh Jedaan al Hifel of the Agaidat refused to go to Baghdad. However, his son, Abboud, was persuaded to go in his place, though he professed [illegible] Baghdad.

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Lebanon

At a private meeting on the 29th April between Abdel Hamid Karami and Henri Pharaon on the one hand and Riad Solh [illegible] other, a "reconciliation" was [illegible] when asked [illegible] sovereignty [illegible] Prime Minister's speech [illegible] expected [illegible] Government. [illegible] throw [illegible] Government [illegible] The Mufti of Palestine on the 26th May [illegible] to have expressed the view that the Mufti [illegible] Lebanon but throughout the world according to Muslim [illegible] Deputies were unable to follow him in this extravagance and the Government is understood to have no intention of accepting [illegible].

Mr Stettinius has sent a reply to a letter addressed to him by the Lebanese Prime Minister on the subject of Palestine. The Prime Minister had pointed out the Lebanese interest in this question, stressing that it was not a sectarian one since the Christian Arabs of the Lebanon felt as strongly as do the Moslems, and that the Lebanon was directly concerned since Zionism was a dynamic force which might well overflow the frontiers of Palestine into the

Lebanon itself. Mr Stettinius's reply states that the United States Government will bear in mind the views of the Lebanese and of the other Arabs when considering the problem of Palestine, and recalls the United States Government's expressed view that no decision affecting the basic situation in Palestine should be reached without consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

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E 3775/5/89 61

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 163, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, for week ending 15th May, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office 4th June.)

General.

The end of the war in Europe was officially celebrated during the week [illegible] Allied fighting services were present. In the principal towns receptions were given by the local representatives of the Government and by the British political officers and the French délégués. On the whole the celebrations passed off without any major incident, though the general effect has undoubtedly been to resurrect much of the bad feeling between the French and the local authorities which has been lying dormant for the last few months.

In Damascus incidents occurred in which French soldiers and civilians acted in a provocative manner. Shots were fired and a small number of people were injured. Police intervention, however, prevented any of the incidents from assuming serious proportions. The Syrian Government protested to the French authorities against the behaviour of French nationals and also against the action of the French Prevote in arresting a Syrian for an alleged insult to the French flag. A hand grenade was also thrown in the early hours of the morning at the [illegible] of Deputies. The Syrian [illegible] that this was done by three members of the French forces and shots were exchanged or fired into the air.

V-day celebrations in Beirut, as might have been expected in the present political atmosphere, had [illegible] and made bad feeling all round. For these incidents the behaviour of certain French elements [illegible] the exclusion of the flags of any of the Allies. French lorries filled with the [illegible] shouting such slogans as: "We are your children and the country is yours, Oh [illegible] who were bribed to carry them, and tricolours were parachuted over the town by rocket; there seems no doubt that instances occurred of French personnel endeavouring to intimidate shopkeepers into displaying portraits of General de Gaulle.

While these extravagances were generally regarded with contempt and irritation, and were severely commented on in the press, some of the more extreme Christians participated in them. The Moslems reacted and staged Arab Nationalist demonstrations on the 9th and 10th May, in which a number of [illegible] from the Palestine [illegible] The demonstrators carried a portrait of the ex Mufti and shouted anti Zionist slogans; they did some damage in the Jewish quarter, apparently because a young Jew had shouted an insult against the Prophet, and when near a French convent, a stone was thrown at the Mufti's portrait, the demonstrators assumed the convent to be responsible, pulled down its French flags and broke its windows, and thereafter went through the town pulling down every tricolour they saw. Two French officers who intervened were assaulted. Some French-commanded Lebanese troops reacted in their turn, pulling down at least one Union Jack and [illegible] Palestinians who [illegible] police after the gendarmerie had failed. The British military authorities withdrew the Palestinians and placed the town out of bounds. The French authorities protested vigorously, but after discussion with IXth Army the matter is understood to have been settled.

On the 11th May the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, hearing that French troops were tearing down portraits of the Lebanese President, curtly told the French territorial commander to remove his troops from the streets, failing which he would order the gendarmerie to fire on anyone insulting the Lebanon. General Humblot, with surprising meekness, did so and there were no more incidents. The question of these disturbances was raised in the Chamber of Deputies on the 14th May when the Prime Minister stated that attempts to divide the population had failed in the face of general condemnation of the perpetrators and that the Lebanon, backed by 40 million Arabs, would pursue the path of full independence.

General Beynet returned quietly by air on the 12th May and saw the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 14th May. The Minister for Foreign Affairs complained of the conduct of the [illegible] the Palestinian troops, though they had taken part, had a [illegible] Neither the transfer of the troops specialists nor the French proposals for a settlement were discussed, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs learnt from General Beynet [illegible]

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Syria—Damascus.

On the 14th May the Syrian Chamber [illegible] protest [illegible] stirring up [illegible] tribes at the [illegible] Power [illegible] the [illegible] Syria [illegible] the French Special Troops [illegible]

A meeting took place on the 4th May at which a large [illegible] of [illegible] protested [illegible] troops [illegible] Deputies [illegible] the year. [illegible] day at the demonstrators were [illegible]

May [illegible] the 9th May [illegible] the Syrian Government. The Acting Prime Minister [illegible] Minister of the Interior, Minister of Public Works and the Transport [illegible] were absent. A [illegible] 500 people were present. The tone of the speeches was violently [illegible] Government.

General Olivi-Roget (he has just been promoted) was not invited to the Victory reception given by the President on the 9th May, as a result of the incident which occurred on the 6th December 1944 (see Weekly Political Summary No. 141, section 3, paragraph 2), at which he was considered by the Syrians to have insulted the President.

It is reported by the British Overseas Airways representative in Damascus that on the 5th May the American Minister approached the local French Air Force authorities in order to obtain permission for the use of the Mezze airport and its facilities. The British Overseas Airways representative believes that the proposal is to run a twice-weekly service for the purpose of carrying military loads via Lisbon, Istanbul, Damascus, Tehran, to India.

Aleppo

In Aleppo the French flag was noticeably omitted by Nationalists from their [illegible] May [illegible] boys of all religious denominations, over 1,800 in number, with police and fire brigade bands, after serenading the Mohafez, made a friendly demonstration outside the British Consulate. Neither the French Delegation nor other consulates were similarly favoured.

The Rev. Atakios Coussa arrived at Aleppo on the 27th April, having been charged by the Vatican to investigate the affairs of the Maronite community and to enquire into the recommendation put forward by the Apostolic delegate at Beirut that Mgr. Akras, the Maronite Archbishop of North Syria, should be asked to resign and be replaced. On the 4th May Mgr. Akras duly handed in his resignation.

Homs and Hama

Locusts have now reached an area only six miles from Homs. Locusts for eating are now on sale at £S 7 per sackful at Palmyra and £S 4 per sackful at Qariatein.

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Alaouite

There have been further minor incidents in the Alaouite area. On the 13th May the French delegué at Lattakia stated that he had received no orders to withdraw French troops from the Jebel area.

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Tribes

It is reported that the Shammar Agaidat Conference in Bagdad has settled outstanding differences between the two tribes, with a balance of payments of some 90 odd camels by the Agaidat to the Shammar and some 300 sheep by the Shammar to the Agaidat.

Frontier

A report from French sources describes a clash on the Turco-Syrian frontier near Yasirim on the 25th April, between Turkish soldiers and Syrian inhabitants of [illegible] who had [illegible] to make [illegible] in Turkish territory. Two Turkish soldiers are stated to have been killed and a few soldiers wounded; as a reprisal the Turkish military authorities are said to have arrested a few villagers from Yasirim.

Lebanon

See "General" above.

On the 14th May the Chamber [illegible] of the 1945 Budget. Several Deputies criticised the past and present financial policy of the Government, which the Prime Minister defended.

At a press [illegible] 12th May the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that no negotiations had begun between the Lebanese Government and the French for a University Convention. He also declared that the Government had taken no decisions about civil aviation or about the American application for concessions to erect oil refineries at Tripoli.

A delegation from the Arab Union Society of Cairo, headed by Fuad Abaza Pasha, arrived in Beirut on the 12th May and will be the guests of the Government. Their object is apparently to open an Arab Union Centre.

In general the week has shown a marked increase in tension, as a result of the V-day disturbances, the arrival of the French cruiser *Montcalm*, with troops, and the spread of rumours (some probably French-inspired) that anything up to 50,000 more French troops may be expected to arrive in the near future.

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Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 164, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 22nd May, 1945.—(Received 10th October.)

General

THERE has [illegible] rapid deterioration [illegible] general situation in the Levant States during the week. Following the increase in tension arising out of V-day [illegible] Weekly [illegible] No. 163, details of the arrival of the French cruiser *Jeanne d'Arc* on the 17th May, bringing about 600 French reinforcements, has aroused intense public indignation in both States, and, in Syria at least, had led to a high state of tension. The belief is widespread that the return of General Beynet (on the 12th May) was deliberately delayed so that he might be able to present the French demands to the Levant States Governments simultaneously with the arrival of these reinforcements.

On the 18th May General Beynet, at a meeting in Damascus with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of both Syria and the Lebanon, presented them with a note, in which were set out the French proposals for a settlement. The note stated that French interests in the States are cultural, economic and strategic and proposed that the cultural interests should be safeguarded by a University Convention, the commercial interests by agreements on the lines of "usual international [illegible] commercial agreement, and the strategic interests by the establishment of military bases which would guarantee the lines of communication between France and her [illegible] possessions. Once agreement had been reached on these three points, the French Government would be prepared to hand over the Troupes Spéciales to the States, with the reserve that they should remain under French command "as long as circumstances do not permit the full exercise of national commands."

On the 19th May the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents met at Chtaura, [illegible] Bey Mardam, Abdul Hamid Karami, and Henri Pharaon were present. A [illegible] issued jointly by the two Governments on the 21st May on the results [illegible] stated that the two parties had considered the situation which arose from (*a*) the arrival of French troops subsequent to the presentation to the Allied Powers [illegible] requesting that foreign troops should not enter their territory without their previous consent, and (*b*) the French proposals for a [illegible] had been handed to the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs by General Beynet on the 17th May. The two Governments had reached the conclusion that the disembarkation of these troops was an infringement of their sovereignty, and that General Beynet's note contained proposals incompatible with Syrian and Lebanese independence. They had consequently agreed to refuse to enter into negotiations and to throw on the French Government all responsibility which might result from this [illegible] the two countries. Notes closely following the lines of the communiqué, which was [illegible] ments to General Beynet and to the British, United States and Soviet representatives.

The principal towns in both countries were closed on the 19th May and demonstrations took place. In Damascus and Aleppo serious incidents occurred on the 19th and 20th in which a number of Syrians were killed and wounded. (For details see Syria Damascus and Aleppo respectively of this Summary.)

In Syria hostility to the French is more active than at any time since the Allied occupation. There are indications that many leaders, especially of the National *bloc*, are anxious to force the issue before more troops arrive, and it is probable that these elements are behind the disorders which have already occurred, as the students and population will in general take orders from them. The Government seem uncertain how to act. They are reported to be sounding such elements as tribal chiefs and Druzes in order to ascertain how far they can count on them for [illegible] the French at most a[illegible], and they are doubtless also in touch with the other Arab Governments for the same purpose. Their future course of action will [illegible] at least be conditioned by the replies they receive. In the Lebanon, although extreme Christians are still obsessed with the advantages of French protection, hostility to the French is more widespread than at any time since November 1943.

But, whatever policy the Governments desire to pursue, there is a limit to their influence over their undisciplined populations, and there is at least considerable danger that disorders will increase rather than decrease.

The Syrian President had a recurrence of internal hæmorrhage on the night [illegible] May. [illegible] General Hospital, Beirut, visited him on the 20th and gave him a blood transfusion. Two British doctors, in addition to a number of local doctors, are looking after him and he has British night and day nurses. He is reported to be making good progress.

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Syria—Damascus

The town has been closed since the 19th May and demonstrations have taken place daily. On the 19th, as a result of missiles thrown from the French hospital at the demonstrators, the crowd overturned and set fire to two French lorries. Several grenades were thrown by Frenchmen and some exchange of shots took [illegible] having thrown one grenade, with a second in his hand. Twenty-three Syrian casualties were detained in hospital. The gendarmerie restored order shortly [illegible] On the 20th there was a number of clashes between the demonstrators and [illegible] installations, firing continued for a large part of the morning, but only three people were wounded. Demonstrations have continued and isolated incidents have occurred, but up to the present the gendarmerie have taken action solely against Syrians in order to protect French interests. The French have mounted additional guards on a number of their installations and more than once have sent lorry loads of armed troops through the streets. The Syrians have protested to the French against low flying aircraft, the throwing of bombs by Frenchmen, the placing of road control posts on the outskirts of the town and the mounting of guards and tanks in and around the town. The French have protested at the [illegible] by the Government of the inhabitants of Damascus, and at various incidents in which French men or French institutions have been attacked.

The Syrian Government are complaining bitterly that their gendarmerie are [illegible] chief Middle East, to supply them with transport and 2,500 rifles. Meanwhile, they have enlisted into the gendarmerie between 400 and 500 university students and propose to give them three days' training, after which they will be [illegible] rearmed and will assist in maintaining order in the town.

Aleppo

Minor demonstrations occurred in Aleppo on the 18th and the 19th May. On the 20th a crowd of nearly 1,000 young men, many of whom were armed, stoned the Prévôté Headquarters and attacked a French motor car, the occupants of which fired in the air. One demonstrator was killed and a few injured. The crowd then returned to the Prevôté and again stoned it, a French gendarme was killed and further attacks followed on French cars and tramways and on isolated French soldiers. About midday the French sent four tanks and four armoured cars into the town to clear the streets and restore order.

The Mohafez informed His Majesty's consul that after the first incident reported above, the Mohafez had asked the French officer commanding troops to put the town out of bounds to his men and had repeated this request later in the day but he [illegible] continued to circulate in Aleppo. The total casualties reported are: killed French 3, Syrians 8, and wounded French 12, Syrians 22.

Homs and Hama

In Hama Alaouite members of the Battalion Desert Léger were reported to have [illegible] restoration of the French flag to the Sûreté building, which had been torn down the previous week. After strong representations to the Délégué the ceremony was called off, and, although a considerable number of arms, including tommy guns, had been brought into the town and the shops were shut, no incident occurred.

Jebel Druze

Sixty-three of the other ranks of the Druze Squadron recently "[illegible]" by the French at Homs have been taken on the strength of the Druze gendarmerie

and have been issued with arms and uniforms, preparatory to being used as watchmen.

The Emir Hussein-el-Atrash has informed the Political Officer that he has had an interview with the Syrian President at which he offered to call over the loyal officers of the Groupement Druze and to take prisoner all French officers in the Jebel whenever the Government wishes. The Government are understood to have asked him to hold his hand

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Lebanon

The *Jeanne d'Arc* sailed on the 21st May taking 13 French civilian and 220 military and naval personnel

On the 17th May the Chamber met again to discuss the situation resulting from the arrival of the *Jeanne d'Arc* Khalil Abu Jaoudeh, a Maronite deputy made a violent speech of protest against this infringement of Lebanese independence, and the Prime Minister, in reply, stated that the Lebanon was prepared to fight for her sovereignty and called upon the other Arab nations to shed their blood, if need be, in this cause. He stated that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had proceeded to Damascus to concert action with the Syrian Government

Beirut and Tripoli were completely closed from the 10th May to the 21st May The Government had apparently ordered this closure as a symbol of protest against the arrival of troops and French proposals. There were no serious incidents A large section of the press has published outspoken articles condemning the despatch of French troops and reaffirming Lebanese determination to achieve complete independence The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who claims with some truth to have the situation completely in hand, is clearly opposed to any disorders and is said to be [illegible] draft treaty for simultaneous presentation to France, Great Britain and the United States, so as to avoid the impression that the Lebanese Government are adopting a merely negative attitude in the face of French proposals. Serious disorders are, therefore not to be feared unless and until the situation in Syria deteriorates more markedly

The Lebanese Chamber met on the 15th and 16th May to continue the study of the budget Several deputies objected strongly to the Government's action in prolonging the contract for the French financial adviser but after the Government had explained that he was a useful man and that his title had been changed to that of "expert" the necessary credit was voted

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[E 7606/5 89]

(11)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No 185, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 20th May, 1945.—(Received 10th October.)

General

During the week tension increased throughout Syria [illegible] incidents became more frequent and more serious. [illegible] steady increase in the number of deserters from the Troops [illegible] there is no evidence that the Syrian Government encouraged these desertions All towns remained closed His Majesty's Minister and G O C 9th Army continued to urge patience and restraint on both sides, but it was increasingly evident that such counsels could not [illegible] be effective. Moreover the texts of the two alleged draft proclamations by General Olivia Roget, couched in language which could only betoken an intention to force the issue, came into the possession of the Syrian Government The French Sous Délégué admitted that one of the texts was authentic but asserted that he had burnt it and declared the other to be a forgery the Syrians were convinced that both were genuine Subsequent events suggest that they are right

Minor incidents occurred in many towns on the 23rd, 24th and 25th. On the 26th in an interview with His Majesty's Minister, General Beynet talked about the "battle atmosphere" in Damascus and expressed the view that if the Syrians wanted it they could have it. On the 27th May the French military authorities requisitioned O C P lorries in Aleppo and Damascus and on the same day the D H P railways was sabotaged near Hama, trains in both directions being turned back. During this period telephone and telegraphic communication between the various Syrian towns began to break down and by the 28th no communication was possible except by wireless from Damascus in any direction other than to Beirut. On the night of the 27th-28th a northbound train was derailed at Kaoukab, some 15 miles north of Hama and three French armoured cars were ambushed at Hama, one being burnt out and destroyed. During the night of the 27th and on the morning of the 28th and 29th there was indiscriminate mortaring and shelling by the French of both Homs and Hama with numerous casualties. The situation in both towns rapidly deteriorated with the French isolated and firing at any moving object, and the roads barricaded On the morning of the 29th it was reported that the Transjordan Consul had been shot and seriously wounded by fire from the French barracks whilst entering Derna in a car flying the Transjordan flag and that fighting had broken out there between the French and the local population. It was also reported by the French that tribal horsemen had attacked the main Euphrates bridge at Deir Z

The Syrian Government until the 28th succeeded in maintaining a large measure of control and in Damascus in particular the behaviour of the gendarmerie was most praiseworthy As was to be expected, however, as communications broke down and incident followed incident the local authorities, without the means of support from the central Government, found it increasingly difficult to control the actions of the people in the face of French provocation

The French continued to display their guns, their armour and their armed forces in a way which convinced the Syrians that force was the argument which the French intended to use General Beynet himself in a conversation with the Army Commander twice used the word "intimidation" when referring to the reason for low flying by French aircraft and other displays of French forces

At 7 o clock on the evening of the 29th May, when the Syrian Chamber had failed to meet through lack of a quorum, a shot was fired near the Serail in D[illegible] from the Cherkass Barracks and a general fusillade followed from the French all over the town Civilians and gendarmerie in the streets eventually replied and soon afterwards the French opened indiscriminate mortar and artillery fire on the centre of the town. At 8 o'clock just before dark an aeroplane flew in and dropped at least two bombs, one of which hit the Citadel

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Syria—Damascus

At a [illegible] of Deputies on the 24th May laws were passed for the creation of a force of 5,000 gendarmes and for the recruitment in the case of necessity of a National Guard of all Syrians between 18 and 60 At a sitting of the Chamber on the 26th, violent anti-French speeches were made and the Acting Prime Minister stated that it had been decided to request a meeting of the Arab League Council to consider the position of the Levant States.

Considerable excitement was caused in the town on the 26th May when the Syrian authorities obtained the text of a secret French communiqué addressed by General Olivia Roget to all French subjects, in which it was stated that the French should be patient for a few days or only for a few hours, that every man should hold himself in readiness for "la grande bagarre," when accounts would be settled at one blow The French at first denied the authenticity of the document, but finally admitted that it had been prepared as a draft

Aleppo.

On the night of the 23rd 24th the one remaining French unit in the Citadel was withdrawn to barracks outside the town without incident, after the intervention of His Majesty's Consul at the request of both the Mohafez and the French authorities to obtain a guarantee from the Syrians that the convoy would be unmolested. Two batteries of French 75's have remained trained on the town, intermittent indiscriminate firing has taken place and there have been some casualties. The French control the western quarter of Aleppo where they patrol the streets under the muzzles of their field guns and their machine guns the remainder of the town is under Syrian control

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Jebel Druze

The situation in the Jebel Druze remained tense all the week and the Mohafez of Soueida informed the Political Officer that if the signal for revolt is given to the Druze troops they will immediately declare for the Government, overpower the French officers and hold the Citadels in the principal towns

See also General Section

Homs

Events in the rest of Syria have been followed with close interest. The general feeling is probably one of relief that nothing has taken place in Lattakia

Following the statement which he made by proxy in the Syrian Chamber that he was now prepared to support the National Government, Suleiman Murshid returned to his home in Jobit from Damascus on the afternoon of the 20th May

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Lebanon

[illegible] Syria have overshadowed everything else during the past week [illegible] Government has maintained close contact with the Syrian Government and a meeting was held at Chtaura on the 20th May at which it was decided [illegible] Majesty's Minister saw both Ministers of Foreign Affairs after the meeting and the possibility of the preparation of treaties for simultaneous discussion with the British, American and French Governments was discussed

The town of Beirut was closed on 24th May as a sign of sympathy with the [illegible] and a number of anti French articles and cartoons have appeared in the [illegible] A joint Syrian and Lebanese Press announcement was made in San Francisco on the 23rd May in which it was stated that neither Government could accept the French demands

The French have been encouraging the Christian leaders of Moslem [illegible] tion, and on the 20th May at the instigation of Mgr Tapouni, the Maronite Patriarch convoked a meeting of all the heads of Christian communities at Bkerke to discuss "the present situation." The announcement of this meeting caused some uneasiness amongst the Moslems and the possibility of holding a Moslem [illegible] inter communal feeling would outweigh any advantage, and the idea has now been dropped. The [illegible] Patriarch informing him that he could not attend nor could he delegate anyone to do so since such discussions should not be confined to Christians only At the Conference a number of resolutions were put forward declaring that the delegates fully supported the sovereignty and independence of the Lebanon and that they looked to France and the country's other Allies to protect them, and expressing a desire to live on friendly terms with neighbouring countries and with the allies of the Lebanon A further resolution recommended that a treaty should be made with France in which the independence of both countries should be safeguarded In the pro-French Press accounts of the meeting suggested that agreement to these resolutions had been unanimous, but in fact the Maronite Archbishop Moubarek, of Beirut, and the Maronite Bishops Haj and Abdullah Khouri and the Greek Catholic Archbishop Sayigh, did not agree with the last resolution The Orthodox Armenian delegates said they had no power to sign on behalf of their Patriarch

No instances have been reported from the provincial towns of Franco Lebanese clashes

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E 4669/5 69) (12)

Extracts from the Weekly Political Summary No. 186, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 5th June, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office, 20th June.)

General

Syria, where the situation had been deteriorating steadily since early in May, [illegible] the past week. Homs and Hama had already gone up on the 20th May the French garrisons in the Jebel Druze and Hauran were bloodlessly liquidated by the Syrians, on the night of the 28-29th May trouble started in Deir ez-Zor, and on the evening of the 29th May heavy firing

broke out in Damascus and Deir ez-Zor, continuing until the 1st June. Lattakia alone of the principal towns remained quiet

During the past month His Majesty's Government, in concert with the American Government, had repeatedly warned General de Gaulle of the dangers inherent in the situation in the Levant States and particularly in the event of the arrival of further French reinforcements, however small in number, as a prelude to the presentation of the French proposals for a treaty. As soon as reports of the outbreak of open hostilities in Damascus and other parts of Syria were received in London the Cabinet met to consider what steps could be taken to restore order in the States and to eliminate the serious threat to Allied lines of communication with the Far East. On the afternoon of the 31st May Mr Eden informed the House of Commons that a message from the Prime Minister was being handed to General de Gaulle in Paris stating that, in view of the grave situation which had arisen between French troops and the Levant States and the [illegible] His Majesty's Government had with profound regret ordered the Commander-in-chief, Middle East, to intervene in order to prevent further bloodshed and to restore order, once firing had ceased His Majesty's Government would be prepared to begin tripartite [illegible] President [illegible] Mr Churchill [illegible] approval of the order to the Commander-in-chief, Middle East

In the late afternoon of the 31st May General Pilleau, who had taken command of the Ninth Army in place of General Holmes, absent on sick leave, informed General Humblot of the commander-in-chief's instructions to intervene to restore order, General Humblot said that he had received instructions from Paris that French troops were not to resist such intervention. The Syrian President was informed at 6 15 the same day of the action which His Majesty's Government were taking Later in the evening the British commander in Damascus informed General Olivi Roget, who said that he had received no instructions and would not accept orders from a British officer He finally admitted that he had received orders, and ordered the cease fire in Damascus at 10 15 on the following morning He was subsequently removed from Damascus by order of the commander-in-chief and flew to Paris, whence, however, he has now returned after making a statement to the press which contained a number of untruths

The Commander-in-chief, Middle East arrived by air in Beirut escorted by two squadrons of Spitfires early on the morning of the 1st June, a British cruiser and two destroyers also arrived during the morning After calling on General Beynet and being received by the Lebanese President and Cabinet [illegible] His Majesty's Minister at the Sea [illegible] where [illegible] crowds had gathered General Paget proceeded to Damascus with Mr Shone and saw the President of the Syrian Republic, who promised the fullest co-operation with British forces. In Damascus, too, there was great popular enthusiasm and soon after the entry of the British forces at 4 p.m. some shops were opened and the streets were [illegible] people. For the next few days however, the [illegible] remained partially closed and a curfew was imposed to ensure that French military personnel and civilians were evacuated without incident

From the 1st June onwards French military personnel and civilians have been withdrawn under British protection from most of the principal Syrian towns [illegible] Aleppo [illegible] French [illegible] of the town and the [illegible] area [illegible] withdrawal has taken place. As a result there are two large concentrations of French troops near Mezze near Damascus where there are some 2,000 French troops and the other at Rayak in the Bekaa. Many [illegible] French officers and most of the civilians have found their way to Beirut

General de Gaulle has refused to accept His Majesty's Government's suggestion of a tripartite inquiry in London on the Levant States and has made another proposal of a five power conference including Russia and China to discuss the whole Middle East. His Majesty's Government and the United States Government at present both seemed disinclined to accept this. The States Governments seemed at first to favour a five Power conference but later indicated their preference for three Power discussions; their main concern was, however, to secure representation for themselves from the outset at any such conference. The Arab League has also staked a claim to participate

The Syrian authorities have shown every wish to co-operate with the commander-in-chief, but have stated clearly that they cannot accept any proposal which entails French officers or troops remaining in the country Certainly at present, and possibly for a long time to come, the lives of French officers in Syria will be in danger

Many problems remain to be dealt with. The most urgent are the future of [illegible] this report) the Mixed Courts, the Customs Department of the Intérêts Communs, [illegible] frontier and passport control services in which the French have participated in the past.

In a press interview on the 4th June General de Gaulle accused the British [illegible] cations which arose from the attitude taken either at highest level by British Government or at low level by a mass of agents who assumed on the spot a hostile or critical attitude." He went on to say that armed bands helped by the Syrian police and gendarmerie, which forces carried arms supplied to them by British [illegible] ments since the 8th May. There had been some killed and French troops had had to react and re-establish order, which, except in Jebel Druze they had done everywhere, though often with some difficulty as in Damascus, where certain French establishments were surrounded by crowds of gendarmes and artillery. Sir E. Grigg, in a press interview in Beirut on the 11th June, refuted a number of the [illegible] the Syrians had attacked French installations, that the Corps should prepare a report on the condition of the principal French and Syrian buildings.

Economic

The most urgent problem raised by the refusal of the Syrians to have any [illegible] had only sufficient grain for six days, the Lebanon was little better off, and the first of the new harvest was ready for purchase and collection. It was obvious that the Syrians would not sell grain to the O.C.P., which was closely connected [illegible] for military purposes by French troops in Aleppo and Damascus. The commander-in-chief therefore decided that it was necessary for the Ninth Army to take over responsibility for feeding the two countries and set up a temporary organisation known as M.I.R.A., by which the Ninth Army will carry out the task of the purchase and distribution of grain in co-operation with the local Governments. M.I.R.A. will take over the transport and property of the O.C.P. and will be financed by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments; it is already in action.

Syria—Damascus

[illegible] the Syrians had attacked French installations, that the Corps should prepare a report on the condition of the principal French and Syrian buildings. [illegible] the night of the [illegible] May [illegible] the 1st June. Both on the 31st May and the 1st June there was considerable looting by Senegalese soldiers and Troupes Spéciales in the Merje Square and the areas near the hospital. General Olivo Rogot [illegible] place.

A Brigade mounted column entered the town in the late afternoon and ensured the [illegible] General Olivo Rogot's order. By 7 o'clock in the evening the Syrian flag was again flying over the Syrian Parliament building. The British forces received

an enthusiastic welcome from the people of Damascus, and a certain number of shops were open the same evening. By the 5th June the life of the town had almost returned to normal, the majority of the shops were opened and the curfew lifted.

Considerable damage was done by high-explosives and fire near the centre of the town, and Syrian hospitals and ambulances were fired on by French troops, one Syrian doctor being killed whilst travelling in an ambulance. The official Syrian figures of casualties for Damascus were: killed gendarmes 80, civilians 400, wounded seriously 500, minor injuries 1,000, and 500 gendarmes missing. One British officer, Major Scott Nicholson, of O.C.P., was killed in the Orient Palace Hotel, and Mrs. Gray of the Church Army was also killed in the Church Army building. One British officer and one British O.R. were injured by mortar fire, and a British Indian [illegible] in the Citadel who lost their lives when bombs and shells fell on the prison there.

Aleppo

The town remained closed and uneasy during the week and there was sporadic shooting but no actual fighting. The French ordered the cease fire at 11.15 on the night of the 31st May, and a British armoured column arrived at 12.30 p.m. on the 2nd June.

Homs and Hama

Hama, where some fighting had taken place on the 28th May, was the scene of bombing, artillery and mortar fire and general fighting during the 30th and 31st. Much destruction was done in the town and casualties are estimated at more than eighty killed and fifty wounded. One French aeroplane was shot down by small-arms fire and one driven off on fire. An armistice was arranged to collect dead and wounded on the evening of the 31st.

In Homs, after heavy firing on the 28th and 29th May, shooting continued. British troops arrived in the town on the evening of the 1st June and passed through Hama an hour later.

The French claimed that they shelled and mortared Homs on the nights of the 27th and 28th May in order to defend themselves against a massed and carefully prepared attack on the delegation. In fact, the attack was made by some dozen men and this only in reprisal for [illegible] by the délégué's guards of two babies playing in the porch of a nearby house. This incident, the French claimed, occurred the following day, but there is positive proof to the contrary, so that in Homs at least it was the French who initiated violent action.

Jebel Druze

On the 29th May the Mohafez of the Jebel Druze, the Emir Hassan el Atrash, occupied the Citadel at Soueida. There was no resistance from the French-commanded troops of the Druse, who deserted *en bloc* as did all other French troops in the Jebel. French officers and civilians were moved to the Emir's house, where they remained throughout the troubles under the Emir's protection. No blood was shed. In the Hauran the French barracks at Deraa were attacked and occupied by the townspeople after some forty-eight hours' fighting; the French barracks at Ezraa were occupied without resistance. Both garrisons were captured.

Alaouites

The situation remained uneasy throughout the week in the Lattakia area, but no incidents took place.

Euphrates and Jezireh

In Deir-ez-Zor the situation was tense, but relatively calm until the night of the 28th–29th May, when a bomb was thrown into the French Political Offices. Next morning barricades were erected in the streets and the French fired on the crowd, causing several casualties. At 9 a.m. a meeting between the Mohafez and tribal leaders took place, at the latter's house, at which a protest was lodged against the French action. During the course of the meeting firing broke out [illegible] entered the Mohafez's house [illegible] a sheikh. Later in the day an agreement was reached between the French and Syrian authorities by which the French guards [illegible] were replaced by Syrian gendarmes, but the French announced they would call in air support if the tribes attacked.

On the 30th May French troops withdrew from the town to positions outside and the tribesmen were thus able to pour into the town. French armoured cars caused damage and casualties by bombarding the town

Early on the 31st May several French planes dropped bombs on the town, one of which hit British Military Headquarters. At 10 30 a second air raid took [illegible] damage, loss of life and great terror among the townspeople. By 4 p.m. fir[illegible] people meanwhile streaming out of the town into the desert. Late that night news was received of the commander in-chief's intervention. Deir ez-Zor since then has been returning to normal, but the tribal situation is causing some anxiety

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Lebanon

During the early part of the week there was some criticism that the British were taking no action with regard to affairs in Syria. The Lebanese Government were in close touch with the President of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies, who left Damascus by car with the Russian Minister on the morning of the 30th May Apart, however, from expressions of solidarity with the Syrian Government, no direct action was taken against the French by the Lebanese. The Government [illegible] retaliation Apart from the closing of Beirut and Tripoli on the 31st May and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd June, the Government followed this advice.

In the last few days, however, tension has been increasing as it becomes apparent that the French are being removed from Syria to the Lebanon A big concentration of French forces is at Rayak and on the 4th June anti-French feeling has become so marked in Baalbek nearby that the French Political Officer and the Sureté aux Armées were conveyed by the French to Zahlé. In Beirut itself the French are nervous and are making some show of force, moving armed troops about in motor vehicles and allowing armed military personnel to walk about the town Michel Pharnon has been elected as the head of all youth movements, irrespective of their religious connexions, and there is widespread anxiety that the French will remain in the Lebanon stronger than ever although French agents are active in encouraging Christian fears of Moslem domination should French protection be removed

E 4665/5 69] (13.

Extracts from the Weekly Political Summary No 167 Secret Syria and the Lebanon, 12th June, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office 29th.)

General

In Syria, during the week, progress has been made in the evacuation of French military personnel and civilians from some of the principal towns. In addition, the new cereal collection organisation, M I R.A., has started to operate, though there still remain many problems [illegible] civilian personnel from Franco-Syrian organisations have been dealt with on an *ad hoc* basis. There have been a number of Franco-Syrian incidents varying in gravity from the mutiny of a company of Méharistes at Dmeir to isolated attacks on individual Frenchmen who have disobeyed instructions from the Anglo-French Joint Staff and appeared in the streets of Syrian towns.

In the Lebanon there has been a growing anxiety at the influx of French troops and French civilians, and regrets are freely expressed that British advice was so scrupulously followed by the Government that no disorders occurred, and that in consequence no British military intervention has been necessary Certain Christian elements are being actively encouraged by the French to feel that they will be victimised should the French ever leave the country; and the French are taking every opportunity by means of public statements, the press, Radio Levant, [illegible] Syria were unnecessary and committed for purely selfish ends, and that France has the backing of Russia, who will ensure the return of French influence. French troops are in evidence in the streets of Beirut and Tripoli

[illegible]

With the dispersal of the British forces and the necessity for guarding not only, the [illegible] and the few French officials remaining in the various towns, there is a possibility that disorders may occur in such places as Tripoli and Lattakia, where there is no concentration of British forces. The present situation is one which cannot last and unless a settlement is reached before long deterioration seems inevitable

Saadullah Bey Jabri and the Lebanese delegation to the Arab League Conference returned to Beirut on the 12th June. The decisions taken by the League at the final meetings remain secret.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 16th–31st May, 1945, amount to 270 tons, a daily average of 17 tons which [illegible] the 1944–45 crop up to 178,250 tons.

As a result of French action in Syria between the 27th May and the 4th June [illegible] the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, set up a temporary organisation [illegible] M I R A [illegible] distribution of grain [illegible] M I R.A. as a ready [illegible] against the formation of M I R.A.; but it is hoped that discussions with the French about O.C.T. assets and personnel coupled with the numerous assurances that M I R.A. is only a temporary organisation, whose establishment is not [illegible] of O.C.T. [illegible]

Syria [illegible]

[illegible] that the Syrian [illegible] Minister [illegible] what they saw [illegible] great efforts have been made [illegible] force.

Direct contact between the Syrian authorities and the French Delegation has ceased to exist, and His Majesty's Legation and Consulate have as a result been used as a channel of communication

Almost every Damascene feels that in view of recent events he can have no further dealings with the French. The [illegible] informed that financial transactions with French [illegible] the bank to danger of attack, and even the use of [illegible] The Lawyers' Syndicate have [illegible] proposals that the 29th May [illegible] that French memorials should be removed [illegible] should be left in its present [illegible] French savagery, bearing a plaque on which will be [illegible] the names of those [illegible]

The British military commission which was responsible for the selection [illegible] prisoners and for [illegible] French establishments quickly completed its task and a considerable number of Syrian Government property was returned to the [illegible] On the 9th June the safe belonging to the Syrian

Chamber of Deputies was discovered in the residence of General Olivn Roget, together with boxes of Parliamentary archives. The French authorities suggested to the Syrian officials [illegible] British [illegible] commander, visited the residence, that the safe had been taken there for safe keeping, and regretted that it had been damaged in transport. The safe door bore the marks of having received considerable attention, and the locks had been so damaged that it was not possible for the Syrian officials to open it at the time.

On the 8th June the Méharistes Company at Dmeir revolted and killed six of their officers and four non-commissioned officers. A party arrived in armoured cars shortly afterwards at the Citadel, and by arrangement with the Syrian authorities were disarmed but not put under arrest, on condition that they should be at the disposal of the British military authorities when required. The remainder of the company at Dmeir were similarly disarmed and were evacuated on the following day. Pending a final decision the Méharistes have been put at the disposal of the Syrian Bedouin Control, to which the French Commandant Lacroix has been attached as adviser. A British force known as Bedou Force, under the command of Colonel King, has been formed to assist the Syrian authorities when necessary in maintaining security in the desert.

A numerous medical mission under the auspices of the Egyptian Red Crescent arrived in Damascus on the 6th June. The precursors of the mission who arrived by plane on the previous day received a very chilly reception from the French authorities at Mezzé airport.

Faiz Khouri, Minister designate to Moscow, has been temporarily put in charge of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

[illegible]

The situation in Aleppo during the week has given rise to considerable anxiety. The French have not wholly withdrawn to barracks west of the town and still occupy a number of buildings in the western and most European quarter in which automatic guns can be clearly seen by the passers-by, and groups of French troops are also to be seen in the streets. It is reported that there has been some victimisation by the Syrian authorities of Syrians previously employed by the French, these for the most part are Chr[illegible] and this has given rise to uneasiness amongst the minorities that they may be attacked by the Moslems.

On the nights of the 9th and 10th June, fighting broke out at Jisr el [illegible], [illegible] company of the B.I.[illegible] was sent from Lattakia to evacuate French personnel. It is not yet clear how the fighting started but there were casualties on both sides and Syrian buildings were machine-gunned and [illegible]. The [illegible] reported to be tense at Latakia. These events have still further increased the tension in Aleppo, where ugly incidents, which may well spread to general disorder, [illegible] at any time unless French troops and civilians are withdrawn. The British authorities have made every attempt to urge on the Syrian authorities the absolute necessity of maintaining order and preventing incidents by irresponsibles.

Homs and Hama.

All the French have been evacuated from Homs and Hama. The students of the military school at Homs were sent to their homes on leave.

The French Méharistes Company at Palmyra was disarmed by a British column on the 11th June, and its French officers taken into protective custody as [illegible].

Jebel Druze.

The 1,400 members of the Groupement Druze who placed themselves under the orders of the Emir Hassan el Atrash on the 29th May [illegible] some concern, and a large quantity of French arms and ammunition had disappeared from the Citadel at Soueida. Arrangements were made with the Syrian Government [illegible] for payment of the troops from Syrian Government funds and the Emir Hassan has proceeded to Soueida accompanied by an official of the Ministry of Finance to undertake this task. A British officer has also been appointed as "Military Adviser" to the Emir and it is hoped that with this assistance the Emir will be able to set about collecting the missing arms before they have time to go underground or cross the frontier. A small British force is being despatched to assist him in this task.

Alaouite Territory.

The situation of the French in the Alaouite Territory remains unchanged though there has been considerable tension in the town, and Nationalist representatives have made repeated requests to Syrian and British authorities that the French should go as in other parts of Syria. The French, on the other hand, are showing no signs of going, and in fact have occupied the Citadel and exposed field guns and machine guns to the view of passers-by. As in Aleppo, as [illegible] of incidents spreading to general disorder.

Mazhar Pasha Raslan has been appointed Mohafez of Lattakia.

Euphrates and Jezireh.

An uneasy calm returned to Deir-ez-Zor at the beginning of the month, after [illegible] of British troops under the command of Colonel King, officer commanding Bedou Force, did not arrive in the town until the 8th June. Their presence had an immediate calming effect on the population, who gave them an enthusiastic welcome. Shortly afterwards part of the force moved to Raqqa, where there had been some fighting between the French and the local inhabitants during which the town was [illegible] by British troops.

French troops are mainly confined to their barracks in Deir-ez-Zor, and on the 10th and 11th June women and children of French military families were evacuated by air to the Lebanon.

There has been no open hostility to the French in the Jezireh area though the Mohafez has complained to officer commanding Bedou Force of alleged French efforts to stir up trouble in the area.

* * * * * *

Lebanon. (See also General.)

The events of the past fortnight have given an opportunity for criticism of the Government. Riad Solh has made it clear that he feels he has been [illegible] opportunity to take part in the deliberations and consultations in which [illegible] therefore not improbable that he will shortly organise an attack on the existing Government, with the intention of returning to power or at least regaining a place in the Cabinet.

The Lebanese Government have kept in close touch with their Syrian colleagues, and adopt the attitude that in any settlement both countries should receive similar treatment. Some anxiety is shown that the discussions will drag on until after the British General Election, and that a Labour Government, if returned, may be less inclined to support the Levant States in their demand for the elimination of all French privilege.

Local Communist leaders are taking the line that France and Britain intend to divide up the Levant States, and that the former will never leave the Lebanon nor the latter Syria; disorders in the Lebanon should at all costs be avoided as they would be certain to lead to civil war, the only course now left is diplomatic action, and the support of the U.S.S.R. and the United States must be obtained.

Radio Levant continues under French control. The tone of many of these broadcasts is anti-British, and much of the output is strongly resented by the Lebanese.

On the 13th June the Lebanese Foreign Minister published a communique replying to General Beynet's Press Conference. He gave an accurate factual account of the principal events between the 3rd May and 19th May, including the arrival of two French cruisers with troops, the presentation of Lebanese and Syrian Notes requesting that troops should not be brought into their territories without their previous consent, the States' warning to French against the [illegible] refusing to negotiate with the French under pressure. He went on to express the complete solidarity of his Government with the Syrians and their indignation at the bombardment of Damascus and other Syrian towns, and concluded that the Lebanese Government considered that French actions call for the intervention of international justice, and that the French Government must accept all responsibility for a situation created by their actions in the Levant States.

CHAPTER VI.—GENERAL.

E 2594 3 66] No. 37

Lord Killearn to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd April.)

(No. 589.)

Sir, *Cairo, 12th April, 1945.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 563 of the 31st March, in which you requested a translation from the full Arabic text of the Covenant of the Arab League, I have the honour to transmit the enclosed English translation which [illegible] text supplied by Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

2. It will be seen that the enclosed translation incorporates the passage which, as reported in my telegram No. 730 of the 27th March, was omitted from Annex II of the Covenant in the French version. Attention is also invited to the wording of the first sentence of article 5 where the French version referred to disputes between two States of the League, whereas the enclosed translation from the Arabic text refers to disputes between two or more States of the League.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch, with enclosure, to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, His Majesty's representatives at Bagdad, Beirut and Jedda, the High Commissioner for Palestine, the four Service Chiefs, and Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East.

I have, &c.
KILLEARN

Enclosure in No. 37

(Translation.)

Covenant of the League of Arab States

His Excellency the President of the Syrian Republic,
His Royal Highness the Emir of Transjordania,
His Majesty the King of Iraq,*
His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia,*
His Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic,
His Majesty the King of Egypt,
His Majesty the King of the Yemen,

Desirous of strengthening the close relations and numerous ties which bind the Arab States, and anxious to cement and reinforce these ties on the basis of respect of the independence and sovereignty of these States, to direct their efforts for the welfare and prosperity of all the Arab countries, to assure their future, to achieve their aspirations and hopes, and in response to public opinion in all the Arab countries,

Have decided to conclude a pact with these objects in view and have delegated the following [illegible]

His Excellency the President of the Syrian Republic has delegated for Syria:

His Excellency Fares el Khoury, Prime Minister.
His Excellency El Sayed Jamil Mardam Bey, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Royal Highness the Emir of Transjordania has delegated for Transjordania:

His Excellency Samir el Rifai Pasha, Prime Minister.
His Excellency Said el Mufti Pasha, Minister of Interior.
Soliman el Nabulsi Bey, Secretary of the Council of Ministers.

His Majesty the King of Iraq has delegated for Iraq:

His Excellency Sayed Aashad el Omary, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
His [illegible] Iraqi Minister Plenipotentiary in Washington.
His Excellency El Sayed Tahsin el Askari, Iraqi Minister Plenipotentiary in Cairo.

His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia has delegated for Saudi Arabia:

His Excellency El Sheikh Yusuf Yassin, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs for Saudi Arabia.
His Excellency El Sayed Khair el Din el Zereky, Counsellor of Saudi Arabian Legation in Cairo.

His Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic has delegated for the Lebanon:

His Excellency El Sayed Abdel Hamid Karamy, Prime Minister.
His Excellency El Sayed Yusuf Salem, Lebanese Minister Plenipotentiary in Cairo.

His Majesty the King of Egypt has delegated for Egypt:

His Excellency Mahmoud Fahmy el Nokrashi Pasha, Prime Minister.
His Excellency Mohammed Husein Heikal Pasha, President of the Senate.
His Excellency Abdel Hamid Badawi Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
His Excellency Makram Ebeid Pasha, Minister of Finance.
His Excellency Mohammed Hafer Ramadan Pasha, Minister of Justice.
His Excellency Abdel Razzak Ahmed El Sanhoury Bey, Minister of Public Instruction.
Abdel Rahman Azzam Bey, Minister Plenipotentiary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

His Majesty the King of the Yemen(†) has delegated for the Yemen:

Who, after having exchanged their credentials according them full powers, recognised valid and in due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1.—The League of Arab States is composed of the independent Arab States who sign the present Covenant.

Every independent Arab State has the right to join the League. If it desires of joining, it will present an application to that effect and deposit it at the Secretariat-General of the League to be laid at the first meeting to be held after presentation of the application.

Article 2.—The object of the League is to strengthen relations between member States, to co-ordinate their political action with a view to ensuring collaboration between them and protection of their independence and sovereignty, and generally to consider all questions concerning the Arab countries and their interests.

Likewise its aim is to ensure close co-operation between the member States consistent with the régime of each State and the conditions prevailing therein, in the following matters:

(a) Economic and financial matters, including commercial relations, customs, currency, agriculture and industry.
(b) Matters of communications, including railways, roads, aviation, shipping, posts and telegraphs.
(c) Cultural matters.
(d) Matters relating to nationality, passports, visas, execution of legal judgments and extradition of criminals.
(e) Social matters.
(f) Health matters.

Article 3.—The League shall have a council composed of the representatives of the member States of the League, each State having only one vote irrespective of the number of its representatives.

Its task will be to realise the aims of the League and to attend to the execution of agreements made between the member States on matters referred to in the preceding article and others.

The duties of the Council will also include those of determining the means of collaborating with international organisations which may be created in the future to maintain order and peace, and of organising economic and social relations.

Article 4.—For each of the questions enumerated in Article 2, a special commission will be formed on which the member States of the League will be represented. These commissions will be entrusted with the task of laying down

† Note.—The King of the Yemen being unable to send delegates to Cairo, the text of the [illegible] sent to him at Sana'a to be signed by his plenipotentiaries.

the basis and extent of collaboration and of putting them into the form of draft agreements to be examined by the Council before being submitted to the States concerned.

The commissions may include representatives of other Arab countries. The Council will define the circumstances in which such representatives can be admitted and the bases of their representation.

Article 5.—It is not permissible to resort to force in order to settle disputes between two or more States of the League. In case of a dispute which does not affect the independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of the State and if the litigant [illegible] appeal to the Council for the settlement of the dispute the decisions of the Council shall be considered as effective and binding.

In such a case the States involved in the dispute will take no part in the deliberations and decisions of the Council.

The Council will also mediate in any dispute which it is feared might lead to war between one of the States of the League and any other State of the League or third State in order to effect a conciliation.

Decisions on arbitration and in cases of mediation will be taken by a majority vote.

Article 6.—In case of an aggression by a State against a member State of the League or in case of threat of such an aggression, the State [illegible] or threatened with attack may apply for an immediate meeting of the Council.

The Council will decide on the necessary measures to prevent the aggression. Its decision will be unanimous. In case of aggression by a member State of the League the vote of that State will not be taken into account when reckoning unanimity. Should the aggression take place in a manner which renders the Government of the State against which the aggression is committed unable to communicate with the Council, the representative of that State [illegible] a meeting for the purpose set out in the preceding paragraph. Should the representatives also be unable to communicate with the Council, [illegible] State may apply for its convocation.

Article 7.—Decisions taken unanimously by the Council are binding on all member States of the League while decisions taken by a majority are binding on those that accept them.

In both cases the decisions of the Council will be executed by each State in accordance with its organic régime.

Article 8.—Each member State will respect the régimes established in the other States of the League and will consider those régimes as a right of each State. It undertakes to abstain from any action tending to change that régime.

Article 9.—The Arab States of the League shall be anxious to strengthen between them closer and stronger ties than those laid down in this Covenant may conclude between themselves such agreements as they may desire to realise these objectives.

Treaties and agreements already concluded or which may be concluded in future by a Government or Governments of the League with any other Government whatsoever do not (and will not) bind and do not (and will not) commit the other members.

Article 10.—The permanent seat of the League of Arab States will be in Cairo, but the Council may meet at any other place as may be appointed.

Article 11.—The Council of the League will meet in ordinary session twice a year during the months of March and October. It will meet in extraordinary session whenever the necessity arises at the request of two States of the League.

Article 12.—The League will have a permanent Secretariat-General comprising a Secretary-General and Assistant Secretaries and an adequate number of officials. The Secretary-General will be appointed by the Council of the League by a two-thirds majority of the States of the League. The Secretary-General will appoint, with the approval of the Council, the Assistant Secretaries and senior officials of the League.

The Council of the League will lay down internal regulations covering the duties of the Secretariat-General and staff matters.

The Secretary-General will hold the rank of Ambassador and the Assistant Secretaries the rank of Ministers Plenipotentiary.

The first Secretary-General will be designated in an annex to the present Covenant.

Article 13.—The Secretary-General will prepare the League's budget and will submit it to the Council for approval before the beginning of each financial year.

The Council will determine the share of each State of the League in the expenses, which may be reconsidered when necessary.

Article 14.—The members of the Council of the League as well as members of its commissions and its officials as laid down in the internal regulations will enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

The premises occupied by the organisations of the League will be inviolate.

[illegible] The Council will [illegible] the Egyptian Prime Minister and thereafter when summoned by the Secretary-General.

The representatives of the States of the League will assume the presidency of the League in turn at each ordinary session.

Article 16. Except in the cases mentioned in the Covenant, a majority vote will suffice to constitute a binding decision by the Council in the following matters:

(*a*) Questions concerning the staff;
(*b*) Adoption of the budget of the League;
(*c*) Adoption of regulations governing the Council, Committees and Secretariat-General;
(*d*) The closing of sessions.

Article 17.—The member States of the League will provide the Secretariat-General with copies of all treaties and agreements concluded or to be concluded with any member State or third State.

Article 18.—If one of the States of the League desires to withdraw from it, the Council is to be informed of its intention one year in advance.

The Council of the League may consider any State that does not comply with the obligations of the Covenant as excluded from the League by a decision given unanimously, excluding the vote of the State in question.

Article 19.—This Covenant may be amended by a two-thirds majority vote of the States of the League specially with a view to strengthening the ties [illegible] creating an Arab Court of Justice or regulating the relations of the League with [illegible] and peace.

No amendment will finally be adopted until the session following that in which it was first raised.

Any State not accepting the amendment may withdraw at the time of its entry into force without being bound by the provisions of the amendment.

Article 20.—This Covenant and its annexes will be ratified according to the constitutional provisions of the various high contracting States.

The instruments of ratification will be deposited at the Secretariat-General and the Covenant will become binding on those States that have ratified it, after the expiration of fifteen days from the date of receipt by the Secretary-General of the instruments of ratification from four States.

This Covenant has been drawn up in Arabic in Cairo on 8 Rabia el Tani, 1364 (22nd March, 1945) [illegible] the Secretariat-General.

A true copy will be delivered to each State of the League.

Annexes

I.—*Special Annex on Palestine*

At the termination of the last Great War, the Arab countries were detached from the Ottoman Empire. These included Palestine, a vilayet of that Empire, which became autonomous, depending on no other Power. The Treaty of Lausanne proclaimed that the question of Palestine was the concern of the interested parties and, although she was not in a position to direct her own affairs, the Covenant of the League of Nations of 1919 settled her status on the basis of the acknowledgment of her independence. Her international existence and independence are therefore a matter of no doubt from the legal point of view, just as there is no doubt about the independence of the other Arab countries. Although the external aspects of that independence are not apparent owing to force of circumstances, this should not stand in the way of her participation in the work of the Council of the League.

The States that have signed the Covenant of the Arab League consider therefore that, owing to the peculiar circumstances of Palestine and until that country enjoys effective independence, the Council of the League should undertake the selection of an Arab delegate from Palestine to participate in its work.

II.—*[illegible] co-operation with Arab [illegible] in the Council of the League*

Considering that the States participating in the League will have to deal both in the Council and in the commissions, with questions benefiting and affecting the whole Arab world, and in view of the aspirations of the Arab countries that are not members of the Council, it being for the Council to take them into account and work for their achievement, the States that have a [illegible] the Arab League invite the Council of the League, when considering the participation of those countries in the commissions referred to in this [illegible] co-operation with those countries to the greatest possible [illegible] effort to be acquainted with their requirements, to [illegible] and hopes and in addition to work for their welfare and for the [illegible] of their future by all means which political methods provide

III.—*Special Annex on the Appointment of the [illegible] of the League*

The signatory States of this Covenant have agreed on the appointment of Abdel Rahman Azzam Bey as Secretary General to the League of Arab States

His appointment will be for two years and the Council of the League will define subsequently the future organisation of the Secretariat General

File Number

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TREATY

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CONFIDENTIAL

17021

Further Correspondence

respecting

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 62

July to September 1945

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Printed for the use of the Foreign Office

CONFIDENTIAL

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 62.—JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1946.

CHAPTER 1. AFGHANISTAN

E 4787 2318 97] No 1

Mr Squire to Mr Eden.—(Received 4th July.)

(No. 50.)

Sir *Kabul* 19th June 1946

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your circular despatch No. L. 3603/405 dated the 9th June, 1938, I have the honour to enclose a copy of the records of leading personalities in Afghanistan duly corrected up to June 1945. In the present revision an attempt has been made to substitute the leading personalities references in place of "Who's Who in Afghanistan" references.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch, without enclosure, to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of [illegible]

I have, &c.

G. F. SQUIRE.

Enclosure in No. 1

Records of Leading Personalities in Afghanistan

[illegible] W. W. relate to "Who's Who in Afghanistan" 1936 [illegible] issued by the [illegible] India and where preceded by L.P. relate [illegible]

1. *Abdul Ahad* (W. W. 4).

Born about 1880. Son of Qazi Ghulam [illegible] of W. W. 63. "Sardar i Ala." Ismail Khel [illegible]

"Wardak." From 1900 to 19[illegible] (Arbab) to the Ameer [illegible] (Governor) of K[illegible] Habibullah Khan (1919) and banished, but was [illegible] appointed. In 1921 was appointed A.D.C. to King [illegible] months Governor of the Eastern Province, but was recalled and sent to Moscow to meet King Amanullah, it being realised that he was incapable of administering the province. Returned to Kabul July 1928. Officiating Minister of Interior [illegible] flects from Kandahar. Fled with Amanullah to India May 1929 and went to Persia. Returned to Afghanistan December 1929. Elected President of [illegible] In [illegible] treatment. In suffering from diabetes. Sta[illegible] President of National Council. He is now a very sick man, but continues to carry out his duties. A friend of the Prime Minister (L.P. 50). Owing to ill-health he is unlikely to be given any more active [illegible] Government of [illegible]

Is apparently friendly to members of the British Legation, but does not convey an impression of [illegible]

2. *Abdul Ahad* (W W 5).

Son of Abdul Ahan Khan of Ghazni and brother of L.P 30. Born 1902 in Kabul, Tajik. He owns property in Kabul and Ghazni. An infantry officer [illegible] nt to Turkey about 1925 for military train[illegible]g and studied in Military Academy Istanbul. Returned to Afghanistan via Herat early in 1929 [illegible] reached Kandahar just after Amanullah fled to India. Returned to Herat. Later joined late King Nadir Khan in Southern Province and took part in fighting there. Appointed Officer Commanding, Arg, after Nadir's succession. Appointed General Officer Com[illegible]nding, Kandahar, in 1930. Has more than once been congratulated by the King on his good work as General Officer Commanding, Kandahar. Attended manoeuvres in Dehra, January 1935. Afte[illegible]

[illegible] started seriously to learn English, of which he [illegible] little. Appointed General Officer Com[illegible]ng, Herat, in June 1936. Came to Kabul, received by the King and returned to Kandahar and left to take up his new appointment. An [illegible] good little man with a great sense of humour, he is a keen student of his profession and from all accounts a capable commander. Popular and loyal. Speaks Turkish well. Was very friendly to British Military Attaché on his visit to India and w[illegible] the friendliness and hospitality of [illegible] officers he met. In 1936 he visited Maimana on the Persian frontier to select a site for a post in area given to Afghanistan by the Boundary Commission. Treated men in an [illegible] work. Takes an interest in medical work and rewards doctors who have done good work. His brother joined Abdul Ahad (L.P 9) in Herat for his time in Europe. Popular in Herat. Appointed commander in [illegible]

received [illegible] loyal appreciation [illegible]y in connection with services in Helmand [illegible] A very hospitable man, polite and [illegible] prepared to discuss any subject but not very communicative on military matters. Appears keen on his profession and anxious to [illegible] opment of th[illegible]

[illegible] of Herat. Said he was impressed by his visit [illegible] in manoeuvres in 1935 and with British methods. Reported that he exercised more influence than the Governor of Herat. In absence of the [illegible] of Herat, he and Mohammad Ali Khan [illegible] as Governors jointly. He opened a school in Rabat Dhuman where officers learn English. Formed a local intelligence corps in Ghorian. Transferred from command of Herat forces, appointed Governor of Ghorian 1937. Inhabitants of [illegible] are said to have confidence in him. Has some influence with the various tribal leaders. Assisted Indian Government of intrigue with the [illegible]. Detailed men in Katawaz for pro-Government propaganda. Induced Suleiman Khel visitors to keep away from rebels. Warned Suleiman Khel agent in Paktia of tips, which he called a "British [illegible]" [illegible] of Afghan rebels. Visited Turkey in 1942 for medical treatment and returned [illegible]

[illegible] of troops sent to suppress tribal disturbances or to head a military mission abroad or to [illegible] visited Dundeys in 1945 for medical treatment. H[illegible] is more mental than physical and he shows a tendency to become a permanent invalid. His [illegible] and Major Sharif [illegible]

3. *Abdul Aziz Khan* (W W 13).

Son of the late Ghulam Haidar Charki. Born 1901. Brother of Ghulam Siddiq (W W 500). Was a lieutenant-colonel (Kandak Mishri) of artillery. Was on the Amur front in 1919. Commanding Arandu October 1919. Promoted Ghund Mishar (brigadier) and proceeded to Mazar-i-Sharif June 1920. General Officer Commanding, Kunar Valley 1922. Hakim (Governor) of Laghman 1923-24. Under Secretary to the Minister of the Interior 1926. Officiated as Home Minister 1927. Governor of Mazar November 1928. Wounded and imprisoned in Mazar-i-Sharif by Saqaris February 1929. Sent to Kabul March 1929 but escaped. Arrived Quetta and left for Meshed July 1929. Returned to Kabul, via India, April 1930. Left Kabul by air on the 20th June 1930 to visit his brother Ghulam Nabi deceased in Anpora. Accompanied ex King Amanullah to Mecca in 1932. One of the Amanullah party in Europe. Lived some time in Constantinople at No. 110, Grande Rue de Sera, but left for Bonn when Amanullah was in Mecca in 1933. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. In September 1935 was at Constantinople but was expelled from Turkey that month and left for Germany.

4. *Abdul Haik Khan* (W W 8).

Dawi Kakar of Kandahar. Son of Abdul Ahad Hakim (Governor) of Kandahar. Member of the Afghan Peace Delegation June 1919. Formerly editor of the *Amana-i-Afghan*. Assistant to the Foreign Minister as Mustashar, course of in charge of Indian Affairs. Member of the Afghan delegation, Mecca Conference 1920. Arrived Kandahar November 1920 with a mission to enquire into the position of the Afghan Consul [illegible] Afghan representative at Bokhara. Returned to Kabul July 1921 and resumed his duties in the Foreign Office. Appointed Minister at London [illegible] Relieved August 1924. On retur[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Afghan Government was too friendly to His Majesty's Government. Went to Mecca in 1931. Reported to have met at Jeddah in Yemen March 1932. In May 1932 returned to Kabul after performing pilgrimage to Mecca. Was close [illegible] by Afghan government, who doubted [illegible] imprisoned on [illegible]

[illegible] expected to be sending letters from [illegible] republican party in Kabul advising them [illegible] in Britain rather than Russia for help. [illegible] King Zahir Shah is said to have announced grant of money to his relatives who interceded with him [illegible]

[illegible] transferred as a junior Under-Secretary [illegible] Ministry of Education in 1928. A[illegible] Secretary to Afghan Legation in Rome, February 1927. Appointed Second Secretary Afghan Legation, Berlin, May 1931. Assistant Secretary in [illegible]

[illegible] sympathies due to lack of courtesy shown to him in India. Does not belong to any important family.

6. *Abdul Hamid Khan* (W W 45).

Muhammadzai. Born about 1898. Son of the late [illegible] Amir Khan. Brother of Abdul Hussain Khan Mazrai. Educated in France. In Teheran in 192[illegible] with his father, with whom he returned to Kabul in December 1929. Secretary to the Afghan Legation [illegible] Rome, February 1931-34. First Secretary [illegible]

[illegible] Appointed Afghan Representative in Geneva 1936. Returned t[illegible] November [illegible]

[illegible] Khan (W W 47)

[illegible] office in Teheran in 1930. Was Under Secretary in Charge of Reception and Visa Branch of Afghan Foreign Office January 1934. Dismissed [illegible] 1935 partly for taking every commission on purchases in India for Afghan Mission of Afghan Transport Company.

[illegible] Rome and presented credentials as [illegible] Afghan delegate to the Disarmament [illegible] Geneva during 1933, and seemed very friendly with Italians.

Served as Ambassador to Moscow during 1934. Brought the body of the late Sardar Mahmud [illegible] Khan to Kabul in June 1938 and returned to Moscow in December.

Speaks quite good English and has many friends in India where he spent some time during the Great War.

Visited Kabul September 1935, then returned to Moscow.

Reported to have pro-Axis leanings.

Returned to Kabul July 1939. Appointed Minister [illegible] Posts and Telegraphs 1940. Suspected of intrigues with Germany 1942-43. Left for Washington April 1943 to take up newly created post of Afghan [illegible] there. It is believed that he was selected [illegible] the appointment in order to get him out of Kabul. Not trusted by the Yusha Khel dynasty and believed to be anti-British in his political sympathies.

Abdulla Khan

[illegible] Abdul Ahad Khan Tajik (L.P 30) and Abdul [illegible] (L.P 2). He was formerly an official in the [illegible] Purchasing Department and after [illegible] Jemal Pennsary in 1940. Stated to be pro-[illegible] junior officials in a senior post. Said to be [illegible] made a fortune by smuggling goods to Russia and Iran. Became unpopular in Herat owing to food shortage and subsequent riot resulting in the murder of two Afghan officials.

9. *Abdul Majid* alias *Abdul Majidoff* or *Hakimoff* (W W 73).

Torak of Herat. Born about 1902. Son of Abdul Hakim. A man of no important family. Was at one time an official in the customs office in Herat, from where in 1930 he went to Moscow and was at one time attached to the Afghan Embassy there. Started business in Moscow, and made a considerable amount of money by exporting and importing contraband goods with the connivance of the customs [illegible]

[illegible] to organise and manage the Ashami Company. Prior to proceeding to Berlin he is believed to have a considerable amount of his [illegible] cated by the Soviet Government. Believed to have Soviet tendencies but this has [illegible] denied by the Afghan Government. H[illegible] tact and a capable business man.

[illegible] spring 1935 carried out an extensive business [illegible] Northern Afghanistan. Speaks Russian and [illegible]

[illegible] has a wife and four children in Berlin.

In January 1936 managing director of the Afghan National Bank and Ashami Company. In 1939 went to Europe to arrange for trade credits and contacts. Is an ardent Nationalist in his trade negotiations and the most important business man in Afghanistan. Largely responsible for the introduction of the monopoly system and formation of various trading companies. Was also responsible for the propaganda part of the issue of the new currency notes (1935-36). Still in Europe (December 1937) negotiating loans and trade credits and purchasing machinery and armaments. Attended Nazi Congress meeting in Nuremberg in 1[illegible]

Returned to Kabul, March 1938. Appointed Minister of Trade September 1938. Proceeded to Delhi December 1938 for trade discussions with the Government of India. Appointment changed to Minister for National Economy, April 1939. Left Kabul January 1941 for United States but changed [illegible] aircraft and went to Germany for medical [illegible] in and in Switzerland 1946. Known [illegible] distribution as charity. His financial affairs in Afghanistan are believed to be controlled by Government.

10. *Abdul Tawab Khan* (W W 124).

Muhammadzai. Son of late Mahmud Tarzi. Born 1902. Went to Europe for education October 1921. Admitted Saint Cyr early in 1924 and completed a course of nearly three years' duration there. Spent a year with a French cavalry regiment. Head of Cavalry School, Kabul, 1929. Accompanied King Amanullah to Europe 1928. Escaped from Kabul to Peshawar with Inayatullah (W W 366) by British aeroplane January 1930 and went [illegible] Married daughter of Istanbul Zahir Khan [illegible]

Speaks French fluently and is a smart-mannered man, of whom more may be heard in the future. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933.

11. *Abdul Wahab* (W W 126).

Muhammadzai. Son of the late Mahmud Tarzi, born about 1900. Accompanied his father to the Afghan Minorities Conference 1920. Left Kabul for London with despatches August 1921. Educated at Exeter College, Oxford. On return to Kabul w[illegible] appointed to a branch of the Foreign Office. Went [illegible] Kandahar at the time of Amanu[illegible] [illegible] ted as Foreign Minister there. [illegible] Deprived of Afghan nationality in [illegible] In October 1936 was living in [illegible]

12. *Abdur Rahim Khan* (W W 89).

Nal Sahibzada. Son of the late Kabirdad. Son of Abdul Qadir Khan. Born about 883 in Kabirdad. Brother-in-law of Muhammad Hussain, accountant

under Ameer Habibullah Khan, who was executed by King Amanullah Khan.

Appointed to Sar-e-Qo (commander of the Royal bodyguard) by Ameer Habibullah at age of 16. Served for five years in Kabul. Afterwards was for ten years supervisor of bridge construction in the [illegible] (brigadier) (1921) and posted to the Cavalry Kandak of the Herat army. Recalled to Kabul about 1927. Later transferred to Mazar-i-Sharif as Qhund Mishar of the Cavalry Qhund. On outbreak of the 1929 [illegible] Saqao in Charikar during the latter's second attempt to capture Kabul January 1929. Sent by Bacha-i-Saqao to Mazar-i-Sharif to organise a revolution. He murdered the Governor and left for Murmana, and [illegible]

Mohammad at Chaman (W W 362). In May appointed Civil and Military Governor by Bacha-i-Saqao and promoted later by Nadir Shah October 1929. [illegible] to be very popular with the Hazaras and to be [illegible] His loyalty to the [illegible] uncertain. [illegible]

After the massacre of Shah Mahmud (W W 414) in [illegible] of 1931 in Kataghan and Badakhshan, he [illegible] have decided to submit to Nadir Shah, and [illegible] major general) [illegible] an (W W 611a), who has [illegible] (revenue officer). In August 1932 [illegible] and in September was confirmed in [illegible] of Nadi-al Hukumah (Governor), [illegible] Kabul [illegible] walir on Afghan [illegible] to decide the Herat [illegible] the Prime Minister [illegible] and gave his allegiance to King Zahir Shah. Appointed head of Persia-Afghan Boundary Commission September 1934.

In 1938 reported to be with Russian. Owns a large estate in Kunar.

[illegible] moved in Kabul in June 1935 and appointed Minister of Public Works. A man of great [illegible] who governed his province well. While [illegible] Ha. His loyalty is doubtful [illegible] who may play an important role should the [illegible] succeed. In July 1933 awarded [illegible] Kabul. Was being closely [illegible] government (1936), as he was [illegible] tendencies or [illegible] negotiations 1941 and still being carefully watched by Afghan Government. Does not take much part in public life.

13. *Abdur Rahman Khan*

[illegible] January 1941, and was on his way to Baghdad when he was recalled from Karachi owing to outspoken [illegible] of commercial policy of Abdul Majid Khan. [illegible] receives his departure. Later reported [illegible] and presented his credentials to the [illegible] Kabul.

14. *Abdur Samad Khan* (W W 118)

Tarik

Secretary of Afghan Legation in London, returned to Kabul May 1925, visiting Mecca en route, and appointed a junior Under-Secretary in the Afghan Foreign Office. His post was abolished, owing to economies of budget of April 1926, and he was thrown out of employment. Appointed a member of Afghan deputation to Ibn Saud's All-Muslim Conference, May 1926. Appointed First Secretary to Afghan Legation, Paris, October 1926, and left in that month for Paris. Appointed to the Foreign Office as Assistant Secretary November 1928, transferred to the Protocol Branch, Foreign Office Kabul February 1931. Appointed Minister at Rome and left to take up appointment in February 1936. Represented King Zahir Shah [illegible] London, 1937. Still in Rome.

An intelligent man possessing good manners. Speaks English, and believed to be well disposed [illegible]

15. *Ahmad Ali Jan* (or *Khan*) (W W 140)

Sardar Mohammadzai. Born 1899. Son of Suleman Khan and cousin of the late King Nadir Shah. Brother of Ali Shah Khan. Appointed A D C to King Amanullah 1923, but incurred his displeasure by marrying without his approval a daughter of Prince Musa Khan (W W 657), Governor of Jalalabad in 1923-24 (imprisoned by Bacha-i-Saqao in April 1929 but was released in October). Appointed [illegible] 1929 and transferred to London, June 1931. [illegible] attended Afghanistan at the Economic Conference, London, 1933. Relieved in July 1933 and appointed Minister of Education. Returned to Kabul in October 1933. In 1936 Minister of Education. Left Kabul in November 1937 on appointment as Ambassador at To[illegible]

Is a pleasant man, a keen sportsman but not very capable. Appears to be lazy. Is said to be pro-British and is always very friendly to members of the British Legation, Kabul. His wife was educated in England and speaks and writes English perfectly. He is itself speaks English, French and Urdu. He is a son born about 1896. Appointed Minister in London (1939). Now Minister in [illegible]

16. *Ahmad Shah Khan* (W W 149)

Sardar Mohammadzai. Son [illegible]

[illegible] believed that Ah[illegible] murderer and that [illegible] suspicious. It is stated, however, on excellent authority that the actual murderer was not Ahmad Shah Khan. Married a niece of the late Shaghasi Ali Ahmad Khan, one time Wali of Kabul. Was an A D C of ex King Amanullah. Went to Europe [illegible] India in 1929 with a message from Bacha-i-Saqao to Nadir Khan. Returned to Kabul early 1930. A pointed W[illegible] India in the [illegible] where he married a second wife. His eldest daughter was married to King Zahir Shah in November 1931. Speaks English and Urdu and is a pleasant, well-mannered and easy going man. [illegible] 1934 was reported to be on bad terms with the Premier. Visited India in November 1936.

His four sisters were married to—

(a) Late King Nadir Shah.
(b) Late Muhammad Azim Khan, brother of (a).
(c) N S Abdul Ghani Khan (W W 34).
(d) Muhammad Akbar Khan (L P 48).

[illegible] a week during celebrations of [illegible] Iran (1939). Still Wazir [illegible] Fond of shooting, fishing and gardening [illegible] and not therefore very active. Does not take any active interest in politics.

17. *Ali Muhammad Khan Mozan* (W W [illegible] 179)

Born about 1894. A brother-in-law of the Ameer Habibullah. Travelled in Europe, and on return (1923) was appointed as assistant in the Ministry of Education. In 1925 promoted Under Secretary Ministry of Education. Appointed Minister at Rome, [illegible] 1927. Was with Amanullah in London [illegible] Council for the [illegible] 1928. Appointed [illegible] 1929. In June 1933 was appointed Afghan representative at the Economic Conference, London, and in July was appointed Afghan Minister, London. Appointed Minister in Switzerland and representative of Afghanistan to the League of Nations February 1936 and was still in London in June 1938. Selected to represent Afghanistan at the Fou[illegible] Hospital Conference in Rome in M[illegible] Returned to Kabul July 1935 and arrived there the same month via Moscow and Termez. Returned to [illegible] via India in October. Speaks English and is intelligent and capable.

Represented King Zahir Shah at funeral of King [illegible]

Speaks English well but no French. Is a keen student of English literature and interested particularly [illegible] friendly to Britain, but not a strong character and lacks energy. Not being related to the ruling family he has no great influence with the Government.

[illegible] (W W 80).

[illegible] Naib Salar and [illegible] of Mohammad Sulaiman Khan, late King Nadir Shah. Son in law of [illegible] (W W 661a) and brother of Ahmad [illegible] Was commandant of [illegible] 1922 to [illegible] Tour[illegible] and General Officer Commanding [illegible] corps and promoted to the Naib Salar (general). He is a pleasant, rather easy going individual, but has not been very successful as an administrator in the Southern Province, of which post he was relieved in April 1944. At present unemployed in Kabul, but may be given an appointment shortly (June 1945).

[illegible] *Allah Nawaz* (W W 182)

[illegible] son of Mahsud. Son of Khan Bahadur Rah[illegible] In 1927 was employed by the [illegible] advance on Kun[illegible] Minister [illegible] for negotiations [illegible] which he is reported to [illegible] for medical treatment [illegible] November 1931. [illegible] Europe for the same reason [illegible] January 1933. In June 1938 [illegible] Minister of Public Works, but [illegible] year in the Southern Province in connection with the disturbances there. Left Kabul on visit to Europe ostensibly for medical treatment December 1933 for [illegible] the murderer of Sir of Mahsud [illegible] Area, and to discuss affairs of State with Sardar Shah [illegible] Khan (L P 78). Popular rumour in Kabul said he had been sent [illegible] ex King Amanullah. In spite of rumours that he was returning to Kabul was still (1936) in Europe. Appointed Minister Berlin, 1935 but was not at first accepted by the German Government owing to his being the representative at the trial of Said Kemal. Was directly attached to the late King Nadir Shah. His life has been threatened by the Amanullah party. Trusted by the Prime Minister (L P 50), who considers him very capable. Travelled to Kabul by German aeroplane (August 1937). Returned to Germany with his family (October 1937).

Again visited Kabul (1938) and returned to Germany. Played an important part in the Government's efforts to quell the Suleman Khel rising of 1939. Visited Kabul in 1940 via Russia. Said to be anti British. Is still Minister in Berlin. Now said to be returning to Kabul via Russia.

20. *Amanullah Khan* (W W 183)

Ex King of Afghanistan, third son of the Ameer Habibullah Khan by the Uya Hazrat (W W 346[illegible] 462). In 1914 married Soraya, [illegible] Sardar Mahmud Tarzi. In [illegible] was reported to be friendly with the Germans [illegible] Kabul and in [illegible] He gave [illegible] 19th April held a [illegible] in Kabul for the trial of those arrested [illegible] murder, and at its conclusion a [illegible] Ali Shah Reza, generally regarded [illegible] was sentenced to death and [illegible] rebellion. The commander-in-chief apparently exceeded his instructions and precipitated hostilities [illegible] of considerations led to the grant of lenient terms to [illegible]

a country by the sword, and, by the conclusion of treaties with a number of European countries, that he had brought about the recognition of Afghanistan as a basis of equality by the great powers. These dealings gained him consid

appointment of advisers. Through one wife he had been

proceeded to carry out a tremendously rapid programme of reform without regard for the backwardness and prejudice of his people particularly the mullahs. He failed to profit by the warning afforded by several revolts, the most serious of which was the Khost rising of 1924, and continued to spend his revenues on schemes for social or educational progress, whilst neglecting his army

disorders were exaggerated) as a result of his tour of 1927-28, and per

result of his visit to M

man followed by other in ben. Dur-i-a Saqao, a brigand of low birth, attacked Kabul in December 1928 and again in January 1929. Amanullah

on in favor of Inayatullah on

9 January and fled to Jalalabad a day or two

A Kandahar attempted to rally support for dynasty and formally proclaimed his

2 April he abdicated in favor of his

Roman with his family on the 23rd May and sailed from Bombay for Italy on the 22nd June 1929. Visited Montreux, Rome, in August

again for three months in June. Left Constantinople (arrived) for Italy. Returned to Turkey in September, but went back and spent the winter in Italy. Left Naples for Jeddah to perform pilgrimage on the 5th April, 1934, with the object of either rehabilitating himself in Moslem eyes, or more

a letter decry ng King Nadir and his regime

Jeddah for Suez. On 9th May 1934

ity accorded Mohammad Adil (W W

mother of Sardar, Abdul Fateh Tarzi (W W 20

the late Ghulam Nabi, Bhoja of Dr ab W W 612

and two officers of the Angora Embassy Faizul Ahmad and Abdul Aziz. Returned to Italy via Alexandria, the 21st May. Left Rome for Switzerland and the 20th June

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acted to be writing his autobiography and to

ng to Russia where he had finished it to have

Russel by the Soviet. This has never

published. In Europe he has constantly intrigued against the present Afghan regime with a view to regaining his throne. In July 1938 he visited Cou

nd held a meeting of his principal

The execution of the late Ghulam Nabi, one of his chief adherents, intensified his hostility against the Ya ya Khel. Members of his party were responsible for the assassination of King Nadir Shah, Kabul 1933, and his brother Mohammad Aziz (Berlin 1933) and are active in intriguing on Amanullah's behalf. His chief supporter in Europe

Ghulam Siddiq (W W 300), a brother of the late Ghulam Nabi. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Receives an annual allowance of about £150 a month from the Italian Government. In March 1

number of sympathisers, especially Indians, but appears to have effected little. Returned to Rome, where he normally lives. Since then his adherents in Europe and Asia have been active in spreading propaganda against the present Afghan regime amongst the North West Frontier tribes. He owns property in Switzerland, which he occasionally visits. Has three sons and four daughters. Different opinions are held as to the possibility of his return, but this seems unlikely unless the situation in Afghanistan seriously deteriorates, possibly as the result of further assassinations of members of the present ruling family or fessing on the Indian side of the border definitely turns in favour of initiating an incursion into Afghanistan on his behalf. Since he has been living in Italy he invariably leaves for Switzerland during the summer months, but, in 1935, instead of going to Switzerland he rented a large house in Stresa in Northern Italy and took with him his family and Hassan Jan Muhammad, his brother-in law. Returned to Rome after a short visit to Montreux on the 17th August, and believed to be in Rome (1937). Visited Mecca again in 1936. Rumoured to draw an allowance from Russia. Still in Italy (1948). Reported to have visited Switzerland (1945). After staying at Gstaad and at Villars he returned to Rome. He was accompanied by an Italian mistress. Rome with his family when it was liberated

21 *Amanullah Khan* (W W 199)

Sardar. Muhammadzai, Durrani, Mahsud. Born 1911. Is a son of the late Habibullah by the Uliya

Nadir Shah. Is thus a half brother of ex King Amanullah and a cousin of King Zahir Shah. Educated at the French school, Kabul, and speaks French fluently. Imprisoned in Kabul by Bacha-i Saqao in 1929 and grossly ill-treated. In November 1929 visited Lahore for medical treatment. On return was appointed Sard i Os (Commander of the Royal Bodyguard) and A.D.C. to the Minister of War. Appointed to officers as second secretary equivalent to quartermaster-general War Office in addition to his other duties, in December 1930. 1931 qualified at the Infantry Officers' School, Kabul. Promoted Firqa Mal ar and appointed General Officer Commanding, Guards Division, 1933 to 1934 acted as Officer Commanding Infantry Officers' School, in the absence of the German instructor Major Christiana. Is still (1937) General Officer Commanding, Guards Division, and, as such, in command of the Arq and household troops including the Hazarbashes (personal bodyguards of the Royal family). He is also in charge of the advanced course for officers. Nervous in manner appears to be intelligent and to take a keen interest

sentative of both the "Kabul" and "Peshawar Sardars". Has a son born in 1934. Unconfirmed reports loyal to the Yahya d from time to time

Forum to attend the milena celebra

ment Firdausi, October 1934, and returned Kabul in the same month, having met Reza Shah. Left Kabul for Europe March 1937) and represented King Zahir Shah at the Coronation of King George VI. Attended Turkish manoeuvres (August 1937) and returned to Kabul (September 1937). Appears to take his profession seriously and

years. He visited India again in 1939 for medical treatment and is learning English (1943). He is not strong character or likely to be a danger to the

the Afghan Army an appointment he still h

He occasionally officiates as Minister of Defence

22 *Ata Muhammad Khan* (W W 207)

Alam. Tarak. Son of the late Sardar Nizam

was Governor of Mazar in the time of

Amanullah. Uncle of Ata

in the time of Amanullah

at his arrival

1928) and he

returned to Mazar. Was one of Ali

ordered to render secret assistance to

in Central Asia (1922). Unemployed for four years

Appointed Governor of Balkh at time of Amanullah's visit to Mazar (1928) just prior to latter's visit to Europe, and awarded the Order of Astor. During

the revolution fought against the Saqavi forces at Aktar Rohan (W W 89), was defeated and fled to Tashkent. Accompanied the late Ghulam Nabi in his unsuccessful effort to recapture N

Afghanistan in April 1929, and again retired to Russian territory. Appears to have returned to Afghanistan soon after Nadir Shah's accession. Was a member of the Commission of Reconstruction sent under Yakub Khan (W W 675) to Mazar-i Sharif in March 1930. Commanded a flying column during against Ibrahim Beg (1931). Promoted

a Malar (major-general) and awarded the Order of Astor 2nd Class (1931). Appointed a member of

roll of Nobles December 1931. Victor

932. Has a reputation for courage. Is

pro-Russian. Is now (1943) President of the Council of Nobles. Is reported (1945) to have

23 *Ata ul Haq* (W W 200)

Born about 1895. Eldest son of the late Khan Jan of Rosa Khanja, Kohi Daman. Brother of late Sher Jan and the late Mohammad Sadiq Kh

in Saqao's officials. Loyal to h

A. Accompanied Ameer Habibu

to March 1929 for inefficient handling of the Western Took over command of Kandahar Infantry Brigade April 1929. Spent two years in Moscow in

of Afghan students. Appointed Foreign Minister by Bacha-i Saqao June 1929. Arrested with Hashim Saqao November 1929 on capture of Kabul by Nadir

He is well educated and possesses

as released from jail in 1933

24 *Faiz Muhammad Khan* (W W 243)

Sardar. Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Gul Mohammad Khan (W W 214). Born about 1899. W as secretary to the late Muhammad Aziz Khan. Attaché Envoy Tashkent. Returned to Kabul 1929. Adviser to the late Mohammad Wali Khan, Afghan Envoy to Moscow 1930. Returned from Moscow and in charge of arrangements for the party September 1933. Arrived Tashkent the 5th January 1921 en route to Moscow. Appointed first secretary to Mohammad Wali's mission to Europe 1921 which visited London, America, Paris and Berlin. First Under Secretary in the Foreign Office 1922. In charge acted as Minister of Education 1923. Appointed Minister of Education March

1934. A member of Bacha-i Saqao's Council for the Maintenance of Order April 1929, although at one time the Bacha had condemned him to death. Appointed Foreign Minister by King Nadir Shah November 1933. Went on pilgrimage to Mecca in 1934. Well educated and intelligent, has a good name for honesty in financial matters. In friendly

mances and self indulgent particularly as regards drugs, the use of which results from inactivity of sustained mental effort. Prefers any discussion of abstract principles to discussion of practical details and is tiresome when he feels obliged to live up

Left Kabul

Europe on tour

anticipated

May 1946 on leave

25 *Fazl Ahmad Khan* (W W 250).

Hazrat Sahib of Chenghatam, Herat. Sa

nah and grandson of Hazrat

of the family of Sirhindi Pir

akhsar in East Persia where his father was m

s. The family returned to Afghanistan in 1

ntified as a judge in religious matters. Vis

Shah on his accession

ed Assistant Minister of Justice 1933 an

ing Minister of Justice was Sher Agha

W W 256 in 1932. After Nadir Shah's assassin

been visited Kandahar to spread propaganda in

of King Zahir Shah. Appointed Minister

Justice 1934. Member of the joint Persia-Afghan Commission to enquire into the Zorawar (Iran

incident December 1934. His family is influential

and receives an allowance from the Afghan Invest

ments, but he himself has no influence and character

He has pleasant manners and is friendly. Married

1930 a daughter of Sher Agha (W W 256). Still

Minister of Justice

26 *Fazal-i Umar (Sher Agha)* (W W

A member of the family of Sirhindi Pir established in Kabul. Son of Qayum Khan, descendant of Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar. Assumed the title of Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar on the death of his elder brother, Sher Agha in 1925, the latter succeeded to the title on his father's death. In 1929 went on pilgrimage to Mecca and did not return to Kabul but eventually went to Dera Ismail Khan where in 1938 he was intriguing against Amanullah. Was expelled from the North West Frontier Province in March 1928 under Frontier Security

being against the Afghan

ber 1928 Amanullah made

Hazrat Sahib of Chaughatan, Herat (W W 250) is [illegible]

to be spreading anti-Nadir propaganda. His resignation [illegible]

pilgrimage to Mecca, but owing to the death of his mother he returned to Kabul [illegible]

government to persuade the Hazrat of Chaharbagh to return to Afghanistan. Reactionary and [illegible]

support of King Zahir Shah is therefore [illegible] and he is not trusted by the Afghan government. On the other hand, is probably not [illegible] Amanullah [illegible] on behalf of the Mohmands September 1935, when he visited the Southern Province and brought back to Kabul the principal religious leaders, who, after holding meetings in his house, tried to induce the Prime Minister to declare "jehad". Wields great influence amongst the Suleiman Khel Ghilzais. Said to favour friendship [illegible] British as opposed to the Soviet. Is said to [illegible] his loyalty and would have [illegible] but was afraid to do so. [illegible] visited Sirhind (Punjab) on pilgrimage in March [illegible]

Given a fief and 70 acres of land in Chaharbagh by King Zahir Shah (March 1936). Visited Mecca 1938. In 1942 expressed a desire for an Allied victory and according to one report asked his followers to pray for such a victory but was also reported to be [illegible] contact with the Italian [illegible]

27. *Ishaq ud Din* (W W 244)

Pataua, Ahmadzai, Ghilzai. Son of the late Jehandad Khan, who was implicated in the Ahmadzai Mangal revolt of 1912, and executed for treason in 1914. In 1918 was concerned in a conspiracy against Amir Habibullah with Akram Khan and Azam Khan, sons of the late Ayub Khan. Was confined in Jubbulpore jail. Given permission to return to Afghanistan by ex King Amanullah. His father's family lands and property were restored to him in November 1920. Arrested March 1921 and detained in the Arg whilst there was trouble in Khost, but later released and proceeded to Khost where his handling of the Ahmadzai Ghilzais in the Ameer's favour gained him the title of "Mir [illegible] services. Made overtures to the British Government after the flight of Amanullah to Kandahar January 1929. Lent his support to Nadir Khan in the Southern Province and raised a lashkar of Ahmadzais. His treachery, on account of a bribe from Bacha-i-Saqao, was the cause of Nadir Khan's defeat in the Logar Valley in April 1929. Again made overtures to the British Government for support of his claim to the throne. Fled from Hansh to Parachinar at the beginning of October 1929 as a result of the discovery by Nadir Khan that he was in communication with Bacha-i-Saqao. In Delhi under surveillance January 1930 from whence he was removed to Jubbulpore. Deported to Burma in May 1930. A deceitful, treacherous and untrustworthy man who [illegible] ends. Has since been transferred to Kodai Kanal. [illegible]

the Afghan Government against Germany and Russia but this was believed to be merely a cloak to cover his real intentions of establishing himself with the Ghilzais.

28. *Ghulam Ahmad Khan* (W W 292)

[illegible] trip to his [illegible] Civil and Military Administrator of the Eastern Province in 1921. Left Kabul for Kandahar [illegible] Sogan and proceeded to [illegible] Returned to Kabul on [illegible] December 1929. Returned to Kabul 1930. April in January 1932 visited Lahore for medical treatment, returning to Kabul in March. Went on pilgrimage with Chamkani [illegible] Shah [illegible]

Petrol Company of Afghanistan 1933. In May 1935 appointed Deputy Minister of Court. His stepmother, Surayya Begum, is a sister of ex King Amanullah. Assistant manager of the new [illegible] the Petrol Company in 1936 and appointed Deputy Court Minister, of which appointment he was relieved in July 1939. Fled to Tirah in September 1939 after [illegible]

29. *Ishaq Khan* (W W 275)

[illegible] Afghan Cyclist [illegible] manager Motorcar Company. Arrested with father at the same time as ex King Amanullah. Arrested the Hazrat Sahibs of Shor Bazar. September 1929. Released October 1929. Arrived in Peshawar from Kabul by air February 1931 accompanied by one of the younger Hazrat Sahibs, Kabul Mahsuds. Returned to Af[illegible] September [illegible] October 1932 [illegible] Governor of the Eastern Province December [illegible] Muhammad (W W 290). His first wife daughter of the late Sardar Muhammad Aziz Khan, died some time before. In April 1932 was in touch with Afridis and Mohmands including Badshah Gul (W W 224). In July the Sofis of Konar complained of his harsh treatment. Left Jalalabad on the 1st December 1932 on relief by Muhammad Qasim Khan (L.P. 57) and took over the Governorship of Kandahar. Returned temporarily to Jalalabad in December 1932 to deal with Hassan Khan (W W 344), in which he was successful. Did well as Governor of Kandahar and [illegible] energy. Was awarded the Sardar-i-Ala in January 1933. In July 1935 appointed Governor of Herat in succession to Abdur Rahim. A great favourite of [illegible] and but [illegible] Appointed Governor of [illegible] stated to be in poor health (1939). [illegible] Governor of Kandahar [illegible] appointed Governor (Rais-i-Ta[illegible]) and Badakhshan Provinces, and on [illegible] return Kabul to officiate as Home Minister. Believed of the appointment of Home Minister later in the year but

retained his appointment as Governor of the Kataghan and Badakshan Provinces, which he still holds. Incurred the displeasure of the Prime Minister in 1942 owing to a liaison with the wife of his brother-in-law (a son of W W 288). He divorced his wife and much against the wish of the Royal Family, married the wife of his brother-in-law.

30. *Ghulam Muhammad Khan*

Muhammadzai. A younger brother of Ahmad Ali Khan (L.P. 18) and Ali Shah Khan (L.P. 19). Born about 1897. Educated at the French School Kabul. Employed as clerk in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs prior to his appointment as Director Protocol Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1930. Friendly and pleasant to deal with, but has an exaggerated idea of his importance. Plays [illegible] and speaks French and some English. Visited India in January 1945.

31. *Ghulam Siddiq Khan* (W W 309)

Sardari Ala. Son of the late Sipah Salar (commander-in-chief) Ghulam Haider Charkhi. Brother of the late Ghulam Jilani Khan, late Ghulam Nabi and Abdul Aziz (W W 13). Born 1894. Assistant to Gul Muhammad Khan, Afghan Envoy in India October 1919 and a junior member of the Afghan delegation at the Mussoorie Conference. Left Mussoorie with despatches for Kabul June 1920, and was refused readmittance into [illegible] owing to his improper behaviour at Mussoorie and intrigues with militants. Appointed assistant president to the Mutasarrif Committee, Kabul, August 1920. Second Counsellor to the Afghan Mission under Wali Muhammad Khan which visited [illegible] in 1920. Returned from London to Kabul with despatches September 1921. Left again for Europe, via Peshawar October 1921. Appointed Afghan Minister at Berlin 1922, where he remained until April, 1926, when he was relieved by Ahmad Ali (W W 141). Visited Angora whilst en route to Kabul from Berlin. Appointed first personal secretary to the King and Minister of Court January 1927. Appointed to officiate as Foreign Minister January 1927 during absence of the late Mahmud Tarzi in Europe. With King Amanullah in Europe in 1928. Appointed Foreign Minister November 1928. Sent to Jalalabad to bargain with rebels December 1928. Fled with Amanullah to Kandahar January 1929. [illegible] Amanullah on a special [illegible] Moscow, April 1929. [illegible] June 1930. [illegible] Kabul the 7th March, 1931. [illegible] 1 of Amanullah's letters in [illegible] April 1931. Arrived Berlin the 18th July 1931 to take up the appointment of Afghan Minister. Worked almost openly against his own [illegible] in July 1932 when he was invited to return Afghanistan by the King. As a result of the plot discovered when Ghulam Nabi was executed in November 1932, Ghulam Siddiq was dismissed from [illegible] and in touch with pro-Amanullah Afghan element amongst the pilgrims. Visited Constantinople in early summer and was in touch with Soviet representative. Heroes, through his brother Abdul Aziz Khan (W W 13). Engaged in active pro-Amanullah work in Europe. Visited Berlin in November 1933. [illegible] Home in January 1934. In 1934 married [illegible] Khanum (W W 290), sister of ex-Queen Soraya [illegible] ment. A close personal friend of ex King Amanullah and greatly trusted by him. Speaks French, German and a little English. Bitterly opposed to present Afghan regime, and now ex-King Amanullah's principal adherent in Europe. Stated to be wealthy and to have money invested with Haji Ghulam Haidar (W W 278). Deprived of Afghan nationality [illegible] German interests in Asia. Believed to have been involved in spring 1946 in a plot to restore Amanullah with German and Russian assistance. Plan said to have miscarried owing to disagreement between Germany and Soviet. Was reported in April 1946 to have arrived in Shanghai. In 1947 he arrived in Istanbul, but the Turkish Government refused him permission to stay there and he returned to Germany.

32. *Ghulam Yahya Khan* (W W 311)

Muhammadzai. Born 1896. Son of Ismail Shah Nab Tarzi, deceased, and nephew [illegible] late Mahmud Tarzi. Brother of W W 100 and cousin of W W 325. Formerly secretary of Afghan Legation, Berlin. Appointed Under-Secretary, Visa and Passport Branch of Foreign Office, June 1920. Transferred to charge of Persia and Turkey section of Foreign Office, November 1920. Received Order of Astor 1st class, February 1927. Accompanied Amanullah to Europe 1927-28. Roughly handled by Bacha-i-Saqao's men, but still in the Foreign Office, January 1929. Appointed Afghan Minister, Berlin, December 1929. Assistant Secretary Political Secretary Afghan Foreign Office, 1931. Visited Chakhansur, November 1931, in connection with Helmand water dispute with Persia. Officiated [illegible] the Foreign Minister in the [illegible] Appointed Director (Rais) of Department of Public Health February 1936. Appointment raised to that of Minister in June. Member of Republican [illegible] A pleasant, well-mannered man of an outstanding ability. He has been reported to be an Amanullah [illegible] Turkish. Was removed of his [illegible]

33. *Gul Agha* (see *Siddiq Agha Mohmand*)

34. *Gul Ahmad Khan* (W W 315)

Tajik. Son of Mirza Abdul Ahmad Khan, Deputy of F. M. Assad Ahmad Khan (W W 5) and Abdullah Khan, Governor of Herat. Born about [illegible]

Was in charge of Government buildings at the beginning of Amanullah's reign. Later on became Superintendent of Roads and Ways. Afterwards appointed Assistant Chief Judge. Some time later was placed at the head of the Intelligence Department. During Amanullah's march to Ghazni from Kandahar Gul Ahmad fled with his family from Kabul and joined the ex-King on the way. In 1929 said to be in Karachi. A member on the committee for reforms led by Muhammad Yakub Khan (W W 375) in Mazar-i-Sharif June 1930. Believed to be Governor of Mazar-i-Sharif 1931. Arrived in Kabul June 1931. Appointed President of the Kabul Municipality in 1932. Appointed Governor of Mazar-i-Sharif vice Abdul Jabbar Khan (W W 49) in November 1934 which post he still holds. Appointed Minister of Health in 1939 but appointment later cancelled.

Believed to be capable and intelligent. Supporter of the present Afghan regime. Speaks some English.

35 *Habibullah Khan Tarzi* (W W 325)

Muhammadzai Born 1906 Son of the late Mohammad Zaman and nephew of the late Mohammad Tarzi (Volumes W W 101 and W W 311 Was a

In Foreign

secretary in Mahmud Tarzi's office when latter was Minister Paris On his return to Kabul was appointed Under Secretary in charge of the branch of the Foreign Office dealing with India and Europe Appointed Afghan Minister in Paris November 1928 Recalled by Ahmad Shah Jan (L P 15) December 1929 and returned to Kabul Third secretary in Foreign Office May 1931 Chief delegate to the Persian Boundary Commission June 1932 Chief delegate on the Persian Boundary and Helmand W

Kabul Appointed M a

[illegible] October 193

but arrived in Kabul June 1934 and appointed first secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs a post he was still holding in 1944 He is kept in this position of a responsible character as he is believed to be pro Amanullah and is therefore not trusted by the present regime He owns property in Shahr e Nau is an amusing student who always wishes to have cards and make money

36 *Hazrat of Shor Bazar (see Mazlat Umar)*

37 *Inayatullah Khan* (W W 346)

Habibullah Khan His nephew is the [illegible] Lord of Darunta Born the 20th [illegible] Visited India in December 1933 He is the appointment of Mohammad Salamullah Helper of the State under Ameer Habibullah Khan Kalakani Nazar Ali in 1945 Appointed Minister for Information in 1946 Was the recognised heir to the throne up to the time of Ameer Habibullah Khan's death Married a daughter of the late Mohammad Khan Tarzi, and was at one time said to be under the

When a child he received an allowance of 120,000 rupees per annum After the murder of Habibullah Khan Sardar Nasr

[illegible]

should retire but private life and [illegible] no duty nor part in public affairs Although seemingly seen to [illegible] government work and was of his a [illegible] his abstinence during the Salt movement at his fast on 20 June 1929 This amount was raised to Tagna by Inayatullah a yearly allowance of 1½ lakhs of rupees and an escort of twenty men March 1922 He consistently refused to take up any Government appointment In July 1922 was allowed a certain measure of freedom, which was increased until he moved about apparently without restriction When Bacha Saqao attacked Kabul on the 14th December 1928 was summoned by the King and confined in the Arg Forced to accept the throne on Amanullah's abdication, the 14th January, 1929, but as both besieged in the Arg by Bacha-e-Saqao, surrendered on the 17th January 1929, on condition that and his family were sent to Kandahar by air Evacuated to Peshawar with his family in the Royal Air Force planes, the 18th January 1929 and proceeded to join Amanullah in Kandahar Joined with Amanullah to Bombay the 23rd May, 1929 sailed from Bombay for Persia, via Basra, the 6th July, 1929 Arrived in Teheran, the 27th July 1929. Left Teheran for Europe, May 1930, and was [illegible] believed plotting against Nadir Khan Applied for permission to reside in England for six months (June 1934) Visited England, August 1934 [illegible] stayed three weeks in London with his wife and eldest son, Khalilullah (W W 309). Then joined Amanullah in Rome Visited Constantinople on his nephew's wedding, December 1935 and then went on to Tehran where his sister joined him from Kabul In receipt of 800 [illegible] per month from Government in February 1932 In lieu of the Persian Government were said to be intending discontinue this allowance, he sold [illegible] since then has resided in Teheran, where he now

Probable that the allowance made him by the Persian Government has been stopped, and that

the country [illegible] energy but economic dignity [illegible] and had a reputation for [illegible] in United Afghanistan [illegible] been granted a [illegible]

38 *Mohmand Jan* (W W 415)

Son of Shah Muhammad Khan, and a distant cousin [illegible] Abdul Aziz Khan, and the

[illegible]

charge of the Frontier Tribes Department, of which Haji Muhammad Akbar was Under Secretary Was in partnership with Herr Harten, German engineer in charge of Dar ul Aman works, and made a lot of money out of public works Created Sardar i Ala January 1927 Appointed Wali of Kabul, December 1927 Captured by rebels near Jalalabad December 1928, where he had [illegible] order Arrested by Bacha e S [illegible] leave celebrations.

Was appointed [illegible] passed of his appointment the following month Imprisoned in the Arg on a charge of theft of Government funds and jewels January 1929 Under trial for being concerned in the Kohistan Dehan revolt of 1929 Released in January 1931 but rearrested with other members of the Shah

[illegible] also arrested [illegible] years are said to have been tortured as a punishment Was released in November 1931 and kept [illegible]

was friendly to foreigners A great personal friend of ex King Amanullah Speaks Pushtu

Reported to have been arrested in March 1936 for the murder of his own son. Reported to be still in Kabul jail

39 *Mohendra Pratap Singh* (alias *Raja*) (W W 437)

Indian agitator, son of Raja Ghanasyam Singh Jat of Mursan Aligarh, United Provinces, and brother of the Maharajah of Jind. Founder of the Prem Vidyalaya (the Free Industrial and National Arts College) of Brindaban. Went to England at the end of 1914, and to Berlin in the autumn of 1915 where he posed as an Indian prince. Had an interview with the Kaiser and accompanied the German mission to Kabul in 1916. Arrived at Mazar-i-Sharif in 1917 Endeavoured to cross to India but returned owing to our precautions In 1918 with a [illegible] estate, and proceeded to Tashkent In March 1918 was in Berlin, and later went to Petrograd, where he received a warm welcome from Trotsky and Joffe. Same year visited Constantinople where he delivered Ameer's reply to the Sultan No reliable news in early 1919 as to his whereabouts,

[illegible]

ber 1919 Regarded as an imbecile of no importance by the Bolsheviks in Kabul, but Obaidullah (W W 491) found him useful as a figurehead and to attract Hindus to his party [illegible] at Washan the 14th June, 1920 en route for China Sent a letter to the Governor of Tashkurghan saying that he had been appointed Afghan Envoy to Chi by the Ameer He soon returned, on January [illegible]

September 1921 he was [illegible]

of 1923. Left Kabul the 10th September 1924 [illegible] then went to Japan, whence he was deported Returned to Afghanistan in October 1926 reception in Kabul was remarkably frigid and

[illegible]

having styled himself Afghan representative at a [illegible] describing him as such and showing his unceremonious arrest and deportation having been seen by the King in English illustrated papers. Left Kabul [illegible] Moscow February 1927 Returned to China [illegible]

Pan Asiatic" Conference in Kabul. Owing to outbreak of rebellion was prevented from leaving Tashkent to come to Kabul by King Amanullah Went to Tehran January 1929 and returned to Moscow in April 1929. Returned to Kabul from Moscow by air December 1929. Was in close touch with Aziz Nawaz (W W 182). He was deported by air to Termez in March 1930 Visited Berlin and reached New York on the 27th May 1930. In [illegible] P O Box 20, Peping, China). Published two books *Afghanistan the Heart of Asia* and *Long Live* [illegible]

[illegible] received at Japanese instigation to further [illegible] Asiatic policy Forbidden to lecture in [illegible]

Indian Legislature Has been regarded as an Afghan suspect since 1934.

In the Far East in 1937 Reported to be in Japan 1942

40 *Muhammad Agha Sami* (W W 555)

Brother of Shahgassi Muhammad Yakub Khan (W W 675). Son of Muhammad

birth, but the family have settled in [illegible] same generations. Was Mehmandar to the British mission in Kabul 1921 Appointed Police, Kabul, but was dismissed in 1929 partly due to escape of Ardah and Daud Shah (W W 297 from Kabul gaol and partly due to reports of his complicity in a order of one Abdul Ali Appointed Political Officer during Mangal rebellion 1924 and sent to the frontier where his services earned appreciation of the Ameer Appointed Mehmandar to Wali of Eastern Provinces during Ameer's visit of April 1928. Reappointed Commandant of Police Kabul August 1928 Was a trusted personal informer to the Ameer Efficient, controlled a mob with great skill during the fire which gutted the British Legation at Kabul December 1928 Appointed officer acting Governor of Kabul November 1928 Arrested by Bacha-e-Saqao February 1929 but escaped and joined Amanullah in Kandahar Sent to Tashkent as courier by Amanullah, returning again to Kandahar via Dardap, April 1929. Accompanied Amanullah as far as Quetta, where he remained. Left for Meshed in August 1929. Later returned to Kabul Arrested and sentenced to banishment for imprisonment in Kohistan Dehan revolt, July 1929, but subsequently released Said to be doing propaganda work in favour of Amanullah On pilgrimage to Mecca March 1931 Arrived Tehran with W W 672 [illegible] December 1931 Applied for permission to visit [illegible] in Tehran, where his [illegible] (W W 675) was joined with [illegible] from Quetta. He and [illegible] Muhammad Bashir deported of Afghanistan November 1933 His property [illegible]

[illegible]

41 *Muhammad Akbar Khan* (W W 161)

Brother of W W 115 Minister [illegible] son of the late King Nadir Shah.

[illegible] of appointment as Minister of Home returned to Kabul In married to [illegible] of I P 17

Civil A D C to the King, 1942 Visited India in [illegible] leave a mission and retired [illegible]

42 *Muhammad Akram Khan* (W W 102A)

Born approximately 1900 Director of the Reception Branch of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1937 39 Appointed Minister in the Ministry of National Economy 1939, which post he still holds Is also acting as private secretary to King Zahir Shah [illegible] enjoys the affection and confidence of the King A pleasant well-mannered and urbane apparently friendly with the British Legation but was suspected of having been involved in pro-Axis intrigue in 1942–43

43. [illegible]

Born the 12th October [illegible] who was sent to [illegible] was born. [illegible] Department [illegible] was also in charge of the [illegible] Khan (Deceased). In 1917 he held the [illegible] of Sardar Ma[illegible] [illegible] and also [illegible] and [illegible] have been married to Sardar Abdul [illegible] August 19[illegible]
A.D.C. to the King 1929. Arrived [illegible] in January 1932. Arrived Quetta on the 4th Nov[illegible] 1932.

[illegible] and to be very [illegible]

44. *Muhammad Atto Khan* (W W 209a)

Sardar. Son of Rafiq Khan and nephew-in-law of Sardar Ahmad Shah Khan, Court Minister (L.P. 17). Brother of Dabir Jan alias Zulikha, widow of late [illegible]

Afghan National Bank. Was kept under surveillance in 1930 for his alleged pro-Amanullah [illegible]
Speaks Russian and German fl[illegible]

Royal Family. Shows no outward signs now [illegible] of being pro-German, but is an enlightened Nationalist who works hard and with great ability for the industrial development of his country. [illegible] pleasant and intelligent [illegible] friendly to the British [illegible] and appreciative of the assistance rendered [illegible] his country by the British and Indian Govern[illegible]

[illegible] and developed after the wa[illegible]
His brothers are Mohammad [illegible] Khan (L.P. [illegible]) [illegible] Khan, [illegible] Kabul Municipality.

45. *Muhammad Daud Khan* (W W 25[illegible]

[illegible] as Detention Officer Gardez [illegible]

[illegible] Chief as Governor and General Officer [illegible]

[illegible] Commander Kabul Central Army Corps and Commandant of the [illegible] appointment he still holds. Since the reorganisation [illegible] Kabul Army Corps in 1928–30 on absence [illegible] its budget and is almost independent [illegible] Ministry of Defence. He promoted some 230 officers [illegible]

[illegible] of the Afghan Embassy appeared not too [illegible] he was believed to be awaiting an [illegible] approach to Germany by the Afghan Government [illegible]

[illegible] inclined to resent the employment of foreign officers, but favours seeking the assistance of Great [illegible] reorganising the Afghan army, though he is a difficult person to deal with as he always suspects [illegible]

46. *Muhammad Gul Khan* (W W 315a)

Born Mohmand of village Hara (on the Dwarak Road about 7 miles west of Peshawar). Educated in Turkey. Was a Grand Master (teacher) in [illegible] appointed in succession as Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Superintendent of Police) and Military Administrator, Eastern [illegible]. He held this post until the summer of 1930. During this time he did much to restore order in the province and dealt with the Shinwari attempt on Torkham in February 1930. After the Kohistan rising in 1929 he was appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh of that district and apparently succeeded in pacifying the people. Assumed duties of Minister of Interior in October 1930. Appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh of Kandahar in February 1931, and left for Kandahar via India. Administered the province with firmness and efficiency. Congratulated by the Government on his work January 1932. Visited Kabul for Independence celebrations August 1932 and was awarded the Sardar-i-Ala, first class, and a grant of 25,000 Kabuli rupees. Was offered Governorship of Herat in September 1934, but refused owing to his friendship for Abdur Rahim [illegible]

[illegible] doubtful and that he was in favour of a republic. A quiet, well-mannered man, but ruthless [illegible]

[illegible] Kandahar in 1936 and 1937. Warned to be more tactful by the Prime Minister. Appointed Republican party. Resigned Governorship of Northern Provinces 1940 and appointed Minister of

State 1941, a post he still holds though he has withdrawn to his estate at Ushak and remains there in spite of the Prime Minister's attempts to induce him to take a more active part in the Administration. His resignation of the Governorship of the Northern Province is thought to have been due to his dislike of Abdul Majid's (L.P. 9) trade development [illegible]

47. *Muhammad Haider Khan* (W W 329a)

Born about 1901. Son of Ata Muhammad Khan (Mir. Qaus of Herat). Formerly Afghan representative at the League of Nations and subsequently private secretary to the King. Appointed Afghan Ambassador at Tehran vice Muhammad N[illegible] Khan in January 1944.

48. *H.R.H. Muhammad Hashim Khan* (W W 33)

Mohammadzai. Son of Sardar Yusuf Khan [illegible] Zahir Shah. [illegible]

Solar [illegible] of Herat [illegible] been an outstanding reformer, but [illegible] retire by threat of mutiny on the part [illegible] Kandahar after [illegible]

Appointed Governor of [illegible] in July 1924 and [illegible] in Kabul [illegible] at the [illegible] completion of [illegible]

[illegible] Kamber Khan Afridi to Jalalabad in September 1931. Rewards in [illegible] cash to the tribesmen [illegible] that Nadir Khan had promised [illegible] allowances and the distribution of rifles for them from the Afghan Gun Mount. Reported in August 1931 to have engineered in connection with Nadir Khan, the robbery of one of [illegible] mail bags on route from Kab[illegible] [illegible] to Kabul from Jalalabad on [illegible] ber 1931. Officiating as Minister of War, Kabul January 1932, vice Nadir Khan, who proceeded on [illegible]. Went to Europe with his father in 1923 [illegible] Minister at Moscow March 1924 when he [illegible]

Afghans in Russia and on his views being disclosed [illegible] the Afghan Government to the Kabul authorities he resigned and left Moscow 3rd July 1926, to join his brother Nadir Khan at Geneva. Offered position of Minister at Tehran, which he refused, October 1926. Aqa as Siraj, the sister of the King, whom he wished to marry, was betrothed to Amanullah's cousin Muhammad Hasan Jan (W W 341) in October 1926. This was looked upon as an insult to Hashim Khan and his brothers. At Geneva December 1928 [illegible] diplomatic visa for India en route to Afghanistan January 1929, and left Marseilles with Nadir Khan and Shah Wali (L.P. 78) on the [illegible] February 1929. Left Peshawar for the Eastern [illegible]

19th September, 1929. Arrived Quetta 1st October [illegible] where he remained under surveillance until [illegible] October 1929, when he was permitted by the [illegible] in his dealings with other Government officials he is consequently both feared and hated. Was on tour in the Northern Provinces when Nadir Shah was [illegible] and returned immediately to Kabul [illegible] Shah, upon whose [illegible] real ruler of Afghanistan [illegible]

[illegible] quickly. It is said [illegible] careful in his dealings with other officials but is [illegible] popular. The danger of his being assassinated is [illegible] Is very friendly to the [illegible] of the British [illegible] Khan. Unless under English [illegible] and [illegible] Prosecuted in Berlin in October [illegible] Officer [illegible]

[illegible] (Sec. 38). Before [illegible] was able to return [illegible] and take a long holiday in England.

49. *Muhammad Hassan Jan* (W W 342)

Mohammadzai. Born 1892. Son of Sardar Muhammad Umar Khan (W W 646). A.D.C. in [illegible] February 1926. Married to Sardar Sirajuddin's sister October 1927. Was well known in Diplomatic Location at Kabul. Accompanied King [illegible]

[illegible] in Rome with Amanullah [illegible] Deprived of Afghan nationality [illegible] 1928. Accompanied Amanullah [illegible] Tripoli in 1935. In Rome with [illegible] since [illegible] 1938.

50. *Muhammad Hasan Khan* (W W 363)

Major general. Born about 1890, son of General Yusuf, an Iron smith. Related to the late Basawal Saqaw. Received three years' artillery training in Italy. Appointed to command Afghan Air Force 1924. Visited Western Command manoeuvres and carried out a tour in India at the invitation of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief Nov. [illegible] 1926. Was helpful to the Royal Air Force officers who visited at Sheepur in December 1928. Dismissed from his post by Bacha-i-Saqao January 1929, but was reappointed by Nadir Shah on his accession to the throne. In keen [illegible] and is keen on flying [illegible] the Frontier [illegible]

[illegible] 1936-37 with view to [illegible] Afghan Government. Pur[illegible] Great Britain and twenty [illegible] Crown of Ital[illegible]

despatch of A[illegible] training, the latter being a policy he consistently

supports. In 1942 he proceeded to India for medical treatment. [illegible]

He resents the fact that the Air Force is under War Ministry control, and wishes to have it [illegible] one dominating personality in the Air Force. Again visited India for medical treatment during winter 1944–45.

[illegible] Khan (W W [illegible]), Waziri, Tatu Khel, Ghilzai. Son of Abdullah Khan (W W 63) and nephew of W W 4. At one time Director of the Eastern Branch, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Governor Hukumat Kalan of the [illegible] province, Kataghan and Badakhshan 1936. Has pleasant manners and attitude towards British Legation. Not on good terms with His Royal Highness Shah Mahmud [illegible]

52 *Muhammad Khan Mirza* (W W 450).

Sent to Moscow on a special mission [illegible]

[illegible] On return from Russia he was for a short time an Under Secretary in the Ministry of [illegible] and Secretary of the Foreign Office on return from Europe. Chief Afghan member of the Urta Tagab Boundary Commission, and proceeded to Badakhshan January 1936, returning in June 1936. Appointed Minister at Moscow October 1936, having first refused appointment of Minister at Rome. As Minister at Moscow he preserved a broad outlook [illegible] 1939. Appointed [illegible] by King Nadir Shah [illegible] disgraced by the King for his work. Was put [illegible] as a result of the plot discovered in Kabul with the [illegible] Appointed Minister of Trade in 1937 [illegible] of no great stature or marked ability [illegible] grant on the Governor of Kandahar [illegible] but is lately [illegible] His son Abdul [illegible]

[illegible] *Khan* (W W [illegible]) [illegible] married in 1934 the eldest sister of King Zahir Shah. His wife gave birth to a son in August 1939 [illegible]

again in 1936 during the absence of Faiz Muhammad.

Also acting managing director, Afghan National Bank, during absence of Abdul Majid (W W 73) in Europe 1936–37. Appointed Minister of Education in 1937. [illegible]

Appointed Acting Foreign Minister during the Foreign Minister's absence in Tehran June 1937 and Jalalabad in January 1938. Still Minister of Education. Visited Khandahar as head of an investigation [illegible]

Appointed assistant to the Prime Minister September 1939. In addition to his duties as Minister of Education. In 1941 appointed officiating Minister of National Economy during absence of [illegible]

[illegible] 50), with whom he is a great [illegible] pleasant mannered and friendly to British Legation but somewhat reserved as a result of a tendency to deafness. Speaks French and English tolerable. It is believed that he is destined to succeed his [illegible]

54 *Muhammad Nai* [illegible] (W W 470)

[illegible] friendship with Germany [illegible] Russia. Accompanied [illegible] Europe in January 1938. Returned [illegible] appointment of [illegible] appointed [illegible] [illegible] Has beauty and capacity and speaks a little English. Since his appointment as Minister [illegible] popular. The latter said to be due to his patience when [illegible] complaints.

55 *Muhammad Qasim Khan* (W W 506)

Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Muhammad Sarwar Khan Kaka. [illegible] Ahmad Aziz. First cousin of Ghulam [illegible] (W W 81). Born at Lahore about 1900. Si[illegible] various minor appointments in Afghan [illegible] Office 1921–25. Was a per[illegible] Foreign Office in 1926 [illegible]

[illegible] and very good Pushto. His father died January 1936. Appointed Governor of Herat (1939). Appointed Governor of Kandahar 1941, a post he still holds. In [illegible] interest in the provincial administration which is almost non-existent. He is said to [illegible]

56 *Muhammad Qasim Khan* (W W 507a) (F M Muhammadzai)

Born approximately 1904. Director of Intelligence in the War Ministry 1935. Chief of Staff, Gu[illegible] Division, 1936. Officiating General Officer Commanding, Kataghan and Badakhshan Division, 1936. Promoted Firka Mushir 1937. Officiating General Officer Commanding Guards Division 1937. General Officer Commanding, Herat Division, 1937–40. [illegible] ted Governor and General Officer Commanding of the Southern Province in May 1944 at the time of the Zadran disturbances. A fine popular and efficient officer who has pleasant manners, is intelligent and speaks little English. A staunch supporter of Shah Mahmud (B.P. 70).

57 *Muhammad Sadiq Khan* (Mir)

[illegible] of Mir Sikandar Khan. Born about 1861. His father was a Court [illegible] with the honorary rank of general in the reign of Amir Sher Ali Khan and left Afghanistan during the Second Afghan War and lived first in Baghdad, where Muhammad Sadiq was born, and later in India, where he was educated. Mir Muhammad Sadiq returned to Afghanistan during the reign of ex King Amanullah and had minor appointments in the Education and Agricultural Departments of the Southern Province and in Northern Afghanistan. During the reign of the late King Nadir Shah he became Pirst Secretary of the Afghan Embassy in Moscow, an appointment he held for three years. When [illegible] returned to Kabul, he was appointed Director of International Affairs in the Foreign Office. [illegible] speaks English, Urdu and a little [illegible]

58 *Muhammad Sarwar Khan* (W W 560)

Darakai, Nath Sahar [illegible] Son of Muhammad Salim Khan. Brothers Ghulam Haida [illegible] Brigadier in 1936 [illegible] [illegible] ere he officiated as Minister of the Interior. Governor of Kandahar 1929, but the real power in the province was wielded by the Minister of the Interior who, personally officiating as Governor of Kandahar, remained there on relief [illegible] deal with the disorders that were rife in the province during 1929. Muhammad Sarwar [illegible] and was received by the King. Created Sardar-i-Ala November 1929. Appointed Governor of Badakhshan and Kataghan, 1932, but did not take up appointment. In Kandahar 1939. Appointed Governor of Kabul February 1940 but relieved in 1941 and went on pilgrimage to Mecca. Returned via Meshed and Kandahar. Appointed a member of the Majlis-i-Ayan (Council of Nobles) December 1941. Reported to be pro-Amanullah. Visited his brother Ghulam Haidar (W W 276) at Marud, Kandahar Province, in February 1942 but was recalled to Kabul in July. Has been unemployed [illegible] and friendly, but Amanullah's description shows little [illegible]. Still a member of the Council of [illegible]

59 *Muhammad Shah Khan* (W W 569) (Sultan Muhammad Khel)

Born approximately 1900. Son of M[illegible] and [illegible] brother of S. Faiz Muhammad Khan (W W 248). Was a Mulki in the Afghan Foreign Office 1934–35. Appointed Afghan Consul, Karachi, 1935. Received [illegible] special regime. A [illegible] recent in India since Saur and the (S[illegible]). Still Afghan Consul, Karachi. A pleasant [illegible] who speaks English and is always friendly towards the British Legation.

60 *Muhammad Shuaib Khan* (W W 611)

Born approximately 1904. Younger brother of Sarwar Khan (W W 50). Appointed Governor of Kandahar and Mulki of [illegible] of Court in 1941. Resigned in August [illegible] Left Kandahar near again to Chandar Khan, agent for Burma Shell Oil Company in Afghanistan. Agent for the Shakar in Residence [illegible] importing Japanese goods. Brother also of Ghulam [illegible] Karachi 1940. Still Afghan Consul at Karachi.

61 *Muhammad Umar Khan* (W W 612)

Faiz Mushir (major general). Younger of the Tarakai family. Born 1898. Appointed [illegible] staff 1921. Visited Delhi [illegible] 1924 at the invitation of the [illegible] India. Appointed head of Afghan Military Mission [illegible] Artillery for the Afghan army [illegible] Soviet military methods October 1936. Left Kabul by air for Termez en route to Moscow. [illegible] Was at one time military attaché in Berlin [illegible] 1935. Recalled to Kabul [illegible] freedom. His [illegible] work. Does not [illegible] intelligent officer but said to have had little experience in the field in handling troops. Has been much in Europe and speaks French, German and [illegible] To also said to speak French and Urdu. His loyalty to the present regime is doubtful. It is said that he will probably be appointed to a diplomatic post in Europe. Has pleasant manners and is friendly. Afghan representative to the League [illegible] Said to have been recalled to Kabul 1940 owing to unofficial conduct in Europe. Still Chief of Staff and a close friend of W W 414. He has the confidence of the Royal Family except in matters of a very secret nature. He is not a forceful character or likely to prove a leader of troops in the field. He makes out that he is a great Nationalist and neither anti- or pro-Russian, British or German. Headed Afghan Military Mission to India in [illegible] 1944 and made a success of it. He favours close [illegible] with the British and Americans in [illegible]

62 *Muhammad Usman Khan* (W W 661)

Sardar. In 1935 appointed to command at Asmar where he adopted a friendly attitude towards the British and was taking security from "badmashes"

prevent raids into Chitral. In 1916 was appointed [illegible] and in 1919 was still Commandant at Asmar. Recalled to Jalalabad in August 1929 reason unknown. He, however, again returned to Asmar and went to Kabul in September 1929 Chief Staff Officer to Nadir Solar Hashim Khan [illegible] Commanding the Ningrahar Corps in [illegible] Served as Afghan Consul [illegible] and as Consul-General India, in [illegible] 1929. Courier to Afghan Embassy Tehran, in 1930. Appointed Mum II in the Foreign Ministry in 1931. Was a member of the Musahal Pernu Afghan Commission 1934–35. Pensioned and unemployed 1935. Member of the Republican party. Was suspected of complicity in Afridi Amanullah plot in 1939. President of the Municipal Committee, Kabul, since 1937. Relieved of this post July 1942 for alleged malpractice in the distribution of food supplies to the public. A capable [illegible] with pleasant manners, who is somewhat disgruntled because he has not been given more important appointments. Reputed to be a [illegible] drink and to be showing signs of disloyalty to the Yusufzai Khel. Took up directorship of several public [illegible]

63. ***Muhammad Yunus Khan*** (W W 685).

Comes from Jandarwal and is of Pathan stock [illegible]

and was posted with pro[illegible]

February 1928 to January 1930. Energetically appointed Sh[illegible] al Dauleh a (W W 61[illegible] chiefs of Legation pro[illegible] Left London for United States in [illegible] (W W 865) arrival as Minister in January 1930 owing to disappointment of non recognit[illegible] work and refusal of Shah Wali to appoint hi[illegible] successor. Reported to be in touch with Ghadr party in San Francisco. In June 1935 tried to obtain the assistance of British Foreign Office to get on to Afghanistan. Believed to be, 1939, in United States. Pounced and became Director of the Afghan Naturals Association in the United States.

64. ***Muhammad Zahir Shah*** (W W 688a).

Mohammadzai. Only surviving son of the late King Nadir Shah. Born [illegible] father to France in 1924 [illegible] country. Returned to Afghanistan in October [illegible] In 1931 attended a year's course at the Infantry Officers School, Kabul. Married (1931) a daughter of Ahmad Shah (W W 340). Appointed Assistant War Minister 1932. In September 1933 officiated as Education Minister in addition to his other duties [illegible] and King on the 8th November 1933 immediately after his father's assassination. Quiet and unassuming with pleasant manners and a fair presence, he has so far had little share in the government of the country, the real power [illegible] wielded by his uncle H.R.H. Hashim Khan (W [illegible] 687), the Prime Minister. He is keen on shooting, tennis, riding and swimming. Up to 1938 he [illegible] left Kabul. Since 1938 he has made a few excursions into the country for a day or two, but is usually accompanied by a large number of officials. He [illegible] two or three months each year at Paghman, the summer capital to which the Government does [illegible]

development of the army and air force, and [illegible] known to express a desire to take a more active part in the direction of State affairs.

65. ***Najibullah Khan*** (W W 465a).

Born approximately 1900. Director General of the Political Section, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. [illegible] mother. Educated at the French School, Kabul. Speaks French fluently and is now able also to con[illegible]

ability and influence. He appears to enjoy the confidence of the Prime Minister and is probably closer to the centre of Afghan foreign and political affairs than the present Foreign Minister himself (L.P. 18). Ambitious and somewhat conceited, but unfailingly courteous. Had the reputation of being strongly anti British, but largely as a result of the kindness and courtesy shown to h[illegible] India in April 1944, is now extreme[illegible] towards us. He could be more [illegible] strong Nationalist. Dabbles in cultural matters and is a keen student of literature. If the present regime remains in power it likely to become a most important personage.

66. ***Obaidullah Khan*** (W W 402).

Son of Ameer Habibullah Khan by the Ulya Hazrat, younger brother of ex King Amanullah. Born 1915. Called Shah Agha. Carefully looked after by the Ulya Hazrat (W W 646), who employs [illegible]

[illegible] with Amanullah June 1929. In Berlin with his mother 1930. Still in Berlin, living at the Afghan Legation November 1932. With Amanullah in Rome in December 1934. In October 1935 was living [illegible] his mother (W W 646) in Ghulam Siddiq a (W W 803) villa in Berlin. Deprived of Afghan nationality November 1935.

67. ***Rahmatullah Khan*** (W W 5[illegible]).

[illegible] Relieved July 1941. In July 1942 transferred to the Home Ministry as Director, Posts and Telegraphs. Appointment raised to a Ministry in June 1943. [illegible] reported to be efficient and gets on well with Marconi's representative in Kabul. Stated to be keen on improvements and modern developments in his Department, but is slack and inefficient in carrying out his duties. His father died in 1936. Appointed Minister of Mines November 1939. Relieved of appointment of Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in 1940, and appointed Minister of Public Works in addition to Minister of Mines, but this is probably due to the help he obtained from German [illegible] tions, &c. His attitude towards the British [illegible] tion has always been friendly. Relieved of [illegible] appointment of Minister for Public Works in May 1944 owing to ill-health, but retained portfolio of the Ministry of Mines. Said to have pro-German [illegible]

68. ***Ramatullah Jan*** (W W 519).

[illegible] and Queen Souriya [illegible] Europe with King 1928. Declared heir apparent 1928. Accompanied Amanullah to Chaman and [illegible]

Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933.

69. ***Sayid Qasim*** (W W 548).

Son of Ahmad Shah Khan, Sayid of Kabul. Proceeded to Peshawar through the Khyber, December 1921 on his way to London as messenger from the Foreign Office. Married the third daughter of the late Mahmud Beg Tarzi. Member of the Afghan Legation in London 1924. Acted as Chargé d'Affaires in 1924 between departure of Abdul Hadi (W W 86) and arrival of Shuja ul Dauleh (W W 612). Returned to Kabul May 1925 and appointed Under Secretary in charge of Russia and Turkestan branch of Foreign Office to succeed Hafizolla (W W 327). February 1926. Appointed Afghan Consul-General, Delhi, October 1926, vice Haji Muhammad Akbar (W W 158) and left Kabul for Delhi, the 20th November 1926. Awarded Order of Astar, January 1927. Appointed Afghan Minister in Rome, 1928. Returned to India and left for Constantinople, June 1929. Said to be working as a translator in the Foreign Office, Kabul, the 7th January 1940. In Dec ember 1943 was believed to be with Amanullah in Rome. Speaks excellent English, well educated. Used to be friendly [illegible] members of British Legation, Kabul. His sister is the wife of W W 1[illegible]

70. ***Salah ud Din Khan*** (W W 553).

Born about 1883. Son of Mufti Sirajud Din [illegible] native of Herat. [illegible] married to the sister of Dilkusha Jaan, Shuja Dauleh (W W 612) brought him to Ka[illegible]

[illegible] in his Boundary duties. A[illegible] in India August 1933. [illegible] as vernacular pa[illegible] tan. Appointed Controller of Broadcasting and Propaganda, November 1939. Appointed Director of Press and Publicity in 1941 which post he still (1943) holds. Has at various times stated that, when General and Consul General in India, he was neglected socially by British officials at Simla, Delhi and Bombay. Is believed to have attempted to introduce news on the Kabul Radio and in the press with an anti British tone but the strict censorship maintained by the Afghan Govern[illegible]

Is a philosopher and poet. Speaks English intelligibly but not very well. Was once reported to be pro-Russian and pro-Republican, but appears to be trusted by Afghan Government. Has the reputation of entertaining anti British sentim[illegible]

71. ***H R H Shah Mahmud (Mahmud Jan)*** (W W 414).

Sardar Muhammadzai. Born 1884. Youngest son of M[illegible] hammad Yusuf and uncle of King Zahir Shah. Half brother of L.P. 30 and brother of L.P. 73. Appointed Sar Sar[illegible] Ga, ranking as general, in 1917. Commanded the troops on the Peiwar front 1919 [illegible] year with the Ameer for never having suffered a defeat (he was never attacked). Appointed Civil and Military Governor of the [illegible] 1919. In Khost February 1920. Arrived in Kabul from Gardez December 1920. Was married in Kabul during the same month to a step-sister of the Ameer. Returned to Gardez soon after. Shah Mahmud was in touch with Muhammad Hasan, B.A., at Mekin and Haji Abdur Rezaq at Shakin in 1920 and early 1921 and undoubtedly supplied them with frequent convoys of ammunition, rifles and money for distribution to the hostile sections of the Waziri Warin and Mamozai. Arrived in Kabul in October 1921 accompanied by his family. General Officer Commanding Hadda Jalalabad and Kunghan, from 1922 to 1925. Appointed Governor of Eastern Province April 1926. Interviewed Afridis at Jalalabad April 1928, and promised them proper treatment to that given by his brother Nadir Khan. Toured Jalalabad Province and interviewed Afridis at Mogha July 1929. Visited Kabul to discuss Mohmand unrest with King November 1928. Interviewed Mohmands at Jalalabad January 1927 [illegible] Peshawar and distributed money amongst Shinwaris. Transferred from Jalalabad to Kabul February 1928. Appointed second secretary in the Ministry of Interior March 1928. In Kabul February 1929. Commissioned by Bacha Saqao to go as his emissary to the tribes of the Eastern and Sou[illegible] his arrival in Khost March 1929. Assisted Nadir Khan in his campaign against Bacha i Saqao. Appointed War Minister by Nadir Shah Nov[illegible] 1929. Left Kabul for Northern Provinces and in [illegible] Supreme Civil and Military Administrator) of Northern Afghanistan. Succeeded in driving [illegible] Beg across the Russian frontier and pacified the country sufficiently for him to be able to return to Kabul in August 1931. Awarded the Ahmar A[illegible] September 1931 and appointed a member of the [illegible] Aiyan (Council of Nobles). He suffered [illegible]

December 1937 he was still engaged in settling affairs in the Southern Province and handing over position to Sardar Ali (W W 460a), the new Governor. Spent spring and summer of 1938 in the Southern [illegible] Shah's murder displayed great promptness of mind dealing with the situation in Kabul. Pro[illegible] Zahir Shah King and swore allegiance to him. Appointed Commander in-chief and Minister of War. [illegible] to possess considerable energy and force of [illegible] mand of irregulars than of regular [illegible]

[illegible] In addition to his military [illegible] [illegible] to the two sons of [illegible] due to 1922, 1924, 1932, 1936 and 1939. Left for [illegible] Europe March 1937 for medical treatment and [illegible] in Berlin [illegible] Kabul December [illegible] Now (1937) said to be taking less interest in [illegible] Still (1943) War Minister. Developed heart trouble in 1943 and was unable to carry out his duties for some time, but his health is said to be improving. Was in Gardez from April to June 1944 where he succeeded in isolating Mazarak (W W 423) and obtained support for the Government of the majority of the tribal leaders.

72. ***H R H Shah Wali Khan*** (W W 585).

Sardar. Muhammadzai. Born 1895. Son of Sardar Muhammad Yusuf Khan and brother of the

late King [illegible] Shah. Brother of L.P. 72 and half-[illegible] of L.P. 50. Was Rikab Bashi (equerry) to [illegible] Habibullah. Accompanied him to India in [illegible] After the A[illegible] [illegible] in order in February 1910 [illegible] Kabul, but was acquitted [illegible]

19. Promoted general for good [illegible] border. Married a sister of ex King Amanullah in May 1920. Appointed to [illegible] 1st Division in Kabul April 1921. Was on [illegible] terms with ex King Amanullah and seemed to be his greatest personal friend. Was one of the delegates at the British Afghan Conference in Kabul 1921. Commanded 1st Cavalry Corps December 1944. Appointed to command the Kabul Corps 1928. Appointed Yawar Hazrat (equerry to the King) December 1934. Visited India in May 1935 and again in December 1935 when he persuaded Mullah [illegible] Umar (W.W. 640) to return to Afghanistan from Hyderabad. Commanded the Legion during the Mangal rebellion 1924-25, and for his services was created "Tajwar Afghan." Left Kabul for Paris September 1926, accompanying Afghan students returning from vacation. Was with his brother Nadir Khan at Grenoble. Left Marseilles with Nadir Khan and Hashim Khan (L.P. 50) February 1929 and proceeded with Nadir Khan to Khost March 1929. Captured Kabul the 10th October, 1929. Appointed Inspector October 1929. Appointed Minister at London November 1929 [illegible] until the 10th January, 1931. Transferred June 19[illegible]

[illegible] late Ghulam Sabi. Returned to Paris and resumed his appointment February 1928. [illegible]

[illegible] 1944-50. His popularity caused owing to the exact [illegible] [illegible] refused to accept pay [illegible] concessions to the monopoly system of the Afghan Company. Acting Prime Minister in the absence of Hashim Khan in Europe (1936). Left Kabul in March 1937 to resume his appointment of Minister at Paris. Represented King Zahir Shah at the Coronation of King George VI.

Visited Kabul March 1939 and returned to Paris June 1939. Left Paris for Switzerland in August 1941. Returned to Paris early in 1945 on reappointment as Afghan Minister in France.

7. *Sher Agha (see Fazal-i Umar)*

74. *Sher Ahmad Khan* (W.W. 498)

Sardar Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Fateh Muhammad Khan [illegible] appointment of Ishaq Khan [illegible] 1917. Appointed Hakim (Governor) of Andkhoi 1921. Bastinaded and arrested Kabul May 1921. Appointed Afghan Envoy to Italy 1921 and arrived in Peshawar on the 10th October en route proceeding to be educated in Europe. Afghan Minister at Rome during 1922, and was engaged in negotiations for the purchase of arms and [illegible] end of 1923, when he returned to Kabul with an expert and instructor for his own country. Appointed Pesaulo [illegible] Leader [illegible]

With King [illegible] in Europe 1928. Appointed to still lower post of Prime Minister September 1928 and subsequently to be head of the Public Service Bureau. Held Jaghatai for Amanullah November 1928. Was given full powers to settle the Shinwari rising, but failed and returned to Kabul December 1928. Fled with Amanullah to India May 1929. Returned to Kabul later and was appointed Privy Councillor by Nadir Shah December 1929. Appointed Ambassador at Tehran December 1930. A man of some ability.

[illegible] be very outspoken on the subject. Arrived in Kabul the 18th September, 1933, on a visit. Returned Tehran December 1933. Visited Kabul 1936, using [illegible]

[illegible] received by W.W. 140 as Ambassador at Tehran in April 1937. Appointed Minister of State October 1937. Still (1943) Minister of State.

75. *Shuja ud Daulah* (W.W. 612) of Ghorband.

[illegible] of a Trans-Oxus family. Born 1946. Was [illegible] Bashi (page) in 1916 and was employed [illegible] after the turbulent mission to Herat. Appointed Farash Bashi Hazrat (Head Chamberlain to the King) to Amour Habibullah Khan January 1917. Appointed Kotwal of Kabul [illegible] chief of police) by Amanullah. C[illegible]

[illegible] Officiated as Governor of [illegible] recalled and returned to Kabul [illegible] the end of 1924. Was deputed to maintain order in the Southern Province during the Mangal rebellion (1924). Appointed Mudatar at London August 1924 and arrived in London April 1925. Carried through many rifle deals, out of which he is believed made a considerable fortune. Gave trouble to [illegible] to be the debts due by the Afghan Legation, for [illegible]. Summoned to Kandahar by Amanullah [illegible] 1929. Arrived Herat the 28th March, 1929 [illegible]

[illegible] Afghan Government property and on this [illegible] was asked to leave the country. In Berlin September 1929. In Moscow November 1929. Accompanied Amanullah to Mecca in 1931 returning to Europe via Beirut. Was in Germany in 1933. One of Amanullah's most active supporters [illegible] believed to be the active murderer of the Habibullah. Proved to [illegible] Deprived of Afghan nationality November 1933. Believed to be in [illegible] of the Soviet. His wife is a sister of W.W. [illegible] In Russia February 1936.

76. *Siddiq Agha Muhammad (Gul Agha)* (W.W. 613)

[illegible] Qazi ud Din Agha, the Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazar (W.W. 547), and half brother of Pacha Prince (Sher Agha (W.W. 236). On the death of Qayyum Jan Agha the title was assumed by the eldest son, Sher Agha. On the latter's death in June 1926 the title was assumed by Mulla ud Siddiq Agha, in the absence of his half-brother Sher Agha, then a political refugee in India. Was arrested with Rasul Jan Agha (W.W. 522), for trying to stir up trouble in Khost September 1928. Later released and in February 1929 was reported to have accepted Bacha-i-Saqao's rule. In June 1929 was placed under surveillance in Kabul on account of his intrigues with Sher Agha in the Southern Province. Confined to the Arg, June 1929. Released, and joined Nadir Khan on his entry into Kabul October 1929. Appointed Minister to Egypt and passed through Peshawar en route Feb[illegible] 1931. De[illegible] to Mecca, April, 1931 to watch Amanullah

In July 1932 visited Kabul on leave, and was received [illegible] a friendly manner by the King and the Prime [illegible]. Sher Agha (W.W. 236) was reported to be trying to persuade him to resign, but he returned to [illegible] in September 1932. Visited Mecca for the Haj 1933. Appointed Minister Hejaz in addition to duties as Minister Egypt April 1935. Visited Mecca during pilgrimage (1935), but evinced sympathy for Amanullah. Will in future reside permanently in Hejaz, relinquishing duties of Minister [illegible] Still (1937) Minister in Hejaz. Reappointed (1939), in addition, Minister to Egypt and will reside at Cairo. Visited Kabul in July 1942. Returned to Cairo in 1942. Expressed anti-British views in conversation with the war situation and British attitude towards Egypt in 1942. Still Minister in Cairo (1943).

77. *Sultan Ahmad Khan* (W.W. 624)

Son of Colonel Sher Ahmad Khan (W.W. 600) [illegible] to Mirza Muhammad Khan (W.W. 45[illegible]) Ambassador at Moscow August 1920. Head of Afghan mission to Angora 1921. Arrived in Baku March 1921. Arrived in Angora in April. Addressed a large crowd, including many prominent Turkish Nationalist Deputies, at the mosque of Namatu, Angora, in August 1921. The subject of the address was the [illegible]

[illegible] of 2,000 lirae to the Red Crescent. Bolshevik Envoy in Kabul Raskolnikov instructed his Government early in September 1921 at the request of the Afghan Government to provide Sultan Ahmad Khan with 40,000 roubles in gold, payment [illegible]

1922, and was appointed third secretary in Foreign [illegible] Officiated as first secretary during absence of Mirza Muhammad Khan (W.W. 450) on Urta [illegible] Boundary Commission. Appointed second secretary Foreign Office, June 1926, and first secretary October 1926. Granted title of Sardar-i-Ala February 1927. Appointed Ambassador at Tehran [illegible]

(W.W. 247). Suspected of pro-Axis sympathies [illegible] decorous. Was on [illegible] also terms with the late Ghulam Nabi [illegible] October 1941. Visited Europe in 1933 and, a[illegible] an representative, concluded a Treaty of Friendship with Brazil through their Embassy 1937. Appointed as an Afghan delegate to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1933. Still (1[illegible]

To be Minister Egypt in addition to his other duties [illegible] more also to [illegible]. Represented King of Afghanistan at the funeral of King George V January 1936. Visited [illegible]

[illegible] safety and to have given depressing accounts of [illegible] military ability to resist the Germans. Visited Kabul [illegible]

7[illegible] (W.W. 646). [illegible] for Majesty the Sun of the [illegible] of Lumab Khushdil Khan, [illegible] King [illegible] In 1918 said to be strongly in favour of [illegible] hostility and [illegible] to help Turco-German [illegible] of 1918 had numerous quarrels with Amec Habibullah owing to her interference in politics [illegible] term, and was eventually said to have been expelled from the Arg. After the murder of [illegible] left for Kabul to negotiate with her son, [illegible]. It is believed by many to have been, with [illegible], the organiser of the plot which resulted [illegible] Was said to have been of Tarzi's party and [illegible] ship with the British [illegible]

1915. Left for Kabul [illegible] December 1938, and proceeded with energy to raise [illegible] for the Durrani Dynasty. Was [illegible] [illegible] 1948), so far as is known, in [illegible]

[illegible] Yakub Khan (W.W. 675)

Mohmand. Son of Mohammad Yusuf Khan and brother of Agha Saif (W.W. 554). Born 1899. W[illegible] page to Amour Habibullah. Numerous favours were conferred on him by Amanullah. Appointed a Mustaufi Khas (Privy Councillor) in 1920, and [illegible] 1926. Created Sardar-i-Ala, January 1927, and appointed Minister [illegible] Amanullah to Europe [illegible] 1928 and to [illegible] June 1929 for Dorda[illegible] April 1929. Ordered to [illegible] deported for complicity in the Kohistan revolt 1929, but was detained [illegible] Said to be p[illegible]

April 1931. Arrived at Tehran with his brother [illegible] W.W. 505) December 1931. Has a son, Musa Jan [illegible] his property in [illegible] Deprived of Af[illegible] Family deported from Ka[illegible] to Te[illegible]

80. *Zulfiqar Khan, Muhammad* (W.W. [illegible])

Muhammadzai. Of an important family. Educated at Habibia College, Kabul. Went to France with Afghan students to look after them, and became guardian to Hidayatullah Khan (W.W. 348), son of Amanullah Khan. Was recalled to Kabul by Amanullah, and for some time was unemployed. During the revolution joined Hashim Khan (W.W. 317) in the Eastern Province and became his private secretary. Went to Paris [illegible] where he joined Nadir Khan and Shah [illegible] (W.W. 485). Councillor to the Afghan Legation in London 1931. Left London for Paris, with Shah Wali, in June 1937. Returned to Kabul September 1931 and was appointed assistant to the Prime Minister. A talkative little man, speaks English fluently and is very friendly towards members of the British Legation, Kabul. Visited Lahore in January and returned to Kabul April 1936.

Appointed Minister at Tokyo, 1939. Still (1943) Minister at Tokyo.

E 5095/5095/97] No. 2

Mr Squire to Mr Eden.—(Received 12th July.)

(No. 59)

Sir, *Kabul, 29th June, 1945*

THE end of the war in Europe and my own impending departure on leave [illegible] of the principal events that have taken place since the beginning of the year.

2. The principal factor in the country's stability remains the health of her Prime Minister. For the first time for many years Muhammad Hashim spent the w[illegible] in Jalalabad, and though the change of air seemed generally to have benefited his health, on his return to Kabul in the spring he was again for several weeks far from well. He has now quite recovered but seems to have lost much of his former interest in the administration of the country and to be no longer attempting to exercise the detailed control over petty affairs which has been such a feature of his Government ever since he first came into power. At the same time, his general authority is unimpaired and in all matters of importance he [illegible] appears to be absolute. He himself says openly that he would like to retire altogether and take a long holiday in England, but he sees no possibility of [illegible]

The rivalry between Daud Khan and his uncle Shah Mahmud, the War Minister is still a potential danger which may lead to trouble, but the two seem to have been able to achieve a certain degree of co-operation. The War M[illegible] has great influence among the tribes, has maintained his position and keeps the army as a whole, especially the irregular elements in it, fairly contented, leaving Daud Khan to organise and administer the Kabul Army Corps almost inde[illegible] [illegible] comparatively unimportant position by his unc[illegible]

3. The internal situation remains on the whole satisfactory, though the dynasty has not increased its popularity, especially in the provinces. So long as the ruling family remains fairly united and retains control of the army, and so long as no important rival appears, there seems little likelihood of serious trouble. The unpopularity of the present régime is probably greatest in Kandahar, where reactionary mullahs still seem to be able to call on fanatical support to block all attempts at modernisation. This has recently been instanced by a minor riot organised to protest against the visit of an amateur theatrical party from Kabul and by the opposition which the building of a cinema has aroused. Maladministration and corruption in Kandahar and Herat, the two most important towns in the country after Kabul, has also given the Government a bad name. The food situation was in fact so badly managed and so much [illegible] shortages in both places, which for a time caused some anxiety and which led, in Herat, to the murder of the Director of Food Supplies and two of his assistants in a riot which took place in that town. The situation on the Baluchistan border has remained peaceful on the whole and a greater readiness on the part of the local officials in the Kandahar province to co-operate with the authorities in Baluchistan has helped to maintain tranquillity in this area. In the Southern [illegible] still precarious. The Zadrans are discontented with Mazrak, their rebel leader still at large and still causing trouble, though strict vigilance on both sides of the border has prevented any recrudescence of the outbreak of last year. In the

Eastern Province the Prime Minister, during his residence in Jalalabad, made great efforts to obtain closer control over the tribes and to introduce a personal system of recruitment in place of the present tribal system, but his efforts met with determined opposition and appear to have been abandoned for the time being, though the Government have felt strong enough to arrest Malik Qais Khugiani, one of the chief opponents of the reform, and to confiscate his property apparently on a charge of plotting a rebellion.

4. In the realm of foreign affairs the defeat of Germany, though anticipated and therefore to a large extent discounted in advance in Government circles, came as something of a shock to the people as a whole. There can be no doubt that the interest that Germany took in Afghanistan during the period between the two wars has had a profound effect on the country. Many material improvements have been due to German assistance. Afghan armaments and military equipme[illegible] come largely from Germany, and except for the Turks, who are classed as "Half Europeans," the majority of the foreigners who worked in Afghanistan prior to the evacuation of the Axis nationals in 1942 were Germans. Afghans had been so impressed with German might and German victories in the early months of the war that they found it difficult to envisage the possibility of German defeat. German influence had been very widely welcomed if only because it was a change from, and was less of an immediate danger than, British and Russian influence, of which Afghans are traditionally so suspicious. It is therefore not surprising that the collapse of Germany evoked widespread feelings of sympathy and regret which even the Government-controlled press could not [illegible] important officials, there was a clearer understanding of world affairs, and the [illegible]eral feeling was rather one of relief and a hope that the end of the war in Europe might allow Afghanistan to return to a more normal existence and continue the tasks of economic improvement which the war had interrupted. Latterly, too, there has been a more general realisation of how dependent Afghanistan really is on the goodwill of His Majesty's Government and the Government of India, and appreciation of the economic assistance which in spite of war time difficulties has readily and consistently been granted. [illegible] popular opinion to maintain their neutrality, the Government made no difficulty [illegible] closed and its personnel interned pending arrangements for their departure. No such sympathy is felt for Japan and there have been rumours that after the defeat of Germany the rupture of diplomatic relations with Japan was seriously considered at a Royal Family conclave as being possibly in the best interests of Afghanistan and giving her a greater claim to economic assistance from the British and American Governments. In the absence, however, of any pressure from the Allied Powers, no steps to this end have yet been taken though an even closer watch than before is being maintained over Japanese activities.

5. The Afghan attitude towards His Majesty's Government and the Government of India has shown steady improvement. It is true that the informal discussions on the subject of frontier policy initiated at the end of 1944 have [illegible] conduct of India's external affairs is causing much speculation [illegible] but it is too early as yet for any crystallisation of Afghan [illegible] outside Government circles [illegible] by Great Britain [illegible] Great Britain has upheld the [illegible] Middle East. I think [illegible]

the Afghan Government are hoping to send some 160 to 170 students to various Indian military establishments

in March of a small mission of officials of the Afghan Press Department to Delhi to see something of publicity work in India. So far, the apparent results of this mission have been meagre. The Prime Minister has a rooted objection to propaganda in all its forms, and it is doubtful whether he really wishes his countrymen to have their minds freely opened to the influences of foreign publicity, however friendly its intentions may be. This may account for the unwillingness of Afghanistan to produce possible announcers for Delhi Radio's Afghan Persian programme, or even to encourage that programme at all. In

that the Afghan press should be willing to take its ideas freely from British sources and to accustom its readers to the idea of friendly co-operation with India. The Press Department itself has recently been permitted to discuss matters of mutual interest direct with the British Legation and to correspond direct with the Information Department of the Government of India. This is a new and hopeful line of advance. Progress in cultural relations must be gradual and must be allowed to grow naturally without too much forcing. The connexion between the Literary Academy, which is a branch of the Press Department, and the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal has been maintained and an invitation from the Indian Archaeological Department to take part in meetings of Indian Archaeologists has been gratefully accepted. The reopening of the French Archaeological Mission

Afghanistan in this sphere

7. Progress in enlarging social contacts is still slow. I understand that a Government order relaxing the restrictions that have been placed during the war

Meanwhile, there are welcome signs of impending change. Rather more Afghans than usual have been able to accept our invitations to cinema parties and to the

have been recently invited to Afghan houses which have not been open to us since the early days of the war. There is, however, as yet no free social intercourse between ourselves and the Afghans, though these restrictions do not apply

be under no restrictions in their contacts with Afghans.

8. One of the movements which is, in my opinion, most important from the point of view of Indo-Afghan relations is that for the better teaching of Afghan history in their schools, and it is most encouraging that Daud Khan, who is

accredited with pronounced German views, recently told the military attaché that he was having the teaching of history entirely revised and the anti-British bias which has always been so strongly in evidence in the presentation of the history of the last 100 years removed. The teaching of English in Afghanistan is making

regarding which I have already expressed my views at some length. Further progress must await the arrival of English teachers for the Ghazi College, two of whom are at last expected. The help that we have been able to give in this direction has been disappointing, and this applies to the provision of Indian as well as English teachers and also to the provision by India of other specialists whose services the Afghan Government have wished to borrow. We have long wanted

whose qualifications and political antecedents leave much to be desired. It is unfortunate, therefore, that in spite of India's best endeavours it has so far been impossible to find more than a fraction of the specialists for whom we have been asked. Similarly, we have consistently urged the Afghans to send their students to India for training rather than to foreign countries, and our inability to meet requests which they have recently made for courses of forestry, veterinary surgery, agriculture, &c., is not a little disheartening. War conditions naturally create difficulties, and India's own needs for post-war reconstruction must have prior consideration. The same applies, though in lesser degree, to the question of supplies from India. Help is given to the best of India's ability, and very material help it has been too, but war-time demands and cumbersome machinery

The Afghans find it difficult to believe that a country of 400 million could not freely spare the modest requirements of the 10 million in Afghanistan if it had any real desire to do so.

9. However unjustifiable Afghan criticisms of this nature may be, our

ment to turn more and more to America. American policy is not altogether easy to understand. The American Minister asserts that Afghanistan is far too small

of view, and that America's main interest in coming into the country at all was to assist in maintaining stability in this part of the world, especially in the years when Axis influence was all powerful. On the other hand, the American Legation as a whole is extremely active in doing all it can to supply Afghanistan

t, and to endeavour to secure for the United States complete freed

any sort of restriction in pursuing this programme. The diversion of the Karakul (Persian lamb-skin) trade, the country's most valuable export, from London to

has, of course, given America a very great advantage and provides the

with large dollar reserves which it is only natural should be expended

the United States. This is a loss which the United Kingdom will probably be unable to recover. India, however, with the advantages of proximity should find

undoubtedly increased. The embassy staff is believed to number over 100

They are doing everything they can to cultivate friendly relations with Afgh

and are apparently making extensive use of Uzbeks and other agents from

northern border for the furtherance of their own particular purposes, which

be presumed to be the fostering of discontent with the present order a

preparation of the ground for organised revolution in due course. In this connexion the capture in Berlin of Ghulam Siddiq, the brains of the pro-Amanullah movement, and his removal to Moscow is ominous.

11. Relations with Turkey have remained unchanged. The Turkish Military Mission is still largely responsible for Afghan military training, and though its members are being reduced there seems to be no intention of bringing its activities to a close. With the reopening of the French Legation French

is again to the fore in Kabul and efforts are being made to re-establish the cultural relations which existed before the war. A Chinese Legation is shortly to be opened. The new Chinese Minister has arrived in India, and his secretary accompanied by his wife, who speaks no language other than Chinese, is already

12. Any great advance in the country's economic development must, of course, await the ending of the war with Japan, but Afghanistan, like other countries, is already making plans for post-war improvements. Two American engineers are now engaged in the uphill task of correcting past mistakes and trying to inaugurate new projects, especially that of the Boghra Canal on the

subordinates and there are hints that they may find the task too much for their patience. Plans for the extension of the textile industry are being considered as are also various hydro-electric schemes. Little progress is, however, being made

certain bridging material has been asked for from India. Civil aviation has made no progress, though the Afghan Government is believed to have ratified or to be about to ratify all the conventions proposed at the Chicago Conference. The Government admit that they have only the very vaguest idea of the implications of these agreements and are not ready to take active steps to encourage any air services themselves. The most helpful line of approach may perhaps be through

service, and so not only open the door to direct air commu

but also secure British predominance in civil as well as in military aviation.

13. It is important the we should keep a close look out for opportun of assisting Afghanistan's economic recovery and seize every opportunity of re-establishing our pre-war trade position in the country. The proposal that has

been made, that a small Economic Mission from the United Kingdom would help towards this end, is one that well merits consideration.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India, the Government of India, the Government of the North-West Frontier Province, the Baluchistan Administration and His Majesty's Consuls in Kandahar and Jalalabad.

I have, &c.
G. F. SQUIRE.

E 5316/5316/97] No. 3

Mr. Squire to Mr. Eden.—(Received 21st July.)

(No. 60. Confidential.)

Sir,

Kabul, 1st July, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a report on the heads of foreign missions in Kabul.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
G. F. SQUIRE.

Enclosure in No. 3

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Kabul

(Passages marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports.)

Egypt

M. Abdel Karim Sabri [illegible]

A quiet [illegible] family [illegible] accredited as Vice-Consul and as the E[illegible] in London. Has also been in Teheran, Rome, Vienna and Budapest. He has not been here long enough to have created much of an impression.

France

M. Jean Charles Serre (Minister).

Presented his credentials on the 31st May, 1945. Served in the war of 1914–18, first in the infantry in the fighting round Verdun and subsequently as an artillery officer. After the war he passed the diplomatic service and has spent 20 years in North Africa. Was apparently the head of the Department of Consular Affairs in the Vichy Foreign Office from 1940–42. Speaks English tolerably well and is, I [illegible] to the whole well disposed to Great Britain but like most Frenchmen is extremely sensitive and critical of our policy, particularly in the Levant. Is already hard at work trying to restore his country's prestige in Afghanistan. Is accompanied by his [illegible] a depressed and tired wife and a stepdaughter. Their hardships in France in the last two years seem to have left them tired and somewhat embittered.

Iraq

Colonel Khalid Al Zahawi (Minister).

*Presented his credentials on the 4th February, 1941. Served with the Iraqi army and has received training at the Staff College at Camberley, where he [illegible] himself thoroughly and where he seems to [illegible] very well treated. Before being posted to Kabul he was Director General of Irrigation in his own country. (Written in 1944.)

Speaks French, Persian and Turkish. His Turkish wife, who was in Kabul from 1943–44, returned to Istanbul last year and is shortly to accompany their son, a medical student, to America.

Italy

[illegible]

Japan

Matoharu Shishida (Minister).

*Presented his credentials on the 3rd November, 1942. (Written in 1944.)

Persia

M. Abouhassan Sadjadi (Ambassador).

*Presented his credentials on the 5th August, 1943. A career diplomatist, who has been successively Minister in Berlin, Paris and Tokyo. Friendly but ineffective and appears to have little influence in Kabul. The co-operation which he is on occasion [illegible] a Legation on matters of mutual interest is adequate, but not more. As far as I am aware, he has never expressed any enthusiasm for the United Nations. Is learning [illegible] which he understands tolerably well. (Written in 1944.)

Was made Cabinet Minister in the short-lived Hakimi Government in the summer of 1946, but fortunately for himself had not left when that Government fell.

Soviet Union

M. Ivan Nikolaevitch Bakulin (Ambassador).

*Presented his credentials on the 17th February, 1944. Aged 35. The *enfant terrible* of the

Diplomatic Corps in Kabul. Was apparently appointed to the diplomatic service from China in [illegible] 1938, and, except for a period as Consul-General in Sinkiang, has served mostly in Moscow. Burly, outspoken and entirely without polish, he boasts of his peasant origin. Like so many Russians, he considers the only test of a friend is the capacity to put away an unlimited number of drinks [illegible]

His wife is the Embassy surgeon and works very hard. A simple soul, but genuinely friendly, she is wonderfully good at keeping her husband in order.

Turkey

[illegible] where [illegible] seems to be friendly, though of course he finds [illegible] With so many [illegible] to say [illegible]

United States

Mr. Cornelius Van H. E[illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] almost a religion, and there is at all times the best co-operation between the United States [illegible] Kabul, which is of great assistance [illegible] Engert's policy of co-operation.

[illegible] personality [illegible] respect which he should otherwise enjoy. [illegible] in 1944.)

Is now retiring and expects to leave Kabul in [illegible]

CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

E 4748 3229/93 No. 4

Sir H. Stonehewer Bird to Mr. Eden.—(Received 3rd July.)

(No. 251.)

Sir,

Baghdad, 14th June, 1945

WITH reference to your telegram No. 219 of the 7th June on the subject of British policy in Kurdistan, I have the honour to report that I saw the Iraqi Prime Minister this morning and after reminding him of his enquiries at our first meeting regarding the British attitude to Kurdistan, handed him an *aide mémoire* (copy enclosed) embodying the substance of paragraphs 7 and 8 of my despatch No. 180. Hamdi Bey expressed his agreement with and gratitude for this statement.

2. I told him that I was anxious that our position should be made perfectly [illegible] before I paid my first visit to the north, which I hope to do during the [illegible] a leading Kurdish politician and *sheikh*, and Minister of Economics in the present Cabinet, would be in Sulaimaniyah to welcome me.

3. I hope to report on my trip to Kurdistan in due course.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident, Middle East, and to His Majesty's representatives at Angora, Tehran and Beirut.

I have, &c.

HUGH STONEHEWER BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 4

Aide Memoire

British Attitude towards Kurds of Iraq

IN regard to the Kurds of Iraq, the attitude of the British Gove[illegible] it wishes them to be good, loyal, and prosperous subjects of their [illegible] Members of the British Consular and Political Advisory staffs in the no[illegible] are therefore, being reminded that they are always to work towards this end. They [illegible] Kurds are to be regarded only in the capacity of Iraqi subjects, not as a separate [illegible] people who have grievances are to be advised to refer them through the proper constitutional channel that is to say through the Iraq Government administrative officers and parliamentary representatives.

At the same time the British Government feel that it is in the interests [illegible] agriculture and social services, and that the Kurds should be given their fair [illegible]re in Government posts and offices.

(E 5131/198/93) No. 5

Sir H. Stonehewer-Bird to Mr. Eden. (Received 14th July.)

(No. 280.)

Sir,

Baghdad, 5th July 1945

[illegible] concluded a week's visit to the four Northern Liwas. The total area of these provinces is greater than that of Scotland, and it would be clearly impossible in so short a time to [illegible] but in a tour of more than 800 miles (excluding the initial and final train journeys) I was perhaps able to form some useful idea of the country and its problems. I was accompanied throughout by the oriental counsellor and by Lieutenant-Colonel Mead, Political Adviser, Northern Area. I was [illegible]

by members of my political advisory and consular staffs, by British civilians, by the four mutasarrifs, by three mayors, and by Arab and Kurdish tribal leaders; I had an opportunity of talking with many officials, both of the Iraqi and British Governments, with officers of both armies, with representatives of the British Council and the Iraq Petroleum Company, and with scores of citizens.

2. I started my journey as the guest of the Iraq Petroleum Company at Kirkuk. In a morning's round of the installation, I was enabled to see every [illegible], from the drilling of a new well to the despatch of the distilled product [illegible] from which both Britain and Iraq gain so materially is under wise and liberal direction. Far from wishing to exclude the people of the country, the senior officers of the company at Kirkuk are most anxious to enlist more Iraqis into their service, and offer good prospects of advancement. I hope that Professor Scaife, British Adviser to the Ministry of Education, will shortly be visiting Kirkuk to discuss with the company future policy with regard to technical education, for which the need here is so pressing.

3. From the oil company—the epitome of twentieth-century outlook and practice—to Sulaimani, was a contrast indeed. As I reported in my despatch No. 251 of the 14th June, the Prime Minister expressed great satisfaction with the aide mémoire on Kurdistan which I presented to him on that date. His colleagues also were favourably impressed by it, so much so that the Minister of the Interior sent for the oriental counsellor shortly before I left for the North [illegible] reciprocating His Majesty's Government's goodwill, and that in days gone by the North had not been "neglected" any more than the South, because the whole country had been neglected during the first years of its independent existence when Iraqis were more interested in politics than in social progress. (The only exception he made was in regard to education. Here he admitted that in the days when the Shiahs were in charge of the Ministry, they had deliberately promoted welfare of their co-religionists in the South to the detriment of the Sunni North). The Government now, said his Excellency, had every intention of promoting the prosperity of the North, together with that of the South. As a [illegible] from Sulaimani and a proved friend of Britain, who is now Minister of Economics, was sent ahead to Sulaimani to welcome me. In a prearranged exchange of addresses between his Excellency and myself, reference was made to the fact that Britain's friendship with the Kurds went back not only to the last war, but to the days of Claudius Rich, who visited Sulaimani in 1820. (It was at Sulaimani that Rich received, and had at once to re-transmit to India, the news of the death of King George III—an example of the importance of Iraq [illegible] link in our communications with the East.) Both Colonel [illegible] expressed the hope that Iraq would become like Britain [illegible] in which its citizens of diverse races would be able [illegible]

4. [illegible] to the little [illegible] Halebja near the Persian frontier. [illegible] was not fed and tarred. In this respect the [illegible] entertained [illegible] regaled with feasting and dancing, in which the Minister [illegible] only joined. There must have been several hundred [illegible] Most of them appeared to be well fed, voluminously dressed, [illegible] with a [illegible] Beyond the [illegible] meals [illegible] paid. I was [illegible] Kurdistan where poverty does not [illegible] country is on the upgrade, and this impression was emphatically endorsed by Colonel Wahbi.

5. Here, as elsewhere in the Middle East, we stand on the watershed between the mediæval and the modern. An example of this contrast is the once notorious Sheikh Mahmoud. This retired rebel received me in a gay pavilion which he had pitched by the roadside on the way up to Sulaimani, not far from the scene of his former misdemeanours. He was inclined to deplore the lawlessness of the younger generation who had deserted the tradition of their forefathers. One of his younger sons was also there. He was educated at Victoria College, spent five years in America, and is now interested in scientific farming. This process

of rapid, almost violent, change from ancient to modern is, for good or evil, going on throughout Kurdistan. Naturally it is resented by those who, like Mulla Mustafa, can have no part in it. It is our duty I feel, while showing sympathy with the old, to attempt to guide and conciliate the new. Our recent statement of attitude should make this task easier, if only because it will enable us, I hope to enlist the co-operation of the Iraq Government in the achievement of this object.

6. On my return to Sulaimani in the evening I was asked to witness a kind of floral dance which was taking place in the public streets in my honour. This entertainment was made memorable by a human flame-thrower—a man who takes a swig from a bottle of kerosene then strikes a match, and holding it at arm's length blows the vaporised kerosene upon it. The resulting conflagration is extremely spectacular but apparently innocuous.

7. I was unable to stay long in the Erbil Liwa, but was very delightfully entertained by the mustasarrif at Shawlawa, a mountain village of streams and groves where the Iraq State Railways have constructed one of their summer resort hotels. The mutasarrif, Said Qazzaz, Bahai Kurd, is an energetic and capable man with very sensible ideas on how to administer his province. He realises that [illegible] like Mulla Mustafa must be dealt with sympathetically but firmly [illegible] allowed to assume an importance to which they have no right. Said [illegible] typical of the younger Government official, all too rare, alas, who has been trained under British influence, and is honestly trying to realise British standards of administration and integrity.

8. Finally I spent a couple of days in Mosul. It is something of a shock to breast the ramparts of Nineveh and to see before you so large a city in so comparatively remote and empty a land. The population of Mosul (150,000) now exceeds that of ancient Nineveh by some 30,000 but the Prophet Jonah's word [illegible] on its inhabitants, "which discern not their right hand from their left" [illegible] just. Nevertheless, here, too, the spirit of energy and progress is evident. The mutasarrif is an ex Minister of the Interior. The mayor is a younger brother of Arshad al Umari, now Minister for Foreign Affairs, who for so long held the same office in Baghdad. Like Baghdad, Mosul is being intelligently town-planned; new streets have been opened, new gardens planted, new plans drawn up for illumination and water supply. The mayor was obviously pleased at having just succeeded in including within his municipal boundaries the whole area of ancient Nineveh, his object being to prevent squatters planting their hovels on the sites of the palaces of Assyrian kings. He also hopes in due course to remove the village of Nebi Yunis so that the excavations which have been the dream of archaeologists for a century can at last be undertaken.

9. I concluded my tour by dining with the Shammar Sheikhs at Shargat. Unfortunately the dispute between Sheikh Sfook and his brother Ahmed still continues and seems no nearer a solution than ever. This i[illegible] only for the tribe itself but because [illegible] ment and the [illegible] the Interior is in conseq[illegible] for the Western Desert, as has been [illegible]

10. Both in Kirkuk and in M[illegible]

11. I feel that this journey, short and crowded as it was, was well worth the time and trouble which it involved, not only for me but more particularly for many officers of the Iraq Government. The impressions which I described [illegible] reinforced. There is no doubt whatever that Great Britain continues to have a considerable and honourable rôle to support in this country, and equally that we can only play our part if we approach the people as [illegible] influence rather than upon authority for the achievement of our legitimate and beneficent ends.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, the [illegible]

I have [illegible]

HUGH STONEHEWER BIRD

[E 7274/7274/93] No. 6

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 29th September.)

(No. 377.)

Sir, *Baghdad, 14th September 1945.*

WITH reference to Viscount Halifax's circular despatch of the 9th July 1938, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on the leading [illegible]

2. Opportunity has been taken to [illegible] a number of new names, chiefly representatives of the press and the younger politicians.

I [illegible]

G. THOMPSON

Enclosure in No. 6

Report on Leading Personalities of Iraq for 1945

THE ROYAL FAMILY

1. A[illegible]

the 3rd April 1941
Amir Abdul Ilah
[illegible]

[illegible] palace at Pir Mam (Erbil) just before Rashid Ali and his associates decamped. He is a [illegible] intelligent child though somewhat delicate [illegible]

[illegible] 1943 recovering and recuperating [illegible] Transjordan. In 1944 he again [illegible] at Alexandria. In 1945 he did not [illegible]

American Legation. The [illegible] the 2nd Ap[illegible] Baghdad [illegible]

the Regent [illegible] of His Majesty's ships. By now any hope of staying a [illegible] port for his exile on the south had [illegible] On the 19th April he [illegible] with Ali Jawdat and Jamil Midfai, who had [illegible] at Basra. During the hostilities he [illegible] Regent [illegible] Baghdad [illegible] d on the 1st June after the collapse of Rashid Ali's regime and was welcomed by a large gathering of [illegible] and well wishers.

Since then he has taken his public duties seriously and has done his best to establish his position among [illegible]

[illegible] Among the past two years and has [illegible] powers of discussion but he lacks the personality [illegible]

He was made an Honorary Air Commodore in the [illegible] He caused a [illegible] 1945 by injudicious [illegible] for the General Election [illegible] second sense in his desire to reform the Administration and improve the general conditions [illegible]

[illegible]

he was the guest of Their Majesties the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace. He returned delighted [illegible] hospitality shown to him and much [illegible] by Britain's war effort.

During 1944 the Regent toured extensively within the country and paid particular attention to the army manœuvres which he constantly attended. In June he visited Alexandria, returning early in July. In September he again visited Transjordan and [illegible]. He paid a second brief visit to Transjordan in February 1945.

In the spring of 1945 he was much discouraged by Mr. Churchill's failure to invite him to join King Ibn Saud and others for talks in Cairo. This led to a threat of abdication, a thought which still preoccupies his mind.

In May 1945 he left on an official visit to the United States, returning via Canada and Britain. In London he was twice received by the King, met the Prime Minister and members of [illegible] he [illegible]

2. *Abdul Ilah, His Royal Highness the Amir.*

Only son of A[illegible] who died in 1933. Born in the Hejaz 1912. Came to Baghdad as a child with father in 1920, after the latter's expulsion from the Hejaz. Educated partly [illegible] Victoria College, Alexandria.

He speaks good English.

In November 1930 he married in Baghdad the daughter of Sa'ab al Din Fahmi Beg and granddaughter of Amin Nakshab Pasha of Cairo.

He is keenly interested in Arab horse racing and [illegible] a large stable.

[illegible] Regent on the death of King Ghazi on the 3rd April 1939. Although in Iraq he only enjoys the title of Highness, it is considered proper for foreigners to refer to him as His Royal Highness.

In November 1945 he was declared Heir to the Throne under the provisions of an amendment to the Organic Law passed in October.

Married his wife in the summer of 1940.

During the Cabinet crisis of January 1941 which led to the fall of Rashid Ali's Cabinet, he [illegible] to resist the Prime Minister's demands [illegible] treatment of new Ministers but fled to Diwaniyah to escape the threats to his life made by the four army officers, Salah-ud Din Sabbagh, Kamil Shabib, Fahmi Said and Mahir al Salwan. Rashid Ali thereupon resigned and Taha al Hashimi succeeded him. The Regent then returned to the capital. During the night of the 1st April the four army officers with their troops and went to the Palace to demand the resignation of Taha al Hashimi and the appointment of Rashid Ali as Prime Minister. The Regent was, however, warned in time, eluded them and took [illegible]

before returning to Iraq in September. While in the United States he displayed irresponsible extravagance, spending over $200,000 on jewellery. He has also invested heavily at the cost of grave inattentiveness, in speculative industrial enterprises in Baghdad. All this is generally known and has markedly decreased his prestige and may give rise to serious [illegible]

3. *Zaid, His Royal Highness the Amir*

Born in Constantinople in 1933. Youngest son of the late King Hussein of the Hejaz. Half-brother of King Ali, King Faisal and the Amir Abdullah (of Transjordan). His mother was a Turk. Educated in Constantinople. Fought with the Arab Nationalist forces during the Great War and won the good opinion of the British officers with the Sharifian [illegible] made a C.B.E. for his services in the war of [illegible]

Came to live in Iraq in 1921 and was commissioned in the Iraqi cavalry. Acted as Regent for a short time in 1924 during King Faisal's absence.

In 1926 he went to England and studied agriculture at Oxford for nearly three years. During this period he took an active part in the social life of the university and rowed in the torpids for Hertford. In 1928 he joined his father in Cyprus and remained there until King Hussein's death in 1931. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in January 1932.

In 1933 it became known that [illegible] of his sisters had contracted a clandestine marriage with Atta Beg Amin, some time first secretary at the Iraq Legation at Angora (and later at the Legation in London). The Royal Family were indignant, and Zaid was transferred to Cairo in January 1936 as the first Iraqi Minister at King Fuad's Court. He did not, however proceed to this post, which he ultimately refused to accept. At the end of 1934 he was busy in Athens engaged in litigation concerning extensive properties which he claims to have inherited in Greece. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935. In the spring of 1937 it was suspected that he had been using his position as Iraqi Minister to give false certificates for arms destined for Spain. He was recalled to Iraq for enquiries, but apparently established his innocence and returned to Berlin.

He is a pleasant, well-mannered man, and speaks excellent English and Turkish.

In 1935 he married a Turkish lady who had been divorced by her husband. This marriage mattered little so long as he was not living in Iraq, but when he was withdrawn from Berlin in the spring of 1938 and came to live in Baghdad it was considered [illegible] locally. But for his wife he would probably have been made Regent after the death of King Ghazi in April 1939. In the summer of 1939 he went to live in Istanbul.

Came to Baghdad in October 1941 to meet his mother the Amir Abdullah on the occasion of his State visit to the capital and has remained, living [illegible] in a small house.

He returned to Turkey in June 1943. Accompanied by his wife, he came to Baghdad in November 1943 to act as Regent while the Amir Abdul Ilah was in England, and remained until May 1944, when he went back to Turkey.

He returned to Iraq in 1945 to act as Regent during the Amir Abdullah's absence in America and [illegible]

[illegible]

1. *Abbas i Mahmud Agha*

[illegible] Hamdan Agha). Gone [illegible] when trouble in Sheikh [illegible] being at feud with Ha[illegible]

2. *Abbas [illegible]*

[illegible] Resigned with Cabinet in March 1935. Appointed Director-General of Tapu in October 1935.

Became Minister for Economics and Communications in February 1936 but resigned with Jamil al Madfai's Cabinet in August 1936. Reappointed Director-General of Tapu December 1936.

Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the Palace March 1937. Joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937 as Minister for Economics and Communications, and was appointed Minister for Justice in the Cabinet formed by Jamil al Madfai in August 1937 after Hikmat Sulaiman's resignation.

Transferred to the Ministry of Economics and Communications in October 1938, and resigned with whole Cabinet in December 1938.

Appointed Principal Private Secretary at the Royal Palace in July 1941.

Appointed Minister at Tehran in January 1943. Pleasant but without personality. Returned to Iraq in June 1945 and appointed first Iraqi Minister in [illegible]

3. *Abdul Amir al Uzri*

[illegible]

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in Rashid Pachachi's Cabinet in June 1944. Was Minister of Supply in August 1944, returning at the end of the month to his former Ministry. Speaks English well and is pleasant, intelligent and friendly.

4. *Abdul Aziz al Mudhaffar, M.B.E.*

Sunni of Baghdad. Born 1897. Speaks English, German and French well. Served as superintendent [illegible] Basrah, under the Government of Occupation March 1917, and in 1919 became Mudir of Basrah Secretary to the Ministry of Interior December [illegible] Director of Census Department 1927.

Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul, May 1931. Withdrawn September 1931 for incompetence and tried for misappropriation of public funds. Found not guilty and appointed to be member of Muntafiq Appeal Court. Lost this post when the court was abolished in June 1932. In the summer of 1933 was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Tehran, and in May 1934 was transferred to be [illegible] general in Beirut.

Appointed counsellor to the Iraqi Legation in [illegible] in May 1935.

In the spring of 1937 he was accused of [illegible] remained in Syria. He is married to a daughter of Nuri al Suwaidi, and this family connexion brought about his full exoneration in December [illegible]

He returned to Iraq [illegible] and shortly afterwards [illegible] that it had [illegible]

his name and made lavish use of the "V" sign on his business statement and press advertisements. As director of Iraqi Manufacturing and Trading Company was interested in the erection of a wax match factory in 1944.

5. *Abdul Aziz al Qassab*

Sunni of Baghdad. Kadhimain of Kut under the Sayid's Provisional Government and did very well. In October 1921 he was appointed Mutessarif of Mosul on probation for six months but refused to go [illegible] of a full mutessarif. In the [illegible] he went as Mutessarif of Karbala [illegible] Muntafiq in January 1929, and to [illegible] of Interior as Director General of Administration in June of the same year [illegible] of Mosul in January 1934. A [illegible] strength of character. Minister of In[illegible] 1938. Minister for Justice [illegible] W[illegible] out of office with the resignation of [illegible] Has not been [illegible] a adequate personal [illegible] Inspector Grade I [illegible]

He was appointed Minister [illegible] Cabinet formed by Jamil al Madfai in March 1935 but resigned with all his colleagues twelve days later [illegible] a deputy for Baghdad in the general elections of August 1935. Appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts in December 1937. In succession to Tawfiq [illegible]

6. *Abdul Ilah Hafidh*

Born about 1897 in Mosul. Son of the late Muhammad Ali Fadhil, who was for some time a Sunni [illegible]. Educated in Paris, where he qualified as a doctor. He also studied political economy. He [illegible] a degree in political science. Became Deputy for Mosul in 1920 and afterwards lost [illegible] seat. He then set up a dental clinic in Baghdad. Again elected Deputy in 1928. In 1935 he was appointed Iraqi Consul in Paris, but did not stay long, and in September 1935 he became [illegible] at Comoores. His subsequent posts were Consul-general Beirut 1936-39, Consul [illegible] 1939-40, Director-General of [illegible]. In July 1942 he became Minister of Economics and Minister for Foreign Affairs in [illegible] personality with wider [illegible]

7. *Abdul Latif Nuri*

Born in Baghdad 1893. Graduated as officer in the Turkish army in 1908. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Promoted staff-lieutenant-colonel in 1925 and colonel (retired) in 1929. He has held the command of the Northern and Southern Divisions, and has passed the senior and junior officers courses, and was posted to the Northern District in 1933. Promoted [illegible] as leader of the army revolt against Yasin al Hashimi in October 1936.

Minister of Defence in the Government formed by Hikmat Sulaiman.

Resigned after the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 and was then placed on retired pay.

Left Iraq in the same year for medical treatment and lived abroad. While in hospital in Damascus he [illegible] placed under arrest by the British military authorities when Syria was occupied in June 1941, but was allowed to return to Iraq in September 1941, since when he has been living quietly in Baghdad on his pension.

8. *Abdul Mahdi (Sayyid)*

[illegible] of Shatta Muntafiq. Born about 1904. [illegible] belongs to an influential family and owns a large [illegible]

Minister for Education under Rashid Ali al-Kilani May to October 1941. Lost his seat [illegible] in the election of 1944 [illegible] no part in politics until [illegible] December in elections 1947.

He was again returned for this constituency in [illegible] An erased person. Apr[illegible] Appointed Minister of Economics in the Cabinet formed by [illegible] Made Bank of Greece [illegible] [illegible] great Pan-Arab [illegible] treaty revision but is generally regarded as a young man whose days of effective agitation are [illegible]

9. *Abdul Majid Alawi*

Born 1898 of a large Shia family of Baghdad. Graduated in law at Baghdad and for some time [illegible] as a lawyer. Elected a Deputy in 1928 [illegible] was not re-elected in 1930. In a few months [illegible] Iraq Bar Association. In 1932 was appointed Legal Adviser to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs but was sent at once as vice-consul to Kermanshah. Transferred to Tehran 1934 and to Tabriz in 1939 where he remained for four years and where he co-operated closely with His Majesty's Consul. Became Director of Oriental Affairs in the Ministry [illegible] and Acting Director of Political Affairs in 19[illegible] when Dr Fadhil Jamali was [illegible] leaving the ministry as Director of the Political Department of the Ministry. On the 21st December, 1944, he joined the Cabinet of Hamdi al Pachachi as Minister of [illegible] Height. He is [illegible] appears in public, which is surprising for a Shia [illegible]

10. *Abdul Qadir al-Gailani*

Ladies' brother of Yusuf Ghani. Born Baghdad [illegible] Entered Government service 1926, and shortly afterwards was appointed attaché in the Iraq Legation in London. While in London he attended the London School of Economics. Speaks good [illegible] many occasions he was in charge of the legation and [illegible]

[illegible] Rhodesia. Was sent back to Iraq with the other Iraq internees for trial in April 1944. Tried in August 1944, he was found guilty of having, in May 1941, insulted the Queen Mother on the telephone. Although he was sentenced to three months [illegible]

Has been described as arrogant and selfish.

11. *Abdul Qadir al Rashid*

Sunni of Baghdad, related to the Gilani family. Born 1894. Speaks English well.

Appointed secretary to the Council of Ministers in 1924 in succession to Hussein Afnan. Remained in that post, the duties of which he discharged with noteworthy tact and efficiency, until November [illegible] when he was appointed Minister for [illegible] in Nuri Said's Cabinet [illegible]

12. *Abdul Razzaq Hussein.*

Born in Baghdad 1905. Sunni Moslem of a poor family. Educated in Baghdad and received his military training in Istanbul. Appointed as officer in Machine Gun Corps of Turkish army in 1912. Took no part in Arab revolt. Joined Iraq army on the 15th February 1934.

In very pro-Rashid. On the 17th May 1940, he, along with eleven other Iraqi officers, went on a tour of the battle areas of the Western Desert on the invitation of the Commander-in-chief, Middle East. [illegible] was Director General of Defence [illegible] one year 1944 he was promoted Amir [illegible] rank he now holds as Officer Com[illegible] Division of the reorganised Iraq army.

13. *Abdul Razzaq al Uzri*

Born about 1890. Shi'ah. A [illegible] Deputy 1921–32. Public Prosecutor in 1932. Subsequently held post of Mutessarif of Kerbela and Diwaniyah. Appointed Minister of Social Affairs by Nuri Said in November 1942. Ineffective and lacking in personality, he became a Minister only because no other eligible Shi'ah could be found [illegible] portfolio when Nuri Pasha reformed his [illegible] December 1943. Appointed Mutessarif [illegible] August 1944 as a result of Salih Jabr's intrigues. Mutessarif of Baghdad March 1945.

14. *Abdul Wahid Shaikh*

Fatlah tribe, son of Hajj Sikkar, once [illegible] Hashim. Throughout recent years he has steered his course with a view to maintaining to the utmost his [illegible] tribal influence. His support and loyalty were carefully cultivated by King Faisal, and [illegible] political parties have thought it worth while to try to make him an adherent. He has many friends and many bitter enemies, and is reputed to deal harshly with his fellahseen.

He was prominent as a leader of disorders in [illegible] August 1937 he was released from prison, but kept under surveillance first in Sulaimaniyah and later in Samawa.

He was permitted to return to his home in July 1939 and elected Deputy for Diwaniyah in June 1939. [illegible] nevertheless, to keep touch [illegible] supporters, among whom Hassan Sobah, of the Beni Tamim, was prominent.

Transferred to the internment camp at Amara in the summer of 1942. He was released in 1944 and lived in *résidence forcée* in Mosul till April 1945, when he was allowed to reside in Samarra. The compulsory economy of his exile leaves him the richest tribal leader in the Euphrates. His influence is still probably greater than that of any other chief of the Fatlah tribe.

15. *Abdullah al Damluji*

Formerly called Abdulla. [illegible] born 1905. A native of Mosul. Studied medicine in Constantinople and calls himself doctor, though it is believed that he did not graduate. Seems to have been serving in the Turkish army when Ibn Saud occupied Hassa in 1913, and to have transferred his allegiance to Ibn Saud. Soon rose to a position of influence in Ibn Saud's Court, and came to Baghdad as his unofficial representative in 1921. Was the [illegible] Affairs in 1922 and signed the Uqair Protocol. Went with the Amir Faisal al-Saud to London in 1930, and took part in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927. After this his influence waned owing to the intrigues of Fuad Hamza and Yusuf Yasin.

In August 1929 he represented the Court of Nejd, the Hejaz and its dependencies at the Medina Railway Conference at Haifa. The conference was a failure, and when it ended, instead of returning to the Hejaz, Abdullah Damluji came to Baghdad. [illegible] to Ibn Saud. Arrived [illegible] presence at the head of the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs seemed likely to embarrass Nuri [illegible] relations, but when Nuri Pasha visited [illegible] 1931 Ibn Saud [illegible] reinstated in his post at the end of December but resigned a few months la[illegible]

For nearly [illegible] Affairs and [illegible]

Resigned in June 1942.

16. *Abdullah Qassab*

Sunni of Baghdad. Born 1900, the son of an Alim, Shaikh Abbas Ammu-al-Fatwa. Nephew of Abdul Aziz Qassab, q.v. Educated in Baghdad, graduated from the Law College in 1928 and entered the Civil Service. Became Kaimakam of Samarra in 1936 and later became Director of Tribal Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior.

Appointed Mutessarif of Kerbela in October 1941 and was transferred to Diwaniyah a month later. Did well as a Mutessarif and joined Nuri Said's Cabinet as Minister of Interior in October 1944. Quiet and efficient, with no marked political leanings. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in December 1944 and was dropped from Nuri's immediately following Cabinet. Appointed Mutessarif of Mosul in March 1944.

A strong and capable administrator. He initiated and worked hard at the Conferences (Dec. 1944–June 1944, Baghdad, May 1945) to settle Shammar-Agedat disputes, but has not to date secured a [illegible]

17. *Ahmad Shaikh of Barzan*

A chieftain of the Kurdish Barzan tribe. Headquarters at Barzan at the foot of the Choman Shirin. Exercised powerful influence over the Baradost and Mizuri Bala areas to the north-west of Rowandiz. Friendly relations were established with him in 1918 [illegible] no administrative control was exercised in his tribal area. In 1920 he was implicated in the murder of two British officials. He and Faris Agha of Bera Kajra were declared outlaws with a price on their heads, and Barzan was destroyed by troops, but his country was not occupied. In 1922 he welcomed Turkish agents into Baradost and Mizuri Bala, and in September 1922 his men made an unsuccessful attack on Amadiyah. A month later Barzan was again destroyed by the Royal Air Force, co-operating with Assyrian irregulars. In 1923, the Turks having been driven from Rowandiz, Shaikh Ahmad turned on these retreating columns and came into Aqra to make peace with the Anglo-Iraqi authorities. His outlawry was cancelled, and he was permitted to continue in undisputed control of his tribal villages and mountains. In the si[illegible]

Persia and set free to his villages. Government intervention became necessary to restore order. Iraqi troops were concentrated early in 1932, and after some sharp fighting, followed by intensive air action by the Royal Air Force, Shaikh Ahmad was defeated and driven across the Turkish border in June. He and his two brothers, Muhammad Sadiq and Mulla Mustafa, were interned for a time in Turkey, but [illegible] the Iraqi Government on condition that his life should be spared. For a little over a year he lived in comfortable and honourable detention in Mosul [illegible]

into conflict before with Shaikh Rashid of Lolan, led him to arrange for the liquidation of various Mullahs in 1944–45. There is evidence that he is mentally unbalanced and his "dervish" influence is so strong that Mulla Mustafa dare not directly oppose him and resorts to flattery and cunning to get his way. Throughout 1945 he was opposed to the moderate course pursued by Mulla Mustafa and expressed his disapproval by announcing his intention of retiring into the background, but his feud with the Rekan tribes has never died and in J[illegible] 1945 he came forward again and ordered his tribe to overthrow the local Government. Disorder has [illegible] and the Barzanis, with Mulla Mustafa, are committed to wholesale resistance to the Government's intention to crush them, for the fourth time in 25 years.

18. *Ahmad Mukhtar Baban*

Born about 1895. Sunni of the Imran family which is Kurdish in origin. He himself knows no Kurdish and has no racial interest in the Kurd[illegible] A lawyer by profession, he served as a judge for many years. For a short time in 1942 he held the war-time post of Director-General of Supplies and in October 1942 he joined Nuri Said's Cabinet as Minister of Social Affairs. A fortnight later he was transferred to Communications and Works, where he remained until the Cabin[illegible] when he was appointed to the Mi[illegible] He kept the same Ministry in the [illegible] Cabinet of June 1944. Has held [illegible] of Finance and Foreign Affairs in [illegible] Ministers. Not a bri[illegible] clear of political intrigue.

19. *Ahmad al Rawi*

Born about 1890. Sunni of Baghdad. Son of one of the leading Sunni Alims. Became a police officer soon after the formation of the Iraqi Gov[illegible] and after reaching the rank of commandant served in several lines as a mutessarif. In February 1930 he was made administrative inspector and not long [illegible] placed on pension. In June 1941, after [illegible] of Rashid Ali's rebel Government, he [illegible] Police. In this position he co-operated energetically with the British officials in eradicating pro-Nazi propaganda and intrigues and also gave his personal and official support to all plans for improving Anglo-Iraqi relations.

In 1943 King Abdullah of Transjordan created him a Pasha. Appointed Minister to Syria and the Lebanon in June 1943. The unprecedented number of farewell parties to Ahmad Pasha reflected the [illegible] esteem in which he is held. A good [illegible] man with a keen sense of humour, he is intelligent and though not sufficiently forceful to administer with successful results, he may have found his metier in this new appointment.

20. *Ahmad al Shaikh Daud* [illegible]

[illegible] successful at a by-election. In October 1930 he became pro-treaty but in January 1930 voted against ratification of the extension of the treaty period. Minister for Auqaf under Abdul Muhsin Beg in January 1928 but resigned office April 1929. Elected to the Chamber as [illegible] 1928, and retained this seat in the elections of 1934

Lost his seat in August 1935.

He is now an ageing man and unlikely again to play a prominent part in politics.

Made a Senator in May 1937. Resigned October [illegible]. Reappointed to Senate January 1943.

His daughter Bahiha (a teacher on the Women's Training College) became the first woman student in the Baghdad Law College in 1947.

21. *Ahmad [illegible]*

[illegible] the process [illegible]. The Iraqi Government have [illegible] to endeavoured to replace him by others less sympathetic to Kurdish aspirations, but these efforts have not been successful. Ahmad Beg has [illegible] since 1930. He is connected by marriage with the ruling families of the Pizhdar tribe and owns property in the Surdash nahiyah. A pleasant and presentable man, who has always been popular with British civil and military officers.

Transferred as mutasarrif to Arbil in April 1933.

Made an administrative inspector April 1939. Placed on pension in spring of 1940.

22. *Ahmad Zaki al Khaiyat*

Shiah. Baghdad. Born 1896. Educated Baghdad Law School. Has held the following posts: Secretary of the Ministry of Education, [illegible] general at [illegible] Mutasarrif of Kut and Hillah and Land Settlement Officer. Appointed Director-general of Posts and Telegraphs in July 1932. Was instrumental in placing important telephone contract with firm against local foreign competition [illegible] and from his post in June 1941 as a result of the support which he had given to Rashid Ali's régime in May.

Appointed Director-General of Press and Propaganda in August 1944, in which position he has co-operated well with the British. But he is a weak creature with little control over the press and his chief official activity is perpetual flattery of the Royal House.

23. *Akram Mushtaq*

Born Baghdad 1888. Member of Sunni. Brother of Talib Mushtaq (q.v.). Gazetted officer in army 1927. Passed through Cranwell and appointed to Royal Iraqi air force in 1930. Promoted captain 1932. Took an active part in the coup d'état of October 1936. Promoted major 1937 and lieutenant-colonel in 1938. Appointed Commander of Iraqi air force in [illegible]

24. *Ali Jawdat*

Sunni, of [illegible] Officer in the Turkish [illegible] Turkish officer prisoners to join the [illegible] he was a member of the Ahd-al-Iraqi. After the war he was Military Governor of [illegible] with the Amir Faisal in June 1921 and in October 1921 was given the post of Mutasarrif of Hillah, which he held till September 1924. He took a very active part in the anti-mandate agitation, and was finally dismissed (on the advice of the High Commissioner) for defrauding the Treasury by underestimating revenue diamonds on supporters of his political views. In January 1929 he was appointed Mutasarrif of Karbala in the hope that he might be able to reconcile the [illegible]. He was unsuccessful, and in May was transferred to Muntafiq, where he did very well. Minister of Interior in the Ashan Cabinet, November 1933–[illegible] the Treaty. A[illegible] Inter of Basra [illegible]

1932. Re-elected for Mosul 1933. Appointed principal private secretary to the King March 1933. Became Prime Minister and Acting Minister of the Interior in August 1934. Was forced to resign in February 1935 on account of the agitation worked up against him throughout the country [illegible] Hashim and Rashid Ali. [illegible] President of the Chamber in [illegible] appointed Iraqi Minister in London in August 1935. [illegible] transferred to Paris in December 1936.

He came to Baghdad on leave in October 1937 and decided not to return to his post at Paris.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Sa'di's April 1939. Resigned with whole [illegible] in April 1941 he [illegible] resignant and accompanied [illegible] He returned to Iraq after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion and was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941.

Resigned with the whole Cabinet in October 1941. Has a son, Nizar, who was educated [illegible]

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Washington in March 1942.

Has interested himself in good relations between the United States to make better [illegible] side of the Palestine question.

25. *Ali Mahmud Shaikhli* [illegible]

Born 1889. [illegible] acquitted on [illegible]

He was brought before the courts again in 1930 for a similarly violent agitation against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance signed in that year and sentenced to a short term of imprisonment. He has twice been elected to the Chamber of Deputies. He was one of the members of the [illegible] Hikmat Sulaiman's reorganised Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned August 1937 and returned to the Bar.

[illegible] ment for about a year he was transferred to [illegible] to be Director-General of Customs and Excise. As a mutasarrif he allowed his politics [illegible] to colour too deeply his administrative [illegible]

[illegible] ted Minister of Justice in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. Fled to Persia with the rest of the Cabinet after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941. [illegible] over to the British military authorities by the Persian Government after the entry of British forces into Persia in September 1941. Imprisoned Ahwaz and thence sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment. Sent back to Iraq and handed over to the Iraqi court for trial in March 1942 and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in the following May.

26. *[illegible]*

[illegible] a daughter of Yasin-al-Hashimi in 1922. Appointed [illegible] director-general of Revenues in 1935, but was [illegible] for a time when Bekr Sidqi [illegible] as a government in [illegible]

In January 1939 he was reappointed Director- [illegible]

Rashid Ali's coup d'état. In May 1941 he was [illegible] ted director of the newly created Rashidian Bank, and in October he became Minister of Finance in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said.

Resigned in October 1942 largely [illegible] inability to get on with Salih Jabr. [illegible] the Interior.

Made Minister of Finance in Nuri Pasha's ninth Cabinet in December 1943. Headed Iraqi delegation to Middle East Financial Conference in April 1944. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

27. *Ali Shukur*

President of the Railway Labour Union (now illegal). An ex-engine driver of radical outlook who was dismissed from the Iraqi State Railways at the end of 1944. Became President of the Union in November 1944 and was active in promoting the Railway labour strike, which lasted from the 15th April to the 1st May 1946, and was the [illegible] movement which has been seen in Iraq [illegible] the formation of the Trade Unions. He appeared willing to stop the strike after a few days and to discuss terms with the Minister of Social Affairs but the majority was in favour of continuing. Was arrested during the strike when the Union was [illegible]

28. *Ismail Umari*

[illegible]

formation. He was promoted Assistant Chief of the General Staff in 1935 and General Officer Commanding the Northern Area in 1937. In August 1937 he refused to carry out the orders given to him by the Government to arrest a number of officers charged with co-operating in Bekr Sidqi's murder and this successful defiance brought about the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet. Soon after, when Jamil-al-Madfai came into office, Amin-al-Umari was transferred to command of the Baghdad District.

Went to Europe on leave in the winter of 1938 to undergo medical treatment. As a soldier he is out of date and obstinately refuses to modernise his tactical ideas [illegible] placed on pension in February 1940 because of the influence which he endeavoured to exercise in political matters outside his proper sphere.

Appointed C.G.S. in June 1941.

Placed on pension in November 1941 because it seemed that he was endeavouring to organise a new military clique to interfere in politics.

29. *Amin Zaki Sulaiman*

A Moslem (Sunni) of Turkoman origin. Born 1887 in Baghdad. Received his military training in Istanbul and appointed second lieutenant in the Turkish army in 1905.

He joined the Iraq army in 1921 as a captain, and was promoted major in 1926 and lieutenant-colonel in 1930, when he was placed in command of the 4th Iraq Infantry Battalion.

He was promoted colonel in 1934 and appointed to the command of the Northern Division with headquarters at Mosul, and a [illegible] appointed quarter-master-general. In October 1937 he was given the command of the Euphrates [illegible] Promoted brigadier in June [illegible]

He was much opposed to the Bekr Sidqi régime in 1936. He remained with the Euphrates Division until August 1937 when he was appointed G.O.C. the 2nd Division, Kirkuk, which position he was still holding when he was appointed acting C.G.S. in March 1940. Promoted major-general in June 1940.

In 1940 he was 53 years old and was the senior officer serving in the Iraq army. A staunch supporter [illegible] officer and a strict disciplinarian, but was generally [illegible] army with both officers and men [illegible] from Salah ud Din Sabbagh, he [illegible] internment in Ahwaz, he was sent [illegible] Sent back to Iraq for retrial [illegible] in March 1942, and in May was sentenced by a military court to five years' imprisonment.

30. *Arshad al-Umari*

Of the well known Umari family of Mosul. Born 1888. Trained as an engineer in the days of the Turk [illegible] Telegraphs. Made Amin-al-Asimah (Mayor of Baghdad) November 1931 and during his two-year tenure of that appointment did much for the improvement of the amenities of Baghdad. Was appointed Director of Irrigation in November 1933. [illegible] with the Cabinet in February 1935 and remained without a post until May 1936, when he was appointed Director-General of Municipalities. In November 1936 he again became Mayor of

Baghdad, in which capacity he is well known and liked by most of the foreign community. He has proved himself a good friend to Great Britain.

Following the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 when Rashid Ali and his Cabinet fled to Persia, Arshad Bey formed a Committee of Internal Security to conclude an armistice with the British forces and to maintain order until the return of the Regent.

In November 1941 he was reappointed Lord Mayor of Baghdad. Has done much to embellish Baghdad by opening up new roads and laying out public [illegible]

As president of the Iraqi Red [illegible] has shown himself very wo[illegible]

[illegible]

against the Colonel and returned to Iraq [illegible] 1944. As leader of the Iraqi deleg[illegible] he failed to [illegible] independence for [illegible] to mind and rel[illegible] to Iraq in Ju[illegible] readily every[illegible]

31 *Arif al Naqib, Sayyid*

The fourth son of Sayyid Abdul Rahman, younger brother of Sayyid Mahmud. Born Baghdad 1879. Appointed Naqib on the death of Sayyid Mahmud in July 1936. A man of little character [illegible]

32 *[illegible]*

[illegible] Legation [illegible] [illegible] Bahrain [illegible] [illegible] Iraqi Minister at [illegible] in August 1944. He speaks good English.

33 *Babekr Agha*

A powerful chief of the Pizdeir (Kurdish) tribe of Qalah Diza (on the Lesser Zab River north of Suleimaniyah). Has always been honest and friendly in his dealings with the Government, whether British or Iraqi. An able and most estimable man, who has been liked and respected by all who have had close contact with him.

His rival for tribal influence is Abbas Mahmud Agha, who has always tended to be against the Government. Both, however, visited Baghdad in October 1933 and protested their loyalty and obedience to the Iraqi Government.

He behaved well after the Iraqi [illegible] established normal administration in the Pizdeir area in 1936.

On the outbreak of hostilities between Rashid Ali's rebel Government and the British forces in May 1941 Babekr Agha, together with Sheikh Mahmud and many of the Suleimaniyah tribal chiefs, planned a revolt against the Government. Rashid Ali's rig[illegible] was, however, overthrown before their plans could materialise.

He visited the ambassador in December 1943 and pledged himself to act always under British [illegible]

34 *Daud al Haidari*

Sunni of Baghdad. Born about 189[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Arbil, where Ibrahim Effendi has an [illegible] property. Daud Pasha was a Depu[illegible] de-camp to the Sultan Abdul Hamid. Speaks Turkish better than Arabic. He was in Constantinople during the war and returned to Baghdad in 1921. Appointed, in October 1922, Amin al Umana (Chamberlain) in the King's palace. Member for Arbil in the Constituent Assembly March 1924 and Vice President. Voted for the treaty 1924. Hazb al Shab and opposed treaty of 1930. Minister for Justice under Ta'ifq Suwaidi, April-November 1929. Disliked and distrusted in Arbil.

[illegible] at store Ta'ifq Suwaidi's Cabinet resigned in August 1929. In 1930 became lawyer for the British Oil Development Company in Baghdad and has done quite well out of this work. Was not elected in the Chamber in the elections of 1934.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tehran in June 1941. Appointed Minister of Justice in February 1942, but was squeezed out of the Cabinet in June 1943 because of his intrigues against the Prime Minister. He was immediately appointed a Minister Grade I in the Foreign Service *en disponibilité*. Posted to London as Minister in October 1945. He took an active part in founding the Anglo-Iraqi Society in England, where he experienced the war at first hand, the Iraqi Legation being damaged by a bomb. His two daughters are emancipated and [illegible] successful debut in London, are now in Baghdad. Of

35 *[illegible]*

[illegible] Prominent [illegible] lawyer. Usually associated with all [illegible] and intrigues. Elected to the [illegible] Hab in August 1937 [illegible] prosecutor in August 1939 by [illegible] Resigned in December [illegible]

[illegible] supporter of Rashid Ali in 1941 he fled to Persia at the end of May after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. He was handed over to the British military authorities by the Persian Government after the entry of British forces into Persia in [illegible]

36 *Fadhil Jamali Dr*

Born Kadhimain 1902. Shiah. Educated at the American University of Beirut 1921-27. Columbia University New York 1927-29. Wrote a thesis on education among the tribes for his doctorate. On his return to Iraq he was appointed to the Ministry of Education. In 1933 he was made Director-General of Instruction. He has a natural predilection for American methods and is a disciple of Mr. Dewey.

In early 1938 he was invited by the British Council to visit the United Kingdom to study British educational methods. He was well entertained and shown the best colleges and schools of all kinds. As a result he became far more favourably disposed towards British education.

[illegible] appointment of a British adviser and the establishment of a boarding school on public school lines under British control. He was finally transferred from his post of director-general and appointed [illegible] January 1943 but at the end of May he was still in Baghdad hoping to contrive measures to return to a [illegible]

[illegible] ates Legation [illegible] General for Foreign Affairs in [illegible] delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. Returned to Iraq August 1945. Still desirous of returning to Education. Is outwardly zealously pro British nowadays, and professionally always [illegible]

37 *Hamdi Pachachi*

[illegible] with the Cabinet in November 1936. After this he remained outside politics for many years but returned to public life as Minister for Social Affairs in Taha al Hashimi's Cabinet in February 1941. He took no part in Rashid Ali's adventures in May 1941 and in November 1941 was elected President of the Chamber. He was re-elected to this position in November 1942 and again in October 1943. Ceased to be President of the Chamber when he became [illegible] was reappointed a Minister in Nuri's [illegible] on the 23rd December 1946 [illegible]

[illegible] the advantages that he has no aptitude to increase his holdings and gives a personal bent to any schemes for agricultural development (such as the Dujeila collective farm project).

Has taken a [illegible] Conferences [illegible]

38 *Hanna Khayat*

Syrian Catholic of Mosul. Born 1884. Medical [illegible] at Beirut and Paris, much medical and [illegible]

Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs October 1931. Appointed Inspector-General of Health in 1933. Became director of the [illegible] General Hospital and dean of the Royal Medical College in September 1934. Appointed Inspector-General of Health September 1937. Inspector-[illegible] Placed on pension at the end of 1940. Reappointed Director-General of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Director-General of Health in July 1941.

Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in January 1943.

Headed Iraqi delegation to Arab Medical Congress 1943. Elected a Deputy October 1943. Became invalid in April 1944.

39 *Hikmat Sulaiman*

Sunni. Born 1890. Director of Education in Baghdad under the Turks. Also Assistant Governor. Member of C.U.P. Was in Constantinople at the time of the occupation. Returned in January 1921 and was a candidate for the Ministry of Education. [illegible] October 1921 and for [illegible] He played an active [illegible] opposition to Ali Jaudat's Cabinet [illegible] months of 1935 but refused office [illegible] portfolio [illegible] try of Justice, but did not accept it. Is very influential in political circles, where his intelligence is most respected.

In October 1936 he joined with Bakr Sidqi in the plot which resulted in the successful military revolt [illegible] Again a resignation he became Prime Minister. He remained in office until August 1937 when, after the murder of Bakr Sidqi, he and his Cabinet resigned. As a Prime Minister he was disappointing. His [illegible] with detail and administrative routine, coupled with the foreign influences exercised by Bakr Sidqi over the Cabinet, prevented him from achieving anything of [illegible] well-educated man of wide Liberal views.

In 1938, though he took no active part in politics, he was on the alert to keep Nuri-al-Said from returning to power. When Nuri-al-Said formed a Government in December 1938, no sooner messages of [illegible] will to Hikmat and other men were exchanged between Hikmat and Saleh Nuri's son. In spite of their reconciliation, he was arrested early in March 1939 tried by court martial for treason and sentenced to death. This was at the same time commuted to five years imprisonment. In the summer of 1939 [illegible]

In April 1941 was released by Rashid Ali and allowed to go to Persia, where he remained throughout the May rebellion. He afterwards returned to Baghdad and gradually began to take part in social life.

He is now a flourishing farmer and apparently [illegible] to give up politics altogether.

40 *Husain Fauzi bin Hassan*

[illegible] 1881. Entered the Military C[illegible] and received a commission in the Turkish [illegible] Joined the Iraqi army (art. [illegible]) in May 1921. Promoted major 1925. He has passed the Senior Officers Course at Belgaum, India, and has twice been attached to units in England for training. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1929 and colonel in 1933. In 1934 he was appointed Commandant of the Staff School, Baghdad, and in February 1935 he was given the command of the Northern District [illegible]

November 1936 he was made G.O.C. [illegible] Division. A pleasant man with good manners. He speaks good English. He had nothing to do with the military revolt of October 1936. After the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 he was [illegible] of the General Staff. Relieved of his appointment and placed on pension in February 1941 for interference in politics.

41 *Ibrahim Akif al Alusi*

Sunni. Born Baghdad 1894. Educated Baghdad and Turkey. Graduated from Medical College Istanbul, 1916, and came to Iraq, where he served in several posts under the Turks. Joined Iraqi Health Service, and served as Director of Health Basra and Baghdad, with considerable success.

Was Director-General of Public Health in Ma[illegible] Services in Ministry of Social Affairs. He is secretary-general of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society.

Appointed Minister of Education in Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet in June 1944.

42 *Ibrahim Kamal*

Sunni. Born 1896. Captain in the Sherqatian army. A very good officer in the field where he commanded a battalion. Wounded at the first battle of Mazar. Legal officer in G.C. [illegible] in 1919 making [illegible] Was afterwards at Daq but not known to [illegible] participated in the attack on Tall Afar [illegible] and kept area [illegible] leaving the course to take up the legal profession. Entered Parliament as a Nationalist, but later gave [illegible] and Karbala in June 1934.

Proved to be a very efficient director. In November 1936, after Hikmat Sulaiman had had [illegible] principal private secretary to King Ghazi. He was not happy in this post for long and in July 1937 reverted to the Customs Department as Director-General. In August 1937 he joined Jamil al-Madfai [illegible] Company [illegible] with whole Cabinet in December 1938 after the military coup made against them by Nuri al-Said.

Appointed Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of Justice in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941 after the collapse of Rashid [illegible]

43 *Ismail Kamil*

[illegible] from Mosul. Born 1892, son of an officer in the Turkish army. Educated at Military College and gazetted an officer in the Ottoman army in Istanbul in 1912. Joined Amir Faisal in 1917 and commanded the Hashimi Cavalry. After becoming an officer in the Iraqi army in 1921 he attended various courses, including one of six months at [illegible] Became Commandant [illegible] in May 1945. He is generally considered to be pro-British. He is a man of sound sense. He has not, until 1944, mixed in politics, and disapproved of Bakr Sidqi's coup d'Etat. His venality has been the subject of comment, but he is quiet and temperate. Speaks good English.

44 *Jafar Pachachi*

[illegible] was energetic in promoting all Nationalist [illegible] especially the anti-mandate agitation. Minister of Domains from April 1922 till the [illegible] of June, when he resigned a [illegible] opposition to the terms of the [illegible] organised the Hashimi [illegible] where he [illegible] Returned to pol[illegible] in a Baghdad by[illegible] Hizb al-Watani [illegible] the latter [illegible] Baghdad Chamber of Commerce in November 1935.

During the summer of 1936 he became an active critic of Yasin al-Hashimi [illegible]

[illegible] Transportation Company in Baghdad.

45 *Jafar Hamandi*

Born 1894. At the time of the outbreak of war in 1914 he was a school-teacher in Baghdad. After the war he graduated at the Baghdad Law School and was appointed to a junior judgeship in Kadhimain. Later he was given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice. In 1930 he was transferred to the M[illegible] of the Interior and been in succession Najaf then after serving in several other districts he was made Mutasarrif of Kut in 1936 and was later transferred to the same post in Hilla. He was [illegible] Minister for Education in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned in August 1937 and in September he was appointed Director-General of tribal affairs in the Ministry of the Interior.

Appointed M[illegible] in September 1938.

Appointed Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet [illegible] by Jamil Madfai in June 1941 after the [illegible] Al's rebellion. Resigned with [illegible] in October 1941.

Appointed Mutasarrif of Baghdad in December 1941. [illegible] the Hashimi [illegible] Sadik Jabr as Minister of Finance [illegible]

46 *Jalal Habib*

Kurd of the Hilla [illegible] occupation he was [illegible] Nationalists and was deported to Hin[illegible] Appointed he makes [illegible] in the civil administration, holding the posts of [illegible] Karbala and Arbil in [illegible] tions. Made a Senator. Resigned from [illegible] May 1938 on account of immoralities [illegible] colleagues (not without reason) th[illegible] corrupt agreement with a Government road contractor. Appointed Minister of Communications [illegible] Works in September 1939, resigned with whole [illegible] cabinet in February 1940 [illegible] Works in the Cabinet of Jamil Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

In the sessions of 1941 and 1942 he was active in the Senate as a critic of Government measures.

Appointed Minister of Finance in June 1948, but resigned in October of the same year.

47 *Jamil Rohan*

A Kurdish lawyer. Born 1890. Served for some time as a judge in the Northern Liwas. Became Deputy for Arbil in the general election of 1928. Appointed Minister for Justice in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet March 1930. Resigned with Nuri Pasha in October 1932. Reappointed Minister for Justice [illegible] at the Ministry of Justice in Ali Jaudat's [illegible] formed in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935, and in October joined the party organised by Jamil al-Madfai to oppose Yasin Pasha. Owed his continued presence in successive Cabinets perhaps more to the tradition that each Cabinet must have one Kurd than to his personal abilities.

Ret[illegible]ned for Arbil in the elections of June 1939.

After practising as an advocate, returned to public life again by his appointment as Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Nuri al-Said in October 1941.

Resigned in October 1942 and began practising again as an advocate.

48 *Fa[illegible] Ra[illegible]*

[illegible] Fadhel on [illegible] came to Iraq with the [illegible] party after Ibn Saud's conquest of [illegible] Elected Deputy for Diwaniyah in the general election of 1928 became vice-president of the Taqaddum party and Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies. Minister for Communications and Works in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet formed in March 1930. Became Minister for Defence in January 1931 but lost his portfolio when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Mutasarrif of Kirkuk July 1932. Transferred to Kut in October 1935. His services were dispensed with by the Hashimi Cabinet in March 1936. In December 1936 he was in Jerusalem and in touch with the Grand Mufti and the Arab movement in Palestine. Appointed Iraqi Charge d'Affaires in Jedda September 1939.

Appointed consul-general at Jerusalem in July [illegible] Withdrawn in the autumn of 1941 and was appointed Iraqi Minister at Jeddah in December [illegible]

49 *Jamil al-Madfai*

of Mosul, born about 1890. Led the party which [illegible] Sheikh which he had instigated [illegible] leader of the Northern Mesopotamian army [illegible] of British troops from Mosul [illegible] to Daiz. Returned to Iraq 1920. Soon appointed mutasarrif and saw service in a [illegible] Minister for [illegible] under [illegible] Vice-President of the Chamber in December 1930 following Jafar Pasha's resignation [illegible] for the Interior. Con[illegible] Minister [illegible] Because Prime Minister in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but resumed office with a reformed Cabinet about ten days later. Resigned again in August 1934, but accepted portfolio of Defence in cabinet which was then formed by Ali Jaudat. Became Prime Minister in March 1935, but was forced to resign by Yasin Pasha's agitation in the Euphrates after being in office for only twelve days. In October 1935 revived the party of National Unity as an opposition to Yasin Pasha's Cabinet, but received little support. Declined an invitation to join the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936. In the winter of 1936–37 he went to the Yemen to obtain the adhesion of the Imam to the Pact of Arab Brotherhood, signed by Saudi Arabia

and Iraq in April 1936, and in August 1937, after the resignation of Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet, he became Prime Minister.

He lacks administrative ability, but is a figure in the political world. Is generally popular because he expresses his opinion in an honest, downright manner.

Throughout 1938 he held his Cabinet together and carried on the government of the country in difficult circumstances with success. Forced to resign on the 25th December, 1938, by a military demonstration organised by Hussein Fahmi, the Chief of the General Staff, and Taha-al-Hashimi in favour of Nuri-al Said. Continues to enjoy considerable political influence.

When Rashid Ali seized power by a *coup d'Etat* at the beginning of April 1941 Jamil Madfai fled to Basra, where he joined the Regent. Both narrowly escaped capture by the Iraqi rebel troops and took refuge on a British warship. Thence they were flown [illegible] Palestine, where Jamil Madfai remained during [illegible] Ali's rebellion of May. He returned to Iraq with the Regent on the collapse of the rebellion, and after considerable hesitation was persuaded to form a Cabinet. Faced with the difficult task of restoring public confidence and security he showed that he had lost his former resolution and energy. An ageing man, except his to the intervention of others, he inclined towards a policy of appeasement and refrained from drastic action against the pro-Nazi [illegible] operated loyally with His Majesty's Government, and during the four months of his premiership conditions in Iraq were largely restored to normal. Feeling unable, however, to carry out the policy of strong action which was pressed on him from many sides, Jamil Madfai, together with the whole Cabinet [illegible] in October 1941.

Since then he has been active in the Senate. In [illegible] Egypt at the request of Nuri Said to canvass support for the idea of an Arab congress to plan the closer union of all Arab States. He met with little success but was pleased to have had an opportunity to maintain his part as a veteran of the Pan Arab [illegible] December 1944 and resigned from Senate in February 1945.

50 *Jamil al Wadi*

[illegible] 1883. Appointed [illegible] no Lands (in the [illegible] Ministry of [illegible] Court of Cassation and a judge later [illegible] Chief Public Prosecutor. Appointed Director [illegible] of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1935.

Appointed principal private secretary [illegible] in July [illegible]

51 *Jafar Al Hasani*

[illegible]

to new proprietor of *Al Akhbar*, although he does not write the articles as he himself cannot write. The [illegible] properties in Turkey. [illegible] ple-minded man, sentimentally attached [illegible] ly. An ingenuous type, as witness his acceptance of partnership with Rafael Butti. Invited to visit Britain as one of delegation of Iraqi journalists in autumn 1945.

52 [illegible]

[illegible] for publishing pamphlets against [illegible] was released for lack of evidence. He was at that time well known for his Left wing views. The *coup d'Etat* of Hikmat Sulaiman in [illegible] gave him his first Cabinet post as Minister of Economics and Communications in October of that year, a post which he resigned in June 1937 because of a difference of opinion on the Cabinet's policy regarding the Euphrates. He left the country for a few months, returning after the Bekr Sidqi incident and from that time he has been an active [illegible] many diverse types from [illegible] of life. Given the right conditions Chadirchi and his party might expect strong support from the middle classes. His following includes Majid Mustafa (ex Minister for Kurdish Affairs in Nuri Pasha's last Cabinet), Rahmat Sabah [illegible]

53. *Khalid Sulaiman*

Brother of Hikmat Sulaiman (q.v.). Born 1877. Returned in 1926 from Constantinople, where he had spent most of his life in commerce. Was Minister for Education under Taufiq Suwaidi in April 1929 [illegible] of portfolios which followed Abdul [illegible] in November 1929, Khalid Bey [illegible] Pasha Suwaidi. A pleasant, honest and likeable man, but has no influence in politics. Appointed Director-General, Public Works Department, January 1932. Transferred to be Director General of Posts and Telegraphs in September 1934. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1935. Retired in March 1939 and now lives on his pension.

54 *Khalid Zahawi*

Sunni. Born 1889. Entered Military College at Constantinople in 1908. Served in the Turkish army until 1924. Joined Iraq army and was appointed aide-de-camp to the late King Faisal I. Promoted colonel in 1931 and appointed Commandant of the Military College. Went to the Staff College, Camberley, in 1934 and on his return was made a brigadier and appointed Director of Military Operations. Became O.C. R.I.A.F. in 1936. Appointed Director of Army Administration in 1937. Placed on pension in February 1939. Appointed Mutasarrif of Kut in October 1939. After the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 became Mutasarrif of [illegible] but was relieved of his appointment in June [illegible]

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Kabul in November 1942.

55 *Khalid Isma'il*

Sunni of Baghdad. Born 1906. Graduate of Law College, Baghdad. Held various positions under the Ministry of the Interior 1925-32. Appointed Secretary to the Cabinet 1932. Director General of [illegible] of Interior 1935. Director General of Education 1936. Pleasant, reasonable, speaks English well.

Appointed Director General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1937 but in October he was sent to be Mutasarrif of Amara.

[illegible] or General of Ministry of the Interior [illegible] Dec 1939.

Appointed Director General of Awqaf in 1940. Appointed Director-General of Census in October 1941.

Appointed Director General of Revenues in [illegible] 1942.

Director General of Finance August 1943.

56. *Khushaba Malik*

Assyrian chieftain of the Lower Tiari tribe, aged about 35. Presbyterian, and generally in disagreement with Mar Shimun. Well educated by American [illegible] Dem at Urumia. A striking personality with a romantic record as fighter and leader. Supported the Iraqi Government in their efforts to settle the Assyrians satisfactorily in Iraq and thereby incurred the bitter enmity of Mar Shimun. Many of his followers were bor[illegible]

Since hope of moving all the Assyrians from I[illegible] has been abandoned Malik Khushaba has set[illegible] in a quiet life in his village. Now resides in [illegible]

57 *Mahmud Abdul Razzaq*

Aged about 30. Arabic editor of the *Iraq Times* and Iraqi representative of Reuters. Editor of *al Hizar* started [illegible]

Has many Jewish friends.

Kemal (q.v.) but takes no side in party politics. Invited to Britain as one of delegation of Iraqi journalists, autumn 1945.

58. *Mahmud Subhi Daftari*

Sunni of Baghdad. Lawyer. Born 1890. Went with his father to Constantinople during the occupation and returned in 1919. Appointed Ikram-al-Asimah (Mayor of Baghdad) April 1930, but was dismissed in September 1931. Appointed principal of the Law School November 1931 but resigned immediately after his appointment. Became Director-General of Tapu December 1932 and Amin-al-Asimah October 1933. Transferred to the Ministry of the Interior as Director General of Municipalities in November 1936. He soon quarrelled with Arshad al-Umari, the Amin-al-Asimah, and resigned. He was made a Senator in October 1937.

Pleasant, well intentioned and outwardly more moderate in politics than in his earlier days.

Became Minister of Justice in Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in December 1938, but devoted more attention to his entertaining than to his official duties. Resigned February 1940 with whole Cabinet.

Made a Senator in 1940.

Made Minister for Foreign Affairs in Nuri Said's Cabinet in December 1943, a post which he obviously enjoyed enormously. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in June 1944.

59. *Mahrut bin Hadbahal, Shaikh*

Chief of the Amarat, Anaza (Arab) tribe of Iraq. He succeeded his father in 1927. Born about 1898. Intensely proud, but wiser than he appears to be. He has endeavoured to maintain good relations with the Iraqi Government, though the Nationalist element in Baghdad regard him with suspicion on account of his father's close friendship with the British. His tribal area is from the Euphrates southwards to the Nejd border.

He obtained a good contract for the supply of labour on the Rutba Baghdad road in 1940. During Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 he lost control of his tribe, parties of which attacked and looted some of the road camps.

His estate al Hazza, near Kerbala, has been expropriated for the Abu Dibbis reservoir and Mahrut has experienced great difficulty in obtaining compensation from the Government.

60 [illegible] Shaikh

[illegible] he revolted again [illegible] and deported to Henjam Island in the Persian [illegible] He was reinstated as Hakimdar of Sulaimaniyah in 1922 after the Turks had forced the British political officers there to withdraw. In 1923 armed action had to be taken against him to check his endeavours to establish his influence in the Kirkuk and Arbil [illegible] Persian villages close to the border. He chose Piran and stayed there quietly until 1930, when an outbreak of Kurdish Nationalist feeling in Sulaimaniyah again dragged him into the political arena. Air and ground forces had again to be sent against him, and on the 21st May he surrendered at Panjwin. He was granted an allowance and sent to live at Hilla. From there he was later removed to Basra and on the [illegible] of 1933 he was permitted to take a house in Baghdad. He receives an allowance of 900 rupees a month from the Iraqi Government. He has three sons, Jaafar Baba Ali and Latif [illegible] and intrigues and is a student in the Law College. Elected Deputy for Sulaimaniyah in December 1938 and again in June 1939. Baba Ali, after completing his secondary schooling at Victoria College in Alexandria, was sent to Columbia University, New York, to study political economy. On his return [illegible] given employment in the railways. He [illegible] of his father and will follow closely in [illegible]

[illegible] Shaikh [illegible] and in company with [illegible] Bakr Agha (q.v.) he raised a tr[illegible] Sulaimani with the object of ejecting Rashid Ali's officials. Before their plans could materialise, how[illegible] rebellion collapsed a[illegible]

tribesmen returned home. Shaikh Mahmud himself endeavoured to exploit the occasion to obtain concessions to the Kurds, but he was persuaded in the end to disperse his followers and to settle down in Danurea, one of his villages in Barzan. His youngest and favourite son, Latif, is restless and untractable, and a source of anxiety to the Mutasarrif of Sulaimania.

61. *Majid Mustafa*

A Kurd of Sulaimania, born about 1896. During the war of 1914-18 he was an officer in the Turkish army, and for some time after the Armistice of Mudros held pro-Turkish views. He was an active supporter of Shaikh Mahmud 1924-26. When Shaikh Mahmud submitted to the Government Majid was made a Mudir in the Liwa. His [redacted] ity was soon apparent. In 1939 [redacted] Nasiriyah, and in 1940 he [redacted] Two years later he was posted to Amara where he remained [redacted] attitude to the Rashid Ali [redacted] was [redacted] but he seems on the whole to have favoured Rashid Ali's cause rather [redacted] Regent. Rashid Ali did not, however, trust him and brought him in to the capital so that he could be watched. After the Regent's return to Baghdad at the beginning of June 1941 Majid took leave in [redacted] in September and was then suspended [redacted] on account of his misbehaviour with the [redacted] the Ras-al-Ain.

[redacted] ister without Portfolio with the special task of finding some means to stop the fighting with Mulla Mustafa in the Barzan area and redressing Kurdish grievances. The Regent disliked his appointment and only reluctantly agreed to it.

[redacted] with Mulla Mustafa in January 1944 and [redacted] the Cabinet without Portfolio, but [redacted] specially with advising the Government on Kurdish affairs.

[redacted] into business but has not abandoned politics. Made a vigorous and impressive speech on Kurdish needs in the Chamber in January 194 By the Kurds he is [redacted] careful to advertise on the surface his dissociation from events in Barzan.

62. Ma [redacted]

[redacted] atholicos of the Church in the East.

Born about 1909. Succeeded to the patriarchate in 1920 when a child. Educated in England at a seminary in Canterbury. Since coming of age and assuming the authority of his position, Mar Shimun has actively fostered discontent among the Assyrians. Whatever his position as the head of a spiritual community, his temporal authority is not acknowledged by a large number of Assyrians, estimated at a maximum of 12,000. His aim has been to establish the whole community in a compact area under his own spiritual and temporal authority. He was the inspirer of the mutiny of the levies in 1932 and of the exodus to Syria in 1933. Deported by the Iraq Government in the summer of 1933, he was given an asylum in Cyprus, where his father David [redacted] aunt Surma joined him. In October 1933 [redacted] went to Geneva to protest to the League of Nations against the massacre of Assyrians which followed the Assyrian attack on the Iraq army at Dairabun (Faishkhabur) in August 1933, and in [redacted] allowance of £750 a year, subject to his correct behaviour. This allowance was stopped by King Ghazi in the summer of 1934 on account of the propaganda which Mar Shimun persistently carried [redacted]

While paying lip-service to the League of Nations and always ready to petition that body on behalf of the Assyrians, he has proved disloyal to its decisions whenever they have conflicted with his personal ambition. By preferring [redacted] needless suffering on a deserving people. [redacted] year 1934 he was mostly in England, paying several visits to Geneva when Assyrian affairs were under [redacted]

In 1939 he was granted British naturalisation and went to live in Cyprus.

Since 1940 he has been living in the United States.

63. *Maulud Mukhlis*

Sunni. Born about 1875. A fine soldier, he behaved with great gallantry with the Sharifian army and was badly wounded. His exploits do not lose in the telling. Served in Syria and was sent in 1920 to Deir, where the agreement between the British Government of Occupation and the Arab Government was reached under his auspices in April. A hot Nationalist, he continued to spread anti-British propaganda among the tribes until he was recalled by King Faisal in June. Remained in Syria after the fall of the Arab Government and returned to [redacted] lost no time in joining the extreme Nationalist group. There was no post to offer him in the Iraq army, but he was given some land near Tikrit and settled down to cultivate it, with occasional visits to Baghdad and Mosul to take part in Nationalist activities. In May 1923 he was appointed Mutasarrif of Karbala to deal with the Ulema. He is no administrator, but he kept things quiet at the time of the exodus of the *mujtahids*. A [redacted] man who allows his pan-Arab sentiment to rule his actions. He was bitterly hostile to the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936 after Bakr Sidqi's *coup d'Etat* and openly condemned the murder of Jafar Pasha. In February 1937 [redacted] in Syria, but returned soon after [redacted] Sidqi's murder in August 1937. Has been a Senator [redacted]

Attended the Arab Parliamentary Conference on Palestine arranged by Alluba Pasha in Cairo in the summer of 1938.

Re-elected president of the Chamber November 1939 and again in June and November 1940. Was not re-elected in November 1941.

In recent years his drunkenness has increased and discredited him.

64. *Muaffaq-al-Alousi*

Born about 1894. Belongs to a learned family of Baghdad. He is a graduate of the Sorbonne, whence he returned to Baghdad in 1926. Was appointed a professor in the law school and afterwards in 1929 Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Two years later he quarrelled with the Minister Abdullah Damluji and withdrew to Beirut. In 1931 he accompanied Nuri Pasha to Mecca to negotiate [redacted] time to take up a [redacted] Aziz al Sa [redacted] ear and then returned to Baghdad. In May 1934 he was appointed first secretary in the Iraq Legation in Tehran. Transferred to be consul at Beirut in May 1935. Appointed consul-general at

Bombay December 1935. Dismissed from the Foreign Service in November 1937.

Remained in Syria until January 1939 when he returned to Iraq. Returned to the Foreign Service in February 1939 and posted to Paris as chargé d'affaires. Transferred to be consul-general at Damascus June 1939.

Transferred to Istanbul as consul-general in July 1941. Recalled in November. A heavy drinker wit [redacted] moved in April 1943 for insubordination [redacted] early summer was seeking official employ [redacted] Saudi Arabia. In 1944 he was living in Turkey on an allowance supplied to him by Ibn Saud.

65. *Muhammad Ali Mahmud*

Sunni. Born 1895. A lawyer who has served in many posts under the Ministry of Justice, including that of Director-General of the Ministry, Director-General of Tapu and judge of the Court of A [redacted] ted to the Chamber as Deputy for Ba [redacted] 1935 and for Arbil in 1936. Has twice been elected Vice-President of the Chamber and held the post of chairman of the Finance Committee in 1937. Appointed Minister of Finance in Hikmat Sulaiman's reformed Cabinet in June 1937. He resigned in August 1937 with the whole Cabinet.

[redacted] ted Deputy for Arbil December 1937 but lost his seat in June 1939.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works [redacted] nd subsequently sent to Southern Rhodesia to be interned. Sent back for trial in March 1944.

66. *Muhammad Amin Zaki*

A Kurd of Sulaimani. Born 1880. Well educated and speaks French, German and English. Formerly staff officer in Turkish army. Was made Minister for Communications and Works in November 1925 and subsequently held the portfolios of Education and Defence. Exerted little influence in the Cabinets in which he has held office. His policy is to try to please the Kurds by supporting Kurdish Nationalists without compromising his position with the Arabs. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930. Again Minister for Economics and Communications July 1931. Resigned October 1932. Appointed Director-General of Economics and Communications March 1933, but became unemployed when this post was abolished in September 1933. Became Minister for Economics and Communications in March 1935 in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet. Resigned when the Cabinet fell in October 1936.

Elected Deputy for Sulaimani in December 1937 and again in June 1939. Became Minister for Economics in March 1940 in Rashid Ali's third Cabinet.

Resigned in July 1940 on account of severe illness. [redacted] ted Minister of Communications and Works [redacted] Cabinet formed by Nuri-al-Said in October [redacted] Resigned in February 1942 on account of ill health. Made a Senator December 1943.

67. *Muhammad Hassan Kubba*

Shiah of Baghdad. Born 1891. Belongs to the old family of Kubba. In 1920 was associated with the Nationalist activities of Ja'far Chalabi Abu Timman. In 1923 he entered the service of the Ministry of [redacted] judge in many parts of the [redacted] in the Ministry [redacted] the Cabinet as Minister for [redacted] Nuri's resignation in June 1944, but became President of the Chamber of Deputies on the resignation of Muhammad Ridha-ash-Shabibi in December 1944.

68. *Muhammad Husain Kashif-al-Ghata (Saiyid)*

Shiah Alim of Najaf. One of the few Arab Divines [redacted]

Attended the Moslem Conference at Jerusalem in [redacted] as Iraqi delegate. Visited Persia on a prolonged [redacted] in the summer of 1933 and returned to Iraq in [redacted] 1934. In the spring of 1935 he took a prominent part in the tribal insurrections on the Euphrates, and gave his full support to the tribes which took up arms again [redacted] nt. He hoped to persuade them [redacted] on with the Ulema [redacted] Govern [redacted] sent a series of sta [redacted] to secure for the Shi [redacted] in the government of the country [redacted] partially successful and, after the defeat of the tribes by the army, he wisely withdrew to silence in the shrines of Najaf.

Declared a jihad for Palestin [redacted] 1938.

In 1940 it was suspected that he had accepted [redacted] an Legation to foster anti- [redacted]

Issued a fatwa against the British during Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941. His nephew, Ahmad [redacted] al-Ghata, actively supported Rashid Ali and was interned in August 1941 at Fao, but was released in August 1944.

69. *Muhammad Ridha-ash-Shabibi*

[redacted] Minister for Education [redacted] Cabinet in 1924. Again given the portfolio of Education in the Cabinet formed by Yas [redacted] resigned [redacted] of the Sen [redacted] in February 1937 and was reapp [redacted] for Education in Jamil al-Madfai's Ca [redacted]

Appointed Minister of Education in the Cabinet formed by Jamil al-Madfai in June 1941. Resigned [redacted] the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed to the Board of Education created in April 1942.

Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1943 and again in December 1944, but resigned almost immediately.

70. *Muhammad Salih-al-Qazzaz*

Baghdad mechanic. Born about 1900. Has recently come into prominence as a labour leader and agitator. A professional demagogue, he always thrusts himself to the van of any bazaar trouble and has been especially conspicuous in encouraging discontent among the labour employed by the foreign companies operating in Iraq [redacted] in organising the boycott [redacted] became the treasurer of the Popular Reform League [redacted] that in February 1937 he was sent to live [redacted] where he remained until December 1937 when he was released. Little has since been heard of him.

71 *Muhammad-al Sadr, Sayyid*

Born about 1885. An eminent Shi'ah divine of Kadhimain. Was a violent Nationalist in the early days of the British occupation, and played a prominent part in the insurrection of 1920. He fled to Syria when the insurrection was put down, but returned with the Amir Faisal in June 1921. Took an active part in the anti-mandate controversy of 1922, but after the proclamation of the Constitution in 1924 greatly modified his views. Appointed a Senator in 1925 and elected President of the Senate in 1929. He has subsequently been re-elected to this position at each new session, until February 1943 when Rida-al-Shabibi was elected instead. He was re-elected President of the Senate in December 1937 and again in December 1938, June 1939 and November 1939.

Re-elected President of the Senate in November 1941 and November 1942. A dignified and picturesque personality. Ceased to be President of the Senate in December 1943 on the election of Jamil al-Madfai.

72 *Mulla Mustafa*

Born about 1896. Brother of Ahmad al Barzani (q.v.). Was the fighting leader of the Barzanis in the troubles of 1931-32. He surrendered with Shaikh Ahmad and was banished to Sulaimaniyah. There he lived for ten years in poverty on a small allowance from the Government. In the autumn of 1943 he visited Arbil to Barzan and a few months later became involved in skirmishes with the police. The fighting gradually developed, and Mulla Mustafa successfully resisted the considerable forces of police and Iraqi troops sent against him.

In the beginning he was concerned only with [illegible] grievances, but later on he began to put forward political demands and in June as a [illegible] Kurdish nationalism. He won a good [illegible] Kurdish sympathy and support. In January 1944 a settlement was arranged whereby he was promised a pardon after paying a formal visit to Baghdad to make submission to the Regent. Thereafter he [illegible] however he [illegible] and took up arms [illegible] again in August 1945.

73 *Musa Shabandar*

Baghdadi Sunni. Born 1890, [illegible] son of Mahmud Shabandar, a wealthy landowner and property owner. [illegible]

Went to Berlin soon after the armistice, and lived in Europe, mostly in Zurich and Berlin, until the autumn of 1932 when he returned to Baghdad.

In January 1933 he was appointed secretary of the permanent Iraqi delegation at the League of Nations. Speaks English, French and German. Appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation in Berlin in October 1933.

Early in 1937 he was accused of giving certificates of export to Iraq for munitions destined for Spain and recalled to Baghdad, where he was placed under arrest. In December proceedings against him were dropped and it seems doubtful whether there was [illegible] for Amarah, December 1937.

Lost his seat in June 1939. Reappointed to the Diplomatic Service in June 1939 and [illegible] affairs to Berlin. Returned [illegible]

[illegible] Foreign Affairs in the unconstitutional Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. His polished and friendly manner led to close and sinister co-operation with Rashid Ali in his pro-Axis intrigues. On the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 he fled to Persia and was handed over to the British military authorities in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and thence sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment. Sent back to stand his trial with internees in March 1944. Sentence was finally passed on him, in August 1944, of five years hard labour and sequestration of all his property. Now at liberty.

74 *Muzahim-al Amin Pachachi*

Sunni of Baghdad. Born 1888, a lawyer. Elected Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly March 1924 and sat in the first Chamber in 1925. Minister of Communications and Works in the Hashim Cabinet August 1924. In 1927, while in [illegible] study of British politics, [illegible] Baghdad in February 1928 and joined the [illegible] His ideas seemed to be tinged [illegible] of 1929. Became Minister [illegible] and Communications in January 1931 and, shortly after, Minister of the Interior, in which [illegible] to confer again regarding his dismissal [illegible] al Aminah. Towards the end of May [illegible] as charged with con[illegible] circulation of [illegible]

Resigned his seat in [illegible] for trial with four others by Baghdad [illegible] court. Acquitted in October 1932. In October he was appointed Minister at Rome and permanent delegate at Geneva. In November 1933 he was relieved of his duties at Geneva. Appointed Minister there in July 1934. [illegible] Minister to the Vatican [illegible] when Iraq severed relations with the Vichy Government, but did not return to Iraq. In 1940 he appeared to be living in Rome. Later he went to Geneva and sought but was refused facilities to return to Iraq.

75 *Mustafa-al Umari*

Sunni of the Umari family of Mosul. Born 1891. Graduated in Law School in Baghdad just before the war. Served as an officer in the Turkish forces fighting in Mesopotamia during the war and was made a prisoner just before the fall of Baghdad. Returned to Iraq after the armistice and entered Government service. Since then he has served in the Waqf Department and in the Ministries of Finance and Interior. His posts included the Chairmanship [illegible] in several districts, Accountant General, Director-General of the Ministry of the [illegible] In 1936 he was appointed Mutasarrif of the Muntafiq liwa and in June 1937 he joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet as Minister of the Interior. He retained this portfolio in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in August [illegible]

During the first half of 1938 he [illegible] he resigned with the whole of Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet after the military demonstration organised by Hikmat Fahmi and Taha-al-Hashimi in favour of Nuri-as-Said. He is a Senator.

Appointed Minister of Interior in the Cabinet [illegible]

Said's Administration. Became Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet of Hamdi-al-Pachachi formed in June 1944.

76 *Dr Naji-al Asil*

[illegible] born 1885. [illegible] conquest of the Hejaz by Ibn Saud. Dr Naji then became destitute in England and was deported to Iraq in October 1925. In Iraq he was soon employed under the Ministry of Defence in the Iraqi Military Medical Service. Appointed Iraqi Consul General and Chargé d'Affaires in Jeddah in August 1931. Returned to Baghdad in June 1932 to be present during the visit of the Amir Faisal, son of King Abdul Aziz-al-Saud. [illegible] Affairs, April [illegible] Appointed counsellor in the Legation at Tehran, April 1935.

In June 1936, while on leave in Baghdad, he was appointed Master of Ceremonies at the palace and accepted the portfolio of Foreign Affairs when Hikmat Sulaiman formed his Cabinet in October 1936. Resigned with Hikmat Sulaiman in August 1937 and [illegible] by Jamil [illegible]

Appointed Director-General of Antiquities in 1944. A pleasant man of considerable intelligence.

77 *Naji Shawkat*

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1891. Studied in Constantinople and [illegible] Stuart and [illegible] Legation in 1919. Early in 1921 he was given appointment under the Mutasarrif of Baghdad, subsequently became mutasarrif. He also [illegible] appointed Mutasarrif of Kut in October 1922, of Hillah in 1923 and of Baghdad in 1924. Minister for [illegible] followed Abdul Muhsin's suicide. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in September 1930. Recalled to Baghdad in October 1931 to take up portfolio of Interior. Became Prime Minister in November 1932. Received the Order of Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy in January 1933. Resigned premiership March 1934. Minister for the Interior in November 1934. Returned February 1935. Again appointed Minister [illegible] on his official visit to Baghdad in the summer of 1937 and was then offered a Cabinet post in Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He declined because of his objection to Bakr Sidqi's influence.

Became Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet formed by Nuri-as-Said in December 1938, but resigned in April 1939. Deputy for Baghdad in the elections of June 1939. [illegible] advisable of remaining with the A[illegible] Ali's approval he went to Istanbul in September 1940 to establish contact with the German Ambassador [illegible]

April 1941. During Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 he went to Turkey to try and enlist Turkish support for Rashid Ali's cause. After the collapse of the rebellion he remained in Turkey. He was [illegible] exiled by court martial and sentenced to [illegible] salary from the Reich Government. In 1948 it seemed that he had taken up his residence in Rome, where he was in touch with the ex-Mufti of Palestine. In the summer of 1945 he was arrested in Italy, sent back to Iraq and imprisoned.

78 *Nadhif Shawi*

Born Baghdad about 1880. Educated in Military College, Constantinople, and the Turkish Staff [illegible] Syria and fought at Maisalun, where [illegible] defeated by the French. He then returned [illegible] Baghdad and for some years was employed as a teacher in the secondary schools. During this period he graduated at the Baghdad Law College. He later [illegible] capacity. In 1933 he attended army manoeuvres in England. On his return he was made Commandant of the Iraq Staff College. After two years in this [illegible] brigadier and appointed [illegible] He was placed on pension in 1939 and became Minister of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941 after the flight of Rashid Ali to Persia. He made a pleasant if colourless Minister and resigned with the whole Cabinet in early October 1941.

79 *Najib al Rawi*

Born about 1886. Sunni of Baghdad. Brother of Ahmad al Rawi. Married to a sister of Major Hikmat Sulaiman. Has for many years practised successfully as a lawyer and in 1942 was elected president of the Law Society. In 1940 he was suspected of being in too close intimacy with the ex-Mufti of Palestine (then a fugitive in Iraq) and with the Italian [illegible]

Sleek and *mondain*, he is a prominent upper class social life in Baghdad. Elected a Deputy in October 1943. He represented Iraq at the Arab Lawyers' Conference at Damascus in August 1944.

80 *Nasrat-al Farisi*

Lawyer of Baghdad, born about 1886. In the early years of the Iraqi Government he held somewhat extreme Nationalist views which he voiced as a Deputy in the Chamber. Was later given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice, where he [illegible]

Minister for Finance, November 1932. Resigned with Dr Naji Beg Shawkat in March 1933. Appointed Minister for Finance in Jamil Beg Al Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934. Appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April 1935. Appointed delegate at Geneva in June 1937.

Steady and intelligent, but inclined to be [illegible]

Was relieved of this [illegible] of 1938 when it was decided to withdraw the Iraqi delegation from Geneva. He then returned to the Bar.

Appointed Minister of Economics in the Cabinet formed by Jamil-al-Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941. [illegible]

81. *Nashat-al Sanawi*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1883. Studied in the School of Law Constantinople. He was in Bagdad before the occupation, went to Mosul with the Turks and was employed in various capacities there. Returned after the armistice and took service under the Brit [redacted] Bagdad 1928–30. Appointed Director General of the Ministry of the Interior in April 1930 and became Principal of the Law School, February 1931. Reappointed Director General of the Ministry of the [redacted] ber 1931. Appointed Administrative [redacted] General of Municipalities in June 1935. [redacted]

Placed on pension about end of 1936.

82. *Nureddin Mahmoud*

Born 1890. A Kurd. Commissioned in the Turkish army in 1912. Intelligent, resourceful and ambitious. Director of Military Operations. Graduate of Camberley and Quetta. Good man both in [redacted] initiated the Anglo-Iraqi negotiations. Does not dabble unduly in politics but sympathises with the Allied cause and was heartily against and worked against Rashid Ali. His only strong feeling is [redacted] and as long as there is [redacted] Kurds and the British his [redacted] granted.

Attractive personality. Has been military attaché in London. Was Officer Commanding 2nd Division [redacted]

83. *Nuri-al Said*

Sunni of Bagdad, born 1888, son of an accountant of Mosul descent. Educated in Constantinople; speaks Turkish, German, French and English. Served in Balkan War. He was one of the founders of the Ahd in 1913 and came from Constantinople to Iraq in order to start branches there. He was in Basra at the time of the occupation as a patient in the American hospital; joined the Arab army in the Hejaz in June 1916 and commanded the troops till the arrival of Jafar Pasha (his brother-in-law); served as C.G.S. till the fall of Damascus. A good intelligent, very receptive of ideas, clever, hard-working, rash and hot-headed under fire. A ... with an excep [redacted] ert intelligence. Was awarded the D.S. [redacted] 17 and the C.M.G. 19 [redacted] and accompanied F [redacted] in 1919 and 1920. H [redacted] rapprochement between the French and the Arabs and dissuaded King Feisal from offering resistance to the French on the ground that he could not hope for support from the British. When the break came in July 1920 he went with Feisal to England. Returned to Bagdad in February 1921 and took charge of the Ministry of Defence during the absence of Jafar Pasha at the Cairo Conference. On his return he became C.G.S. and Director General of Police, and held these appointments till October 1922. Acting Minister of Defence from November 1922 to November 1923. Held the same portfolio in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet. Minister of Defence again in November 1926, and retained that portfolio with only short intervals out of office until he became Prime Minister in March 1930. Negotiated and signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of June 1930. Visited Jedda in 1931 to negotiate a "Bon Voisinage" Treaty with Nejd and the Hejaz. Resigned with the whole Cabinet the 19th October 1931 but reaccepted office on the same day in a reformed Cabinet. Visited Angora with King Feisal July 1931 and again in December–January 1931-32. During latter visit he signed with Turkish Government an Extradition Treaty, a Treaty of Commerce and a Residence Convention. Resigned premiership in October 1932. Appointed Minister at Rome, February 1933 but did not proceed. Became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Cabinet of Rashid Ali Gailani in March 1933. Resigned with Rashid Ali in October 1933 and accepted portfolio of Foreign Affairs and Defence under Jamil-al Madfai in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1934 under Ali Jaudat's premiership. Resigned with Ali Jaudat in February 1935, but retained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the succeeding Cabinet formed by Jamil al Madfai and returned again to the Ministry in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935.

In October, after Bakr Sidqi's successful military revolt, Nuri Pasha, fearing for his life, fled to Egypt with his family, where he carried on a restless agitation from Cairo to secure his return to Iraq. He came back in October 1937 after the murder of Bakr Sidqi and the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He was offered the post of Iraqi Minister in London, but did not accept it. In early December he went to Syria with the intention of working privately for a [redacted] future of the Jews and A [redacted] occupied principally in desultory conversations about Palestine with [redacted] London. On each of his short vi [redacted] presence gave rise to rumou [redacted] political intentions, but these died away as soon as [redacted] gned the premiership in February 1940 [redacted] at the Regent's request reformed his Cabinet and continued in office until the end of March when, with his own collaboration, a new Cabinet was formed by Rashid [redacted]

Remained in office as Minister for Foreign A [redacted] end of January 1941 when he and several [redacted] thrown by Rashid Ali and the army. Nuri Said withdrew to Transjordan, where he remained until he was able to come back with the Regent at the beginning of June. Before the end of the month he was appointed Iraqi Minister in Cairo but was recalled to form a Cabinet on the resignation of Jamil Madfai at the beginning of October 1941. From that time onwards he collaborated closely with His Majesty's Ambassador in eradicating pro-Nazi propaganda in Iraq and it was due to his initiative that Iraq declared war on the Axis Powers in January 1943.

In the summer of 1943 Nuri Pasha visited [redacted] to discuss Arab unity with the Egyptian Prime Minister Nahas Pasha. He also went to Syria and Palestine for talks with Arabs there. He remained Prime Minister throughout 1943 but there were many changes in his Cabinet, and he formed his [redacted] 25th De [redacted]

Resigned in June 1944 with his whole Cabinet after an undignified brawl in the Chamber between some of his supporters and the Opposition, which convinced him that he did not enjoy the Regent's confidence and support. In any case he was tired and needed a rest. Accompanied the Regent on his travels in America and Europe during the summer of 1945.

84. *Rashid Ali al-Gilani*

Sunni of Bagdad, born [redacted] of the Naqib. In Turkish times was a clerk in the Waqf Department. Fled to Mosul with the Turks on the capture of Bagdad, and after the fall of Mosul [redacted] In May 1924 he was appointed [redacted] of the Interior [redacted] Deputies in the general [redacted] gned his seat in March 1931 in company with Yasin-al Hashimi, Naji al Suwaidi and Ali Jaudat, as a protest against the conduct of Nuri Pasha's Government. Became a prominent leader of the Hizb al Ikha al Watani (the party of National Brotherhood). He encouraged the general strike in July 1931, hoping thereby to [redacted] Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. Appointed chief private secretary to the King in July 1932. Became Prime Minister in March 1933. Resigned October 1933. Appointed Senator in summer of 1934. He led to organise the disturbances on the Euphrates which forced Ali Jaudat to resign in March 1935 and, Minister for the Interior, joined the Cabinet then [redacted]

After Bakr Sidqi's military revolt against the Hashimite Cabinet in October 1936, Rashid Ali fled to Constantinople. He came back in October 1937.

During 1938 he made several speeches in the Senate attacking the policy of Jamil-al Madfai's Cabinet.

[redacted] to Anah December 1938. Returned a few days later when Nuri-al Said succeeded Jamil al Madfai as Prime Minister. Appointed chief private secretary to the Palace in January 1939 and remained in this post after King Ghazi's death in April 1939. Became Prime Minister in March 1940.

Throughout 1940 he moved steadily towards a break with His Majesty's Government and a closer understanding with the Axis. He refused to break off diplomatic relations with Italy when Italy entered [redacted] intrigues with the A [redacted] and sponsored the overtures which Naji Shawkat made to the German Minister at Angora in the summer 1940. In Iraq he gave free rein to the Palestinian [redacted] resignation at the end of January 1941 but he returned to office by means of a military *coup d'État* on the 1st April. He then set aside the Regent and installed Sharif Sharaf in his place. At this juncture, as part of their war plan, His Majesty's Government began to move troops into Iraq, but Rashid Ali, backed by the army, refused to agree to the presence of more than one brigade.

At the beginning of May the Iraqi army a [redacted] to surround the British air base at Habbaniyah and hostilities broke out. Throughout the month Rashid Ali and his colleagues endeavoured to unite the country in a campaign against us, but [redacted] countrypeople were with him, he received [redacted] from the big tribes and fled to Persia after a [redacted] tively small British column and [redacted] larger Iraqi forces opposed to th [redacted] he contrived to make his way to Turkey [redacted] having broken his parole he escaped to [redacted] d joined the Mufti in Berlin, where he [redacted] Tried in absentia by court [redacted] death in January 19 [redacted]

Throughout the years 1942-44 he continued to conduct an active campaign against Great Britain from Berlin and Rome and was recognised by the Axis as the legitimate Prime Minister of Iraq. It is now known that the struggle for predominance between him and the Mufti [redacted] It was rumoured that [redacted] ured by the Russians, but there is to date no confirmation of his whereabouts. When in London the Regent reiterated his determination that when caught he would be executed.

85. *Rashid al Khojah*

Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1884 [redacted] ber of the Ahd al Iraq [redacted] turned to Bagdad in November 1920 [redacted] appointed [redacted] in January 1921 [redacted] d much under the thumb of the extremist [redacted] group. In February 1922 he was [redacted] sarif of Mosul, where he was comp [redacted] under the influence of Mustafa Sabunji. As his presence in a frontier division was considered inexpedient by the Iraqi Government, he was removed and reappointed mutasarrif of Bagdad. Appointed Iraqi Consul-General at Cairo October 1928 and Director General of Education January 1930. Consul-General Beirut August 1931. Chargé d'Affaires and Consul-General Jedda August 1932 but did not take up post. Appointed Minister for Defence under Naji Shaukat November 1932. Resigned with Naji Shaukat's Cabinet in March 1933. Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies November 1933 after resigna [redacted] Defence in February 1934, resigned with Jamil al Madfai's Cabinet in August 1934. Re-elected President of the Chamber in December 1934. Again [redacted] nted Minister for Defence in Jamil al Madfai's [redacted] net in March 1935 but resigned with the whole Cabinet after being only twelve days in office. Elected to the Chamber in August 1935 and joined the Opposition led by Jamil-al Madfai. Appointed [redacted] cipal private secretary in the Palace in Septem [redacted]

Appointed Director-General of th [redacted] Foreign Affairs by Nuri [redacted]

86. *Rauf al Bahrani*

A Shiah of Bagdad, born about 1897. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School and was appointed to a clerical post in the Ministry of Finance, where he rose to be Accountant General (not altogether by merit). Appointed Minister for Finance in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in March 1935.

Resigned October 1936.

Appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise January 1938. Became Minister of Finance in February 1940 and of Social Affairs in March [redacted] with Rashid Ali and his Cabinet in January 1941 and joined Rashid Ali's rebel Government in April 1941. Fled to Tehran when British troops approached Bagdad towards the end of May 1941 and was arrested by the British forces which occupied Persia in August. After a period of detention at Ahwaz he was sent to Southern Rhodesia in December 1941 to be interned. Sent back for trial

in March 1944 and in August 1944 condemned to three years hard labour and sequestration of all his property

87 *Rauf-al Chadirchi*

Sunni of Baghdad. He was Mayor of Baghdad at the time of the cutting of New Street and earned a great deal of personal unpopularity thereby. Left for Berlin shortly before the occupation, and subsequently went to Switzerland, returning to Baghdad in the summer of 1920, up to which time permission to return had been refused him. Speaks French, English and German well. He set up practice as a barrister and consorted much with British officials. He took no part in the Nationalist agitation nevertheless, when his father was deported to Constantinople in August, he was asked to return with him. He came back in 1921 and resumed his legal work without taking any part in politics. He has most of the business of foreign firms in his hands owing to his knowledge of English. He was in England on a visit of [illegible]

strongly opposed to the passage of the treaty without amendments and votes [illegible]

November 1926 Iraq Minister in Angora autumn 1929. Resigned post as Minister at Angora in [illegible]

Appointed Iraq Minister [illegible] 1930 and proceeded to [illegible] post early in 1931. Resigned March 1935 and remained in England, where he has a well paid post with the Iraq [illegible] company.

[illegible] and intelligent [illegible]

88 *Rauf-al Kubba*

Sunni of Kurdish origin. Born 1893. [illegible] commandant of gendarmerie in Aleppo under Jafar Pasha in 1915 and did useful work in keeping order before the advent of the French in July 1920. Refused office under the French and returned to [illegible] Kaimakam of Suq in November 1921 but was dismissed in June. He then for a time joined the extreme Nationalist group in Baghdad. Appointed Director-General of Prisons in 1924 and subsequently played an part in politics. Appointed Mutessarif of Basra January 1930. Dismissed for [illegible] April 1931. Appointed Director-General of Augaf in [illegible] of 1933, and Director-General of Custom in [illegible] of 1937.

Mutessarif of Baghdad November 1938 and Director-General of Augaf April 1939. Resigned June 1940.

Reappointed Director-General of Augaf in November 1941 by Nuri Said.

89 *Razzuq Ghappan*

Doyen of Baghdad journalists. Owner of *Al Iraq*. A Christian. Pro-British backer of Nuri Said. He [illegible] for Baghdad in the 1942 Assembly [illegible] supported Rafael Butti, but soon [illegible] revealed his true feelings. Pan- [illegible] protection of the profiteers and opportunists. Invited to visit Britain as one of the [illegible] Iraq journalists, autumn 1945.

90 *Sabih Najib*

Born 1892. Gazetted to the Turkish army in 1912. Joined Iraq army 1921, and reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel 1929. Passed a staff course in England and for some time was Commandant of the Iraq Staff College in Baghdad. Speaks English and French and some German. Appointed Director-General of Police in March 1931. Represented Iraq on the Syria-Iraq Frontier Delimitation Commission in 1933. Appointed counsellor Berlin, June 1935. Transferred to Geneva as Iraq delegate to the League of Nations in November 1936.

He was appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in December 1937, with the [illegible] of Minister Plenipotentiary.

Made Minister for Defence in October 1938. Resigned with the whole Jamil al Madfai Cabinet on 25th December 1938.

Tried by court-martial in February 1940 for being an accessory to the murder of Rustam Haidar Minister of Finance. Acquitted on this charge and sentenced to one year's imprisonment for having used insulting language when speaking of the Government at a semi-public gathering. Was pardoned by the Regent after serving only a few [illegible]

Relieved of his appointment in February 1943 and now seems to be living on his pension in Turkey. Was retired from the service in August 1944.

91 *Sadiq-al Bassam*

Shiah of Baghdad. Born 1885. Graduated at the Baghdad [illegible] and became Minister of Education in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in September 1935. Resigned in October [illegible] Economics in September 1939. Joined the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in March 1940 as Minister of Education.

Resigned with the whole Cabinet in January 1941. Throughout the disturbances of 1941 he remained inactive and was made Minister of Justice in Nuri Said's Cabinet in October 1941.

Resigned February 1942.

Appointed an unofficial member of the Board of Education in April 1943.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in December 1943. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Said's Cabinet in June 1944.

92 *Salih al Din Ali al Sammarrai*

[illegible] Has done [illegible]

[illegible]

1940, and in company with Rashid Ali, brought about the *coup d'Etat* of the 1st April 1941. He fled to Tehran with Rashid Ali at the end of May 1941 and evaded arrest and disappeared when British forces entered Persia in August.

Turned up again in Turkey in February 1942 and was placed under strict police supervision by the Turkish authorities. The Iraqi Government's request for his extradition was refused. Negotiations are now in 1945 in progress for him to be handed over.

93 *Salman-al Barrak*

Shiah and a tribal notable of H[illegible]ah. Minister of [illegible]

Appointed Minister of Economics in November 194[illegible]

Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1943, but returned to the Cabinet as Minister of Economics at the end of the same month. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

94 *Salman-al Shaikh Daud*

Sunni. Born Baghdad about 1890. Son of Shaikh [illegible]

A lawyer with a large practice and a forceful personality. Given to women and drink, but a staunch supporter of democracy. He was the first person of note in Iraq who openly and independently attacked the Axis in speeches and press articles.

Elected a Deputy in October 1943 and was prominent in debates as a critic of Nuri Pasha's Government. Arab News Agency representative. Invited to visit Britain as a member of the Iraqi parliamentary delegation, autumn 1945.

95 *Salih Jabr*

Shiah lawyer of Najaf, born about 1890. Employed for some time as a judge. Elected Deputy February 1930 and returned from the bench. Appointed [illegible] taker of [illegible]

Resigned February 1934. Elected Deputy for Muntafiq December 1934. Appointed Mutessarif of Karbala in April 1935 where he proved successful. In October 1936 he accepted the portfolio of Justice in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet. Resigned in June over the Euphrates disturbances and went away for several months. He returned when Jamil al Madfai [illegible]

Deputy June 1939. Minister for Social Affairs February 1940. Resigned in March 1941.

Appointed Mutessarif of Basra in June 1940. Supported the Regent when His Royal Highness fled to Basra in April 1941 to escape from Rashid Ali and the "Golden Square." For this he was arrested and narrowly escaped a heavy sentence. He [illegible] and released on condition that he left the country. He withdrew to Tehran and returned in June 194[illegible] after the fall of Rashid Ali. Appointed Minister of Interior and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Nuri Said in October 1941.

Appointed Minister of Finance in October 1942 with the special task of finding solutions for the country's economic difficulties.

Did not come up in expectations and in June 1943 he was returned to the Interior. Resigned from the Cabinet in October 1943.

He is married to a strong-minded tribal woman of H[illegible]ah, who causes her husband much trouble by interfering in the tribal politics of Hilla Liwa.

Joined the Cabinet of Hamdi-al-Pachachi as Minister of Finance in June 1944. Took on portfolio of Defence in August 1944 when Taban Ali refused to dismiss senile officers as part of the scheme for reorganising the army, but in the reshuffled Cabinet he took up Supplies, only to hand them over in December 1944, and he is now back in Finance. During the absence of Hamdi Pachachi, the Premier, he has acted for him. Opinion is divided as to his sentiments towards the British and there are not lacking those who prophesy that he will lead the most violent reaction against British influence.

96 *Sami Shaukat*

Born Baghdad 1889. Sunni. Brother of Naji Shaukat. Graduated at Military College of Medicine, Constantinople, 1916. Joined the Arab army in Syria in 1919. Appointed to Iraqi Health Service 1921 and subsequently served for several years as Director-General of Education. Became Director-General of Public Health in 1936. An ardent Arab Nationalist.

Appointed Director-General of Education in March [illegible]. He has done much to increase military education in the secondary schools. Became the first Minister for Social Affairs in September 1939 and Minister for Education in February 1940. Resigned in March with whole Cabinet and was reappointed Director-General of Education in April 1940.

Retained his position throughout the disturbances of 1941 and survived subsequent [illegible] It is believed by many to have pro-German leanings, but he himself stoutly denies these allegations. However this may be, he has done little to eradicate pro-Nazi sentiment from the Iraqi education system.

Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs and Health in January 1943.

97 *Shaker al Na'eem*

[illegible] a little trouble with the Mutessarif of the Basra Liwa for publishing articles in his paper criticising the local supply distribution methods. He was told to cease such publications but he acted for such instructions in writing, presumably he would have taken the matter further. The instructions in writing were not forthcoming, but from that time he has been the subject of persecution by the Mutessarif. A good friend of Britain. Invited to visit Britain as a member of the Iraqi journalists' delegation, autumn 1945.

98 *Shukri-al Wadi*

Sunni of Baghdad, born 1894. Brother of Jamil-al Wadi. Served as an officer in the Turkish army from 1915 to the armistice. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Captain 1928. In 1929 he was attached for training to various units in England, and in 1930 he was promoted major and made aide-de-camp to King Feisal. He was on King Feisal's staff during His Majesty's State visit to England in 1933. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1935 and attended the Staff College course. Returned to Iraq 1936 and was appointed G.S.O. 1 in the Kirkuk Division, of which Bakr Sidqi's was the G.O.C. He was right hand man to Bakr in the military revolt of October 1936. He is intelligent, capable and ambitious. After Bakr Sidqi's murder in August 1937 he was appointed military attaché in London, but a few weeks later he was dismissed and placed on the retired list.

Banished from Baghdad in December 1938 for intrigues against Jamil-al Madfai's Government but [illegible] to return in January 1939 after Nuri-al- [illegible] had formed a Government. Appointed to the [illegible] service in June 1939 as second [illegible] Legation, Tehran. [illegible] to have done well and kept in [illegible] with His Majesty's Legation. Later on

[illegible], he seems to have yielded to the blandishments and bribes of the German Legation and, as chargé d'affaires during April and May 1941 he dutifully carried out instructions sent to him by Rashid Ali's Government. Daud Hadari, who was appointed manager at Tehran in June 1941, was asked to keep a close watch on Shakir.

Appointed consul at Jerusalem in Nov[illegible] Transferred to London in October [illegible]

99. *Sufuq al-Ajil*

Of the Shammar Jarba tribe. Born about 1910. [illegible] Darul University. Once spoke English [illegible] forgetting it. Eldest son of Sheikh Ajil [illegible] paramount sheikh of [illegible] Iraq to the east [illegible] died in November 1940. Ajil acquired much minor [illegible] relations with the B.O.D. Company and [illegible] providing labour to the railways when the line [illegible]

Sufuq's younger brother, Ahmed (born about 1[illegible]), is said [illegible] leadership, but the quarrel was [illegible] the family now accept Sufuq's [illegible]

In 1942 he obtained a [illegible] the British [illegible]

In early 1944 he had a serious quarrel with his younger brother Ali and about the division of their [illegible] made in May, but its terms were so antagonistic that it is not likely to endure for long. An attempt was made to involve him in June 1944 by putting on [illegible] but it was foiled. His brother Ahmed was suspected [illegible] with the tribe by issuing free the Shal[illegible] influence. Flashy, engaging and plausible, he has made himself acceptable to authority, more especially the Regent. Sufuq, who is flabby, selfish [illegible] have attempted to sort out his quarrel wit[illegible] [illegible] exiled his tribesmen near the Syrian frontier.

Of the younger brothers, Mish'al, though on [illegible]

100. *Tahsin al-Askari*

[illegible] 1916 when he became Director-General of Irrigation. When his brother Jafar-al-Askari was murdered by officers of Bakr Sidqi's staff at the time of the latter's coup d'état in October 1936 he left the country on three months' leave with Jafar's widow and later resumed his post at Irrigation. In May 1940 he was appointed counsellor in the Iraqi Legation in Cairo and became minister in October 1941. In October 1942 he was recalled by his brother-in-law Nuri Said to become Minister of the Interior.

He is devoted to the Pan-Arab cause but at the same time well disposed towards Great Britain and [illegible]

Transferred to the Ministry of Communications and Works in June 1943, and acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in November 1943. He resigned with the whole Cabinet in December 1943 and was [illegible]

101. *Taha al-Hashimi*

[illegible] late Yasin el-Hashimi. Born 1890. Served in Turkish army and was employed in Arabia and the Yemen during the war. Was given a [illegible] (1921), but returned to Baghdad in 1922 to join the Iraqi army and was at once appointed Officer Commanding Troops in Mosul. Appointed Chief of the General Staff and came to Baghdad in 1923. Was attached to Sir Percy Cox in May 1924 for the boundary negotiations with the Turkish Government which followed the signing of the Lausanne Treaty. The post [illegible]

In September 1935 he was appointed Acting Director-General of Education in addition to his other duties. [illegible]

Elected Deputy for Baghdad in December 1937. Opposed Jamil al-Madfai's Cabinet in the Chamber. Worked actively on the committee of the Palestine Defence League in 1938. On the 25th December 1939, in collaboration with General Hussein Fawzi, he organised a military demonstration against Jamil al-Madfai's Government, and became Minister for Defence in the Cabinet which Nuri-al-Said formed when Jamil al-Madfai resigned. Became a Deputy for Baghdad in the elections of June 1939. Retained the portfolio of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in February 1940.

Resigned in January 1941 with most of the members of Rashid Ali's Cabinet and on the 1st February succeeded the latter as Prime Minister. On assuming office he freely attempted to break the power of the military clique which during 1940 he and Rashid Ali had allowed to dominate not only the army but the Cabinet. They defied him and overthrew him and his Cabinet after it had enjoyed office for only two months. Taha Pasha thereupon went to Turkey, where he remained through Rashid Ali's rebel régime. When the [illegible] been restored Taha [illegible]

He was still in Turkey in May 1944.

102. *Tahsin Ali*

A Kurd. Modern Kurd born [illegible] the Balkan War fought against the British at Basra, and after the fall of Baghdad joined King Hussein of

the Hejaz. Fought under Faisal and was a brigade commander in the Arab army at Aleppo. Was [illegible]

Commandant of Police in Mosul in 1922, he was removed because of his connexions with the Sulaimaniya faction and transferred to the Diyala area in 1925. Between 1927 and 1938 held a number of administrative posts, including those of Mutasarrif of Mosul [illegible] as largely connected [illegible]

[illegible] tions in August 1944 and finally dropped from the ministry altogether at the end of that month.

103. *Tahsin Qadri*

Sunni of Dulaimiyya. Born 1888. Was with Faisal [illegible] July [illegible] and was appointed an A.D.C. to the King in August [illegible]. Married the daughter and heiress of Alaiul Wahhab 'Isaba Qartam of Basra. Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the Palace March 1932. Accompanied King Faisal on his State visit to England in 1932 and received the K.C.V.O.

In June 1936 he was compelled to resign from the Palace on account of the scandal of the marriage of [illegible] in the Iraqi Legation in Tehran and took up his [illegible] in November 1936. Appointed consul-general at Bombay in December 1937. Speaks English and [illegible] fluent and clever.

Appointed Director of Ceremonies in the Ministry [illegible] Affairs in February 1939. Became consul-general in Beirut in July 1939.

In May 1941 (the all Iraqi consuls, he seems to have carried out his orders from Rashid Ali without protest and his behaviour was strongly criticised by the British authorities.

In September 1943 he was appointed chargé d'affaires at Damascus, when the Iraqi Government recognised the new Syrian Government. On the 27th January 1944, he was accredited as first Iraqi Minister to Syria and the Lebanon to reside at [illegible], where he has been active in Arab Unity affairs, at the same time maintaining close to [illegible] His Majesty's Minister. Recalled early in 1945 and appointed Acting Director-General for Foreign Affairs in the absence of Fadhil-al-Jamali at San Francisco. Appointed minister in Tehran, June 1945 but in September was still in the Lebanon.

104. *Fadhil Mahdi*

[illegible] signature of the Supreme Committee of Iraq Secret Societies. Appointed Inspector of Schools in 1924 and held a variety of appointments under the Ministry of Education until November 1931, when he was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation [illegible] Appointed Director of the Consular [illegible] Foreign Affairs in November 1935. Appointed consul-general at Beirut in August 1937.

Withdrawn and dismissed from the service in February 1938. He remained for a time in Syria but returned to Baghdad when Nuri-al-Said formed a cabinet in December 1938. Appointed Accountant-General in January 1939 and Director-General of Propaganda, Publicity and Broadcasting in May 1939. Became consul-general in Jerusalem May 1940.

During May 1941 he carried on [illegible] anti-British propaganda on pages and was strongly supported Rashid Ali's rebel government. He was recalled in June and subsequently interned.

105. *[illegible]*

[illegible] people and international law in Paris. In 1918 became first interpreter to the Ministry of Education [illegible] represented Iraq at the Arab [illegible] in July 1918. After [illegible] retire went to Syria and was appointed judge in [illegible] Minister for Education January 1929. Prime Minister 1929. President of the Chamber 1929 [illegible] 1931. Joined [illegible] 1934 as Mi[illegible] [illegible] Comptroller-General of Accou[illegible] Minister for Foreign Affairs in Jamil al-Madfai's Cabinet in August 1937 and headed the Iraqi delegation to the League of Nations in September. There he handled the Assyrian and Pa[illegible] questions with tact and moderation.

Again represented Iraq at the League of Nations in the autumn of 1938, and afterwards visited London as the guest of His Majesty's Government. There he had conversations with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and with the Secretary of State for the Colonies about Palestine.

Resigned with the whole of Jamil al-Madfai's Cabinet on the 25th December 1939, as the result of [illegible] Affairs and did what he [illegible] the military clique which during 1940 had established a stranglehold over the Government. Was forced out of office by Rashid Ali's coup d'état of April 1941. Tried to join the Regent at Basra, but failed. He took no part in the events of May and would have been asked to join Nuri's Cabinet in October 1941 if the fact that his brother Naji had been summoned to stand his trial for treason had not made it difficult to include him.

He is aggrieved that he has not been appointed to the Senate and blames Nuri Said for his exclusion. He is not well disposed towards the Regent. Nevertheless, an attempt was made to get him into the Cabinet in 1942, but was unsuccessful owing to the exaggerated conditions he sought to make.

In the summer of 1943 he reached an understanding with Ibrahim Kemal to co-operate in political matters. But by the end of the year he was reconciled to Nuri and joined the latter's 9th Cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister in December 1943. He was violently attacked both in Parliament and outside, and the legality of his office was called in question. Resigned in March 1944, when a High Court was appointed to consider the constitutional validity of the appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister. Went to San Francisco Conference. On his return appointed Chairman of the Economic Committee of the Arab League.

106 *Tawfiq Wahbi Maroof*

[illegible] 1887. Educated Sunni [illegible] ted from Turkish Military College in 1908, and thereafter served in [illegible] tions in European Turkey [illegible] conduct impeccable. He returned to Baghdad and re-entered the army, and with the rank of colonel became Commandant of the Military [illegible] 1920 he was sent on a course [illegible] appointed as Mutasarrif of [illegible] y until July when as the [illegible] ion [illegible] he was re [illegible]

[illegible] of the operations against Rashid Ali, Tawfiq Wahbi resigned from Government service (took pension) made a considerable fortune as a contractor [illegible] British forces.

In June 1944 he was appointed Minister of Economics in Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet, in which capacity he has toured the north to investigate possible relief and developments. It was largely owing to his initiative that the Director of the Sulaimaniyah Forestry Service was engaged to prepare a comprehensive survey of the economic possibilities of forestry in Kurdistan. To the young Kurdish nationalists and hot-heads he pleads moderation and [illegible] effects.

Tawfiq Wahbi is keenly interested in Kurdish culture and has devoted much time to modernising the Kurdish language. He has given valuable help to the Public Relations Department in the production of propaganda in Kurdish.

107 *Thabit Abdul Nur*

Born 1900. Son of Aziz Abdul Nur a prominent Jaafaite Chieftain of Mosul. He was christened Nicola. Was an officer in the Turkish army embezzled money and fled to Syria to join Sherif [illegible] name. At this time he changed his name to Thabit became a Moslem and performed the pilgrim[illegible] Mecca [illegible] became prominent in extreme Nationalist politics. Elected Deputy for Mosul in general election of 1930 and appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1931. The post was abolished in March 1933. Tried in 1932 for misappropriating the funds of the Agricultural Exhibition (April 1932) but acquitted.

Appointed counsellor in the Iraqi Legation [illegible] London December 1933. This post was abolished and he was appointed Iraqi Oil Representative in London in July 1934. Appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of [illegible] cations in June 1935. [illegible] the King of the Yemen.

He was on leave in Germany on the outbreak of war in September 1939 and chose to remain there rather than return to Iraq. It is believed that he [illegible]

[illegible] Graduated at the Baghdad Law College 1913. Appointed Judge, Khanaqin 1913. Baquba 1914, on the outbreak of the war joined the Reserve Officers' School and was named Public Prosecutor to the Military Court, Baghdad. Appointed Judge, Civil Courts, Kirkuk 1921, Arbil 1923, Kirkuk 1924, Vice-President, Civil Courts, Mosul 1924 [illegible] ant of Kirkuk Liwa 1927. Mutasarrif of Kut and Basra Liwas. Administrative Inspector 1931. Mutasarrif of Mosul Liwa 1934.

Held other Government posts up to August 1937, when he was made to be Director-General of Revenues. Became a Minister of Economics and Communications in December 1939 in the Cabinet of Nuri as Said.

Made a Senator April 1939. Minister of Interior in September 1939 and Acting Minister of Justice in February 1940. Jamal Baban Ac[illegible] March 1940 as Minister of Communications and Works.

Resigned in January 1941 with most of his colleagues as protest against Rashid Ali's pro-Axis policy.

Since November 1941 he has been an active member of our Senate.

Appointed Minister of the Interior in [illegible] Cabinet in December 1943. Resigned with [illegible] of Nuri Said's Cabinet in June 1944.

109 *Yahya Qasim*

Age 30. Advocate, ex-Iraq State Railways employee. Is the editor and proprietor of *Al Sha*[illegible] He is a Moslem and is married to the [illegible] Khoshi, the brother of the ex-Chief of the General Staff. A[illegible] He is a prominent leader of [illegible] out-of-Units (Houses of the Nation) Society [illegible] was interested in the publishing of a secret Radical paper called *Al Shaqra* which caused [illegible] ration some time ago. It has not been confirmed that he is connected with the present ar[illegible] clandestine pamphlet *Al Qaida* although there [illegible] been reports to that effect.

As a result of his meddling in politics—including [illegible] pamphlets, for which he was [illegible] by Yahya a future Baathists a British Imperialist concern, he is somewhat embittered against the British. He is an active member of a group of advocates known to have advised the Railway Union to strike. There are grounds for believing that he has received minor subsidies for his paper from the Romans.

110 *Yunis Bahri*

Born about 1904. Of the Jubur tribe of Mosul. From his early days he has been well known for his [illegible]

From 1923 to 1926 he held minor clerical posts in Government offices. In June 1926 he went on a journey round the world and was repatriated destitute from Paris after having served a term of imprisonment for a misdemeanour. Between 1929 and 1933 he travelled in Arab countries, including Tripoli, Tunis and the Hadhramaut, and also Java, India, Afghanistan and Iran. On his return to Iraq he took up journalism and gave his support to extreme nationalism. He also published a news-

paper called *Al Laqab*. He was subsidised in 1935-36 to publish articles favouring the Italian conquest of A[illegible] In 1936 he sold himself to the Germans [illegible] berlin and was [illegible] of the Berl[illegible]

In this position he has been very successful, and his broadcasts were a powerful instrument of G[illegible] propaganda.

In the spring of 1942 he "went off the [illegible] It is rumoured that he was put [illegible] camp in Germany.

[illegible]

111. *Yusuf Ghan*[illegible]

An intelligent and hard-working [illegible] of Baghdad born about 18[illegible] [illegible] he takes freely with Moslems and w[illegible] [illegible] of Finance in January 1938, after [illegible] dustry and ability as supervisor of [illegible] Committee of the Chamber [illegible] ty of National Brotherhood). Appointed [illegible] General of Revenues in the Ministry of Finance December 1932, and Director General of the Ministry in 1933. Became Minister for Finance in Ali Jaafar's Cabinet in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in June 1935.

Appointed general manager of the Agricultural Industrial Bank in December 1936.

Was made Director-General of Antiquities in November 1943. In July 1944 appointed Director General of Supplies and President of Post War Planning Committee, and he became Minister of Supplies in November 1944, since when the [illegible] has settled down to accepting supply controls [illegible] rationing has become more effective in reaching the consumer at the end of the supply line.

112. *Yusuf Izzat Din*

Sunni. Son of Ibrahim Pasha, a Kind of Sulai[illegible] Married to the daughter [illegible] Owns property in Baghdad, [illegible] Educated locally and [illegible] 1918. Graduated at the [illegible] law School in 1927. Became a finance inspector in 1928 and was promoted Assistant Director-General of Finance in 1930. Became Director-General of Land Settlement June 1934, Accountant General June 1935. Appointed [illegible] Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in October 1936. Resigned in July 1937 because of his dissatisfaction with the Cabinet's policy on the Euphrates and with Nuri Said's influence over the Prime Minister.

Sir Inquiry since last Report

[illegible]

Said bin Ali

CHAPTER III.—PERSIA.

[E 4870 4870 34] No. 7

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 6th July.)

(No. 220. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tehran, 28th June 1945

WITH reference to my despatch No. 273 of the 1st July, 1944, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on heads of missions at Tehran.

I have, &c.

R. W. BULLARD

Enclosure in No. 7

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Tehran

(Paragraphs marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports.)

Afghanistan.

Ambassador: M. Mohamed Heydar Khan Homsiat. (6th January, 1944.)

*A young man for the post, born probably about 1900. Has always served in diplomatic posts or in [illegible] Has [illegible] little English. Wife in [illegible] amiable but colourless. (Written in 1944.)

Belgium.

[illegible] M. Eglantine Graeffe. (17th January, [illegible]

[illegible] poke about. A diplomat by [illegible] ment. Unfortunately he is vain and boastful and lays claim to omniscience, and this leads many people to underrate his abilities.

[illegible] hen the King of the Belgians surrendered to the [illegible] supported the Belgian Government in exile, and continued to do so, in spite of the defeat of France. Graeffe has been on closer touch with the Sixth [illegible] ways had plenty of leisure. M. Graeffe is absent [illegible] sation or at his other post in Baghdad. For the last six months he has been very ill and it is not yet certain that he will ever recover full working capacity. Too long residence at this high altitude, and anxiety about his country and about a son in Belgium, may have contributed to the decline of his health.

M. Graeffe speaks excellent English, as does his wife, who is half American. (Written in 1944.)

Brazil.

Minister: M. Renato de la Serda Lage. (3rd July, 1944.)

Was Minister [illegible] from Brazil with [illegible] league which he has [illegible] true that he has nothing [illegible]

Talks English well, besides French.

China.

Ambassador: Mr. Li Tieh-tseng. (Minister, 20th June, 1942; Ambassador, 14th May, 1943.)

*Mr. Li is the first Chinese Minister to Persia. He [illegible] serve as a magistrate in Nanking, but since 1931 he has been in the diplomatic service. He spent four years in London, where he acted as [illegible] director and in his [illegible] Hotel of [illegible]

Czechoslovakia.

Minister: M. Josef M. Kadlec. (14th April, 1943.)

[illegible] General in Jerusalem for some years. He seems anxious to ingratiate himself with everyone he meets, and to the perfect stage diplomat. He [illegible] from England and seems genuinely grateful to the [illegible] compared. (Written in 1943.)

M. Kadlec does not seem altogether happy at the subservience which his country is obliged to show towards the Soviet Government.

Denmark.

Chargé d'Affaires: M. A. [illegible] (19th April, 1944.)

[illegible] y towards his country [illegible] it was due, at least in part, to him that about one in five of the men in the Danish community volunteered to serve in the Allied forces. For several months he ignored telegrams from his Government instructing him to work with the German Legation here, but finally obeyed instructions to inform the [illegible] Legation that he regarded his legation as neutral. (Written in 1944.)

*He maintained close relations with the Allied [illegible] ns, and after the signature of the Anglo-Soviet Persian Treaty, when it was certain that [illegible] was finally in the Allied orbit, he adhered officially to the Free Danish movement and brought his whole community with him. (Written in 1942.)

Those to whom M. Fenmark points out his troubles often find him lacking in a sense of proportion. His community is now split into two [illegible] or and against the legation, and although [illegible] probable that if M. Fenmark had been more sensible and less authoritarian he might have held the community together.

Egypt.

Ambassador: Mohamed Sabit Pasha. (4th April, 1944.)

Born about 1890. Finished his education at Cambridge, of which he has the happiest memories, and was employed in the newly-established Egyptian Legation in London for some years. His last post was that of Head of the Protocol in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Cairo. He and his wife and h[illegible] ter of 20 have become immediately popular. Mme. Sabit is related to the Queen of Egypt. Her daughter has become very friendly [illegible] of Persia, who will be all the [illegible] companionship of a naturally good natured [illegible] patched with a serious force beyond her years.

Sabit Pasha is not a great mind, but he is very [illegible] and makes a pleasing impression of frank [illegible] honesty.

France.

Delegate of the French Committee of National Liberation: M. Pierre Lafond. (20th March, 1944.)

*M. Lafond was born probably about 1893. He fought in the 1914–18 war and then entered the diplomatic service. He returned to the army in 1939 but after the defeat of France he obtained an appointment in Tunisia. His open antagonism to Vichy caused him to be arrested by the Germans and sent back to France, whence he escaped back to [illegible] the occupation of North Africa by the [illegible]

From all British sources we have good reports of M. Lafond. He is rather allusive in language but not the less sincere for that. He is an [illegible] large family is still in Tunis. (Written in 1944.)

Greece.

Chargé d'Affaires: M. Georges Coustas. (13th September, 1943.)

*M. Coustas has the rank of first secretary, though both he and his wife think that he ought to be a Minister. Agreeable but vain and with no character. His wife, a Greek from Istanbul, is young and very silly. (Written in 1944.)

Holy See.

Apostolic Delegate: Vacant.

[illegible] Secretary, Monsignor Pietro Pavan, is in charge.

[illegible]

[illegible] inister: M. Tahsin Qadri.

The agrément has been given for the present [illegible] Minister in the Levant States. M. Tahsin Qadri [illegible] take [illegible] post here.

M. Hachim Khalil is Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Netherlands.

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim: Jonkheer de Brauw. (11th March, 1942.)

*Came here from Simla, where he held a consular post. He and his wife, who both talk English well, are very friendly. They have an only son in the Netherland forces in England.

M. de Brauw is not a great character, but as he has nothing to do this does not matter. (Written in 1944.)

Poland.

Minister: Vacant.

M. Witold Okonski is Chargé d'Affaires.

Soviet Union.

Ambassador: M. Mikhail Alexeevitch Maximov. [illegible] 1944.)

[illegible] Maximov's appointment as Ambassador was [illegible] was counsellor to the Soviet [illegible] ed to succeed M. Con[illegible] h Mikhoihe, who retired [illegible] after three months.

M. Maximov was born about 1900. He served for several years in Afghanistan and was then for several years consul-general in Meshed, where His Majesty's consular officers got on well with him. He talks Persian well and is beginning to score English.

M. Maximov has the reputation of being an exceedingly charming man and of being mainly responsible for the election of a number of pro-Russian and pro-Communist Deputies to the Majlis [illegible] 1943. I believe that this reputation is deserved. Nevertheless, M. Maximov is business like and is sufficiently well informed about Persia to be able to give an opinion without fear, and, as he is also amusing and can grin at a fair bit, he is as good a Soviet colleague as one could expect to have in this [illegible] M. Max[illegible] an Ambassador. He has even posed [illegible] business like. He would make a good [illegible] Prosecutor in Russia [illegible] but as an Ambassador he has shown himself [illegible] a petty trickster and shamelessly dishonest.

Sweden.

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim: Dr. G. Jarlov.

Switzerland.

Chargé d'Affaires: M. Charles-Edouard de Bavier.

[illegible] Was in Athens during the Axis occupation and admits having strained Swiss neutrality by hiding in his house a British officer who had been condemned to death by the Germans. Talks English well. As he has only just arrived little can be said about him except that he seems intelligent and very friendly.

Turkey.

Ambassador: M. Kemal Köprülü. (24th May, 1945.)

Born about 1900. His last post was Kabul. Has had some experience of Persia as member of a delegation which negotiated an agreement some ten years ago. Has only just arrived. Seems friendly [illegible] not highly intelligent. Talks very far English.

United States.

Ambassador: Mr. William Murray. (4th June, [illegible]

M. [illegible] tary at the United States Legation in Tehran in the early twenties and is believed to have acquired at that time a sentimental affection for Persia and a

deep suspicion of British imperialist aims in Persia. Since then he has been employed in the section of the State Department where until the last year or two he was not considered very friendly. However, after a visit to London early in 1944, when he discussed with the Foreign Office all questions relating to the Middle East, Mr Murray seemed to be [illegible] of co-operating with us, and it [illegible] his fear of Russia is now greater [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] d'Affaires ad interim. M. Dragos [illegible] (28th October, 1944)

Born about 1910. A Serb. Colourless but agreeable. Does not seem to approve the more robust actions of Marshal Tito but is very discreet. Besides French, knows a little English.

The British Political Representative in Belgrade reports that Amir Ali Hadjie has been appointed Minister to Persia.

[illegible]

[illegible] Andreev (28th April, 1942). Resides in Moscow.

[illegible] 1890. He was for seven years a member of [illegible] He is a friendly, sociable colleague, gets on well with Persians and has done excellent work among them in the Allied cause. His visits to Tehran are short as most of his time is spent in Moscow. (Written in 1944.)

E 4969/222/34]

No. 8

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th July.)

(No. 225.)

Sir,

Tehran, 29th June 1945.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith three copies of a report [illegible] I am sending copies of the same report to the Resident Minister in Cairo, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department and [illegible]

2. I think you will agree that this competent and comprehensive survey reflects great credit on Mr. Gault, and that in conjunction with his report on the Bakhtiari tribes, which I sent you with my despatch No. 197 of the 3rd May, 1944, a valuable contribution to our permanent records relating to Persia.

I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 8.

(Confidential.)

A Report on the Isfahan Province by Mr. C. A. Gault, His Majesty's Consul at Isfahan.

CONTENTS.

PREFACE.

This report has been written to place on record much miscellaneous information about Isfahan and its surrounding district which I have collected in the past few years and which I consider of permanent value for a consular officer here. It is not intended to be exhaustive but to give useful information as succinctly as possible.

Isfahan, April 1945.

CHARLES A. GAULT.

CHAPTER I. [illegible]

[NOTE. Map references given are for the quarter-inch maps of Persia published by the Government of India and the British army. The sheets of this series which cover the Isfahan province are: I 39-N, I 39-O, I-39-P, I 39-Q, I-39-T, I 39-U, I 39-V, I 39-W, H 39-C, H 39-D and H-39-E.]

Isfahan lies in latitude 32° 38′ 1″ and longitude 51° 36′ 33″ at a mean height of 5,100 feet above sea level (this is the mean of observations by Khanikoff, St. John and Walker Floyer).

The climate of Isfahan is good. The summer is warm but the temperature rarely rises above 105°. The winter is cold and there is some snowfall and rain, but not much, for the average rainfall seldom exceeds 4 inches. A disadvantage is the hardness of the water which is drawn from shallow wells 18 to 20 feet deep, of which every house has two or three. In the spring there are often strong winds which bring a good deal of dust with them. In the last twenty [illegible] town, more especially along the river banks to the west. Malaria is endemic among the native population, but is not a scourge to Europeans provided normal [illegible] endemic among the Persian population.

The Isfahan province, which lies roughly between 50 and 54 east longitude and 32 and 34 north latitude, under the present administrative system obtaining in Persia forms the tenth "Ustan," or governor-general's province. This [illegible] Chahar Mahal, chief place, Shahr Kurd (Q4062), Pusht Kuh, chief place [illegible] place, Falsarvarjan or Pul i Vargan (R1091), Shahreza, chief place, Shahreza [illegible] Ardistan (M8588). Yezd, chief place, Yezd. These are the official sub-divisions of the province, but in practice the old names of districts, some in use from the earliest days, are still in current use by the people.

Isfahan itself is made up of eight districts or "bulukat," besides the city. They are Jay, Qohab, Burkhar, Marbin, Barzerud, Kararaj, Baraoon, Rudasht. Jay lies immediately to the east of Isfahan, including Khurasakan (M3502) and [illegible] Qomsheh lies beyond Jay to the east, including the areas on both sides of the Isfahan-Yezd road from Gavart (M4005) to just beyond Gulnabad (M4806). [illegible] Khur (M0450) to the north and as far as the [illegible] north east. Marbin lies west of Burkhar [illegible] Kosheh (M0801). [illegible] Isfahan [illegible] Barzerud [illegible] Kararaj [illegible] Baraoon [illegible] Rudasht [illegible] extends along both sides of the river from [illegible]

Chahar Mahal [illegible] west of Isfahan [illegible] Chahar Mahal are roughly those [illegible] east [illegible] Q0652 [illegible] west [illegible] Zayandeh Rud [illegible] east of Sarab Q5774 [illegible] Q7387 [illegible] Qaleh Mir Q6085 [illegible] westwards to include Beh Bar Q3885 [illegible] Q1880 [illegible] Sarud Q0482 [illegible] from Sadeqan [illegible] to Beh Hadar Q1490 [illegible] from Beh Hadar [illegible] ridge of the Kal Sadar (Q2[illegible]) and the Kal Zar (Q402[illegible]) [illegible] along the same ridge to Imam Sartak [illegible] (V8287) and then following the loop of the Ab i Wanak (V7387) south east and north to include Imam Qais

V9799) a line running north to include Burujin (Urujin) (Q9527) and up to the Kuh-i Bidakun ridge again at the Tang-i-Duzdan (R0138). The Lar district [illegible] Kurd. Its most southerly parts are the areas of Qahfarukh (Q6154) and Shamsabad (Q5244). The Kiar district lies immediately south of Lar, and includes the valleys in which lie Dastena (Dasht-i-Tan) (Q4332), Shalamzar [illegible] (Q5627), Kheraji (Q4936), Dehzak (Q63[illegible] Mizdej is the valley lyi[illegible] Chashmeh (Q2348, [illegible] in Qashqai territory. Buldaji (Q[illegible] area south of it to the line of the A[illegible] Ardal (Q3424), Naghun (Q4218) and Dashtak (Q1443) westwards up the Karun [illegible] Bakhtiari proper and lies south of Chahar Mahal and south-west of Isfahan. Its limits are as follows: on the north the line of the Ab-i Wanak (V7187) from Shamsabad (V9272) westwards to join the Karun and thence along that river to include Bars (V1389) and Saadat (V0475), on the west and south, from Bars eastwards along the line of the Ab-i Khirsan (V5835) to point V7442 where is the confluence of the Ab-i Khirsan and the Rud-i Khirsan (V9247) according to the map, which is probably inaccurate), on the south the line of the Rud-i Khirsa[illegible] on the east the north-south line of the Rud-i-Khirsan and the Kuh-i Dur Deh-i [illegible] districts: Lurdekan (V5272), Khan-i Mirza (V7575) and Felart (V[illegible] (L0433). Its limits are: on the east the line of the Darun Kuh (Kuh-i Daran, L3129), but including Darreh Rid (L0843) and Damaneh (L1237), on the south a line running from point L5306 (height 9634) south westwards to pass between Qazaqach (Q4598) and Garmdarreh (Q4897) thence north of Latun (Q3488) and [illegible] and passing between peaks 10700 and 9040 just to the west of [illegible] north-westwards to include Maidanak Bala (P7612) and Sibak [illegible] pass west of Chugrub (P6431) and thence northwards to the summit of the pass just west of Darreh Sari (P6359); on the north the Kuh-i Dozu (7067). Fereidan is from south to north divided into four districts or "nahiyehs." They are Chadegun, Tukhmaqlu, Varzaq, Karchambo.

Karvan is a long straggling district to the west of Isfahan. Its chief place is Najafabad (Q9798) and its boundaries are as follows: on the east Karvang (R0798), on the south and west the line of mountains running north-west from the K[illegible] Sultanabad (L2929), on the north-east the line of the Kuh-i Takhtak (L4733). Also forming part of the Karvan is the district of Arabistan lying north of Karvan proper. Arabistan is the district round Deh Haqq (L5349) [illegible] Qamishlu (P8018) and Dorr (L2368).

Linjan, which is divided into Upper and Lower Linjan and Garkan and is consequently sometimes called Linjanat, lies along both banks of the Zayandeh R[illegible] follows: [illegible] Yazdabad (R1696) and Shahabad; on the north-west Qudrijan (R0593); on the west or upstream side the area of Bagh-i Badran (Q6965) (wrongly placed on map). Upper Linjan is the area from Bagh-i Badran down to and including Linj (R1073). Garkan is the area immediately south-west of the Shah Ku[illegible] (R2085) and including Deh Surkh (R2577).

Shahreza, formerly called Qumishah (R4733), lies south of Isfahan on the [illegible] of Upper and Lower Semirum and Jarqooyeh, as well as that of Shahreza itself. Upper and Lower Semirum lie west of Shahreza. The northern limit of Lower Semirum is the road from Mubarakeh (R1167) to the Tang-i Bidakun (Q9152). But Mubarakeh itself is in Linjan. The west boundary of Lower Semirum is the line of the Kuh-i Bidakun and the eastern is the line of hills running from the Kuh-i Zard (R2963) [illegible] Upper Semirum and Semirum village itself (W4362). On some maps there are two other places marked Semirum, Yazd-i Khast (or Izad Khast) (W7581) and [illegible] (W349[illegible]). [illegible] boundary of Upper Semirum is the line of the mountains running south from Imam Qais (V9790) and the eastern one is the line of hills lying to the west of

the Shahreza-Abadeh road. The southern boundary is undeterminate, but probably runs roughly east-west a short way south of Semirum village. Jarqooyeh lies south of Rudasht and comprises the area bounded by Rahmatabad (R6775), Nasirabad (R7251) and the villages round Hassanabad (Husseinabad) (R7705).

Qohpayeh, or as the degree sheet incorrectly spells it Kuhpayeh (M9715), district, lies east of Qohab district of Isfahan itself. It includes on the west Sagzi (M0709), on the south Harand (R9897), on the east Faizabad (N3018) on the north the line of the Kuh-i-Marshinan (M9133).

Ardistan (M8588), comprises Jaukand (M9668), Zavareh (G9403), Karmobad (G9408), Chah Nigu (G8728), Mughar (G6711), but not Sarab (N1593). To the south-west the district extends up to the mountains on the other side of which lies the Burkhar district of Isfahan.

Yezd covers the whole of the remainder of the 10th Ustan to the east of Ardistan, the Mulla Ahmad pass (also known as the Bilabad (B3918) pass) on the [illegible] the Gavkhaneh salt lake and Jarqooyeh. This [illegible] total area of the ustan, but as it lies outside the [illegible] consular district it is not described here.

[illegible] itself has many sub-divisions. Officially it is now divided into [illegible] districts, which bear numbers only. In practice older districts [illegible] names, there are seventeen of them, are still in general use, as follows: Bakhsh 1, Chaharsooq-i-Shirazeha, Mustablek and Abbasabad, Shamsabad, Chahar Bagh and Pusht-i Matbakh. In addition there are Lunban Jurun and Shaish, which are villages on the western edge of the town.

Bakhsh 2. Ab Bakhshan and Darvazeh-i-No, Bidabad, Mahalleh-i-No, Darb-i-Kushk, Masjid-i Hakim, Pusht-i Baru, Sunbulestan. In addition, there is Talvaskun, which is a village on the northern edge of the town.

Bakhsh 3. Maidan-i Kohneh, Jubareh, Shahshahan.

Bakhsh 4. Qasr-i Monshi, Pa-i Qaseh.

Bakhsh 5. Julfa, Sichun and Husseinabad, which are villages on either side of Julfa. None of these three are reckoned as "mahallehs."

There appears to be no accurate maps showing the limits of the 10th ustan. Such maps as do exist are very inaccurate as regards the placing of rivers and villages and show that the boundary lines of the administrative area have been drawn quite arbitrarily, without any consideration of whether a boundary as shown is a physical possibility or not.

[illegible] II.—History.

The first mention of Isfahan in history occurs in Strabo who speaks [illegible] under the name Gabae as one of the dwelling places of the Achemenian k[illegible] (550-330 B.C.). Subsequently it was the capital of a vast province in the Parthi[illegible] and Sassanian epochs [illegible] the 10th century [illegible] with the weakening of the power of Bagdad, it fell into the hold of the Buyid family (sons of Buwaih) [illegible] 969 the city was captured and held for a time by Mohamed ibn Makan of Khorassan, but was later retaken by the Buyid Adud ed Doulah. In 1030 the Buyid power had to yield to that of the Kakoyid Ala-ed Doulah, vassal of Mahmud of Ghazna, who was confirmed in the possession of the city in 1033 by Sultan Masud, son of Mahmud. In 1051 the Seljuk Toghrul Beg took Isfahan [illegible] "the city"—and still the name of a district of Isfahan and Yahudiyeh—"the [illegible] which later became the present city of Isfahan. It is said that Yahudi[illegible] was so called because either Nebuchadnezzar or Shushandukht the Jew[illegible] [illegible] the Masjid [illegible] the Persian mosque with four archways set round a square court from the

original Arab type of mosque with colonnades set round a court. By the begin [illegible] conquest followed (1228) and although, as a result, Yahudiyeh recovered its prosperity, Jay never did so and dropped to the importance of a suburb. Towards the end of the fourteenth century Tamerlane (Taimur Lang), Amir Taimur Kurekan, conquered the city killing a large number of its people. He occupied the citadel of which the ruins still remain on the east side of modern Isfahan, called Qaleh Tabarak. There then followed the dynasties of the Black Sheep, Qara Qoyunlu, and the White Sheep, Aq Qoyunlu. In 1501 the Safavid dynasty succeeded to power in north west Persia, but it was not until 1598 that the greatest of its kings, Shah Abbas I, moved his capital from Qazvin to Isfahan and opened the best known phase of Isfahan's history. Shah Abbas set about making Isfahan a worthy capital of Persia and began the series of public and private buildings which to-day remain to illustrate his vision and artistic sense and which embody what is best in the golden age of Persian art. [illegible] among these monuments are the Chahar Bagh avenue and the Allahverdi Khan bridge, 1598, the Lutfullah mosque, 1603, the Ali Qapu and the Maidan-i-Shah. [illegible] the Khaju bridge, the Hasht Behesht palace, the Madrasseh and the Caravanserai on the Chahar Bagh avenue built by the mother of Shah Sultan Hussein, 1706-1714, and many other lesser buildings. Shah Abbas also brought to his new capital the entire population of the Armenian town of Julfa on the Araxes which had been destroyed in 1605 in the course of the Turco-Persian war. These he settled in a newly built suburb of Isfahan named Julfa on the opposite [illegible] a number of the inhabitants of his native Tabriz and settled them in a quarter of the town still known as Abbasabad. In Julfa the Armenians enjoyed complete liberty of worship and built their cathedral of St. Saviour and other churches, in the years from 1605 onwards. Behind Julfa, under the Kuh-i-Sufeh, lie the ruins of the palace of Farahabad, built by the last Safavid king, Shah Sultan [illegible] tion of Isfahan was estimated by European travellers of the day at about 500,000 [illegible] seventeenth century, contained 30,000 inhabitants. With the eighteenth century, however, both Isfahan and Julfa declined. The Afghan invasion of 1722 hastened this. The Afghans, of the Sunni sect of Islam, had revolted against Shah Sultan Hussein in 1709, but did not invade Persia until 1721. In a battle near the village of Gulnabad, some fifteen miles east of Isfahan on the road to [illegible] of his conqueror. Isfahan was ravaged and its population decimated. It is [illegible] west of Isfahan, successfully resisted the Afghans during the whole of the time [illegible] Isfahan. In 1729 Nadir Shah [illegible] Khur, thirty miles north of Isfahan [illegible] In the course [illegible] were pulled down. Fath Ali Shah used to visit Isfahan occasionally and died there in 1834. At [illegible] the eldest son of Nasir-ed Din Shah, the Zill-es-Sultan, was for many years Prince-Governor of Isfahan (1874-1907) and at one [illegible] Kermanshah and Shiraz being part of his dominion. He did nothing however to develop the place at all, and even pulled down a number of Safavi and other ancient buildings. In 1909 at the time of the constitutional movement in Persia, a force of so-called constitutionalist Bakhtiaris marched on Tehran from Isfahan which they had previously occupied, and with other bands from the north, were instrumental in securing the abdication of the reactionary Mohamed Ali Shah. During the Great War Isfahan was a centre of German influence in Persia as a result of the activity of Dr. Pugin, agent for German dye interests so much so that in 1915 the British and Russian communities had to be evacuated after the British Consul-General had been fired at and wounded and a Russian *protege* killed. In 1916 a Russian Cossack detachment re-occupied Isfahan for the allies and later in the same year a British force, the newly-raised South Persia Rifles under Brigadier General Sykes, lay there for some time on its way to Shiraz. In the last twenty years Isfahan has become an industrial centre of some

importance in Persia. Nine large cotton and wool spinning and weaving mills and several small ones have been erected in this period largely because of Reza Shah's policy of encouraging the development of industry in his dominions. He himself, however, is always said to have disliked Isfahan and to have visited it much less frequently than other cities of equivalent size. In his reign, too, the town was developed by the cutting of new roads through it and the widening of others. The restoration and preservation of most of the important buildings of the past was also begun by a French archaeological expert, M. Godard, who is in the employ of the Persian Government.

The present city of Isfahan covers a wide area on both sides of the Zayandeh Rud river. Apart from its ancient monuments, to which reference has already been made, it has no modern features of beauty or interest. It bears the somewhat untidy appearance of the average Persian town and off the main avenues is a maze of narrow lanes with high walls on either side behind which are often hidden picturesque houses and pleasant gardens.

[illegible]

Isfahan is the chief town in the 10th Ustan or Governor General's province and is the seat of the Governor General Ustandar. He has under him three farmanders or governors, at Yezd, Shahreza and Shahr Kurd (). He has also under him [illegible] districts immediately around Isfahan, at Najafabad for Karvan, at Daran for Fereidan (with one at Akhoreh also in Fereidan, as well), at Falavarjan for Linjan at Shahr Kurd for Chahar Mahal, at Kuhpayeh, at Ardistan, at Ardal for Pusht Kuh, at Lordekan for the Sehdehistan. The farmandar of Yezd has under him twelve bakhshdars. The Governor General does not have any very extensive powers in theory for he comes under the Ministry of the Interior and controls only the police and gendarmerie, which both depend on that ministry. The other Government departments in theory take their orders direct from their respective ministries in Tehran, but in practice the Governor General is able to exercise an influence on the spot which amounts to a considerable degree of control over other departments. The Governor General [illegible] Central Government [illegible] has its headquarters at Isfahan, who is followed by the financial agent (at present [illegible] the financial agent).

The 9th Division is stationed mainly at Isfahan. Detachments of troops are sent out to other parts of the province as required by the local situation.

Isfahan is the headquarters for the whole province of the following Government departments, each under its own head: Ustandari (Governor-General), army (9th Division), police, municipality, finance, industry and commerce, public health, roads, registration of property and documents, census, education, agriculture, [illegible] the cereals, distribution, opium and tobacco monopoly and road transport depart[illegible] which come under the general supervision of the finance department (¹). [illegible] departments have representatives in the chief towns of the district outside Isfahan. The police only operate within the municipality limits of Isfahan city [illegible]. Police work outside these two areas and the maintenance of [illegible]

(¹) The farmandar of Shahr Kurd is also farmandar of Bakhtiari and in practice has autonomy in Bakhtiari tribal affairs, referring direct to the Prime Minister in Tehran. For departmental matters connected with this area he works under the governor-general at Isfahan [illegible] tary matters refers to the General Officer Commanding, 9th Division, Isfahan. The [illegible] Shahr Kurd, Daran, Akhoreh and Lordekan are in practice nominees of the [illegible] Chahar Mahal and Bakhtiari, as these are tribal areas with the exceptions of [illegible]

(¹) With the reorganisation of the financial side of the administration consequent upon the withdrawal of Dr. Millspaugh, it appears that the cereals, distribution, opium and tobacco monopoly and road transport departments are no longer under the supervision of provincial directors of finance.

[illegible] provincial capital. The lowest court is the "dadgah-i-bakhsh (sulhich)," or court of summary jurisdiction, which has two sections, followed by the "dadgah-i-shahrestan (bedayat)," or court of the first instance. This is followed by the "dadgah-i-ustan (Istinaf)," or court of appeal, and finally there is the "diwan-i-kishvar (Tamiz)," or court of cessation. There is also a "dadsara" or "parquet," under the prosecutor-general of the province—"dadseta [illegible]." A second, and junior, prosecutor-general ("dadsetan-i-Shahrestan"), who presides over the court of first instance. A court for the trial of criminal cases is formed of the appeal court judges sitting under the head of the justice department of the 10th province, who is usually president of the court of appeal. [illegible] only with matters concerning Government officials and Government property. There is also a department of claims—"edareh-i-Tasfieh"—which deals with commercial and financial matters between companies and merchants.

According to official statistics (1944) there are in the Isfahan province eighty primary schools for boys with 8,723 students and sixteen primary schools for girls with 2,525 students. In Isfahan itself there are eleven secondary schools for boys, of which four are Government schools, and the remainder run by private enterprise. These schools have 1,128 students. There are only two girls' schools in Isfahan, one Government and one run by private enterprise, with 198 students. Najafabad, Shahreza, Ardistan, Sehdeh and Shahr Kurd each have a Government secondary school for boys. Each one teaches about twenty students. Shahreza also has a Government girls' school with twelve students. [illegible] 60 beds)—are Government hospitals. The remaining five are privately owned. They are the Church Missionary Society with about 100 beds, the Ahmadieh with 40 beds, the Boghorkhanum with 60 beds, the Kazerooni (maternity) with 40 beds, and the Razi with ten beds. There is also a 100 bed hospital under construction by the mill owners for the use of mill workers. Outside Isfahan itself there is a 10 bed Government hospital at Najafabad. At Shahreza, Sehdeh and Shah Kurd hospital buildings have been erected by the Government, but the hospitals are not yet in operation.

In the villages, administration is in the hands of the village headman [illegible] of a village of peasant proprietors, by the villagers, whereupon the formal appointment [illegible] six "sarjags"—one for each sixth of the village. These men are appointed [illegible] prietors) and the kadkhoda. They are, with the kadkhoda, responsible for law and order. All receive a wage in the form of a small percentage—about one per cent. of the crops of the village. In addition there is a "mirab" ("mudir-i-ab") whose duty it is to look after the village's water supply, and see that it is properly divided, and one or two "doshtban" who look after the agricultural lands of the village.

Isfahan city and district send three Deputies to the Majlis in Tehran. Najafabad (Karvan) and Feredan together send another, Shahreza sends one and Shahr Kurd and Bakhtiari together send one, making five in all. The Isfahan constituency includes the city of Isfahan, the eight surrounding districts of Jay, Qohab, Borkhar, Marbin, Barzerud, Karaaj, Barasoon and Rodasht and in addition Kohpayeh and Ardistan districts. Najafabad and Feredan includes Najafabad itself, Karvan, Arabistan and Feredan. Shahreza includes, as well as Shahreza district itself, Linjan and Alamjah. Shahr Kurd and Bakhtiari include all Chahar Mahal and Pusht Kuh. Although all males over 21 years of age are entitled to vote it is customary to distribute voting papers, without which nobody can cast a valid vote (in theory, at any rate, in the proportion of one voting paper to every eighth person of the population.

Chapter IV—Communications

Isfahan lies in a central position on the Persian plateau and since earliest times has been an important communications centre. Here caravan routes from north to south, from north-west to south-west, and from north-east to south-west have crossed. To the west, north-west and south-west lie the high mountain systems and to the east the deserts of the plateau. To-day these ancient routes have become motor roads, some passable in all weathers, others only passable in the dry season.

At Isfahan the main motor road from Tehran forks, the western fork continuing south to Shiraz and Bushire on the Persian Gulf and the eastern fork running to Kerman and the Indian frontier with a fork at Kerman to the Persian Gulf at Bander Abbas. These roads are fully metalled, but badly worn. From Nain and Yezd, towns to the east of Isfahan on the Kerman road, tracks run across the salt desert to Khorassan. Other similar tracks, now used only by a few camel caravans, run north across the same desert from Kashan, which lies north of Isfahan on the old road to Tehran, to Semnan and the eastern Elburz mountains. A motor road, liable to become snowbound in winter, runs north-west [illegible] most generally used route between Isfahan and Sultanabad. This road also has a fork to the west at Damaneh (L1237) to the Trans-Iranian railway at Azna. A caravan route runs from Isfahan (road head at Shalamzar) (Q4831) to Khuzistan across the Bakhtiari mountains and an unfinished motor road from Shahreza (road head at Semirom) (W4461) runs further to the south-west towards [illegible].

A three-wire telegraph line, owned and operated by the Government, runs [illegible] site direction, to Shiraz and Bushire. A similar line runs eastwards from Ardistan to Yezd, Kerman and the Indian frontier. A local line [illegible] Isfahan via Shahreza to Burujin (Q9527) and Shahr Kurd (Q4963) with [illegible] line from Isfahan to Shahr Kurd via Sahid Dasht (Q8244).

Isfahan is also linked with Sultanabad by telephone (a private company under Government supervision) by way of Najafabad, Damaneh and Khunsar with a branch line to Ali Gudarz, with Qum by way of Murchehkhur, Nantanz and Kashan, with Shahreza and Abadeh and with Riz (Q8372), Mobarakeh (R1167), Qahfarukh (Q6154), Shahr Kurd and Burujin. It is only possible to speak by telephone as far as Qum and Abadeh on the main Tehran-Bushire telephone line because there are no boosting stations to supply the extra power needed for long-distance calls.

Isfahan has an oil storage depot maintained by the Anglo-Iranian Oil [illegible] of paraffin, 1 million litres of black oil and gas oil. A small stock of packed petrol, paraffin and aviation spirit is also maintained as well as a quantity of lubricants. Oil is brought by tanker from Qum by road.

The company has two petrol filling stations, one at the Tehran gate and the other at the Shiraz gate of the town. There are also petrol filling stations at [illegible] Qum [illegible] on the road to Shiraz. In addition petrol is sold in small quantities by dealers in the larger villages on the main roads.

The Isfahan airfield, south-east of the town, is not a very good one and is unsuitable for very large aircraft, being small, bumpy and rather near the Kuh-i-Sofeh (R2396). The dimensions are 1,200 yards by 900 yards (approximately). There are two hangars erected for the Persian Air Force by the British Government. At present no Persian Air Force machines are stationed at Isfahan, although up till recently there was a detachment here.

[illegible]

The population of Isfahan city, *i.e.*, the area enclosed by the circular road round the town which joins the four main entrances to Isfahan, the Tehran, [illegible] 194,064 is divided among the districts of the city as follows: district 1, 27,951, district 2, 38,600, district 3, 73,894, district 4, 36,102, district 5, 17,517. The bulk of the population is of the Moslem faith. There are about 5,600 Jews living mainly in the Joobareh quarter (district 3) and about 5,500 Armenians in Julfa (district 5).

For the province the population is divided as follows:—

Chahar Mahal—Shahr Kurd, 13,516, rest of district (119 villages), 106,194. Total 119,710.

Feredan—Daran, 2,486, rest of district (167 villages), 94,883. Total, 97,369.

Karvan and Arabistan—Najafabad, 25,150, rest of district (79 villages), 58,082. Total 83,232.

Shahreza—Shahreza, 21,230, rest of district (86 villages), 54,740. Total, 75,970.

Ardistan.—Ardistan, 6,942; rest of district (86 villages), 29,028. Total, 35,970.

Qohpeyeh.—Kuhpa, 2,211; rest of district (194 villages), 31,922. Total, 34,133.

Bakhtiari.—59,454 (Bakhtiari villages in the Isfahan province).

The population of the eight buluks of Isfahan is divided as follows:—

Marbin.—Sehdeh, 31,210; rest of buluk (55 villages), 44,218. Total, 75,428.

Rudashtan.—Varzaneh, 3,059. Rest of buluk (46 villages), 5,383. Total, 8,442.

[illegible]

Qohab.—Qajavarustan, 1,105; rest of buluk (29 villages), 2,330. Total, 3,435.

Jay.—Khoraegun, 6,450; rest of buluk (60 villages), 14,016. Total, 20,466.

Karoray.—Dashti, 238; rest of buluk (19 villages), 2,015. Total, 2,253.

[illegible]

Linjanat.—Riz, 8,850; rest of buluk (89 villages), 82,104. Total, 90,954.

These figures give, therefore, a total population for the Isfahan [illegible] which shows that Isfahan is one of the most heavily populated [illegible] This has been obtained from the distribution department [illegible] carried out a census of its own in connexion with rationing [illegible] able figure than could be obtained from the census department [illegible]

[illegible] THE PEOPLE

The people of Isfahan [illegible] throughout Persia [illegible] the conversation of two Isfahanis in the street the [illegible] always connected with money. Both the townsman be he bazaar merchant in a big way or petty shopkeeper, and the peasant have these characteristics. Even the very wealthy are always bethinking themselves of some way whereby they may make just a little more money. Socially the Isfahanis are harder to get to know than the people of most other parts of Persia, [illegible] to themselves and do not mix well with others. There are also, as in all provincial towns, many petty cliques and strifes which it behoves the stranger to know of if he is to avoid unnecessary social difficulties. To their friends the Isfahanis are hospitable enough but do not set store by outward appearance unless there is some ultimate tangible profit to be had therefrom. As in the case in most [illegible] a Persian. Tehran, Shiraz and Yezd are looked on almost as foreign countries inhabited by other races.

Racially the [illegible] with the exception of the Armenians and Georgians of [illegible] are the least [illegible]

The [illegible] and has its own dialect [illegible]

The bulk of the popul[illegible] in dialect. The Armen[illegible] spoken by them. Printing [illegible] the Jews a knowledge of Hebrew [illegible] Turki-speaking villagers in [illegible] Among the Bakhtiari tribe and those of Bakhtiari origin settled in Isfahan, the Bakhtiari dialect of Luri is widely spoken.

A high standard of [illegible] of the population remarkable for its absence and culture, as such, is almost non-existent.

In the past, Isfahan was a stronghold of the mullas, and although these lost their power [illegible] Reza Shah's reign [illegible] still quite strong in many ways. The number of mullas and religious students to be seen about the streets is relatively large, and much is made of religious festivals.

The Moslems naturally make up the greatest part of the population, and besides them there are small minorities of Jews, Armenians, Persian Christians (other than European and other foreign Christians) and Zoroastrians. The Bahai faith has also a number of followers, mainly in Najafabad, a small country town to the west of Isfahan.

The Armenians form the largest minority, for besides the few thousand in Julfa, the Armenian quarter of Isfahan, there are some 19,000 who live in twenty-four villages (mostly owned by the peasants themselves) in Fereidan, in two in Upper Karvan, and in nine villages in south-eastern Chahar Mahal. A list [illegible] community was transplanted from Julfa on the Araxes River in Azerbaijan and the area around there, by Shah Abbas at the beginning of the 17th century, and has contrived to retain its identity and religion since that time in spite of persecution at various times. In this respect the Armenians are unlike the Georgians brought to Fereidan by Shah Abbas at the same time, for these have [illegible]

In character the Armenian has, in many ways, remained the most virile of [illegible] Armenians played important parts in Persian affairs (Prince Malkom Khan, Ypren Khan), but since then the community does not seem to have produced anyone outstanding. The Armenians are mainly middle-class people and [illegible] industrious and thrifty, and for that reason have been much used by foreigners in Persia, because they usually know English, Russian or other languages. Many inhabitants of Julfa have connexions with India, Burma, Java and California. Thus the Imperial Bank of Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company have at one time or another employed Armenians extensively, especially as accountants. They are also good mechanics and the oil company employs them extensively as tanker drivers. On the other hand, because of the religious disability under which they suffer in the eyes of Moslems, they seem to go out [illegible] he, like them, is a Christian and to expect the Englishman automatically to take their part against the Moslem for that reason. The Jew adopts this attitude much less. The modern Armenians of the Isfahan area are cultivated a [illegible] deal by the Soviet Consulate in Isfahan, which is not altogether surprising since Etchmiadzin monastery in Soviet Armenia is the headquarters of the Armenian Orthodox Church. The Armenian priesthood has much influence and provides leadership and organization for the community. Nearly every village has its church, while in Julfa there are eleven churches and one cathedral. St Saviour Julfa is the seat of an Archimandrite (Bishop) whose diocese covers Persia, except Tabriz, India and the Netherlands East Indies. He is appointed from [illegible] caused by the death of the previous incumbent is awaited. It is probable that the appointment will have to be made with an eye to pleasing the Soviet Government, and there are already signs that the Armenian priesthood is alive to the importance of maintaining good relations with the Soviet Consulate in Isfahan. Most of the priests in Julfa are men of education, having studied in India and elsewhere, but in the villages the standard is less high. In Julfa there is a small number of Roman Catholic Armenians with their own priests and church.

In their mode of life the Armenians have a much higher standard of cleanliness and domestic efficiency than Moslems, and are consequently healthier. In the villages the men wear the same clothes as Moslems, while the women go unveiled and wear their own traditional costumes.

The Armenians have complete freedom of worship and have recently (1942) [illegible] attended by Armenians—three hours' religious teaching a week and one hour's language teaching every day. Before Reza Shah's reign the Armenians had their own schools, which taught mainly in Armenian. During Reza Shah's reign these [illegible] Armenians usually speak very bad Persian while the younger speaks much better [illegible] Ecclesiastical Council in Julfa, an elected body on which both priests and laymen sit.

There is not much friendliness between Armenians and Moslems, although there is at present no evidence of any actual persecution by the latter. Where a Moslem landowner has Armenian peasants, he is usually appreciative of their greater industry as husbandmen compared with Moslems, and in the villages

Moslems and Armenians live on the whole peaceably together. Like other non-Moslems, however, they are under disabilities regarding entering Government service. The Armenians of the Isfahan area, with those of the rest of the south of Persia, combine to elect one of the two Armenian Deputies to the Majlis.

The Jewish community in Isfahan is probably as old as Isfahan itself. Various explanations of its origin exist (see Chapter II). Certainly its history goes back to the time of Cyrus. There is a shrine near Isfahan, at Pir Bakran (R1681), which is supposed to be the tomb of Sarah, daughter of Asher and grandaughter of Jacob.

The Jewish community has at various times suffered persecution at the hands of the Moslems, though this has decreased in modern times. Moslems will even admit that the thrifty character of the Isfahani is due to his having Jewish blood in his veins. Latterly, however, with the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe and the spread, before the present war, of German ideas in Isfahan, some anti-Jewish feeling has developed in Isfahan and during 1942, when the Germans were near the Caucasus, there were frequent attacks made on Jews here, both physical and verbal.

The Isfahani Jew is a relatively poor man. He owns no villages, but may have house property in the town. There are a few Jewish merchants in the bazaar and most of the antique trade in Isfahan is in Jewish hands. For the rest [illegible] wares of various sorts in the villages. One textile mill in particular, Nakhtab (cotton thread spinning) employs many Jews and a proportion of its capital is held by Jews. The Jews live mainly in the Joobarsh quarter of the town, where, like the Armenians in Julfa, their houses are warren like with tunnelled entrances and in narrow streets as a guard against Moslem attacks. The Jews have complete freedom of worship in Isfahan and there are eighteen synagogues and two or three rabbis. One of these is officially recognised by the Persian Government for the purpose of registering Jewish marriages and similar matters of Jewish personal status. The community has a committee formed of its leading members for dealing with matters affecting the Jewish community as such. There is a large Jewish school under the management of the "Alliance Israélite Universelle," which managed to keep its schools in Persia when other foreign controlled schools, such as the British and American missionary schools, were taken over by the Government in 1940. The Jews in Isfahan take no part in politics and seem less anti-Moslem than, for instance, the Armenians. The Persian Jewish community sends one Deputy to the Majlis.

Like the Armenian, the Jew is intelligent and clever. Through having been educated in a French school he usually knows some French and also English and [illegible] like the Armenian [illegible] and [illegible] of his work. He practices his religion and keeps his religious festivals, but is rarely able to read the Hebrew scriptures intelligently.

There are estimated to be about 10,000 Bahais in Isfahan and another 3,000 in Najafabad and in Shahreza. They are mainly converts from Islam with only a few [illegible] in Persia [illegible] are [illegible]

There are [illegible] Zoroastrian [illegible] twenty two [illegible] Zoroastrians. [illegible]

[illegible] consists mainly of about 150 families [illegible] converts [illegible] community of about ten persons in each place.

The Georgian population of the Fereidan district was brought there by Shah Abbas from the Kaheti district of Eastern Georgia, about the time he brought the Armenians from Azerbaijan. Like the Armenian population of Fereidan it is entirely agricultural.

It seems that the number of these Georgians is about 13,000. They live in the Karchambo and Tukhmaqlu districts of Fereidan in ten villages which are solely Georgian, while there are four more which were originally Georgian, but are now of mixed Persian, Armenian and Turki population. A list of these villages is given as Appendix 2 to this chapter. A sprinkling of Georgians exists as well in the other villages of Fereidan. Georgians indeed claim that many Armenians are really Georgians who adopted the Armenian faith rather than Islam. The Georgians of Fereidan as a whole, however, have now embraced Islam, but have retained their own language and customs.

Appendix 1 to Chapter VI

Armenian Villages in Fereidan and Chahar Mahal with Population Figures.

(Census taken in October 1944 by the Armenian Authorities of Julfa, Isfahan.)

Fereidan

Armenian Name	Persian Name	Mapped	Population
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	69
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] 41	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Jezar Jorab	[illegible]	
[illegible]	Qa eh Khajeh	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] Bara	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	643
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] Mashk	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Mudan	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Sarkhan (Inner) Khogan	Khogan	I-39 U 1.0316	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	300
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	695
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
		Total	[illegible]

Chahar Mahal

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	108
[illegible]			[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		2[illegible]
Ma[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
Ar[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Ma[illegible]	[illegible] Jamaka	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Najafabad	Not on map	4[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]
		Total	8,210

Appendix 2 to Chapter VI

Villages in Fereidan Inhabited by Persian Moslems of Georgian Origin

Persian Name	Georgian Name	Mapped	Population
[illegible]	Zemo Markhopi	I-39 [illegible]	3,085
[illegible]	Bomi	I-39 O/oP8141	1,143
[illegible]	Sibaki	I-39 [illegible]	[illegible]
Ja[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	835
[illegible]	Agbelah	I-39 O/oP7242	986
Mahdasht (Dom-i-hamari)	[illegible] Televi	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Afusi	I-39 O/oP7535	[illegible]
[illegible]	Tashkesana	I-39 O/oP8287	[illegible]
Chaqyurat (Chaga-Yurt)	Chugbrati	I-39 T oP8531	[illegible]
Khamalu	Khamu Imam	I-39 [illegible]oP8534	[illegible]
		Total	12,610

Chapter VII — British Interests.

British interests in Isfahan are at present confined in the main to the Imperial Bank of Iran, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Church Missionary Society. As regards official bodies, there is, apart from the consulate, an Anglo-Persian Institute which is under the control of the British Council. There are also smaller trading interests.

Off and on there have been British interests established in Isfahan for over 300 years. In the reign of Shah Abbas, the East India Company established a factory in Isfahan, and in the Christian grave-yard is at least one English grave of that period bearing the inscription "Gulielmus Bell—Joan F Northumbr—Apud Regem Abbas, Pro Anglia Agens," with the date of death, 24th February, 1624. Even to-day a certain caravanserai off the main Isfahan bazaar (the Qaisarieh) is called the "teemcheh-i farangiha" because it once held the East India Company's factory. This early connexion with England was, however, almost entirely due to private venture in search of trade. No British Consulate existed in Isfahan until 1891. About this time also a Russian Consulate was opened. In 1900 the British and Russian Consulates were raised to consulates general. In 1933 the British C[illegible] General was closed, Isfahan being put under the supervision of the British Consul at Shiraz. [illegible] consulate in the spring of 1942. With the opening of the British-owned over land telegraph line from London to India in 1870, Isfahan received a small community of British telegraph officials belonging to the Indo-European Telegraph Department, for it was an important station on the line from Tehran to Bushire. In 1931 the line was handed over to the Persian Government and the British staff left. In 1869 the first missionary of the Church Missionary Society established himself in Julfa (where, as it was anyhow inhabited by non-Moslems, all foreigners were obliged to live until the Persian authorities agreed to the establishment of non-Moslems in Isfahan itself in the last few years of the century). From that date Isfahan has been the Society's chief station in Persia and is now the seat of the Anglican Bishop in Persia and of men's and women's hospitals run by missionary doctors. These hospitals were opened in the early years of the present century and have done much good for the sick of Isfahan and its neighbourhood, as well as being a very useful manifestation of British influence. There was also a very successful school—the Stuart Memorial College—run on English public school lines by the mission, for Persian boys. It was taken over by the Persian Government in 1940. A woman member of the mission staff, a Persian subject, runs one of the only two girls' schools in Isfahan and the mission also supervises a school for blind children which had been started by a German who was later interned.

From time to time various British trading firms have operated in Isfahan. Up [illegible] Russian manufactured goods and textiles found a ready market here, as did Indian tea, and this led to the setting up of one or two British enterprises here. The best known of these were Lynch Brothers and Ziegler and Company. Both were general trading firms, Lynch Brothers being concerned with shipping on the Karun and Euphrates and Tigris rivers and also with the development of the Bakhtiari caravan road from Isfahan to Ahwaz, and Zieglers with the import of Manchester piece-goods and manufactured articles in general. Lynch Brothers ceased to exist about 1922 and Zieglers was wound up in 1933. Both concerns unfortunately suffered from mismanagement and were forced to close. The Imperial Bank of Persia established a branch in Isfahan in 1890 which has developed into one of the most important of its offices after Tehran. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company also established an office here in 1928. In 1944 Lynch Brothers reopened an office in Isfahan under the name of The Lynch Company with the intention of doing general trading and agency work as soon as the relaxation of war restrictions on the export of British goods will allow.

The British community in Isfahan [illegible] between twenty and [illegible] people as a [illegible] of their [illegible]. There [illegible] number of British [illegible] mostly [illegible] or concerned with the repair and operation of motor transport. The [illegible] are mainly Sikhs with a few Punjabi Moslems.

Chapter VIII — Other Foreign Interests

1. *Russian Interests*

Under the 1907 agreement between Britain and Russia, Isfahan fell within the Russian zone of influence. At that time Russian trade in manufactured goods, textiles and oil was ousting that of Britain which had won a commanding position earlier on. Russian political influence does not, however, seem to have established itself in Isfahan in any enduring fashion. With the collapse of the Tsarist régime at the end of the Great War Russian influence in Isfahan may be said to have virtually disappeared and it has never really developed since. Since 1941 and the re-establishment of a Soviet Russian Consulate in Isfahan at the end of 1942 (the former Consulate-General had been closed in 1938) the Russians have worked hard to create a position for themselves, but have not so far succeeded. Apart from the Soviet Consulate, the only Soviet interests in Isfahan as such are the Transovtrans road transport organisation, which has recently opened an office here, and the insurance corporation, Gosstrakh. These do not, however, do a large amount of business. If as is probable, a Soviet nominee is appointed by the Armenian church headquarters at Etchmiadzin in Soviet Armenia to replace the [illegible] Armenians which is already spreading will undoubtedly flourish.

2. *United States Interests*

There are no United States interests in the Isfahan area. An American has since December 1943 been in charge of the Finance Department here, for part of the time with an American assistant, but these two were members of Dr. M. Millspaugh's mission.

3. *French Interests*

For a time, up to about ten years ago, there was a French Consular Agent [illegible] "Alliance Israélite Universelle" is the sole French interest here, albeit an indirect one.

4. *Vatican Interests*

Priests and nuns of the order of St. Vincent de Paul have been established here for many years. They seem to devote their time more to educating Persian children than to proselytising. The Vatican also has charge of the spiritual welfare of the small community of Roman Catholic Armenians in Julfa, who are, however, Persian nationals.

5. *German Interests.*

At present, naturally, there are no German interests in Isfahan, but a large proportion of the upper class of Isfahanis has German sympathies, although now [illegible] Before this war [illegible] had a particular business interests here, for out of the nine large textile mills, all were laid out by Germans and all except one, Risbaf, had wholly German plant. German influence in the textile industry was paramount and the Isfahan Technical School was run and inspired by Germans. There was quite a large German community in Isfahan as well, which was highly organised for political and propaganda purposes and, through the British Consulate-General having been closed in 1933, was enabled to carry on its work virtually unwatched.

Chapter IX — Politics in Isfahan

On the whole the Isfahani is not very politically minded. He is much more [illegible] The [illegible] is the same. Politics in Isfahan consequently are the pastime of the few. Hitherto the most powerful [illegible] group in Isfahan has been that of [illegible] and [illegible] were. Under Reza Shah they enjoyed the support of the Government and so were absolute. With the change of régime in 1941 and the removal of any ban on Communist propaganda, the Russian-backed Tudeh party began to develop, although it was not until the summer of 1942 that it began to have any influence in Isfahan. This was brought about largely by the intrigues of the pro-Axis military commander in Isfahan, General Zahedi, who, in order to stir up mud for his own political purposes, set the mill workers and their employers against each other by encouraging both sides secretly. Up to this time there had been hardly any political problems in Isfahan that were other than purely local. Since then, however, the

struggle between labour and capital has developed and will continue to do so with various ups and downs. At present Isfahan is the centre of this [illegible] money can do everything, reactionary to a degree, and solely interested in making as much money as possible. They are, especially now, when the mill workers and the peasants are being awakened by the propaganda of the Tudeh party to a sense, even though it be but dim, of their rights and wrongs, very harmful to [illegible] communist propaganda is to win the friendship and respect of their employees, whether peasants or mill operatives, by generous and progressive treatment. The [illegible] or big merchants. Were the big men to assure themselves of the support of these [illegible] Persian estimates put the number of peasant proprietors in the district at about 500,000, as against a few thousand large landowners. The largest landowners of all do not own more than six to ten villages. In the town the trade [illegible] are strong and are able to exercise considerable political power, for instance, at election time.

Much depends on the attitude of the senior Government officials. The [illegible] prosecution of personal feuds or intrigues by the leading Isfahanis, but if he is out to make money he will seek to encourage these so as to take money from both sides. Similarly, the divisional commander has much scope for trouble-making or the reverse. As often as not he intrigues against the civil Governor-General and from such enmities among officials the Isfahanis themselves are quick to profit for their own ends.

The Bakhtiari khans do not take much part in Isfahan politics to day but are [illegible] to Isfahan. As long as the townsmen of Isfahan have enough cheap bread and other essential food-stuffs to eat they keep reasonably quiet. This can only occur when the surrounding country is untroubled so that supplies can be properly collected and sent in to the town, and this in the last resort depends on peace in Bakhtiari, because any explosion there has immediate reactions on security [illegible] case when the Central Government is weak, as it has been for the past four years.

Chapter X.—Tribes

The Isfahan province includes a part of the Bakhtiari area, made up of western [illegible] It is not proposed to give any detailed explanation of Bakhtiari affairs or organisation here, since that already exists in my report on the Bakhtiari tribe, 1934. Only the general influence of the Bakhtiaris on Isfahan affairs will be considered.

The Bakhtiaris are of importance to Isfahan mainly for economic reasons. Chahar Mahal and Feredan are the [illegible] areas for Isfahan town. The Bakhtiaris virtually dominate Chahar Mahal, since the tribes' summer quarters be next door to it and the khans own a good deal of land in the area. Similarly in Feredan the fertile area is dominated by another part of the Bakhtiari tribe in the summer. Therefore successful collection of the grain crop

depends on peace in Bakhtiari as a whole. In addition, Isfahan's charcoal, cooking butter and fat and meat come largely from tribal areas or from areas where tribal influence is great. Road communications with the rest of Persia are also subject to raids by Bakhtiari and other tribesmen in the spring, summer and autumn.

In the southern part of the province round Shahreza and the area between Shahreza and Nain, raiding by the Qashqai and Boir Ahmadi tribes is common in [illegible] of the [illegible] of people of Bakhtiari origin [illegible] and Juzdan areas of the town.

Chapter XI.—The Land, Agriculture and Husbandry

Landowners in the Isfahan area are of two classes—those who own comparatively large amounts of land, landowners in the English sense of the word, and peasant proprietors who own only small amounts of land. In the Isfahan area, the number of large landowners is, unlike other parts of Persia, very small indeed compared to the number of peasant proprietors. Land is [illegible] "bakhshe" [illegible] doing all the land and take the whole crop. A landowner [illegible] his crop with his peasants and gives them certain services as well. Normally he supplies the land, water, seed (for winter—"shatvi"—crops such as wheat and [illegible] fruit and [illegible] crops he supplies only the water [illegible] rye, millet). With winter crops the landlord, if he supplies the seed, takes two-thirds of the yield and the peasant receives one-third, but with fruit, nuts, summer crops and opium, where the peasant supplies the seed, the crop is divided into halves, one for the landlord and one for the peasant. In one or two cases more enlightened landlords (Sarem-ed-Doulah is one) divide all their crops equally with their peasants, taking only half the yield (*).

Round Isfahan itself and near large villages where land is crowded, the land never lies fallow, but is manured every year with human manure from cesspits and sheep manure from grazing sheep, so that it can stand the strain of continuous cultivation. Where a village is not limited as to space, land is normally only cultivated once every three or four years and is not then manured at all. Horse manure is not used at all, because it makes the ground hard, and cow manure is used as fuel by the peasants. For newly-planted trees, pigeon manure is much used. This is collected in the many pigeon towers to be seen round Isfahan. These are opened once a year and the manure taken out. These towers do not, however, carry the pigeon population they did formerly, for the [illegible] he can break the soil up better than by using the primitive local plough which can only really scratch the surface. This is important when the same land is cultivated every year. Also, he may not be able to afford oxen to pull a plough. In other less crowded parts of the province the simple plough, an iron-shod wooden prong, is used behind oxen.

The greater part of the Isfahan area bears irrigated crops. Only in parts of [illegible] Irrigated cultivation is watered either by water drawn from the Zayandeh Rud and other smaller rivers by means of canals or by water from the underground water channels known as "qanats." The distribution of the water of the Zayandeh Rud river between the many villages which depend on this source of [illegible] the point where the river loses itself in the Gavkhaneh salt lake east of Isfahan, is still in the main the same distribution that was devised 300 years ago by one of the Shah Abbas's advisers, Shaikh Bahai. Naturally, since Shaikh Bahai prepared his roll—

(*) In Chahar Mahal the peasant takes two-thirds and sometimes four fifths of the crop. In the latter case he supplies his own seed.

[illegible] setting forth the mode of dividing the waters of the Zayandeh Rud, villages have disappeared and others have sprung up, but nevertheless his basis for distribution was essentially sound and is so to-day. The Isfahan plain is very fertile, but depends entirely on successful irrigation and does not in consequence carry the cultivation it should do. This was realised even in Shah Abbas's day, for he embarked upon an immense scheme for making a cut in the mountain ridge—the Karkunan ridge (I-39-T: U7878) forming the watershed between the Zayandeh Rud and Karun river basins—so as to draw water from the Karun to supplement that of the Zayandeh Rud. This plan never matured however. Since that time it has been continually under discussion in Isfahan, but although many proposals have been drawn up by Persian and foreign engineers, nothing concrete has yet been done. Additional water for the Zayandeh Rud [illegible]

The wheat and barley production of the Isfahan province, that is, the surplus available after landowners' and peasants' own needs have been met, is, in a reasonably good year, when water is plentiful and there are no pests or diseases [illegible] about 40,000 kharvars or 11,000 tons [illegible] is two-thirds is wheat and one-third barley. This surplus goes to supply [illegible] with bread for the year.

[illegible] is a Government-owned silo (Russian equipped) of a capacity of 18,000 [illegible] It has [illegible] fixed. However, flour is issued daily to the bakers of the town in amounts varying from 50 to 150 kharvars daily, according to the bakers' needs. These needs depend in turn on the time of year and on whether it profits the bakers to buy flour from the silo or in the open market. In addition the rich people of the town have their own flour which they either buy or bring in from their villages.

There is also a quite important local production of rice in the Linjan area by the Zayandeh Rud river. Here a surplus of about 6,000 kharvars is given in a normal year. Linjan rice is preferred by most Isfahanis to Mazanderan rice, for it suits the hard water of Isfahan better and has a delicate scent which other rice lacks. In the Ardistan district, which is very dry, a good deal of giant millet is grown.

Isfahan is noted for its fruit—cherries, apricots, grapes, melons ("garmak" and "kermsorr" rather like [illegible] and [illegible]arbuzeh a white-fleshed yellow-skinned melon, which ripens late), peaches, apples, pears and other sorts as well. A good deal of stone fruit is dried and sent to other parts of Persia. Najafabad produces good varieties of almonds. Cucumbers, too, are extensively grown in the summer.

[illegible] grows in which a scale insect lives which produces a white excretion which, when collected and prepared with sugar, forms the sweetmeat "gaz," for which Isfahan is famous.

In the Isfahan area horses are bred in the villages, and oxen and cows and also sheep and [illegible] M [illegible] in particular in the villages of Upper Linjan and at Shahr Kurd and Haftadjan (map Hushegan I 39. U Q4559) in Chahar Mahal. [illegible] Mazar (I 39 V R4071) [illegible] I 39 V N [illegible] are cows and oxen bred by the villagers of Mahabad (I 39, Q-G6905) and Tudeshk (I 39, W N1816).

Chapter XII — Industry and Commerce

Isfahan is, after Tehran, the biggest trading centre in Persia. Indeed if those commercial activities be set aside which must of necessity be carried on in the capital of a country, Isfahan is a more important commercial centre than Tehran itself. Apart from [illegible] such as firms and individuals importing tea and sugar there is, for Persia, a large concentration of the textile industry in the nine cotton and wool spinning and weaving mills in Isfahan which, on the whole during the war years (from 1939) have made large and [illegible] profits. Prosperity has also been the lot of the smaller merchants and of the landowners, big and small, because of the high price of grain. [illegible] fact that current deposits with the Imperial Bank of Iran amount to [illegible] five times the current deposits of pre-war years, [illegible] the Imperial Bank also certainly has increased its business [illegible]

The chief [illegible] of the Isfahan [illegible] cotton cloth, [illegible] cotton waste, [illegible] tragacanth, [illegible] dried fruit

almonds, givehs (cotton shoes). It is also a distribution centre for other parts of Persia [illegible] sugar imported from India. Most of Isfahan's products, especially textiles, find a market elsewhere in Persia. Opium was before the war exported to the Far East, mainly to the Straits Settlements and Japan. Some also went to Britain and America. Since the war and the increase in the price of other crops such as grain, opium cultivation has dropped off because it is a difficult crop to raise successfully, both as regards trouble and expense. Isfahan opium, however, is of high quality, containing up to 11 per cent. of morphine. Tobacco, which is of a high quality for its type, is exported to Egypt where it [illegible] Gum Tragacanth goes to Britain. A certain amount of grain is normally sent to the Yezd area, but as a rule Isfahan is only just self-supporting in grain—at least it has been so for the last twelve of fifteen years.

The chief imports of the Isfahan region are manufactured goods of all kinds, motor cars and lorries, bicycles, machinery and raw materials for the textile mills, piece goods, drugs, food-stuffs, charcoal and oil products. Manufactured goods, [illegible] industry, all come from abroad. Oil products and petrol, paraffin, lubricants, diesel oil (now extensively used for heating houses, bakers' ovens and public baths), are supplied by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company from Abadan and Kermanshah. Manufactured articles in general in the years before the war came from Germany, Japan and Russia. Germany and Japan had trade agreements with Persia which to a greater or less extent forced Persia to trade with them in certain commodities. Motor vehicles came largely from the United States and bicycles from Britain, France and Germany. [illegible] Germany, and piece goods from India, Japan and Russia, with a small amount of [illegible] country, such as rice from Mazanderan (local rice cultivation was forbidden until after the fall of Pahlevi), cooking butter from the Qashqai and Bakhtiari tribes and charcoal from Bakhtiari.

A table [illegible] appendix to this [illegible] shows [illegible] the nine big textile mills in Isfahan. It will be seen that in every case the original capital has been dangerously increased. Reserves are in no case greater than the legal minimum of 10 per cent. All these mills have German power plants (diesel-electric) and [illegible] British (Platt Bros., Oldham) cotton spinning machinery but German wool spinning and weaving equipment. As well there are several other smaller textile enterprises (Javeed, Zarifi).

Isfahan is also well-known for its engraved silver and brass ware although the value of this trade is not probably of great importance commercially.

Other Industrial activities in Isfahan

A small amount of hand printing on calico is done in the bazaar and there is local production of carpets. Dyes for these are almost entirely of vegetable origin and locally prepared.

Chemicals

A small [illegible] potassium and magnesium salts from plant ash and local magnesite deposits and gives a small amount [illegible] The quality of the products were judged good by M.E.S.C. experts who visited the plant in 1943.

Eight small plants in the bazaar produce about one ton per eight hour day of [illegible] which is supplied to the [illegible] glass makers.

Castings

A small forge operated by Ustad Hassan in the Bazaar Najar turns out iron and bronze castings from scrap metal. This production w[illegible] machine shops attached to several of the big mills results in good quality machine parts being turned out.

Cotton Ropes.

The Rubaf mill makes a satisfactory cotton rope for rope drives out of cotton waste and there is also a small production of this in the bazaar.

Matches

The Sherkat i-Firuz Kebrit Sazi factory produces about 10,000 boxes of matches a day

Glass

A primitive glass melting furnace in the bazaar produces poor quality glass vessels and bottles up to about one gallon capacity

Oil Extraction

Extremely primitive production in the bazaar gives about 120 kgs. a day of linseed, cotton seed and opium seed oil.

Motor Transport

In the Shahpur Avenue there are several motor repair workshops where ordinary repairs to cars and lorries can be executed. Most of these establishments can do welding as well

Coal

A primitive coal mine exists at Soh (L 9988) It has an output of three or four tons daily, most of which comes to Isfahan for sale

APPENDIX 1 TO CHAPTER XII

Textile Mills in Isfahan.

1. *Karkhanah Risandegi va Bafandegi Vatan.*—Capital in 1933, 5,000,000 rials. Capital in 1943, 27,628,000 rials. 5,220 spindles for wool and 1,500 for doubling. 101 looms. 1,200 workers employed

2. *Sherkat Sahami Mahdood Risandegi va Bafandegi Zayanderoud Isfahan* Capital in 1935, 2,070,040 rials. Capital in 1943, 32,020,000 rials. 8,096 spindles for cotton. 171 looms. 1,400 workers employed

3. *Sherkat Sahami Risandegi va Bafandegi Rishaff.*—Capital in 1933 1,067,620 rials. Capital in 1943, 63,234,000 rials. 8,448 spindles for cotton, 6,080 for wool, 2,000 spindles for doubling. 60 looms. 1,970 workers employed

4. *Sherkat Sahami Risandegi va Bafandegi Shah-Reza.*—Capital in 1936 1,224,000 rials. Capital in 1943, 26,702,000 rials. 4,324 spindles for cotton, 500 spindles for doubling. 130 looms. 1,100 workers employed

5. *Sherkat Sahami Risandegi va Bafandegi Sanaye Pashm.*—Capital in 1936 2,040,000 [illegible] Capital in 1944, [illegible] 3,200 spindles for cotton 3,280 spindles for wool, 400 spindles for doubling. 60 looms. 1,150 workers employed

6. *Sherkat Sahami Risandegi va Bafandegi Pashm.*—Capital in 1930 2,004,740 rials. Capital in 1944, 60,900,000 rials. 2,376 spindles for cotton 4,480 spindles for wool. 100 looms. 1,400 workers employed.

7. *Karkhanah Risandegi Bargh. Now S.S. Risandegi and Bafandegi Noor* Capital in 1945 25,000,000 rials. 4,896 spindles for cotton, 600 spindles for doubling. 800 workers employed

8. *Sherkat Nesbi Haji Syd. Abdul Rasoul Rahimzadeh Roghani and Shureka.*—Capital in 1933 438,000 rials. Capital in 1943, 12,120,000 rials 6,400 spindles for cotton 680 spindles for doubling. 800 workers employed

9. *Sherkat Sahami Nakhlab.*—Capital in 1935, 383,333 rials. Capital in 1944, 19,500,000 rials. 2,468 spindles for cotton, 996 [illegible] workers employed.

APPENDIX 2 TO CHAPTER XII

Weights and Measures

[illegible] the old Persian system of weights and measure is still used, especially among the uneducated classes, as follows:—

The Shah Man

4 gandums	=	1 [illegible]
24 nukhuds (5 grammes)	=	1 [illegible]
10 misqals		1 [illegible]
20 [illegible]		1 panj nar
10 [illegible]	=	1 dah nar

The Shah Man (continued)—

80 misqals	=	1 bist-o-panj.
160 misqals (600 grammes)	=	1 panjah (charak).
320 misqals	=	1 Sad darham.
640 misqals	=	½ shah man (1 Tabriz man)
[illegible]	=	1 [illegible]
1,280 [illegible]	=	1 [illegible] (nearly 6 [illegible] grammes or 2 [illegible] lbs. [illegible])
50 Shah mans (100 Tabriz mans)	=	1 kharvar (649 lbs. avoirdupois)

The Tabriz Man (*used much less than the Shah Man*).

24 nukhuds	=	1 [illegible]
8 misqals	=	1 [illegible]
16 misqals	=	1 seer
160 misqals	=	1 dah seer or cherak
640 misqals	=	1 Tabriz man

[illegible]

2 bahrs	=	1 gerreh (2·56 inches)
16 gerrehs	=	1 zar'a (41 inches or 110 cms.)
6,000 zar'as	=	1 farsakh—3·87 miles (in theory only, for a farsakh in fact represents the distance a horseman can travel in an hour at a walk and [illegible] varies from 3 to 4 miles, according to the nature of the ground).

[illegible]

26¼ square zar as	=	1 nay
4 nays	=	1 qefeez.
6 qefeez	=	1 [illegible] (1,067 sq. zar as)

R 5883/31/34 No. 9

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 13th August.)

(No. 263. Secret.)

Tehran, 20th July, 1945

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 128 of the 25th April, I have the honour to [illegible] June 1945.

Copies of this despatch are going to His Majesty's consular officers in Persia, His Majesty's [illegible] and Iraq Command, the Middle East Command, the Minister-Resident in Cairo and the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East.

I have, etc.

R. W. BULLARD

Enclosure in No. 9

The Question of the Withdrawal of Allied Troops from Persia

1. This question took on a more practical form during the quarter as a result of [illegible] of official notes by the Persian Government to the representatives of Great Britain, Russia and America in Tehran, asking for the removal of Allied troops forthwith, and [illegible]

2. When the quarter began, overseas cargo for Russia had almost ceased to arrive at [illegible] to the extent that she was receiving aviation spirit from Abadan under an agreement which was due to expire on 1st June. It was decided however that

Russia should be supplied from some other source with the June quota of aviation spirit, so that, with effect from the end of May, aid to Russia, with the exception of a small quantity of cargo lying at the ports or on the sea, ceased entirely to be sent across Persia.

3. On the 10th May the Ministry for Foreign Affairs addressed a note to His Majesty's Embassy asking for British forces to be withdrawn from Persia forthwith, arguing that it was essential that Persia should be able to return to [illegible] in accordance with the wishes of her people. It maintained that Japan was so remote that the war in the Far East could not be influenced by the presence of Allied troops in Persia and added that in any case Japan on her own showing was no longer allied to Germany. The Tripartite Treaty concluded to promote the war effort against Germany had therefore lost its meaning. The note added that communications on the subject had been addressed also to the Soviet and American Embassies. Under instructions from the Foreign Office, His Majesty's Ambassador informed the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in reply that although His Majesty's Government could not accept the argument that the Allied Powers were not entitled by the Anglo-Soviet Persian Treaty to keep troops in Persia until six months after the end of the Japanese war, they were nevertheless prepared to consider sympathetically the Persian Government's request that the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia should begin before the final date fixed by the treaty. He added that His Majesty's Government were discussing the question with the Soviet and United States Governments.

4. His Majesty's Ambassador in Washington was instructed to inform the State Department of the action taken in Tehran and to explain that it had been taken before consultation with the United States Government because news had just been received that the United States Government intended to withdraw American troops from Persia, and to hand over operation of the railway by the 1st July, and because the attitude of the State Department at the time of the [illegible] difference of opinion between the two Governments on the subject. It was suggested that it would assist Persia and, incidentally, His Majesty's Government, if the United States Government would tell the Soviet Government that they regarded it as desirable that the evacuation of Persia should start at an early date. It was left to the discretion of His Majesty's Ambassador whether to inform the State Department that we were not prepared to withdraw any troops except *pari passu* with the Russians, and that the extent of our withdrawal was limited by the obligation, until the end of the war with Japan, to protect the oil-fields and the refinery. A few days later the American press [illegible] Government's note, that the United States Government naturally sympathised with the Persian Government's point of view, and that it was believed well known that the number of American troops in Persia was already being rapidly reduced.

5. The attitude of the American Embassy in Tehran was disappointing. This was seen at its worst in a harangue by the American Counsellor, who argued that whatever we did Persia would be eaten up by Russia in a few years anyhow, and whose conscience disapproved the British attempt to induce the Persians, by the placing of a time-limit on Allied offers of assets for sale, to make up their minds quickly—and thereby give no excuse to any foreign Ally to retain troops to guard its assets. The heart of the counsellor bled like anything, but [illegible] trying to hustle the East, or by fear that haste might produce fewer dollars [illegible] ambassador, Mr. Wallace Murray, in spite of his avowed suspicion of Russian motives, deprecated a too speedy withdrawal of British troops lest this should interfere with the sale of assets.

6. In reply to the communication from His Majesty's Embassy in Washington the State Department said that they were drafting a reply to the Persian note agreeing to the idea of withdrawing troops from Persia before the final treaty date. The State Department agreed that it would be desirable for British and American troops not to be withdrawn except *pari passu* with the Russian, but on the other hand said that the War Department would not wish to delay the withdrawal of American troops for political reasons. The War Department would wish to leave, until the end of the war with Japan, 500 men to service the air transport command, besides leaving guards on military installations and properties until their final disposal, which might take many months. The State Department were considering what, if anything, they would say to the Russians.

7. The nature of His Majesty's Government's reply to the Persian note was communicated to the Soviet Government in Moscow on the 31st May. The communication was to add that His Majesty's Government now wished to propose formally that Allied troops should start withdrawing from Persia *pari passu* and in stages before the final treaty date, and that military talks should be held to discuss the stages in which such withdrawals might take place. No reply had been received by the end of the quarter—perhaps because arrangements for a meeting of the Big Three had already been made. The Persian Ambassador in [illegible] beyond the fact that the question "was being considered carefully." The Soviet Ambassador was in his permanent state of having received no instructions, but he assured the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the presence of the Soviet troops [illegible] temporary and that the mere removal of material would take a long [illegible]

8. A possible hindrance to our good intentions came to light with the [illegible] relieved the British forces of the responsibility of guarding it, the railway brigade would be moved from the railway and moved to the camp at Hamadan no longer required by the Americans. The advantage of good ready-made quarters in a good climate was fully realised by His Majesty's Embassy, but it seemed that it would completely wreck our attempt to secure a substantial withdrawal [illegible] forward than ever before, and quite close to Qazvin, the point above all which it is desirable to clear of Soviet forces. It was found, however, that once free of its duties on the railway, the railway brigade would not be needed in Persia [illegible] fortunate, for the pro-Russian newspapers in Tehran were already announcing [illegible] transfer of troops to the Kermanshah area from Iraq to escape the hot weather.

9. The more the question was studied the sharper seemed the unfortunate contrast between our good intentions hampered by the exigencies of the war with [illegible] possible in spite of the fact that this was justified by no military necessity [illegible] went on, troops must be kept in the Kermanshah area—the only suitable place in the Middle East with a good climate, and this involves retention of the camp at Bisitun—twenty miles nearer to Tehran than the nearest point allowed to us when the military zones were defined with the Russians in 1941.

10. A curious misunderstanding had to be cleared up, viz., that the proposal for the withdrawal of troops was a policy of appeasement—a feeble attempt to [illegible] view, was to tell the Russians that we needed to stay in Persia because we were at war with Japan; the Russians always understood a bold front and would respect us. It was explained in reply that this "bold" policy would delight the Russians, because the more of Persia we occupied, the easier it would be for them to justify the retention of Soviet troops, and that our aim, far from being a [illegible] was to use [illegible] only weapon in our hands—that of exposure of their "imperialist" tendencies, if they refused to [illegible] substantial withdrawal by making the facts public. This we considered [illegible] minds of the Persian public [illegible] foreign countries, especially [illegible]

11. It is realised that [illegible] responsibilities for the Dashar [illegible] Tappeh aircraft factory and, [illegible] were still running their service to Tehran, alternative arrangements for airfield control meteorological service and signals would have to be made. It seems to His Majesty's Embassy that every day the Russians strengthen their grip on the

north of Persia, and that, consequently, the necessity for the evacuation of at least Tehran [illegible] from all sides with the greatest vigour, whereupon some obstacles which at present appear large may shrink in size.

12. The problem can now be summed up thus:—

(1) It will presumably be proposed at Potsdam that we and the Russians should begin the *pari passu* evacuation of our troops forthwith [illegible] Tehran.

(2) We shall not be embarrassed by the stationing of British [illegible] at [illegible].

(3) We shall, however, be embarrassed if it is considered essential to retain troops at Kermanshah Bisitun after the autumn, since it seems quite certain that the Russians would then wish to retain troops along the Tabriz-Qazvin-Tehran-Semnan-Meshed line, thereby prolonging the paralysis of the capital which serves their political schemes so well. An alternative suggestion made by the embassy was to keep the mobile reserve in a tented camp at Karind, which is only just inside the Persian border or better still (if there is no suitable place in Iraq) in Palestine. If troops could be brought by air to Abadan or the oil fields from Palestine in case of emergency, they should arrive as quickly as troops from Kermanshah could arrive by other means. The question whether the airfields in the oil-wells area were or could be made adequate to receive airborne troops remained to be examined.

(4) An important factor is that dealt with in paragraph 30 of the March quarterly report, whether the security of the oil area could be assured without British troops by some sort of police force. This continued to be debated. At the beginning of June the War Office asked the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Paiforce, whether, in his opinion, the Persian oil fields could be reasonably well protected against sabotage and disturbances, of internal security, if all British troops were withdrawn from Persia by some such arrangement as the [illegible] He was [illegible] could be held in Iraq to re-enter the oil fields if necessity arose. The General Officer Commanding showed the political, strategic and climatic objections to the retention of the mobile force in Iraq, and on the other question he quoted probable American objections to our entrusting the protection of the oil to Persians and to our removing troops before they had had time to dispose of their assets advantageously, and he pointed out that hurried evacuation would probably mean great loss to His Majesty's Government in the price to be obtained for our assets. His conclusion was: if South Persian oil was vital in the war against Japan, then although sabotage in the oil field was easier said than done and, although security was good at the moment, it was considered essential to retain British Indian troops in Abadan and desirable to retain our troops in [illegible] and the reserve brigade in Persia.

13. On the question of the replacement of British/Indian troops [illegible] British Indian [illegible] the General Officer Commanding-in-chief calculated that 3,000 would be required, but that if as appeared preferable [illegible] 2,000 points. It was agreed by all concerned that the more the Persian authorities could be associated [illegible] they were perhaps [illegible] to improve their forces so as to justify us in effecting the maximum withdrawal [illegible] the transfer to [illegible] and help to ensure the protection of the oil area when the British forces had left the country. This led to an examination of methods of improving the Persian police and gendarmerie, which was still going on when the quarter came to an end.

British Army

14. The previous report omitted to mention that on the 15th February Paiforce ceased to be [illegible] and came under the Middle East Command.

15. During the quarter under review the number of British combatant troops in Persia [illegible] at about 10,200 [illegible].

Proposed Counter-Measures against Soviet Pressure.

16. In April the Foreign Office asked whether more could be done to prepare against further Soviet pressure on Persia, since the Russians might return to the charge at short notice. The standard Soviet complaints against any Government which they wished to subvert were (1) that its failure to maintain order was a threat to Soviet security; (2) that it was "Fascist" and needed to [illegible] The Russians might well claim that their interests were threatened by disorders in Azerbaijan or Tehran. And it was difficult to maintain that present Persian Governments represented public opinion. In case the Soviet Government tried to confront them with a *fait accompli*, His Majesty's Government should be ready [illegible] their own nominees represented public opinion any better. The Foreign Office asked, first, that this embassy should supply notes on Persians whom the Russians [illegible] Secondly, they asked for a list of the more notorious cases in which the Russians had prevented the Persian Government from keeping order by interfering with [illegible]'s proposed security measures. Thirdly this embassy must maintain [illegible] Persian Government to carry out social reforms. Another very important factor was publicity (since wide advertisement of the difference between Russian professions and Russian actions was apt to put the Russians off their stroke). This point is discussed in the next section.

Reluctance of Anglo-Saxon Press to Publish News of Nefarious Soviet Activities.

17. One of the troubles of this embassy is that nearly all foreign publicity about Persia is pro-Soviet. (This was particularly noticeable last autumn when the Soviet Government was putting unfair pressure on the Persian Government to grant them an oil concession in North Persia.) One cause is that the Soviet section of the Anglo-Soviet Persian Censorship conducts a heavy political censorship on messages from foreign correspondents in Tehran, and the latter dare not circumvent it lest they or their colleagues elsewhere should be penalised. Another is that the news agencies disregard messages from their Tehran correspondents and imagine that Persian news is only news if it comes from Moscow. This is disastrous since the Tass Agency in Tehran, as an official agency, is exempt from the Anglo-Soviet Persian censorship and telegraphs what messages it likes, and these form the basis of foreign correspondents' messages from Moscow. Consequently it is only the visiting journalist to Persia who can evade the Soviet censor and speak plainly.

18. The following are illustrations of the effect of the Soviet censorship [illegible] correspondent in Moscow, passed through Tehran he was scornful regarding [illegible] propaganda about Persia. His words had scarcely died on his lips, when he sent from Tehran an interview with the leader of the Tudeh party, in which he publicised the lie that the Tudeh was a genuinely democratic party. After [illegible] the British facilitated the return of Seyyid Zia to Persia, thus representing us and Seyyid Zia as the joint opponents of the Soviet Union and of the Tudeh party. [illegible] with the aim of throwing ridicule on the recent Soviet press comment on Persian affairs, if his message had given a pro-Soviet impression then his sub-editor in New York had failed to detect his ironic intent! Shortly afterwards, the war correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News* also telegraphed an interview with the leader of the Tudeh party, [illegible] received no money from the Russians. His Majesty's Embassy in Moscow commented that neither of these correspondents was in the least deceived by [illegible] again they could not criticise Soviet policy openly.

19. This question was also discussed with the State Department, who undertook to investigate whether an American editorial writer or commentator could produce an impartial article on Persia which might be telegraphed abroad. (So far as this embassy is aware, nothing has come of this suggestion.) This embassy then suggested that the *Daily Express* correspondent in the Middle East should visit Persia and send a message after having left the country. The Foreign Office replied that neither the *Daily Express* nor any other newspaper

wanting to have a correspondent in the Soviet Union or Soviet-occupied Europe would publish any article unflattering to the Russians, the best course would be to get an article published in the *Economist* or *Manchester Guardian*, as they had no Moscow correspondent. This embassy commented that it was disturbing when important English newspapers, including presumably *The Times*, dare not send truthful messages from Persia lest they should lose the privilege of sending untruthful ones from Moscow.

Persian Internees: British Soviet Amenities Regarding Same

20. Twenty-six Persian internees were released from internment at the request of the British and Soviet authorities in April and May. However, their war against Germany having ended, the Soviet authorities could not resist currying favour with the Persians at our expense. On the 25th May, the Soviet Ambassador proposed the immediate release of the remainder, and by the 29th May, the Soviet authorities had already informed the Persian police that they were willing to set free all internees, but that the British authorities opposed their release. On the 2nd June, therefore, His Majesty's Ambassador informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the British security authorities desired the detention of those internees only who might be a danger to the countries at war with Japan. Thereupon thirty-one more internees were released. The Soviet Embassy then published a statement in the press that they were not opposed to the release of any of the internees. The Soviet Ambassador also informed the Ministry for Foreign Affairs accordingly, and, having ascertained the names of those whom the British authorities wished to keep interned, emphasised that he considered desirable the release of the Mullah Kashani and General Aghevli (whom the British authorities regarded as especially dangerous). Shortly afterwards, the British authorities found five men in the internment camp, whom the Soviet authorities had interned and then forgotten about; so His Majesty's Embassy had pleasure in informing the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that it disclaimed all interest in them. Assuming that the Soviet authorities have now been good enough to liberate them, the total number of Persians released from internment during the quarter was sixty-two.

21. Thirteen Persians now remain interned in Persia, twelve in the Persian camp at Tehran and one, the Mullah Kashani, in the British camp at Kermanshah. A few more, including General Zahedi, are interned in Palestine. On the 2nd June the Persian Prime Minister enquired of His Majesty's Ambassador whether the internment of those in Persia could not be commuted to forced residence in the small town of Mahallat, fifty miles east of Sultanabad. The proposal has been approved by all concerned, except that Kashani is to remain provisionally at Kermanshah; the future of Zahedi and the others in Palestine is not yet decided.

Internal Politics and Soviet Interference

22. Bayat was still [illegible] at the beginning of April, owing largely to the inability of the Deputies to agree on a successor. His Government was, however, slowly disintegrating. Nasrullah Intizam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, resigned on the 1st April. Ibrahim Zand, Minister for War, had gone to Palestine for medical treatment; and the Russians were bringing increasing pressure to bear on Bayat to dismiss Sururi, Minister of the Interior, who had shown firmness in dealing with Tudeh activities. A deadlock appeared, moreover, to have been reached in the Majlis, with Government supporters and opponents in [illegible] for the first time after the No Rúz recess on the 3rd April, proceeded to elect its new president. Seyyid Muhammad Sadiq Tabataba'i, the retiring president, who was a strong supporter of Bayat, was re-elected by a majority of one vote over his principal rival, Farrukh, the nominee of Bayat's opponents in the Chamber. Bayat, however, appeared to enjoy the support of the Shah, who was believed to be working to expose the futility of the Majlis, and of the Russians to whom a state of continued administrative paralysis was not unwelcome.

23. On the 15th April Seyyid Zia deposited a motion of non-confidence in the Government on the bureau of the Majlis, requesting an early debate. The motion was subsequently withdrawn by the Seyyid when he learnt that Bayat intended to clarify the position of the Government at the next meeting of the Majlis. This took place on the 17th April, when Bayat made a long speech which was frequently interrupted by cries of dissent, defending his Government's policy and asking the Chamber to judge between his Government and their

[illegible] He [illegible] authority by s[illegible] the tribes an[illegible] only forty [illegible] abstentions. [illegible]

24. Although [illegible] successor to Bayat without delay and to p[illegible] had been formed by the end of April. After endless [illegible] decided to nominate representatives from each parliamentary fraction to meet together and try to find a solution. At a secret meeting of these representatives on the 24th April Mahmud Bader received most votes, with Qawam es Sultaneh a close second, and Mansur, Pakravan and Sadiq Sadiqi far behind. Bader was, nevertheless, not chosen because the Russians were against him. The inability of the Majlis to come to a decision was indeed due largely to the fact that some thirty or forty Deputies wished to elect a candidate pleasing to the Russians; and although they were unable to impose a man of their choice on the Majlis, they [illegible] with the selection of a candidate who [illegible] important part in [illegible] Minister with sixty-four [illegible] twenty-four cast for Sadiq Sadiqi (Mustashar ed Dowleh), who was [illegible] by the Russians [illegible] Qawam es Sultaneh.

25. Hakimi presented his Cabinet to the Shah on the 10th May. It was composed as follows:—

Anushirvan Sepahbodi, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ghulam Hussein Rahnema, Education
Nasrullah Khal'atbari (Etela ul Mulk), Agriculture
Dr Ismail Marzban, Health
Abdul Hussein Hajir, Finance
Abul Qasim Najm, Commerce and Industry
Ibrahim Zand, War
Mustafa Adl, Without Portfolio
Hussein Ali Kamal Hedayat (Nasr ul Mulk), Without Portfolio
Nadir Arasteh, Roads

[illegible] in the above list were new to Cabinet rank, Rahnema being, indeed, a newcomer to [illegible] preceding ministry. Khalatbari, who is over 70, had long been in retirement. Hajir was able, but was likely to be opposed by the Tudeh and Najm. [illegible] himself took charge of the Ministry of the Interior, while the Ministry of Justice was placed temporarily under the direction of the Under Secretary, Dr Khushbin, until the return from America of Allayar Saleh, who was designated for the post. The Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs was left temporarily vacant. On the whole the ministers were considered a colourless lot, and met with little general approval.

26. The Prime Minister presented his Cabinet to the Majlis on the 13th May, and on the following [illegible] which included agricultural and economic reform, improvement of conditions for workers and peasants, [illegible] of taxes and the usual declaration of its desire to work for the consolidation of friendly relations with the Allies based on the Tripartite Treaty, the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of Tehran. The Tudeh party immediately declared on principle its opposition to a Government which did not stand for a radical reorganisation of the social system, and with the Tudeh was now also an increasing number of Deputies, who for private reasons found it advisable to adopt a Russian [illegible] Many Deputies [illegible] who had voted for Hakimi were annoyed that he refused to be influenced by them in his choice of

ministers, and were especially disappointed that they had not secured the [illegible] in their favour. The Deputies of the Right felt that the composition of the Cabinet revealed a desire on the part of the Prime Minister to propitiate the Russians.

27. The position of the Cabinet appeared therefore from the beginning to be none too secure, and its supporters did their best to postpone the taking of the vote of confidence. For a week the Majlis discussed the question of the impeachment for alleged peculation of Taddayun, a former Minister of Food. His enemies fearing he would be acquitted, delivered themselves of a series of fiery speeches demanding his conviction. On the 19th May the Majlis was to meet to vote on this question, but many Deputies absented themselves, and in the absence of a quorum no vote was taken. The President of the Majlis, however, took the opportunity to remind the Chamber that it had not yet discussed the new Government's programme. The debate which followed lasted about two week [illegible] French and their sympathisers, and by some spirited rejoinders by their oppon[illegible] made the usual accusations that reactionaries were suppo[illegible] system and arming the tribes in the interests of imperia[illegible] Better relations and a new treaty with Russia were advocated. The debate, however, did not materially affect the views of the Deputies about the Government. The opposition of the Tudeh and of those Deputies who for personal reasons fear to incur Russian displeasure, could be taken for granted. The bulk of the remainder, having failed to induce Hakimi to appoint ministers to their liking, decided that a different Government might give them a better chance of re-election in the approaching elections. When, therefore, the vote was taken on the 3rd June Hakimi received the support of only twenty-five Deputies, and resigned.

28. He was succeeded by Seyyid Mohsin Sadr (Sadr ul Ashraf) who was [illegible] the Majlis [illegible] the 4th June, by the Shah with the formation of a Government. Sadr was, however, like his predecessor, soon in difficulties with the Deputies over the selection of his ministers, particularly the Minister of the Interior, who is able to exert great influence in the elections. Nevertheless, on the 12th June, he presented his Cabinet, composed as follows, to the Shah:—

Prime Minister and Minister of Interior: Seyyid Mohsin Sadr (Sadr ul Ashraf).
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Health: Dr Sa'ed Malek (Laghmani ul Mulk).
Posts and Telegraphs: Ahmad Itebar.
War: [illegible] Zand.
[illegible]
Agriculture: Dr Nakhai.
Education: Ghulam Hussein Rahnema.
Minister without Portfolio: Mustafa Adl (Mansur es Sultaneh).
Minister without Portfolio: Hussein Ali Kemal Hedayat (Nasr ul Mulk).

[illegible] the new [illegible] of them, the Ministers of War [illegible] Ministers without portfolio [illegible]

29. [illegible] Sadr. Some thirty [illegible] Deputies, for the Nasr [illegible] fear. [illegible] most [illegible] of obstruction [illegible] to support Sadr [illegible] Majlis [illegible] Kemal Hedayat [illegible] Minister [illegible] Majlis [illegible] Minister [illegible] who [illegible]

30. [illegible] influence immediately opened a vigorous campaign against the new Prime Minister, raking up the history of

nearly forty years ago to accuse him of persecuting "the freedom-lovers during the [illegible] hardened reactionary. Although representatives of the pro-Government majority and of the Opposition met frequently during the next two weeks to try and find some way out of the crisis, they were unable to come to any agreement, and the minority maintained its attitude of obstruction. Whenever Sadr attempted to present his Cabinet to the Majlis the minority refused to attend, with the result that there was never the quorum required for a vote to be taken. On the 28th June [illegible] discussions took place between the [illegible] of the Majlis. The minority proposed that Sadr should resign, in which case they would be [illegible] Prime Minister and Cabinet. But the majority refused, and the deadlock continued. In an attempt to put an end to the crisis the Shah received representatives of the majority and of the minority and urged them to do their utmost to find a solution without delay. But no solution was found and Sadr had not received a vote of confidence by the end of June.

31. [illegible] and the labour movements during the period under review. The order forbidding political demonstrations in Tehran was suspended for the 1st May in order to allow the (Soviet sponsored) Tudeh party to hold a procession in honour of the Red army. Some 5,000 people, mostly Armenians, Turks from Azerbaijan and refugees from the Caucasus took part in the demonstration, which was perfectly orderly. Similar May-Day demonstrations were held in all the main towns in Northern Persia and in Kermanshah and Hamadan. In Meshed the celebrations lasted for two days, and mounted Russian officers and about eighty soldiers with [illegible] the Tudeh [illegible] On the 18th May the Adalat party, which advocates a policy of reform by persuasion, and which is opposed to the Tudeh because of its Russian connexion, staged a demonstration in Tehran to celebrate the Allied Victory and to demand the evacuation of Persia by Allied troops, and the release of the internees. The meeting was attacked by members of the Tudeh, and one of the Adalat party was killed and several were injured. The police failed to intervene, possibly because the Government, at Russian instigation, had suspended the Chief of Police at Isfahan for taking action against Tudeh rioters. In retaliation Seyyid Zia's supporters demonstrated on three successive days in front of the Majlis.

32. In April [illegible] in Isfahan was [illegible] the Tudeh campaign of intimidation against Persian officials who were striving to maintain law and order seemed to be dying down. But in the middle of May the Isfahan Tudeh leader Bahrampur returned from Tehran with a large sum of money which he used to stir up the Tudeh sympathisers, with the result that there were some clashes between them and anti-Tudeh workers in the town. On the 25th May a leader of the anti-Tudeh Labour Union of Isfahan was murdered by Tudeh ruffians. The result was a wave of resentment against the already seriously discredited Tudeh. The authorities immediately replaced the Acting Chief of Police, who was believed to be in Russian pay, by a military officer, and a number of arrests were carried out. But their failure to bring the principal instigators of the crime to book, subsequently caused a good deal of anxiety as it was felt that the Tudeh, having failed to make headway by lawful means, had now definitely adopted a policy of terrorism.

33. During May there was increased Tudeh activity also in the Kermanshah area culminating in a strike of workmen at the refinery of the Kermanshah [illegible] Company. The strike was not a spontaneous movement [illegible] genuine grievances against the company. [illegible] There was [illegible] to prove that it was in the nature of a try-out to be followed, if successful, by more serious outbreaks among labour in Abadan and elsewhere. When it became apparent that the strike was a failure the Tudeh press which had [illegible] the workmen, published a statement that it had not approved the strike which should be ended as soon as possible to avoid hindering the prosecution of the war against Japan.

34. Seyyid Zia's party, the Iradey i Milli, continued to increase in numbers and activity. It is taking steps to open branches in the provinces wherever the Tudeh is established. The Tudeh and other Left-wing papers continued regularly to attack Seyyid Zia as the agent of imperialism and a would-be dictator. At the end of June, the Seyyid retorted with a violent counter-attack in a speech in which he accused the Tudeh of being the tools of the Russians.

Persian Press and Public Opinion, and Soviet Influence.

35. There have been a number of casualties among the press at the hands of the military governor of Tehran during the period [illegible] the military governor and to demand the abrogation of the military governorship. In fact the military government has little [illegible] power [illegible] on of the military governor, subject as he is to the whims and caprices of the general officer [illegible] military government is the, at times, severe pressure put on the [illegible] against papers which have incurred the displeasure of the Soviet authorities pressure which few Governments have the courage to resist. [illegible] Russian [illegible] y or brief according to whether it was opposed or supported by the Soviet Embassy.

36. [illegible] The general [illegible] press was [illegible] press to make [illegible] all sections of the press for the release of the [illegible] Freedom Front, by a demand for the evacuation [illegible] forces. In many cases it was alleged that the [illegible] war in Europe [illegible]

37. The [illegible] between the Russian [illegible] supposed of Tudeh papers [illegible] the Tudeh party often take [illegible] "anti-imperialist," *i.e.*, [illegible] has been [illegible] Soviet [illegible] and [illegible] part of the [illegible] imperialist agent [illegible] Freedom Front have [illegible] wished to [illegible] whether [illegible] & An incident which [illegible] when some Persian [illegible] was the pretext for [illegible] which Indians were attacked as [illegible] ster motives were attributed to [illegible] y of Great Britain. The statement [illegible] Mr [illegible] Law [illegible] House of [illegible] British [illegible] the [illegible] of Persia [illegible] by the Freedom Front [illegible] about the [illegible] of [illegible] power the [illegible] The [illegible] was [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible] to [illegible] others whose [illegible] Persian [illegible] what the [illegible] by encouraging an [illegible] Kurdish [illegible] Islamic Union to combat [illegible] Russian [illegible] in the Middle East. Mr Churchill's first [illegible] greater than the Freedom Front [illegible] The violent [illegible]

and of Seyyid Zia, and the, at times, exceedingly flimsy grounds upon which these attacks are based, coupled with the insistence by the Russian Embassy on the suppression of certain papers may, perhaps, be taken as an indication that the counter-campaign in the pro-Seyyid Zia and Independence Front papers against the Tudeh and their Soviet masters has been more effective than they care for.

38. The official organ of the Tudeh party, *Rahbar*, has had articles stating that [illegible] made by a servile Majlis under Reza Shah were invalid. *Zafar*, the official organ of the [illegible] the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for alleged maltreatment of workers.

39. [illegible] sive Cabinet crises and the Majlis [illegible] press has followed similar lines: the Freedom Front [illegible] the pro-Seyyid Zia and Independence Front papers on the [illegible] of the two last-named groups has been one of anxiety over [illegible] serious nature of the financial [illegible] have been emphasised, though few [illegible] remedy the situation. As for the [illegible] d of possible attempts by the army [illegible]

40. [illegible] not provoke the Russians to even gre[illegible] the [illegible] of the country. The general te[illegible] compromise, pending a clarification [illegible] tries to shift responsibility from h[illegible] of Persia, in his view, depend[illegible] but upon the attitude take[illegible] and, to a lesser extent, by A[illegible] Persians are now to [illegible]

The Tribes and Soviet Activities among Them.

42. Except in western Azarbaijan (northern Kurdistan) the tribal situation has been satisfactory during the first half of the year. There have been minor ebullitions and instances of banditry, but the disorders that usually accompany the tribal migration were hardly noticeable this year. But the elements of disorder are still there, easily provoked by political agitators or corrupt administration.

43. In northern Kurdistan the attitude of the tribes has been causing the Persian Government much concern. For a long time past the Soviet authorities have prevented the Persian Government from taking any measures to enforce their authority, with the result that the tribes from Mahabad to Maku are practically a law unto themselves, except in so far as they are restricted by Russian officials. For a time endeavours were made to induce the Kurds to join the Tudeh party, but Tudeh principles found little favour in the eyes of Kurdish chiefs. Russian support is now reported to have been transferred to the movement for Kurdish independence, known as *Komala*, which seems to be gaining ground rapidly. The Persian Government expects to be faced, on the withdrawal of Russian troops, with a very serious situation in western Azarbaijan, and there is little ground for hope that they will be proved wrong.

44. In eastern Azarbaijan the hitherto patriotic Shahsavan tribes have been shocked by the impotence of the Persian Government to prevent the arrest and enforced detention in Tabriz by the Soviet authorities of two of their chiefs, whose only crime was opposition to the Tudeh party.

45. Little progress has been made with the collection of the large number of arms in the hands of tribes and others. A thousand or so have recently been seized in southern Kurdistan, mostly from settled tribes and villagers.

Tribal Lands.

46. [illegible] Sheikh Khazal of Mohammerah reached Tehran from Bagdad and joined his brothers and sisters in their efforts to get the Persian Arbitration Commission to decide in

their favour a distribution of lands or allotment of revenue from the large landed [illegible] in 1925. It looks as if the five arbitrators want to give an indecisive finding, or one that does not show up the Persian Government's (or rather the late Reza Shah's) gains in this sordid transaction.

Persian Army.

47. Some efforts are being made [illegible] the present Chief of the General Staff [illegible] play a part in rallying patriotic elements to make a stand against [illegible] against the intrigues and calumnies [illegible] and individual and faction animosities. [illegible] present Chief of the General Staff and to the officers he has appointed to the senior ranks of the army. The Tudeh party tries hard to attract the sympathies of junior officers and non-commissioned officers, with some success it is believed. In spite of all this some slight general improvement is noticeable in the troops in the capital. In the northern provinces of Khorassan and Azarbaijan the troops are entirely demoralised by the high-handed actions of the Russian authorities who allow them no liberty of action, restrict them to certain defined areas and insist on the limitation of their numbers to what amounts to little more than token forces, which add nothing to the authority or prestige of the Persian Government, rather do they make the Persian authorities look ridiculous.

48. [illegible]

Gendarmerie.

49. The gendarmerie, except in the capital, remains much where it was [illegible] rather than preventing disorder, and Colonel Schwarzkopf's schemes, rules and regulations are, with a few exceptions, still on paper. Antagonism between the army and the gendarmerie has been [illegible] parties sent out by both forces to pursue robbers have more than once come to blows with each other. Co-operation between the two forces is rare. The retransfer of the gendarmerie to the control and administration of the War Office is now receiving some serious consideration. Such a step should lead to economy and might lead to improved security.

50. Gendarmerie District Headquarters have been abolished except in Fars and Azarbaijan [illegible] the direct command of Gendarmerie Headquarters in Tehran. This will complicate the relations of the Governor-General with the gendarmerie in his province: he previously had the district commander with him at the provincial capital.

Police.

51. As Russian provocation of the proletariat through the Tudeh party and [illegible] increase so does the police force become less capable of maintaining order. Always corrupt, it is now reduced to [illegible] depths of venality and mediocrity. Many of its officers are in the pay of one or other of the money-making rackets or one or other of the political parties. No impartial action can then be expected in the treatment of any situation. For this state of affairs successive Governments are, of course, primarily to blame. Even if an energetic and capable

chief of police were to be found he would be frustrated by the pusillanimity and inefficiency of Ministers. Only a mission of foreign officers with adequate powers, which once granted can be exercised independently of changes in Government, and adequate funds at their disposal can be expected to turn the Persian police force into an instrument for the impartial suppression of disorder, and even they, as the experience of the American officers with the gendarmerie has shown, will have no easy task. The quality of the Persian police is of particular interest to His Majesty's Government since it is on that force that reliance must, in the first instance, be placed for the protection of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company labour against intimidation and subversive provocation.

Persian Air Force.

52. Under the personal stimulus of the Shah, there has been a good deal of talk about modernising and expanding the air force. The advice of the [illegible] and in great measure taken, but in view of the chronically meagre air force vote progress is not likely to be rapid.

53. Meanwhile, there is some superficial improvement in day to day work, but morale under Brigadier Khosrovani remains bad.

Civil Air Lines in Persia.

54. The Iranian State Airline, under the Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, now operates two return services a week to Bagdad via Kermanshah and one to Bushire via Isfahan and Shiraz. Passengers are not (officially) carried south of Isfahan pending the installation of wireless facilities on this section of the route.

55. The Persian commercial company talks a lot but has done nothing. No more has been heard of the rumoured Russo-Persian company. The Russian so-called official services between Tehran and Meshed are well filled with Persian commercial traffic as are those to Pahlevi and Tabriz, which, however, appear to be running less regularly than last summer.

56. The Americans claim to have applied to the Persian Government for rights to operate an official commercial service between Bagdad and Tehran to supplement and gradually replace the military services of the United States Air Transport Corps. The French military line continues [illegible] and has been detected in some dubious practices about visas. [illegible] Overseas Airways Corporation services a week to Bagdad. Lydda and Cairo are well filled with official load and private travellers can seldom be accommodated.

Finance.

57. The budget results for the Persian year 1323 (21st March, 1944–20th March, 1945) showed a surplus on the ordinary budget of 61 million rials and a deficit on the commercial budget of 543 million rials, making a net deficit of 462 million rials. The total deficit in 1322 was 1,052 million rials. These not unsatisfactory results were due mainly to the efforts of Dr. Millspaugh and his mission. The future prospects now that Dr. Millspaugh has gone are uncertain, especially as the first item on the financial programme of any Government will now be the revision of the income tax law.

58. The Persian Government, following the fall in the London price of gold announced on the 9th June, duly applied for the adjustment of their sterling balances under article 8 of the Financial Agreement. They were informed by His Majesty's Embassy that none of the other Governments with whom His Majesty's Government have similar payments agreements have asked for a similar adjustment, the change in price being the result of the reduction in insurance and transport costs to the United States, but that His Majesty's Government were prepared to adjust their balances if the Persian Government considered it was right to ask for this adjustment.

59. The scarcity of dollars led in June to the National Bank refusing to [illegible] United States. Following this action the Foreign Trade Control Division and the Middle East Supply Centre [illegible] for the proper utilisation of Persia's dollar resources. Hitherto, the Persian Government have taken no steps to gain possession of dollars in private hands [illegible] United States. The price of dollars on the free market rose to rials fifty (compared with the official rate of rials thirty-two).

Economic Situation

60. The Economic Organisation set up to take over the economic departments of the Government set up by Dr Millspaugh, functioned rather better than was at first expected, thanks mainly to the legacy of organisation and routine left by the Americans and to the continued presence of many members of the Millspaugh Mission. For all its shortcomings the Economic Organisation was able to maintain the essential economic services in operation at a time when Cabinet [illegible] the Economic Organisation not existed. The British cereals and transport teams also continued to function. The future of both the Americans and the British in the economic departments is, however, uncertain, and it is unlikely that they will remain much longer. Corruption and confusion in the issue of import licences increased considerably during the quarter, the tendency being for obscure firms to get licences at the expense of the established importers. The British, United States and Indian [illegible] to try and effect an improvement in this situation.

61. Markets showed no spectacular movements in spite of the end of the war in Europe. It was greeted on the whole without enthusiasm by the merchants, who have had a profitable year and see [illegible] were stimulated by the high premium on dollars. The sale of gold was discontinued by the National Bank on the 22nd May, but the market [illegible] and Syria continued until late in the quarter.

Disposal of Russian [illegible]

62. [illegible] installations [illegible] Government, who were invited [illegible] The chief of these assets [illegible] telephone line system. It seems [illegible] Jews [illegible] British [illegible]

Handing Back of the British-American Run Section of the Persian State Railway

63. The [illegible] Persia was [illegible] British and American [illegible] the 1st July [illegible] British [illegible] are pressing for this agreement [illegible] and to follow the Anglo-American [illegible] the line to Persian control before [illegible] of Alliance.

Cereals Situation.

64. By the end of June the total [illegible] in Persia amounted to 204,000 tons, of which 134,0[illegible] harvest will be a monster one [illegible] American enquiry of the Soviet Embassy [illegible] dog-in-the-manger reply [illegible] decide whether they will openly ask the assistance of the Americans and British to get rid of the anticipated surplus of some 100,000 tons of rather [illegible] wheat, or bow to the bullying of the Russians and risk a real glut [illegible] amongst the cultivators, who will not be able to dispose of their [illegible] harvest.

Locust Control

65. This quarter saw the conclusion of the campaign in South Persia, which had been operated by a Middle East anti-locust unit. Although infestation over many parts, notably Bandar Abbas, was large, control was effective and no damage to crops occurred. This speaks highly for the administration of the campaign since the difficulties *vis-à-vis* the Persian locust officers and labour were many. Usually, the Persian officers' reports of the area infested were greatly exaggerated, in order that they could obtain greater quantities of bait than would be necessary, and sell that which they could not use. Accounts and figures were purposely falsified, until checked by the British Locust Officer.

66. It is understood that no Middle East anti-locust unit will operate in Persia next year.

Economic Warfare

67. The quarter under review has been marked by the relaxation of controls. The Statutory List for Persia has been reduced to five names. The Black List for Persia has ceased to operate and the sole name on it has been deleted.

68. New regulations concerning trade with Switzerland have been introduced.

New American Ambassador

69. Mr Leland Morris left Tehran on the 19th May, and his successor Mr Wallace Murray, presented his letters to the Shah on the 5th June.

70. Mr Murray seems friendly, and if he still retains the suspicion of British imperialism, which he certainly used to possess, he shows no signs of it at present, though whether it has been dissipated by experience or merely outweighed by his greater suspicion of Russia can only be surmised. Mr Murray is certainly outspoken in his indignation at the methods which Russia is using in Eastern Europe and in Persia, and by [illegible] the Persian Government. He is, however, rather timorous of making even the slightest move without instructions from the State Department, and even in seeking instructions he seems rather to leave it to the State Department to decide instead of suggesting the course that the local situation seems to call for. However, he is [illegible] aim in life was not to make ten words grow where one grew before. I should regard him as a very good colleague.

Polish Refugees

71. During the period under review the evacuation of Polish refugees from Persia was almost at a standstill, since shipping to Persian Gulf Ports has been greatly reduced owing to the diminution of "Aid to Russia." Only seventy-eight Poles left Persia, travelling overland to Beirut. This left a total of 3,798 in Persia at the end of June.

72. Hitherto, the Poles had, on the whole, been reluctant to leave Persia for more distant destinations, since they hoped to return home soon. As, however, the prospects of a Soviet-controlled Poland appeared to them to increase, their fear of being deported by force to Poland increased also, and most of them longed to leave Persia for any destination. It was unfortunate, therefore, for them that shipping difficulties should have arisen at the same moment.

Indian Affairs

73. The previous enthusiasm shown by the Persians at the Indo-Iranian Cultural Society's weekly meetings began to flag because of the chaotic state of politics in Persia, which left prominent Persians with insufficient time to devote both to their political futures and to the society. However, by dint of hard work the Attaché for Indian Affairs succeeded in sending off four out of the five students selected for the Delhi Polytechnic courses in textile and ordinary engineering.

74. In May the society [illegible] guests at a lecture on India and Persia given by C. P. Skrine, Esq., His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed and illustrated by excellent coloured and monochrome cine-films.

75. The English classes given by Indian teachers at Meshed, Yezd and Kerman continued to have somewhat poor attendance. The teacher for Ahwaz arrived in the middle of the "hot weather" and found it difficult to settle down. In consultation with the British Council he (and in turn the teachers from Kerman and Yezd) will attend "refresher" courses at the Anglo-Persian Institute in

Tehran during July and August. A newly arrived second teacher at Meshed seems to have the gift of collecting pupils and of keeping them interested in his English lessons.

Indian Trade

76. Major M. Hassan, the first Indian Government Trade Commissioner to be appointed to Persia, arrived here on the 12th June. It will be some time before his office starts functioning properly as he has still to receive his staff and his office equipment from India.

77. The Government of India are planning to stage a commercial-cum-cultural exhibition regarding India and Indian manufactured goods in Tehran in the spring of 1946. It would also be shown in other important centres of the country.

British Propaganda Activities

78. [illegible] up its propaganda broadcasts from Radio Tehran. Public reaction has been negligible. A few polite letters of regret have been received. The continued use by the Russians of their "cultural" time on Tehran Radio to broadcast objectionable, or at least controversial, material is sufficient justification alone for our withdrawal before foreign broadcasts become so unpopular as to force the Persians to stop them altogether.

British Council

79. As the Public Relations Bureau of this embassy has been reducing its activities with the end of the war in Europe, the Council has had to reassure the Persian community that its work here will continue after the war. Persistent requests continue for the establishment of English teachers in country districts. In some cases local enterprise has led to the formation of groups of voluntary English teachers. Unfortunately the Council has not got the staff to assist.

80. French, Russian and American competition in cultural matters is on the increase.

81. Distinguished visitors during the quarter were Professor Davies, of London University, who inspected technical colleges in Persia and delivered lectures on British engineering, and Professor Boase, of Hertford College, Oxford (Middle East representative of the council), who delivered lectures on mediæval English illumination. Professor Zuchner, of Christ Church, Oxford, who is a member of this embassy's Public Relations Bureau, delivered a lecture on Oscar Wilde. The council's dramatic club produced the play "Granite" by Clemence Dane.

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(1)

Military [illegible] No. 24 [illegible] 24th June, 1945. Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 217 of 25th June (Received in Foreign Office, 4th July.)

Persian Affairs

Political

THE deadlock created by the refusal of the Deputies of the Opposition to attend the Majlis of the Cabinet was to be presented has not yet been solved. [illegible] the Government [illegible] majority [illegible] the issues of the Opposition. [illegible] Deputies who are [illegible] wide [illegible] with [illegible] Majlis.

2. [illegible] Deputies of the Opposition [illegible] the purpose of [illegible] paid to Government employees. Since the budget for the current year has not been passed, nor even presented to the Majlis, credits have been [illegible] or

credits of a fraction of last year's budget voted at intervals by the Majlis. A credit of one-twelfth was voted on the 17th June.

3. Hassan Ali Kamal Hidayet, Minister without portfolio, has been appointed Minister of Justice in place of Amanullah Ardalan who declined the appointment.

4. Queen Fauzieh has left Persia to visit her brother King Farouk of Egypt.

Economic

5. In an interview with the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, Bader, the Minister of Finance, promised an early revision of Dr. Millspaugh's unpopular income tax law, the minimum intervention by the Government in commerce and economic affairs, and the encouragement of the formation of private companies for enterprises of public benefit.

6. The Persian press announces that the Economic Council has decided to remove all restrictions on the operation of motor transport in Persia and to sell all lorries now controlled by the Road Transport Administration.

7. The Council of Ministers has decided to increase freight rates on the Persian railways by 100 per cent. from the 22nd June.

8. A serious accident occurred on the southern section of the railway on the 19th June in which, according to the Persian press, some forty persons were killed an another forty injured.

Appointments—Cont.

9.—(i) Sardar Akram Qaragozlo, Mansur Ali, to be acting Governor-General of Kermanshah.

(ii) Aizzullah Bihoia to be Assistant to the Persian Trade Commissioner in India.

(iii) Mahmud Arfa Munfarid to be First Secretary at the Persian Consulate-General in Herat.

(iv) Abdul Hussain Sardari to be First Secretary at the Persian Legation in Berne.

Persian Army

10. A list of the officers of the American Advisory Mission with the Persian army is attached as Appendix 1 to this Summary.

British Interests

11. The commander-in-chief in the Middle East and the general officer commanding-in-chief in Persia and Iraq visited Tehran during the week and held conferences with His Majesty's Ambassador.

12. British troops will cease to be responsible for the security of the railway from Andimeshk to Tehran on the 1st July.

Russian Interests

13. It was recently stated in certain Persian papers that the Russian Ambassador had expressed the opinion that the persons interned by the Allies were innocent of the charges made against them. The Soviet Embassy has now published a statement to the effect that no opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the internees had been expressed by any member of the Soviet Embassy staff but that the Persian Government had been informed that the Soviet authorities had no objection to the release of the remaining internees.

14. It seems that Russian officers may have been [illegible] commercial transactions on their own account for the Soviet Embassy has published in the Persian press a warning against entering into commercial transactions with any Russian officer unless he is in possession of a certificate of authority signed by the commander of the Soviet forces in Persia.

15. The newspaper *Zafar*, the official organ of the Tudeh Labour organisation [illegible] to Persia. [illegible] to the "Workers' Unions" of Russia, Great Britain, America and France to send missions to Persia to study the conditions of the working classes. Russia had accepted this invitation and was sending a mission under Borisov, a member of the executive committee of the Soviet Workers' Union.

16. An example of the type of propaganda that is being addressed to the Persian employees of the A.I.O.C. by the Russian-inspired Persian press is attached to this Summary as Appendix 2.

17. In Az[illegible] have moderated for the time being its attacks on Persian landlords, tribal chiefs and the partisans of Seyyid Zia and to be devoting more of its energy to championing the cause of the unemployed. In response to notices posted up by the Tudeh Workers' Union some 6,000 unemployed, it is claimed, have now registered at the office of the union. After a meeting of the unemployed a telegram, said to represent the views of 5,000 people, was sent to the Government urging a programme of public works to provide employment. It mentioned, in particular, the completing of the railway from Mianeh to Tabriz, the exploiting of oil and other minerals in Azarbaijan and the building of hospitals and other institutions. A tendency has been noticed in the Tudeh party in Tabriz to widen its appeal to include *bourgeois* elements, even merchants and landlords.

Tehran, 24th June, 1945.

Appendix 1

Staff of the American Military Mission to the Persian Army as on 12th June, 1945.

1. Major-General C. S. Ridley
2. Colonel F. G. Dumont, Transport Services
3. Colonel T. E. Mahoney, Q.M. Branch
4. Colonel T. L. Solgard, Accounts Branch.
5. Lieut.-Colonel J. A. Lee.
6. Lieut.-Colonel K. T. Brunswold
7. Major M. Wulwick, Medical Adviser
8. Major B. D. Swick
9. Major J. E. Calhoun
10. Major R. F. Conly, S.O. to General Ridley
11. Captain W. D. De Armond.
12. Captain R. R. Murray

The above are all on the staff in Tehran.

Advisers on Supply Matters to Divisional Commanders.

13. Lieut.-Colonel E. G. Tremaine, Isfahan
14. Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Foster, Tehran
15. Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Fields, Sanandaj
16. Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Barker, Shiraz
17. Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Hull, Ahwaz.
18. Major W. D. Hull, Kerman
19. Major E. R. Stanley, Zahedan.
20. Major E. M. Collins, Khurramabad

N.B.—Lieut.-Colonels Tremaine and Barker are both leaving shortly.

Appendix 2

Summary of article in newspaper "Zafar" of the 17th June, the official organ of the Tudeh labour organisation.

A[illegible] states that [illegible] thorities of the Oil [illegible] are then summarised.) This strike had cost the [illegible] the A.I.O.C. very dear, and they were seeking to avenge [illegible] decisions of the authorities of the company, 400 workers were thrown out of work. In this way the rights of Persian workers were sacrificed to the lust of a handful of capitalists. [illegible] hunger, misfortune and oppression by the employers. They had risen against foreign capitalists to demand the rights of [illegible]

to the world that the Persian workers could not be kept as slaves any longer, this strike was proof of the social and political maturity of the workers. Although the workers had suffered as a result of the cruel behaviour of their masters they [illegible] the A.I.O.C., they asked help from fellow workers and lovers of freedom. This help to unemployed workers who were subjected to the anger of foreign capitalists would deal a severe blow to the evil magnates and their agents. By [illegible] fellow workers, Persian workers and lovers of freedom would strang[illegible] national reaction. It was the duty of every courageous worker and lover of freedom to lighten the misfortunes and pressure on the unemployed workers of Kermanshah, and in their time of trouble to help them. The paper states that up to now it had received several thousand rials for the unemployed workers and expresses the hope that subscriptions would increase.

E 5004/70/341 (2)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 25 for the Period 25th June to 1st July, 1945. (Communicated to Tehran despatch No. 231 of 2nd July.—Received in Foreign Office 11th July.)

Persian Affairs

Political

1. The political deadlock continues, the minority opposition refusing to attend the Majlis and the majority refusing to consider the resignation of the Prime Minister. The minority, under the leadership of Dr. M[illegible] the majority of the Deputies. This Majlis had [illegible] first assembled, five urgent tasks: to form a Government that would command the confidence of the people, to ensure the prosecution and punishment of offences against the law, to revise the electoral law, to lower the cost of living and to alleviate poverty, to abrogate the special powers given to Dr. Millspaugh. Only the last of these had been accomplished. In selecting a Prime Minister the majority of the Deputies had no other consideration than to find one whom they could trust to use the influence and authority of the Government to secure their re-election. That was why they had selected Sadr and that was why Sadr was opposed.

Economic

3. The railway from Tehran to the Persian Gulf has now been handed back to the control of the Persian authorities. The sector between Ahwaz and Khorramshahr, which was constructed by the British army, has been put at the disposal of the Persian authorities, on condition that they maintain it, pending decision [illegible] the sector controlled by them from Tehran to the Caspian Sea. The [illegible]al deficit on the operation of the whole railway from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea has hitherto been met by His Majesty's Government. Limited [illegible] 10th September to cover deficits on the operation of the railway south of Tehran only. The Persian Government is being informed that His Majesty's Government accepts no further financial responsibility for the railway north of Tehran.

Internal Situation

Eastern Azerbaijan

4. It is reported from Ardebil that among the Shahsavans, who have always prided themselves on the [illegible] His Majesty's prestige has greatly

suffered from his apparent impotence to prevent the arrest and detention by the Russians of an important Shahsavan chief, Amir Arslan—see Summary No 22 45 paragraph 6

Kurdistan

5. The Persian General Staff has decided to send a column to Dizli, Avroman, Merivan and Rezab. The scope of the operation is not known. It is understood to be to collect unauthorised arms, to show the Persian flag, and to settle some local disputes. In Rezab a certain Hassan Khan has recently unlawfully seized certain villages. In Merivan the behaviour of Mahmud Kanisanani [illegible] 1944 does not seem to have been followed by any excessive oppression by the Persian troops. His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Kermanshah recently visited both [illegible] and that something has been done to reconstruct Baneh, destroyed by Hama Rashid

6. In Northern Kurdistan, from Mahabad to Khoi [illegible] a general deterioration of the situation as regards the attitude of the Kurds [illegible] the Persian Government. In Mahabad the British Public Relations cinema van recently met with a hostile reception from some Kurdish hooligans

Khuzistan

7. Some alarm was caused by the return to Khuzistan of a Bani Turuf sheikh, Yunas Asi, who last November, during the operations for the disarmament of the Arabs, refused to surrender his arms and took refuge with some of his followers in Iraq, where, it is believed he was ordered to live in Amareh. On his return he was joined by some other sheikhs and together they attacked some Arab villages near Bustan, burnt houses and carried off cattle. They were, however in their turn attacked by loyal sheikhs. Eighteen of the insurgents were captured and are to be tried by military court. Yunas Asi has disappeared. It is as well [illegible] to believe that the return of a rebel Arab chief from Iraq is somehow connected [illegible] the British, of forming an independent Arab province in Khuzistan as part of the Arab federation

Baluchistan

8. Sardar Idu Khan Reki, who is suspected of having been implicated in the murder of the electioneering agent of the opponent in the last elections of his son, has been deported from Khwash to Kerman.

Russian Affairs

9. Reports from Tehran, Meshed, Birjand, Hamadan, Kermanshah Sanandaj and other places in Southern Kurdistan speak of a general increase in Tudeh propaganda and activities. In the towns the Tudeh have been successful in infiltrating their influence into the police—a necessary preliminary to secure freedom for subversive and provocative activities.

10. In the anti-locust campaign on the Moghan steppe north of Ardebil the Russians are assisting the Persian authorities with eight experts, eight aircraft and forty-eight lorries.

11. It seems that the Arab Federation does not meet with the approval of the Russians, since it has been criticised with hostility in the Persian press [illegible] by the Russians. It is there represented as another design to preserve Britain's imperial interests and to prevent ideas of freedom spreading to the Middle East, as an extension and consolidation of the policy long followed by Britain to control all the States along the routes to India, a policy obviously dangerous to Persian independence. British intervention in Syria and her alleged desire to exclude Russia from the conference that is to discuss a settlement of the dispute between France and the Levant States are also represented as part of the same policy

12. The Russians are withdrawing all their security troops from the railway south of Tehran on the 1st July

Chinese Affairs.

13. Dr T V Soong has arrived in Tehran on his way to Moscow

Tehran, 1st July, 1945

[E 5301 70 34] (3)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No 26, Secret, for the period 2nd July [illegible] *Received 21st July*)

Persian Affairs.

Political

1. In spite of the Shah's appeal to the representatives of the majority and minority parties to [illegible] the minority continue to prevent the presentation of the Government to the Majlis by absenting themselves and so reducing the number present below the necessary quorum. [illegible] present in Tehran, and the majority is still a few short of this number. Some of the Deputies of the minority who vote according to Russian instructions from fear and not from conviction had agreed to leave Tehran so as to reduce the [illegible] of the dangers they would run in doing so

2. Public opinion has been greatly disturbed by a statement broadcast by Angara radio, [illegible] an important element in the solution of the Dardanelles problem was the annexation to Russia of Persian Azarbaijan, which had been demanded by a committee of the province. The whole Teheran press is loud in protest. It is said, with truth that there is no committee in Azarbaijan that could make such a demand, and perhaps with less truth, that there is no Azarbaijani who would. The Turks are reproached for giving publicity to such a mischievous statement. The Tudeh [illegible] although there may be justification for reconsideration of [illegible] to such considerations apply to Persia [illegible] for 120 years.

3. Seyyid Zia, [illegible] party, the Iradeh-i-Milli, made some very outspoken criticisms of Russian actions in Persia. He said that Russian [illegible] intimidated the people into voting for the candidates of Russian choice and [illegible] supported their opponents. He accused the Deputies who had been elected [illegible] the Tudeh press, having little to say in defence of Russian [illegible] with the usual violent attacks on Seyyid Zia and on the British. To discredit Seyyid Zia [illegible] interview with General Paget [illegible]

4. [illegible] U.S.S.R. [illegible] organisation to the Workers' [illegible] France (see Summary No. 24 25 paragraph 15). It [illegible] Kuznetsov, the former deputy [illegible] Soviet Workers' Union, also Akhundov, Ibrahimov, and Mme. Simonine Keva. They were met at the aerodrome by members of the Tudeh labour organisation, who garlanded them with flowers.

Economic

5. [illegible] Secretary of [illegible] statement [illegible] Persian [illegible] operation of the Allies particularly the Russians [illegible] railway [illegible] condition the [illegible] locomotives and [illegible] stock had been [illegible] disposal of the Persian authorities. He [illegible] the Allies [illegible] stock but the [illegible] quite [illegible] because [illegible] was [illegible] of the war [illegible] was not [illegible]

excess of Persia's needs. The Allies had developed the railway to a capacity of 11,000 tons a day, whereas Persian requirements were not likely to exceed 3,000 tons a day. Any material that was decided to be surplus to Allied war needs would be offered to the Persian Government at a reasonable price. Moreover the British military authorities were offering 815 lorries at cost price which would greatly improve the transport facilities of the country and, he hoped, help to reduce the cost of living. The Allies had hitherto financed the railway. The Persian administration was now faced with operating costs of 900 million rials against an estimated revenue of 350 million rials. They had therefore been obliged to raise freights by 100 per cent. Even if that brought in a revenue of 700 millions there would still be a deficit and this could be wiped out only by economies such as reduction of staff. The railway now employed 35,000, at least 13,000 would have to be discharged. He understood that the Russians were disposed to hand back the railways north of Tehran, they had already reduced the number of Soviet officials on the railway by 60 per cent. The Under Secretary has, of course, been attacked for admitting [illegible] treated the Persian railway administration [illegible]

6. It should have been noted in paragraph No. [illegible] Summary No. 27 [illegible] that the [illegible] not [illegible] the [illegible] Minister [illegible]

Appointments—Civil

7. Ali Muhammad Sadiq Shahbazi to be Farmandar of Mako.

Appointments—Military

8. (i) Sartip Muhammad Mazheri, Head of the 4th Bureau, General Staff, to be Assistant Head of the Advisory Department of the Ministry for War.
   (ii) Sarhang Ahmad Ibtisabian, Head of the 1st Bureau, General Staff, to be Head of the Military Secondary School, Tehran.
   (iii) Sarhang Hussain Sinsu, Head of the 2nd Bureau, General Staff, to be Director General of Stores in the Army Transport Department.
   (iv) Sarhang Gholam Reza Shahin Nuri, Head of the 3rd Bureau, General Staff, to be Assistant Commandant of the Officers' College.
   (v) Sarhang Hussain Manuchehri, attached to the Staff, to be Head of the 1st Bureau, General Staff, A.H.Q.
   (vi) Sarhang Doyum Hassan Akhavi, to be Head of the 2nd Bureau, General Staff, A.H.Q.
   (vii) Sarhang Mahmoud Amini, to be Head of the 3rd Bureau, General Staff, A.H.Q.
   (viii) Sarhang Ali Asgar Muzayyini, to be Head of the 4th Bureau, General Staff, A.H.Q.

Internal Security

Fars and Kuhigalu

9. Restlessness is again becoming evident in Kuhigalu. There was some minor scrapping in the latter half of June between the followers of Hussein Quli Rustami and those of Ali Qaid Qiveh, Boir Ahmadi. The Boir Ahmadi are also said to be mixed up in an attack made by Muhammad Ali Liravi on the properties of his rival, Fathullah Khan Hiat Daudi. These two were fighting with each other in June 1944, see Summary No. 23/44, paragraph 9, and a settlement of their quarrel had been made some months ago by the Governor-General of Fars. Abdullah Khan Zarghampur is accused of now assisting Muhammad Ali, but he says that it is his half-brother Khosrow, with whom only very recently [illegible] (see Summary No. 19/44, paragraph [illegible]) Persian forces have been ordered to take action to stop the fighting.

10. In spite of the pact made between Morteza Quli Khan, Governor of Bakhtiari, and Nasir Qashgai (see Summary No. 32/44, paragraph 8) the Darrehshuri Qashgai have again been raiding into Bakhtiari territory in the Gandaman district and levying tolls on goods passing through their territory.

South Kurdistan

11. A communique issued by the Persian General Staff says that 1,007 rifles have been collected from the inhabitants of the Sanandaj and Saqqiz areas. Some of these are rifles that had been issued to landowners and villagers for their own protection.

North Kurdistan

12. As a movement for Kurdish independence the J.K. Society appears to have been supplanted by the party known as Komala. According to Persian sources [illegible] Mergavar and Tergavar of whom Zero Beg Herki is the most active, and its activities extend from Mahabad to Maku. Zero Beg is a Russian protégé who would have [illegible] R[illegible] support. The Mamish, influenced by Qurani Agha, and the Deh Bukri, under the influence of Amir Assad, are not yet committed to open support of the movement. Whatever the truth may be, the Kurds believe that the movement has Russian approval, and there is much circumstantial evidence to confirm their belief. It is reported, and appears to be true, that attempts are no longer being made to persuade the Kurds to join the Tudeh party, which found little favour with them. Kurdish independence is a more effective slogan.

Russian Interests

13. An entirely reliable report states that on all roads leading southwards [illegible] are stationed within the protective radius of Russian military posts to stop and search all lorries leaving the area for the south. Any rice carried is thrown off [illegible] the local authorities when [illegible] were powerless to protest. The Tudeh said that the rice would be exported by the British and that this could not be allowed while Persians were starving. But the Tudeh did not object to rice being exported to Russia. Force was on the side of the Tudeh. Resistance was followed by a beating and the destruction of property. Persian officials gave [illegible]

14. Further information has now been received of the hostile demonstration against the I.R.B. [illegible] which was reported in Summary No. 25/45, paragraph 6. It was organised by the Komala party (see paragraph 13), members of which paraded near the van, beating drums and bearing aloft a large portrait of Stalin. The electric leads of the apparatus were twice cut. It is by no means certain that this outburst was approved by the Russians. It may have originated in a spontaneous desire of the members of the Komala party to demonstrate their preference for Russia over Great Britain. There had been no previous indication of anti-British feeling in Mahabad.

15. The total deliveries against the contract made by the Soviet authorities with the Persian munition factories (see paragraph No. 11 of Summary No. 45 of 1942) up to the date when the contract was closed were—

41,500 rifles,
9,623,000 rounds of small arm ammunition,
10,279 machine pistols.

The figures stated in the contract were—

60,000 rifles,
42,000,000 rounds of S.A.A.,
30,000 machine pistols.

Deliveries began in April 1943 and ended in January 1945.

Tehran, 8th July, 1945.

E 5444/70/34] (4)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 27 for the Period 9th July to 15th July, 1945. (Enclosure in Tehran Despatch No. 248 of 16th July. Received in Foreign Office, 25th July.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE political deadlock continues, the minority insisting that Mahsun Sadr must resign, the majority refusing to be intimidated by the minority. The majority have now sufficient Deputies to form a quorum but insufficient in the

absence of the minority, for a question to be put to the vote. For this it is necessary that three-quarters of the number of Deputies [illegible] should be present in the [illegible]

2. Seyyid Zia's speech to his followers, mentioned in Summary No. [illegible] paragraph 3 [illegible] Himself, the Prime Minister and his Government, friends of the British and every element in Persia that does not truckle to the Tudeh party are attacked with much venom. The reactionaries, it says, have greatly intensified their activities to suppress the movement for freedom and are organising terrorist groups, arming the tribes and forming tribal unions with a view to attacking not only the Tudeh party but also Russian interests. The publication of such an article in an official organ of the Soviet Government is obviously meant to leave on Persian minds [illegible] Iran, its continue to oppose Russian designs. The Russians began to broadcast the [illegible] for the Iran-Soviet Cultural Society for cultural talks, but to bear themselves [illegible] from their own broadcasting [illegible] who used it down [illegible] towards the [illegible] Russians [illegible] was not in favour [illegible] all well to [illegible] only the Russian version [illegible] the world [illegible] Persian censorship stop every press message that reports the true facts.

3. The broadcast from Angora stating that the annexation of Persian Azarbaijan to Russia [illegible] by a provincial committee in Azarbaijan (see Summary No. 26/45, paragraph 2) has forced even the Tudeh papers to deny [illegible] Russian part [illegible]

4. The Medical Congress (see Summary No. 23/45, paragraph 4) after a week of [illegible] the Russians to provide the latter with an international audience for their propaganda.

Economic

5. The Executive Committee of the Government Economic Council has asked for a credit of 10 million tomans to pay for the 815 motor vehicles, surplus to Allied military requirements, which have been offered to the Persian Government by the American authorities.

Persian Forces.

Army.

6. The Ministry for War has decided to construct houses in the vicinity of barracks for the accommodation of officers. Five million rials are to be borrowed from the army fund for this purpose.

7. A number of conscript officers have been released from the army before the end of their full period of compulsory service [illegible] to defray army expenditure.

Gendarmerie.

8. Headquarters of districts have now been abolished in the gendarmerie except in Fars and Azarbaijan, and regiments will in future be under the direct command of central gendarmerie headquarters in Tehran. This is likely to handicap co-operation between the civil and military authorities in the provinces on the one hand and the [illegible] Previously the district commander, whose [illegible] was located at the provincial capital [illegible] headquarters. There is [illegible] between the army and the gendarmerie.

9. Colonel Schwarzkopf, American adviser to the gendarmerie, who has been for the past 2½ months in America, has retired to Tehran. He informed the Persian press that the purpose of his journey was to obtain supplies for the Persian gendarmerie and that he had been successful.

Internal Security

Fars and Kuhigalu.

10. Later reports indicate that Muhammad Ali Liravi's outburst against Fathullah Hoidandi's properties near Liravi (see Summary No. 26/45, paragraph [illegible] the intervention of troops [illegible] Ardabagh there have been [illegible] of settlement by negotiation. Nasir Qashgai, fortified by the encouragement of Qavam-ul-Mulk, has arrived in Tehran to make, it is hoped, his peace with the Shah and the general staff.

Southern Kurdistan.

11. It is reported that the column of Persian troops operating in southern Kurdistan to which reference was made in Summary No. 25/45, paragraph 6, met with some opposition before it succeeded in entering Rezah and that both sides suffered casualties.

Hamadan.

12. Tudeh demonstrations in Hamadan during the first fortnight in July [illegible] both sides and the arrest of Tudeh leaders.

Russian Affairs.

13. Reports, not yet fully confirmed, say that the control of affairs in Gilan and Mazanderan is passing into the hands of Tudeh committees or Soviets. In Azarbaijan the process of substituting Russian control, whether exercised [illegible] steadily. Some [illegible] of Maragha [illegible] Tudeh toughs. Two Shahsevan chiefs (see Summary No. 25/45, paragraph 4) are also detained in Tabriz by the Russians and the Persian subjects accused of assault on some Russian civilians are still in Russian custody. The Iran-Soviet Cultural Society has now monopolised the whole of the municipal garden in Tabriz. The Persian forces are immobilised in their barracks. The Kurds of western Azarbaijan snap their fingers at the Persian authorities. The red flag, hoisted by the Kurds at Mahabad on VE-day, flew for three weeks.

14. Two extracts from the Persian press, which may safely be assumed to have been dictated by the Russians, are attached to this summary. The first discusses the Russian attitude to Turkey. The second [illegible] British policy in the Middle or rather Near East. The Russian inspired Persian press has been publishing increasingly violent anti-British articles. Great Britain is accused of opposing all movements of freedom and progress, and of deliberately weakening small Powers so that British imperialism may be dominant.

15. The [illegible] made an extended tour of east Persia, visiting Taban, Yazd, Kerman, Zahedan, Mirjawa, Zabol and Birjand. Photographs were taken of the airfields constructed by the British, which are of much interest to the Russians.

16. Reports continue to be received of an increase of Russian troops on the Perso-Turkish border and of the construction of defences, but they have not yet been confirmed by any reliable source. Manœuvres of Russian troops did take place along the frontier in June, but no reliable information is available as to the number of troops that took part. The suspicion is frequently voiced that the desire to bring pressure on Turkey is an added reason for the retention of Russian troops in Azarbaijan.

(*Tehran, 15th July, 1945*)

Appendix A.

Summary of Articles in Newspaper Mardum *of 6th July, 1945.*

A LEADER discusses the Soviet note to Turkey and the false news item broadcast by Angora Radio concerning Azarbaijan, and states that some people had been surprised at the suddenness of the Soviet note, but if the course of events was followed and various items of news were fitted together, one would find that the Soviet measure had not been sudden, but merely one in a series of notes and

discussions concerning the probable revision of the Turko-Soviet Treaty. After [illegible] acceptance of the terms. Not only the Soviet Union, but [illegible] independent and free nation had the right to specify the terms on which negotiations with her [illegible] terms, the writer states that Kars and Ardahan had been ceded to Turkey at a time when the newly formed Soviet Government was suffering from the [illegible] of war, and she did not wish to have any differences with the new Turkey whose friendship she desired. She had even [illegible] experience had shown that [illegible] with the Soviet Union [illegible] press showed [illegible] her attitude [illegible] pt on the life of Von Papen left [illegible] the Soviet Union. The Soviet [illegible] divisions of the Red army idle [illegible] used them elsewhere. Russian [illegible] rent from that of Turkey [illegible] ed her share to the victory [illegible] Persia should be sincere in her [illegible] was in favour of preserving friendly relations [illegible] ing perfect democracy in her country. One of [illegible] S.S.S.R. for opening negotiations with Turkey was [illegible] democratic régime. It was natural on the part [illegible]

Appendix B

Summary of Extract from Persian Newspaper Rahbar *of 12th July, 1945*

A LEADER states [illegible] 1939 [illegible] policy [illegible] in the Great war years [illegible] policy was based upon [illegible] nations of the League of Nations. It was [illegible] the [illegible] and expelling America from Europe. It [illegible] the treaty of Munich [illegible] the Great war [illegible] was [illegible] Britain was [illegible] Russia [illegible] Britain [illegible] that area, with which [illegible] were [illegible] against the evolution of world [illegible] from the Middle East. Russia [illegible] vital interests in the Middle East. Britain tried to come to terms with [illegible] Russia [illegible] from the Middle East [illegible] and other [illegible] for the [illegible] in that country, [illegible] meetings between British and Turkish statesmen, &c., were aimed at excluding Russia and France from the Middle East. Believing that she dominated the Middle East, Britain interfered in Syria and created a crisis in her relations with France, the repercussions of

which were felt in the West. In the same way that the uselessness of the idea of a "separate peace" or "regional wars" was proved, a world balance could not be partial or local. The great evolutions and progressive movements created in Europe could not be confined to that continent, and while the collapse of German fascism had brought about a new balance of Europe, the effects of this change were manifest in the Middle East, where the situation was bound to follow the general trend of the world. The principles of this new balance would be: (1) the destruction of the domination of any Great Power and of a one-sided policy so that all interested countries might enjoy an equal status in sharing in the solution of general affairs, (2) dictatorial and Fascist régimes, and the influence of imperialism which prevailed in most Middle East countries, would be exterminated.

E 5675/70/34 (5)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 28 for the Period 16th July to 22nd July 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 259 of 22nd July. Received in Foreign Office, 30th July.)

Persian Affairs

Political

MUHSIN SADR presented the following Cabinet to the Majlis on the 17th July:—

Finance: Mahmud Bader
Justice: Hassan Ali Kamal Hedayat
Commerce and Industry: Abbas Quli Gulshayan
Without Portfolio: Mustafa Adl
War: Ibrahim Zand
Health: Dr. Said Malik
Agriculture: Dr. Nakhai
Communications: Nadir Arastel
Foreign Affairs: Anushirwan Sipahbodi
Education: Ghulam Hussein Rahnema

A Minister of Posts and Telegraphs will be appointed later and the Prime Minister will take charge of the Ministry of the Interior. The Government's 11 point programme was then read as follows:—

(i) To safeguard and strengthen the bonds of friendship existing between Persia and the Allies and other friendly Governments has always been one of the principal aims of the Persian Government. My Government also recognises it as a primary duty to apply all its efforts and energies to strengthening and confirming that friendship. To achieve this goal my Government will base its policy on sincerity and justice, and its policy towards each one of our great Allies will be based on the complete political and economic independence of Persia, and mutual respect, conforming to the Tripartite Pact, the Atlantic Charter and the Tehran Declaration.

(ii) Study of economic problems with a view to taking steps and creating organisations which will meet the needs and interests of the country [illegible]

(iii) Revision of the Income Tax Law and other revenues and the balancing [illegible]

(iv) Establishment of security throughout the country by [illegible] and the [illegible]

(v) Development work [illegible] public works such as [illegible] the high roads and irrigation [illegible]

(vi) Improve the [illegible] workers in accordance with [illegible]

(vii) Improve the lot of Government employees and revision of the Civil Service Law.

(viii) [illegible] Ministry of Health after approval by the Majlis [illegible] long term plans to improve health organisations throughout the country.

(ix) Study and revision of teaching programmes, accelerate the application of the Compulsory Education Law, and steps to be taken to establish [illegible]

(x) Revision of the Electoral Law

(xi) Preparation of long-term plans to develop agriculture and industry [illegible] Majlis.

2. The debate on the programme began in the Majlis session o[illegible] the 19th [illegible] employed and about to become unemployed as the result of discha[illegible] 22nd June)

3. The Persian Government has now recognised the new Polish National Government in Warsaw

4. The Minister of Finance has tabled a further two-twelfths Budget Bill

Appointments—Civil

5.—(i) Amir Ahmad Mihbud of the Ministry for F[illegible] Affairs [illegible] second [illegible] at W[illegible]

(ii) Ahmad Zahir to be first secretary at Berne

(iii) Abdul Hussein Samii to be attached to the Persian Legation, London

(iv) Dr. Ali Amini (F.O. 15 M.A. 19) to be Director of the Economic Organisation now placed directly under the Ministry of Finance

Persian Forces.

Gendarmerie.

6. With reference to paragraph 9 of last Inte[illegible] Schwarzkopf has [illegible] for the supply from America [illegible] further 600 [illegible] W[illegible] for the work of [illegible] W[illegible] one for administrative [illegible] and two officer requirements

American Military Mission.

7. See Appendix I to Intelligence Summary N[illegible] 24 dated the 24th June. The revised [illegible] given in Appendix I [illegible] this summary

British Military Interests

8. At the suggestion of the Chief Signal Officer, South Iraq and Persia [illegible] the Persian Ministry [illegible]

9. Since the cessation of aid to Russia *i.e.*, from the 4th May to the 10th July the British military authorities have discharged the following labour

Area	Skilled	Unskilled.	Total
Tehran	[illegible]	1,413	1,413
Bandar-e	65	610	[illegible]
Shahpur-ad	10	377	387
Qazvin	7	335	342
Persian	1,669	2,070	[illegible]
Isfahan	[illegible]	726	726
Khorramshahr	69	487	556
Total	1,810	5,718	7,528

From August 1944 to July 1945 the following discharges by British military American military, U.K.C.C., and others had previously been reported —

British naval and military	[illegible]
United States army	27,[illegible]
U.K.C.	[illegible]
Miscellaneous (Skodas, &c.)	20
Total	[illegible]

Internal Security

Fars and Kuhigalu

10. Nasir Qashgai has had an audience of His Imperial Majesty the Shah He has also seen His Majesty's Ambassador He does not intend to stay in Tehran longer than is necessary for him to arrange for the education abroad of his son Abdullah. A fairly reliable report states that at his audience with His Imperial Majesty the Shah Nasir Khan spoke bluntly on the general insecurity and indiscipline in the country and warned the Shah that continued lack of a firm Government could only result in the disintegration of Persia in the very near future. Only a Persian could fail to see anything inconsistent in Nasir's adoption of the rôle of mentor and in his conveniently forgetting his own past share in weakening Persia by harbouring her enemies and maintaining in Fars an armed rebellion against the central authority

In the dispute between Muhammad Ali Liravi and Fathullah Hatefandi [illegible] further intervention by the small military force sent to Liravi has as yet been found unnecessary

Southern Kurdistan

11. No further news has been received about the activities of the Persian army column which entered Rezab (see paragraph 11 of last intelligence summary). Its tasks, as enumerated by the Chief of the General Staff, seem ill-defined. It is to show the flag in those more remote parts of Southern Kurdistan which lie between the Sennandaj Merivan and Kermanshah Nandshah roads, to destroy any armed force of Kurds which may oppose it and to cut off those tribes living round Merivan from support by the Avroman tribes to the south. No arrangements for its maintenance in this inaccessible area will have been made by a non-existent supply department and after a few weeks' sojourn there during which time it will have commandeered and exhausted the supplies of the country-side it will return to its base at Sennandaj

12. The J.A.F. nomads are reliably reported to have signed an agreement with the Iraq authorities not to cross the frontier into Persia this summer. They failed to induce the Persian frontier commissioner to modify his conditions for their entry—conditions which they regarded as too onerous

British Interests.

13. His Majesty's Government are reminded from time to time that the Persian Government has not given up its claim to Bahrein. The claim is rather shadowy as it is based on a [illegible] of sovereignty of 570 years in the last seventeen centuries of which 350 years belong to the pre-Muhammadan era. In more recent times Persia cannot be said to have exercised effective rule for more than 167 years in the aggregate and it is now over 160 years since she last held the islands. The Persian claim was restated recently in the Russian-[illegible] red paper *Rakhat*. Still more recently a party of Bahreini pilgrims bound for Mecca were stopped in Bahrein [illegible] on the grounds that being Persian subjects, their British passports were invalid. The party has now returned to Bahrein and their passports, which had been impounded by the Persian authorities, have been recovered.

Chinese Interests

14. Dr. Soong, on his return from Moscow, arrived in Tehran on the 14th July and left for Chungking on the 15th

Brazilian Interests

15. His Excellency the Brazilian Minister left Tehran on transfer on the 13th July. No successor has arrived as yet.

Tehran, 22nd July, 1945

Appendix I

Staff of the American Military Mission to the Persian Army as on 22nd July 1945

1. Major-General C. S. Ridley, Head of Mission.
2. Colonel F. G. Dumont: Second in command and Head of Transport.
3. Colonel T. E. Mahoney: Supply.
4. Colonel T. L. Solgard: Accounts.
5. Lieut.-Colonel J. A. Lee.
6. Lieut.-Colonel K. T. Brunswold.
7. Lieut.-Colonel M. Wulwick: Medical Adviser.
8. Major R. D. Swick.
9. Major R. F. Cooly, P.A. to General Ridley.
10. Captain W. D. Dearmond.
11. Captain R. R. Murray: Communications.
12. Lieut. R. Houston (and 2 Sergeants for transport duties).

District Inspectors.

13. Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Foster, Tehran.
14. Lieut.-Colonel W. R. Fields, Sanandaj.
15. Major W. D. Hull: Kerman.
16. Major E. R. Stanley: Zahidan.
17. Major E. M. Collins: Khurramabad.
18. Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Hall: Ahwaz.

J.E 5924/70/34]

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 29 for the Period 23rd July to 29th July 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 265 of 30th July. Received in Foreign Office 14th August.)

Persian Affairs

Political.

1. The Majlis stalemate continues. A recent debate was enlivened by exchanges between the windy and woolly Dr. Musaddiq and Ali Dashti. The doctor maintained that free elections could not be held as long as foreign troops were on Persian soil. He was equally averse to postponing the elections until the evacuation of Persia by foreign troops had been completed, because that was an act contrary to the laws of the constitution. He maintained his point of view that the present Government was not representative of and did not enjoy the support of the people. In the meantime Government business is at a standstill. The voting of a proportion of two-twelfths of the annual budget, subsequently amended to one-twelfth, to meet the cost of Government salaries was, however, proceeded with and passed h[illegible] by [illegible] to [illegible] Ali Dashti.

2. The Persian delegation to the San Francisco Conference has returned.

Internal Security.

Southern Kurdistan.

3. According to the latest information available to the General Staff, the Persian army [illegible] from [illegible] a distance of some [illegible] miles. The Kurdish tribesmen are now [illegible] groups, one [illegible] 15 miles south-west of [illegible] the other just short of the Perso-Iraqi frontier. As the result of the recent outbreak of skirmishes at Merivan and [illegible] retirement of the insurgents to positions further west, the Chief of the General Staff regards the first phase of the operations as [illegible] completed and [illegible] the successful outcome of the second phase, *i.e.*, disarmament. When asked what tactics he intended to adopt if the Kurds refused to stand their ground and let themselves be disarmed, he glibly assumed that the Iraqi army would take up positions along the frontier so as to bar Kurdish ingress into Iraq. Sarlashgar Amanullah Jehanbani has left on a special mission to Kurdistan, from which he is due to return in a fortnight with a report on the advisability of the operations, their possible scope and their conduct.

Fars.

4. Some raiding by Darreshuri tribesmen in Gonduman Buraijan and by the K[illegible] the Deputy Staff [illegible] Kalantar of Kazerun, in the face of a threat of punitive action by the Kazerun garrison, has made his submission and handed in the Government rifles which he acquired by burning and looting a gendarmerie post some months ago.

Khuzistan.

5. With reference to Intelligence Summary No. 25, paragraph 7, eighteen rebel sheikhs [illegible] the Governor-General, a Majlis Deputy and others who feel that they had much provocation for their acts in the land settlement which General Humayuni sought to impose on them, probably not without profit to himself.

Khorasan.

6. The [illegible] meeting of Seyyid Zia's Iradeh-i Milli party was staged to take place in Meshed on [illegible] of the working committee of the party, including the brother of Seyyid Zia. [illegible] were confiscated. They are at present believed to be in custody at the Soviet Military Headquarters.

Azarbaijan.

7. Hatim, one of the Shahsevan chiefs, is reported to have been released by the Russians, though Amir Aslan is still in their custody.

8. According to [illegible] Armenians and Assyrians, attempted to emigrate into the U.S.S.R. They did not receive permits and after some days of hardship at Julfa returned to their [illegible].

British Interests.

9. Major-General W. A. K. Fraser, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.V.O., M.C., left Tehran on the 26th July for the United Kingdom on [illegible] the appointment of British Military Attaché.

Russian Interests.

10. Of recent weeks the Russians increasingly persuade strange [illegible] from Persia [illegible] to produce [illegible] Government, especially [illegible] power. [illegible] have [illegible] their [illegible] Russian [illegible] allow [illegible] Union. [illegible] of the Iran party [illegible] to Asia and to [illegible] stated that [illegible] Russian [illegible] allow [illegible] Union. [illegible] of the Iran party [illegible] of Persian Government [illegible] Tehran [illegible] the Persian Government [illegible] Russian [illegible] suspects. Some [illegible] party was removed and [illegible] suspects were [illegible] arrested.

by the Persian authorities as the result of pressure brought to bear by the Russians on the Persian Government in Tehran.

11. The Russian trade union delegation has completed a tour of the Caspian provinces and is shortly to leave for Tabriz. The Russian press and the Russian-controlled Persian press has devoted much space to the wonderful reception given to them, and the spontaneous welcome shown by the 250,000 Tudeh members in Persia. A conservative estimate of the total industrial p[illegible] Tudeh party, though many are daily being forced into joining by exclusion, unless possessed of a Tudeh membership card, from the utilisation of public transport facilities and even the weekly visit to the public bath.

French Interests.

12. According to a press message from the Agence Pars, the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs has decided to raise the status of its legation in [illegible]

Polish Interests.

13. The number of civilian Polish refugees still remaining in Persia on the 15th July was :-

		Men, women and children
In Tehran	...	2,459
In Isfahan	...	216
In Ahwaz	...	1,108
Total	...	3,783

14. As the result of the recognition of the new Polish National Government by the Persian Government, Lieut.-Colonel B. T. Rudnicki, Polish Military Attaché has been relieved of his appointment. He will stay on in Tehran in a [illegible]

Correction.—Military Attache's Intelligence Summary No. 27, dated the 15th July 1945. Paragraph [illegible]

Tehran, 29th July, 1945.

E 6081/70/34] (7)

Military Attache's Intelligence Summary No. 30. Secret, for the period 30th July [illegible] 6th August. Received in Foreign Office, 21st August.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE situation in the Majlis has remained virtually unchanged. The minority continue their tactics of obstruction and the majority refuse to withdraw their support of Sadr. The minority issued a manifesto, signed by Dr. Musaddiq, Hikmat, Farivar, Tehranchi, Iskandiari, Raji and Afkhami, which explained their reasons for opposing Sadr. Some press representatives were invited to attend a special meeting at the Majlis, where Ali Dashti replied for the majority to the manifesto. An attempt by some of the more moderate Deputies of both sides to come to an understanding was foiled by Dr. Musaddiq, who refused to have anything to do with the written agreement produced by them. The minority are now reported to be seeking another interview with His Imperial Majesty the Shah at which they intend to reiterate their objections to Sadr and to inform the Shah that, as long as he remains, they will neither participate in Majlis business nor accept responsibility for the government of the country.

2. The newspapers *Nida-yi Millat*, *Nida-yi Adalat*, *Kishvar* and *Arzu* have been suppressed at the request of the Russians.

3. The newspaper *Rakhar*, the leading Russian-controlled paper, has published a [illegible] Russian [illegible] have officially announced that they have no objection to the release of the remaining internees

and that their further retention must be considered as being at the insistence of the British authorities.

4. A large Tudeh meeting was held on the 5th August. Over 5,000 people are said to have attended. They moved in procession through the town to the Majlis square. Their behaviour throughout was orderly.

5. On the 2nd August, after a delay of several days in order that the Russian and American Embassies might receive their instructions (they have not as yet been received), the Persian Government was informed by His Majesty's Embassy of the recent decision of the Potsdam Conference to evacuate Allied troops from Tehran at once. Gratitude on the part of the Persian Government for British efforts at achieving this decision was hardly to be expected, but, even so, the Persian reaction was disappointing. They were suspicious of Russian intentions because the Russian Embassy had as yet made no communication on this subject; they had hoped that the whole of Persia would be evacuated within [illegible] months and, [illegible] apprehensive of a sharp decline in security now that the evacuation, for which they had clamoured so loudly, was actually about to begin.

Appointments—Resignations.

6. (i) Hussein Ala, Minister of Court (F.O. 7, M.A. 11), to be ambassador in Washington.

(ii) [illegible] recently returned from San Francisco, [illegible] for London as the Persian Government representative on the Executive Committee of the Reparatory Commission. He will have the special rank of ambassador.

(iii) Abul Hassan Behbehan to be Persian Consul-General in Palestine.

(iv) Dr. Murteza Azmudeh has resigned from his post of Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Agriculture.

(v) Abbas Quli Ardelan to be head of the Transport Department of the Ministry of Finance.

(vi) Mahmud Salahi to be Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

(vii) Hassanpur to be Director-General in the Ministry of Roads and Communications.

(viii) Sipehrnia to be Governor of Bandar Abbas.

(ix) Ahmad Faridunl to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Interior.

(x) Abul Hassan Sipehr to be Governor of Ham.

Internal Security.

Khorasan.

7. The members of the Tudeh Milli party arrested by the Russians (see last Internal Security paragraph) have now been released in Meshed with the exception of Seyyed Hashim [illegible] and Zia ud-din) and six others, who were taken to Sh[illegible] there will orders of banishment from Khorasan. The arrests have aroused deep resentment in Meshed against the Russians and the Tudeh party, though the populace is too scared to give vent to their indignation. The Governor-General, Ali Mansur, though he has been [illegible] the Iradeh i Milli party from the beginning for fear of [illegible] which would serve as an excuse for Russian intervention [illegible] the Russians' latest move. Acting upon [illegible] military authorities took [illegible] Turaj Amin, the chief of police.

[illegible]

8. The Governor of Maku, Lutf Ali, is reported to have been suspended from his functions at the request of the Russians [illegible] the officer concerning [illegible] parts were released at the request of the Tudeh party. [illegible] General Zanganeh has been reappointed Acting Governor-General of the Ali [illegible] (Western Azerbaijan). Confirmation of the report of the attempted [illegible] emigration to Russia has been received [illegible] It was a piece of Russian propaganda designed to show the [illegible] the oppressed population of Persia to emigrate to the promised land of the U.S.S.R. [illegible] must be offset by the criticism of Russian methods expressed by the would-be emigrants who, after being kept waiting at the frontier for

several days, were refused entry visas and sent home in a penniless and half-starved state. Agrarian reform has become an additional plank in the Tudeh platform which [illegible] the [illegible] Maragheh and Sarab have been two important centres of agitation.

Khuzistan.

9. The military court convened for the trial of the rebel sheikhs (see last Intelligence Summary, paragraph [illegible]) [illegible] of imprisonment on some others and has ordered the release of thirteen. The death sentences will require confirmation, and the Chief of the General Staff has ordered that no further action be taken pending the arrival of an inspector. The Governor-General has also requested a fresh trial as it is believed in some quarters that General Humayuni, General Officer Commanding Khuzistan Division, may have unduly influenced the court in its findings and sentence.

Mekran.

10. A lorry was recently held up by bandits (believed to be Afghans) at a point 18 miles north of Zahidan on the Zahidan-Meshed road.

French Interests.

11. Lieut.-Colonel M. Jouvel has relinquished the appointment of [illegible] and has been succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel P. Chavonin of the French colonial army.

Russian Interests.

12. Another instance of unwarranted interference by the Russians in the internal affairs of Persia comes from the gendarmerie. Twenty-five officers, who had recently completed a refresher course at Gendarmerie Headquarters Training School, were sent out to gain practical experience as post commanders on the Tehran-Meshed road. The entire party was stopped at Semnan by the Russians and sent back to Tehran.

Tehran, 5th August, 1945.

(E 6236/70/34) (8)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 31, Secret, for the period 6th to 12th August, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 286 of 13th August; Received in Foreign Office 25th August.)

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE Majlis deadlock continues. The President and some of the Deputies were invited to tea by His Imperial Majesty the Shah on the 7th August. [illegible] more than discuss generalities, with emphasis on Persia's great need for increased irrigation. A public session of the Majlis was to have been held on the 9th August, but the minority adopted their usual tactics of preventing it by their absence. There seems to be a growing conviction [illegible] to resign. The Shah is believed to favour this and to prefer his own previous choice of Hakimi. That the Shah should advise the minority to cease their opposition on condition that Sadr resigned was, however, ruled out by some of the [illegible] interference by the Sovereign and also for future obstructionist tactics by any minority which desired the removal of a Prime Minister.

2. The Soviet Ambassador has now received his instructions (see paragraph 3 of last Intelligence Summary), and on the 9th August informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the decision to evacuate Tehran forthwith.

3. The recent visit of the Soviet trade union delegation and the question of the representation of the Tudeh at the forthcoming Paris conference has stirred up rival unions to apply for membership, such are the Workers' and Peasants' Union of Yusuf Iftekhari and the anti-Tudeh Union in Isfahan.

Appointments—civil.

4.—(i) Asadullah Masud Ansari, Persian Consul at Suleimaniyeh, to be consul at Mosul and Erbil, *vice* Muhammad Hajib Davallu, appointed counsellor at Stockholm.

(ii) Mahmud Isfandiari to be 2nd secretary at the Persian Legation at [illegible].

(iii) Ali Reza Bahrami to be 3rd secretary at Stockholm.

(iv) Daulatshahi to be consul, with the local rank of 1st secretary, at Delhi.

(v) Abul Qasim Nawai to be Persian Vice-Consul at Karachi.

Communications.

5. According to a press report, the Ministry of Roads and Communications has decided to complete the construction of the Mianeh-Tabriz and Shahrud-Meshed sections of railway. The completion of these sections was part of the original project and it is known that the Persian Government is anxious to provide work for those thrown out of employment as the result of the cessation of Allied war effort in Persia, but, even so, the above announcement must be regarded as premature as the Government has not got the money to spend on railway construction on a scale which will complete this work in the near future.

Internal Security.

Fars.

6. (See Intelligence Summary No. 28, paragraph 10.) The latest news of [illegible] Fathullah Hirat Daudi and Muhammad Ali Lirawi factions. The Chief of the General Staff has been informed by the British military authorities that, in view of Fathullah Khan's long-standing friendship with the British, his success in maintaining order in his area with the help of the 200 Persian Government rifles [illegible] it might be an act of doubtful wisdom to disarm him at the present time.

Khuzistan.

7. The following note on the land settlement in Dasht-i Mishan has been taken from His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General's Diary No. 13:—

> "The Tehran commission charged with the examination of the whole question of the Dasht-i Mishan lands and with making recommendation [illegible] the Ministries of the Interior, Justice, War, and Finance, the last being Mr. Solomon, and the Majlis Deputy Hussein Farhudi, who has been showing [illegible] of Mr. [illegible] basis, the heads of families being named collectively in the title-deeds. This would greatly shorten the task of registration and enable the villagers themselves to sub-divide the land annually in accordance with the exigencies of the moment; the land, in fact, would be held in undivided shares known by the term "musha." Certain taxes which used to be collected by the sheikh are to be abolished, the only tax remaining being the smaller one payable to the "[illegible]." The [illegible] shares of land, but will have no privileges. It remains to be seen whether this arrangement will work; the peasants ought to welcome it, but, of course, the sheikhs will not; and it will need strong and impartial handling with frequent inspections."

Khorasan.

8. As a result of the arrest by the Russians of prominent members of Seyyid Zia's Iradeh-i Milli party (referred to in paragraph 7 of last Intelligence Summary) a reliable report states that Russian-Tudeh liaison is even more in evidence. The Persians, under Russian pressure, are prosecuting non-Tudeh Government employees and forcing them to subscribe to a Russian newspaper.

9. A mass emigration movement, suspiciously akin to that reported from Azerbaijan [illegible] 12,000 applications from Turki and Turcoman motor drivers and others to acquire Soviet nationality and migrate to the U.S.S.R.

10. A party of Indian pilgrims bound for Meshed was held up and robbed by armed bandits about 40 miles south of the town.

Kurdistan

11. The Chief of the General Staff had no news of interest about these operations and is probably waiting for the return of Sarlash Jehanbani with his report. He mentioned that Jehanbani had telegraphed to advise the despatch of yet another infantry battalion. The Chief of the General Staff intends to send as reinforcements the infantry battalion now located as a temporary measure at Abadeh in Fars.

Azerbaijan

12. The Soviet Trade Union delegates have visited Tabriz, where they were [illegible] three Tehran trade unionists. They inspected various factories, where they talk[illegible] with the workers, but ignored the managers. They have left Azerbaijan for Tehran on their way home to Russia. They are not visiting Abadan, though this was included in an itinerary published in the Persian press some weeks ago.

Chinese Interests

13. Dr Soong, Prime Minister, Dr Wong Shih-chieh, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and a son of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek passed through Tehran on their way to Moscow to resume conversations with the Soviet Government.

Polish Interests

14. The Government of the Lebanon has agreed to admit 800-odd Polish refugees from Persia.

Tehran, 12th August, 1945.

(E 4637/70/34) (9)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 32, Secret, for the Period 13th–19th August, 1945. (Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 287 of 20th August, Received in Foreign Office 20th August.)

Persian Affairs

Politics

1. The minority refuse to come to terms with the majority, and by their continued absence from Majlis sessions have kept all parliamentary business at a standstill. [illegible] Prime Minister untenable. A further supply of money, in the shape of a 1/12th Budget Bill, must be voted in the near future and many think that the occasion will be taken by the minority to force a decision.

2. This paralysis at the centre is rapidly affecting the provinces. [illegible] his chances of obtaining office as Prime Minister should the present Government fall. Firuz is still in Tehran and it is rumoured that he will not return to Fars. Bahrami is also in the capital and has said that he will not return to Kerman. Azerbaijan is still without a Governor-General since the departure of Dadvar many months ago. There were also reports of a change in Khuzistan but the latest news is that Misbah Fatemi is to remain. Kermanshah has at long last received a Governor-General, Kahntari, a hitherto unknown official of the Ministry of Interior, having been appointed.

3. Much discussion is taking place as to whether the new parliamentary elections should be postponed until all foreign troops have left Persia. Dr Musaddiq, whose logic is at times difficult to follow, thinks that they should not be postponed, not because the postponement is inexpedient, but because it is contrary to the Constitution. At the same time he maintains that the electoral laws require redrafting. Who is to redraft them when he has brought all Majlis business to a standstill the worthy Doctor has not revealed. Normally the life of the present Majlis would end about the 12th March 1946 and the new elections should begin three months and the public notices announcing the elections should be issued five months before that date.

The Court.

4. H.I.M. the Shah paid a visit during the week to the Lar valley, where he inspected the preliminary work now being carried out by Messrs. Alexander Gibb and Partners to determine the feasibility of the Lar irrigation project.

Internees.

5. The remaining Persian political internees interned in Persia have now been released. Their names are:

Ali Hayat,
Captain Matini,
General Abul Hassan Pourzand,
Yahya Vira,
Major Mohammad Hussein Sartipzadeh,
Ahmed Akbari,
Ahmed Namdar,
General Farajullah Aghevli,
Javad Aliabadi,
Habibollah Naubakht,
Hussein Neiyandi,
Sheikh Abdul Majid Shirazi,
Sayid Abol Qassem Kashani.

Persian Forces.

Gendarmerie

6. A recent reform of Colonel Schwarzkopf is proving of doubtful value. He considered rightly that small posts of four men were an easy target for robbers. One of the inmates of these small posts was usually absent, one was not [illegible] the remaining custodian was normally asleep. The post and its arms therefore were an easy prey. He decided to scrap the small posts and concentrate his men in platoon posts at greater distances apart. A deficiency of M.T. and a failure to keep roadworthy the little transport that they have has defeated Colonel Schwarzkopf's plans. The posts are now not infrequently 30 miles apart and, as they have not the means of patrolling, the intervening stretches of road are a happy hunting ground for bandits.

Appointments

7.—(i) Allahyar Saleh (F.O. 198-M.A. 253) to be Minister at Washington.
(ii) Bakhuda to be head of the Propaganda Department in place of Safavi dismissed. (Safavi's name will be recalled in connexion with the recent broadcasting incident when, judging that the Russians were making improper use of broadcasting facilities to attack the Persian Government, Safavi closed down the transmission).
(iii) Sartip Abdul Ali Itemad Moqaddam to be Military Governor of Tehran vice Sarhang Baharmast.

Internal Security

Fars

8. Three gendarmes were recently shot dead by a Qashgai band on the road between Khan-i-Zinian and Dasht Arjan. This murder is said to be in revenge for an affray which took place near Ardekan of a month ago.

9. The Tudeh party recently opened a club at the sugar factory at Mervdasht. On the 9th August a crowd incited by local landlords and the [illegible] The Majlis Deputy [illegible] suspected of [illegible] Two mullahs are also reported to have been sent by Qavam-ul-Mulk to stir up anti-Tudeh feeling.

Kurdistan

10. Security on the Senneh Kermanshah road is deteriorating and two [illegible] In one of the [illegible] two British employees of the Kermanshah Petroleum Company were the victims.

According to a senior officer of the Gendarmerie recently arrived from these parts, the closing down of a number of small Gendarmerie posts has facilitated the task of the bandits.

Azerbaijan

11. The situation in Azerbaijan has deteriorated sharply during the past week. On the 11th August a gang of Tudeh agitators visited the village of Liklivan near Tabriz and attempted to incite the peasants to withhold the landlord's share of the harvest in accordance with the Tudeh programme of agrarian reform. The landlord, Intisham, and his supporters interrupted the agitators and beat them. A party of Tudeh said to number 200 and to be armed with revolvers and daggers, then went to the village where a fight ensued. The proprietor, his grandson and a servant were killed by the gang. The Tudeh on their side suffered casualties amounting to 4 killed and several wounded. The landlord's son was taken away captive to Tabriz. On their return to Tabriz the Tudeh ordered the closing of all [illegible] for their dead. A request by the Ministry of War to despatch troops from the [illegible] refused by the Russians. A Commission of Enquiry has been allowed to proceed. It comprises General Amanullah Jehanbani (recently returned from his inspection of the Kurdistan operations), Brigadier Khosrow Panah (Chief of the Gendarmerie), Ahmadi (a former Governor of Tabriz), and a Colonel Taras of the Persian General Staff.

Khorasan

12. [illegible] report [illegible] consular sources but believed to be substantially true, to the effect that 17 Persian army officers, including one lieutenant-colonel, have deserted from Meshed with arms and joined a gang of Turcoman bandits. According to the Persian General Staff, the Russians have refused a request by the G.O.C. Meshed Division to be allowed to send a punitive column into the area where the gang now is.

British Interests

13. Colonel R. O. A. Gatehouse, I.A., arrived in Tehran on the 15th August to take up the appointment of Additional Military Attaché at His Majesty's Embassy.

American Interests

14. Brigadier-General Booth has left Persia on relinquishing the command of United States Persian Gulf Command.

15. Six American officers of Movement Staff have received Persian decorations.

Tehran, 19th August, 1945.

E 6557/70/34] (10)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. [illegible] for the Period 20th August to 26th August, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 299, Received 5th September.)

Persian Affairs

Political

THE Majlis majority and minority have not yet come to any agreement and the position shows little change. A special session of the Majlis to mark the end of the war with Japan was held on the 16th August, but the minority did not attend owing to the non-acceptance of their proposal that the Cabinet should not be present and that only the Presidential body of the Majlis should speak. A special session was convened at the request of the Prime Minister on the 18th August at which he blamed the minority for holding up business and said that, although the Government was capable of dealing with current affairs and crises itself, it considered the support of all Deputies desirable. The cause

of this particular crisis was the events in Khorasan (see paragraph 8 below) [illegible] following upon those in Azerbaijan. He proposed to make them a test case to determine the [illegible] in the Majlis. A [illegible] ensued as the result of which all the minority Deputies [illegible] were respons[illegible] for the disturbances in the provinces, [illegible] sessions at which those minority Deputies who wished to might attend. The Minister for War also made a st[illegible] in Khorasan (see paragraph 8 below) and urged the speedy passing of the budget to provide the necessary money for the [illegible] of the [illegible] law and order throughout the country.

2. The recent speeches by Mr. Bevin and Mr. Eden in the House of Commons have had a very good effect in this country. Nearly all Persians are [illegible] heartened by the references to Persia by the reassuring statement about the reasons for Allied troops entering the country and the equally cogent reasons for now leaving it, and by the condemnation of the system of zones of influence. The overwhelming majority of Persians appreciate the efforts of His Majesty's Government on their behalf at Potsdam; the recent publicity given to Russian behaviour in Persia; these recent speeches in the House and what they believe to be an attitude to the early removal of [illegible].

3. Not much reliance is placed on a recent statement by [illegible] to the effect that over seventy Deputies had signed a proposal [illegible] till one month after the last of the Allied troops had left Persia.

4. The Cabinet has tightened up the military governorship of Tehran by reimposing a curfew from 11 [illegible] and by the prohibition of all outdoor political demonstrations. These measures were introduced to prevent any repetition of the recent events in Azerbaijan and Khorasan and of the arrest of some officers at Dispatch to the south of persons suspected of either plotting with the Russians or of complicity in the Khorasan mutiny.

Economic.

5. The Council of Ministers has reconstituted the Foreign Exchange Control Commission under the Ministry of Finance. Dr. Sajjadi has been appointed director. A black market for dollars and pounds has already come into existence.

Communications

6. According to the Persian press the Persian State Railway has [illegible] British Transport [illegible] Director [illegible] from the Allies [illegible] £77,000 [illegible] freight charges. This is in excess of the £[illegible] already paid by the Allies [illegible] the railway [illegible]. The Persian State Railway [illegible] the fuel freight rate [illegible] of 40 rials per ton [illegible] far paid by the Allies. [illegible] although discussions took place no railway agreement was ever signed.

Appointments, etc.

7.—(i) Dr. Ali Sajjadi to be Governor of Saveh.

(ii) Ali Asghar Mansoor Rouhani, Governor of Saveh, to be an inspector in the Ministry of the Interior.

(iii) Mehdi Shahrukh, Chief of the Department of Justice in Isfahan, to be Governor-General of the 6th Ustan (Kerman) vice Fazlullah Bahrami, resigned.

(iv) Mohsin Shahrukhi to be head of the Contracts and Legal Affairs Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

(v) Murteza Mushbq Kazemi to be head of the Minister's office in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

(vi) Yadullah Malek to be head of the Cipher Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

(vii) Sadiq Fatemi, Inspector-General of the Registration Department, is appointed Director-General in the Ministry of Interior.

Internal Security.

Khorasan

8. Further details are now known of the recent mutiny of Persian army officers in Meshed (see paragraph 12 of last Intelligence Summary) on the 16th August. Fourteen officers, including a Lieut.-Colonel Nawab of the Supply

and Transport Department, 2 majors, 5 captains, 5 subalterns, and 4 or 5 soldiers [illegible] To prevent pursuit they immobilised the remaining army vehicles by removing their switch keys and by putting salt in their petrol tanks (sugar, though more effective, is too expensive in Persia). With the connivance of the Russian control post (some say avoiding the control post by a detour) they made their way to Bujnurd, having taken the precaution of cutting the telegraph lines between [illegible] inspection of the cavalry squadron stationed there. Thus they disarmed and made for the Turcoman Sahra. It was thought in Meshed, and the General Staff was so informed by the Russians, that these mutineers would join forces with a band of armed Turcomans, said to number between 1,000 and 2,000, and subsequently attack Meshed. The Chief of the General Staff, having much experience of Russians, did not think that they would go out of their way to give him accurate information about a gang of mutineers with whom they were probably in sympathy, nor did he think it likely that the Russians would tamely allow them to attack one of their garrison towns. He acted, therefore, on the assumption that their information was wilfully misleading and reckoned on the mutineers heading in the opposite direction. Having no troops in Gunbad-i-Qabus [illegible] which place they must pass, he asked for the assistance of the gendarmerie, who acted with the greatest promptness and energy. The local [illegible] lieutenant, hurriedly collected the men from their scattered [illegible] to assemble a force of about one and a half companies before the mutineers put [illegible] ensued, in which the gendarmerie, first putting the vehicles out of action, then fired upon their occupants. Seven of the mutineer officers were killed and two were wounded and taken prisoner. The vehicles, arms and ammunition were [illegible] exhausted condition nearby on the road between Gunbad-i-Qabus and Shahrud. General Abdullah Hidayet has left for Meshed on a commission of enquiry.

9. Tudeh activity is increasing and on the night of the 18th August 200 or 300 members of that party, mostly "Muhajirs," marched to the Telegraph Office in Meshed, where they demanded the resignation of the Prime Minister. The [illegible] branches of the party have been opened at Fariman and at Gifan in the Yamut Turcoman country.

10. The Russians have opened a branch of the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society at Bujnurd. They are busy canvassing votes for Seyyid Mahdevi, their [illegible] for the next elections, with a view to displacing the sitting member, Tusai, who is regarded as "reactionary."

11. The emigration referred to in paragraph 9 of Intelligence Summary No. [illegible] the Soviet frontier already. Applications are received daily and are sent to the Soviet Embassy in Tehran.

12. Ali Mansur, the Governor-General, has returned to his post. While in Tehran he suggested to the General Staff the removal of Colonel Vossuq, the [illegible] Russians. The Russian Military Attaché also spoke to the Chief of the General Staff on this subject and, when asked for his reasons for their request replied that Colonel Vossuq did not collaborate with the Russian Commander. The Chief of the General Staff says that he replied that such vague indictments could not be followed up and requested the Russian Military Attaché to specify Colonel Vossuq's acts of non-co-operation.

Azerbaijan.

13. The commission of enquiry headed by General Jehanbani has arrived at Rezaieh. The situation is still grave. No further news is to hand from Maragheh, where a band of Tudeh toughs occupied Government offices and gave the officials five days, which [illegible] reinforcements to be sent. There is a garrison of one company in Maragheh and the Chief of the General Staff is anxious as to its fate.

14. The emigration to the U.S.S.R. continues and as many as seventy applications per day are being [illegible] Armenians, Assyrians, &c., and from those comparatively recent emigrants from the U.S.S.R. [illegible] as Molokans.

15. Russian methods are well illustrated by a report from Astara—a report which owing to Russian censorship [illegible] took twenty-three days to reach

the capital. A Russian officer accompanied by a soldier entered the house of the Bakshdar of Astara and shot him dead.

Kurdistan.

16. The Chief of the General Staff states that a minor Kurdish chief and about 100 of his followers have surrendered to the more northerly of the Persian army columns near Merivan. The villages of Rezab and Karabad were occupied on the 12th August. A consular source reports that a Colonel Airom has been appointed military governor of Senneh town and that this new appointment does not meet with the aproval of the Governor, Shahab-ud-Douleh, who sees himself being pushed further into the background. While most observers agree that Brigadier Hushmand Afshar is a gallant officer and capable commander, they aver that his harshness, his rapacity and his blind hatred of all things Kurdish are sowing the seeds of further trouble in that area.

Isfahan (see Intelligence Summary No. 15, paragraph 11).

17. The Armenian Patriarch of Jerusalem has recently visited Isfahan. He admitted in conversation with His Majesty's Ambassador that propaganda for the return of Armenians to the U.S.S.R. has undoubtedly been spread. He says that he pointed out to the Isfahan Armenians that Soviet Armenia was a highly developed and full country, and that there would not be jobs or openings for an unlimited number of immigrants. Persia, on the other hand, was undeveloped and under-populated and presented a better field for Armenian enterprise.

British Interests.

18. Mr. D. W. Lascelles, counsellor of embassy, has left Tehran on transfer to Athens.

E 6830/70/34] (11)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 34, Secret, for the Period [illegible] *Tehran to despatch No. 311 of 3rd September, Received 14th September.*)

Persian Affairs.

Politics.

1. [illegible] Majlis still refuse to come to terms [illegible] 26th August the Prime Minister [illegible] the United Nations Charter [illegible] me was begun but ended [illegible] Deputy, Hovanessian on [illegible] Tabriz in which he [illegible] Persia for so long as a "reactionary Government" was in power. It is believed that the attack would have developed into a [illegible] immunity and subsequent impeachment, but Hovanessian [illegible] escape from the chamber.

Internal Security.

Azerbaijan.

2. The situation in Maragheh (see paragraph 13 of last Intelligence Summary) has deteriorated sharply. The Russian Ambassador officially informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Persian Government was free to take any action it wished. [illegible] that the leader of the [illegible] there, one Kabir, was a charlatan and in no way connected with either the Russians or the Tudeh. (Since the Russians have never ceased to affirm that the Tudeh party has no connexion with them the question by the Minister for Foreign Affairs as to how the Russian Ambassador knew that Kabir had no connexion with the Tudeh was a shrewd one.) When the Persian garrison, acting on instructions from the G.O.C., Tabriz Division, had effected the arrest

of Kabir, the Russian detachment stationed at Maragheh forcibly released [illegible]

Kurdistan

3. General Jehanbani informed the [illegible] that as the result of his visit to Kurdistan he was not di[illegible] these operations. The repulse of Mahmud Khan Ka[illegible] beartening effect on the garrison and a corres[illegible] Further arrests are being made as further deta[illegible] The Chief of the General Staff, on the stren[illegible] extracted from the captured mutineers [illegible] general uprising existed and that the Meshed [illegible] general mutiny to go off at half cock.

Two officers sent by the General Staff to make [illegible] the Gunbad [illegible] A party of 200 gendarmes proceeding by lorry as reinforcements for the [illegible] the Meshed garrison coming from Turbat-i-Sheikh Jam were stopped at the Russian control post south of Meshed. The fact that the original party of mutineers was able to leave Meshed at all and pass through the Russian control posts *en route*, the attitude of the Russian control at Torbat-i-Sheikh Jam, [illegible] Meshed and elsewhere towards the mutiny, and the presence in Bujnurd of the Russian Vice Consul at Meshed a few hours prior to the arrival of the mutineers and [illegible] the Russians. The Chief of the General Staff has complied a letter [illegible] chapter and verse for all these incidents and others in the past of Russian interference in Persian affairs which the Minister for War [illegible] before the Cabinet to induce

that body to protest officially to the Russian Ambassador. There is no doubt that the financial embarrassment of the junior officers was a prime cause of the mutiny by rendering them receptive to Tudeh propaganda on the subject of better pay and living conditions and the inefficiency and corruption of their seniors.

Economic

7. The Cabinet has finally sanctioned the abolition of the cotton monopoly. In future there will be no restriction on the local sale or purchase of cotton, but the import of cotton will be subject to permits obtainable from the Ministry of Agriculture.

Censorship

8. The Anglo-Soviet-Persian censorship ceased to function as from the 30th August. The Russian representative, though still without his instructions on the subject, joined in informing the Persian censor that with effect from the 30th August no outgoing or incoming letters or telegrams (including press telegrams) between Persia on the one hand and the British Empire or the United States, or its dependencies on the other, need be shown to the Russian censor.

Communications.

9. 3,300 railway wagons are being transferred to the Russians from the United States Persian Gulf Command.

10. The Ministry of Roads and Communications has announced an extensive programme of road construction and improvement. In spite of the advice given to them by the Royal Engineers that the Persian Government will need all its financial resources to keep in good repair the asphalted trunk routes handed back by the British military, the Ministry of Roads and Communications has announced its intention of asphalting the stretches Tehran-Qum and Kerej-Kazvin, and of constructing or improving many minor routes. Should funds be available the intention is sound enough as it would provide work for many of those thrown out of employment with the departure of Allied troops from Persia.

Appointments

11. Muhammad Vahid to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Education. He has held this appointment before and has officiated for a short while as Minister of Education.

Obituary.

12. The death occurred on the 1st September at an advanced age of Ayatullah Haji Imam Juma of Khoi, a celebrated divine of Tehran. He was [illegible] of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and now on a Persian Government purchasing commission in Bombay, and of Jamal Imami, the Majlis Deputy.

Russian Interests

13. The Russian Ambassador has left for a tour of Azerbaijan, as he said he had received conflicting reports on the local situation. He announced before his departure that he might be visiting [illegible] This has given rise to various rumours of his recall or of a change of Russian policy in Persia.

American Interests

14. The Commander, United States Persian Gulf Command, has stated that American troops will evacuate Tehran in two echelons on the 19th and 25th September respectively, and that his command will be clear of Persia by the 1st November. After that date the only troops remaining will be the guards on camps, installations, &c., and the personnel of the American Liquidation Commission. A communiqué from the United States War Department published in the *Tehran Daily News* gives the figure of these guards as 2,600. It also states that "some Army Air Transport Command personnel will be left to continue operation of the plane routes through the country." The communiqué also stated that the maximum strength of the United States Persian Gulf Command in Persia at the peak period of "Aid to Russia" had been 27,000.

Corrigenda.

15 (i) Reference line 3 paragraph 6 of Intelligence Summary No. 33 dated 26th August, 1945, delete (about £770,000) and insert (£7,812,500).

(ii) Reference paragraph 15 of Intelligence Summary No. 33 dated the 26th August, 1945, the Persian Government now admit that an error in deciphering this message was made and that the Bakshdar was not shot dead but only threatened with death

Tehran, 2nd September, 1945

[E 6978/70/34] (12)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 35 Secret for the Period 3rd September to 9th September, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 320 of 10th September; Received 19th September.)

Persian Affairs

Political

1. The majority and [illegible] in the Majlis have not [illegible] their differences [illegible] 2nd September [illegible] States War [illegible] 14 [illegible] 2,000 troops were [illegible] to [illegible] American [illegible] the Americans [illegible] in Persia. The Minister for Foreign Affairs [illegible] that the American [illegible] were [illegible] disposed of. At the session of the 4th September [illegible] Dr. [illegible] a member of the Persian delegation to the San Francisco Conference [illegible] a long and [illegible] speech [illegible] the drafting of the charter and its ap[illegible] to Persia of to-day. After [illegible] gratefully to the recent [illegible] Mr. [illegible] Mr. Eden, he com[illegible] of the unwarranted into[illegible] the Russians [illegible] Persia's internal affairs. [illegible] the charter [illegible] a few days previously [illegible] signed by representatives [illegible] the province [illegible] the Soviet [illegible] Persia [illegible] the northern provinces of Persia [illegible] the Government [illegible] Persia [illegible] the Bridge of Victory [illegible] the Bridge of Victory [illegible] with [illegible] the Russians [illegible] and despair. Persia and the Persians expected the Soviet Government and her other neighbours to [illegible] the country within six months in accordance with the terms of the Treaty [illegible] But [illegible] would [illegible] be fulfilled was certain [illegible] the Persians were [illegible] of the Russian Government. [illegible] there was no [illegible] between Great Britain [illegible] the Soviet [illegible] those who [illegible] to respect Persia's rights [illegible] would [illegible] in the heart of every Persian [illegible] attempt [illegible] Persian sovereignty would [illegible] the extreme. Friendship with all three [illegible] America was desired by Persia but no breach of international law would be tolerated.

Other business at the same session included the approval by a unanimous [illegible] of the United Nations Charter and a bitter attack by M. Dashti on the minority whose behaviour he compared with that of sulky children. Deputy Tusi, making himself heard with difficulty over the increasing din, accused Dashti of being a spy in the pay of a foreign Power. After this pandemonium broke loose and Dashti was with some difficulty rescued by his supporters from violence at the hands of his opponents and safely removed from the Chamber. At the session of the 6th September Dr. Musaddiq asked for time in which to [illegible] This was refused. The Minister for Foreign Affairs then made a long speech on Persia's foreign policy. The 2/12ths budget bill was then sent to commission for amendments.

2. Most educated Persians are pinning their hopes on a favourable statement on the evacuation of Persia from the Foreign Secretaries Conference now in session in London. They feel that in this lies their only hope of saving the northern provinces from being incorporated in the U.S.S.R. and of preventing further Russian interference in their internal affairs. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is believed to have demanded permission for the Persian Ambassador in London to attend the relevant discussions, hoping thereby that Persia's case may be represented more strongly and that more publicity will be achieved for Persia's present plight.

The Persian Army

3. The Ministry for War has under consideration a scheme for bettering the financial condition of Persian army officers. H.I.M. the Shah, at an audience which he granted to the British military attaché on the 3rd September, informed him that the following benefits were to be granted:—

(i) An increment of pay for every year of service.
(ii) A free issue of summer and winter uniforms.
(iii) [illegible]
(iv) [illegible] officers' quarters to be built in the vicinity of barracks.
(v) [illegible] of a co-operative society.

The B.M.A. took the opportunity to represent to H.I.M. that discontented officers, or officers rendered desperate by financial difficulties, were a menace to any army, that paper promises were insufficient, that the houses would take several years to complete, and that much opposition to the scheme might be expected in the Majlis who would probably insist on similar benefits and concessions for civilian employees of Government.

4. There is little further news of the recent mutiny. One more officer, a conscription official at Shahrud deserted but was captured. Two junior officers in Meshed, whose complicity has been suspected, shot themselves. There is [illegible] have been investigated and much criticism is being directed against General Arfa, the Chief of the General Staff, for arresting officers on insufficient evidence or on the false testimony of interested persons.

Communications

5. The maintenance of the Zahidan-Meshed road is being handed back by G.H.Q. India, to the Persian Government. The hand over is to be by sections and is to begin on the 21st September.

Internal Security

Fars

6. The General Staff claim to have collected 115 and 128 rifles respectively from the rival factions of the Haiyat Daudis and Lirawis. Some confusion occurred when columns despatched by the Fars and Khuzistan Divisions arrived simultaneously on the scene claiming that the other had no jurisdiction.

Azerbaijan

7. The arrival in Tabriz of the military commission of enquiry (see paragraph 13 of Intelligence Summary No. 33) was the occasion for the issue of a [illegible] appealing for protection against Tudeh oppression. The notices were at once torn down by the Tudeh. The situation in Maragheh is unchanged with the Persian army garrison incarcerated in its own barracks by Russian troops. The municipal accountant is reported to have been beaten to death by the Tudeh. There is some talk of the formation of a new Democratic party in opposition to the Tudeh, but well informed sources consider this to be merely an electioneering stunt to disarm the general odium and suspicion attaching to the Tudeh on account of its identification with the

Russians, and that the candidates of the Democratic party at the forthcoming elections will be found to be the same Tudeh members in new guise or, as the Persian would put it, "the same donkey with a new packsaddle."

Gilan and Mazanderan

8. The Russians have now given permission for the Persian army to remove the vehicles, arms and ammunition captured from the mutineers at Gunbad-i-Qabus. They have refused, however, to allow any escort to accompany the vehicles. As the road is known to be infested with armed Turcomans and as the remaining mutineers are still at large in the neighbourhood this permission is not of much practical value. Armed Turcomans with Tudeh armlets now patrol the railway stations of Bandar-i-Gaz and Shahi. The situation at Chalus, Sari, Shahi and Babul is reported to be quieter as resistance to the Tudeh has ceased and the civil administration is virtually in their hands.

Isfahan

9. A consular report discloses an interesting situation in the district of Fereidan where the villages are, for the most part, owned by numerous small holders and where the chief elements are Armenians, a colony of Georgians and two rival factions of Chahar Lang, Bakhtiaries. The Armenians are frequently visited by a Father Joachim from the Armenian church at Ju[illegible] This priest is in close touch with the Soviet Consulate-General and has recently [illegible] are also in close touch with the Soviet Consulate-General. Murteza Quli Khan has had some difficulty in keeping the peace in this potentially troublesome area.

Appointments

10.—(i) Hussain Pasha Nawai to be Persian Consul General at Herat.
(ii) Hussain Ala has left to take up his post as Persian Ambassador at Washington.

Appointments—military.

11.—(i) Sartip Muhammad Baquir Bushmand Afshar, General Officer Commanding 2nd Central Division,
(ii) Sartip Fazlullah Humayuni General Officer Commanding 10th Khuzistan Division, to be General Officer Commanding 4th Kurdistan Division,
(iii) Sarhang Lutfullah Afsharoglu, Commander Kazerun Brigade, to be General Officer Commanding the Khuzistan Division,
(iv) Sartip Mansur Muzayyini, General Officer Commanding 2nd Central Division, to be attached to the General Staff
(v) Sartip Abdullah Hidayet to be placed *en disponibilité*

Tehran 9th September, 1945

(E 7117 70 34) (13)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary, No. 38, Secret, for the Period 10th to 16th September, 1945 *(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 331 of 17th September; Received 24th September.)*

Persian Affairs.

Political

1. *The Ma[illegible]* On the 9th September the Minister of Finance tabled a Bill to revise Dr. Millspaugh's income tax law of November 1943. Deputy Ardelan's proposal that in future foreign nationals should only be engaged after sanction by the Ma[illegible] On the 11th September the Minister of Finance tabled a single-article Bill to ratify the 1925 Geneva Convention regarding the export of opium. (The arrival of Persian opium at American ports has recently been the subject of a complaint by the United States Government.) On the same day the Minister for War tabled a Bill asking for provision for two additional divisions for the army of a strength of 12,000 men at a cost of 165 [illegible] and concessions to army officers (see paragraph 3 of last Intelligence Summary).

and for a credit of 3 million [illegible] United States. The Bill was subsequently approved by the Majlis Budget Commission, but is likely to meet with a stormy passage through the Majlis, when the Tudeh members, acting on Russian instructions, will certainly oppose any measures calculated either to strengthen or improve Persia's armed forces. At the same session Dr. Musaddiq made one of his typically turbid and turgid orations. He described the tactics of the minority, prescribed the ideal form of government in Persia, recommended an ideal form of foreign policy, gave a long historical sketch of Persia's relations with Russia and Great Britain, made a long indictment against Reza Shah, and finally attempted to justify his own acts and opinions on any and every occasion in the past. On the 13th September the session was taken up with personal attacks and counter-attacks, the chief bouts being between Tusi and Ali Dashti, and between the Armenian Deputy Hovanessian and Siqqat ul-Islam. The Minister for War also intervened to defend the General Officer Commanding, Tabriz, from slanderous attacks by Hovanessian.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has addressed a note to the British, Russian and American Embassies, in which he stated that the surrender of Japan on the 2nd September 1945, had given the greatest satisfaction to the Persian Government and congratulated the Allies on this final victory. He also stated that his note dated the 19th May, 1945, on the occasion of Germany's surrender had remained unanswered. In that note his Government had requested the evacuation of Persia by the Allies, so that Persia could regain her normal status. [illegible] Minister for Foreign Affairs [illegible] Treaty the period of six months' delay after the cessation of hostilities in which the Allies had undertaken to evacuate Persia would be calculated from the 2nd September, 1945, and that his Government expects that, according to clause 5 of that treaty, not a single Allied sailor, soldier or airman shall remain on Persian [illegible] 2nd March 1946. He [illegible] be of the greatest service to Persia.

3. Despite the Military Governor's ban on political meetings in Tehran some forty members of the Tudeh party attempted to hold a meeting in the party's headquarters on the 14th September. Most of the Tudeh Deputies were there. A [illegible] inside the building, beaten by a Tudeh Deputy, and had his epaulettes torn off. The military governor, on hearing of the incident, stated that he could not arrest the Deputy on account of his parliamentary immunity.

Internal Security

Khorasan

4. A Meshed Tudeh paper has published a copy of the manifesto posted on the walls of Gunbad-i-Qabus by Lieut.-Colonel Niwai, the senior officer of the Meshed group of mutineers. It calls upon the Turcomans and others to rise and overthrow the present Persian Government.

5. The [illegible] elections. Both they and the Russians are reported to be bringing pressure to bear on the Governor-General Ali Mansur, to ensure that the largest possible number of Tudeh Deputies are returned from Khorasan.

6. Colonel Hatemi has been appointed provincial chief of police vice Colonel Turaj Amin. The latter has been frequently reported from consular sources to be a tool of the Russians.

Kurdistan

7. The General Staff has announced that, as the result of operations in Kurdistan up to the 2nd September, 1,343 rifles have been collected. This figure, in the light of events and the balance of casualties in the recent operations, is undoubtedly exaggerated, and 500 would be a better estimate. Of these, few have been [illegible] whom previous commanders had issued these arms for their protection.

Azarbaijan

8. The Chief of the General Staff informed the British Military Attaché that, according to a report received from the General Officer Commanding, Tabriz, a Russian consular officer and the Russian Town Major of Miandoab, by name Namazaliof, recently visited Ghazi Mohammad at Mahabad and asked him to send a force to aid Mulla Mustafa of Barzan in his operations against the Iraqi

army. Ghazi Muhammad showed the Russians a letter to the same effect which [illegible] the same source as having been non-committal in his reply and to have laid down as a necessary condition for his armed support the crying off by the Russians of all Tudeh activity in his area as inimical to the activities of the K[illegible] which alone he was interested. [illegible] subsequently, contacted some M[illegible] The Mangur pleaded inability [illegible] fear of retaliation by the Pushtdar tribe [illegible] The Herki also showed little enthusiasm fo[illegible] action by the Iraq[illegible] Iraqi territory an[illegible] Kurds.

9. According to a consular report unconfirmed by the General Staff the Persian army detachment at Maraghah has been disarmed by the Russian garrison there and is now allowed to leave its barracks (see paragraph 7 of last Intelligence Summary).

10. A consular source reports that, following a skirmish between Zero [illegible] two gendarmes were killed, a force of seventy gendarmes was despatched from Rezaieh to attack the Kurds. The Russians stopped this force and disarmed it, sending back the arms to the Officer Commanding Persian garrison at Rezaieh. The Russians claimed that they had acted in good faith, having mistaken the gendarmes for bandits.

11. No visible result has come from the visit to Tabriz of the recent military commission under General Jahanbani. There are no signs of a Russian withdrawal from Tabriz, where they are, in fact, acquiring additional houses, possibly to accommodate troops to be withdrawn from Tehran. A general tightening up of check post control has also been noticed.

Bakhtiari and Luristan.

12. After three years of continued pressure by His Majesty's Embassy the Persian Government announce that they have effected the arrest of Haidar s/o Bagir, Barani s/o Ali and Seyyid Murad s/o Shah Murad all of Feraidan in Bakhtiari who were responsible for the murder in 1942 of Mr. Harris, British Vice-Consul at Isfahan, and of Dr. Griffiths of the Church Missionary Society and of his small son and, subsequently fled to the mountains between Bakhtiari and Luristan. The arrested men are to be brought to Tehran and tried by a military court.

The Court.

13. The prolonged absence of Queen Fawzieh in Egypt had given rise to rumours of an impending Royal divorce. On the 14th September most of the Persian papers published a communiqué from the Persian Embassy in Cairo announcing that rumours of a divorce between the Shah and Queen Fawzieh are completely without foundation and that the Queen is merely passing the summer months in Egypt.

Economic.

14. In order to make good economic losses caused by the war the Finance Ministry is to draw up an economic programme covering trade relations with Great Britain, United States, U.S.S.R., [illegible] and Iran. Dr. Ali Amini has been appointed to go to India to examine the possibilities of Persian exports to India and imports therefrom. Dr. Ali Amini, F.O. to M.A. 19[illegible], is a brother-in-law of Dr. Imami who has been in India for more than a year on a purchasing commission.

Education.

15. The Persian Government has accepted the invitation issued by His Majesty's Government and the French Government to send a delegation to the forthcoming International Education Conference in London. The Persian delegation will consist of A. Asgar Hekmat who needed last year a Persian [illegible] to India, Dr. Reza [illegible] to the Ministry of Education, [illegible] Hassan Sadeqi Director-General [illegible] Secretary of Tehran University and Dr. Is[illegible] professor at Tehran University.

American Interests.

16. Two parties of American Congressmen arrived in Tehran on the 10th September, one party from Moscow and the other from Syria. They left by air for Saudi Arabia on the 13th September.

Yugoslav Interests.

17. Asim Ali Hadzic, the newly-appointed Yugoslav Minister has arrived and has presented his credentials to [illegible] Shah.

Russian Interests.

18. The Russian Ambassador is still absent. The Russian military attache is also absent at [illegible].

19. Large numbers of Russian troops have been seen leaving Tehran for the west in a new [illegible] the western outskirts of Kazvin [illegible] The information so far received is not [illegible] and no to be made as to the numbers of Russian troops which have left and which still remain in the capital.

20. During the past three weeks the Soviet consular authorities have been [illegible] passes for British civil and military officials to visit places on the Caspian littoral.

Polish Interests.

21. The number of Poles in Persia as at the 14th September, 1945, is as follows:—

Location.	*Men.*	*Women.*	*Children.*	*Total.*
Tehran	352	1,103	295	1,750
Isfahan	69	410	394	873
Ahwaz	151	689	279	1,119

In addition there are 812 Poles living in Tehran in employment or privately who are not the responsibility of the Polish Refugee organisation.

The Poles in Isfahan are being transferred in batches to the Lebanon and [illegible] to Ahwaz. No other moves outside Persia are at present contemplated.

The future at Ahwaz of the Warsaw Government will determine largely the question of future moves either by way of a return to Poland or moves further afield.

Persian Army.

22. Though there is little further information about the recent mutiny it would be premature to consider it as entirely stamped out. During last week one more officer absented himself from Tehran under suspicious circumstances, but returned to duty after three days. Those officers who, as the result of the findings of the commission referred to in paragraph 6 of last Intelligence Summary No. 34, are to be kept under arrest until the state of emergency comes to an end are to be transferred to Kerman.

23. The addition of two new divisions to the Persian army, the provision of financial benefits to officers and the demand for a $3 million credit for purchase of equipment are referred to in paragraph 1 above.

CHAPTER IV.—SAUDI ARABIA.

[E 4961 4961/25] No. 11

Mr Grafftey-Smith to Mr Eden.—(Received 10th July.)

(No. 115. Confidential.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Jeddah presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him herewith the annual report on the Heads of Foreign Missions in Jedda.

Jedda, 1st July, 1945.

Enclosure in No. 11

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Jedda, 1st July, 1945

(Passages marked with an asterisk are taken from previous reports.)

Egypt

[illegible] representation here tends to be kaleido[illegible] Omar Bey came to the Hejaz for the 1944 pilgrimage. Abdel Hamid Monir Bey left Jedda in April 1945 for Cairo, and Aw[illegible] el-Bahrawy, who was then also Minister at Baghdad (see 1940 report), arrived as Minister. He left Jedda [illegible] May 1945, leaving the Legation in the charge of [illegible] and Second Secretary Hassan Abdu[illegible] [illegible] Minister to Saudi Arabia [illegible] two posts of Jedda and Dagenet having been separated as a complimentary gesture to the two countries.

France

M. Maugret, hypochondriac to the last, was replaced in March 1945 by M. Max Ragent, who presented letters as Minister Plenipotentiary of the Provisional French Government which Saudi Arabia recognised at the end of 1944. M. Ragent's career has been in Morocco, where he was for some time [illegible] representative in Rabat. He was [illegible] report) and was then notorious for his pro-Axis attitude. M. Ragent has been warned about him but says that Hamdi is strongly supported by North African personalities and that Paris will not act against him. He has, however, extracted from Hamdi a promise to retire next year.

Iraq

*Jamal Pasha Ar-Rawi was in Jedda from November 1939 to 1941 as Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires. After two years at Kabul he has now returned to Jedda as Minister. He presented his credentials on the 4th March, 1943.

He served during the war of 1914–18, first in the Turkish forces and then with his close friend Nuri Pasha as Said in the Arab forces [illegible] military aide de-camp [illegible] present and friendly [illegible] his health is not good. He is [illegible] but his wife does not appear in masculine society. (Written in 1943.)

*She has no [illegible] started [illegible] coming out." [illegible]

From August 1944 to March 1945, while Jamal Pasha was on leave the Legation was left in the charge of Muhyideen Mumaiya, a humpbacked and noisy little Effendi who had previously served at [illegible] return for the pilgrimage season. Muhyideen Mumaiya is at present (June 1945) on leave, and [illegible]

Netherlands

*Daniel van der Meulen has, owing to the internment in Holland of the titular Chargé d'Affaires, Dr Dingemans, returned to Jedda, where from 1930 to 1931 he was Consul and later Chargé d'Affaires. He had just been promoted Resident in the Dutch Colonial Service, and is merely seconded for the duration of the war. He is an authority on the Arabic language and customs and speaks good English and French. He is a most loyal supporter [illegible] His wife, who is said to have some Javanese blood, has great charm of manner and is most helpful in entertaining. [illegible]

*He was made Minister Plenipotentiary and presented his letters on the 5th November, 1943. In January and February 1944 he made a tour of the Hadhramaut. (Written in 1944.)

In December 1944 he went across to Bahrain by car and thence to Persia for a visit, returning in February 1945. His wife left at the end of May for Holland to rejoin her numerous children, all but one of whom were by then known to be safe, and M. van der Meulen is expected to follow her in July 1945 and not to return. The intention seems to be to send Dr. Dingemans, who gave an impression of strong Nazi sympathies when last here, back to Jedda.

Turkey

*M. Ayashli (see report for 1943) left in 1943 and was replaced as Minister Plenipotentiary by M. Ali Sepahi in January 1944. He presented credentials on the 3rd February 1944. His wife is a welcome addition to English-speaking feminine [illegible] in Jedda although she left for Egypt with her 11-year-old son after only a short time. M. Sepahi himself is a pleasant and friendly colleague if somewhat inquisitive. (Written in 1944.)

He went on leave in the summer of 1944, leaving the Legation in the charge of the First Secretary, M. Sevket Utkuman, a colourless person who served in Paris during the German occupation. M. Sepahi returned in December 1944, but was taken seriously ill almost as soon [illegible] he arrived and had to leave [illegible]

United States.

Mr Moses, now in Damascus, was replaced in September 1944 by Colonel William A. Eddy with the rank of full Minister. Colonel Eddy of the United States Marines, was born of [illegible] parents in Syria and has had long experi[illegible] Middle East. He speaks fluent Syrian Arabic [illegible] America he is said to have some reputation as an [illegible] and journalist. He has also taught at the American University in Cairo. He is a member of the Office of Strategic Services and served under Colonel Donovan at Tangier in 1942. He first came to Saudi Arabia in March 1944 from Cairo where he was Attaché at the United States [illegible] [illegible] stayed here [illegible] a bluff and friendly manner and he entertains much and well. This hearty exterior does not, however, entirely conceal a ruthless energy directed towards the furtherance of American political and economic influence in Saudi Arabia, and Colonel Eddy's interpretation of Anglo-American co-operation in Saudi Arabia leaves much to be desired. His wife, also of missionary stock, was born in Chile and looks more Chilean than missionary. She suffers fr[illegible] pressed Anglophobia and is essentially [illegible]

Representatives accredited also to other Governments

Afghanistan

*Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq-al-Mujaddidi is also Minister to Egypt and resides in Cairo. He [illegible] on pilgrimage at the end of 1942, but was not seen by his Christian colleagues. (Written in January 1943.)

Did not come to the Hejaz for the 1943 or 1944 pilgrimages.

Persia

*Ali Akbar Bahman, Minister to Saudi Arabia and Ambassador to Egypt, terminated his mission to both countries on an unspecified date in 1942, and as far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, no successor appears to have been appointed yet. (Written in [illegible]

No successor has yet been appointed.

E 6396 209/25] No. 12

Mr Bevin to Mr Grafftey-Smith (Jedda)

(No. 151.)

Foreign Office, 29th August, 1945.

Sir,

THE Amir Faisal accompanied by Shaikh Hafiz Wahba visited me at the Foreign Office on the morning of the 29th August.

2. The [illegible] desired, in the era of [illegible] upon which he hoped that we had now entered, to continue to collaborate with His Majesty's Government in the same close and friendly manner that he had done during the difficult days of the recent war. His Majesty [illegible] that, for their part, His Majesty's Government would reciprocate by extending to Saudi Arabia the same support and help that they had given in the past.

3. I said that I should be glad if His Royal Highness would take back to King Abdul Aziz a message of [illegible] an assurance that we should do our utmost to maintain and strengthen the historic ties of friendship existing between Great Britain and Saudi Arabia.

4. I reminded the Amir that I had myself been a member of the late Coalition Government and that I had shared in the shaping of that Government's foreign policy throughout the war.

5. The present Government's policy in regard to Saudi Arabia would be the same as that of their predecessors. Indeed, we desired continuity and stability in our relations with all the Arab States.

6. Our position in relation to the Middle East had been made clear in my recent speech in the House of Commons during the debate on the speech from the Throne.

7. The Amir then referred with appreciation to the help which His Majesty's Government had given to the Levant States and hoped that the same help would be given to the Arabs elsewhere, particularly in Palestine.

8. I replied that Palestine presented a difficult problem, but His Royal Highness [illegible] that His Majesty's Government would give it the most careful consideration.

9. After an exchange of friendly courtesies His Royal Highness then took his leave.

I am, &c.
ERNEST BEVIN

CHAPTER V. SYRIA AND THE LEBANON

[E 4917/8/89] No 13

Report by Mr Donald Wallett, Regional Press Officer at His Majesty's Embassy, Paris, on his Visit to Syria and the Lebanon.—(Received in Foreign Office, 7th July

I LEFT Paris on the 17th June, and travelling via Cairo arrived in Beirut [illegible]

His Majesty's Minister explained to me that he had arranged for me to [illegible] I was to see the Syrian British and French authorities, where the latter still existed

On my arrival he at once wrote a letter to General Beynet, the French Délégué Général explaining who I was [illegible] he would receive me. Within an hour General Beynet telephoned to make an appointment for the next day

On the 21st June I left Beirut for Damascus. From Damascus I went to Homs, Hama and Aleppo, returning to Beirut on the 25th June

To all officials and others that I spoke to during my tour I said that I had been sent by His Majesty's Ambassador, Paris, at the request of His Majesty's Minister to the Levant States, to see on the spot the state of affairs in Syria and the Lebanon and to hear what the different authorities had to say

Before leaving for Syria I saw General Beynet on the 20th June. He received me at his residence in Beirut, and M. Schlumberger, the French press officer was present throughout the whole of the interview, which lasted for more than an hour I told General Beynet that I had been sent by His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris at the request of His Majesty's Minister to the Levant States, and that I had come to see on the spot what the true state of affairs was and to hear what the different authorities had to say As well as seeing British and Syrian officials, I hoped to see French officials wherever possible. General Beynet was extremely affable and said he had nothing to add or subtract from any of his previous statements, in which he had said nothing but the truth Nevertheless, he at once started on a résumé of the events which had led up to the present crisis. The intransigence of the Syrian Government was no new thing, for many years they had made every difficulty possible. Encouraged by the British they had refused to negotiate a treaty, finally the French were [illegible] The B[illegible] the French had been humiliated and had been forced to retire from many parts of Syria. The French now found themselves in an impossible situation, a [illegible] were shut up in barracks, the affair was over, the French were out and the British [illegible]

I asked General Beynet why, when the Syrians had been prepared to [illegible] at once for Syria with the terms. He said that he did it purposely. He said that he knew it was going to be extraordinarily difficult to negotiate any treaty with the Syrian Government, that he had never wanted this job and had never felt very [illegible] in Paris as long as possible, believing that by so doing the atmosphere might [illegible]

About the Syrians, General Beynet said quite frankly that they were very [illegible] "Syrian public opinion" it was ridiculous since such a thing did not exist. [illegible] regards the Syrians as [illegible] and has no conception of the strength of Syrian or Arab nationalist feelings. He was quite unashamed about the French bombardment of Damascus: to him it seemed a perfe[illegible] attacked in Damascus. He said Sir Edward Grigg had said he could not see any bullet holes in the French headquarters opposite the Syrian Parliament

building in Damascus, and he begged me, when I went to Damascus, to go to see them for myself. "Sir Edward," he said, "did not find any bullet holes because he only looked at the [illegible] There are [illegible] outside of our headquarters because the Syrians fired from close range through the windows, but if you go inside you will see bullet holes in the rooms." (When I went to Damascus I went inside the French headquarters and spent a ludicrous quarter of an hour with [illegible] these alleged bullet holes. It was like a game of "hunt the slipper." After looking unsuccessfully in two rooms we found a few holes in one curtain and four or five small holes in the wall of one room, and one bullet hole in the hall. General Grigg, which I [illegible] bullet holes, was very embarrassed and said that apart from a few broken windows there was nothing at all to be seen.)

General Beynet also complained at length to me about the humiliation that French officers had been forced to accept at the hands of the British military authorities. He said that one officer [illegible] worse than the Germans would have treated them In the course of his conversa[illegible] German methods. He [illegible] made against him in Paris of being pro-Vichy He denied that hotly to me, and said that he was always considered as pro-English. He did, however, admit [illegible] better there than the British here.

At the request of His Majesty's Minister I delivered a message to General Beynet to the effect that the British military authorities in Aleppo were extremely anxious about the safety of M Fauquenot, the French délégué there, who insisted on driving about the town in his car flying a large French flag, despite their warning [illegible] publicly in such a provocative manner! General Beynet shrugged his shoulders and said he would not ask M. Fauquenot [illegible] driving about the town. M. Fauquenot would be quite safe, he was well known in Aleppo. General [illegible] the British went to aide [illegible] up hostility to the French to support the warning we had given them.

General Beynet also declared that atrocities had been committed by the Syrians on the bodies of French officers who had been murdered. He complained of [illegible] from looting [illegible] quite true. After all, they [illegible] Their discipline was always a [illegible] might have been different [illegible]

General Beynet also [illegible] ment and the British-controlled radio stations in Palestine with carrying out a campaign to encourage the Troupes Spéciales to desert He said if this went on his forces would become so reduced that he would have to ask for reinforcements from France and that he had already sent a telegram to Paris explaining the situation to them and warning them that if this went on in the near future they would have to take the decision as to whether to send reinforcements to the Levant or not.

The mentality of General Beynet does much to explain French actions in the Levant. I formed the impression that he is a tired, elderly soldier, who really believes in the colonial methods of the last century. He has no conception of the state of opinion of the Arabs. To him they are all natives who, if they cause any trouble, are quickly subdued with a little shooting. He sees nothing extraordinary at all in the French bombardment of Damascus. I am convinced that he really believes that the British Government has numerous agents of a sinister nature all over the country His own information must be extremely bad. His last words to me were that if the matter were put before an international tribunal of some sort he was quite sure that the evidence he had in his possession would convince the tribunal that the whole crisis had been provoked by British agents and that the French were in no way to blame for what had happened.

1 *Syria*

Damascus.

On the morning of the 21st June I left for Damascus by road with Brigadier Frere On arrival at Damascus I made a tour of the city to inspect the damage caused during the French bombardment. In general the damage is superficially not likely to impress European public opinion because it in no way

[illegible] publicised in European newspapers. But when one considers that it was carried out entirely by one side, that the other side had no artillery and no aircraft to reply, it is an astonishing sight.

The Parliament building was shelled and the exterior is pitted with shell-holes and the marks of hand-grenades. Inside, nothing has been touched since the fighting ceased. The deputies' seats are overturned, the floor is littered with papers, everything is in a state of complete disorder, there are marks of blood from the gendarmes who were killed there.

The Orient Palace Hotel is still closed to guests while repairs to bedroom walls riddled with bullet holes are being carried out. The exterior of all buildings in this area are covered with machine gun bullets. It is quite clear that the roofs, windows and balconies of all the houses in this central area of the city were sprayed with machine gun fire.

In the railway station is the burnt-out wreckage of a British Red Cross train, set on fire by a stray shell. There is no evidence that the train was deliberately destroyed by the French.

At the Citadel I was taken round by Colonel Hrant, the Armenian Commander of the South Syrian gendarmerie. The Citadel, which is the headquarters of the [illegible] damage has now been repaired, but Colonel Hrant showed me where the first [illegible] and where, during the second attack, the headquarters of the gendarmerie was hit and he himself was [illegible]

I [illegible] shops burned out and looted by Senegalese troops.

It is important to remember that all the attacks were concentrated in the administrative district of the city, where all the Government offices are situated. The Parliament House was destroyed and had it not been for the fact that there [illegible] would have been sitting when the attack was carried out. The Orient Palace Hotel was where all the foreign diplomats were living. The Citadel is the headquarters of the gendarmerie—the only force at the disposal of the Syrian Government.

The Syrian Government charges the French with deliberately trying to destroy the whole government machine in Damascus. The Syrians say the French hoped to kill all the deputies while Parliament was sitting and force the Government to flee.

The French reply that they had no intention of killing the deputies. The Parliament building was attacked because it had been fortified by the Syrian gendarmerie and was a strong point from which the French Etat-Major on the other side of the road was being attacked.

Damascus is quiet now, but all the authorities, including the French, are [illegible] Damascus to-day would be assassinated, and I think that this is undoubtedly true.

After inspecting the town I talked to Colonel Morgan, who took over from General Oliva Roget, and who was so much criticised by the General during his talk to the press in Paris.

Colonel Morgan has a very different story from that told by General Oliva Roget. He says that he did everything possible to foster good relations with General Oliva-Roget. He invited him on several occasions to meals; he took every opportunity of being seen with him whenever possible at public functions so that the Syrians would have no grounds for saying that the British military authorities were not on good terms with the French military authorities. On one occasion he paid a visit to the Druze country with General Oliva-Roget, riding in the General's car, and made a speech, after General Oliva-Roget had made one, in which he made a public reference to the fact that he was glad to have this opportunity of visiting the Druze country in the company of General Oliva-Roget, who was so well known there.

When he received orders to intervene he went to see General Oliva-Roget and told him what his requirements were, following the instructions he had received from the commander-in-chief, and handed him the letter which Oliva-Roget read out at his press conference in Paris. General Oliva-Roget refused to accept these orders, saying that he had had no instructions from his commander-in-chief, General Humblot, in Beirut. General Oliva-Roget was out of communication with Beirut and, when offered the use of British communications, he refused, and it was not until [illegible] the next morning [illegible] before when he saw General Oliva-Roget again, that the general agreed to accept the British orders. This is very different from what General Oliva Roget said in Paris. In Paris

he said that the British intervened in Damascus on the evening of the 31st May [illegible] the night of the 31st May–1st June, even though the British had said they had intervened to maintain order and were supposed to be protecting French lives. According to Colonel Morgan General Oliva Roget had not accepted our terms until the 1st June, and so we were unable to intervene and protect French lives during that period when General Oliva-Roget charges us with being responsible for the deaths of French officers.

Later that evening I was received by Jamil Bey Mardam, Acting Prime Minister [illegible] Foreign Affairs and National Defence. Jamil Bey Mardam put to me the Syrian case, which I was to hear repeated in almost exactly the same words by every Syrian official to whom I spoke. Briefly, the Syrian point of view is as follows:—

1. The Syrian quarrel with the French springs from the Syrians' relations with the French [illegible]
2. The French have progressively cheated the Syrians of their hopes and aspirations for liberty and independence, so that no Syrian has now any confidence left in anything the French say or do.
3. The Syrian feelings are so bitter that there is now no question of there being any Frenchmen and bad Frenchmen; all Frenchmen are to the Syrians [illegible] shall stay in the country.
4. The whole population of Syria is united and unanimous in their distrust and hatred of the French and the present anti-French manifestations are not the expression of feeling of any party or section of the country but represents the country as a whole.
5. During the years they have been in Syria the French have done nothing for Syria, and there is no question of the French ever having a privileged position in Syria. The Syrian Government is determined to be free to make whatever treaties and agreements with foreign countries it may desire.
6. The presence of French troops in the country is a continual provocation and [illegible] while French troops remain in Syria.
7. It is useless for the French to cling to the Troupes Spéciales, who are deserting in ever increasing numbers, more than a quarter having [illegible]
8. The Lebanese Government is [illegible] Syrian Government and the presence of French troops in the Lebanon is, in the view of the Syrian Government, a danger to Syria. As well as withdrawing from Syria there can be no solution without a withdrawal from the Lebanon as well.
9. The French have always posed as the protectors of the Christians, doing their [illegible] of persecution by the Moslems. There is no truth in this and Christians and Moslems in Syria are united in their present desire to have no more of French rule.

The following morning I called on Shukri Bey Quwatli, President of the Syrian [illegible] on every hill overlooking the main towns. It was there that they had established their armies and their guns had pointed at the towns and villages which lay below. It was not an army that had come to defend the country, it was an army that had come to fight and subdue the country. He spoke at some length about French culture, of which he said the Syrians would have no more, and told me that students were putting to [illegible] I thought that this was an act which would be badly received in the world at large; that it savoured of Nazi methods and that one could not destroy truth by burning books. He said it was a spontaneous outburst showing the hatred which every Syrian had for the French. They loathed French culture and they wished to remove all traces of it from their country. We were [illegible] the only exception talking in French. (I later reported the plan to burn the books publicly to His Majesty's Consul, Damascus, who agreed that it was an act likely to provoke

disorders and as a result protests were made to the Syrian Government, and a large-scale demonstration was stopped.) The President stressed that in his view [illegible] that the French relations with Syria and their attitude towards the Syrians would improve. He said that whatever any Frenchman said now who was out of power, once he came to power he would carry on just as the others had carried on. He said that if M. Herriot succeeded General de Gaulle to-morrow there would be no change in French policy towards Syria, M. Herriot would be just as bad as General de Gaulle, and so it would be with any other Frenchman. If General Catroux were to return to Syria the President said he would refuse to receive him.

I asked the President about Syria's relations with the Arab League. He replied that Syria lent its fullest support to the Arab League and that the Syrian Government intended to take its rightful place in Arab councils. Damascus [illegible] attached great importance to its relation with the other Arab States. Finally he summed up Syrian determination to free themselves from what he called "French domination" by assuring me that if the French bombarded Syria so that half their houses were destroyed over their heads, the Syrians would fight on and would never submit to the French.

[illegible] the Délégué-Adjoint at Damascus. He had been informed of my visit by General [illegible] eye-witness account of what happened, but that if I wished to speak to any of his staff [illegible] the last six months in the Levant forced him to the conclusion that relations between British and French officers were bad and had been so for some time. He went on to say that now, as a result of the British army's intervention, the British had come out into the open and the French military naturally felt humiliated. He spoke at length of the famous interview between Colonel Morgan and General Olivo Roget. He said that had he been in General Olivo Roget's place he would never have accepted the orders because of the manner in which they were given. He showed me a copy of the now famous letter and said that he himself would have handed the letter back and said, "You can shoot me if you want to, but I cannot accept orders couched in that language."

[illegible] He referred to the French bombardment of the city and believed that the disorders were stirred up by some thousand or fifteen hundred turbulent characters, inflamed by the Government. He believed that the French, by force, had the city under control and that if the British had not intervened, law and order would have been restored and maintained by the French. He did admit that feeling in Damascus is such that now a Fr[illegible] admitted that he himself was forced to travel in a British armoured car when he left his headquarters. He also admitted that French civilians, realising their danger, had [illegible] evacuation. He admitted that Troupes Spéciales were deserting every day and told me that at one barracks a deserter had been captured before he could get away and that the man was now awaiting court-martial. For this the penalty was death. He said that he himself would preside at the court-martial, but seemed genuinely worried at the prospect of having to condemn to death and execute publicly a Syrian member of the Troupes Spéciales, fully realising the effect that it was likely to have on other Syrians who had up to the present remained loyal to the French, and confessed that there was a danger of the Syrians turning against their French officers.

He complained that there was no French journalist in Damascus and that the French public were not receiving any news from Damascus from French sources. He asked me to raise this with the British authorities and request that a French correspondent should be allowed to go to Damascus. Finally, he complained that French property was still being looted, and that despite our claim to be maintaining order, the Syrians were indulging in anti-French demonstrations. He told me that five days previously a donkey wrapped in the French flag had been paraded in front of his window by some Syrians. He said that it was only with difficulty he had restrained himself from drawing his pistol. He argued

[illegible] sibility to the Syrian gendarmerie either we were shutting our eyes to the [illegible] the Syrian Government.

While in Damascus I had conversations with numerous British offi[illegible] including His Majesty's Consul, Major Porter, British Security Mission, [illegible] Group-Captain Marsack, of the Ministry of Information. All were agreed as to the actual incidents which had been caused by French troops firing wildly at Troupes Spéciales deserters, with the result that civilians in the road were injured, and that the French without hesitation had launched a full-scale attack on the town with artillery, aircraft, tanks and machine-guns, which had been placed at strategic points on roofs commanding the main streets in the centre of the city. All were equally unanimous with regard to the entire population being concerned in the anti-French demonstrations, and that it was in no way the work of a small group acting contrary to the general feeling. I also enquired into [illegible] Br[illegible] Frere told me that the British military authorities had exhumed the bodies of the Syrian [illegible] certainly found cuts on these bodies but could not say that these were not such as would have been likely to have been caused during the hand-to-hand fighting which took place inside the Parliament building.

I found, however, that the Syrians believe that the Senegalese did carry out atrocities. While waiting to see the Acting Prime Minister, his secretary told me that the Senegalese had cut off the ears and noses of the Syrian gendarmes. Brigadier Frere was present and he denied the story, telling the Acting Prime Minister's secretary of the findings of the British army doctors who conducted the exhumation. Later in my conversation with the Acting Prime Minister, he repeated the story of the atrocities to me and I again denied it.

There is no doubt that extensive looting was carried out by the Senegalese troops and the British army has recovered a great deal of looted property.

Homs.

I went to Homs on the afternoon of the 22nd June, where I was met by Major Pelloe [illegible] last very long and by the time the British troops arrived the French had already subdued the town. With Major Pelloe I called on the Mohafez, Fuad Hallabi. There are no French in Homs now and I found the same determined anti-French spirit. The Mohafez told me that no one in the town wished to see the French again, and said he hoped that the British would stay. He said quite frankly that what his people wanted was for the French to withdraw and for the British to stay for a period. He did not think the Syrian Government could take over the country immediately. He asked nothing better than that Britain should send technical experts of all kinds to advise and help the Syrians. The French, he said, had never done so. They had sent soldiers to rule them.

Major Pelloe showed me the text of the French terms which were presented to the Mohafez by the French delegué when the town was forced to surrender in the face of superior French force. They included orders to the townspeople to remove barricades, cease demonstrations, allow the free circulation of all French military and civilians to collect food, no traffic was to pass the French délégation and French troops would remain in barracks, but reprisals would be [illegible] The [illegible] read: "No complaints of [illegible] will be received either by the military commander or by the [illegible] the sacking and entire burning to the ground of the town.

Hama.

Later that evening I went on to Hama, where I was met by Major Dearden, the Br[illegible]

Ha[illegible] contact with [illegible] a few [illegible] Arabs [illegible] from the air [illegible] people were [illegible] two tractor [illegible] There also shot down two

[illegible] the French lost [illegible] Hama, with the result that Hama, flushed with pride in its victory, is most violently anti French

I called on the Mohafez, Khalil Bey Dagheistani. In his office when I called was a deserter from the Troupes Spéciales and another from the Bedouin control. He expressed the unity of his townspeople in their hatred for the French and their determination never to have them back in Hama again. In Hama the hatred has become a blood feud and in certain families and tribes solemn oaths have been [illegible] The Mohafez said that all was quiet in the town now but that while any French remained in Syria there was always the danger of disturbances. Their presence in the Lebanon he regarded as provocation if they remained in the Lebanon [illegible] their agents into the country with a view to regaining their previous position [illegible] Azem, the head of the leading family in Hama, who by his wealth and position is the most powerful influence in the town. I spoke to him through his son Abdul Rahman Azem, a very intelligent young man speaking good French [illegible] between Syria and France, explaining how the confidence of the Syrians had been shaken by the French, first in 1936 when the treaty was never ratified, again in 1941 when General Catroux negotiated no treaty after the Free French forces had supplanted the Vichy administration of General Dentz and finally shattered by the recent events. I could not help being impressed by the fact that his analysis of the history of France's relations with Syria was practically word for word what I had heard Madame Vienot, speaking for the Socialist party say in Paris during the first day of the debate on Syria before the French Consultative Assembly. I tried to explain to him that I had heard similar views expressed [illegible] that there were no Frenchmen whom they could trust and that from France they would never get independence. He assured me that even if what I said were true it was too late. The Syrian people could never trust anything that was said by any Frenchman again. He reminded me that the present Government were the people who went to Paris in 1936 for the treaty negotiations and who, when they came back to Syria, did tremendous propaganda for France. These men were men of his father's age and were now so embittered that there was no [illegible] The young people of his own age could only judge from the Frenchmen they had seen in Syria and what they had seen confirmed what their parents told them.

When we came to discuss the future he explained to me that in Hama the people and the tribesmen, while they supported the Government in the present crisis, were not in favour of the republican system but wanted a monarchy. They preferred the idea of a monarchy and their choice for a king was the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan. He told me that they had had contact with the Amir Abdullah, who had sent several envoys to their town and that a movement in favour of a monarchy had gained a great deal of ground recently. He pointed out that the other Arab States—Egypt and Iraq—were monarchies and that we in England were a monarchy. He insisted that the king must be a member of the Hashimite family and they preferred Abdullah to the Emir Abdullah of Iraq. As for King Ibn Saud, they did not want him at any cost and they seemed to have a genuine dread of the Wahabis. One of the reasons he gave for this movement to set up a monarchy was the distrust of the sophisticated coffee-house politicians of Damascus and the belief that Damascus, and so Syria, could only regain its traditional pre-eminent place in the Arab world under an Arab king.

With regard to future relations with the French, he warned me that although they had won their battle of Hama they were not sitting back and taking it easy. They were still collecting arms and were still organising, and if the French came back to Hama they would fight again. The French would find that resistance this time would be even better organised.

There is no doubt that rich families like the Azems in this district are producing money to buy arms, are promising to feed Bedouins who come in from the desert and are very active in organising resistance to the French. Relations with the British and Indian troops in the area are everywhere good.

Aleppo.

I arrived in Aleppo on the evening of the 23rd June. In general the town of Aleppo has escaped the destruction to be seen in Damascus because it was

never shelled or bombarded from the air. The people have remained more calm than in other towns, due largely to the energy and influence of the Mohafez who, following the advice of His Majesty's Consul, worked ceaselessly to keep the population calm. The disturbances broke out on the 20th May, when a French officer drew his revolver on a crowd of student demonstrators and fired, killing [illegible] through the town. A Senegalese, a sergeant, and a French officer were killed at various points, the trams were stopped and tram windows were smashed.

The French reply was to order out armoured cars and by indiscriminate machine-gun fire clear the streets. Thirty people were killed.

I called on the French Délégué Adjoint, M. Fauquenot, at the Délégation. Soldiers in steel helmets stood guard on the roof. M. Fauquenot has been for many years in Syria. He was in Damascus during the revolt of 1925. From the [illegible] Britain and France in the Middle East and in Syria in particular. He assured me of his friendly feelings towards Britain and recalled his services in the British cause in the last war, for which he was decorated.

It became quite clear from the outset that he was thinking in terms of the French returning to Aleppo. He admitted that the French military authorities [illegible] had he had aeroplanes he would have bombed Aleppo. He claims that order had been restored in the town and that anti French feeling was beginning to die down before British troops arrived. Since their arrival it had broken out again because the effect of the presence of the British had been to give free rein to all anti-French elements. He said it would certainly be dangerous for a French soldier [illegible] French civilian. I raised with him the question of his driving round the town with a large French flag on his car, which I had mentioned to General Boyriet [illegible] Beirut at the request of His Majesty's Minister. His reply was that he might be shot at, that an escort could never prevent that and that in any case he was prepared to run the risk because if he did not go about showing the French flag, there was danger that France would be forgotten.

He called the present state of affairs "a fever" which would die down about October. The town, he said, was not united against the French, the Christian community were at heart pro-French, but were hiding their true feelings from fear. He said that the Armenians and Algerines in the Troupes Spéciales were loyal to France and that was why France could never hand over the Troupes Spéciales [illegible] that they had left the French, as they found themselves worse off with the Syrian gendarmerie. In Aleppo the Damascus Government was already being criticised [illegible] Minister was corrupt, and the Prime Minister pro-American. I asked him if he really believed that the British Government wished to supplant the French in Syria. His reply was that perhaps the British Government did not wish to [illegible] of Syria because of potential oil fields at Deir ez-Zor, and was it not true that General Spears had large oil interests? I asked him why, since he had spent so many years in this country and was familiar with Arab affairs, France had never concluded a treaty with the Syrians. He said that unfortunately circumstances had always been against them. He said that in 1941 he himself had produced all the Syrian leaders for General Catroux to see and that to each of them General Catroux had put the question of were they in favour of a treaty. They had all stated their desire for a treaty based on the treaty of 1936 with certain modifica[illegible] these modifications. I then asked who chose Sheikh Tag-ed-din as the first President of the Syrian Republic? His face fell and he told me that in his view this was an error. It was because of that choice that he was in Aleppo now, as he had asked to be transferred from Damascus as he knew it would be impossible to work with Sheikh Tag-ed-din.

I formed the impression that M. Fauquenot is an embittered man, who has worked for years in Syria, who knows more than most Frenchman about Arab affairs (he admitted that he spoke better Arabic than the oft-cited "British [illegible] off the Christians against the Moslems have not produced the results they had hoped for. Nevertheless, he is still most active in Aleppo, calling on leaders of

the Christian community to their very great embarrassment. He is going on blindly, trying to spread fear among the Christian communities, which in Aleppo are more numerous than in any other town in Syria, because he does not know what else to do.

M. Fauquenot was most correct and insisted on repaying my call, and as a result came to breakfast at His Majesty's Consulate before I left.

After seeing M. Fauquenot I called on the Mohafez of Aleppo, Ihsan Bey [illegible] M. Fauquenot had said. He charged the French with having sent to Syria second and third-class Frenchmen as their representatives. In the present administration were officers who in 1941 had been simple soldiers. The town of Aleppo was [illegible] of this was the fact that half the Troupes Spéciales deserters were Chr[illegible] He [illegible]ded that the French were offering double pay to the Troupes Spé[illegible] an effort to keep them. Another example of Christian feeling was to be seen in an appeal issued by the Armenian Patriarch to all Armenians in French service to leave their posts. Another complaint made by the Mohafez was that the French came to Syria only as officials. There were no business men in the country working in normal commercial relationships with the Syrian business communities. All the French were officials of one sort or another, who wanted to make as much as they could out of the country. No Frenchman came to work with the Syrians in their country. The Mohafez repeated what I had heard elsewhere, that the Syrians would never feel safe even while the French remained in the Lebanon. Order in Aleppo was now good, but only because the French in the town were kept out of sight; their presence, however, was a danger.

While in Aleppo His Majesty's Consul arranged for me to meet a number of the notables of the town. The Iraqi Consul, to whom I talked, told me that the town was now better armed and better organised than it had been during the incidents and that if the French tried to come back they would find more men with more arms against them. He also told me that the demonstration of students from which the disturbances had sprung had been ordered by the Damascus Government.

I had a long conversation with Ihsan Jabri, a National *Bloc* leader, and a [illegible] increasingly difficult for political leaders like himself to restrain the population from carrying out further acts of violence against the French and French property. He said that the continued presence of French troops in the town was a provocation and that the people wanted them to go and that if we did not evacuate them they might attack them. I was not completely convinced by his arguments, and formed the impression that there is a body of Syrian feeling which would like to stir up trouble in order to force us to evacuate the French.

In conversations I had with His Majesty's Consul and the British army commander I formed the very strong impression that in Aleppo when British troops [illegible] His Majesty's [illegible] taken great trouble to spare French feelings as much as possible. The result is that relations between the British army and the French military authorities are much better than they are in Damascus, and Colonel Gentis, the French commander, accompanies the British commander on all his tours round the district.

I left Aleppo on the 25th June by air, arriving in Beirut the same day.

2. *The Lebanon*

The Lebanon is at present quiet. The French are visible and up to the present there have been no disturbances, although the Lebanese Government has issued a joint declaration declaring its unity with the Syrian Government, and it is impossible to separate the Lebanon from Syria in the present crisis.

The bitterness of anti French feeling in the Lebanon is most noticeable to a returning visitor to what was formerly considered a French stronghold. British officials estimate that only 25 per cent. of the population to-day remains pro-French. This means that a little more than half of the Christian communities, on whom the French have always counted, have turned against them.

M. Henri Pharaon, the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, told me that the fact that the Lebanon had remained quiet was not due to the Lebanese Government, but entirely due to the British Government, and the counsels and assurances given them by His Majesty's Minister, who they believed acted in good faith.

There is no doubt that the Lebanon identifies itself with Syria in the quarrel [illegible]

[illegible] on the 20th June. The Prime Minister [illegible] proof of the interest England was taking in the Lebanese cause. He then plunged straight into an account of Lebanese differences with the French. The French concessions—the Banque de Syrie, the Customs, &c.—he said had been used by the French [illegible] the Lebanese people of their rightful wealth. The French had also [illegible] knowledge, but with the expert [illegible] Lebanese had had enough of the French teaching their children the life of Napoleon [illegible] The French [illegible] kept troops in the Lebanon on the ground that they were necessary to maintain order. If there had been disorders it was because of the presence of these French troops. After [illegible] there was no question of the French staying in the Lebanon. The Lebanese demanded the evacuation of the whole of the French troops and the return of the Troupes Spéciales to them. The French had also tried to divide them from the Syrians. [illegible] They knew that if left to handle their own affairs they could co-operate and agree with the Syrian Government.

The Prime Minister concluded by saying that he well understood the British reasons for friendship with France. We were neighbours in Europe, but he warned me against French jealousy of Britain's prestige in the world, which he said made the French hate us.

M. Henri Pharaon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, said there was no question of the Lebanese granting a position of privilege to France. The Lebanese wanted to be Lebanese, independent and free to make treaties with whom they liked. The French had [illegible] celebrations on VE-day, when they took paid demonstrators in lorries through the streets crying "Long Live de Gaulle," "We are de Gaulle's children." But when it came to negotiating a treaty, General Beynet came to see him two days before the arrival of reinforcements from France, but he never mentioned a treaty. The General waited until the reinforcements had arrived and then summoned him to Damascus and handed him the terms there. Why did the General wait until the ship arrived? Only because he meant to intimidate the Lebanese.

The Lebanese stood side by side with the Syrians in the present dispute; it made no difference whether the French bombed Damascus with only one aircraft or with a hundred aircraft. The fact that the French should use forceful methods had made them hated by all Syrians and Lebanese alike.

He concluded by making the statement quoted above about law and order having been maintained in the Lebanon thanks to the representations made by His Majesty's Government.

M.I.R.A.

While in Aleppo I talked to Brigadier Clarke, the British director of M.I.R.A., who was formerly the British representative in O.C.P. He gave me the following facts and figures about M.I.R.A.

On the 1st June, when M.I.R.A. was set up, Damascus had supplies for two days and Aleppo for five days. The rest of Syria could feed itself from locally-grown supplies. The Lebanon had supplies sufficient to last until the 5th July.

We had immediately borrowed 5,000 tons from the army, of which 2,500 tons had been distributed.

If M.I.R.A. had not been set up no cereals would have been purchased because French agents would have been lynched in the country, and the Arabs would have refused to sell. The result would have been that the Lebanese would have starved when existing stocks were gone. Syria could have fed itself, though Damascus would have been very hungry.

250,000 tons were needed yearly for Syria and the Lebanon. Of this the Lebanon took 140,000 tons a year and grew only 10,000 tons. That was why we had had to set up M.I.R.A. in the Lebanon as well as Syria, because the Syrians would not provide wheat for the French to distribute in the Lebanon.

The purchasing period was from June to October. Purchases were going on very well. The danger of famine had been averted and by the end of October he thought we could hand the whole organisation over to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments.

M.I.R.A. was using the O.C.P. offices and furniture and transport but a careful inventory had been made of all French property.

With regard to the amount owing to O.C.P. mentioned by M. Bidault, the sum was £S. 1 million. There was £S. 8 million in hand at the moment and the debt could be paid at any time.

Conclusions.

After so short a visit to the Levant States it would be foolish to pretend to arrive at definite conclusions. I was, however, very much impressed by the following factors in the situation :—

(1) The anti French feeling in Syria can only be regarded as a national rising against the French. [illegible] started at different points in the country and at different times, but have now become a national revolt by the whole population.

(2) Anti French feeling in the Lebanon should not be under-estimated because [illegible] incident for fierce fighting to begin. This danger does not decrease with the passing of time.

[illegible] The French would [illegible]. They would have had to send [illegible] of reconquest. Meanwhile the [illegible]

[illegible] our present position in Syria [illegible] up to our disadvantage. Up to the present we have got along [illegible] the Syrians and their liking for us. But British martial law does not exist in Syria and we have relatively few troops. Standing as we do between the Syrians and the French we please neither party. The Syrian Government is co-operating but there are elements who want to keep the fire burning. They have got the French on the run but they have not got them out everywhere. I foresee a difficult time [illegible] the Syrians from [illegible], which is bound to make us unpopular with them. This is also likely to [illegible]

[illegible] here is little hope of a permanent solution on the basis of the French [illegible] from [illegible] in the Lebanon. The French can only stay in the Levant States to-day backed by enormous forces.

(7) The only possible solution seems to be for French and British forces to withdraw simultaneously from both States and for the Troupes Spéciales [illegible]. A French [illegible] on equal footing with His Britannic Majesty's Legation might then be acceptable to the two States. The French cannot hope for [illegible] position [illegible] would [illegible] the past.

[illegible] States [illegible] interests in the Levant must not be overlooked. To the [illegible] must now be added [illegible]

[illegible] States. [illegible] relations with France, [illegible] in the Levant have not [illegible] our task of helping them any easier due to their mistrust of our intentions.

The only settlement is a very long-term one.

The first step is to overcome the French mistrust in Paris and get them to see that we alone have tried to help them in the Levant. The only restraining

voice speaking to the local Governments at the moment is the voice of His Majesty's Minister.

If the Levant States will accept a French Legation and French mistrust of British intentions can be overcome it is for His Majesty's Government to try to work out with the French Government, and perhaps with the United States Government, a common Arab policy for the Middle East, so that with the French Britain can present a united front on Middle Eastern affairs both to the Arabs and to the world.

I have, &c.
DONALD MALLETT

Beirut, 28th June, 1945.

E 4925/8/89 No. 14

(1)

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden.—(Received 7th July.)

([illegible])
([illegible])

Beirut, 5th July, 1945.

My telegrams Nos. 606 and 617.

[illegible] the transfer of Troupes Spéciales for publication. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs asked Count Ostrorog to make its tone and substance as sympathetic as possible and the French accepted an amendment [illegible] in this sense. Translation of the draft statement in my immediately following telegram.

2. The Syrians and Lebanese both objected to "the principle of the transfer [illegible] had been admitted long ago and that the acceptance of this formula would not satisfy public opinion and would enable the French to drag things out indefinitely, if they wished. The Syrians also objected to the word "accord." They proposed alternative text providing for "immediate and unconditional transfer" of troops and wished this to cover their arms, equipment and barracks.

3. I told both the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and Count Ostrorog who have been in constant touch with me, that while I saw force in objection to "principle" I considered Syrian amendment (which the French refused to accept) as unreasonable. As the French maintained the transfer of arms, equipment and barracks (some of which are French property having been paid for out of French funds and not out of "intérêts communs") must involve discussions between the French and States Governments, moreover, the French seemed perfectly justified in requiring some assurances from the Syrians about security and proper treatment of men and families of the men who had been particularly loyal to them, and also about the right of men who had signed [illegible] to serve in French regular forces to opt for that if they wished. N[illegible] agreed with me as did Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

4. After Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs had proposed a further formula which the French would not accept, Ostrorog made the following suggestion (in place of the last two paragraphs of draft) which avoids "principle" and "accord" :—

> "Declares that these troops [two groups undecypherable : ? may be transferred to] Syrian and Lebanese Governments in accordance with arrangements which will be defined in the shortest possible time."

5. After further discussion with the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ostrorog, [illegible] the Syrians to accept the above. Brigadier of General Staff Ninth Army accompanied me.

6. Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs feared that the French might spin out the discussion about arrangements connected with the transfer but he eventually agreed to the formula proposed subject to the Syrian President's approval. We had nearly three hours with Shukri who was in a difficult mood and highly suspicious of French good faith (compare my telegram No. 607). It was eventually agreed that the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs should ask the French to

accept a time limit of two months for discussion of the necessary arrangements. [illegible]

7. Please regard the above as confidential at present

E 4927 8 89] (2)

Mr Shone to Mr Eden.—(Received 6th July)

(No 631)
(Telegraphic) *Beirut, 5th July, 1945*

MY immediately preceding telegram
Following is text as drafted by Count Ostorog.

The Provisional Government [illegible]

Wishing to see Syria and the Lebanon invested with all the preroga[illegible] the United Nations

'Declares that it gives its immediate and unconditional agreement to [illegible]

'The arrangements for this transfer will be settled with the least possible delay by a common agreement between the three interested Governments.'

2. The following was inserted as paragraph 2 at the request of the Lebanese M[illegible] and at the same time, to give them full satisfaction regarding these ports."

E 4927/8 89 (3)

Mr Shone to Mr Eden.—(Received 7th July)

(No 638)
(Telegraphic) *Beirut 6th July 1945*

MY telegram No 630 paragraph 4

Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that the Syrians, French and [illegible] shortest possible time" the words "with a maximum delay of forty five days"

2. The announcement is to appear in the press of the 8th July

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E 4942 14/89 (4)

Mr Holman to Mr Eden.—(Received 9th July.)

(No 972)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris 9th July 1945*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has issued following communiqué published in Paris press of the 8th July —

"Under the terms of a declaration issued at Beirut by General Beyret [illegible] has been decided in view of the end of hostilities in Europe to accede to the wishes of Syria and the Lebanon to constitute a national army and, consequently, to transfer to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments the locally recruited military units, of which the French command had taken cha[illegible]

"The steps by which this transfer is to be effected will be defined within forty five days"

E 6094 8 89] No 1

Mr Bevin to Mr Duff Cooper (Paris)

(No 1497)
Sir *Foreign Office, 16th August, 1945*

I MET M Massigli to-day and conveyed to him congratulations on the conclusion of the war in the East which he stated he would pass on to his Govern[illegible] I then made a tentative approach on the problem of the Levant As he [illegible] I asked him to speak to M Bidault rather than pass on my views by telegram.

2. I said that he must understand that anything I said would not commit His Majesty's Government since the Cabinet had not yet discussed this matter It was most desirable, however, that the Levant question should be settled, for that would assist us in dealing with other outstanding problems between our two countries I understood that the French had suspicions that if the troops of both countries were all withdrawn and trouble thereafter arose the British would go in and remain there. I wanted to adopt means which would remove any suspicion of that character

3. The tentative suggestions I made were that —

(1) Both Governments should agree forthwith to withdraw their troop[illegible]
(2) If the French had fears for the Christian minorities and the likelihood of an attack upon them, it would be left to Britain, America and France, in the interim period before the functioning of the World Organisation, to decide whether they should intervene, and if so to determine what troops would be used. So far as we were concerned, we would support the employment of French troops for this purpose. This, I thought would have a moral effect in preventing outbreaks and would mean that care would be taken by the Syrians and Lebanese to see that these things did not arise At the same time, there should be a strict understanding between both of us that there would be no provocation
(3) The police force should be organised Advisers should be sought from Sweden or Denmark
(4) Steps should be taken to deal with the problem of exchange in order that the territories might be fed. This would have to be discussed between us.
(5) The question of a base which was claimed by France should be dealt with by the World Organisation when the time came.

4. M Massigli then raised the question of air services and I asked him whether he meant purely commercial and he said "Yes" Both of us had airfields and both had air services and there would have to be a settlement of this question.

5. I indicated that if this tentative approach appealed to his Government, then I would take the matter up with the Cabinet If they approved this policy we could set our respective staffs busy to work it out I said that I had no objection if the proposals on these lines actually came from him. That might assist him in which case I would remain in the background

I am, &c
ERNEST BEVIN

E 6228 5484 89 No 16

Mr Shone to Mr Bevin.—(Received 25th August)

(No 172)
Sir *Beirut, 9th August, 1945*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith [illegible] of a [illegible]ing paper, prepared by Headquarters, British Troops, North Levant, on the Christian-Moslem problem in Syria.

2. The paper stresses, rightly in my opinion, the special composition of the population of the province of Syria which (like the Lebanon) contains many different and often mutually antagonistic communities. Some of these, notably the Assyrians and Armenians, are comparatively recent immigrants who took refuge from persecution elsewhere and it is not therefore surprising that, having up to the present been accustomed to look to the French for protection,

they should now display apprehensions for their safety in the event of a general evacuation of Syria by Allied troops. How far these fears are justified, only the future can show, but it is unfortunately undeniable that in the Jezireh they are widespread amongst the minorities and, indeed, amongst the sedentary population as a whole. They seem to be based less on doubts of the intentions of the Syrian authorities than on disbelief in the ability of those authorities to protect them, *e.g.*, against marauding Bedouin tribes, and they are not likely to be allayed unless, during the period which elapses before a final Allied withdrawal, [illegible] efficient control.

3. In the rest of Syria the prospects of co-operation between Christians and Moslems seem more promising. The Orthodox communities in particular have usually been able to maintain good relations with the Moslems, perhaps [illegible] have found it necessary to do so. It is the less numerous Catholic communities who, from their long tradition of French protection, have tended to adopt an attitude of superiority towards the Moslems and who in consequence now feel themselves most in danger of oppression. The fact that a large number of the [illegible] latter in the present heat of anti French feeling amongst the Moslems, particularly liable to retaliatory measures.

4. The present rulers of Syria seem alive to the dangers of the present situation of which I have spoken to them more than once. As reported in my telegram No 740 of the 1st August, the Syrian President has convened Christian leaders in order to assure them of his Government's intentions to treat Christians and Moslems on an equal footing, and the Government are understood to have instructed the Moslem *Ulema* to preach religious tolerati[illegible] Syrian electoral law provides for an equitable distri[illegible] Chambers amongst all communities, in proportion to their numbers, and it will not have escaped notice that the present Prime Minister is a Christian, and that two of the three members of the Syrian Delegation to San Francisco [illegible] included the Prime Minister) were Christians. So long, indeed, as Cl[illegible] show themselves to be politically in harmony with the prevailing [illegible] nationalism—in the sense of loyalty to the Syrian State—and so long as this spirit is free from religious fanaticism and xenophobia, they need have little fear [illegible] In the remoter country districts the safety of Christian villages must depend, after the withdrawal of Allied forces, on the extent to which an entirely [illegible] Syrian Government can keep order and impose respect for their a[illegible] the Syrian Government can do this, any declaration they may m[illegible] intention to give full protection to Christians will be of little va[illegible] in these districts.

5. Syrian Christians are apt to express fears that, in an officially Moslem state the law of which is based on the Koran, they may find the scales of justice habitually weighted against them, and that Moslems will always prefer Moslems when it comes to the choice of contractors or Government emp[illegible] This undoubtedly may occur, to some extent at least. But Syrian Moslems are [illegible] general not fanatical, and so long as the Syrian Government give proof of their intention to avoid serious discrimination against Christians and provided that any tendencies to fanaticism and xenophobia are kept in check the only real danger of a more general Christian Moslem clash, elsewhere than in the Jezireh, seems to lie in the possibility that some of the Christians will not, in the words of paragraph 15 of the enclosed memorandum, be "tactful and correct" in their behaviour towards the Moslems. Such canons of behaviour have not always been followed by minorities elsewhere and if any of these communities should be led to believe that, even after the establishment of complete Syrian independence, they have only to raise their voices to bring about the intervention of powerful external forces, whether secular or religious, on their behalf [illegible] will be the less likely to settle down to their inevitable final status as members of the Syrian State. It is during the present transitional period, when the abrupt change in the situation hitherto obtaining and uncertainty as to the future have naturally had an unsettling effect, that the activities of ignorant or ill intentioned agitators can be most mischievous.

6. I attach also a note on the Christian Moslem question in the Lebanon. Here the problem is very different. In the Lebanon as at present constituted, the Christians slightly outnumber the Moslems and no one community forms a

majority. Christian-Moslem strife in the former "Little Lebanon" is a comparatively recent memory, and the possibility of the Lebanese Christians [illegible] of the Lebanon, and there have been many signs of late that the political leaders (Riad Solh, for example) will do everything in their power to prevent it. The issue is, indeed, between those, Christians and Moslems alike, who wish to see the establishment of an independent Lebanon in which all communities will have equal rights, and those extreme Christians, led by the Maronite Patriarch and his clergy, who wish to see the Lebanon converted into a "Christian Home" protected by foreign Powers against any possibility of Moslem domination.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE

P.S.—Since drafting the above, I have received from H.Q., B.T.N.L., a [illegible] pared by Brigadier Clayton, of the Minister Resident's office, and P.I.C.M.E. With their permission, I enclose copy of these comments, which in general do not affect the conclusions in my despatch.

T. S.

Enclosure 1 in No. 16

(Secret.)

Memorandum by Headquarters, British Troops, North Levant

THE CHRISTIAN MOSLEM PROBLEM IN SYRIA.

The Future Relations between the Two Communities when the French and British withdraw

General

THE Near East has seen the birth of three of the great religions of the world, the Christian, the Jewish and the Moslem, and it has also seen the division of these religions into many and varied sects, the majority of whom have been engaged in conflict with each other for centuries. The religious differences are often complicated by racial distinctions and it is at times difficult to discern whether a dispute is a religious or racial one, or both. It is usually both.

2. The largest element of the population of Syria is Arab and Moslem. Of these, the greater number are Sunni Moslems, but there are some Shias, and two important sects springing from Shi-ism, the Druzes and the Alaouités. The last two are secret religions, but they probably take something from Christianity and paganism as well as from Islam. The Christian sects in the country are divided into five main groups: Armenians—Catholic and Orthodox, Syrians—Catholic and Orthodox, Greeks—Catholic and Orthodox, Maronites and Assyrian Nestorians. Of these, the largest and most important groups are the Greek Orthodox and the Armenian Orthodox.

Distribution and Numbers.

3. The census [illegible] 1943 showed a total population [illegible] 2,500,000. Of [illegible] 1,97,000 are Sunni Moslems who [illegible] largest group in the [illegible] 82,000 [illegible] 57,000. Of the other [illegible] 12,700 [illegible] 28,000.

4. The largest [illegible] Greek Orthodox [illegible] 136,900. They are followed [illegible] Orthodox [illegible] 101,700 [illegible] 4,000 [illegible] 41,700 [illegible] 16,000 and the Maronites 13,300. The other Christian groups are of small importance—they [illegible] 11,000 [illegible] 4,700 [illegible] 900. Syria has 29,700 Jews, practically all of whom live in Damascus and Aleppo. The Yazidis, Kurds who practise an interesting semi-pagan religion which includes devil propitiation, number only 2,300, and they live in the Aleppo area and in the Jezireh.

5. The Christian communities are distributed throughout the country but, except in the Euphrates and Jezireh Mohafazats, they live mostly in the large

towns. The Greek Orthodox population is concentrated mostly into the four Mohafazats of Damascus (with 23,700), Homs (with 20,200), Hama (with 17,300) and Lattakia (with 58,100). The Armenian Orthodox community have their [illegible] 67,500 in the Aleppo Mohafazat—and the only other large group of [illegible] Damascus with 16,800. The Greek Catholics are nearly all concentrated into the Mohafazats of Damascus (with 20,300) and Aleppo (with 11,900). Three-quarters of the Maronites are in the Lattakia Mohafazat. All the Nestorian Assyrians live in the Jezireh.

Past Relations of Moslem and Christian Elements.

6. During the 400 years that Syria formed part of the Ottoman Empire the Sunni Moslem element was dominant in all branches of activity. The Sunni Sultan Caliph at Constantinople could feel little sympathy with the religious minorities in his Empire, and too often the Turks solved the minority problem particularly the Armenian one, by applying the decisive proverb "Stone dead hath no fellow." The frequent interference of foreign Christian Powers, particularly Russia, France and Great Britain, induced the Sultan to take a more statesmanlike attitude towards his Christian subjects, and the Millet System, whereby the religious head of each Christian community was made responsible to the Constantinople Government for the good behaviour and government of his flock, produced a reasonably tolerable status for the minorities. Nevertheless, Christian loyalty to the Ottoman Government was never very strong, and the communities tended to look towards foreign Christian Powers for support—the Syrian and Armenian Orthodox to Russia, the Maronites and Catholic communities to France.

7. [illegible] distinctions only widened the political [illegible] ference helped in this widening and, [illegible] and France came to Syria, there existed a religi[illegible] of religious discrimination under the Turks.

8. At the same time the growth of Arab nationalism was a factor of importance. The movement was not essentially a Moslem one. The emphasis was on the Arab rather than on Islam. Many Christian Arabs were ardent supporters of the movement. It must not be forgotten, however, that the Arab past and the period of Arab Empire, from which the movement so much derives its inspiration, are inextricably bound up with Islam. In any Arab movement, Islam is bound to be a dominating factor. The Christian Arabs realise this, and yet it has not prevented them from being Nationalists.

9. As far as Arab Christians are concerned, therefore, there would seem to be no great fear of persecution or even unfavourable treatment on the part of Moslems. With foreign communities, peoples with no Arab blood, the danger is more pronounced. Events in Palestine have produced a decided anti-Jewish bias throughout all the Arab countries. In Iraq the State showed itself unable to absorb satisfactorily its Assyrian minority. In Syria an anti-Armenian move is by no means an improbability. Racial rather than religious discrimination is [illegible] foreign minorities, with the exception of the Jews, are mostly Christian. Therefore, racial persecution would undoubtedly appear also as religious. But the racial cause would be the potent one, the religious one would be only subsidiary.

10. During the years of their mandate in Syria, the French endeavoured to pursue a "divide and rule" policy. They attempted to "play off" the minorities, such as the Christians, the Druzes and the Alaouites, against the Moslem majority. Their efforts met with some success. The unwisdom of French policy in the war years which culminated in their major blunder of May and June of this year have brought about a unity of all religions and races in Syria such as has never been known before. Many "fence-sitters" have veered to the side of the Government, and the minorities have thrown in their lot with the Moslem Arabs. Unity of all communities has been achieved against the French, an uncertain question is whether that unity will continue when the French have gone.

The Situation after a Franco-British Withdrawal.

11. The main areas where there are large Christian groups, other than the Jezireh, are [illegible] The situation in all these areas would seem to be similar, and the different religious communities fear the future in varying degrees. The Greek Orthodox Communities, most of

whom are of Arab blood, have been for some time on good terms with the Moslem authorities. Many [illegible] undoubtedly be loyal to an Arab State, and would expect to be given religious toleration in return.

12. The Maronites and the communities affiliated to the Catholic Church were always more [illegible] to fear the future. Recently, however, most of them have been anxious to demonstrate their loyalty to the Syrian State, and it is unlikely that they will be persecuted [illegible] minority in a politically undeveloped State.

13. The Armenians are a more complicated problem. They are not Arab, many of them have favoured French rule, and they have memories of cruel Moslem persecution under the Turks. They are a politically-minded people, and a group of them look towards Russia and the attractive goal of Soviet Armenia. A large number of them favour America and Great Britain. They are a wealthy, [illegible] to the Arab. Any loyalty they would possess to an Arab Syrian State would be entirely based on self interest and not on deeper instincts. In the recent crisis they [illegible] movement. Years of persecution have taught them tact and the importance of not arousing the ire of the ruling majority. Trouble will probably not come from them when the French and British go, and it is unlikely that the Arab Government would seriously persecute a well behaved and economically important portion of its population.

14. The Jezireh [illegible] mixture of Christian sects—approximately 2,000 Armenian Catholics, 8,000 Armenian Orthodox, 2,000 Chaldeans, 3,000 Syrian Catholics, 18,000 Syrian Orthodox, and 9,000 Nestorian Assyrians. The Jezireh is a province in which the authority of the Syrian Government is less strong than elsewhere, and it would be particularly difficult for them to control the large and lawless tribes in that region. The Christians in the area have not reacted favourably to the movement against the French, and the majority feel that their position would be untenable if both the British and French forces left. The Moslems have made efforts to conciliate the Christians and to assure them that they have nothing to fear. It is likely that the Jezireh is an area which might need special treat[illegible] force, and the solution might be in a small foreign mission—perhaps American—being attached to the force and ensuring the guarding and fair treatment of the Christians. Any appearance of favouritism towards the Christians at the expense of the Moslems would have to be most carefully avoided.

Conclusion.

15. Other than the Jezireh, which would seem to be a special case deserving special treatment, Moslem persecution of Christians after a Franco-British withdrawal is unlikely. The Christians would have to realise that they are minorities and as such need to be tactful and correct in their behaviour towards the Moslems. With foreign influences removed, the Christians would [illegible] but is unlikely to take violent form. [illegible] Christians. [illegible] efficient police force, it will be able to control the more lawless Mos[illegible] who might try to make [illegible]

Enclosure 2 in No. 16

Note by British Legation, Beirut.

The Christian Moslem Question in the Lebanon.

THE present Lebanon dates only from 1920. Before that date, the present Mohafazats of north Lebanon, south Lebanon and Beirut belonged to the Turkish *Vilayet* of Beirut, the Bekaa (less Zahlé) formed part of the Vilayet

of Syria, and the present Mohafazat of Mount Lebanon, plus the district of Z[illegible] by five foreign Powers (Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia and Prussia).

2. This "Mountain" was populated almost entirely by Maronites (who were in a large majority), Greek Orthodox, and Druzes. When the Lebanon, by the Decree of General Gouraud in 1920, was extended to its present boundaries, its population was increased by many thousands of Sunni and Shia Moslems and by some Greek Catholic and other Christian minorities. As a result, the Christian (Maronite and Greek Orthodox) majority of some 80 per cent. in the Little Lebanon was reduced to its present proportion of some 55 per cent. Since 1920 the Moslems have probably increased faster than the Christians, but against this must be set the influx of Armenian (Orthodox and Catholic) refugees from Turkey who have been settled either in Beirut or in Shia districts in the Bekaa and south Lebanon. It should also be noted that the great majority of Lebanese emigrants established abroad are Christians.

3. Following the Statute of 1864, which laid down the régime for the former "Little Lebanon," Great Britain, France and Russia were recognised [illegible] communities respectively. The communal system established at that time has been consecrated in the present Constitution of the Lebanon, which provides for equitable division of public functions between all communities and for the representation of the principal communities in the Government. The present electoral law, based on this Constitution, comprises an elaborate formula by which the communities in each Mohafazat are represented by a number of Deputies proportionate to their strength.

4. A considerable cleavage between the different Lebanese communities continues to exist. For this the following factors are all to some extent responsible:—

(a) The policy of "divide and rule" pursued by the French Mandatory authorities.

(b) The existing laws of personal status which give considerable powers to the ecclesiastical courts in such matters as the marriage of members of their communities.

(c) [illegible] particularly the Maronites inhabiting the [illegible] Intermarriage between Christians and Moslems is [illegible].

(d) An increasing difference of culture due to the fact that the Christians in general look westwards and the Moslems eastwards.

Whilst all thinking Lebanese are prepared to agree that these communal barriers constitute a serious handicap to the emergence of an independent Lebanon, few if any, politicians would be prepared to support any change in the existing Constitution or electoral law designed to eliminate their communal basis. It was noticeable that when in 1943 an attempt was made by the temporary Head of the State to amend the electoral law in a manner which increased the number of Christian seats more than that of the Moslem seats, a violent Moslem reaction was at once followed by a Christian counter reaction and a serious crisis arose. The heads of the different communities are constantly insisting on the rights of their communities to a proportionate share of even the lowest Government functions, so that even the recruitment of 100 gendarmes can only be effected by giving so many of the 100 to each community.

5. It is clear from the above that the whole structure of the Lebanon still rests on a communal basis, and that sufficient prejudice still exists amongst the [illegible] Christian communities are often acute. But, as was shown in the crisis over the electoral law referred to above, there is a general tendency for Christian and Moslem communities to divide into separate camps on such issues. The fundamental risk of Christian Moslem strife in the Lebanon resides in the attitude of the reactionary Maronites (particularly those inhabitating the "Mountain" and in close touch with the Maronite clergy), for their memories of the 1860 massacres and consequently deep-rooted fears of anything that savours of Moslem domination, seem ineradicable. These fears are much less strong in the other Christian communities, the Greek Orthodox, and to some extent Greek Catholics, have always prided themselves on their good relations with the Moslems, whilst

the Armenians, knowing themselves to be still alien immigrants, are anxious only for a quiet life.

6. On the political plane, Christian Moslem rivalry is less clearly defined, since many even of the Maronites (for example, the present Lebanese President) are working as enthusiastically as the Moslems for the elimination of French control over the Lebanon. The Moslems, too, are not all of one mind; some of the Sunnis seek the incorporation of the Lebanon in the Arab League and to this end might even welcome the union of the Lebanon with Syria, whilst other Sunnis and most Shias and Druzes dislike the idea of being governed from Damascus and seek only autonomy without foreign control. But the opponents of the present regime, including those who are generally regarded as pro-French, are drawn almost exclusively from the reactionary Maronites; and even those Christians who [illegible] like the French generally favour the establishment of an autonomous Lebanon separate from the other Arab States and [illegible] by one or more foreign Powers against the possibility of any eventual aggression on the part of the Moslems of Syria or elsewhere.

Beirut, 2nd August, 1945.

Enclosure 3 in No. 10

[illegible] *by Brigadier Clayton on Enclosure 1*

REFERENCE [illegible] paragraph 2 of the report. The classification of the Christian sects is [illegible] important racial group of their own, as do the Assyrian Nestorians on a much smaller scale. Apart from [illegible] difference is between the Uniate (Catholic) Churches on the one hand, and the [illegible] Greek and Syrian Catholics, the Maronites and the Chaldeans, the Armenian Catholics also have ties with this group. The latter group includes the Greek Orthodox, the Syrian Orthodox (Jacobites) and the Protestants. The Armenian Orthodox (Gregorians) and the Assyrian Nestorians are swayed chiefly by racial ties. It might be made clear that all these Christian Churches, except the Armenians and Nestorians, are Arab, just as much as are the Moslems.

2. Reference paragraphs 6 and 7. The Millet system was [illegible] gave the Greek Orthodox Patriarch a measure of temporal [illegible] own flock, supported him in his spiritual authority and recognised him as the responsible head of his own community or "millet." This step was taken on the sultan's own initiative. Whilst the Sunni Caliph in Istanbul may not have had much sympathy with his Christian minorities, he did give them a very considerable measure of protection. It was the frequent interference of foreign Powers and their attempts to trade on their connexion with the Christian minorities for political ends that irritated and frightened the Turks, and was to no small extent indirectly the cause of the massacres. The "millet" system worked tolerably well although, as the report states, it emphasised religious differences. These differences, however, are inevitable where Moslem law is the law of the country, or where the Shari' code is admitted as a civil code. The effects of external irritation, with consequent Christian Moslem trouble, potential or actual, have also [illegible] "protection" in the Levant, which has emphasised and fostered the desire for protection among the Christians. To avoid Christian Moslem trouble, the need or desire for "protection" has to be removed.

3. Reference paragraphs 9 and 10. In Iraq it was the Assyrian minority that [illegible] not only religious but [illegible] and civil separation. It is questionable whether discrimination in Syria will [illegible] of the Armenians and the Jews, the other inhabitants of Syria are all of one race and for some [illegible] religious discrimination [illegible]. The Christians have a very definite minority complex. The Moslems have an equally pronounced superiority complex.

4. The rest of the report is considered [illegible] of the conditions [illegible] optimistic. There will certainly be considerable discrimination, but if the conditions outlined in the last sentence of the report are fulfilled, this discrimination should stop short of persecution and will be no greater than in Iraq or Egypt.

[E 6670 6 89]

No. 17

Mr Shone to Mr Bevin. (Received 7th September.)

(No. 161.)

Sir,

Beirut, 25th August, 1945

IN my despatch No. 69 of the 30th April I gave an account of developments in the Levant States, with particular regard to the relations between France and the States, up to about the middle of that month. The t[illegible] due to continue the story. The [illegible] is scarcely possible to provide an adequate record of the period in the compass of a single despatch. When few have time to read long despatches it may seem [illegible] al in comparison with those in other parts of the globe. But they have had such repercussions, not only in the Arab world but on Anglo-French relations, and they have given rise to so much misunderstanding and misrepresentation that I feel a despatch which enters into some detail may be more valuable and more interesting than one which would be at once briefer and more colourless. While I must write it mainly from the local angle, I shall include in it some account of the more important convers[illegible] well as here and I shall venture to draw one or two conclusions. By devoting several paragraphs to events in Damascus between the 29th May and the 1st June of which I was an eye-witness or of which I learned from others in close touch with me, at the expense of much that might be written about occurrences else[illegible] I can at least hope that my account will be accurate and objective [illegible] ence not only for its length but also for its shortcomings.

2. I w[illegible] the end of April I submitted that we should be under no [illegible]ston as to the nature of the *détente* in relations between France and the Levant States, which had been [illegible] also with the aid of the United S[illegible] of the Arab States. In January and February the tension betwee[illegible] and the French and conditions in Damascus had been such as t[illegible] radically [illegible] and French activities in the States (*e.g.*, in the Alaouite territory) went to show that the French were determined to preserve as much as they could of their former position. On the other hand, both States' Governments were, if anything, more determined than ever to concede no preference or privilege to France. The [illegible] direct approach to the Lebanese (which General Beynet later told me he thought had been a mistake), but the attitude of the Lebanese Government was perceptibly hardening to the [illegible] and were susceptible to attack by Nationalist elements notably Riad Solh's group, who were bent on making capital out of any appearance of fa[illegible] the part of the Government to defend Lebanese independence.

3. In the continued absence of the French Delegate General in Paris the only Franco-Syrian discussions which had taken place were those on the revised French draft of a University Convention. As the Syrians were only prepared to conclude such a convention as part of a general settlement, no real progress was to be expected until General Beynet returned with proposals concerning other outstanding matters, of which the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales* was, in Syrian eyes, by far the most important. In fact the discussions on the University Convention broke down before General Beynet's return as the Syrians considered the revised French draft to be unreasonable in that the application of certain of its provisions would have entailed French interference [illegible] mittee, appointed to discuss the draft, said they had no authority to modify it. The Syrian [illegible] that the Americans would have been unwilling to acquiesce in their acceptance of the French proposals, said they would not conclude an agreement which went beyond the terms of the Report by the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education on Cultural Conventions.

4. On the 25th April the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me an account of a frank conversation he had had with Count Ostrorog (acting French Delegate General in the absence of General Beynet) in which he had stated fully and clearly the position of the Syrian Government with regard to their relations with France. The purpose of this conversation, he said, was to induce the French to make the most of the existing *détente* to reach a settlement.

He had also told Count Ostrorog, in response to a suggestion thrown out by M. [illegible] delegation at San Francisco discussing matters with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, they were not and would not be empowered to conduct negotiations there.

5. In Syria itself, the position of the Government was at this time far from strong. The large proportion of Damascenes in the Ministry was a cause of dissatisfaction in Aleppo and other districts, the mere readiness of the Government to resume negotiations with the French had earned them considerable unpopularity, and in view of their failure to secure the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales* and General Beynet's continued absence in Paris, it was becoming daily more difficult for them to maintain their position against the more extreme Nationalist elements in the Chamber of Deputies and elsewhere. They had only succeeded in doing so by reiterating that the result of the forthcoming negotiations with the French would be satisfactory to Syria and it was only to be expected that if General Beynet's proposals disappointed Syrian hopes, more extreme elements, to whose policy the President would be forced to conform, would come into power.

6. Early in April a report, which was confirmed on the 26th April, had reached His Majesty's Legation that a further potential cause of trouble was in the offing in the shape [illegible] French [illegible] two convoys. The latter were to be used because the French had no civil transport at their disposal and had objections to moving the troops overland [illegible] from Alexandria. I reported that both States were confident that we would not allow the French to reinforce their troops in the Levant States, and that if we were unable to prevent such reinforcements, disillusionment might well excite Nationalist elements in both countries to violence. Intelligent opinion in both countries was alive to the fact that His Majesty's Government alone had admitted and advocated a privileged position for France, that we, the British, had played the leading part in bringing the States to the point of resuming negotiations with the French, [illegible] the French to give them satisfaction over the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales* or the effective armament of the gendarmerie, and that we were not in a position to prevent activities by the local French authorities, such as those in the Alaouite territory, directed against the States' Governments. With [illegible] still had confidence in us, largely because of the continued presence of the Ninth Army, the sands were running out. The States had looked to His Majesty's Government more than anyone else to induce the French to be reas[illegible] able, and if they were now confronted with demands which they had so often [illegible] French [illegible] they would be hard [illegible] feel that we had led them up the garden path. On the other hand, the [illegible] States' independence [illegible] qualification, and their enrolment in the United Nations [illegible] San Francisco, had led the States' Governments [illegible]

7. My [illegible] States Government [illegible] proposals [illegible] forced to w[illegible] I was [illegible] reply that [illegible] by us His Majesty's Government [illegible] position [illegible] the [illegible] with the French [illegible] these proposals were. If we were [illegible] keep [illegible] stood that we [illegible] the Levant States. [illegible] the French [illegible] settlement [illegible] the Levant States [illegible] the Soviet Union as well as the Middle East states. Wherever the French [illegible] might turn out [illegible] that [illegible] area of [illegible] to

8. By the morning of May everything possible had been done locally [illegible] French Government to hasten [illegible] Beynet's return and to ensure that the proposals which he would bring with him would be [illegible] It was also [illegible] represented to the French Government both by His Majesty's Government and the

United States Government, that the despatch of French troops and warships to [illegible] provocative and as a threat to bring the States' Governments to heel in their negotiations with the French. It seemed, indeed, that if we failed to stop such developments, the States Governments would be likely to lose all confidence in [illegible] whole Arab world and the danger to security in the Middle East base of operations against Japan.

9. The French Government, however, remained unmoved by our representations. In conversation with His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris on the 30th April, General de Gaulle had said he did not understand why the matter should concern the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces. He recognised that there might be trouble in the Middle East, though he considered it would come in Palestine rather than in the Levant States, and he was prepared to discuss with His Majesty's Government the necessary precautions with a view to the greatest possible Anglo-French co-operation. But he insisted that the maintenance of order in the Levant states was a French responsibility under the [illegible] that he could not hand over the [illegible] exception. [illegible] and on the [illegible] it was the policy of His M[illegible] in the Levant. He remarked that if we were prepared to withdraw all our troops [illegible]

10. On the 4th May His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris gave General de Gaulle a personal message from the Prime Minister regretting that the General appeared to view the situation in the Levant States in the light of the [illegible] Majesty's Govern[illegible] troops from the States whenever a treaty had been concluded and was in operation betw[illegible] General de Gaulle said he was willing to believe that we had [illegible] on the Levant, and he hoped we would believe that it was [illegible] to annex Syria or the Lebanon. He was [illegible] themselves, although he doubted whether th[illegible] a military base in the Levant. When he asked whether His Majesty's Govern[illegible] that he was not in a position to give him any assurance on the subject, he thought that the whole question of defence bases on foreign territory would have to be [illegible] General Beynet would be leaving shortly for Beirut and that he would be empowered to hand over one brigade of the *Troupes Spéciales*, which was rather more than the reinforcements which the French were sending. As regards a simultaneous withdrawal of British and French troops, General de Gaulle said he [illegible] would w[illegible] raw all ours from the Middle East, a policy which he did not think it would be at the wise for us to adopt.

11. On the 6th May General de Gaulle replied to Mr. Churchill's message to the effect that France had recognised the independence of the Levant States and that French interests there were mainly cultural and economic. France also had strategic interests because she wished to have a position in the Eastern Mediterranean in these dangerous times and to maintain her communications with the Far East. [illegible] not to intervene in the government of the States and would hand over to them the control of the *Troupes Spéciales*.

12. On the 2nd May, by when the news of the French intention to [illegible] troops and warships had been [illegible] States had been informed that, notwithstanding our representations and contrary to the express request

of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, the French cruiser *Montcalm*, carrying [illegible] 800 men, was being sent to Beirut on General de Gaulle's orders, and that His Majesty's Government were not prepared to intercept it at sea nor forcibly to prevent the French troops from landing. It was pointed out that the French were within their technical rights in sending troops and that it was difficult to accept any limitation on the movements and stationing of troops in the Levant States while the war continued. There was as yet no agreement in this respect [illegible] showed how necessary it was that such agreement should be reached. It would be preferable for any advance communication to be made to the Governments [illegible] the French, in any case, I was to avoid creating the impression that the French troops were arriving with the previous consent of His Majesty's Government. The French authorities, in fact, informed the States' Governments in advance at our instance, and although it was made clear to the local Governments that the arrival of these troops was in the nature of a relief they were gravely concerned and apprehensive lest reinforcements should follow.

13. On the 8th May the Lebanese Delegation at San Francisco raised the matter with Mr. Eden, who counselled patience and caution pending General Beynet's return with the French proposals for a settlement. The Lebanese stated that M. Bidault had said that the French would withdraw their troops from the Levant as soon as the British withdrew theirs. Mr. Eden replied that His Majesty's Government had already made proposals to the French Government for the with[illegible] The Lebanese Government received from their delegation at San [illegible] time a telegram stating that M. Bidault had given all assurances that France was ready to transfer the *Troupes Spéciales* to the States' Governments immediately and to withdraw her troops at the same time as all other troops of foreign Powers which had recognised the independence and sovereignty of the States. This statement of French intentions was very different from that made by General de Gaulle to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris.

14. The *Montcalm* arrived at Beirut on the 7th May and disembarked one battalion of Senegalese troops. She sailed again two days later with the battalion which had been relieved. The realisation that French troops could arrive had a profound local effect. The majority of the population could not believe that troops could come against our wishes, and suspicions that we were doing a deal with the French at the expense of the Levant States, and would let the latter down, as they claimed we had done in 1920, were freely expressed in many quarters. The immediate reaction of the two Governments was to send in notes, in similar but not identical terms, to the French, ourselves, the Americans and the Russians, stating that in their view the end of the war made it desirable that the presence and movement of Allied troops on their soil should be regulated in accordance with international usage and requesting that in future such troops should not be brought in without the previous consent of the Government concerned.

15. Tactless French ebullitions of feeling during the V.E.-day celebrations on the 8th May appreciably raised the temperature in all towns, especially Beirut. [illegible] were induced by local Moslems to join in Arab Nationalist demonstrations, in the course of which a portrait of the ex-Mufti was paraded through the streets, and, because a stone thrown at it was thought to have come from a French convent, the convent was damaged and many French decorations in various parts of the town were pulled down. The battalion in question was immediately withdrawn from the Levant States [illegible] that these soldiers were responsible for the whole state of tension in the Levant States. In fact, the Palestinians hardly contributed to it, and their participation was almost immediately forgotten by the population, which on the other hand remembered vividly the exaggerated displays of tricolors, the parades of lorries filled with French employees shouting, "The country is yours, de Gaulle," and similar extravagances. Although actual clashes were not serious in either country, it was clear by the 12th May that the comparative *détente* between the French and the States was at an end. In a telegram sent from Beirut, after a visit to Damascus, Sir E. Grigg drew attention to the gravity of the situation in the Levant States.

16. On the 12th May General Beynet at length returned from Paris. In his first official contacts with the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers, it was made clear to

him that they would be prepared to negotiate if, and only if, further French troops did not arrive. It was, however, already being rumoured in Syria that this would in fact occur; and demonstrations with a strong anti French flavour began in the principal Syrian towns from the 13th May onward. I and my staff [illegible] General Beynet's proposals, when he presented them, in a reasonable spirit.

17. [illegible] on board, and on the 18th May General Beynet met the two Foreign Ministers together in Damascus. In answer to reproaches about the arrival of reinforcements, General Beynet attempted to take the line, which the French Government also adopted, that we had recently sent a British division into the Lebanon. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs stated categorically that no division had come in since the presentation of the Lebanese Government's note asking for previous consultation in such cases.

18. [illegible] Foreign Ministers [illegible] notes [illegible] an outline of the French Government's proposals. These notes, after [illegible] sorts, cultural, economic and strategic. It was proposed that the cultural interests [illegible] agreements on the lines of usual international procedure; and the strategic interests by bases which would guarantee the lines of communication between France and her Far Eastern possessions. When agreement had been reached on these three points, the French Government were prepared to hand over the *Troupes Spéciales* with the reserve that they should remain under French military com- [illegible] command. The notes contained no reference to the immediate transfer of a brigade of *Troupes Spéciales*, which had been General de Gaulle's pretext for the despatch of reinforcements.

19. Little discussion on the French notes seems to have taken place at the [illegible] 19th May presented notes to the four Powers stating that, in their opinion, the despatch of further French troops to the Levant after the presentation of the States' notes and after the end of the war in Europe constituted an infringement of their sovereignty, and that the French notes contained proposals which were incom- [illegible] for which [illegible] occur on the French Government. A joint communiqué in the same [illegible] 21st M[illegible]

20. From then onwards the Levant States' dispute with the French came [illegible] Government had already issued strong protests against the despatch of French reinforcements, and the Secretary General of the Arab League made two strongly worded pronouncements on the subject. The Syrian and Lebanese Delegates [illegible] a press conference which was widely publicised, and the French Delegate [illegible] a new [illegible]

21. The news of the arrival of the reinforcements and of the contents of [illegible] was suspected that General Beynet had purposely postponed his return in order that the reinforcements [illegible] proposals. The French failure to make any concession over the *Troupes Spéciales* was particularly resented. The Syrian towns at once closed in sign of protest. The first serious riot took place on the 20th May at Aleppo, where demonstrators, after stoning French posts and being fired on, murdered a French officer and N.C.O., and [illegible] the French then used armoured vehicles to clear the streets and several civilians were wounded. In the [illegible] days a number of attacks were made on individual Frenchmen, and a series of large demonstrations, though well controlled by the gendarmerie, strained the resources of the latter to the utmost.

22. The Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Forces, visited the Levant States at this time. He and I had received instructions to explain to the local Governments that the function of British troops in the event of disorders would be to protect British war interests as well as lives and property. General Sir B[illegible] was prepared to by the Syrian Government [illegible] arms for the gendarmerie, who were [illegible] firing, but the French, to whom this proposal was referred, [illegible] refused it on the grounds that the arms might be used against them. A British authority [illegible] to urge the States' Governments in the strongest possible terms to preserve calm, and, *inter alia*, to avoid

accepting deserters from the *Troupes Spéciales* who were already coming over to the Syrian Government in increasing numbers. In response to our representations the Syrian Government sent back to the Djebel Druze a whole formation which had so deserted. General Beynet, and the French authorities generally, at first adopted an attitude of extraordinary nonchalance towards the situation and appeared to think that it would blow over. As late as the 19th May, the [illegible] general, on whom I had endeavoured to impress the gravity of the situation, declined to admit that it was worse than it had been in January [illegible] He remarked that if disorders occurred, a few shots in the air were generally enough to send the crowds packing. I mentioned the reactions in Egypt, of which I myself had been a witness, to events in the Lebanon in November 1943. General Beynet rejected any comparison between conditions then and now and denied the soft impeachment that any coup like that of 1943 was under contemplation. When the commander-in-chief and I saw him on the 21st May and spoke earnestly of the danger to the whole Middle East of disturbances in the Levant States, he appeared to be more concerned, he said the *Troupes Spéciales* were mostly reliable, and while he mentioned the possibility of "performing a surgical operation," he went on to say it would serve no useful purpose. When it was suggested to him that the arrival of French troops when he was returning with proposals to put to the States Governments was inopportune, he took the line that the Government would have rejected his proposals anyway. He even remarked that he had not hurried back because he was sure of this—a disappointing statement, to say the least, after all our efforts to bring the two parties together. By this time the French had begun to take military preparations for the defence of their installations and colonies in Syria, many of which measures appeared to the Syrian Government to be unnecessarily provocative in form. The British military authorities and I continued to urge the French to avoid excessive measures.

23. In the Lebanon, where the Government had better control over the situation, there was a complete three days' strike of protest from the 19th May to the 21st May, but no serious disorders. The Syrian Government, at this juncture, appeared uncertain how to act; there was obviously a large body of opinion pressing them to have a show-down with the French there and then, [illegible] have been to take soundings amongst the [illegible] ments, with a view to ascertaining how much support they could command for this purpose, but whatever the results of these enquiries, events outran them. In the meantime, the general strike continued throughout Syria and Damascus looked like a city in a state of siege, with frequent incidents during the day and intermittent firing all night.

24. Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government were in touch with the United States Government, who were also concerned at developments in the Levant, with a view [illegible] agreed that a further approach to General de Gaulle was necessary, but the United States Government favoured the presentation of diplomatic notes while His Majesty's Government felt that results would only be achieved by a meeting. On the 20th May His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris saw General de Gaulle, who showed great irritation at the suggestion that the Americans should take part in the discussions, he said that they were not concerned and that he would never consent to France being put in the dock by the United States and Great B[illegible] He would be prepared to discuss the whole Arab question, including Palestine—the source of all trouble—and Egypt, with us and the Americans, but not the Levant alone. All Mr. Duff Cooper's counter-arguments fell on stony ground. The ambassador later saw M. Bidault who spoke of resigning if he failed to make any impression on General de Gaulle. He remarked that General Beynet had not carried out the instructions which he, M. Bidault, had given him; he had no doubt received different instructions later from General de Gaulle.

25. Forceful representations were also made to the French Embassy in London regarding provocative measures on the part of the French in the Levant States [illegible] the hour of prayer, and a reported threat by General Mondar to shell Aleppo if his column evacuating the citadel were fired on. The French were urged in particular to send no further reinforcements to the Levant States. (If that had happened [illegible] the Lebanon as well as Syria would have exploded.)

26. At this time I was closely questioned by the States' Government as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the event of the French attempting to coerce them. I replied by citing Mr Churchill's statement that it was not for Great Britain alone to defend by force either the independence of the States or the French privilege

27 On the 27th May such serious disturbances broke out in Homs and Hama that the Syrian Government told the United States Minister and Mr Young, whom I had sent to Damascus, that they could no longer be responsible for internal security since events had overtaken them. About this time the Syrian Government showed Mr Young the text of what they alleged was a draft proclamation by General Olivia Roget, the French Delegate in Damascus, referring to the imminence of "la grande bagarre" and indicating his intention to proceed w[illegible] French Deputy Delegate at Damascus subsequently admitted privately that this proclamation was authentic but said he had burnt it. The Syrians posted up on the walls of Damascus [illegible] Mr [illegible] they alleged was the text of another and even more threatening proclamation by General Olivia Roget

28 On the 28th May I went to Damascus to relieve Mr Young The car in which my w[illegible] was hooted by Senegalese troops in one of the barracks on the main avenue leading into the city—no doubt because, like other British military [illegible] it carried the Union Jack painted on the body On my arrival in [illegible] I called on my United States colleague (who was about to return to [illegible] Jamil Bey Mardam took me at once to see the President, w[illegible] in consequence of an internal haemorrhage [illegible] as he had been a year before, by a Brit[illegible] Minister were calmer than I had expected, [illegible] all he could to carry out the advice [illegible] graphs 14 to 17 of Foreign Office [illegible] negotiate with the French [illegible] the French demand for m[illegible] that the Syrians must try [illegible] being strained to the utmost

29 The 29th May was a day of unmitigated [illegible] shortly after 7 p m. when heavy firing broke out in [illegible] after by French shelling. The leg[illegible] the centre of the [illegible] gardens in the neighbourhood [illegible] take cover The [illegible] the arm[illegible] Mr [illegible] Roget, in Mr. Young's [illegible] to do as little damage as possible

31 I shall not attempt to describe in full the events of [illegible] few days [illegible] Damascus itself. A detailed account of them is contained in the valuable report by Mr Acting Consul Evans enclosed in my despatch No 105 of the

20th June. A further report on the subject, by the station manager of the B O A C in Damascus, was forwarded in my despatch No. 123 of the 2nd July [illegible] described in the interesting report by Major Dearden enclosed in my despatch No. 119 of the 28th June, and those in other parts of Syria (notably the heavy bombing of Deir-ez-Zor and, in contrast, the rapid and almost bloodless liquidation of the French garrisons in the whole of southern Syria by the local inhabitants) have been covered in a number of telegrams, weekly summaries, [illegible] In this despatch I will confine myself in the main to reporting what I and those who were with me in His Majesty's Legation at Damascus, including Colonel Furlonge, saw, heard and did, with such conclusions as I think may be fairly drawn

32. The Syrian Chamber of Deputies had been summoned to meet on the evening of the 29th May In fact, there was no quorum because [illegible] Deputies were absent from Damascus. Just before the firing beg[illegible] Prime Minister had convened a number of Deputies and notables to [illegible] the centre of the city) in order to read to them the following message from Mr Churchill (which I had communicated to him on instructions) and to urge them to abstain from provocative action of any kind —

> "I have received your Excellency's telegram of the 23rd May regarding the situation in Syria and asking for my intervention
>
> "I have heard with much regret of the breakdown of negotiations between the Syrian Government and the French Government. For reasons which I explained personally to his Excellency the President of Syria at our meeting in Cairo, we are anxious to see a settlement of the outstanding questions between the Syrian, Lebanese and French Governments which will be satisfactory to all parties and which will take full account of your independence.
>
> "You may rest assured that we shall give careful attention to this new development We are already in consultation with the United States Government and in constant contact with the French Government. For the moment I cannot say more than this, but I must definitely ask that both sides will work to relieve the present tension until wider issues can be considered. I cannot see that anything has happened which could possibly justify hostilities [illegible] the United Nations to refrain from precipitating any situation which would almost certainly impede the war with Japan.
>
> "I have been very sorry to learn of the illness of Shukri Kuwatli Bey Please convey to his Excellency my personal good wishes and hopes for an early recovery."

Soon after the firing started Jamil Bey Mardam telephoned to me as follows

> "Just at the moment when I received Mr Churchill's message I summoned Deputies and notables of Damascus to tell them to do nothing to upset calm and order in the country Now we have French aggression [illegible] every side. I have given strict orders to the gendarmerie on no account fire on the French."

On a subsequent visit to Damascus the Saudi Arabian Minister, who was present in the Serail on this occasion, told me that he had heard Jamil Bey Mardam give this order

33. It may be recorded here that no evidence has reached me from British or American eye witnesses of the outbreak in Damascus—and there were many circulating at the time in various parts of the city—to support the French contention that a concerted attack was made by the Syrians on their installations The French buildings, including those adjacent to the Parliament House, which the French alleged was one of the focal points of Syrian aggression have been carefully examined, both inside and out, amongst others, by Mr Donald Mallett of His Majesty's Embassy in Paris, who inspected them in the company of General [illegible] suggestion. They show scarcely a trace of bullet marks, while the Parliament House itself was heavily mortared and machine-gunned at point blank range on the evening of the 29th May by French troops who occupied it during the night, slew most of the Syrian gendarmes protecting it and then proceeded to loot and break up the offices and the Chamber itself in an orgy of wanton destruction Photographs of this, taken by the American Office of War Information, have been sent to your department

34. As explained in my telegram No. 544 of the 15th June, there was no foundation for General Beynet's contention that a concerted attack was made on French installations in other parts of Syria at the same time as the [illegible] attack in Damascus. It is worth noting, too, that neither General Beynet nor General Humblot, the French territorial commander in the Levant, visited [illegible] 29th May to the 31st May. It would seem that General Oliva Roget, who has spent a large part of his career in Syria and was thoroughly imbued with the mandatory mentality, was given a free hand and that the troops under his command did much as they pleased. It is noteworthy that, despite General Beynet's order to him not to shell Damascus during the night of the 29th May, the centre of the city was again bombarded, as I myself saw and reported, at midnight.

35. On the morning of the 30th May French aircraft flew over the city and during this and the next day bombs were dropped on the citadel, which contained the headquarters of the gendarmerie and also a civil prison. A considerable number of the prisoners serving sentence there, including a British Indian subject, were killed or wounded.

36. The Syrian President, having sent for me early on the 30th May, I repaired to his house, where he was still in bed, in one of the armoured cars which the British military authorities had kindly placed at my disposal to guard His Majesty's Legation and enable me and my staff to move about the city. A large crowd gathered outside the house, cheered the arrival of the car. The President said he was unable to get into touch with the Syrian Government, who were all together in a house somewhere in the city. What was he to do if they resigned? What was he to tell his people, who were asking why the British army sat by as spectators in face of this monstrous attempt by the French to force themselves again on Syria? How could we expect Syria to conclude treaties or give military bases to people who behaved like this? Where was the Commander-in-Chief M.E.F., who was responsible for security in the Middle East? Had France [illegible] independent by so many Powers? Was General de Gaulle to be allowed to wreak his will uncurbed? And so forth. I could but tell his Excellency that I had reported [illegible] to His Majesty's Government, but that I was [illegible] Later, having asked whether I could arrange for the United States Chargé d'Affaires to visit him, I sent an armoured car to bring Mr. Satterthwaite to his Excellency's house and later to His Majesty's Legation to discuss matters.

37. The Syrian Government succeeded [illegible] their way to the President's house and I or Colonel [illegible] there on each of the [illegible] By [illegible] May [illegible] effect that [illegible] Damascus.

38. Among the buildings on which heavy French fire was directed was the Orient Palace Hotel, the leading one in the city. I have never fathomed why this was done. It is true that Saadallah Jabri, the President of the Chamber of Deputies and a strong Nationalist, was living in the hotel, but, according to our information, there were only eight gendarmes there and I have been told, on good evidence, that Saadallah himself told them not to fire and arranged for them to leave the hotel in civilian clothes. Also resident in the hotel at the time were a number of [illegible] whose [illegible] at least was riddled with bullets), and the Patriarch of Russia, and his suite. My Soviet colleague gave me a graphic description of the difficulties and dangers he encountered in removing his compatriots to Beirut, owing to the wild fire in which the French were indulging. He telephoned to General Oliva Roget to ask him to cease fire while he was evacuating the Russians; the general offered him a French escort, which he declined. M. Solod felt he could not refuse the request of Saadallah Jabri, who was due to go to Cairo for a meeting of the Arab League, to take him as far as Beirut. One of the many bursts of French fire on the Orient Palace Hotel resulted in the death of a British officer, Major Scott Nicholson, who [illegible] was eventually occupied by French troops and many of the guests who [illegible] life there too uncomfortable to remain, failed to find [illegible]

39. On the 30th May [illegible] the French delegate telephoned to complain that a British soldier was firing from the roof of His Majesty's [illegible] British [illegible] Army house near His Majesty's Consulate.

40. In the afternoon of the 30th May an armistice was arranged between the British and French military authorities for the evacuation from Damascus of British and American civilians. During the armistice the British Area Commander saw a [illegible] In reply to his enquiry the French officer in charge said he knew of the armistice but he had seen some Syrians and thought he would have a shot at them. This was by no means the only breach of the armistice reported, and it was clear from the manner in which French troops had been driving about the streets firing indiscriminately at vehicles (including British), houses and people, that they were quite out of hand. I saw the Syrian President again at his request during the afternoon, the Acting Prime Minister and Minister of Education were with him; and it was obvious that they were becoming unnerved. On this occasion there were the first signs of something like animosity on the part of the Ministers (for which the [illegible] whom I had sent to see him). The President implored me to urge again on His Majesty's Government the need of British intervention and next day he sent me a personal appeal to Mr. Churchill.

41. After the armistice the centre of the city was subjected to the heaviest shell fire yet experienced, and the noise of firing by all arms continued during the night. At one time the rattle of machine guns was so intense that a British officer who was spending the night in His Majesty's Legation and who had been at Anzio, said it exceeded anything he had heard there. We thought at least that the Syrian tribesmen must have come to town and that a concerted attack was being made on the French barracks whence this intense fire appeared to be coming. But no such reason, nor indeed any other apart from nerves or deliberate terrorisation—was ever discovered for this episode. Two large fires were burning during the night in the centre of the city—one of these, we learned later, was a Red Cross [illegible] of which an ancient, if minor, mosque formed part.

42. At dawn on the 31st May Colonel Furlonge toured the city and found the few people about in a state of abject terror. The British armoured car in which he travelled was still cheered at times, but as the day went on the mood of the population, who could not understand why the British army did not intervene, became uglier. The United States Chargé d'Affaires reported that an American school had been hit by French shelling and that starvation was setting in in the heavily-shelled quarters of the city. (This might indeed have been the case everywhere had not a British officer, Major Dai Jones of the O.C.P., visited all the bakeries he could reach during the night and succeeded in inducing them to bake so that the population could at least have bread. For this action he has since been officially thanked by the Syrian Government.) The head of one quarter had told him that the French had not allowed [illegible] The Syrian Director of Public Health reported that Red Crescent ambulances had frequently been fired on by the French (a Syrian Government driver was killed in one of them, a photograph of which, riddled with bullets, has since been published) and that the latter had also posted machine-guns round his hospital near the British Consulate. Large numbers of wounded were lying in streets where the ambulances could not operate. The British Victoria Hospital, which did excellent work throughout this period under Dr. Thomas, was filled to overflowing with wounded and was beginning to run short of linen and other necessities. The British military medical authorities lent invaluable assistance in furnishing supplies and alleviating wounded. During the armistice [illegible] Syrian and British hospitals in an armoured car. We received a welcome visit from Major-General Pilleau, commanding 9th Army, who, with his staff, were in close touch with me throughout the proceedings and to whom I wish here to record my gratitude for all their help.

43. The French had ceased shelling Damascus after the morning of the 31st May, but firing of other kinds continued in the city during the day. In the afternoon a second armistice was arranged for the evacuation of some remaining British and American civilians and for collection of wounded.

44. I myself made a tour of the city during the armistice and saw Senegalese and *Troupes Spéciales* looting shops. The Syrian Government had by that time

sent most of their remaining gendarmes out of Damascus because they were being fired on at sight by the French. The Government assured me that they had taken this step because they were anxious faithfully to observe their promises to me to avoid provocation from their side.

45. At 6 p.m. we heard on the wireless the news of His Majesty's Government's decision to intervene. About the same hour I received a telegram from Mr. Eden reporting the meeting of the Cabinet on the evening of the 30th May (when it was decided to send a message from the Prime Minister to President Truman), the conversations which the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had had with the French Ambassador in London after the Cabinet meeting (when M. Massigli was given clearly to understand that the Commander-in-chief, Middle East Force, would be receiving instructions to intervene in the immediate future), and the Cabinet's decision on the 31st May to despatch a message from the Prime Minister to General de Gaulle and to send instructions to General Paget to intervene, without waiting for President Truman's reply. The President, in fact, telegraphed his approval and support of the proposal [illegible] the 31st May.

46. The message to General de Gaulle was as follows:—

> "In view of grave situation which has arisen between your troops and [illegible] with profound regret, ordered the Commander-in-chief, Middle East, to intervene to prevent the further effusion of blood in interests of security of whole Middle East which involves communication for war against Japan. In order to avoid collision between British and French forces we request you immediately to order the French troops to cease fire and to withdraw to their barracks. Once firing has ceased, and order has been restored, we shall be prepared to begin tripartite discussions in London."

It was received by His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris at 14.50 hours on the 31st May; and as General de Gaulle was not immediately available, it was delivered without delay to M. Palewski for communication to the General. A copy was also given to M. Chauvel, who had already heard from M. Massigli of the statement made by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons. The news of British intervention spread like wildfire in Damascus, and Colonel Furlonge, whom I sent to the President to inform him of His Majesty's Government's decision, was [illegible] I was in contact, who had been appalled by what they had witnessed in Damascus in the last two days and nights. The President and Acting Prime Minister lost no time in telegraphing their gratitude to His Majesty's Government.

47. When, on the evening of the 31st May, the General Officer Commanding 9th Army communicated to the French territorial commander the decision of His Majesty's Government to intervene, General Humblot stated that he had received orders from Paris not to oppose the decisions of the Commander-in-chief, Middle East Forces. According to the printed version of General de Gaulle's "public declarations" in Paris on the 2nd June, circulated by the French authorities here, the General stated that the order to cease fire was given on the 30th May at 11 p.m. and was put into effect on the 31st May. He repeated this statement in reply to a subsequent question by a newspaper correspondent, who remarked that, according to a communiqué issued on the 1st June, the order to cease fire had been given not on the 30th but on the 31st May. The correspondent observed that it was regrettable that the order had not been made known earlier. Whenever the order was issued, it is certain that the French military authorities here had made no mention of it to the British authorities before Major-General Pilleau made the above communication to General Humblot, and it is no less certain that while, as stated above, the shelling of Damascus ceased after the morning of the 31st May, the firing which continued throughout that day in the [illegible] When General Olivá Roget, in Damascus, was informed by the British Area Commander on the evening of the 31st May of the instructions given to General Sir Bernard Paget, he at first took the line that he would never obey the orders of a British officer and he launched into a violent tirade against the Syrians and ourselves. After reference to General Beynet (not to General Humblot, [illegible] whom his relations had for long been said to be strained), he accepted the position.

48. One of the first orders issued to General Olivá Roget by the British military authorities was one to stop looting by French troops. Such looting, nevertheless, continued during the morning of the 1st June, and only ceased after British armour had been able to reach Damascus during the afternoon in sufficient

strength to restore order effectively. Amongst the objects removed by the French from Syrian Government offices were the seals from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and a safe from the Chamber of Deputies, which was eventually traced to General Olivá Roget's house. The French said it had been removed thither for safe custody. Unsuccessful attempts had been made to open it. General Olivá Roget subsequently declared that order had been restored on the 31st May. In this connexion I would cite the following paragraph from Mr. Acting Consul Evans's report:—

> "There is no doubt that the savage attack which the French launched had the effect of completely demoralising the city. The bombardment of the Citadel effectively put the gendarmerie out of action, and it is reported that word was passed to the quarter leaders that, in the event of a hostile rising, the quarter concerned would be obliterated. These measures were certainly successful in the sense that there was no mass rising of the population and the quarter of Souq Saroujа capitulated. This was presumably what General Beynet meant when he said that he had the situation in hand, although at no time could the French have made their appearance in any part of the town except with armed strength. There are, however, indications that General Olivá Roget's statement in Paris that there were negotiations for the surrender of the city on the 31st May was not completely without foundation."

49. In the circumstances it was hardly surprising that Syrians retorted by looting French establishments as soon as they felt able to do so. For the next few days our efforts were constantly directed to preventing a population, whose [illegible] Damascus but in all Syrian towns which had been the scene of conflict. The Syrian Government co-operated well with us so far as their means allowed. Thus, on the morning of the 1st June, before the arrival of our armour, when a large demonstration began to form in the Souqs and threatened trouble, the Acting Prime Minister, in response to a request from Colonel Furlonge, at once [illegible] were dispersed to their homes. But a French officer and two Senegalese, who ventured into the streets on the 2nd June, were murdered by the crowd with a promptitude which demonstrated the temper of the population.

50. And so we were faced with the situation which we had striven ever since January to avoid. It was clearly one which called not only for [illegible] tactful handling, not only French property but the life of every French [illegible] in Syria was in danger, and means had to be found to ensure their safety while making every endeavour to avoid humiliating our Allies. The "mixture of falsehoods, half truths, suppressions of inconvenient facts [illegible] against Britain"—to quote His Majesty's Ambassador [illegible] General de Gaulle and other French authorities immediately [illegible] were not helpful to those on the spot. But the principal danger which confronted [illegible] of a [illegible] thanks to the admirable behaviour of the British troops but also to the manner in which General Beynet interpreted the instructions he had received from Paris to put no difficulties in the way of the Commander-in-chief, Middle East Forces.

51. On the 1st June I went to Beirut to meet General Sir Bernard Paget. The Commander-in-chief was escorted by a squadron of Spitfires and H.M. destroyers *Musketeer* and *Exmoor* arrived at Beirut on the same day. Vice Admiral Tennant arrived in H.M.S. *Arethusa* on the following morning. General Paget and I called on the Lebanese President and Government in the Serail outside which a large and enthusiastic crowd had gathered, and also on General Beynet, who was informed of the measures which the Commander-in-chief considered necessary to give effect to his instructions to restore order. General Beynet himself reported to Paris that the interview had been friendly, but the French Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed indignation at the terms of what he called General Paget's "proclamation." In fact, no proclamation was issued by the commander-in-chief, and M. Bidault's complaints were based on misunderstanding of the nature and of the terms of a written communication handed to General Beynet, to which no publicity was given either then or later.

52. General Paget and I then proceeded to Damascus where we saw the Syrian President—still in bed—and the Acting Prime Minister. The President of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies and the Lebanese Prime Minister were also present. The Syrians expressed their profound gratitude and assured General Paget that they would give him all assistance in his task. He had only to tell them what he wished them to do. They at once agreed to impose a curfew during

the hours of darkness for as long as necessary (M. Bidault complained to Mr Duff Cooper that a curfew was being imposed on the French alone, whereas it in fact applied to all the inhabitants of Damascus.) General Paget was received everywhere in Damascus by cheering crowds, but on the following day I reported that there was no such enthusiasm, the Syrians were licking their wounds and Damascus was in a dangerous mood (as exemplified by the murders of Frenchmen referred to in paragraph 48 above), the life of any Frenchman was not likely to be worth a moment's purchase for some time to come, and any prospect of France's obtaining any sort of special position in Syria has [illegible]

53. Subsequent developments must be reported in a further despatch. I will only say here that our first efforts had to be directed to explaining to the Syrians that we had not intervened, as they hoped, in order to throw the French out of the Levant States. The first essential was to prevent, in so far as possible, the loss of further French lives in Syria, where, unfortunately, all too many Frenchmen seemed oblivious of their peril. General Beynet had assured the commander-in-chief and me that the Méharistes squadrons of the *Troupes Spéciales* were reliable. But the words were scarcely out of his mouth before one of these squadrons mutinied and murdered most of their French officers and non-commissioned officers. For that we were in no way to blame. The rapid deployment of British troops was effective in preventing similar catastrophes in the remaining squadrons, but there were unfortunately occasions on which French officers, who disregarded the instructions issued for their safety, were killed. The second essential was to prevent trouble in the Lebanon. In this we have so far been successful. But so long as French troops remain in either country and so long as the local French authorities continue to play upon the Christian elements in both countries and to maintain the remnants and the trappings of the mandatory régime—as they are doing—there will be a constant danger to security and to the eventual stability of these two small but complex countries.

54. Under the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement concluded on the 22nd July 1941—a few days after the final occupation of the Levant States by the British and Free French forces, to which the Free French were in a position to contribute but the small fraction of one brigade—the French territorial commander assumed responsibility for internal security in the States. The agreement, which recognised the over-all responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, M.E.F., for security in the Middle East, was designed to consolidate Allied military control over an area which was part of the zone of operations against our enemies. The States' Governments, who had no say in the agreement, have not only never [illegible] French and which, they maintain, the French used to restore and preserve their former position in the Levant despite their recognition of the States' independence in 1941. The French had linked with that recognition the conclusion of a treaty with the States, but in 1941 and for a long time afterwards circumstances prevented the negotiation of such a treaty—the war continued and there was no French authority with whom a treaty could well be signed. In 1937 and thereafter, the French had themselves declined to ratify a treaty which the States had accepted in 1936, the golden opportunity was thus lost; by 1941, French [illegible] Levant had been grievously shaken by the submission of the Vichy authorities to the Axis Powers, and nationalist sentiment in the States had greatly increased. In the circumstances, the French could scarcely hope to secure a treaty or indeed any privileges in the States unless they made progressive concessions to national aspirations, but they resisted constant pressure by His Majesty's Government to do so. Persistence in this attitude was bound to lead, sooner or later, to a clash, and it duly came in the Lebanon in November 1943, when the French authorities arrested the President and Government, with the result that we were compelled to intervene with the threat to proclaim British martial law in order to maintain security. The French then made considerable concessions to the States, but after some six months of conciliation, troubled mainly by the question of the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales*, their attitude proceeded to harden.

55. [illegible] employed on the harder Syrian nut, and as its repercussions in the rest of the Axis [illegible] Allied base in the Middle East than those with which we had been faced in 1943, we were again compelled to intervene, this time more directly. The French apparently saw no possibility of reaching a settlement with the present Governments in Syria which would give them satisfaction, and they realised that any

other Government acceptable to the Chamber of Deputies would only be more [illegible] troops at the same time as his return from Paris with the French Government's proposals was merely a pretext for the States to break off negotiations, ignores the fact that the proposals themselves were unacceptable, not only because of the demand for [illegible] but because [illegible] was made in respect of the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales* which everyone knew to be of primary concern to the States. General Beynet has told me more than once that he has ample evidence to prove that the Syrians were about to rise against the French, but he has never given me chapter and verse. While it is true that in the days preceding French action attacks were made, with loss of life, on individual Frenchmen and Senegalese (whose presence here [illegible] particularly resented since the events in the Lebanon in November 1943), there is no evidence from our sources that any such concerted attack was being planned; and however fervently the Syrians wished to see the last of the French, they were clearly unprepared to meet the French assault, when it came. I doubt whether any impartial observers on the spot would admit that the savagery of that assault was justified. From the Syrian point of view—and perhaps also from our own—it is fortunate that the French military commanders did not dispose of more [illegible] planes than they did. Even if the Syrian capital had surrendered to General Oliva Roget, and the puppet Government which is said to have been in readiness had been placed in office on the 31st May, [illegible] to show that the resistance of the country as a whole would not have been broken. The French might well have realized that by taking thought to their own recent history, and General Beynet surely showed greater wisdom in his statement to me that a "surgical operation" would be futile because it would have no lasting effect, than in his actual attempt "to lance the Damascus abscess."

56. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo, His Majesty's Minister at Jedda, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Baghdad, the Officer Administering the Government of Palestine, the British Middle East Office at [illegible] the External Affairs Department of the Government of India.

I have, &c.

TERENCE SHONE.

E 7607/6/89] No. 18

(1)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 170, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 10th July, 1945.—(Received 19th October.)

General

Count Ostrorog returned from Paris on the 27th June and called on His Majesty's Minister on the same evening. In reply to an enquiry His Majesty's Minister gave him a frank description of the situation in the Levant States. [illegible] On the 28th June Count Ostrorog informed the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, "unofficially," that the French Government, in order to improve the atmosphere with the Levant States, might be prepared (1) to transfer the Troupes Spéciales to the States immediately, (2) to give a guarantee to withdraw French troops in the [illegible] but British troops were withdrawn, (3) to discuss the transference of all remaining Intérêts Communs services. Asked about the [illegible] was, according to Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, no mention of a treaty. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, after consulting the Syrian Government and His Majesty's Minister, informed Count Ostrorog that both States' Governments gladly accepted the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales, but that the other points should be left for subsequent discussions.

After further discussions between the Lebanese, Syrian, British and French authorities—the Syrians, who refused to have any direct contact with the French, being kept in the picture by the Lebanese and ourselves—the Délégation Générale was authorised by the French Government to issue the following declaration on the 8th July:—

> "The Provisional Government of the French Republic, wishing to answer the demand made by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, concerning the transfer of the military units recruited locally

"And desirous of manifesting to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments its good will by giving them full satisfaction concerning these units [illegible]

[illegible] glad to see Syria and Lebanon invested with all the prerogatives [illegible] ty and able to play the rôle which is due to them in the [illegible] of the United Nations

"Declares that these troops are hereby transferred to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments according to formalities which will be defined within a maximum of forty five days [illegible]

On the evening of the 9th July the Lebanese and Syrian Governments issued [illegible] acknowledgment and an expression of satisfaction by both Governments at "taking over their troops." The Lebanese Government issued a further com- [illegible] the transfer of the services due to be restored to the Lebanon would not be [illegible] powers should form the subject of a simultaneous arrangement between the interested parties. The Syrian Government were unwilling to associate themselves with this expression of opinion on the ground that they did not wish to suggest in any way that they desired the withdrawal of British forces

A conference is to be held at Chtaura on the 12th July, at which Syrian, Lebanese and French will be represented, to consider the ways and means of handing over the Troupes Spéciales to the States' Governments

While general satisfaction has been expressed in the Syrian Press and in some sections of the Lebanese Press, less public interest has been shown than might have been expected. This is due to the feeling that the French action is only a very tardy admission of rights which should have been accorded long ago, and that in any case the French hand was forced by the steadily increasing [illegible] to impress. In the Lebanon, which is less directly affected, public attention has been focussed largely on internal political intrigues.

The press has reported conversations between the French Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Lebanese Minister in Paris in which the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Levant States and the conclusion of a Franco-Lebanese Consular convention are stated to have been discussed. Many rumours have been circulating in the States to the effect that further Franco-Lebanese talks are in progress regarding consular and economic conventions and the transfer of various other services still held by the French, particularly the Beirut Broadcasting Station, but there does not appear to have been more than a preliminary exchange of views on these subjects and the Lebanese Government have now officially denied that any such negotiations are in progress.

Economic

Total purchases for the period 16th June–7th July, 1945, amount to 23,097 tons, a daily average of 1,077 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1945–46 crop up to 25,370 tons.

On the 3rd July the M.I.R.A. agreement referred to in Weekly Political Summary No. 169, Economic, was signed by the G.O.C., Ninth Army, on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, the Acting Prime Minister of Syria and the Prime Minister of the Lebanon.

The Syrian Government have confirmed the signature of the Interim Air Agreement and have also telegraphed to their delegate at the San Francisco Conference authorising the signature of a transport agreement with the Americans, with the Fifth Freedom specifically excluded; there is reason to believe, however, that the Americans are bringing some pressure to bear on the Syrians to concede this Freedom.

Syria—Damascus.

The general situation in Damascus for the last fortnight has been normal though there has been a marked increase in internal political activity. It is possible that when the Syrian delegate returns from San Francisco about the 20th July, there will be a Cabinet crisis. On a number of occasions his

Majesty's Legation have made representations to the Syrian Government to [illegible] Chief, Middle East, are being carried out in outlying parts of the country. On the whole the Syrian [illegible] though the position in Aleppo is still unsatisfactory.

[illegible] submitted a report on the proposals for the [illegible] authorities. Lieutenant Colonel Scott and a training team of British [illegible] Ninth Army to the Syrian Government to assist in training the Syrian security services in the use of the new [illegible] equipment and arms provided by the British Army.

[illegible] 6,000 of the Troupes Spéciales—approximately [illegible] connexion with their enlistment in the Syrian gendarmerie force [illegible] following reasons:—

(1) In view of their long service with the French their loyalty to the Syrian Government could not be fully guaranteed.
(2) As the Troupes Spéciales officers are retaining their present rank the promotion chances of regular gendarmerie officers are lessened.
(3) The Troupes Spéciales officers continue to receive their old rates of pay which are considerably higher than those obtaining in the gendarmerie.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs are engaged on the preparation of a [illegible]

[illegible] Syrian Government to under- [illegible] e issue of visas to Turkey [illegible] been asked to issue [illegible] Syrian [illegible] Syrian [illegible] Syrian [illegible] Prime [illegible] been taken [illegible] for [illegible] was involved. On the 30th June the Council of Ministers decided that the gendarmerie military courts should have [illegible] action in all cases which, under the existing laws, should come before [illegible] military courts. [illegible] was taken because the French are in the process of trying a number of Syrians in French military courts at Mezzé and that the Syrian Government wish to have an alternative legal [illegible]

[illegible] British Council representative discussed with the Minister of Education [illegible] Syria [illegible] or no [illegible] Two alternatives were considered, namely, [illegible] British [illegible] that the necessary fees should be collected by local subscription.

Aleppo

[illegible] hostile to the French and a [illegible] Christian Deputy [illegible] were slightly injured. This [illegible] see in it, and in the failure [illegible] who in recent weeks [illegible] French Joint Staff in the name of the commander-in-chief, was communicated to the délégué, restricting the

movements of the civilian and military members of the staff of the délégation, [illegible] ment the insignia of the M.B.E. (Military Division) awarded to him and Madame Fanquenot in 1919.

The broadcast report that Turkey might recover Aleppo and its hinterland as compensation for territory ceded to Russia, caused anxiety amongst the Syrians and considerable delight amongst the French. In this connexion the Turkish Consul-General again expressed his opinion regarding the advantages that would accrue to Aleppo if it were reincorporated into Turkey. Facts and figures, however, do not support the view that commercial activities in Aleppo have declined since 1919, the city has increased in population and is certainly commercially no poorer than it was 25 years ago.

The French had been recruiting Armenians into the Troupes Spéciales, offering attractive pay and French nationality with the option of serving either in the Levant States alone or in the French colonies. The British military authorities took the matter up with the French authorities and His Majesty's Minister made representations to Count Ostrorog, with the result that the recruitment has now been stopped. The Orthodox Armenian Archbishop at a meeting in Aleppo, impressed on those present the danger to the community of joining the French forces at this time.

Homs and Hama.

On the 1st July firing broke out in Tel Kalakh as a result of the desertion of [illegible] Within a few hours a small British force had arrived and firing ceased, with [illegible] On the 2nd July other sections of the Dandashi tribe from neighbouring villages [illegible] arrived in the neighbourhood and set up road pickets to prevent the arrival of French reinforcements. The tribesmen at first refused to disperse until the French had been withdrawn from Tel Kalakh, as they feared a resumption of hostilities; they also refused to lay down their arms at the request of the British officer in command, since this, they said, would lay them open to attack from the neighbouring tribes. Strong representations to the Syrian Government, however, resulted in the tribesmen dispersing to their homes the next day.

Jebel Druze.

The situation in Jebel Druze and the Hauran is becoming rather more stable, although the Syrian Government does not yet command any real authority in the neighbourhood; such support as it receives is largely due to the belief that it has, and will continue to have, British backing.

There is evidence that the French are still sending agents into the Jebel. One has been arrested and [illegible] he succeeded in [illegible] go to Mezzé to petition the French to return to the Jebel.

There are indications that the isolationist sentiments of the Jebel are reviving; the Emir Hassan Atrash has admitted to the Political Officer that he has no sincere feelings of loyalty to the Government, and that he intends henceforward to work for a Greater Syria under the Emir Abdullah.

The Atrash family regard the Groupement Druze as their own private army and there is talk of Zeid Bek, brother of Soltan Pasha, being appointed as "commander-in-chief."

Alaouites.

On the 5th July a French vehicle in Lattakia knocked a man off his bicycle without injury. An angry crowd immediately collected and at least three Troupes Spéciales soldiers were attacked and stabbed. French troops returned to barracks and started to fire on the town, rifle grenades being used from the roof of the état-major and other French establishments, including civilian houses. Hand grenades were also thrown indiscriminately from the barracks and some 20 mortar bombs were fired. Indiscriminate and undisciplined fire continued for some time. British forces occupied Qalaa Hill, a position commanding the town, early in the morning of the 6th July. [illegible] are reported amongst Troupes Spéciales and Syrian civilians. The French troops are confined to barracks and the town was closed for five days; but is now almost fully reopened.

On the evening of the 9th July firing broke out at Banias and continued for 20 minutes. Rifles, machine-guns and mortars were used by the French against the town. The officer commanding the gendarmerie informed the French that if they did not cease fire they would be held responsible; the French complied. Two civilians were killed and three wounded. A British armoured car was sent from Lattakia and the situation was reported quiet on the 10th July. The origin of the incident is not yet known.

Euphrates and Jezireh.

The French garrisons at Ras-el-Ain, Amouda, Kabar-el-Bid, Tel Kutchek and other small isolated posts were withdrawn on the 20th and the 30th June and concentrated at Derbessiye, Qamichlie, Derik and Hasseiché. On the 3rd July news was received that the French garrison at Derbessiye had gone over to the Syrian Government. The position is still not clear but 25 men who remained loyal to the French have been moved to Qamichlie. In view of this further desertion the French are considering the advisability of withdrawing also from Derik.

On the 2nd July the Transjordan Frontier Force Mechanised Regiment (less one squadron) arrived in the Jezireh.

* * * * * *

Lebanon.

Riad Solh's opposition group are continuing their attempts to secure the [illegible] since the announcement of the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales. The irregularities which are widely believed to have been committed by Riad Solh and other members of his last government before their resignation, still constitute a serious obstacle to their return to power. It is now generally believed that, on the return this week of the Lebanese delegation to San Francisco, a reshuffle or enlargement of the Government will take place, after which the Government will call for an extraordinary session of the Chamber and will ask for a vote of confidence. Many names have been mentioned as possible additions to the Government; the most surprising amongst them is ex-President Alfred Naccache, who is regarded as head of the pro-French minority in the Chamber. It is known that he has for some months been in close touch with Henri Pharaon, who continues to pursue his policy of placating elements considered to be opposed to the present régime, but it would be surprising if the nationalist elements submitted to the inclusion in the Government of one so closely identified with the former mandatory régime. It is, in fact, this policy on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs which forms the chief target for opposition attacks on the Government.

During the last few days signs have become apparent of a movement amongst [illegible] delegate, who is in close touch with the political bureau of the Délégation Générale, visited His Majesty's Legation on the 9th July to state that he had reported to the Vatican his fears of a massacre of Christians by Moslems in the Jezireh. Similar fears are being expressed in conversation by Lebanese Maronites and other Catholic communities. While Christian fears of Moslem domination are deep-rooted in the Lebanon, it is highly probable that the present agitation is being systematically worked up by reactionary French political elements in order to create a demand for the maintenance of some form of French control. A petition to be signed by some of the notoriously pro-French notables like Emile Eddé, and then transmitted to the French Government, is said to be circulating.

Further dismissals of French officials employed by the Lebanese Government or the Intérêts Communs have now been announced; they include the French advisers in nearly all Lebanese departments. These advisers have long been cold shouldered, so that their disappearance will make little practical difference.

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[E 5590/5/89] (2)

Weekly Political Summary No. 171 Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, for the week ending 17th July, 1945.—(Received 1st August.)

1.—*General*

THE French, Syrian and Lebanese Commissions to arrange the details of the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales met at Chtaura on the 12th and 16th July. At both meetings the attitude of all concerned was correct and on the whole satisfactory. [illegible] was reached on the transfer of certain barracks which are indisputably Syrian property and of certain of the Troupes Spéciales on the 20th and 21st July. [illegible] committees were formed to study the questions of personnel, barracks and equipment. The question of the so-called "Avenantaires" (Syrian troops enlisted in the French regular forces) is, however, presenting some difficulty, and both parties have reserved judgment, the Syrians maintaining that they should be handed over with the other troops. (See also Section 3, paragraph 2.)

The United States Government have been asked by His Majesty's Government to agree to American participation in the operation of Mira, and to the provision of an American training team for the Syrian gendarmerie and security forces. It is felt that such participation might do much to dispel the French impression that His Majesty's Government desire to oust the French from Syria in order to substitute British influence.

A party of Syrian and Lebanese journalists left Beirut for the United Kingdom on the 12th July for a tour to be conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of Information.

2.—*Economics*

Total purchases for the period 8th to 15th July, 1945, amount to 16,040 tons, a daily average of 2,005 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1945/46 crop up to 39,737 tons.

3.—*Damascus*

Fares el Khouri, the Syrian Prime Minister, and Naim Antaki, Minister of Finance, returned to Damascus from San Francisco on the 14th July. Rumours of a Cabinet change persist and Jamil Mardam has confirmed that it is the intention of the Government to convene an extraordinary session of the Chamber; it is possible that on this occasion the Government may resign or, alternatively, announce a reshuffle.

The Syrian Prime Minister was interviewed by B.G.S., Ninth Army, on the 14th July [illegible] "Avenantaires." He pointed out that they were in any case few in number and suggested that they could be divided into three categories: (1) those who wished to continue their service with the French, (2) those who wished to transfer to the Syrian army, and (3) those who wished to be demobilised, each category being allowed to act in accordance with their wishes.

The President of the Republic, however, held strong views on the subject and His Majesty's Minister was obliged in consequence to send him a personal message pointing out the deplorable impression which would be created in England if the negotiations for the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales failed owing to the insistence of the Syrians, contrary to British advice, on 100 per cent satisfaction of their demands. The President took note of the message but raised certain objections on points of detail, pending discussion of which the question of the Avenantaires would be held over.

Other points discussed between the B.G.S. and Jamil Mardam Bey at their interview included the discipline and accommodation of the Troupes Spéciales during the period of transfer, and the size and composition of the new Syrian army. On the latter question the B.G.S. suggested that the plan put forward by the head of the gendarmerie for a force of 11,000 was overlarge, and that the Syrians might do well to decide at once on the size of the force they envisaged, in order to avoid the expense of taking over too much equipment from the French. Jamil Mardam agreed that an army of something like 8,000 would be more reasonable, and said that the matter would be studied urgently, as for equipment, his Government's policy was to take over everything that was there and to consider the question of further requirements in the light of the size of the army which should be decided on.

Abdul Qader Midani, a lawyer, has been appointed Mohafez of Jezireh, this is his first Government appointment.

Lieut.-Colonel Hrant has been appointed Acting Chief of the Gendarmerie and Police in Aleppo. He is an exceptionally competent officer, and his presence in Aleppo in such a tense period will be valuable, but he is anxious lest the appointment may be permanent and his chances of promotion thus prejudiced. [illegible] has been appointed in [illegible]

[illegible] bringing a gift of LP 10,000 for those who had suffered in the recent disorders.

4.—*Aleppo*

During the past week a state of calm has prevailed throughout the district [illegible] which have [illegible] of the past week [illegible] out as a result of the desertion of Alaouite Troupes Spéciales from the Massy Barracks.

There have been some signs during the past week of the emergence of a more [illegible] has shown a tendency towards moderation and has published a few reasonable articles. The Mohafez, on the 11th July, addressed a meeting of Quarter Leaders, urging restraint and moderation while the negotiations were in progress over the Troupes Spéciales; he stated that the Franco-Syrian dispute was being considered on a high level, and urged the population to appear on the streets [illegible] addressed newspaper editors and urged on them the paramount need of restraint in writing on all matters affecting the French.

5.—*Homs Hama*

Nothing to report.

6.—*Jebel Druse*

Nothing to report.

7.—*Alaouites*

The situation still remains uneasy in Lattakia and Tartous and wherever other French garrisons remain.

8.—*Euphrates and Jezireh*

The political officer reports that there is a certain uneasiness amongst the Christians, particularly in Deir ez-Zor and Kamichlié, at the prospect of the withdrawal of French support. A number of the more wealthy Christian families from Deir ez Zor have left for Aleppo.

[illegible] on the night of the 6th and 7th July. The French stated they were defending themselves against an attack but there was no confirmation of this, nor were any casualties reported. Subsequently, on the night of the 10th and 11th July, some shots were fired against the French, but at the request of the local British commander the French did not return the fire. The Kaimakam arrested some local [illegible]

Following the evacuation of all French posts west of Kamichlié, complaints have been received by both French and Syrians of acts of provocation against [illegible] on the 14th July a French report was arrested by Syrian [illegible] at Kamichlié, having in his possession a live grenade. He was taken [illegible] to the French fort. Later in the afternoon rifle and machine-gun fire broke out from the fort and lasted for about half an hour. The local British commander reports that the gendarmes behaved extremely well, though two of their number were wounded by French fire. British troops were fired on at the same time (including an ambulance prominently displaying a Union Jack), no shot, however, was fired in return. Two gendarmes were killed and two civilians wounded. The British officer commanding Bedon force visited Kamichlié on the 15th July accompanied by the [illegible] disarmed: all automatic weapons are to be dismounted from the perimeter of the fort and other weapons locked up under French guard. French troops in the Jezireh will in future be strictly confined to barracks.

9. *Tribal*

A gendarmerie force assisted by a detachment of British troops has succeeded [illegible] These have been taken to the frontier and will be handed over to Iraqi officials as agreed at the Bagdad conference.

10. *Frontier*

Nothing to report.

11. *Lebanon*

It is now possible to assess reaction in the Lebanon to the French sta[illegible] France was handing over to the States only what rightfully belonged to them. Some newspapers took the opportunity to list the additional Lebanese desiderata, prominent amongst which were the transfer to the control of the Lebanese Government of the Radio Levant Broadcasting Station and the Banque de Syrie, and the return of the gold reserves of the latter which General Dentz took to France in 1941. Public opinion on the whole took only lukewarm interest in the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales, which has never been a live issue in the Lebanon, but in general was suspicious of French good faith.

The Lebanese and Syrian Ministers for Foreign Affairs met at Ain Sofar in the morning of the 16th July, before the meeting of the Franco Levant States Special C[illegible] had been reached between "all interested parties" regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Levant States. A *démenti* published the following day stated that what he had said was that a *modus vivendi* had been discussed regarding the presence of such troops in the Levant States.

The Lebanese Delegation to San Francisco returned to Beirut [illegible] in all and, as his deputy is not considered competent, an extraordinary session [illegible] to the idea of a reconciliation between Abdul Hamid Karami and Riad es Solh, possibly on the basis of the inclusion in the Ministry of two of the latter's supporters, Karami himself seems determined to make no change in the Govern[illegible] and to confront the Chamber with his present team, and the Minister for [illegible] Affairs apparently still hankers after appointment to the [illegible]

[illegible] French authorities celebrated the 14th July with commendable di[illegible] as in previous years. The Lebanese Government were represented [illegible]

Some agitation has occurred in the Lebanese silk weaving [illegible] yarn, the Prime Minister signed an order requisitioning it; this order was, however, considered illegal by the Minister of National Economy, who secured its [illegible] The matter is under discussion between the competent authorities, but in the meantime the weavers are understood to be on strike in protest.

12. *Press*

The French de[illegible] Syria and Leba[illegible] general satisfaction. Most [illegible] had this gesture been made earlier [illegible] [illegible] with the [illegible] the Government and people of Syria

being determined that the French shall effect complete evacuation before negotiations are reopened.

In the Lebanon, also, general satisfaction was expressed by the press, this satisfaction was, however, tinged with suspicion in the Nationalist papers in view of the fact that the new proposals have been made by the men who were responsible for the recent events in Syria. The general consensus of opinion in the Nationalist papers was that the importance of this French gesture should not be exaggerated, as there are more that must follow, including the all-important prerequisite to a resumption of negotiations, viz., complete French evacuation. The Beirut Communist paper advocated that the question of the Levant should be solved on an international basis, saying that any solution based on the consideration that the Levant States lie astride imperial communications would be a further attempt to bring the Levant States under a new form of colonisation.

The pro-French papers continued to urge that the present moment is propitious for the conclusion of an agreement with France.

The Lebanese papers continued to give prominence to the Russo-Turkish [illegible] were bluffing in their stand against the Russian claims, and that Great Britain will not support Turkey to the extent that the latter believes.

There has been a slight recrudescence of commentary on the Zionist question, and one Beirut paper called the attention of the Government to the extensive Zionist commercial enterprises in the Lebanon.

E 5696/5/89] (5)

Weekly Political Summary No. 172, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, for the Week ending 24th July, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office, 13th August.)

1. *General*

DURING the week arrangements for handing over the Troupes Spéciales [illegible] making unnecessary difficulties about the transfer of the barracks, but the B.G.S. Ninth Army was able to assure the Syrian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs that the removal of all French equipment from barracks would necessarily take some time. British military authorities assisted in the transportation of French equipment in Damascus, and on the night of the 22nd July the Syrian troops moved into the Hamidieh Barracks.

Considerable progress was also realised in the matter of the "Avenantaires." The B.G.S. was able to assure the Syrians that no French recruiting had taken place since the 8th July (see section 3, paragraph 3 of Weekly Political Summary No. 171).

A French circular issued on the 21st June which stated that the French were prepared to offer protection to the families of Avenantaires, and advised them to move into French zones, was referred by the B.G.S. to the French, who agreed to suspend its operation. The Syrians agreed that 6,000 men who had signed up [illegible] but whose contracts had not been completed by the French, should be demobilised by the French and paid gratuities, all Avenantaires units would be similarly treated, but men who wished to stay in French service would be allowed to do so. Finally, it was agreed that the solution of the outstanding problems connected with the Avenantaires should be postponed until the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales had been completed (for further details of the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales see section 3 of this report).

Negotiations in connexion with the restorting of the civil air services from the Mezzé aerodrome near Damascus have continued and a satisfactory solution has since been reached. The Syrian authorities are anxious to take over the aerodrome *in toto* from the French. The commander-in-chief has, however, [illegible] that the four main aerodromes in the Levant States [illegible] Beirut and Rayak, are essential for the Allied war effort, and the Allied air force must retain the right to use them until the conclusion of hostilities with Japan; the British are responsible for Aleppo and Beirut aerodromes, and the French for Mezzé and Rayak; for technical and administrative reasons it is [illegible] be hoped at present; in the event of any agreement being reached in the future for the

transfer of the aerodromes to the States it would be essential that the necessary technical staff should be trained before the present control could be withdrawn, the withdrawal of the Allied air force could not in any case be considered before the general withdrawal of the Allied forces. The Syrian President, at first took the line that he was unable to accept arrangements which would admit of French control, but later agreed to reconsider this.

General Officer Commanding Ninth Army has received a letter dated the 19th July from the Commander-in-Chief French troops in the Levant, stating that the extension of the powers of French military courts to cover cases of Syrian and Lebanese subjects who have committed offences against the British army in the Levant is no longer justified now that the maintenance of security and order no longer devolves upon French army; from the 1st August, therefore, the services of French military justice will not be able to deal with offences against British forces. The letter which is courteously worded ends with an expression of thanks for the spirit of co-operation shown by British services who have had dealings with French military justice during the past four years, and a request that the necessary arrangements may be made for replacing French military courts in tasks they have hitherto performed on behalf of Ninth Army.

2. *Economic.*

Figures for weekly grain purchases not yet available.

3. *Damascus.*

At the end of last week there were strong rumours that the Minister of the [illegible] resigned. A Damascus newspaper stated that the Prime Minister had [illegible] the following day the press published [illegible] Minister in a press interview declared that [illegible] the Syrian delegation to San Francisco had not [illegible] parliament, and the San Francisco [illegible] doubt that the Minister of the [illegible] departure. [illegible] Minister [illegible] was [illegible]

It was recently learnt that the Syrian [illegible] "Black Book" setting out in detail the [illegible] of the French [illegible] Acting Consul in Damascus [illegible] the view of His Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs this stage would be [illegible] His Majesty's Minister also raised this question personally with the President of the Republic on the 22nd July, suggesting that only a limited number of copies should be [illegible] the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that [illegible] with Yazigi, who had [illegible]

Further problems in connexion with the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales were discussed with the Syrian President and the Commander [illegible] 21st July. Of the 20,000 Syrian Troupes Spéciales [illegible] have not been [illegible] 6,000 [illegible] States. His Bris Nuta Army informed the Syrians that it was the intention of the French authorities to hand over the [illegible] 12,000. If the Syrians [illegible] Troupes Spéciales as possible.

In an interview with Reuter's correspondent on the 20th July the Syrian Prime Minister paid tribute to the French [illegible] of the Troupes Spéciales [illegible] that they had been faithful to their promises and most helpful." He further stated that it was the intention of the Syrian

Government to be liberal in the matter of compensation for buildings taken over [illegible] the troubles would be included in the final account. He hoped that the evacuation of foreign troops, with the exception of those required for the war effort in the Far East, would be completed before the end of the summer.

4. *Aleppo.*

The past week in Aleppo and district has been quiet and the slightly more reasonable attitude towards the French authorities has been maintained.

On the 20th July the Musay Barracks, the Dépôt de Remontes, the Moulmieh Barracks at [illegible] were handed over under British military supervision to representatives of the Syrian Government. [illegible] Aleppo to the north-west of the Citadel was formally handed over to the Syrians [illegible]

The American College in Aleppo is planning to extend its [illegible] to admit at least 200 more boys. His Majesty's Consul has been approached by many persons with requests that a British school should be opened in Aleppo.

5. *Homs and Hama.*

No report received.

6. *Jebel Druze.*

Commandant Hamid el Atrash has been appointed to command and reorganize the Druze militia. He is a supporter of the Emir Hassan. He has [illegible] Government to reduce the numbers, and particularly to get rid of undesirable elements.

7. *Alaouites.*

No report received. The French garrison from Massiaf was withdrawn without incident to Tartous on the 22nd and 23rd July.

8. *Euphrates and Jezireh.*

No report received.

9. *Tribal.*

No report received.

10. *Frontier.*

Nothing to report.

11. *Lebanon.*

The transfer of the Troupes Spéciales has on the whole proceeded smoothly in the Lebanon. There have been no popular demonstrations and none is anticipated. Such difficulties as arise are on the technical plane and are being gradually solved by the technical committees appointed for this purpose. The principal barracks occupied by the Troupes Spéciales in the Lebanon will be handed over shortly, and the transfer of the troops themselves is arranged for the 1st August.

With this thorny problem in the process of settlement the Lebanese Government have turned their attention to the question of the transfer of certain services which still remain in French hands, of which transfer has not yet been effected in practice. Amongst the other the most important is the Régie des Chemins de Fer Syriens et Libanais, which operates the railways of the part of Syria and the Lebanon. Mr. Minister for Foreign Affairs states that he has [illegible] conversation with Count Ostrorog on these subjects, and [illegible] insuperable difficulties will arise. Meantime, the Lebanese Government have formed a technical commission to study the [illegible] that the Syrian Government are [illegible] However, [illegible] they claim to have made satisfactory progress [illegible] complete agreement.

The internal political situation has again come to the forefront. On the 21st July Gabriel Murr, the Vice-President of the Chamber, resigned, being hurt at Government statements which he regarded as a reflection on his competence to manage the Chamber in an extraordinary session during the illness of the Speaker. On the 23rd July he gave a lunch party at which twenty Deputies assisted, eight more absenting themselves, but promising support in advance to any decisions which might be taken. As a result, a deputation of four composed of Murr himself, Riad and Sami Solh and Georges Zouein, waited on the President of the Republic to demand the convocation of the Chamber. This was accorded, and it is understood that the session will start about the 1st August. The Government intend to demand a vote of confidence, which it is generally expected they will obtain.

The publication in the Paris newspaper *Le Monde* of a letter from the Maronite Patriarch suggesting that French protection was necessary for the Christians of the Levant and that a treaty with France was in Lebanese interests, has aroused considerable opposition, not only amongst Moslems, but also amongst the many Christians who favour Lebanese independence. *L'Orient* published an article (inspired by the Minister for [illegible]) [illegible] the Patriarch's "dangerous attitude." The Greek Orthodox Archbishop has published a statement entirely dissociating himself and his community from the Patriarch. This latest manifestation of extreme Christian sentiment, whether or not at French inspiration, has certainly done more harm than good.

The deadlock over the appointment of a commander for the new Lebanese force [illegible] Meanwhile the Lebanese Government have welcomed the proposal that an American Mission might be sent to reorganise their gendarmerie, [illegible] Power. The necessity for some such mission, and the impossibility of its being carried out by the British, was explained to him. The question was further discussed at the Syro-Lebanese meeting on the 23rd July.

The functioning of the Lebanese Finance Ministry is beginning to cause concern, as the lack of effective direction seems to have resulted in serious disorganisation. It has been noted that the Lebanese merchants have still not [illegible] and it is generally believed that revenue is not coming in properly and that expenses are not controlled. A project for the establishment of a "Cour des Comptes" for the purpose of improving control over public finance is on the agenda for the next session of the Chamber.

12. *Press*

The tone of the Damascus press [illegible] the Franco-Levant situation, [illegible] tions made by the [illegible] on the com[illegible] of the Levant States [illegible]

One [illegible] to the effect that [illegible] Syria since the last [illegible] has

The French [illegible] conflict in Algeria received wide publicity under heading [illegible] Speak for Themselves" and "Forty-four [illegible] by the French in Algeria."

[illegible] the Lebanese press on the general aspect of Franco-Levant relations [illegible] hitherto, the papers dealing more with [illegible] Government's [illegible] has appeared, and some papers [illegible] considerations [illegible] the Government.

[illegible] French interests [illegible] expressed [illegible] joint Syro-Lebanese note to the [illegible] the recent indulgent attitude shown by the Government towards the French was not unconnected with a certain British influence.

The alleged activities of the Maronite Patriarch have been criticised in a Nationalist organ which [illegible] has no right to speak on behalf of all Lebanese Christians.

Russo-Turkish relations were again given prominence, comment, however, was scanty, being mainly confined to [illegible] from foreign sources.

The Zionist danger was again emphasised in both the Syrian and Lebanese press, and one Lebanese paper urged the Government to take the necessary steps [illegible] her [illegible] to Palestine.

Anti-Government papers in Syria seized on the return of the San Francisco delegation to suggest a change of Cabinet, but changed their tone after a [illegible] Prime Minister [illegible] at San Francisco.

The Damascus *Al-Insha* continued to complain of the newsprint quota and against the lack of press freedom in Syria.

E 5992/5/89] **(4)**

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 173, Secret. Syria and the Lebanon, for Week ending 31st July, 1945.—(Received 17th August.)

General

THE result of the British general election has been widely discussed in both States. The first reaction was that the resumption of power by the Labour party, and, in particular, the defeat of General Spears, foreshadowed a closer alignment of British foreign policy with the French, and a tendency to favour the Zionist rather than the Arab cause. While after a few days it appeared to be more generally assumed that policies and not personalities are predominant in Great Britain, and that a change of Government need not necessarily bring about a drastic change of British foreign policy, fears about Palestine continued to be voiced in most quarters. In the Lebanon public opinion later tended to take the view that since General de Gaulle's French critics were mostly of the Left, his personal policy towards the Levant States was unlikely to find favour with the new British Parliament.

Further meetings took place between the Lebanese and Syrian Ministers for Foreign Affairs on the 23rd and the 27th July. The *Troupes Spéciales* will be handed over to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments on the 1st August, and appropriate measures were begun on the 25th July, when officers of the two Governments made contacts with their units. Officers, non-commissioned officers and other ranks who do not wish to serve in the National armies will be allowed to return to their homes. "Avenantaires" who have signed since the 30th June, 1945, and who do not desire, or are not accepted for service in the National armies will return to their homes before the 31st July; those who desire to serve in the National armies will be transferred with the remainder of the *Troupes Spéciales*, and the Avenantaires remaining in French service, together with French personnel will be withdrawn from their units. Owing to the special conditions obtaining in East Syria only nominal transfer will take place on the 1st August, to permit the evacuation of those who wish to continue in French service and the troops who wish to be transferred. The French authorities have agreed to the withdrawal from East Syria of their political officers, who will be replaced by four Officiers de Mission for liaison purposes.

The French have informed the States' Governments that they are prepared to hand over the remaining services in French hands, loosely known as "common interests" and both the French and the States have appointed technical commissions to arrange for the transfer.

[illegible] Radio Levant, [illegible] the Office Economique de Guerre, the Sequestration Office, Beirut and Tripoli aerodromes, the telephone service and control over the Beirut Port Company, Radio Orient and the D.H.P. railways. Of these Radio Levant is purely French-controlled and the French claim it was built with French money, whereas the Lebanese Government claims that it was built with Intérêts Communs money; the principle of the transfer of the control of the D.H.P. railway and the Beirut Port was agreed by a Protocol dated the 5th June, 1944, but the details of transfer of control have never been worked out; the telephone system in both States is French military property, which the States now wish to purchase and run for themselves.

A member of the staff asked Count Ostrorog whether the French had made any official declaration to the Lebanese Government that they would withdraw their troops as soon as British troops were withdrawn. Count Ostrorog stated

that his [illegible] offer (see Weekly Summary No. 170) had been made officially, [illegible] Paris: that he had not received any more [illegible] way

Economic

Total purchases for the period the 16th to the 22nd July, 1945 amounted to 8,419 tons, a daily average of 1,202 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1945–46 crop up to 48,156 tons

Damascus

On the 25th July the President of the Syrian Republic invited the heads of the [illegible] that his door would always be open to them. He gave them an assurance that all Syrians, irrespective of religion would enjoy the same rights. He added that he had on the previous day received 30 Ulema and had spoken to them in no uncertain terms regarding the necessity of co-operation between the various religious communities. The Bishops, who stayed with the President for [illegible] half, were well pleased with their [illegible]

On the 28th July the Prime Minister convened members of the [illegible] August. The Prime Minister gave the Deputies some [illegible]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed the Acting Consul that the "Black Book" [illegible]

The British Overseas Airways Company restarted their civil services from [illegible] the depot being responsible for transferring [illegible] from airport

Aleppo

The past week has been quiet in Aleppo town and district. The transfer of most [illegible] has taken place without [illegible] the [illegible] of *Troupes Speciales* with their families, finding temporary accommodation for them and supplying them with rations.

Homs and Hama

On the 24th July representations were made to the Prime Minister regarding [illegible] Abdel Hamid Shechef, the Mufti of Homs, [illegible] Minister was [illegible] Political Officer at Homs [illegible] was arrested on the 24th July.

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Alaouites

Incidents have continued to occur in the Alaouite area and the situation remains tense. On the 29th July [illegible] Levant Ba[illegible] the Alaouite troops [illegible] prevented these [illegible] over to the Syrians [illegible] the Alaouites. The greater part of these [illegible] British guard but discipline [illegible] among the Alaouite troops who threaten to destroy all Syrian property. It has now been arranged

that they will be replaced by Moroccan troops from Tartous. British troops are now guarding all material and barracks due to be transferred to the Syrians, and there is no doubt that only the presence of British troops is maintaining order

Euphrates and Jezireh

The final transfer of *Troupes Speciales*, entailing the evacuation of French "avenantaires," discharged men and any remaining families, is planned to begin on the 30th July from Raqqa and Deir ez Zor. Very few men will remain to be transferred to the Syrian Government in this area, where the new Syrian army will consist very largely of the 600 or 700 deserters who left the French earlier.

In an attempt to reduce the number of "avenantaires" remaining in French service, and at the same time induce more men to accept transfer to the Syrian Government, an Anglo-French Commission has visited each place where there are still French garrisons. In general the net result of these visits has been to increase the category of men wishing to be discharged without substantially altering the numbers accepting transfer.

As far as can be ascertained the following figures represent the various categories of men at Raqqa and Deir ez Zor when evacuation took place:—

	Raqqa	*Deir ez Zor*
Avenantaires	178	109
Men for discharge	344	254
Men for transfer	28	77

Following a visit to Beirut the Political Officer informed the Moubafez that [illegible] to take all possible measures to stop these incidents and to ensure that no discrimination against Christians was permitted. He willingly agreed to repeat the instructions he had previously given in this respect.

The evacuation of French garrisons from the Jezireh began on the 30th July with the despatch of a convoy of families from Derik to Hasetche, whence they [illegible] moved by train. Qamichlie, and finally Hasetche, will be dealt with in the same way. It is not expected that evacuation will be complete before the 14th August.

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Lebanon

Now that the Extraordinary Session of the Lebanese Chamber has been definitely called for early August, political activity has increased. Habib Abi Chahla has been trying to act as liaison officer between the Prime Minister and Riad Solh, but has merely fallen foul of both in the process, with consequent prejudice to his own chances of forming part of any new Government. A meeting of Opposition representatives was held at Broumana on the 30th July at which Naccache's so-called National party decided to oppose the Government so long as they were not represented in it. As a result of this meeting it is suggested that there are some twenty-seven Deputies likely to vote against the Government on a vote of confidence. If, however, the date of this vote is postponed, there are many chances for political bargains, and the result must be held to be extremely [illegible]

Amongst draft laws transferred by the Government to the Chamber for consideration during the Session, are one regarding the flying of foreign flags on Lebanese territory and another designed to abolish the power of French military courts over Lebanese nationals.

The Lebanese gendarmerie have now begun attempts to destroy the hashish crops in the Bekaa and North Lebanon. It has not been possible this year to provide British military assistance, on account of the heavy security commitments of the British military authorities, and it is not thought probable that the gendarmerie's efforts will result in destruction of more than a fraction of the total crop. The areas sown with hashish are everywhere reported much greater than last year.

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E 6379 5 89

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 174, Secret, Syria and Lebanon, for Week ending 7th August, 1945.—(Received 30th August.)

General

The transfer to the States Governments of the Troupes Spéciales has taken place during the week without major incident, though the Syrians are somewhat [illegible] from his colleagues on this question, and it is probable that the matter will be [illegible] Jamil Mardam Bey has been informed that, if the Syrian Government are prepared to leave this question until the 21st August, there may be a considerable change for the better, since the French Command are definitely anxious to keep down to a minimum the number of troops who will continue in French service and will, therefore, have to be evacuated to French territory with their families.

The first meeting of the French, Lebanese and Syrian Commissions to study the question of the transfer of the remaining services still controlled by the French took place on the 2nd August. Little progress was made, as the States' representatives professed ignorance as to what services there were to discuss and asked for information. A further meeting is to be held shortly. There seems to be some divergence of views between the Lebanese and Syrians, the former being extremely anxious to get these matters concluded, whilst the latter, who are less directly interested in many of them, are taking the line that the French are bound to show bad faith in any such discussions. It is understood that the questions to be discussed include Radio Levant Broadcasting Station, completion of the transfer of control of the railways and Beirut Port (the protocol signed on the 5th June, 1944, not having been executed), the custodianship of enemy property, the O.P.G., telephones and Radio Orient.

Discussions have taken place during the week between the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Lebanese and Syrian Ministers for Foreign Affairs about the eventual recognition of the States by Turkey. Jamil Bey has expressed to a member of the legation staff the view that the question of the recognition of Syria by Turkey did not arise, since this had taken place at the San Francisco Conference, that discussion was only necessary as regards the exchange of diplomatic representatives, that the Syrians and Lebanese were prepared to exchange [illegible] but that the Turks wished this matter to be settled before the exchange of representatives took place. No decision was reached, and it is understood that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs will inform the Levant States whether or not his Government is prepared to agree to an exchange of representatives without prior agreement about the Hatay.

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Damascus

A decree has been published convening the Chamber of Deputies to an extraordinary session on the 14th August. The agenda includes draft laws for (1) the transfer of the army and the necessary credits, (2) the establishment of new schools, (3) an amnesty for prisoners who were released from the prison of Damascus during the bombardment, (4) ratification of the Covenant of the United Nations, and (5) promotion of police and gendarmerie personnel.

Reports that an agreement had been reached between General Paget and General Beynet to the effect that French troops would be retained on the Syrian littoral have caused concern and an official *démenti* was published by the Syrian authorities.

The transfer of the Troupes Spéciales on the 1st August passed without [illegible] The approximate position at present is that, apart from the 3,000 original Avenantaires, 3,000 remain with the French, 2,500 have been demobilised, and 2,000 have passed to the Syrian army. When informed of the number of troops still remaining under the French, Jamil Mardam showed considerable concern and said that the figures confirmed his suspicion that the French were going back on their engagements. He referred to a "Note de Service" which had been issued by a French commander on the 25th July, and which stated that, "contrary to their previous declarations," the French were prepared to keep on troops who were disposed to serve overseas. At a meeting with His Majesty's Minister and the British military authorities at Sofar on the

3rd August, Jamil Mardam Bey agreed to leave the question until the 21st August.

The Syrian Government are now studying the reorganisation of their armed forces. It is clear that immediate attention needs to be concentrated on improving [illegible] present [illegible] A committee has been set up under the Minister of Defence to work out the details of the reorganisation.

[illegible] the Mezzé aerodrome. [illegible] applied for permission to open their Cairo–Damascus service, but this [illegible] B.O.A.C. were already operating (see Section 2, paragraph 5, of Weekly Summary No. 173), and the Syrian Government, in the absence from Damascus of Jamil Mardam, cancelled the arrangements whereby Syrian customs officials carried out their formalities in the B.O.A.C. office, as they considered that for their officials to have to show passes, albeit Syrian ones, to a French sentry on the aerodrome was an affront to their national dignity. Jamil Bey was subsequently able to reverse this decision and formalities for B.O.A.C. passengers are now being carried out in the B.O.A.C. office in Damascus.

This question was also discussed between His Majesty's Minister, the British military authorities and Jamil Mardam Bey on the 3rd August, when it was [illegible] this question in a manner which would take account of Syrian susceptibilities, and that civil air services must continue pending any modification of the existing control of the aerodrome, which for the present must remain vested in the French. It was finally agreed that the Syrian Government should make an official request for the formation of an Anglo-Franco-Syro-Lebanese Commission to study the whole question of the control of aerodromes in the Levant States. It is clear [illegible] and the Government will probably be heckled on the subject when the Chamber next meets.

Aleppo.

The calm and generally improved situation in Aleppo has continued, but there is little improvement in Franco-Syrian relations. The hand-over of Troupes Spéciales and the subsequent procession through the streets of the newly acquired vehicles and equipment aroused much local jubilation, but no disorder.

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Euphrates and Jezireh

The transfer of the Troupes Spéciales was finally concluded in the Euphrates [illegible] to the Syrian authorities, the barracks at Raqqa having been handed over on the 31st July.

In the Jezireh the Troupes Spéciales, with the exception of about half [illegible] men in Hassetché, who have accepted transfer to the Syrian Government, and some twenty who have accepted their discharge, form a solid block of Avenantaires totalling 1,582 men. These with their families, amounting in all to nearly 5,500, still have to be evacuated during the next week or two. The immediate departure of so large a number of people is causing some concern in the area.

By a decision of the Anglo-French Joint Staff French officers have been appointed to remain in Dez, Hassetché and Qamichlié to look after French interests in East Syria after the general evacuation is complete. Instructions received by the Délégué-Adjoint state that these officers will make liaison with the Contrôle Bédouin, the Syrians and the British authorities. As the Contrôle Bédouin is purely a Syrian responsibility and the Syrian authorities have received instructions to have no contacts with French officers, it is difficult to see how these officers will carry out their mission; for any contact they may have with the local population is liable to create a trouble to the local authorities.

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Frontier

The French frontier posts on the Syrian Turkish frontier have now all been evacuated. The British [illegible] with frontier questions, for which the Syrian authorities are wholly responsible,

and it appears that the Turkish authorities are developing *de facto* contacts with their S[illegible] posts [illegible] of relations between the two Governments.

Lebanon

Further discussions and intrigues amongst Deputies have in general strengthened the [illegible] to have a [illegible] the Lebanese.

The Maronite Patriarch's letter to a Paris newspaper advocating a Franco-Lebanese [illegible] Patriarch has [illegible] to speak in the name of the Christians. The Minister of the Interior visited the P[illegible] was [illegible] Orthodox and Protestant communities have dissociated themselves from the Patriarch's attitude.

On the 1st August a review was held of Lebanese troops at which the Lebanese President presided. [illegible] when [illegible] Minister.

A commission formed by the Lebanese Government to study post war [illegible] committees to consider problems of finance, economics and social welfare. It is [illegible] Egyptian [illegible] and [illegible] and post war [illegible].

The staff of the military school from Homs with all the pupils who had been [illegible] on the 1st August [illegible] deserted and threatened to attack the French, but they were subsequently rounded up by British troops and brought back. They have since been disarmed and are now waiting to be sent back to Syria. All Lebanese naval personnel at the French naval [illegible] British [illegible].

There was a certain amount of discontent amongst the Troupes Spéciales in [illegible] Government were planning to leave their barracks during the night of the 31st July and, with the assistance of the French, were going to take their rifles and machine guns and escape to their homes in the Alaouite mountains. The prompt action of the British military authorities in disarming the battalion on the 31st July prevented the [illegible] British guard and will be handed over to a detachment of Lebanese troops who are expected to arrive in Tripoli shortly.

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[E 6380 5 89] (6)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 175, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon for W[illegible] 14th [illegible] 1945. Received 30th [illegible]

General

The French, Syrian and Lebanese commissions nominated to discuss the transfer of the remaining services still controlled by the French have now held three meetings and have registered little progress. The French representatives have accepted the attitude that it is for the States to say what they would like to take over, whilst the States maintain that they wish to take over everything but cannot know what services there are until the French, who control these services, tell them. The French have now agreed to divide the services into three categories: (1) those in respect of which the principle of transfer has been admitted, (2) those in which transfer is dependent on financial settlements, and

(3) those which are disputable on account of private or foreign interests being involved. A list of those services in category (1) has now been drawn up and will be discussed between the French and Lebanese; the Syrian representatives have temporarily been withdrawn, their Government maintaining that they are ready to discuss the details, but not the principle, of transfer. Since the French and Syrian representatives had tended to snap at each other during meetings, more rapid progress is likely with the Syrians absent; they will be reassociated when any definite result is in sight.

The French steamer *Marrakesh* arrived in Beirut from France on the 9th August, bringing back 183 Syrian and Lebanese students from Europe, some civilian employees, 300 Syrian and Lebanese Avenantaires and some North African troops domiciled in Syria, for demobilisation. She sailed for [illegible] on the 12th August, taking away some 500 French civilians and a number of French military personnel. A few of the returning Lebanese and Syrians were detained for two days by the British security authorities for interrogation. R[illegible] will be forwarded to their respective Governments in due course for such [illegible] as may be necessary.

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Damascus

During the week there has been some political activity in preparation for the sitting of the Chamber on the 14th August. The Damascus group of Deputies, led by Lutfi Haffar and Khaled el Azm, are concentrating their energies on [illegible] a change of Government and are [illegible] in the support of the Aleppo group owing allegiance to Saadullah Jabri. The brunt of their attack is directed against Jamil Mardam, who, in self-defence, appears to be looking for support to the rival Aleppo faction led by the Mudarres family and Dr Kayyali and also to Lebanese and Syrian Deputies. Although it is difficult to prophesy the last word will probably lie with the President, and despite the [illegible] co-operation of recent weeks between the latter and Saadullah Ja[illegible] hand and Saadullah Jabri and Lutfi Haffar on the other, the President [illegible] the existing Government for [illegible].

At the special sitting of the Chamber on the 14th August [illegible] opened with a minute's silence as a tribute to the "martyrs" who died during the May June troubles. A bitter attack was made on the Government [illegible] Homs Deputy who blamed them for what had occurred, on the grounds that they had not taken the advice of the Chamber in breaking off relations with the French at an earlier date and in calling over the Troupes Spéciales. The Deputy also accused members of the Government of promoting their own interests and favouring their friends and supporters. In reply the Prime Minister asked that the Deputy should either withdraw or substantiate his charges against members of the Government and offered to hold an enquiry if definite allegations were made. The Prime Minister then [illegible] the Syrian Delegation had played at the San Francisco Conference. Draft bills dealing with the taking over of the army and emergency education measures were passed to the relevant Committees, who were asked to study them urgently and report to the House at the next sitting on the 20th August.

Commenting to pressmen on the Japanese offer to surrender, the Prime Minister stated that the solution of certain questions affecting Syria depended on the cessation of hostilities and that he anticipated that these questions would shortly be settled.

The Ministry of National Economy are negotiating for the engagement of foreign technical experts. [illegible] an agricultural expert (the Rockefeller Near East Foundation has been asked to approach Professor Goodman of Cornell University) (ii) an entomologist (Professor Bodenheimer of the Hebrew University at Jerusalem has been directly approached) (iii) a statistician (M.E.S.C. have been asked to obtain particulars of a suitable candidate), (iv) a geologist, (v) a veterinary surgeon.

Aleppo

The general situation remains unchanged. A feeling of uneasiness is undoubtedly prevalent amongst the Christian minorities although no serious cases have been [illegible] in light of Moslems having maltreated, attacked or robbed Christians.

There is still no sign of any intention on the part of the Mohafez to resume contact with the French Delegate, though the latter has expressed the hope that

Franco-Syrian relations may soon be re-established. The French authorities [illegible] measures to increase the accommodation for pupils in Government [illegible] suitable teachers [illegible] efficiently.

A dispersal camp has been opened in Aleppo for Avenantaires, disbanded [illegible] August the French have not participated in the work of the Aleppo Bureau Renseignements de la Circulation du Levant.

Lieutenant-Colonel Hrant has been transferred to [illegible] and has been succeeded as Director of the Gendarmerie and Acting Director of Police in Aleppo by Lieutenant-Colonel [illegible]

Homs Hama

A Communist pamphlet of Damascus origin was distributed [illegible]

Jebel Druze

In general the area has been quiet, but an incident occurred in [illegible] No casualties occurred. The house remains vacant, but is [illegible] one of contention amongst the local notables.

Alaouites

The week has been quiet, but the presence of troops and H.M.S. *Jaseur* [illegible] genuinely attempting to secure normal circulation in the town, has been asked to guarantee the security of the main streets of Lattakia and the main road [illegible] so long as Capitaine Boussiquet remains in Lattakia, his arguments [illegible] felt against him by the population as a result of his activities during the past year.

The Moroccan Battalion from Tartous has replaced the [illegible] Battalion [illegible] have been reported since its arrival.

Euphrates and Jezireh

The Euphrates and Jezireh have remained quiet during the week and in the [illegible] troops and their families has been proceeding [illegible] and the following day the fort was [illegible] military authorities.

The decision to allow French "Officiers de Mission" to remain at [illegible] Gendarmerie [illegible] part that the Syrian [illegible] recognise the need for [illegible] French officers to remain in East Syria and are convinced that it is merely another attempt to maintain French propaganda.

Tribal

The Mohafez of Deir ez Zor has not yet heard what success has attended [illegible] attempt to retake the 4000 camels seized by the Shammar from the Agaidat (see Weekly Summary No. 174, [illegible]). He [illegible] to find out the terms of the Bedouin [illegible] reports have been received of two further raids by the Shammar [illegible] and some 250 camels are alleged to have been stolen from the Aseidat and Afadlat respectively.

* * * * * *

Lebanon

Whilst it became steadily clearer during the week that the Government [illegible] a vote of confidence when the extraordinary session of the Chamber opened on the 14th August, the Government's existence was jeopardised on the 12th August when the Constitutional party, to which two of the Ministers belong, decided (by a very small majority) to call on these Ministers to resign. The Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs at once announced to all and sundry that they would resign soon after the [illegible] confidence had been passed and would not accept office in the new Gov[illegible] At the sitting of the Chamber on the 14th August the Government obtained a vote of confidence by 34 votes to 9, with 2 abstentions.

It is now taken for granted in local political circles that a change of Government is imminent but there is considerable diversity of opinion as to who will compose it. The choice of Prime Minister presents the chief difficulty. Riad Solh, who would normally be the natural choice, is still unpopular (on account of the alleged irregularities of his last Government) and is particularly disliked by the President's entourage. Abdullah Yafi, who is favoured by Henri Pharaon, is disliked by the President himself, and Sami Solh, who has considerable middle and lower class Moslem support, is recognised in responsible circles as being so vain and impulsive as to be liable to constitute a danger. There are thus unlimited possibilities of intrigue in the next few days and the situation must be regarded as entirely fluid at present.

The Communist parties of Syria and the Lebanon met on the 9th August and their executive committees later issued a long statement. Much of this was devoted to attacks on the present Governments, but one passage significantly stressed the following points:—

(a) That the British Conservative party, which [illegible] Colonial policy in the interests of British [illegible] adopting a double faced attitude towards Syria and the Lebanon for whilst claiming to support their independence it has recognised a privileged position for France.

[illegible] which aims both at sharing influence in these countries with reactionary French elements, and also at securing control over the rights and powers now being handed over to the States' Governments.

(c) All foreign forces, British as well as French, should be withdrawn from the two countries.

A Polish subject named M. Gadomski arrived in Beirut from Palestine on the 11th August apparently [illegible] the appointment of diplomatic representative of the Warsaw Government. The Lebanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs have asked this Legation for advice as to the footing on which he should be treated.

E 6710/5/89] (7)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 178, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon for Week ending 21st August, 1945.—(Communicated by the British Legation, Beirut. Received in Foreign Office, 11th September.)

I. *General.*

THE only official celebration in the Levant States of the end of the war with Japan was a reception given by the Lebanese President to the Diplomatic Corps and notables in Beirut on the 18th August. Public opinion everywhere showed a complete lack of interest in the conclusion of hostilities. There are, however, [illegible] to use a number [illegible] the evacuation [illegible] abolition of military controls. At a meeting of the Syrian [illegible] 20th August the Prime Minister stated that the evacuation of all foreign troops from Syria must be considered now that hostilities have ceased, and press articles on the same subject have already been appearing.

Owing to the Lebanese political crisis no further meetings have been held between the French and Lebanese to discuss the transfer of services.

* * * * * *

3. *Damascus*

The second anniversary of Shukri Quwatli's election to the presidency was [illegible] President presented colours to the Syrian army. The same evening the President offered a dinner to members of the Diplomatic and Consular Corps and high Government officials.

[illegible] weakened by the Prime Minister's handling of the Chamber on the 14th August (see section 3, paragraph 2, of the Weekly Political Summary No. 175) when, instead of taking the initiative and giving the house an account of recent developments, he allowed the Opposition to get in first with a slashing attack. Although [illegible] present the key to the situation is the attitude of Saadullah Jabri who, though he professes to share the President's view, declares himself unable to intervene. The position of his supporters and of their present allies, Khaled el Azm and Lutfi Haffar is therefore considerably stronger, and the possibility that the Government may fall, or at least be reshuffled, cannot be excluded. [illegible] suspicions of French intentions are increasing. Last week the Min[illegible] Foreign Affairs informed the acting consul that leading F[illegible] talks with foreign diplomats and visitors, were referring to the inevitability of troubles in Syria and saying that the Syrians were incapable of maintaining order and that the British authorities would not be able to assist them. The Minister for Foreign Affairs also stated that the Syrians were in possession of information which showed that the French were making use of agents [illegible] supplied with money to stir up trouble amongst the ex Troupes Spéciales, the [illegible] the Cherkess and the Druzes.

The draft Army Bill which is being presented to the Chamber (see Weekly Political Summary No. 175, section 3, paragraph 2) provides for the taking over of the troops in their present state with the same rates of pay, for the incorporation in the new army of the auxiliary force enlisted earlier in the year, for an increase of credits from 15 to 23 million Syrian pounds for the enlistment of retired officers and for the engagement of foreign experts.

A Department of Arab Affairs under the direction of Tewfik Yazigi, has been established in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

4. *Aleppo*

The lull in every form of local activity which became noticeable early in the month has continued during the past week. His Majesty's Consul reports that after three months virtual imprisonment and humiliation, a very noticeable feeling of impatience is growing among the French, and it is clear that their tempers are becoming frayed after so long-drawn-out a period of enforced inactivity. Although French feeling is primarily directed against the Syrians, anti British feeling continues to increase.

Evacuation via Aleppo of "Avenantaires" and their families from East Syria has continued during the past week. [illegible] matter censored by the British Military Censor resumed publication on the 20th August. On the 16th August another newspaper, *El Hawades*, published a [illegible] claimed that now the war was over there were no reasons to justify the continuance of the military censorship which he would ignore in future. The matter [illegible] taken up by His Majesty's Consul with the Mohafez.

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7. *Alaouites*

During the past week the French in Lattakia have attempted in various ways to recover some of the privileges which they previously enjoyed. An attempt to re-establish themselves and their North African sentries in the Cercle des Officiers, the Délégation Office and elsewhere were met with hostile demonstrations and there have been two cases of dynamite throwing near French installations. The S[illegible] an authorities have done their best to comply with the British requests to facilitate a return to normal conditions and they are in consequence beginning to incur the mistrust of the population.

The liquidation of the "Avenantaire" units at Tartous took place without incident on the 14th and 15th August. Of the Coast Defence Unit 148 members, and of the All-Alaouite unit, 29 have opted to continue in French service.

8. *Euphrates and Jezireh.*

The evacuation of French troops from Jezireh was completed on the 16th [illegible] taken over by the Syrian authorities.

One of the civilian secretaries to the French Officier de Mission at Hassetche was found in the town during the week after dark and attacked by Syrian soldiers; he was not seriously injured but it is clear from this incident that the French cannot yet move freely in the Jezireh without danger to themselves or their staff.

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11. *Lebanon*

[illegible] the vote of confidence obtained by Abdul Hamid Karami's Govern[illegible] intended to resign. The Prime Minister in fact drafted his letter of resignation on the 17th August, but was persuaded not to sign it by the President who wanted a quiet week-end. It was duly signed, and the resignation accepted on the 20th August.

The circumstances in which the Government persisted in resigning after receiving an overwhelming vote of confidence are somewhat difficult to explain to the outside world, and have led to some bitter criticisms in the local press on the failure of the Lebanese parliamentary system under which all important matters are arranged in the lobbies and the debates count for nothing. Abdul Hamid Karami's determination to quit office may be ascribed principally to his unfamiliarity with local politics and consequent thinness of skin in the face of attacks which would leave more seasoned parliamentarians unmoved. He had also been at odds with the President, who, he complained, constantly thwarted his endeavours, and no doubt realised that the longer he remained in power the more his political reputation would suffer. He has once spoken of his [illegible] tion never to resume office unless the Constitution is modified in a manner which will enable him to govern without being constantly at the mercy of self seeking Deputies. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose determination to resign was even greater, seems to have become tired of the constant attacks made on him by his political adversaries and to have felt that he could pull the strings more effectively from the bosom of the Chamber. The other ministers meekly followed the lead of their chiefs.

The President has made no secret of his distaste for the task which [illegible] confronts him in finding an alternative Government and, in particular, an alternative Prime Minister. He has made several attempts to obtain directives from this legation, but these have been steadfastly refused to his [illegible] disappointment. In the welter of intrigue of the past few days in which it would have been undesirable for the legation to become involved it has become [illegible] the choice therefore lies between Sami Solh and Abdullah Yafi if the premiership remains a perquisite of the Sunni Moslem community with the odds rather on the former in view of the latter's known connexions with members of the pro-French minority. A suggestion that the premiership should be given to the present Speaker a Shia has met with violent Sunni opposition, and should be ruled out by the Speaker's known lack of capacity and moral character.

The press has published with evident relief messages from London reporting assurances stated to have been given to the Lebanese Minister by Mr. Bev[illegible] Levant States remained unchanged.

[illegible] is at present showing a great activity. It held a large rally on the 19th August and the issue is pressing up next week [illegible] Lebanon. These manifestations are annoying the Moslems, and Riad Solh amongst others, has expressed his fears that the gap between the Christian and Moslem communities of the Lebanon is being deliberately widened by those who oppose the consolidation of Lebanese ind[illegible]

E 6995 5 89

Extracts from the Weekly Political Summary, No 177, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon for week ending 28th August 1945.—(Received 19th September)

General

THE new Lebanese Government (see this *Summary*) are clearly determined to press on with the negotiations for the transfer of the remaining services still controlled by the French, which they are conducting for both States, though they have held no discussions during the week with the Syrian Government owing to the political crisis in Damascus. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed the Lebanese commission to show themselves as reasonable as possible in the negotiations and not to "quarrel over the piastres" in the questions which involve finance. He himself has made it clear to General Beynet and Count Ostrorog, both of whom have officially called on him, that the Lebanese Government wish to see these questions out of the way as soon as possible. The Prime Minister has taken particular interest in the question of the Grand Serail, which is Lebanese Government property, but in which the offices of the French Delega- [illegible] to hand it over, in order that the Lebanese Government Departments, which are at present scattered all over Beirut, can be collected in one place. General Beynet has apparently promised to study this question sympathetically.

The Zionist Conference in London, and President Truman's declaration on Palestine, have evoked strong reaction in the press in both countries. Many papers have taken the line that only Arabs are entitled to dispose of Arab Palestine and have reproduced declarations by Arab leaders (including the Syrian Prime Minister) to the effect that 60 million Arabs are determined to defend Palestine. The question is also to be raised shortly in the Lebanese Chamber. Despite reported Jewish attempts to win sympathy amongst the Lebanese Maronites, it is noticeable that Christian opinion is in general as anti-Zionist as Moslem.

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Damascus

At a meeting of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies on the 20th August the Prime Minister gave an exposé of the Government's policy which was followed by reports by the individual Ministers.

At the same sitting, at the request of Michael Elian (Aleppo) a petition signed by fifty two Deputies was read, urging the necessity of the Government enjoying the full confidence of the Deputies. The President of the Chamber [illegible] ordinary session which had been convened for the purpose of passing specified laws. No action was taken by the Government for two days, but it was evident that their position in the Chamber had become untenable. The desertion *en bloc* of its former supporters, Saadullah Jabri's Aleppo faction, under the leadership of Michael Elian, who made common cause with Lutfi Haffar and Khaled Azm, left it virtually without suppo

On the 22nd August Naim Antaki and Said Ghazi resigned, and on the following day the Prime Minister tendered his resignation. He was immediately asked by the President of the Republic to form a new Government. Negotiations for the formation of a coalition Government continued for two days but eventually broke down, probably owing to a conflict of personalities. On the 26th August, however, Fares Bey succeeded in forming his Government, the composition of which was as follows:—

Prime Minister: Fares el Khouri (Protestant)
Interior and Deputy Prime Minister: Lutfi Haffar (Sunni Moslem)
Foreign Affairs: Michael Elian (Greek Orthodox)
Finance and Defence: Khaled el Azm (Sunni Moslem).
Justice and Wakfs: Sabri el Assali (Sunni Moslem).
Education and National Economy: Ahmed Sharabati (Sunni Moslem)
Public Works: Hikmat el Hakim (Sunni Moslem)
Supply and Ravitaillement: Hassan Jabbara (Sunni Moslem).

[illegible] members of the outgoing Government [illegible] which had formed round Saadullah Jabri. Six of the Ministers were from Damascus, two from Northern Syria and none from any other part of the country.

The Chamber of Deputies met again on the 27th August. One of the deputies raised the point that a [illegible] Minister was [illegible] a vote of debate followed and the matter was referred to the Constitutional Committee of

the Chamber, which gave as its opinion that a Cabinet of eight members was un- [illegible] the Chamber nevertheless suggested to the Prime Minister that he should reduce the number to seven. The appointment of Michael Elian as Minister for Foreign Affairs was sharply criticised on the grounds that he had no experience and no qualifications for the [illegible]

Another sitting of the Chamber has been fixed for the 29th August, by which time the Prime Minister will have had an opportunity to conform with the wishes of the Chamber. It appears extremely doubtful whether any Government which [illegible] and an eventual dissolution of the Chamber, of which the President has been speaking, may prove the only solution of the impasse.

His Majesty's Minister and the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, were received by the Syrian President on the 21st August. The Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs were also present. The evacuation of foreign troops, Mezze Aerodrome, French diplomatic representation, *Aressataires* and the organisation of the Syrian security forces were discussed.

The commander-in-chief said that he was leaving shortly for the United Kingdom, where he would raise the question of simultaneous evacuation of British and French forces. With regard to the Mezze Aerodrome, the commander-in-chief said that this would have to form part of the final settlement of outstanding matters between the French and Syrian Governments. The Minister for Foreign Affairs complained that the French still retained some 5-6,000 [illegible] some 2,000 of which were *Aressataires* who had signed contracts before the [illegible] the remainder being Troupes Spéciales who had volunteered for service on the *aressataire* basis but whose contracts had not been completed. The [illegible] undertook to speak to General Beynet about these latter. [illegible] Minister for Foreign Affairs then went on to say that the British military [illegible] proposals for the organisation of the Syrian security forces were acceptable to the Syrian Government, subject to discussion on points of detail. The question of the Desert Guard was also raised by the commander-in-chief who emphasised that if British troops were to be evacuated in the near future [illegible] these forces should be put on a sound basis without delay. With regard to the question of equipment and technicians for these forces, the [illegible] commander-in-chief said the French would transfer cert[illegible]

[illegible]

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Alexandretta

The past week has seen a steady deterioration in Franco-Syrian relations and feeling is running high against the Syrian Government as a result of its [illegible] have appeared in the local press urging the immediate evacuation of French forces. As a result of the commander-in-chief's visit (see paragraph 3 above), the general officers commanding the British and French troops in the Levant States visited Lattakia on the 25th August in order to investigate French complaints of the treatment their troops are receiving in the area and made certain arrangements for improving matters.

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Lebanon

Sami Solh succeeded in forming a new Lebanese Government late on the 22nd August in the following form:

Sami es Solh (Sunni Moslem): Prime Minister, Supply, Commerce and Industry, Posts and Telegraphs.
Gabriel Murr (Greek Orthodox): Deputy Prime Minister and Public Works.
Hamid Frangieh (Maronite): Foreign Affairs and National Education.
Joseph Salem (Greek Catholic): Interior.
Ahmed el Asaad (Shia Moslem): National Defence and Agriculture.
Dr Jamil Talhouk (Druze): Health.
Saadi Munla (Sunni Moslem): Justice.
Emile Lahoud (Maronite): Finance.

[illegible] the new Ministry [illegible] in any of those extravagances which caused him so much unpopularity during his last tenure of office in 1942.

On the 23rd August the new Prime Minister made declarations to press [illegible] the following points:—

His Government's foreign policy would in no way differ from that of its predecessor.

His Government would endeavour to maintain and strengthen relations with Arab countries and with those Allied countries, including Great Britain, which had supported the Lebanese cause.

Conversations regarding the evacuation of Lebanese territory (presumably by foreign troops) would be pursued.

The Chamber would be asked to hasten ratification of the Charter of the United Nations.

The first problem which his Government should study and solve was that of unemployment. The Prime Minister would also apply himself to the question of lowering the cost of living.

The reference in this declaration to the withdrawal of foreign troops has aroused some comment, and one or two Nationalist newspapers have been [illegible] French troops from the Levant States now that the war has ended.

The Lebanese Government have sent instructions to their Minister in London to limit the validity of the Lebanese passport of Mgr. Akl, the Maronite archbishop who has been sent on a mission to Europe by the Patriarch, so that he can only return to the Lebanon.

The Lebanese Government have been officially invited to attend the forth[illegible] and are proposing to accept.

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[E 6996/5/89]

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 178, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon for Week ending 4th September 1945.—(Received 10th September.)

General.

THE French in the Levant States are clearly becoming restive at the continued restrictions on their movements and freedom of action. In both Lattakia and Aleppo they are anxious to move about more freely and without British protection, and this week French officers attended a reception at Baalbek where no French officers have shown themselves since the French Political Office [illegible] conclusively shown that the time for any appreciable relaxation of the present restrictions has not yet arrived.

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Damascus.

The new Government faced the Chamber at a sitting held on the 28th/29th August. The Prime Minister presented the Government's programme which was similar to that of the previous Government, with the additions that the Government intended to study a project placing the army, gendarmerie and police under a unified command, that foreign experts would be employed only if free of all political influence, that the Ministry of Supply would be abolished, and that Syrian students would be sent abroad for technical training.

[illegible] the retaining of French troops [illegible] Prime Minister said that the question had been [illegible] with the commander-in-chief [illegible] London and would give an answer on his return.

(2) In reply to the question whether the Government would employ French experts, the Prime Minister replied "No."

(3) It was alleged that the Black Book had been suppressed in order to please certain foreigners.

(4) Reference was also made to the abolition of the Mixed Courts and to the question of the return of the Hatay to Syria.

After an adjournment the Prime Minister announced that Ahmed Sharabati (Minister of Education and National Economy) had resigned and that he himself would take over the Ministry of Education and Hikmat el Hakim (Public Works) the Ministry of National Economy.

At the fifth sitting of the extraordinary session of the 30th August the Chamber unanimously passed a Bill for the ratification of the United Nations Charter. The Chamber met again twice on the 1st September and once on the following day and on each occasion was adjourned owing to the lack of a quorum, the approach of Bairam having taken many of the Deputies away from Damascus.

It is clear that the Government's position is far from being strong. [illegible] Sharabati stated in the Chamber that he had resigned on the grou[illegible] Government was based on a one man party and that he refused to be the tool of [illegible] Michael Ilyan. The new Minister of the Interior, Lutfi Haffar [illegible] to take up office and has already tendered his resignation, but at [illegible] of the President has agreed to postpone it. Jamil Mardam was asked by the President of the Chamber to represent Syria in Geneva at the forthcoming Conference of Parliamentary Representatives, but has excused himself; he told the acting consul that he considered it would be unwise for him to absent himself at the present time from Damascus.

Faiz Khouri, Syrian Minister to Moscow, has returned to Damascus ostensibly on the grounds of ill-health. He is reported to have been far from pleased with the reception accorded to him by the Soviet authorities.

The conference of the National Arab Women's Union was held in Damascus on the 6th August, when speeches were made by ladies representing Syria, Egypt, Iraq and Palestine, all concentrated on the Jewish problem in Palestine.

Aleppo.

Opinion regarding the newly formed Syrian Cabinet, though inclined to [illegible] has been expressed at the continued existence of the Ministry of Supply. Pamphlets were distributed by the "National Youth of the Arab Union" and by the "Bureau of the Students' Union," attacking the policy of the Government and appealing to the Syrians to urge upon the Government the need for the [illegible]diate departure of the "colonising foreigner."

The arrival on the 29th August of four 25-mm. cannon and forty boxes of ammunition in two French aircraft has not yet become generally known, though [illegible]iety has been expressed at the recent activity displayed by the French authorities in connexion with the erection of new sandbag defences and the installation of one at least of the 25 mm. cannon at the French "Subsistence" depot in the Jemaieh quarter of the town.

On the 27th August Bedreddin Sabbagh, Assistant Director-General of the [illegible] which includes the Mohafazats of Aleppo, Deir ez Zor and Jezireh.

* * * * * *

Alaouites.

There has been an increase of tension between French and Syrians in the [illegible] was killed and two other ranks slightly injured. British troops intervened and a curfew was imposed. The initial cause of the trouble was the continued occupation of the barracks by the French, in open violation of their agreement to hand them over to the Syrians. General Humblot has ignored the request made to him by the British Military authorities in this matter. On the 3rd September Alaouite *Accompatriots* showed signs of breaking bounds to avenge the attack, and the situation was made more difficult by the arrival of French rifles, light machine guns and mortars. A British cordon was placed round the garrison and both sides warned of the consequences of trouble. The Syrian Government were asked to prevent the threatened arrival of 500 Syrian troops at Tartous on the

4th September and though they denied that this move had been ordered, they agreed in any case not to move troops there at present

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Lebanon

The new Lebanese Government confronted the Chamber for the first time on the 3rd September. The Prime Minister's declaration of policy closely [illegible] Summary No. 177 of the 21st August). The outstanding speech in the ensuing debate was that of Habib Abi Chahla, who criticised the statement [illegible] as being too full of generalities like previous ministerial dec[illegible] the following points:—

(1) Outstanding questions which must be settled with the French included the withdrawal of the Sûreté aux Armées and postal censorship, retention of which appeared to him no longer justified, and the transfer of the Tripoli Refinery and the Beirut port. (2) The Lebanese nation [illegible] all foreign troops should be withdrawn from L[illegible] fighting should be[illegible] troops which had entered the Lebanon for purposes connected with the war and which had rendered great services in safeguarding Lebanese independence, and troops whose presence was not connected with the war and d[illegible]d from the former mandatory régime. In any case, all these troops should now be withdrawn. (3) Questions which he had previously asked the Government regarding civil aviation and oil refineries had remained unanswered. He had heard rumours that a concession was to be granted for [illegible] air lines to one granted before the war under the man[illegible] clearly referred to Haifa). Such a concession would not respond to the present needs of the Lebanon. (4) Finally, the Palestine question vitally concerned all Arab countries, especially the Lebanon and should now be called the Arab question. He did not understand why the Arab [illegible] I accuse it. It was unfortunate that certain [illegible] the creation of a Zionist State in Pal[illegible] the goodwill of the surrounding Arab countries [illegible] into the Lebanon and th[illegible]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, in reply to the debate, stated that I [illegible] received from the French authorities the same assurances as had been given [illegible] predecessor, namely, that French troops would be withdrawn simultaneously with British, and that he was taking up the matter with the British authorities [illegible] Palestine this question was occupying his mind and that of the P[illegible] and the utmost efforts were being expended on it. Negotiat[illegible] were already in progress with Allied authorities for the lifting of war restrictions.

On the 4th September the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies unanimously passed a Bill for the ratification of the United Nations' Charter. Present at the session was a delegation of six United States Congressmen, who are paying a visit to the Middle East and who left for Syria on the following day.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed this Legation that the Lebanese President has already been in touch with Iraq and Egypt with a view to the Arab League being convened to discuss the Palestine question, in the light of the resolutions to the Zionist Conference and of President Truman's declaration. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has explained that the Lebanese Government feels well placed to take the initiative in this matter because the Lebanon is the only Arab State with a Christian President and moreover [illegible] geographically closest to Palestine, from which country Zionist infiltration is believed already to have begun.

The former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdul Hamid Karami and Henri Pharaon have formed a new political party, named the "Independent party," to which they claim twenty eight Deputies have already adhered. The party comprises most of those elements which consider Riad Solh's group as being too extremist or who differ from him for personal reasons. The party held its first meeting on the [illegible]

One of the first acts of the new Lebanese Government was to sign a decree appointing Edmund Abuhaudeh as head of the Lebanese Sûreté. Although the Sûreté was handed over by the French to the Lebanese in June of last year little progress has been made in its development. Until this week no official had been appointed to direct its activities.

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Further Correspondence

respecting

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 63

October to December 1945

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CONFIDENTIAL

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 63. OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 1945

CHAPTER I.—IRAQ

E 7824/7824/93] No. 1

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Bevin (Received 1st October.)

(No. 376.)

Baghdad, 15th September, 1945.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 320, Confidential, of the 3rd August, 1944, I have the honour to transmit herewith my annual report on the Heads of Foreign Missions in Iraq for 1945.

I have, &c.

G. H. THOMPSON.

Enclosure in No. 1

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Baghdad 1945

Turkey

[illegible] and suitable colleague. [illegible] and Paris and has travelled extensively in [illegible] abroad a fairly [illegible]

Egypt

Nasrulla al Bahrawi Beg, Minister (8th February [illegible]

Persia

[illegible] 1945) [illegible]

Saudi Arabia

Fuad al Fagih, Minister (9th May 1945) [illegible] stands. Since he heard [illegible] delegation to the San Fran[illegible] now honoured [illegible] to be [illegible]

Soviet Union

Grigori Efimitch Zatevev, Mi[illegible]

English is becoming al[illegible] vent. He speaks good Persian. M. Zatevev personally has proved easy to get on with, having a keen sense of humour, but he and his staff [illegible]

[illegible] pleasable English acted as the Minister's interpreter [illegible] occasions when the mission was first [illegible]

Syria

Salah ud Din [redacted]

Diplomatic relations were opened wi[redacted] first ... in 1945 by the ... [redacted] k up his post on th[redacted] He is a pleasant and [redacted] ng than [redacted] cultivated [redacted]

Turkey

M. Nasif Ünay, Minister (17th March, 1945).

M. Ünay spent four months in [redacted] relations on his arrival [redacted] left for th[redacted]

[redacted] es Mason, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim [redacted]

[redacted] of Middle Eastern and African Affairs in the [redacted] No new Head of Mission [redacted]

[redacted] trade expansion and particularly ... capital development ... is a constant source of irritation.

[redacted] accredited to Iraq but resident elsewhere

[redacted]

M. Egbert Graeffe, Minister (25th April, 1945).

M. Graeffe is Minister at Tehran where he resides. He is a very Gallic Belgian and a ... but diplomat with a fund of stories about the ... of his [redacted]

China

Mr. Li Tieh-Tseng, Minister (9th April, 1944).

Mr. Li has been in the Diplomatic Service ... and has served in London for four years ... which period he acted as Secretary to the Chinese Delegation to the World Economic Conference. [redacted] in an agreeable manner [redacted] g of this year [redacted] d'Affaires ad interim is Mr. ... [redacted] Second Secretary to the Legation [redacted] English wife. Both are ... slightly pathetic. They both ... English. [redacted]

Czechoslovakia

M. [redacted] ster (11th April, 1944) [redacted] where he resides. He [redacted] visited Bagdad, when I found him heavy [redacted]

[redacted]

Dr. M. A. E. C. Fenmark, Chargé d'Affaires (17th June, 1939).

Dr. Fenmark resides at Tehran and seldom visits Bagdad. He is friendly [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] a ... diplomatic functions. He has ... many years in the Far East and has travelled extensively in China and Russia.

Netherlands

The Minister, Dr. ... was transferred to South Africa in 1944. His successor has not yet been named.

Poland

M. B. Kossakowski, Chargé d'Affaires.

The Polish Legation at Bagdad has been ... M. Kossakowski, a devout ... of [redacted]

Sweden

Dr. G. Jarring, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim [redacted] Chargé d'Affaires since the recall of Mr. ... to Sweden in July last. He has not so far visited Bagdad.

E 7495/104/93]

No. 2.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 8th October.)

(No. 308.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 26th September, 1945.

HAVING been responsible in some degree for advising a rather reluctant [redacted] Government to gr[redacted] the nettle of entering into diplomatic intercourse w[redacted] the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it has been a matter of particular interest to me p[redacted]ly to observe the manner in which the new Russian Legation has fared since its establishment here in February last. Materially speaking, its beginnings were difficult. The search for suitable premises was

protracted, furniture and fittings had to be imported or locally constructed at enormous cost, office equipment arrived but slowly, and it was no easy matter for M. Zaitsev or his staff to secure cars for their transport. However, after some uncomfortable weeks these and other minor difficulties were ironed out with the expenditure of several thousand pounds so that the legation to-day is a going concern and, so far as I have been able to gather, a pretty happy one. I do not know the exact strength of the staff, but the minister is very proud of the school he has established for their children, who number a dozen or more.

2. From the beginning our relations with the Russians have been extremely cordial. The minister is a cheerful, pleasant little man with a sense [redacted] His wife, a comfortable country type, has smartened up noticeably since [redacted] to this shabby capital, and no longer commits the *gaffes* of inexperience, s[redacted] as appearing at an evening reception in a hat. This sort of thing was, of [redacted] never of any importance, except that it provided the excuse for foolish [redacted] in the background, and was consequently better avoided. Mme. Zai[redacted] learning English, her progress lately having been fairly rapid, thanks, I believe [redacted] previously out of Russia, speaks our tongue fluently and now accompanies her "chefess" on most social occasions. Of the rest of the legation, M. Klimov, the counsellor, is the one we know best. A rather sinister personality, he is popularly reputed to be the secret power behind the throne. He speaks English slowly, but quite well, and has always been most courteous and amenable in his contacts with us, though scarcely forthcoming and excessively cautious. Neither he nor his minister allow themselves to be drawn into any political discussion of any sort or kind, maintaining in this respect a truly admirable [redacted] up, and with the reservation that I have never so far found myself on the opposite side of their barricade, I consider the Zaitsevs and the Klimovs pleasant and intelligent people.

3. In the eyes of the Iraqis, however, the Soviet Legation is a somewhat menacing institution. To the well-to-do majority, it represents the vanguard of a mysterious and ruthless aggression. They are uneasy at having the Russians in occupation of Persian territory on their very borders, especially in the vicinity of troubled Kurdistan. Recently Iraqi apprehensions have been increased by news items concerning Russian ambitions in the Straits and the Mediterranean and by reports of their attitude in the discussions of the five foreign ministers. Then the rich, and the ultra-conservative religious leaders, are fearful of local "Communist" intrigues which rightly or wrongly they firmly believe are inspired by the legation. The fact is that the Iraqis in political, official and propertied circles are afraid of the creeping shadow from the north. Film displays in the wide garden of M. Zaitsev's official residence, illustrating as they do the formidable military might of Russia, do nothing to allay apprehension; in the stillness of the desert night one can almost hear the measured tramp of those magnificent columns through the Red Square. There is a growing feeling that Stalin is more Tsarist than the emperors ever were. This suspicion is reinforced by factors peculiarly operative in any backward, but changing, oriental land. Long-established and powerful vested interests, tribal and urban, fear [redacted] them of their age-old privileges and perquisites. Thus any overdue move for the amelioration of the fellah's lot or of working conditions in the towns is at [redacted] from Moscow. Here, as elsewhere, the fevered imagination of the privileged detects a bearded Bolshevik peering round every corner.

4. In contrast to the above, there can be no doubt that to the young "effendi" and to many of the working poor the Soviet is of absorbing interest. As we learnt to our cost during the melancholy decade that preceded the second world war, youth in particular in this country is attracted by novel slogans and posturings, by the mass evolutions of uniformed thousands, by the bawlings of semi-deified leaders. They like newsreels of huge, white rectangular buildings, of great industries humming with activity, and so on and so forth. Yesterday [redacted] tally is one reason w[redacted] rms of the Foreign Office communiqué th[redacted] erences with His Majesty's representatives

in the Middle East for it referred to the "financial, economic and *social*" needs of the area in question. Too long, it seems to me, have we refrained in our official p[illegible] of the or[illegible] Now that [illegible] app[illegible] By emphasising the n[illegible] favour the many, and a[illegible] better life for the [illegible] the Swastika, must always have [illegible] responsibilities here will merit [illegible]

5. In the above connexion I have for some months endeavoured, with the assistance of our specialist services to ascertain to what if any, extent the coming of the Russians has complicated our task in Iraq, described by Sir K. Cornwallis [illegible] difficult States in the world to govern. So far my enquiries [illegible] ting results. While there is all too much evidence of silly anti-British criticism and talk generally on the part of certain of my American colleagues, no whisper has reached me of similar activity by the Russians. That M. Zatsev and his subordinates are active is undeniable—they entertain quite a lot and they welcome at the Soviet Legation guests not usually seen elsewhere, such as junior Iraqi officials from this or that obscure bureau, schoolmasters, young journalists, and other rather humble folk. But of any so-called subversive activities I have up to date found no trace. And the British head of the Iraqi Criminal Investigation Department states that "nothing has been brought to the notice of the [illegible] y cause any of the p[illegible] d in their favour." [illegible] is engaged in some species of [illegible] ptain Roosevelt of the United [illegible] while we all know too much about "Colonel" [illegible] ited States Steel C[illegible] we searched in vain for signs that the So[illegible] that organ of the vernacul[illegible] Iraqi individual, again no[illegible]

6. I am conscious that in this despatch I may have depicted a surprising [illegible] possible unique state of affairs. [illegible] a none the [illegible] Perhaps it is not temporary and that sooner or later [illegible] dvantage, so that we find ourselves caught up in an orgy of [illegible] cost our only policy here in dealing with the Russians is to be frank and friendly, for there is nothing in our relations with Iraq that calls for concealment or equivocation. And I believe that it is only by friendliness and frankness, coupled as circumstances may dictate with firmness, that we can hope to overcome the suspicious and defensive psychology of our allies which, combined as it is with what Lord Vansittart once described as the "Old Adam" element in human nature, makes them difficult, and indeed inestimable, to handle by western standards.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the General Officer Commanding, and the Air Officer Commanding, as well as to the Office of the Minister Resident.

I have, &c.

G. H. THOMPSON

E 7496/6265/65]

No. 3

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 8th October.)

(No. 403.)

Sir,

Baghdad, 28th September, 1945.

I HAVE the honour to refer to Eastern Department's letter of the 8th September on the sub[illegible] a copy of a memorandum [illegible] INFIA which has been prepared by C.I.C.I.

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2. I agree generally with this memorandum, but desire to make certain [illegible] that "the conditions of the railway workers are probably much higher than in any other form of organised labour in Iraq" is true. At the time of the strike in April of this year it was considered that wages which the unskilled labourers were then drawing (about £4 a month) were quite inadequate. They certainly compared unfavourably with the wages paid by, for example, the oil companies, and the director-general, Iraqi State Railways, was advised accordingly at the time. I raised this matter again with Colonel Smith on his recent return from the United Kingdom. Apart from the duty which, in my view, is always incumbent on us to use our influence to raise the level of the people and to assure them so far as possible of "freedom from want," we have a special responsibility in the matter of the railways, inasmuch as the director-general and all the senior [illegible] quite justifiably criticism of Brit[illegible]

3. As regards "communism" [illegible] opportunity of impressing on Ministers and all responsible Iraqis with whom [illegible] advanced social programme. Communism, we always say, only flourishes in discontented countries. This line of argument has become more than ever appropriate since the establishment of the Russian representation here, and the fears of officially inspired "Communist propaganda"—so far as I am aware so far unfounded—to which it has given rise.

4. There are signs that progress is being made on the social front. The Iraqi Government have just decided to appoint an experienced British adviser to the staff of the Ministry of Social Affairs to deal exclusively with labour problems, having selected as a candidate a Major Boyd Smith of Paiforce. The Ministry has also been most receptive to advice tendered by the British Army Labour and Pioneer Department in regard to the establishment of labour exchanges and the amendment of the Labour Law. There is also in existence a Cen[illegible] Labour Committee under the ch[illegible] [illegible] It is hoped that the railway [illegible] a week [illegible] It is [illegible] I come sooner [illegible] struggle and the bitterness [illegible] I do that the M[illegible] Conference would place the Iraqi Government in an awkward position. It is perfectly true that many so-called "Communists" are merely extreme Left wing nat[illegible] the Fascists and Nazis, naturally attack us as being the predominant foreigners in the country and will continue to do so as long as we have an interest, sometimes a controlling [illegible], in so many concerns here, such as the railways and the port. On the contrary, I consider that a Middle East Labour Conference would be concrete proof of the interest which we take in the social advancement of the peoples of the Middle East. I am sure, too, that the Government of Iraq would respond by sending a delegation which would adequately represent not only the Iraqi Government but also the workers of the country.

I have, &c.

G. H. THOMPSON

Enclosure in No. 3

(Secret.)

Iraq Communist Party.

PLEASE refer to your 791/16/45 of the 22nd September, 1945.

2. The pamphlet enclosed in your letter under reference is but one of many published by the so-called Iraq "Communist" party. It was commented upon in

our Security Summary No. 75, period the 1st May 1945–1st June, 1945, paragraph 6 (c), and many comments on the growth of the Labour and Communist movements in Iraq have been quoted in this and other Security Summaries. The original pamphlet is a Qaida publication, of which we hold the copies in Arabic. It was widely distributed during the last week of May 1945 in Basra, Bagdad and at nearly all stations on the Iraq State Railways. The translation itself in all probability came from the director-general of railways with whom I [illegible]ssed the matter at the time.

The allegations contained in the pamphlet are extremely exaggerated and but few of the attacks on General Smith and the railways administration are at all justified, in fact, as stated at the time of the railway strike, the conditions of the railways workers are probably much higher than in any other form of [illegible] labour in Iraq. It is unfortunate it is true that certain of the [illegible] laid down in the Iraq Labour laws are contravened by the railways administration but it is also true that they are contravened to the advantage of the workers. This fact is entirely lost sight of in the many tirades published by these so-called "Communists." It is not easy to give answers in a few words to the questions in your letter, but we will endeavour to do this as briefly as possible hereunder.

4. All that can be said as to the present strength of the Iraq Communist party is that it very definitely exceeds in membership 6,000. Its headquarters is in Bagdad, but it has sub-sections in all the large towns and in many of the smaller. Its influence has been increasing steadily as far as Labour is concerned [illegible] army, amongst the school teachers and more advanced students and, of course, in [illegible] the various unions.

5. The Iraq Communist party has no legal standing and the provisions in the Bagdad Penal Code make any form of communism an offence against the Crown. Unions however are in certain cases legal and a number of them have been registered since September 1944.

6. Here it is worth while noting the activities of Mohammed [illegible] al Qazzaz. In 1924 this man made an application to the M[illegible] for permission to open a Labour club. This was refused. Meetings under this man continued until 1929 when the Government authorised the formation of a trade society, of which Qazzaz was president. In 1932 this society was closed down by Muzahim al Pachachi, then Minister of the Interior, as a result of its organising an internal strike. Qazzaz was arrested and ordered to live outside Bagdad. In 1932 however an engineers society was formed under Qazzaz and in 1933 this society was changed to the Labour Union Society. This continued [illegible] and later in the year the president and leading members of the committee were arrested and exiled. A few days later the society was closed and several members were arrested having been caught distributing pamphlets urging the people to declare a general strike. From this period until the autumn of 1944 the Government did not sanction the formation of any legal Labour movement.

7. The Labour movement came back legally in September 1944 when the Railways Workers' Union was sanctioned by the Government. At the first meeting of the Railway Workers' Union on the 7th November 1944, Hashim Jewad of the International Labour Office was in the chair and administrative and supervising committees were elected. Ali Shukur was elected president with Abbood Hamza as secretary; a committee of seven was inaugurated and a supervising committee of twelve persons was also elected. Amongst these nineteen persons were many agitators and so-called Communists. This committee lasted until the railway strike early this year when the union was closed by the Government. Though now illegal, it is still operating underground and is exercising great pressure on the Government to be allowed to operate once again.

8. There are twelve other unions of which some of the stronger are: the Mechanics' Union, the Weavers' Union, the Shoemakers' Union, the Cigarette Factory Workers' Union. All these have at times caused trouble to their employers and have featured in the illegal publications of Al Qaida group.

9. To summarise Iraq's Labour movement, it may be said that there is a growing Labour conscience, but that in the main their efforts are often misdirected by unscrupulous persons, particularly the Qaida group.

10. Reference paragraph 3 of your above quoted letter it should be noted that should a Middle East Labour Conference be convened it will probably place the Iraq Government in rather an awkward [illegible] persons of integrity such as Hashim Jewad would wish to attend such a conference, but also many of the extremist riff raff should they come to the fore in the various unions. Many of these people call themselves "Communists," but they have no legal standing and they are in essence, in the main [illegible] their own Government and in particular against what they call British imperialism. Any such meeting would undoubtedly be a little stormy, and were it sponsored by the Ministry of Labour and National Service might place both ourselves and the Iraqi Government in the queer.

11. It is regretted that, though we have answered the questions contained in your letter, we leave the picture far from completed. It has, however, served to bring to our notice the fact that London has quite obviously got some peculiar ideas on Labour and communism in Iraq. We therefore hope to produce a paper covering the subject more fully in the course of the next week or so.

12. I return herewith the photostat copy of the pamphlet, and should you wish to see the Arabic original or any other of Qaida's numerous clandestine publications, we are in a position to provide you with them.

P. REX MARRIOTT
Defence Security Officer

Bagdad 25th September 1945

N 13970/10764/38 | No. 4

Sir H. Stonehewer Bird to Mr. Bevin—(Received 16th October.)

(No. 419.)

Bagdad 3rd October 1945

SIR,

IN connexion with your despatch No. 232 of the 14th September asking for information about the Communist party in Iraq, I have the honour to invite attention to Mr. Thompson's despatches Nos. 398 and 403, of the 20th and 23th September, reporting on Russian activities and communism in Iraq.

2. From these despatches it will be seen that although communism, or something passing under that name, has a considerable following in this country, there is at present no evidence that the Iraqi Communists are directed by or in contact with Russia or any organisation outside Iraq.

I have, &c.
HUGH STONEHEWER BIRD

CHAPTER II.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON

N 14021/10674/38. No. 5

Mr. Young to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 17th October.)

(No. 181.)

Sir, *Beirut, 5th October*, 1945.

IN reply to your despatch No. 200 of the 13th September regarding the relations between the local Communist parties and Moscow, I have the honour to inform you that there is little to add on this subject to the reports already furnished in my despatches Nos. 37 of the 5th March, 71 of the 6th May and 106 of the 28th June.

2. The information in the possession of this Legation suggests that the answers to the questions contained in paragraph 3 of your despatch under reference are as follows:—

(a) and (b). Very little, except in so far as the newspapers run by the local Communist parties follow general Soviet directives in commenting on world affairs.

(c) The Syrian and Lebanese Communist parties are in close touch and frequently hold meetings in common, but are not known to have any particular relations with Communist parties in neighbouring [illegible]

(d) The acknowledged leader of the Syrian Communist party, Khalid Bagdash, is Moscow trained, but no indications have been received that any Communists have *recently* returned to this country from Russia.

(e) [illegible] parties are little more than trades union organisations, and except in the case of a few uninfluential individuals their members have no knowledge of, or sympathy with, Communist ideology.

I have, &c.
G. P. YOUNG.

E 8323/8/89] No. 6

Mr. Skone to Mr. Bevin.—(Received 2nd November.)

N. 194.)

Sir, *Beirut, 20th October*, 1945.

WITH [illegible] Young's telegram No. 984 of the [illegible] conversation with the Lebanese President, I have the honour to report that information received from British sources in all parts of Syria during the past two months has indicated a marked recent increase of talk in favour of the institution of a monarchy in Syria, especially amongst the tribal and Alaouite leaders, in Homs and Hama, in Aleppo and in the Jebel Druze.

2. The Monarchist issue has been latent in Syria since the French expelled King Faisal in 1920, but until lately there has been much difference of opinion as to the choice of candidate for the throne. It has now, however, become clear that the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan enjoys more support than any other claimant, partly no doubt, on account of the propaganda and discreet distribution of largesse in which he appears to have been indulging, and partly because his accession would directly contribute towards the realisation of the Greater Syria project, which makes strong appeal to some Nationalist circles. The R[illegible]nt of Iraq, who at one time appeared to be a potential rival, is now rar[illegible] mentioned in this connexion and seems to have few supporters, and other possible candidates, such as Faisal, Ibn Saud, have faded into the background.

3. Most of the so-called Monarchists have only a vague conception of what a monarchy would imply and little real enthusiasm for the Amir Abdullah or any other candidate; and their profession of Monarchist ideas, where not merely an emanation of that fickleness and love of change which is so pronounced a Syrian characteristic, may be accounted chiefly a measure of their dissatisfaction with the present régime.

4. Since the Troupes Spéciales were transferred in August, Franco-Syrian relations, for the first time in many years, are no longer in the forefront of public interest, which has tended in consequence to concentrate on internal a[illegible] These have given little cause for satisfaction. Since 1943 Syrian political life has been dominated by the National *bloc*, whose policy of unremitting opposition to the French has best interpreted popular sentiment. Successive Governments have been chosen from amongst its members and have consequently contained an unduly high proportion of Damascenes. The *bloc* Ministers have, for the most part, no special aptitude for administration and in a [illegible] occupied in external affairs, so that no Government [illegible] the administration or in promoting the urgently req[illegible] this same preoccupation has prevented the President and the Mi[illegible] undertaking those extended tours of the provinces which are so [illegible] Syria is ever to acquire a national spirit. The provincial Mohafezes are mostly men who had previously been seen in the rôle of subordinates to the French provincial officials, and consequently lack prestige, and the security services [illegible] thrown by the events of last May, and the subsequent mass desertions of the Troupes Spéciales, are not yet an effective instrument. Throughout the pro[illegible] therefore, there is widespread lack of respect for the authority of the Government and a tendency to regard it as a "Damascus racket," bent on furthering the interests of the *bloc* rather than of the country as a whole. Hence the feeling that any régime is preferable to the present one.

5. Monarchist advocates, besides dwelling on the shortcomings described in the previous paragraph, adduce the following arguments:—

(a) That the republican form of government was foisted on Syria by the French, and is quite unsuited to the country's need; since its effect is merely to place the power in the hands of an unrepresentative oligarchy.

(b) That parliamentary government in Syria is unworkable on account of the feudal organisation of the country, which makes it impracticable to hold elections on anything like a true democratic basis.

(c) That the Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan and Palestine are historically and economically one unit, and should be united under one ruler.

6. That the Syrian President is seriously exercised at the growth of the Monarchist movement was shown, even before his conference with the Lebanese President, reported in Mr. Young's telegram under reference, by the fact that he raised the question in the course of recent interviews with three separate British officials. In each case he began by enquiring what a British official would reply if asked whether His Majesty's Government preferred Syria to be a monarchy or a republic. On being told on each occasion that the reply would naturally be that this matter concerned the Syrian people and not us, he gave [illegible] conformity with British interests and that, since it was well known that an expression of British views would affect public opinion in this matter more than any other factor, we should abandon this neutral attitude in favour of a mo[illegible] active support for himself and his régime, at least on the lines that a change of régime was inexpedient so long as Franco-Syrian relations remained unresolved. His main arguments were as follows:—

(a) [illegible]

(b) [illegible] were given to a Hashimite, Ibn Saud would be dis[illegible] if it went to a son of Ibn Saud the Hashimites would be [illegible] and if to an Egyptian prince, such as Mohammed A[illegible] the Hashimites and the Saudis would be disgruntled

(c) Finally, the great advantage of Shukri Quwatli himself was that he had come to power through the will of the people and had not been imposed on Syria by the British, whereas King Faisal and the Emir Abdullah had been so imposed by us, and King Farouk was known to be maintained on his throne by us. Thus, when the President carried out his policy of close collaboration with ourselves, the effect was infinitely greater.

7. The Monarchists have, naturally, not scrupled to suggest that their schemes have British support: for example, Fauzi Bakri, who recently visited Transjordan with a group of Opposition Syrian Deputies, and saw the British Resident at Amman, gave it out on his return that the latter had indicated British support for the claims of the Amir Abdullah, although reports from the Resident show that he carefully avoided any expression of opinion and indeed refused to discuss the matter. A report reached the Syrian President that certain B[illegible] have been sent to His Majesty's consuls and political officers by this legation and to all military formations by the British military authorities, to refuse to discuss the Monarchist question with anyone.

8. On the other hand, the President's contention that British views on the question, if known, would have a decisive effect, is probably well founded. For the moment, with the formation of Saadullah Jabri's new Ministry, Monarchist talk has died down, but there will undoubtedly be a recrudescence in the near future unless another crisis with the French blows up. Since it is clearly undesirable that the internal situation in Syria should be further complicated [illegible] advantages in letting it be known locally that, in the British view, the present is not the time to raise it. I should be glad to receive your instructions on this point.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo and Baghdad, the High Commissioner for Palestine, His Majesty's Minister at Jedda and the Middle East Office in Cairo.

I have, &c.,
TERENCE SHONE.

E 9699/6/89 — No. 7

Mr. Bevin to M. Massigli

Foreign Office
13th December, 1945

Your Excellency,

WITH reference to the discussions on the problems of the Levant and the Middle East which were begun between M. Bidault [illegible] I now have the honour to inform your Excellency [illegible] regarding the evacuation of British and French forces from the Levant States and regarding the situation in the Middle East.

2. If your Excellency's Government likewise accept the terms of these documents this note, and your reply to that effect, will be regarded as [illegible] the agreement of the two Governments in this matter.

I have, &c.,
ERNEST BEVIN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7

BRITISH and French military experts will meet at Beirut on the 21st December, 1945, to discuss the details of a [illegible] stages, with a corresponding regrouping of forces.

One of the objects of this discussion will be to fix a very early date on which the withdrawal will begin.

It is understood that the evacuation of Syria shall be carried out pari passu *in such a way as to be completed at the same time by the British and French forces.*

[illegible] evacuation will be drawn up in such a way that it will [illegible] ing order.

London, 13th December, 1945.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7

[illegible] ernment of the French Republic and His Majesty's [illegible] ngdom, having examined the situation in the Middle [illegible] inated by the same intention to do what is required [illegible] e that the independence which has been promised to the countries [illegible] d be assured and respected.

[illegible] vernments are agreed that it is in their mutual interest to promote [illegible] with other Governments, the economic well-being of the peoples of this region in conditions of peace and security. They will exchange information [illegible] their desire that by such exchanges of information they [illegible] l divergencies of policy which might impair their mutual [illegible] responsibilities of the other in the Middle East, having full regard to the political status of the countries in question.

It is in this spirit that they will examine any proposals submitted to the United Nations Organisation on the subject of collective security.

London, 13th December, 1945.

E 8083/5/891 — No. 8

(1)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 170: Secret. Syria and the Lebanon [illegible]

General.

INTEREST in both countries has been centred during the past week on the [illegible] speculation has taken place, both in the press and in political circles, as to the effect of these discussions on the problems of the Levant and of Palestine.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 1st–7th September, 1945, amount to [illegible] 1945–46 crop up to 140,998 tons.

Syria—Damascus.

The Bairam holidays have much restricted public business during the week [illegible] reported that the resignation of Lutfi Haffar has not been accepted by the President, though he has not yet appeared in his office to take up his work, at [illegible] and that the Ministry of the Interior would be taken over by Sabri el Assali.

[illegible] impression created by the recent attacks in the Chamber have resulted in widespread demands for the dissolution of the Chamber and new elections, and considerable speculation on electoral reform and constitutional changes. It seems certain that the Monarchist elements have gained considerable ground and Opposition elements are crystallising round Jamil Mardam. While a personal [illegible] likely to mean any degree of political co-operation and considerable poli[illegible] administrative machine has, during the last few weeks, been even less effective than usual, this is particularly evident in the Ministry of the Interior owing to the absence not only of the Minister but also of the Director-General, who is now acting as Chief of Police, but a similar state of affairs also exists in other departments, and half of the Ministries have not yet prepared their budgets.

The General Officer Commanding British Troops [illegible] Brigadier-General Staff were received by the Prime Minister and [illegible] Defence on the 5th September when the following subjects were [illegible]

(i) The General Officer Commanding submitted a proposal providing for the participation by the Syrian army in the work at present being done by Beloforce in the Jezireh. The proposals were readily accepted by the Syrians.

(ii) The General Officer Commanding referred to the recent attacks on three [illegible] which had resulted in the death of one of [illegible] the Government to take action against the [illegible] the Prime Minister agreed to arrange for an enquiry to [illegible] for the necessary action to be taken.

The prominent pro-Monarchists, Fawzi Bohri Pasha, Assad Bakri, Said Mahasen and others visited Amman before the Bairam and were received by the Amir Abdullah.

Sharp rivalry between the trade unionists and Communists became evident at the meeting of the Syndicates Union held in Damascus at the end of last month. As a result the Government have reconsidered their decision to approve of Syrian participation in the International Trades Union Conference at Paris, and for the same reason the celebration of Syrian labour day on the 6th September was postponed.

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Alouites.

The situation in both Lattakia and Tartous remains unchanged. Tension [illegible] scarcely a day passes without some minor incident. Dissatisfaction with the present regime in Syria seems to be growing, and there is evidence of increasing sympathy for the idea of a monarchy, though, as elsewhere in Syria, there is no general agreement as to the person of the proposed king or the form the regime should take.

The Lattakia press has been running a campaign against Suleiman Murshed. The political officer has pointed out to the Mohafez that such a campaign is making it more difficult than ever to reconcile Sunnis and Alouites. The Mohafez has sent a strongly worded statement to *El Khabr*, one of the newspapers concerned, pointing out that gendarmerie investigations have proved that Murshed had had nothing to do with the recent robberies of which the paper had accused him and suggesting that such charges should be verified before publication.

Captain Boussinquet, the notorious head of the French political service in Lattakia, left on transfer on the 1st September. He has, however, been replaced by Captain Touré from East Syria, whose reputation is also not good.

H.M.S. *Jervis* left Lattakia on the 6th September and is not being replaced.

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Lebanon.

At the sitting of the Lebanese Chamber on the 4th September at which the [illegible] Palestine as an independent Arab State whereas the United Nations [illegible] considers it as mandated territory. After the debate the Chamber adopted a resolution stating that their ratification of the United Nations Charter did

imply any recognition on their part of the abnormal situation and temporary [illegible] Arab countries in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the Arab League, and announcing their determination to pursue their efforts to aid these States to attain sovereignty.

[illegible] with the French author[illegible] controlled services. F[illegible] [illegible] forces shall all come under the Ministry of Defence, *i.e.*, the gendarmerie and police will be transferred from the Minister of the Interior on which they depend at present. The figures of 2,500 for the army is substantially smaller than that suggested by the Lebanese military authorities, who have envisaged a total strength of some 4,000, this the President considered excessive and too expensive for the country's small resources.

Posts and Telegraphs censorship ceased in the Lebanon by agreement between [illegible] security measures, such as frontier controls, the B.C.C.L. (control of visas for the Levant States), the Mieh Mieh internment camp and film censorship [illegible] on the 15th September. British military press censorship is also expected to be abolished in the near future.

Negotiations between the American oil companies and the Lebanese Government regarding the grant of a concession for the erection of two oil refineries at [illegible] are stated so far to be held up by the insistence of the Government that the refineries and their personnel shall pay Lebanese [illegible] maintain that this would put the refineries at a disadvantage com[illegible] Haifa refinery, but the Lebanese maintain that the concession for the latter was granted under a mandatory régime and that its terms cannot therefore be taken as a precedent for a concession to be granted by a fully independent State.

The Lebanese Prime Minister has constituted the Higher Economic Council, which was suppressed in 1943.

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E 8084/5/89 (2)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 180, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 18th September, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office, 25th October.)

General.

The reference in General de Gaulle's recent statement to *The Times* regarding the Levant States has aroused indignant comments in the press of both countries. After a meeting between the Lebanese and Syrian Ministers for Foreign Affairs [illegible] Prime Minister on the 15th September issued [illegible] de Gaulle's remarks. He declared [illegible] help to [illegible] other [illegible] which, he said, had been [illegible] [illegible] to say what he likes in regard to us was [illegible]

friendship between Britain and France but we deny him the right to make the prerogatives of the Middle East States a subject of bargaining for the maintenance of this friendship.'

The question of the despatch by the States' Governments of a joint note to Great Britain and France requesting the evacuation of their troops from the Levant States has continued to figure prominently in the press. It was discussed at the meeting of the two Governments at Bludan on the 12th September and, it is understood, by the two Foreign Ministers when they met on the 14th September. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs later informed this legation that in deference to British representations, the joint notes would not be despatched, at least for the present, and, while the Syrian Prime Minister stated that his Government had addressed a telegram to their Minister in Paris instructing him to inform the French Government that, as the war was now over, the Syrians were unable to see why the evacuation of French troops should be further delayed and to request that the evacuation should be expedited, and that no similar request had been addressed to His Majesty's Government, to whom, however, a copy of the note to the French Government is apparently to be sent with a request that His Majesty's Government should use their good offices to secure compliance with its terms. Both Governments continue to display impatience to learn what progress in this matter has been made in London.

Economic

Total purchases for the period the 8th 16th September, 1945, amount to 5,308 tons, a daily average of 589 tons, which brings the total purchase for the 1945-46 crop up to 146,306 tons.

Syria: Damascus

The Syrian Chamber of Deputies met on the 15th and 16th September at [illegible] draft laws for education, amnesty and taking over the army. The following are the main points of interest raised during the debate:

(a) The Prime Minister said that the question of [illegible] under consideration.

(b) The Prime Minister said that the Government would not allow French schools to reopen. (This question is now under discussion between the British and French authorities.)

(c) The Prime Minister stated there had been rumours regarding strategic bases, frontier modifications, &c., being under discussion at present in London, these were matters for settlement by the world organisation under the United Nations Charter, although this was well known as a measure of precaution, the Government had addressed a [illegible] randum to the Big Fiv[illegible]

(d) The Government were authorised to engage foreign and Arab experts for periods not exceeding three years. The debate concluded with a speech by Jamil Mardam in which he called for unity and pointed out that great efforts were still required to ensure the independence of the country. Jamil Bey had hoped that this appeal would receive some support from the Prime Minister or President of the Chamber, but this was not forthcoming.

On the whole the general political situation has somewhat improved during the past week. Urgently required legislation has been passed and in the coming month the Government will be in a position to reform and to attend to its work without embarrassment from the Chamber. It was expected that Lutfi Haffar would attend the meetings of the Chamber, but instead of doing so he caused a communiqué to be published in the press to the effect that he was unable to accept office with a Chamber as at present constituted. On the 16th September Sabri Asali also resigned owing, it is reported, to differences of opinion with the Prime Minister, whose weak policy Sabri Asali criticised.

M. Cumat, representative in Damascus of the French Délégation Générale, was the victim of an attack by a group of youths on the 17th September. His injuries are fortunately slight: a knife wound in the leg. The acting consul called upon him and was allowed to read his official report on the incident. He had been visiting the Frères Maristes School and was returning in a horse-cab accompanied by a Syrian plain clothes policeman when the vehicle was attacked. M. Cumat and the policeman defended themselves and the assailants dispersed when the policeman fired a couple of shots in the air with his revolver. In his

opinion the incident was a clear indication of the anarchy prevailing in Damascus where even police officers were open to attack, but he admitted that he did not believe that the attack had been intended for him. The report concluded with a warm tribute to the police officer whose conduct had been exemplary. The acting consul suggested that the real significance of the incident lay in the clear indication it afforded of the attitude of the Syrians to the reopening of French schools and that there might therefore be advantage in postponing the opening for a term when the atmosphere might be more favourable.

The desertion at the instigation of their tribal sheikhs of some sixty Meharistes at Palmyra (see section 5 of this report) led the Government to decide that their dismissal was the only possible course. Nuri Dibsh, director of the Bedouin Control, tendered his resignation at this moment, on the grounds of interference by the military in affairs of his department, but was induced by the Prime Minister to withdraw his resignation after he had received a satisfactory definition of his functions and prerogatives.

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Jebel Druze

There has been some disturbance in the Jebel during the week arising out of the alleged murder by the Druze of two men from the Midani quarter of Damascus some two months ago. The official Government report which stated that the murders were committed by semi-nomad Arabs was not accepted by the Midani quarter and for some weeks there has been a series of inc[illegible] last week with an attack in Jerramana (near Damascus) upon some Druze by assailants alleged to be from the Midani quarter. A noisy demonstration of considerable size was staged in Soueida and a small party of armed men set out for Damascus to avenge the death of the man murdered at Jerramana. The party, however, was induced to return to Soueida by the Acting Mohafez, Zeid Atrash, and the Syrian Prime Minister has arranged for a commission of representatives of the Druze and the Midani quarter to enquire into the whole affairs. Both parties have accepted the setting up of the commission and all is quite for the moment.

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Lebanon

A gentleman's agreement has been reached with the Lebanese Government under which British press censorship in the Lebanon shall be considerably relaxed on the understanding that the Lebanese Government will do their utmost to ensure that the press refrains from publishing material which is either violently anti-French or of such a nature as to impair the morale of Allied troops or reveal items of great security interest.

No agreement has yet been reached between the Lebanese Government and the American oil companies regarding their application for a concession to erect [illegible] proposition and await the American reaction.

The Syrian National party (formerly P.P.S.) held a large rally at Baakline in the Chouf on the 15th September. On this occasion their inveterate opponents [illegible]ists did not stage a rival demonstration and there were no incidents. [illegible] include complete Lebanese independence and the abolition of [illegible]

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E 7623/5/89 (3)

Extract from Weekly Political Summary, No. 181 Secret, Syria and the Lebanon for the week ending 25th September, 1945.—(Communicated by British Legation, Beirut. Received 11th October.)

1. *General*

Public interest during the past week has centred in the various reports, official and unofficial, received from London about the Middle East Representatives' Conference and the Conference of Foreign Ministers. These conferences coupled with the report of King Farouk's visit to Jedda have given rise to a strong

impression that big events are pending, and some uneasiness is being felt about what is going on but while some fear is expressed that Middle East affairs, particularly those affecting the Levant States and Palestine, will be settled in the absence of representatives of the local Governments, there is on the whole a feeling of confidence that His Majesty's Government will not fail to take full account of the Arab point of view The disclosure of President Truman's letter to Mr Attlee regarding Jewish immigration to Palestine has also aroused some excitement and there is a tendency in the press of both countries to rate Palestine as being in a high state of tension and liable to explode at any moment. It is certain that this question will increasingly preoccupy local opinion in the near future unless and until the question of the States' relation with the French again comes to the forefront

7 *Economic*

Total purchases for the period 17th-22nd September, 1945, amount to 6,054 tons, a daily average of 1,009 tons, which brings the total purchases for the 1945-46 crop up to 152,160 tons

8. *Syria—Damascus.*

Efforts to complete the Syrian Cabinet by the appointment of Ministers of [illegible] unsuccessful The situation was complicated on the 25th September by the [illegible]ment to bed of the Prime Minister with a severe attack of heart trouble If he recovers sufficiently to continue in office, it is possible that an attempt will [illegible] vacancies in the Cabinet. If, on the other hand, his health does not allow him to return to work it is thought that Saadullah Jabri, or Khaled el Azm, may be asked to form a new Government Lotfi Haffar, Hashim Atassi, and Jamil Mardam Bey are also mentioned as possible Prime Ministers, though it does not seem likely that Jamil Mardam Bey will agree to [illegible] office at this stage

It is noteworthy that in the course of the week the President has taken an [illegible] the policy of giving a free hand to the Prime Minister in the formation of his [illegible] necessary in order to secure the passing of urgently required legislation

The President of the Republic in conversation with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires discussed the internal situation at length and did not conceal his anxiety regarding the turn which events had taken he also spoke of the pro-Monarchist campaign which is being conducted by opposition elements throughout Syria, and argued that it was in the interests of His Majesty's Government [illegible] in Arab League

In conversation with His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires the Prime Minister [illegible] the press censorship by a press liaison office, to which the newspapers would be required to submit, prior to publication, articles affecting the movements and morale of Allied troops, together with an undertaking by the Government to do all in their power to prevent the publication of violently anti French material During the same conversation the Prime Minister agreed to take no action w[illegible] [illegible] opportunity of discussing the problem with the French in Beirut

Abdul Rahman Azzam and Hafez Wehbeh arrived in Damascus on the 19th September In an interview with the press the former said that the Arab world was faced with three main problems, Palestine, French evacuation from the Levant States and Libya. He was received by the President of the Republic and the leading members of the Government and a number of public functions were given in his honour

[illegible] Minister of Supply [illegible] tative on the M I R A Commission in place of Jamil Mardam Bey

Sami Kirmi (Latakia), Mustafa Jamil (Aleppo) and Shaik Tawfik (Homs) have been elected by the Syrian Syndicates to represent Syria at the International Trades Union Conference at Paris. It is reported that the Prime Minister is in favour of the Communist party sending two representatives to the [illegible]

[illegible] a Damascus newspaper on the activities of the [illegible] in a strong protest by the Russian Minister, [illegible] has demanded the suspension of the newspaper

4 *Aleppo*

The past week has been quiet, and the recent order from Damascus to the Mohafez that he should deal with any elements threatening the peace, coupled with the Mohafez known determination to enforce such orders, has materially orders from the French Délégué Général

There has been a marked tendency of late for French officers to wander about the town unescorted, despite the fact that local antagonism towards them has increased M Fauquenot, the Délégué, has been informed by the Officer Commanding British Troops that if he persisted in touring Aleppo unescorted, the British Military authorities could not be responsible for his safety He has told His Majesty's Consul that he cannot accept British military protection without orders from the French Délégué Général

Two Aleppo advocates representing the Aleppo Committee of a proposed [illegible] Labour party have requested His Majesty's Consul to obtain a copy of the [illegible] of the British Labour Party

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E 8085/5 89 4

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 182, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 2nd October 1945. Received in Foreign Office 25th October.)

General.

[illegible] Governments during the week have shown increasing anxiety at the [illegible] the American Congress [illegible] the publicity given to attacks on American support for the Zionist cause

Salah ed Din Sabbagh, the sole surviving member of the "Golden Square," who was being transferred [illegible] British military authorities from the Turkish frontier to Iraq escaped from Aleppo on the 30th September The Syrian authorities are giving full co-operation in the steps being taken for his recapture

Economic.

Total purchases for the period 23rd-30th September, 1945, amount to [illegible] 1945-46 crop up to 161 287 tons

[illegible]

Lutfi Haffar Minister of [illegible] Minister of Education.

Nasim Antaki Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of Public Works

Hassan Jabbara Minister of National Economy and Acting Minister of Supply.

After several weeks of uncertainty the fall of the Khouri Government and the formation of [illegible]

among the general public. The new Ministers are individually capable and experienced. The position of the Chamber, however, is not yet clear. Khaled el Azm will, no doubt, attack the new Government with all the means at his disposal but his following among Deputies is slight. Though Michael Eliane [illegible] present highly incensed at the overthrow of the Government, it is unlikely [illegible] his opposition to Saadullah Jabri will be long lived and in any case his [illegible]ce with the Parliamentary *bloc* can only be slight without Saadullah Jabri [illegible]hind him. Contrary to expectations the new Government is a purely party [illegible]vernment relying for support on the national *bloc*. Saadullah Jabri has, however, two portfolios available and it is probable that he will make use of them to gain further support for his Government when he has had time to study [illegible]lower the reactions of the Deputies and to negotiate with their leaders. Jamil [illegible]rdam informed the acting consul that he had been requested by the new Prime [illegible]ster to join the Government but had declined while promising to support it in the Chamber. He stated that he himself would have accepted to form a Government but as he has not been asked to do so he preferred to stand aside. [illegible] the week there has also been some activity among Opposition [illegible]side Parliamentary circles. On the 25th September, a meeting took [illegible] house of the Emir Jaafar Jazairli at which representatives of the [illegible] party, the Syrian Popular party, the [illegible] Action—took part. A committee of two [illegible] formed to draw up a programme for the [illegible]

[illegible] his way from Angora to Bagdad [illegible] members of the Government. The question [illegible] the establishment of diplomatic relations between Syria and Turkey was [illegible]cussed, a Turkish formula providing for recognition of the integrity of the existing frontiers did not appeal to the S[illegible].

In conversation with His Majesty's chargé d'affaires, Saadullah Bey Jabri stated that no steps would be taken by the Syrian Government to close French schools, though it is generally felt that few Syrian pupils will apply for admission. El Cumait, representative in Damascus of the French Délégation Générale, informed the acting consul that it had been decided to evacuate the Frères Maristes School situated in the Sudon Barracks. This building is Syrian Government property rented to the French. He pointed out that in return for the evacuation of the school the Syrians would be required to hand over the French Prévôté building which had been lent to the Syrian army, and added that three or four of the Frères Maristes would be installed there to ensure [illegible]

Dr. Crawford, of the American University of Beirut, visited Damascus in [illegible] American secondary school in the capital. Dr. Crawford stated that it was proposed to begin as soon as a suitable building could be found and that this year provision would be made for some 150 pupils in two elementary classes. In view of the present circumstances the bulk of the instruction would have to be in Arabic but it was hoped to establish a special English class, and English would be increasingly used as circumstances permitted.

The three Syrian representatives of the Syrian Labour Syndicates have so far been unable to proceed to Paris for the International Trades Union Conference owing to visa and transport difficulties. The two Communist representatives, however, did not experience the same troubles and it is understood that they are already in Paris.

Les Echos, a French language Damascus news[illegible] for three months on the 7th [illegible] It is understood that the Faris Khouri Government felt that it was necessary for a foreign language newspaper [illegible] French newspapers were being smuggled into the country in fairly large numbers from the Lebanon.

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Lebanon

The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that it was becoming increasingly difficult for them to refrain from presenting a formal note on the subject of the simultaneous withdrawal of British and French troops. The Minister for Foreign Affairs finally agreed to [illegible] His Majesty's Government would not withdraw British troops from the Levant States so long

as French troops remained there, any such assurance would be regarded by the Lebanese as strictly confidential and would be given no publicity whatever.

The Palestine question has come into somewhat artificial prominence in the Lebanon this week, as a result of the alarmist tone adopted by Reuters in reporting on Palestine events, and consequent scare headlines in the local press. Mrs. Bolton, a United States Congresswoman, who arrived in Beirut on the [illegible] tour of the Middle East, was closely questioned by [illegible] ment until passed by Congress, was prominently reported. Various political bodies have submitted resolutions to the Lebanese Government or to foreign representatives supporting the Arab case in Palestine. The Lebanese Prime Minister [illegible] the Chamber of Deputies on the 2nd October as to what steps [illegible] and replied that their policy was unchanged and that the [illegible]

[illegible] sitting of the Chamber the Prime Minister announced [illegible] in course of preparation. He added that certain other questions [illegible] evacuation of foreign troops, the telephone service, Radio Levant, and the Tripoli Topping Plant were still under discussion.

The Chamber also unanimously voted a number of measures which included —

(a) A general amnesty
(b) A law controlling the flying of foreign flags on Lebanese territory
[illegible] franchise
(which includes N A A F I goods)
(d) The repeal of all restrictions on the circulation of motor vehicles

Questioned as to the effect on Lebanese currency of the possible devaluation [illegible] Minister of Finance explained that the 1944 [illegible] ment contained provisions designed to prevent any such contingency, but that the Lebanese Minister at London had been instructed to watch the question closely.

A temporary wave of feeling against the United States is noticeable in the Levant [illegible] Mr. Truman's Palestine initiative which is naturally hotly resented, and also from the impression wi[illegible] position [illegible] the refineries concession which they finally [illegible] Lebanese interests. It is now probable that this [illegible] be some plain speaking [illegible]

The Lebanese President gave a large reception on the 1st October to [illegible] the Palace of Beteddin, which has now been [illegible] official summer residence. Some 250 notables attended. [illegible]

[illegible] position [illegible] The Lebanese [illegible] state that [illegible] be registered in the name of the Lebanese State, after which the refugees will be allowed to continue in occupation without molestation.

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E 6262 5 89] (5,

Extracts from the Weekly Political Summary No. 183, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 9th October, 1945. (Received in Foreign Office 31st October.)

General

THE Syrian and Lebanese Governments, while continuing to express impatience at the apparent lack of progress in the matter of the withdrawal of French forces from their territories, have so far accepted the advice of His Majesty's Legation to take no initiative until the results of the present discussions in London are known. The Lebanese Government are still discussing with the French the transfer of the remaining French controlled services and have reached agreement on a number of the less important ones, though Radio Levant, the telephone service, the Tripoli Topping plant and certain others still remain unsolved. The Syrians, however, have refused to participate in these [illegible] so far have even refused to sign the resulting protocols, maintaining that their immediate requirements, before they will have direct dealings with the French, are complete French military evacuation and the conversion of the Délégation Générale into a Diplomatic Mission. In the face of this refusal the French authorities have been instructed by their Government to suspend all further action on these transfers.

Alarmist reports on the situation in Palestine are still appearing in the local press. As a result, both Governments have decided to take special measures to control their southern frontiers with the object of preventing the passage both of illegal immigrants into Palestine and of refugee terrorists escaping from it, both have offered to co-operate with the British security authorities on the two sides of the frontier for this purpose. In addition, the Syrian Government have turned back 105 Bulgarian Jews who arrived from Turkey with transit visas for Syria granted by the French representative in Bulgaria and valid visas for Palestine, and have made it clear that they intend to offer no further facilities of any kind for Jews proceeding to Palestine.

Salah ed Din Sabbagh, who recently escaped from a British military guard in Aleppo (see Weekly Political Summary No. 182) was recaptured in Aleppo on the 5th October and has been flown to Baghdad for delivery to the Iraq Government.

[illegible]

Total purchases for the period 1st–7th October, 1945, amount to 4,921 tons, a daily average of 703 tons, which brings the total purchases for the 1945–46 crop up to 196,208 tons.

[illegible]

Saadullah Jabri, in his capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs, recently [illegible] Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires the following outline of his foreign policy:

(1) He insists on the withdrawal of all French troops from both Syria and the Lebanon, while emphasising that this must not be taken to signify a demand for the evacuation of British troops.

(2) The French Délégation Générale must be transformed into a legation.

(3) No member of the délégation who was in the Levant at the time of the events in May would be accepted as a member of the future French Diplomatic Mission.

(4) French political officers must be withdrawn.

(5) French troops must immediately be forbidden to circulate in any area.

He went on to say that while Syria would never sign a treaty with the French [illegible] with the French when the above demands were satisfied. [illegible] ter the same day the Syrian President confirmed to His Majesty's Chargé d'A[illegible]res his complete agreement with this programme.

The opening of Parliament has been adjourned for one month; repairs to the Parliament building are still proceeding and no alternative accommodation can be found.

In conversation with British military authorities the Prime Minister raised the question of aerodromes and said that the operations of French airlines in the present circumstances meant that the Syrian authorities had no check on arrivals, further, that it might be difficult for the Syrian Government to resist

requests for Fifth Freedom facilities from the Americans, who were arguing that the French had a privileged position as regards aviation. The Prime Minister expressed his intention of writing an official note to His Majesty's Legation suggesting that a joint commission should be set up to examine this question so that the British authorities might take the matter up with the French.

The Délégation Générale are understood to have received instructions to have all French-sponsored schools in Syria reopened on or after the 15th October, partly as a result of formal assurances given by the Prime Minister to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires that no steps had been, or would be, taken to prevent attendance at them. Since, however, students are by no means completely under control, disturbances are not unlikely, especially in Aleppo, when this occurs. The British military authorities have made it clear to the French that they cannot provide extra protection for these schools and that if their reopening causes trouble it may be necessary to secure their temporary closure.

The opening of the Government elementary schools has been postponed until the 20th October and all secondary schools until the 3rd November, the faculties of law and medicine will open on the 8th November.

The Prime Minister informed journalists at a press conference that the Government were prepared to abolish the military press censorship provided newspapers refrained from publishing statements regarding movements of troops, visits of commanding officers and matters likely to affect the morale of the forces. Journalists have agreed to consider this proposal.

Les Echos (see Weekly Political Summary No. 182, section 3, last paragraph) appeared only for two days, the new Prime Minister reversing his predecessor's decision and informing the proprietor that he would permit the paper to appear only in the Arabic language.

The representatives of the Syrian Labour Syndicates have been obliged to abandon their plans to attend the World Trade Union Conference in Paris. It appears that the French aviation authorities insisted on a formal application from the Syrian Government for passages for the syndicates' representatives, although they made no difficulty about the two Communist representatives.

[illegible]

In Aleppo the formation of Saadullah Jabri's Cabinet has not aroused as much interest as might have been expected. Although there is an undercurrent of dissatisfaction that the President should have again called upon the same group of politicians to form the new Government, Dr. Kheyali and Rushdi Akkbia, the chief Opposition leaders in this area, have both expressed their intention not to attack the Government for the sake of opposition but to wait and see.

The French delegate has informed His Majesty's Consul that there is no intention of reopening the "Ecole Laique" this year, since it has not been [illegible] ment it would be particularly exposed to attack.) The delegate has stated however, that the Terre Sainte Boys' School and the Franciscan Girls' School, both founded more than fifty years ago, will reopen on or about the 15th October and it is probable that the "Marist" school for boys and the St. Joseph's school for girls will also open on the same date.

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Lebanon

The Lebanese President, accompanied by all but two of his Ministers, spent from the 4th to the 8th October touring the province of North Lebanon, the [illegible] of a series of such tours which he intends to undertake in this part of the country. This province contains at least two elements which might have been expected to show little enthusiasm for the President and the régime he represents, namely the Moslems of Tripoli and the Akkar, who before the war were supposed to favour the separation of their district from the Lebanon and its reincorporation in Syria, and the reactionary Maronites of the Kadisah valley (where their patriarch has his summer residence) amongst whom the French have always believed they could count some of their most faithful adherents. Despite this the tour seems to have been a resounding success and certainly evoked what had all the appearance of genuine pro-Lebanese sentiments. Large crowds applauded the President wherever he went, and the Lebanese security authorities claim that they had nowhere to take special precautions to maintain order, still less to encourage the people to attend the various receptions. The President seems to

have acquitted himself well his public utterances dwelt on the unity and brotherhood of Moslems and Christians in the Lebanon, on his Government's intention to grant no foreign nation a privilege position, and on the right of the Lebanon as a small nation, to count on the protection and support of the Great Powers. Only at the patriarch's residence, where the party spent a night, does the atmosphere seem to have been chilly. The President heard many petitions, dealing mostly with questions of public works, and promised to have the various grievances looked into.

The press describes the tour as "a plebiscite for independence" and stresses the national sentiment displayed everywhere. The Prime Minister, in a statement in the Chamber of Deputies on the 9th October, said that the purposes of the tour were to enable the President to establish direct contact with the population and hear their needs, and to explain to the people the aims of the Government in their policy of independence. He claimed that this policy had been everywhere fully approved.

The Lebanese Government have approved the British proposals for converting [illegible] and urging the press [illegible] ority or the morale of [illegible] ny foreign Power."

The Bill setting up a Leb[illegible] the [illegible] ember on the 8th October [illegible] to Joseph Salem. The appointment has been criticised, with some justice, on the grounds that he is incapable of representing the Lebanon worthily in this [illegible]

Elie Haefish, the editor of *Hodna*, returned from his ill-starred visit to Great Britain and France on the 2nd October. He was at once arrested and interrogated, but after denying having uttered any of the "anti-Lebanon" statements attributed to him, was released on bail. The case will probably now be allowed to drop.

Senator Pepper, another of the series of globe-trotting United States [illegible] President, who is understood to have left him in no doubt of the Lebanese attitude on Zionism.

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E 8362/5/89 (8

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 184. Secret. Syria [illegible]

General

ON the 13th October the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents met at *Zehlani* in [illegible] estine appears to be increasing in both countries. The [illegible] declarations supporting the Arab case there. After the meeting of the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents referred to in the preceding paragraph an anodyne communiqué was issued reflecting the official feeling that there was nothing for [illegible] and until some change in His Majesty's Government's present policy was announced, on the other hand, much [illegible] the [illegible] and illegal Jewish immigration through the Lebanon into Palestine [illegible] upon which agreement had been reached, he suspects a French trap and does not accept General Beynet's status as Délégué Général. At the meeting of the 13th October (see paragraph [illegible]) he was persuaded by the Lebanese President to agree to sign a single protocol covering all the outstanding services, if the French were

prepared to do so, and the Lebanese undertook to approach the French in this sense.

According to President Khoury both President Quwatli and himself are disturbed by the increase in talk and press articles advocating the establishment of a greater Syria under the Amir Abdullah as king, which they believe to be largely inspired by the Amir himself. The Lebanese President [illegible] fears the effect of this proposition on the Lebanese Christians w[illegible] favourable to Lebanese independence look with apprehension on any suggestion that the Lebanese should be incorporated in what would certainly be a predominantly Moslem State.

The opening of the French and Catholic schools on the 15th Octo[illegible] under "Syria-Damascus") seems likely to result in trouble of one [illegible] another.

Economic

Total purchases for the period the 8th-15th October, 1945, amount to 4,182 tons, a daily average of 523 tons, which brings the total purchases for the 1945-46 crop up to 170,390 tons.

Syria—Damascus

The Syrians are showing increasing impatience concerning the apparent lack of progress towards a final settlement with the French. The following questions are causing particular concern:

(a) *Exchange Control.*—The Prime Minister alleges that the French are using their control of foreign exchange to strangle the economic life of the country.

(b) The movement of French military personnel and civilians in Aleppo and [illegible]

(c) The absence of Syrian control at French-occupied aerodromes, which has resulted in the infiltration of French agents.

The possibility that the Syrian Government will react and take positive action cannot be excluded though every effort is being made by the British authorities to counsel patience.

A demonstration took place on the 10th October in Damascus after a meeting held at the Moslem Youth Club; the demonstrators dispersed without incident after the Prime Minister had refused to receive the delegation. Two days later a group of students decided to organise a further demonstration after Friday prayers and a strike the following day. The Prime Minister gave orders that if necessary force should be used to prevent these activities, but it did not prove possible to prevent the crowd leaving the Mosque from proceeding to Merje Square. Shops remained closed on the following day for a few hours in anticipation of a demonstration which did not materialise.

Faiz Khoury, Arif Nakad and Emir Mustafa Shehab have been ap[illegible] Acting Director General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Director [illegible] of the Police and Director General of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers respectively, and a committee of inspection, composed of representatives of the Ministries of the Interior, Finance and Justice, has been appointed to report on administration conditions in the Mohafazat.

M. Cuinat, representative in Damascus of the French Delegation Générale intimated to the acting consul that the Lazarist, St. Paul and Franciscan schools would open on the 15th October. The Area Commander informed M. Cuinat that responsibility for the protection of the French schools belonged to the Syrian Government, but that in the event of the reopening of a school leading to a disturbance of the peace, he was empowered by G.O.C., B.T.N.L., to order the closing of the school. M. Cuinat assured the Area Commander that he could count on his fullest co-operation and that, should it prove necessary, he would himself order the closing of the schools.

On the 15th October these three French schools opened, but the head of the Franciscan school was informed during the course of the morning by an official of the Ministry of Education that the school could not remain open as it was not [illegible] St. Paul schools remained open with about 300 students each. No incidents have been reported.

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Jebel Druze

The political officer reports that as a result of the quarrel between Emir Hassan and Hamad Atrash, the former is demanding Hamad's removal and replacement by a Syrian officer, a step which in the opinion of the political officer would be disastrous, since no outsider could hope to control the Groupement as at present constituted. The continual absence of the Mohafez during the past three months and this recent quarrel have resulted in a deterioration of law and order; the Juge de Paix at Soueida has complained that his function has become a farce as he is prevented by deception and pressure, and even threats upon his life, from carrying out his duties impartially and thoroughly.

Three members of the Atrash family, Mteih Bek, Hussein Pasha, and Tewfik Bek, have recently visited the Amir Abdullah at Aman, where they seem to have been made much of; the first has a certain political importance but the other two are nonentities.

It is reported that during the past month the French have given scholarships at schools in Beirut to children of a number of Druze notables.

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Lebanon

The main political activity in the Lebanon has centred in the election of a Speaker for the Chamber, in which the outgoing Speaker, Sabri Hamadi, was challenged by Adib Osseyran, also a Shia. The latter's supporters sprang a last minute mine by securing publication in a newspaper the day before the election of a facsimile of a deed of sale of land to Jews in Palestine, executed by Ahmed Assad, the present Minister of Agriculture, who is Sabri Hamadi's brother-in-law. This revelation, however, was too blatantly a political manœuvre to have much effect, and in the event Sabri Hamadi was re-elected by 33 votes to 14.

Another and more important scandal occurred on the 16th October, when the British military authorities, at the request of the Lebanese Sûreté and on information supplied by them, arranged a road block on the Beirut-Damascus road near Chtaurah, and caught a Moslem Deputy of the Bekaa with sixteen good German rifles in his car. The Deputy was conducted to Beirut and handed over to the Lebanese police, who released him, but he then insisted on bringing them to his house and voluntarily handed over to them nineteen similar rifles and much ammunition stored there. The following morning he was rearrested by the Lebanese police and imprisoned. The case was debated in the Chamber on the 18th October, when some Deputies endeavoured to argue that he could claim immunity, but the Constitution expressly states that such immunity does not apply if the offending Deputy is caught in *flagrante delicto*, and the Chamber unanimously agreed that the case must go on. The suggestion has been made that the arms were intended for the Zionists, but there is no proof of this, and present indications are that the Deputy was merely buying them cheap in the Alouites in order to sell them to his own followers in the Bekaa.

Reuter's correspondent in Beirut, a Palestine Jew, was brusquely expelled by the Lebanese Government on the 15th October, on the pretext that his handling of Palestine news was pro-Zionist. The charge is probably unfair since he is not responsible for the policy of his agency, but in any case a Palestine Jew could hardly expect to escape some such measure in the present state of local feeling.

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E 8699/5/89

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 185, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 23rd October, 1945. (Received 13th November.)

General

THE Syrian Government, as foreshadowed by the new Prime Minister when he assumed office, have now embarked on a process of making life unpleasant for the French who remain in Syria. The French garrison at Mezzé aerodrome, near Damascus, and the French "Officiers en Mission" in the Jezireh, have found difficulties placed in the way of their local purchases of food, and have had to be supplied with British military assistance.

On the 17th October, following an incident on the Syro-Lebanese frontier when an unescorted French vehicle drove through the Syrian control post, orders

were issued to the gendarmerie to a[illegible] back unescorted ones and only to [illegible] were restored.

French and Vatican-controlled schools opened in Damascus and Aleppo on the 15th October. On the following day, however, one of the Damascus, and all the Aleppo, schools were closed by the Syrian authorities on the ground that they had failed to obtain a permit from the Ministry of Education. The French authorities contended that, even if the Syrian Educational Law of the 21st December 1944, had stipulated that permits were necessary (in point of fact, the law appears to require permits only in the case of newly founded schools) their schools were exempted from any such formalities by reason of a Franco-Turkish convention of 1901; they, however, agreed to communicate to the Syrian authorities, through His Majesty's Legation, assurances on the two points to which the Syrian Government seemed to attach greatest importance, namely, the establishment of a curriculum based on that laid down by the Syrian Government and the acceptance of inspection by Syrian officials. The Syrian Prime Minister held that such assurances were inadequate, and insisted on application for permits, on the ground that the Ministry of Education must have full particulars of the persons responsible for running the schools; it remains to be seen whether he can be brought to accept the French proposals. Meanwhile, three French schools are functioning in Damascus with from a quarter to a half of their normal complement of pupils, and with Syrian staff.

In the Lebanon, where French schools have been allowed to reopen normally and where no Franco-Lebanese incidents have taken place, the Government are becoming exasperated at the obstruction encountered from the French side in the negotiations for the transfer of the remaining French-controlled services. Having [illegible]aded the Syrians (see last week's summary) to agree to sign one protocol [illegible] all these services, they now find that they are unable to make any [illegible] the matter of those services whose transfer has not yet been [illegible]

[illegible] ry. The Syrian [illegible] memoire to the United States [illegible] Palestine on the Zionist issue. [illegible] 2nd Novem[illegible]

Economic

Total purchases for the period the 16th to the 22nd October, 1945, amount to 2,875 tons, a daily average of 411 tons, which brings the total for the 1945-46 crop up to 173,265 tons.

It is now becoming apparent that the target figure of 250,000 tons for this year's cereal collection will not be reached, largely on account of hoarding by producers. This in turn is thought to be due in the main to uncertainty as to whether Government control of cereals will continue. Both Governments are, therefore, being urged to make a statement removing any uncertainty on this score, to conduct propaganda designed to secure the co-operation of producers in the scheme, and rigorously to repress hoarding and "black market" transactions.

Damascus

It has been announced that Jamil Mardam Bey has accepted the appointment [illegible] is acceptance undoubtedly represents a success for the Government, as their greatest potential rival has thus shown his solidarity with the National Bloc leaders, and his absence will simplify their task; moreover, his wide political experience and prestige throughout the Arab world will be particularly valuable at the headquarters of the Arab League.

The Prime Minister has not yet completed his Cabinet, as his attempts to separate his chief remaining opponents, Michael Eitan and Khaled-el-Azm, offering the former a portfolio, have so far failed. He is at present concentrating on administrative appointments. The election for the presidency of the Chamber is already giving rise to political activity, the two obvious candidates are [illegible]-el-Khoury and Lutfi Haffar but Jamil Mardam has announced his intention of returning from Cairo for the election and might well present himself if circumstances prove favourable.

A Soviet-Syrian cultural society was inaugurated in Damascus at a reception [illegible] the 14th October under the patronage of Faiz Khoury, the recently returned Syrian Minister at Moscow.

[illegible] Syrian Government have informed the former London Polish Minister [illegible] that they recognise the Warsaw Government.

Arrangements for this year's pilgrimage are proceeding satisfactorily, but it is estimated that only some 5,000 will proceed, as against a first estimate of 10,000.

Aleppo

The Christian minorities, assiduously worked on by French agents (including priests and nuns), have long been expressing fears that the Moslems will sooner or later make life intolerable for them, and the closing of the French schools, of which their communities are the chief supporters, is being widely taken to confirm these fears.

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Lebanon

The Lebanese President on the 20th October broadcast a message to the Lebanese colonists abroad, on whose behalf there have been several recent meetings in various parts of the Lebanon. In his speech he made the familiar points that the Lebanon would not accept the protection, mandate or supervision of any foreign Power and would make no treaty giving a privileged position to anyone, that his Government demanded the complete evacuation of Allied troops without distinction, that the Lebanese could not live apart from their Arab brothers and that they were pledged to defend Arab Palestine.

The Lebanese Budget for 1946 has been submitted to the Chamber by the Council of Ministers. It totals £Sy 58 million as opposed to £Sy 48 million for 1945, the increase being almost entirely due to the larger credit allotted to the Ministry of Defence as a result of the Lebanese assumption of control of some 3,800 Lebanese Troupes Speciales.

The town of Tripoli has been quiet and so far no incidents have been reported following the release of Rashid Mokaddem's two sons, Nafez and Mayezen, who returned to Tripoli on the 17th October. Their arrival there was rather unexpected as it was originally intended that they should be kept in Beirut pending a reconciliation with Abdul Hamid Karami. The French Political Officer called on the Mokaddems the day after their arrival to welcome them back. It is to be expected that the French will endeavour to use Nafez and Mayez to strengthen the opposition to the Government, but it is doubtful whether they will obtain the full support from them which they anticipate.

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E 9408/5/89] (8)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 187, Syria and the Lebanon 8th November 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office 4th December.)

General

PALESTINE has been the centre of public interest during the week. On the 28th anniversary of the Balfour declaration, the 2nd November, the shops of a number of towns in Syria and the Lebanon were closed, many newspapers [illegible] speeches made were mostly moderate in tone but in some cases attacks were made on Great Britain for sponsoring Zionism, in Jebel Druze, Deraa and Beirut demonstrators specifically called for the return of the Mufti. Petitions on the usual lines were received at the legation and in some cases were handed to British

representatives in the provinces, many of them calling for the release or pardon of the "detained Palestinians whose only crime was having defended their country." The only serious trouble occurred in Beirut where there was a clash [illegible] the bitterly opposed Communist and Syrian popular parties, involving [illegible] were torn down by the so-called Palestinian Defence party on the grounds that Palestine was an Arab question in which no foreign sponsored party should meddle, a French civil aircraft flew low over the town during the demonstrations but fortunately the crowd did not react. The Syrian authorities took great trouble to prevent disorders and their efforts were successful. Special precautions were also taken by British military authorities to protect French installations particularly in case the crowd demonstrated against them, but they had no occasion to intervene.

A further meeting between the Sy[illegible] at Shtaura on the 31st October. According [illegible] to the press, the questions discussed included the withdrawal of foreign troops, the transfer of the remaining powers, French representation, suppl[illegible] [illegible] was decided to de[illegible] of a formal note to the French authorities requesting the wit[illegible] troops and the matter had been further discussed with the Bri[illegible] has been realised in connection with the reopening of Fre[illegible] The Syrians are still insisting that schools should apply to the compe[illegible] Syrian authorities for registration and a permit. On the 1st November the Prime Minister received a deputation of bishops and informed them that they could open their schools and teach in the French language provided they applied [illegible] a permit from the Government and followed the Government's p[illegible] as possible. The Prime Minister requested M. Stete, the Syrian Catholic Bishop, to write to Cardinal Tappouni [illegible]

Economic

Total purchases for the period 1st–7th November 1945, amount to 1,724 tons, a daily average of 246 tons, which brings the total for the 1945/46 crop up to 177,519 tons.

Syria—Damascus

The Syrian President has continued his tour in the Euphrates and Jezireh areas (see that section of this summary) (1) accompanied by the Minister of the Interior, the Inspector-General of the Gendarmerie and the Secretary General of the [illegible] tour has been successful, and the Prime Minister anticipates that as a [illegible] Government will be in a stronger position when the Chamber of Deputies [illegible] after the Bairam holidays.

During the week the Syrian Prime Minister made a number of [illegible] against the French to members of the legation staff, amongst them were:—

(a) Low flying of French aircraft over Damascus and towns in the Euphrates [illegible]

(b) The appearance of a party of armed French troops in the village of Mezze near Damascus on the night of the 22nd October.

(c) The addition without notification to the Syrian Government of two vehicles containing ammunition and shells to a French convoy arriving at the frontier.

(d) The proposal to relieve a French North African unit in Lattakia by French Metropolitan troops.

On the 3rd October, shortly after dawn, a hand grenade exploded outside the Banque National d'Industrie et de Commerce and on the following night a [illegible] and there were no casualties. The cause of the incidents has not so far been [illegible]

[illegible]

Saleh Aqil, Syrian Consul in Mosul, has been transferred to Jedda and has left to take up his appointment.

[illegible]

[illegible] appointment as Secretary General of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers

Aleppo

A general strike occurred in Aleppo on the 2nd November and the Committee for the Defence of Palestine organised demonstrations. Anti Zionist speeches were made and the procession marched noisily through the town but there were no incidents; a protest not, however, couched in anti British terms was handed to His Majesty's Consul

The Greek Catholic Archbishop M Fattal has informed the Mohafez that the Terra Santa and Sacred Heart schools were expected to apply to the Syrian [illegible] of Education in Aleppo has issued a statement expressing his agreement to the opening of all sectarian schools, providing they comply with the Government conditions

The Turkish Consul-General has informed His Majesty's Consul that the Soviet Minister M Solod, did not appear to encourage any anti Turkish propaganda during his tour in North Syria, but that he had learned from several Armenian sources that M Solod had raised the hopes of Armenians that in the not too far distant future they might be given an opportunity of going to Soviet Armenia

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Lebanon

Demonstrations held in Beirut on the 2nd November were for the most part orderly, but a sharp brawl developed between members of the Communist and Lebanese Popular parties, who have long been at daggers drawn, and two deaths resulted. At a large meeting held by representatives of all the principal parties, resolutions were passed advocating the complete stoppage of Jewish immigration and the prohibition of land sales in Palestine to non-Arabs, the disarming of Jewish colonists, the disbanding of Jewish organisations, and the denial to the Jewish Agency of the right to interfere in official matters, and the return of Arab exiles, especially the Grand Mufti. Resolutions were also sent to the Arab Leagues advocating the boycotting of Jewish products in all Arab countries, [illegible] passing of measures to prevent Jewish infiltration into any of these countries

The Lebanese Prime Minister was able to announce in the Chamber of Deputies on the 30th October that the French authorities had transferred a number of services formerly controlled by them to the Lebanese Government It is understood that the delegation's letter announcing these transfers requested the Lebanese to pass on to the Syrians their part in the services transferred The actual transfer of one of the services in question the control of Beirut Port gave rise to some difficulty, as the Lebanese declined to take over the Port Police who had been recruited and trained by the French, but a compromise was eventually reached The services in question are, however of comparatively minor impor[illegible] increasing impatience at the obstruction which he alleges the French are dis[illegible] tations regarding the more important services, such as the Beirut [illegible]

[illegible] made the following points

(a) He did not favour any form of mandate or protection for the Lebanon by any foreign Power

(b) France had governed the Lebanon for twenty-five years and it was right that a treaty should mark the end of this period and define the rights and obligations of the two countries.

(c) Although he did not accuse any Powers of working against the independence of the Lebanon, he did not wish to see the French mandate replaced by a mandate held by Great Britain or any other foreign Power. it was important that the country should not be dominated either from the West or from the East

(d) Unhappily he had no confidence in the Arab League, it appeared to him that certain people were thinking of a unity which could be realised only to the detriment of the Lebanon. Syrian leaders had often said that the Arab League was only the first step towards Syrian unity and would be followed by Arab unity others were talking about the unity of Islam

The Parliamentary Committee which is studying the oil refineries concession at Tripoli is reported in the press to have again adjourned without reaching a decision.

The meeting of the Lebanese Chamber on the 30th October was cut short by a violent dispute between the Speaker and the Minister for Foreign Affairs arising out of the former's refusal to allow the latter to make what he said was an important statement regarding the transfer of powers. The M[illegible] for Foreign Affairs threatened to resign, but a reconciliatory [illegible] taken place, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, accompanied by [illegible] of Justice and Habib Abi Chahla duly left on the 5th November to represent the Lebanon at the meeting of the Arab League

The Council of Ministers at a meeting on the 1st November, approved a plan for the creation of a press syndicate, and decided to announce the total abolition of press censorship. The Minister of the Interior on the following day published an announcement in this sense, at the same time exhorting journalists to show discretion in their handling of a list of subjects (previously communicated to him by the British authorities) which might embarrass the [illegible] authorities. On the following day the complete abolition of [illegible] press censorship was announced by the British authorities.

In addition to the French Sûreté agent, who is now being sent twice a week to Baalbek, a member of the French political staff rema[illegible] the town Two officers from the Rayak French aerodrome have [illegible] to the north of Rayak mak[illegible] the Lebanese Syrian front[illegible] said that they also promised to provi[illegible]

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E 9461 5 89 6)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No 168, Secret Syria and the Lebanon, 13th November, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office, 5th December.)

General

ON the morning of the 13th November copies of the text of the statement on Palestine being made that afternoon by the Secretary of State for Foreign [illegible] Presidents. The Syrian President was grateful for this advance information and showed understanding of the difficulties of the Palestine problem, but appeared at first to take a gloomy view of the statement, he assumed that the [illegible]nce in the statement of any reference to the White Paper, to which he said the Arabs attached the highest importance, meant that it had been superseded, especially as under it Jewish immigration was to cease once the quota of 75,000 had been filled. The Prime Minister who was also present, was unhappy about the principle of trusteeship, to which, as he pointed out, the Arab representatives at San Francisco have objected, and wondered whether the promise of eventual independence held out in the White Paper still stood. The Lebanese President's first reaction was less unfavourable. Both Presidents suggested that the question [illegible] their Governments before pronouncing a final opinion.

There has not yet been time to assess public reactions to the statement.

Economic

Total purchases for the period the 5th-15th November, 1945, amount to 1,591 tons, a daily average of 198 tons, which brings the total for the 1945-46 crop up to 179,110 tons

Syria—Damascus

The Syrian President who returned to Damascus from his tour on the [illegible] slightly indisposed.

The internal political situation remains obscure as a large number of Deputies will not return to Damascus until after the Bairam holidays. It seems probable, however, that the President's recent tour in North and East Syria during which he has made a point of stressing the need for all Syrians to pull together, has done something to strengthen the position of the existing Government.

M. Cumat, representative in Damascus of the French Delegation Générale, left on the 10th November to take up an appointment in France, before leaving he stated that he would not be replaced and the Délégation Générale is thus no longer represented in Damascus.

A meeting was organised on the 6th November by the Moslem Youth Club in support of the Indonesians and a resolution was passed promising full support of the Indonesian Liberation Movement.

Some uneasiness is discernible in Jewish circles in Damascus. Complaints have been received that the Syrian Sûreté are refusing to issue exit permits to Jews intending to travel but in reply to an enquiry the Prime Minister stated that no instructions have been issued denying travelling facilities to Syrian nationals of Jewish origin. He admitted, however, that special efforts were being made to prevent suspects, either smugglers or persons engaged in furthering illegal immigration from travelling.

A reorganisation and purge of the police force is being undertaken and it is intended to improve the standard of recruitment. Fifteen commissioners are already stated to have been dismissed.

The former Transjordan consul, Abdul Moneim Rifai, visited Damascus [illegible]

[illegible] el Azam and Nadim Attar have been appointed Syrian [illegible] and Jerusalem respectively.

Ahmed Bey Lahham has been appointed Director General of the Ministry of Defence.

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Lebanon

The Lebanese President spent from the 8th November to the 11th November touring Bekaa, where he appears to have received at least as much acclamation as during his recent tours of North and South Lebanon. There was some slight friction at Baalbek owing to the President's refusal to call on the Greek Catholic Archbishop, whose pro French sympathies are notorious, but elsewhere especially in the turbulent regions of Hermel, enormous crowds gathered to express loyal [illegible] The President [illegible] previous speeches, but at Baalbek he took up the position more clearly than ever before on the Palestine issue. The tour concluded at Rashaya on the 11th November, the second anniversary of the incarceration of the President and his Ministers there, and the President unveiled on the walls of the Citadel commemorative plaques referring to it as the birthplace of Lebanese independence.

It is announced that certain Jewish newspapers have been excluded from the Lebanon on account of criticisms recently published in them of the Lebanese President's public espousal of the Arab cause in Palestine. News of the disturbances [illegible] disorders are generally deplored as tending to prejudice the Arab cause at this moment.

The press reports that the Lebanese and Syrian Legations at Washington have published declarations denying the truth of the pro-French utterances attributed to Mgr. Aql during his tour of the United States, and that the Maronite Patriarch has summoned Mgr. Aql to return home.

General Beynet's departure to Paris has aroused the usual speculation as to whether he will return or will be replaced, as is wishfully thought, by a diplomat.

The Lebanese Prime Minister has put through a first list of administrative appointments. Many [illegible] promotions made. The announcement of this reshuffle has aroused strong criticism, and the President has been much blamed for not having prevented these irregularities.

The Chamber of Deputies met on the 13th November before the announcement of His Majesty's Government's decision on Palestine had been communicated to the Government. The only matter of importance dealt with was the amnesty laws, which, as finally voted, provide for a general scaling-down of sentences imposed by both Lebanese Courts and the French Military Courts prior to the 3rd September 1945.

[illegible] approved by the Judicial Committee of the Chamber and has been passed to the Chamber, which is expected to accept it.

[illegible] informed both parties that he regards them as illegal organisations and will therefore listen to neither. He has also stopped a cable addressed to Moscow by the Tass representative of Beirut because it not only repeated the accusation of fascism against the P.P.S., but endeavoured to prove that the Lebanese Government's toleration of the latter showed that they were anti-democratic. The Soviet Minister has protested against this action on his part but apparently without success.

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E 9677/3/89] (10)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 159, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 20th November 1945. (Received 18th December.)

General

OWING to the Bairam holidays the newspapers in Syria and the Lebanon have been unable to comment fully upon Mr. Bevin's statement on Palestine. On [illegible] tion between Zionism and the Jewish refugee problem and between a Jewish National Home and a Jewish State. But the continuation of immigration is [illegible] stable and it has been suggested that the trusteeship proposal constitutes a whittling down of the assurances of self government given to the Arabs under the White Paper, though in conversation with His Majesty's Minister the Syrian President, while still uncomfortable about the continuance of Jewish immigration and the implied departure from the White Paper, adopted a realistic attitude towards the proposals in general and admitted that he thought trusteeship was the best solution in the circumstances, as an independent Palestine was obviously impracticable at the present stage. One Damascus newspaper used the opportunity to argue that His Majesty's Government should arrange for the return of the Mufti, Jamil Husseini and Dr. Amin Roweiha.

The Syrian President and Prime Minister visited the Lebanese President and Ministers at Aley on the 18th November, primarily in order to discuss Mr. Bevin's statement. As a result of the meeting Sandollah Jabri was sent to meet Jamil Mardam Bey in Palestine and to convey to him the unified views of the two Governments. These views were as follows:—

(a) They felt that the statement must be very carefully studied before the [illegible] if possible must be agreed by all the Palestine Arab parties, should then be communicated by each Arab Government to the British representative accredited to it.

(b) [illegible] there were [illegible] clarification. (This last category seems to have included the questions of illegal immigration and trusteeship.)

At the same meeting the Lebanese Ministers informed the Syrians of the steps that had been taken to secure the transfer of the French-controlled services. It appears that the French have now agreed to transfer the control of the D.H.P. Railway, and that agreement has also been reached in regard to the handing over of the Office Economique de Guerre.

Both the Syrian and Lebanese Governments are considering setting up air training schools and aircraft supplied by the Hunting Aviation Management Company.

Economic

Weekly grain purchase figures not yet available.

Negotiations have now been initiated by the Lebanese Government and the I P C in regard to the disposal of the topping plant erected at Tripoli in Vichy times. The I P C had previously been negotiating with the Délégation Générale and had almost reached agreement with them for this plant to be transferred direct to themselves, but the Lebanese Government then intervened and insisted that this plant must be considered as a French-controlled service and must therefore be transferred to them in the first place. It has now been proposed [illegible] plant shall be transferred from the French to the Lebanese Government [illegible] Lebanese Government to the company, and that an [illegible] subsequently concluded between the company and [illegible] former to operate the plant.

Damascus

There are no developments to report as regards internal politics, activities have been limited by the Bairam festivities. It is anticipated, however, that in the course of the coming week before the opening of Parliament on the 24th Novem [illegible] meet on the 22nd November to discuss the [illegible] Eman and Kaled el Azm. According to a member of this party Saadullah Jabri's position might be seriously affected if [illegible] were approved. The strength of the rival parties will be tested at the election for the presidency of the Chamber, for which post Saadullah Jabri may support Lutfi Haffar or Mohamed el Ayesh, the Acting President.

At a press conference the Prime Minister stated that he hoped the question of the withdrawal of French troops would be decided soon but denied a press report that the President of the Lebanese Republic had been informed by Count Catroux of the date of the withdrawal. On the subject of schools the Prime Minister differentiated between French and Christian schools, permit would be granted to religious schools provided they were prepared to comply with the Syrian law.

It has been reported in the press that the appointment of a Belgian expert in the Ministry of the Interior has been approved. A suggestion in this sense made by the deputy M[illegible] was welcomed by the Syrian Prime Minister but no decision has in fact as yet been taken.

Jemil Ma[illegible] Syrian Minister [illegible] addition to his post as Syrian Minister to Egypt.

Abdul Karim Bey Gailani, the Iraqi Consul in Damascus, has been replaced by Ibrahim Fadli.

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Euphrates and Jezireh

Franco-Syrian tension in the Jezireh has somewhat increased during the week, as a result of a series of small incidents. The most important of these was the arrest on the 15th November by the Syrian police of the officer in charge of the French aerodrome at Hasseiche, Lieutenant Laurent, together with two French [illegible] and two members of the French meteorological service, whilst they were returning unescorted from Mass. The Mohafez at first refused to release these men despite repeated appeals by the officer commanding the British troops in the Jezireh, and gave instructions that they were to be sent direct to Aleppo under escort. Strong representations by this legation to the Syrian Government, however, caused these instructions to be reversed, and the arrested men were eventually released at Deir es-Zor.

On the 6th November a fire broke out at the Hasseiche aerodrome, probably due to the storage of petrol and a generating plant in the same room. One [illegible] building was gutted and considerable damage was done. All possible help was given by British troops on the spot, but as a result either of a misunderstanding or a deliberate misrepresentation of the facts, Lieutenant Laurent has accused the officer commanding troops at Hasseiche of refusing the available assistance.

There are continued reports of unidentified low flying aircraft in various [illegible] Jezireh provinces, and of other aircraft flying at [illegible] the Turkish frontier.

Further reports from the Jezireh [illegible] minorities, while still somewhat uneasy as to the ability of the Syrian Government to protect them, have been much reassured by the declarations made by the

Syrian President during his recent tour of the region. A number of the Christians who left during the summer for the Lebanon are returning to their homes in the Jezireh, their fears of persecution not having mate[illegible] some of them previously employed by the French say that they have [illegible] the increased salaries and special facilities which were promised to them.

* * * * * *

Dissension in the Lebanese Cabinet appears to be growing, the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance being on bad terms and the Minister of Defence, Ahmed el Assad, being the subject of a virulent press campaign on account of the alleged sale of land to Jews, and (with more reason) of his habit of stocking his Ministry with members of his own clan. A reshuffle eliminating him is therefore not unlikely.

The Phalange party have been celebrating the tenth anniversary of their foundation with [illegible] President and them a message of congratulation and was represented by the Prime Minister at the chief celebration. Phalange speakers attacked the Greater Syria project, whilst [illegible] completely independent Lebanon and [illegible] troops [illegible] manned by "avenantaires" has moved [illegible] Tripoli. They will be stationed out [illegible]

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(B 9926 5 89) (11)

Extracts from the Weekly Political Summary No. 190 Secret Syria and the Lebanon, 27th November 1945. (Received in Foreign Office, 10th December.)

General

[illegible]

to the [illegible]

of the [illegible]

protests [illegible]

the subject, the attitude [illegible] not expedie[illegible] at root and branch. A statement in [illegible] recalling that the Arab [illegible] dence of its members within their ex[illegible] threatening to take the matter before the League if public a[illegible] Greater Syrian project were not abandoned has been received with general satisfaction, and in the Lebanese Chamber on the 26th November, Riad Solh (who is well aware that, apart [illegible] most Lebanese Moslem politicians know that their own positions would be diminished if the Lebanon were merely to become a province in a Greater Syria) declared roundly that the Lebanon was an independent sovereign State and that the Lebanese shouldn't [illegible] Greater Syria talk. The Lebanese President is understood to have asked all interested parties, particularly the Phalange (who in their usual rôle of champions of a Lebanon kept separate from the Moslem world, had been displaying excitement on the question) to refrain from any [illegible] on the subject, which it is now expected will be dropped. In Syria no particular interest has been shown in the Transjordan statements.

Interest in the evacuation of foreign troops was stimulated by reports in Syrian and Lebanese newspapers that Radio Brazzaville had announced an Anglo French agreement on the subject. The question was mentioned during a conversation between the Commander-in-Chief Middle East Forces, His Majesty's Minister and the Lebanese President after a luncheon given by his Excellency

in honour of General Paget on the 22nd November but there was little information which could be given to the President beyond that discussions on the subject between London and Paris were proceeding.

In Syria Mr Bevin's statement on Palestine continues to receive much attention and the decision of the Arab League is awaited with interest.

Economic

Total purchases for the period the 15th 22nd November amount to 918 tons a daily average of 131 tons, which brings the total for the 1945-46 crop up to 150 025 tons.

The draft concession for the erection of American oil refineries at Tripoli came before the Lebanese Chamber on the 20th November. Habib Abi Chahla its principal critic, had sent a telegram from Cairo, where he is a member of the Lebanese delegation to the Arab League, requesting that the debate should be postponed until after his return. The Chamber however rejected this plea and, after a short debate, approved the concession by a large majority.

On the 20th November the negotiations between the Lebanese Government the French [illegible]es and the I P C regarding the disposal of Tripoli topping [illegible] successfully concluded by an exchange of letters between the three [illegible]g for simultaneous transfers of the plant from the French to [illegible] Lebanese Government, and from the Government to the company. It was further agreed that negotiations would be initiated between the company and the Government for an operation agreement to enable them to work the plant.

The Lebanese and Syrian Governments on the 22nd November published an identical communiqué reporting a meeting which took place between them on the 21st November to consider commercial and industrial matters, notably the lifting of restrictions on trade imposed during the war. It was stated that agreement had been reached on numerous points amongst them the suppression of import and export licences for certain products which would constitute the first steps towards the return of normal trading conditions.

Damascus

At the first meeting of the fifth Ordinary Session [illegible] Deputies on the 24th November the late Prime Mi[illegible] elected President of the Chamber by 54 votes to [illegible] votes for Lutfi Haffar. Mohammad Ayesh and Said Ghazzi were elected Vice Presidents and Hamed el Khoja and Bedawi el Jebel secretary.

The Prime Minister, Saadullah Jabri read a statement of the Government's policy (see below) and asked the Chamber for a vote of confidence but acceded to the request of an Opposition Deputy Akram Hourani that the question of confidence should be postponed until the next meeting in order to enable the members to study the Government's statement.

The following are the main points of the statement:

(a) The Government's foreign policy was based on complete independence. All powers and attributions with the exception of the telephone and broadcasting services had been taken over. As regards the evacuation of foreign troops discussions were now in their final stage between the British and French Governments. The Prime Minister expressed the hope that these discussions would soon be concluded and that he would be able to inform the House of satisfactory results. The Covenant of the United Nations and of the Arab League formed the basis of Syria's foreign policy. The question of Palestine was being studied by the Arab League and the Syrian Government would await the League's decision before taking action.

(b) The Prime Minister admitted that there was room for improvement in the internal administration of the country after twenty five years of foreign occupation. the Government with the help of experts, would prepare the requisite reforms, hospitals and clinics would be organised throughout the country.

(c) A scheme for the distribution of land to the tribes had been started artesian wells would be provided and special attention would be paid to the health and education of the tribesmen.

(d) The Government with the assistance of specialists, hoped to build up the Syrian army on the basis of other Arab armies.

(e) The Ministry of Supply would be abolished from the 1st January, 1946.

(f) When the present M.T.B.A. [illegible] of the next harvest [illegible] policy [illegible]

The Prime Minister regretted that certain foreign schools had refused [illegible] the Ministry of Education an [illegible] relations caused. A decision would [illegible] who had formerly attended foreign schools.

As had been [illegible]

British Troops [illegible]

importance of p[illegible] still in progress was emphasised [illegible] occupation of Merze aerodrome he the French as not only inconvenient but potentially dangerous and he also spoke of the need for training Syrian personne[illegible]

[illegible] until recently head of the American O W I in the Levant States [illegible] his appointment as technical adviser [illegible] Depart to the Lebanon on [illegible] certain visas and at the last moment only vigorous action by His Majest[illegible] tion in Damascus succeeded in preventing the Syrian authorities from [illegible] in order to conduct a "witch hunt" for Jews [illegible] for Lebanon as Syrian representatives to the United Nations Conference accompanied by Abdul K[illegible] will take up his appointment as secretary at the Syrian [illegible] and act as secretary to the Syrian representative at the [illegible] ference. He has been replaced at the Political Department in the M[illegible] Foreign Affairs by Assem el Nafi.

* * * * * *

Lebanon.

T[illegible] of the President and Ministers from intern[illegible] pro-French Lebanese, had seized on a report that an attempt was to be ma[illegible] assassinate him as a pretext for advising him not to come.

[illegible] have been [illegible] kept separate. This move has aroused further criticism in the press, which [illegible] about recent administrative appointments. The latter has [illegible]

Soviet Union

E 10287 5/89] (12)

Extracts from the Weekly Political Summary, No. 101 Syria and the Lebanon, of 4th December.—(Received in Foreign Office, 31st December.)

General

SPECULATION as to the Arab League's reply to His Majesty's Government's declaration on Palestine continues in both countries, though surprisingly little mention of the subject has been made during the week in the Syrian Chamber. In general the press, which has given much prominence to Palestine [illegible] inclines to the view that the league will reject the clause permitting further [illegible] The Syrian Young Men's Moslem Association has distributed leaflets [illegible]ng against Mr. Bevin's statement and a variety of other matters, including events in the Dutch East Indies.

The storm aroused in the Lebanon by Transjordan utterances on the Greater Syrian project has somewhat died down, though a series of articles in a Damascus newspaper has kept the subject alive in Syria (see "Damascus" below). The Lebanese [illegible] Parliament by [illegible]on on the subject favouring the complete independence of [illegible] in collaboration with the other Arab States.

[illegible] a two hours' strike took place in all the principal [illegible] of the return of the Hitay to Syria; leaflets were [illegible] political organisations deposited petitions with His Majesty's Consuls, Political Officers and His Majesty's Legation. No disorders were reported and in most cases the towns were normal by the afternoon.

[illegible]

Total purchases for the period the 23rd–30th November amount to 1,336 tons, a daily average of 190 tons, which brings the total for the 1945–46 crop up to 181,304.

Following a series of statements in the Lebanese press attempting to suggest that the present unsatisfactory state of the distribution of cereals in the Lebanon, and the consequent high cost of living, was partially attributable to M.I.R.A., the British Director of M.I.R.A. gave a press conference on the 1st December in the course of which he pointed out the obvious truth that M.I.R.A. is concerned with collection and that all responsibility for distribution lies on the Lebanese Supply Department. [illegible] ed a considerable stir. The Prime M[illegible] pply Department the next day, and the press immediately [illegible]lished articles alleging serious irregularities in the department, of which the opponents of the Government were not slow to take advantage.

Damascus

A vote of confidence in Saadullah Jabri Bey's Government was put to the Chamber of Deputies at the second sitting of the Fifth Ordinary Session on the 28th November. A number of Deputies addressed the House and attacks were made on [illegible] Haffar by members of the Constitutional Liberal party. Ahmed Bey Sharabati attacked the Prime Minister about the effects of the financial agreement made in February 1944, which preserves the link between Syrian currency and the French franc, [illegible] the Prime Minister's declaration that no pre-eminent position would be granted to any nation, both the French and British had, in fact, been granted the fifth freedom for the operation of [illegible] Ahmed Bey's contention that the fifth freedom should be granted to all nations "should it not be possible to prevent French aeroplanes from using our aerodromes." Several Deputies raised the question of the Mixed Courts, the retention of which they considered incompatible with full Syrian sovereignty; in reply Saadullah Bey also said that the [illegible] of the Constitutional Liberal party voted against and 1 abstained.

The [illegible] 1st December [illegible] was described on the invitation card as Supreme Commander of the Syrian Army, although there is no constitutional [illegible] after training [illegible] (where General Gouraud defeated the Amir Faisal's Syrian army in 1920), sent

a special message to the [illegible] them to perform their duties towards the [illegible]

[illegible]

Lebanon

[illegible]

[illegible] in 1941, returned to Beirut on a French vessel on the 28th November [illegible] to the French authorities to the Lebanese [illegible]

Three of Anter [illegible] No. 141 of the 13th December, 1944) have now given themselves up to the police in Beirut. The four [illegible] has remained in hiding.

E 213/213 89] (13)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 103 Syria and the Lebanon, 16th December, 1944. [illegible] 1946.

General.

His Majesty's Minister, on instructions from the Foreign Office, handed to [illegible] Agreement on the evacuation of troops from the Levant States and [illegible] of arms of Great Britain and France in the Middle East, together with [illegible] being released in London that afternoon.

Both Presidents spoke to His Majesty's Minister with appreciation of the great efforts [illegible] tions to a passage in evacuation agreement which appeared to mean that French troops [illegible] encourage all the latent pro-French elements and that no independent Lebanon [illegible] admit discriminatory treatment between Syria and the Lebanon in this respect. He, therefore, begged for an assurance from His Majesty's Government that British troops would not in fact leave the Lebanon before the French. He expressed his pleasure at the phrase referring to the consecration of a dependence by the admission of Lebanon to the United Nations, and raised no objection to [illegible] Affairs [illegible] President Quwatli expressed disappointment that no date was fixed for the final evacuation; his attitude and that of his Prime Minister was one of extreme [illegible] documents.

Count Ostorog later handed the texts of the agreement to the Lebanese President.

[illegible] communiqué was received by the public with, at best, reserve and, more particularly in Syria, with [illegible] was not increased by an unfortunate Reuter message by Harold King from Paris suggesting that French forces would regroup in the Lebanon and British forces in a mandated territory.

On the 15th December the Lebanese and Syrian Presidents and Ministers for Foreign Affairs met at Aley to discuss the agreement. The same morning His Majesty's Minister was authorised by the Foreign Office to assure both Governments that there was no intention of withdrawing British troops from either Syria or the Lebanon in such a way as to leave the French there alone. This assurance was immediately communicated to the two Presidents who expressed great relief, but raised a number of points in the agreement on which they required elucidation. They particularly wished to learn at what stage their Governments would be brought into Anglo-French discussions on evacuation. Their queries were referred to the Foreign Office.

Although no strikes have yet occurred, there has been a steady deterioration in the attitude of the press in both countries, and there is a strong feeling that the [illegible]lusion of these unpublished agreements without the participation of the States Governments must mean that a deal has been done by the British and French Governments at their expense. Various Nationalist and Youth Organisations have published unfavourable declarations.

In a *note de service*, dated the 17th December, circulated to all French units, General Huntziger stated that, in view of the conclusion of the Anglo-French agreement, he had decided to lift all restrictions affecting the entry to British establishments of French military personnel.

Economic.

Total purchases for the period the 7th–14th December amount to 5,695 tons, a daily average of 814 tons, which brings the total for the 1945–46 crop up to 188,445.

In order to implement the Arab League's decision to boycott Zionist goods, a Syrian committee composed of representatives of all the Ministries has been set up and held its first meeting on the 13th December. Considerable interest is evident in commercial circles, where it is realised that Palestine is Syria's best customer, and the possibility of measures of retaliation is not overlooked.

In the first report published by the Hadjas Railway Administration since the railway was taken over by the Syrian Government, the Director-General points out that the deficit of £S 1,333,354 anticipated by the French company for the current year has been reduced by £S 660,000. During the first six months of the Syrian Administration, an excess of revenue over expenditure (excluding the compensation paid to dismissed workmen) amounting to £S 46,210 had been realised.

A Lebanese aircraft belonging to the Middle East Air Lines has made a trial run on the Beirut, Aleppo, Hasetchè, Qamichlié, Beirut route.

[illegible]

In Damascus discussions regarding the Anglo-French agreement, similar to those held with the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (see Section II below), [illegible] place between His Majesty's Consul and the Syrian Prime Minister, who maintained that he was unable to "accept" certain of the clauses in the communiqué and in the actual texts, particularly the reference to the French proclamation of independence of 1941, and the provision that French forces should remain in the Lebanon until the United Nations had decided on the organisation of collective security in this zone, this he considered was prejudging the decision of the United Nations, and would be giving a privileged position to the French.

During a budget debate in the Syrian Chamber of Deputies on the 18th December, the Government were vigorously attacked by Opposition Deputies on the grounds that the Minister of the Interior had sent a telegram to Aleppo encouraging demonstrations of approval before the Chamber had had an opportunity of studying the terms of the agreement. A heated altercation arose but the Speaker intervened and maintained that the agreement could not be discussed at a budget sitting; a special session to discuss the agreement was fixed for the 22nd December. It appears that the Prime Minister has been considerably upset by the violence of this attack on his Cabinet and, as a result, his attitude of caution and suspicion has become even more marked.

At the meeting of the Chamber on the 10th December motions were tabled for:

(1) Gradual reduction in the strength of the Syrian army.
(2) [illegible]
(3) Amalgamation of the police and gendarmerie.
(4) Abolition of the Tribal Directorate. This latter proposal was strongly opposed by Sheikh Trad el Mulhem.

There has been considerable speculation regarding a possible reshuffle of the Cabinet. Naim Antaki, Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of Public Works, tendered his resignation on the 12th December but it was not accepted. (When the present administration was formed he was offered the portfolio for [illegible] the Prime Minister to accept the Ministry [illegible] of Finance until the budget was framed). He has agreed to continue for the [illegible] Minister for Foreign Affairs [illegible]. Jabri is likely to insist on handling the negotiations in connexion with the Anglo-French agreement himself.

Zubair Muralet has been appointed Syrian Consul in Mosul.

Aleppo.

[illegible]

the Syrian Government, instructions were [illegible] be made to interfere with his departure. [illegible] airport on the 13th December. Consequent [illegible] in the Délégation in Aleppo. The Sy[illegible] M. Fauquenot will be allowed to return, but it is [illegible] would greatly prefer that he should not do so.

There has been a strike of about 1,500 factory weavers in Aleppo during the past week in protest against the high cost of living, the great profits recently made by local factory owners, and the high wages paid in Damascus and other towns in Syria. An orderly party of demonstrators marching to the Serail was [illegible]ly handled and dispersed by a strong police force; 85 persons were arrested and imprisoned.

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Lebanon.

The communiqué on the Anglo-French Agreement was read to the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on the afternoon of the 13th December by the Prime Minister [illegible] of attending the sitting. The reception of this communication by the Deputies was reserved and somewhat frigid, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs reflected [illegible] of any agreements not submitted to their approval.

The Lebanese [illegible] two long discussions with His Majesty's Minister on the texts of the two agreements. He explained that, had the agreement been between, for example, Great Britain and the United States, it would have passed there as no misgivings or called for the same explanations, since there were no doubts about our good faith; it was [illegible] because of the suspicions resulting from past experiences of French policy and activities in the Levant, and from the intensive propaganda, employment of agents, &c., in which the French still indulged here, that his Government were forced to examine the agreements with the utmost care, if they were to accept them and to reassure public opinion about them. He was particularly concerned at the phrase "interests or responsibilities," which was differently worded in the French text, as his Government could not recognise that France had any responsibilities in the Levant. He also objected to the differentiation between Syria and the Lebanon in the evacuation plan, and considered that if French and British troops must remain in the Lebanon, at least a token force should remain in Syria as well until the final evacuation. He required assurances that the reference to the French proclamation of Lebanese independence in 1941 did not imply an obligation on the part of the Lebanon to conclude a treaty with France, and that

the reference to Anglo-French economic collaboration with the States did not imply unwanted French interference in their affairs.

The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs was strongly urged not to insist too much on points of detail, and to prevent as far as possible any irresponsible public comment or actions, such as strikes (which had been threatened). In the Chamber on the 17th December he stated that the withdrawal of foreign troops would take place simultaneously and that no restriction would be placed on Lebanese independence and sovereignty. He also appealed to the press only to publish authenticated news, and addressed an assurance to the public, especially Youth Organisations, that the Government were still studying the agreement and that if they found anything detrimental to Lebanese rights, which so far they had not, they would not hesitate to denounce it.

On the 11th December, during the opening debate on the 1946 Budget in the Lebanese Chamber the Prime Minister spoke optimistically of the financial situation and explained that the increased size of the budget (£L 58 million as opposed to £L 43 million for 1945) was due to increased expenditure on the Ministry of Defence and other security measures. He denied that the Government intended to contract an internal loan but on the other hand stated that the Banque de Syrie had been approached to provide a loan of £L 10 million for municipal constructions and that the Government were projecting a scheme involving a loan of £L 15 million for the development of agriculture and industry. Deputies expressed concern at the increasing expenditure, especially on the engagement and promotion of officials, and deplored the large proportion of the budget which went on unproductive expenditure and the Government's extravagance. The Prime Minister as usual, claimed that officials could not be dismissed and left to starve.

The Maronite Patriarch came to Beirut on the 16th December on his first State visit for more than a year. He was for one night the guest of the President who is having his activities carefully watched. So far he has said nothing displeasing to the Government.

The Lebanese Government have rejected the Anglo-French option agreement regarding the disposal of the H.B.T. Railway, and have instead expressed their desire to enter into negotiations with His Majesty's Government for the purchase of the line on their own account.

The Lebanese frontier authorities recently intercepted a party of Jewish children being escorted from Palestine to the Lebanon by some armed Zionists, one of whom was arrested with a grenade in his pocket. The Lebanese Government are understood to intend to take the opportunity of this incident to strengthen their frontier defences and to request the Palestine Government to do the same.

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E 321/213/89] (14)

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 194, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 25th December, 1945.—(Received in Foreign Office 10th January, 1946.)

General.

FRENCH and British military experts held their first meeting in Beirut on the 21st December and exchanged their instructions, in which considerable divergencies were revealed. The main Anglo-French committee of military experts decided to set up a sub-committee to examine the respective instructions with a view to co-ordination. When this sub-committee met on the 24th December the French representative handed in a note from General de Larminat on the divergencies on which he had referred to Paris for further instructions.

The French note made the following points:

1. The British instructions foresaw that the regrouping of British forces evacuated from Syria would take place in the Lebanon, whereas it was stated the agreement of the 13th December did not provide for any such regrouping in the Lebanon except for French forces.
2. The British instructions foresaw that the French and British forces stationed in the Lebanon must be in proportion to their present strength whereas the agreement of the 13th December made no mention of any operation based on the proportion of troops.

3. There was no mention in the British instructions of the maintenance of security until the establishment of the organisation for collective security whereas the agreement of the 13th December provided for the maintenance of such forces.

The sub-committee agreed, however, that enough common ground existed to recommend to the main committee that planning for the evacuation of Syria could [illegible]. The sub-committee will meet again on the 27th December to prepare a report for submission to the main committee on the 28th December.

The texts of the Anglo-French Agreement were published in London and Paris on the 21st December. It was felt in London that leakages might occur [illegible] purposes, in so far as the Levant States were concerned, early publication was desirable in view of the wild fears and suspicions to which the local press and [illegible]tion were already giving vent, even though certain passages in the [illegible] give rise to strong criticism as soon as they became known. [illegible]nts were published the initial reaction of the Levant [illegible]ives, which had not been unfavourable, had given way to doubts and apprehensions as a result of their own probing into the documents, of press messages from abroad and of the trend of local opinion despite every effort on the part of His Majesty's Legation to persuade them to consider the agreement objectively and to dwell on its advantages rather than to pick holes in it.

In Syria demonstrations against the agreement took place in the principal towns on the 22nd and 23rd December. For the first time these demonstrations were anti British as well as anti French. In the Lebanon the reaction of public opinion was comparatively restrained.

Economic.

No figures available.

Political.

Since the first favourable reaction of the Syrian Government to the Anglo-French Agreement after His Majesty's Minister had communicated the texts to the President and Prime Minister on the 13th December (following which the [illegible] he was later violently attacked in the Chamber)—the attitude of the Syrian Government has passed through certain distinct phases.

By the 15th December doubts had been aroused by detailed study of the documents and by press messages from abroad, as well as by the first unfavourable reactions of the local newspapers. The anxieties of the Lebanese Government were also no doubt a contributory factor. It was in this frame of mind that [illegible] 17th December and the 18th as stated in Weekly Summary for the week ending the 18th December.

The rough handling the Government then received probably brought it home to them that they must take a definite line. The President's influence seems to have been instrumental in bringing the Government to decide that the agreement, despite certain features to which they took exception, offered some advantages to Syria. On the 18th December the President and the Prime Minister interviewed a large number of Deputies and it is reliably reported that they used the threat of dissolution if the Chamber proved recalcitrant. Efforts to prevent a demonstration by students were almost successful.

By the 20th December the Government had become still more doubtful, especially as the strength of local opposition was realised, and the President sent an emissary to Beirut with a view to inducing the Lebanese Government to protest against the agreement.

On the 21st December His Majesty's Minister went to Damascus and had long conversations with the President (whom he found in a dour and morose mood) and with the Prime Minister who was at first very difficult but was at length induced to write down notes for use in his speech to the Chamber on the following day. He said, however, that he would have great difficulty, especially as regards the phrase "interests or responsibilities" and the provision for maintaining forces in the Levant to ensure security for an indefinite period.

When the Syrian Chamber of Deputies debated the Anglo-French Agreement on the 22nd December the Prime Minister emphasised that whereas the agreement had many points which called for elucidation, there were two elements favourable to Syria, the evacuation of foreign forces and the maintenance of order, this the Syrian Government would be able to ensure, provided the necessary

equipment was made available to the security forces. As regards the doubtful points, he gave the Chamber explanations on the lines which he had received from His Majesty's Legation covering the reference to independence, French and British interests in the Middle East &c. There was, however, one point on which he had not been able to obtain satisfaction, namely, the retention of the foreign forces in the Lebanon pending a decision by the United Nations Organisation regarding security in the Middle East; this was unjustifiable as it anticipated the decision of the United Nations. The Prime Minister's speech was less unsatisfactory than it might have been although he failed to give a lead and left the decision for the Chamber. The speech was on the whole well received and the relative documents were referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee for study before the debate, which will be continued on the 27th December.

Assad Haroun has been appointed Syrian Minister in Tehran. Fatz el Khouri, Syrian Minister in Moscow, who has been in Damascus for several months, has requested to be put on the retired list.

Aleppo.

Speculation about the Anglo-French Agreement occupied the minds of all sections of the population during the period under review. The Government came in for considerable criticism on the grounds that they either knew all about the negotiations but did not inform the Chamber and the public, or that they were insufficiently firm in their attitude towards the British and French and [illegible] not insist on being kept fully informed regarding the negotiations. The feeling was prevalent that the British and French Governments had failed to consult the Levant States during the negotiations and on the 22nd December, when a demonstration of protest took place, anti-British shouts were raised for the first time.

The National *Bloc* appears to be losing ground in the Aleppo area, because of the corruption and inefficiency which it is believed to have tolerated, if not encouraged. Opponents of Saadullah Jabri's Government seized the opportunity of a visit to Aleppo by Nazim Bey Qudsi, the Syrian Minister in Washington, to stage a demonstration against the Government.

On the 17th December a large group of Armenians in Aleppo was [illegible] by speakers who urged the Armenians in Syria not to leave for Russia but to remember that they had acquired Syrian nationality and had the same rights and duties as Syrians.

On the 23rd December a grenade was thrown at the French Delegation and a little later another was thrown at the residence of the French Officer Commanding troops; neither caused damage or casualties.

His Majesty's Consul reports that the resolution of the United States Senate advocating unrestricted immigration into Palestine has aroused bitter criticism.

Abdul Melek Khedari, the Iraqi Consul in Aleppo, is being transferred as First Secretary to the Iraqi Legation in Cairo.

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Lebanon.

On the 22nd December the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs handed to a member of the legation staff the text of the following communiqué, which he said the Lebanese Government had felt obliged to issue to the press:—

"Two official documents were published to-day in London and Paris [illegible] to the recent Franco-British Agreement, and concerning

"1. The evacuation of French and British troops from Lebanese and Syrian territory.

"2. The concordance of British and French aims in the Near East.

"These documents lay down principles and establish procedure for the evacuation of troops.

"On the subject of these documents, and in order to obviate any ambiguity or error in interpretation, the Lebanese Government solemnly declares once again, that:—

"1. Not having taken part in the talks which led to the agreement [illegible] absence, which tend to infringe its rights or interests.

"2. Lebanon's independence and sovereignty are and will remain [illegible] act in respect of the agreement in the manner dictated by its independent status.

"3. The withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanese territory will take place simultaneously in accordance with the solemn assurances given to this effect on several occasions, and of which the Lebanese Government has just received a renewal.

4. The Government declares that it will not accept any act or reservation tending to modify Lebanon's status, either within the United Nations Organisation or in respect of the Arab League.

5. The Anglo-French military talks, which commenced in [illegible] the 21st December, and the results of which will be communicated to [illegible] rian Governments, will be given the most v[illegible] by the Lebanese Government in close conjunction with the [illegible]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs was informed that His Majesty's Minister who was in Damascus on that day, would be likely to take strong exception to the communiqué and was urged to get into touch with him before issuing it. This, however, did not prove possible and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, when informed later of His Majesty's Minister's surprise at the terms of the communiqué, defended its issue on the grounds that it was imperative for the Government to take an unequivocal position forthwith in order to prevent disturbances and possibly a split in the country; the communiqué was intended solely for internal consumption and he had hastened its issue because General Beynet on his return to Beirut the day before had been reported as saying to a journalist that the French were to leave Syria but were to remain in the Lebanon.

At a sitting of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on the 24th December, the Minister for Foreign Affairs made a statement on the Anglo-French Agreement of which the following are the main points:—

1. The Lebanon did not consider herself bound by any agreement in which [illegible] Powers and she wished for good relations with everyone without privilege for any.

2. The Anglo-French Agreement was obscure, it stipulated for simultaneous withdrawal of all troops but fixed no date and referred to sufficient forces remaining in the Levant pending the formation of United Nations Organisation which would have to establish the conditions in which the maintenance of international security would be affected. Since the Lebanon had been invited to take part in the labours of this organisation, she would there express her point of view and would demand the complete withdrawal of troops; attention should be drawn to two points of capital importance:—

   (a) Article 82 of the United Nations Charter only foresaw the stationing of international security forces at strategic points in territory placed under trusteeship.

   (b) Collaboration in the maintenance of international security ought [illegible] take place in accordance with article 43 of the United Nations Charter in virtue of agreements concluded between the interested parties and ratified by constitutional means.

3. Reports which had reached the Lebanese Government from its representatives abroad did not justify pessimism. The Lebanon and Syrian admitted no agreement and no action susceptible of modifying their [illegible] tion as regards either United Nations Organisation or the Arab League; the Government would undertake no action without the prior agreement of the Chamber.

The Lebanese President is reported to have received a deputation from various political groups and to have told them that some explanations on the obscurities in the agreement had already been received and that others were expected. He urged them to do all in their power to maintain calm in order to allow the Government to devote itself to examining the situation.

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Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No 195, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 1st January, 1946 —(Received 18th January)

General

Despite all efforts to reassure the Governments and public opinion in the Levant States, the Anglo-French Agreement is still viewed in both countries with suspicion and apprehension. Apart from the particular points which have been mentioned in previous summaries, there remains widespread mistrust of French intentions and the fear that, as in 1920 and 1941 Great Britain has come to an agreement with France at the expense of the Levant States, which will result in our assisting the French to recover and maintain a special position

The Anglo-French Military Committee met again on the 28th December and approved with some reservations a report submitted by the sub-committee. The latter was then instructed —

(1) To recommend measures necessary to raise the Syrian forces in the shortest possible time to the requisite state of efficiency to maintain order

(2) To draw up in outline a plan for the evacuation of Syria

(3) To collate data in regard to the Lebanon

On the 31st December General Oliva Roget landed in a French aircraft at Mezzé and was flown on to Beirut, but not before his arrival had been reported to the Syrian Government. The Syrian Prime Minister immediately ordered that road blocks should be placed at all exits from Mezzé and on the roads crossing the Syrian-Lebanese frontiers, that no Frenchman was to be allowed to leave Mezzé or to enter Syria, and that no French convoys or French personnel even escorted by British forces, were to be allowed to pass the blocks

On the same day the French landed 186 military and air force personnel at Beirut from a French ship which had come from Marseilles. The Lebanese Prime Minister first learned of this during a meeting of the Chamber and announced amidst loud applause that he would prevent these troops from landing by force, but they had already landed.

It is too early yet to assess the effects of these two events, but despite the French explanation that General Oliva Roget's visit is only to pack his bags before taking up an appointment in Europe, and that the newly arrived personnel have come to replace men posted home for reasons of sickness, leave, termination of service, &c It is already clear that both Syrians and Lebanese are more than ever convinced that there has been no change of heart by the French

Economic

Total purchases for the period 23rd 30th December amount to 615 tons, a daily average of 88 tons, which brings the total for the 1945-46 crop up to 184,780 tons

The devaluation of the franc has been widely commented on in the Syrian press and satisfaction has been expressed that Syrian currency remained unaffected This is described as "the first great advantage obtained by Syria at the break with France" and the complete separation of the franc and the Syrian pound is now demanded

The Syrian and Lebanese Governments held a series of talks on economic matters on the 25th and the 29th December, as a result of which it was announced [illegible] the Customs revenues for the years 1943-4-5 in the proportion 56 per cent. to Syria and 44 per cent. to the Lebanon, (2) to suppress the Ravitaillement tax on [illegible] that each Government would be directly represented on it and [illegible] would be eliminated

Syria—Damascus.

On the 27th December the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Syrian Chamber presented its report on the Anglo-French Agreement; its general tone was uncompromising In the debate which followed leading members of the Opposition s[illegible] which the Government were again reproached with having originally ex[illegible] which he obtained by 50 votes to 8, with one abstention, some 10 Deputies leaving the Chamber before the vote

[illegible] on the recommendations of the Foreign Affairs Committee and stating [illegible]

"That the Government should protest to the United Nations Organisation against the agreement and against the maintenance of any foreign forces on Syrian territory and should ask the United Nations Organisation to intervene to secure complete and immediate evacuation

[illegible] should forthwith call for a meeting of the [illegible] League so that it might study the agreement, which [illegible] the Lebanon but all Arab countries, and take measures with a view to the execution of the decision regarding the evacuation of all foreign forces from Syria and the Lebanon

"That the Government should take all necessary measures to face every [illegible] to prejudice the country's independence and [illegible]

[illegible]

According to the press Naim Antaki Minister of Finance has submitted his resignation on health grounds. He is confined to his house and it is known [illegible] eyes are giving him trouble

Count Ostrorog has informed His Majesty's Minister that the Syrian Minister in Paris has replied to the French protest on the closure of schools in Syria. His note enclosed a copy of the circular letter sent on the 30th October by the Syrian Ministry of Public Instruction to foreign schools other than French, and stated that no discriminatory measure had been taken against French schools which could function in the same conditions as other foreign schools, i.e. if they complied with this circular Count Ostrorog said that in these circumstances the French proposed to open their schools on the 4th January The Syrian Prime Minister, when shown a copy of this note by His Majesty's Minister, said that the French schools in Syria might reopen when they had conformed to the regulations of the Ministry of Education but not before, and [illegible] again referred to the failure of French schools to reply to the Ministry of Education's circular of March 1945. Count Ostrorog was informed in this sense and it was pointed out to him that to open French schools in face of Syrian opposition at this juncture might have unfortunate consequences in view of the prevailing excitement over the Anglo-French Agreement. He said he would consult his experts particularly as to whether it would be possible to agree to French schools replying to the circular of last March, and promised to discuss the matter again with His Majesty's Minister when a decision had been taken

* * * *

Lebanon

The tone of the Lebanese press on the subject of the Anglo-French Agreement, which continued to hold first place, became almost violent by the 27th December, but has since been somewhat moderated though it is clear that suspicions are still widely entertained that Great Britain has done a bargain with France at the expense of the Lebanon which the French never intend to quit. Pro-French elements endeavouring to profit from this situation are not improving matters.

The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs summoned Count Ostrorog on the [illegible] brought in without the previous consent of the Lebanese Government (see "General" above). Count Ostrorog after explaining that these men constituted neither reinforcements nor replacements of existing units, said that General Humblot would be instructed to concert with the General Officer Commanding British Troops North Levant, means of notifying the Lebanese Government in future of any movements of French or British troops into or out of the Lebanon The Minister for Foreign Affairs appears to have been reassured

The Lebanese Chamber, after a series of meetings, had made considerable progress with the budget, but were unable to complete it before the end of the year and another session will be necessary for the purpose

The Lebanese Chamber on the 19th December protested against the reported vote of the United States Senate in favour of unrestricted Jewish immigration into Palestine

When the budget of the Ministry of Justice was debated in the Chamber on the 28th December, two Deputies pressed for the abolition of the Mixed Courts and the Minister of Justice replied that the Government were studying the necessary measures to that end.

Rafaat Kazanou, the Deputy caught redhanded smuggling arms to the Bekaa was sentenced on the 21st December to 15 days' imprisonment (which he had already served) and £Syr 100 fine. He subsequently resumed his seat in the Chamber. A more serious matter was the arrest at Beirut Airport of the counsellor of the Lebanese Legation in Paris in possession of 750 sovereigns which he was alleged to be about to smuggle into France. In subsequent interrogation he has inculpated the Lebanese Consul General at Marseilles and other officials. His resignation from the Lebanese Foreign Service has been [illegible]

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CHAPTER III PALESTINE

[E 7611/3/65] No. 9

Mr. Beeley to Mr. Farquhar (Cairo), No. 677; Mr. Grafftey-Smith (Jeddah) No. 176, The Earl of Halifax (Washington), No. 1772, Mr. Young (Beirut) No. 230, Sir H. Stonehewer Bird (Baghdad) No. 256.

Sir, *Foreign Office, 8th October 1945*

AZZAM BEY, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, came to see me this afternoon. After an exchange of greetings, he expressed anxiety about our attitude towards the Arab League. I replied that I was equally concerned about the Arab League's attitude to us. Did they want to be friendly? Azzam Bey replied "Yes."

2. I referred to the terrible conditions in Europe due to racial hatreds—the Jews stood out as the prime sufferers on this score. The Jews, I said, were first cousins to the Arabs and, instead of approaching them as though they were enemies, could not the Arabs come to look upon them as friends? Azzam Bey agreed that this was the right approach. "God," he said, "has punished the Germans for what they have done to the Jews."

3. W[illegible] chances of representatives of the Arab and [illegible] g me and talking over the present problem? To this Azzam [illegible] I that he had been present in 1930 when Mr. Malcolm MacDonald had got the Jews in one room and the Arabs in another. (Incidentally Dr. Weizmann, whom I had seen a few days previously, made a similar remark.) I pointed out that it might take a dozen talks to accomplish anything, but the first point was would the Arabs participate? Azzam Bey thought they would, if they were approached in the right way.

4. In conclusion, Azzam Bey expressed gratitude at my receiving him and especially for my talking so frankly.

I am, &c.,
ERNEST BEVIN

[E 6742/15/31] No. 10

Extract from House of Commons Debate, 13th November, 1945

Palestine (Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry)

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ernest Bevin): I would like, with the permission of the House, to make a statement.

His Majesty's Government have been giving serious and continuous attention to the whole problem of the Jewish community that has arisen as a result of Nazi persecution in Germany, and the conditions arising therefrom. It is, unfortunately, true that until conditions in Europe become stable the future of a large number of persons of many races, who have suffered under this persecution, cannot finally be determined. The plight of the victims of Nazi persecution, among whom were a large number of Jews, is unprecedented in the history of the world. His Majesty's Government are taking every step open to them to try to improve the lot of these unfortunate people. The Jewish problem is a great human one. We cannot accept the view that the Jews should be driven out of Europe, and should not be permitted to live again in these countries without discrimination, and contribute their ability and their talent towards rebuilding the prosperity of Europe. Even after we have done all we can in this respect, it does not provide a solution of the whole problem.

There have recently been demands made upon us for large-scale immigration [illegible] by itself, provide sufficient opportunity for grappling with the whole problem. His Majesty's Government are prepared to explore every possibility which will result in giving the Jews a proper opportunity for revival.

The problem of Palestine is itself a very difficult one. The mandate for Palestine requires the mandatory to facilitate Jewish immigration and to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced; ther [illegible] Majesty's Government have thus a dual obligation, to the Jews on the [illegible] and to the Arabs on the other. The lack of any clear definition of this dual obligation has been the main cause of the trouble which has been experienced in Palestine during the past twenty-six years. His Majesty's Government have made every effort to devise some arrangements which would enable Arabs and Jews to live together in peace and to co-operate for the welfare of the country, but all such efforts have been unavailing. Any arrangements acceptable t [illegible] Palestine since the mandate was granted has been one of continued friction [illegible], culminating at intervals in serious disturbanc[illegible]

The fact has to be faced that since the introduction [illegible] been impossible to find common ground between the Arabs and the Je[illegible] differences in religion and in language, in cultural and so al [illegible] thought and conduct, are difficult to reconcile. On the o[illegible] communities lay claim to Palestine, one on the ground of a millennium of occupation, and the other on the ground of historic association coupled with the [illegible] that has to be accomplished now is to find means to reconcile these diver[illegible]

The repercussions of the conflict have spread far beyond the small area in which it has arisen. The Zionist cause has strong supporters in the United States, in Great Britain, in the Dominions and elsewhere; civilisation has been appalled [illegible] of Europe. On the other side of the picture, the cause of the Palestinian Arabs has been espoused by the whole Arab world and more lately has become a matter of keen interest to their 90 million co-religionists in India. In Palestin[illegible] there is always the serious risk of disturbances on the part of one condition [illegible] other, and such disturbances are bound to find their reflection in a much [illegible] field. Considerations not only of equity and of humanity, but also of [illegible] amity and world peace, are thus involved in any search for solution.

In dealing with Palestine all parties have entered into commitm[illegible] are the commitments imposed by the mandate itself and, in addition, the various statements of policy which have been made by His Majesty's Government in the course of the last twenty-five years. Further, the United States Government themselves have undertaken that no decision should be taken in respect of what, in their opinion, affects the basic situation in Palestine, without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.

Having regard to the whole situation and the fact that it has [illegible] world-wide interest which affects both Arabs a[illegible] ment decided to invite the Government of the United States to co-operate with them in setting up a joint Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, under a rotating chairmanship, to examine the question of European Jewry and to make [illegible] happy to be able to inform the House that the Government of the United States have accepted this invitation.

The terms of reference that have been agreed between the United States Government and His Majesty's Government are as follows:

(1) To examine political, economic and social conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and settlement therein and the well-being of the peoples now living there.

(2) To examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution and the practical measures taken, or contemplated to be taken, in those countries, to enable them to live free from discrimination and oppression and to make estimates of those who wish, or will be impelled by their conditions, to migrate to Palestine or other countries outside Europe.

(3) To hear the view of competent witnesses and to consult representa[illegible] Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine as such problems [illegible] affected by conditions subject to examination under paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 above, and by other relevant facts and circumstances, and to make recommendations to His Majesty's Government and to the Government of the United States for *ad interim* handling of those problems, as well as for their permanent solution.

(4) To make such other recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States as may be necessary to meet the immediate needs arising from conditions subject to examination under paragraph 2 above by remedial action in the European countries in question, or by the provision of facilities for emigration to, and settlement in, countries outside Europe.

These are the terms of reference. The [illegible] determined by the committee themselves and [illegible] think fit to deal simultaneously, through the medium of sub-committees, with their various terms of reference. The committee will be invited to deal with the matters referred to in their terms of reference with the utmost expedition. In complying with the second and fourth paragraphs of their terms of reference, the committee will presumably take such steps as they consider necessary in order to inform themselves of the character and magnitude of the problem created by the war. They will also give consideration to the problem of settlement in Europ[illegible] and to possible countries of disposal. In the light of their investigations they will make recommendations to the two Governments for dealing with the problem in the interim until such time as a permanent solution can be submitted to the appropriate organ of the United Nations.

The recommendations of a Committee of Enquiry such as will now be set up will also be of immense help in arriving at a solution of the Palestine problem. The committee will, in accordance with the first and third paragraphs of their [illegible] social conditions which are at present held to restrict immigration into Palestine and after consulting representative Arabs and Jews, submit proposals for dealing with these problems. It will be necessary for His Majesty's Government both to take action with a view to securing some satisfactory interim arrangements, and [illegible] to devise a policy for permanent application thereafter. This enquiry will [illegible] elicitate the finding of a solution which will, in turn, facilitate the arrangements for placing Palestine under trusteeship.

So far as Palestine is concerned, it will be clear that His Majesty's Government cannot divest themselves of their duties and responsibilities under t[illegible] [illegible] date while the mandate continues. They propose, in accordance with their pledges, to deal with the question in three stages:

(i) They will consult the Arabs with a view to an arrangement which wo[illegible] ensure that, pending the receipt of the *ad interim* recommendations which the Committee of Enquiry will make on t[illegible] interruption of Jewish immigration at the present monthly [illegible]

(ii) After considering the *ad interim* recommendations of the Committee of Enquiry, they will explore, with the parties concerned, the possibility of [illegible] other temporary arrangements for dealing with the Palestine problem until a permanent solution of it can be reached.

(iii) They will prepare a permanent solution for submission to the Uni[illegible] Nations and if possible an agreed one.

The House will realise that we have inherited in Palestine a most difficult legacy, and our task is greatly complicated by undertakings given at various times to various parties, which we feel ourselves bound to honour.

Miss Rathbone. What about your own policy?

Mr. Bevin. Any violent departure without adequate consultation would not only afford ground for a charge of breach of faith against His Majesty's Government but would probably cause serious reactions throughout the Middle East and would arouse widespread anxiety in India.

His Majesty's Government are satisfied that the course which they propose to pursue in the [illegible] is in accordance with their obligations, but is also that which, in the long view, is in the best interests of both parties. It will in no way prejudice either the action to be taken on the recommendations of the Committee of Enquiry, or the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement which will supersede the existing mandate, and will, therefore, control ultimate policy in regard to Palestine.

His Majesty's Government in making this new approach, wish to make it clear that the Palestine problem is not one which can be settled by force, and that any attempt to do so, by any party, will be resolutely dealt with. It must be settled by discussion and conciliation, and there can be no question of allowing an issue to be forced by violent conflict. We have confidence that if this problem

is approached in the right spirit by Arabs and Jews, not only will a solution be found to the Palestine question, just to both parties, but a great contribution will be made to the stability and peace in the Middle East.

Finally, the initiative taken by His Majesty's Government, and the agreement of the United States Government to co-operate in dealing with the whole problem created by Nazi aggression is a significant sign of their determination to deal with this problem in a constructive way and a humanitarian spirit. But I must emphasise that the problem is not one which can be dealt with only in relation to Palestine: it will need a united effort by the Powers to relieve the miseries of these suffering peoples. I would add, in conclusion, that throughout there has been the closest consultation between my right hon. friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies and myself in this matter, which concerns him since the mandatory status of Palestine brings that territory within the responsibility of the Colonial Office, but which is also a deep concern to me since the problem is clearly an international problem. It is the intention of His Majesty's Government that the problem shall continue to be handled in close collaboration between our two Departments, in order that the particular question of Palestine, and the wider international issues which are involved, may be harmonised and treated as a whole as a great human problem.

Colonel Oliver Stanley: The right hon. gentleman has just made a most important statement on a most delicate and difficult problem. There are obvious questions, and there are matters on which we should like explanation, but I personally feel, and I think many hon. members will agree, that I would much prefer not to have to put them until we have had an opportunity to study the right hon. gentleman's statement, and that any discussion should take place not in the atmosphere of questions and answers, which, in delicate [illegible] this, always presents certain dangers, but in reasoned debate. [illegible] gentleman can say, as I hope he will be able to [illegible] given an opportunity to debate this urgent matter, I would prefer to postpone my comment.

Mr Bevin: I think that if the right hon. gentleman would put that question to the Leader of the House on Thursday we might have an opportunity to consider it. We have not considered a debate, but if representations are made [*Interruption*.] I ask hon. members not to get excited. I personally do not deal with arrangements for debates.

[illegible] Conway: Can I put a question to the Leader of the House now? [illegible] to waive our right to ask questions now if we were assured that there would be a debate. I do not ask that immediately the Leader of the House should settle the arrangements and the day, but perhaps he would say, in response to what I think is a united request on the part of the House, that he would give a day soon for debate.

The Lord President of the Council (Mr Herbert Morrison): We shall not be difficult on that point at all, if there is a general wish in the House for a debate, and I gather there is. My right hon. friend and I thought that as the statement has just been made, it would be as well if members were to read it carefully and then, if they want to talk about it, an approach could be made through the usual channels, and, if necessary, I would make the announcement on Thursday.

Mr Janner: I would like to ask the right hon. gentleman whether, in view of the statement he has made that the responsibility of the mandate rests upon our shoulders, he proposes that that responsibility should be carried out until [illegible] should be in the forefront of any new policy, also if he will bear in mind the fact that at the present time there are some 1,250,000 people anxious to go to Palestine and see what arrangements can be made?

Mr Bevin: I would say to my hon. friend that this problem has been one of [illegible] in the world, and I would appeal to him not to introduce racial feeling. From my point of view, I can assure him that I am struggling to [illegible] not, I hope, on the basis of the passions involved in the immediate difficulties now facing us. But I am sure that this House and Jewry as a whole, apart from the Zionist organisations, are anxious to see a final solution. I give my hon. friend my personal assurance, as I gave it to one of the Jewish leaders the other day, that

I will stake my political future on solving this problem, but not in the limited sphere presented to me now.

Mr Stokes: I want to ask the Foreign Secretary a question on this very important point. I have no wish to raise controversy on this matter. [*Interruption*.] I wish to ask the Foreign Secretary whether he will bear in mind that his preamble, while referring to specific promises made to the Jews, did not make any specific reference to the categorical promises made previously to the Arabs. Particularly, may I ask the right hon. gentleman whether he is aware that the Arabs have made perfectly clear to everybody their willingness to help in this vital problem by admitting Jews into territory other than Palestine.

Mr Bevin: I beg my right hon. friend, in this crisis, not to pursue racial antagonisms. It is the most difficult thing in this world to settle anything when racial antagonism is raised. The Arabs are meeting me very well, and I thank them for it. There is a great sense of responsibility, except for one small section among Jewry, and all the Jews are not Zionists. They want this problem settled. I am pursuing this course in the hope of trying to find a solution. I know it has difficulties. This is the first time I have heard the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr Stokes) not being controversial. But, when we have had so many wars, so much bloodshed, over racial antagonism, I would appeal to this House to help me to carry out my job, and find a solution of this problem.

Mr Sydney Silverman: In view of the arrangement that has been made, I do not want to ask my right hon. friend any questions. I think it would be [illegible] to let the opportunity pass, without thanking the Foreign [illegible] very careful and lengthy statement, and for the spirit in which [illegible] on having secured the co-operation, in this difficult matter, of the United States Government.

E 9852/119/31] **No. 11**

Lord Killearn to Mr Bevin (Received 18th December.)

(No. 1600.)

Sir,

Cairo, 5th December, 194

WITH reference to my telegram No. 2541, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the note from the Secretary General of the Arab League enclosing the reply of the League Council to your proposals regarding Palestine.

2. This text is obviously a translation from the Arabic original and is very lame in various places.

I have, &c.
KILLEARN.

Enclosure in No. 11

The Secretary-General of the Arab League to the British Ambassador.

NOTE.

5th December, 1945.

THE Secretary-General of the League of Arab States presents his compliments to his Excellency the Ambassador of His Britannic Majesty and has the honour to enclose herewith the reply of the Council of the League to Mr Bevin's statement on Palestine.

In accordance with the wish of the Council of the League, the Secretary-General requests the favour of forwarding this reply as soon as possible to his Excellency the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Secretary-General of the League expresses to his Excellency the Ambassador his best thanks and avails himself of this opportunity to renew the assurances of his very high consideration.

Reply of the League on Mr. Bevin's Statement on Palestine

STATES of the Arab League were informed of the statement of your Excellency, delivered on the 14th November, in the House of Commons.

The Council of the League had seen the statement and the note with which it was communicated, individually, to the Arab States.

The Council appreciate the British Government's will to implement the assurances given in 1939, and their promise to consult the Arab States regarding Palestine, since its fate directly concerns these Arab States both in the present and in the future.

The Council realised from your statement the sincere effort you have made in understanding both the Palestinian and the Jewish problems in their various [illegible].

The Council appreciate your Excellency's emphasis to the Arab eternal and actual rights in Palestine, and your clearness in distinguishing between the Zionist and the Jewish problems, and your endeavour to act in helping the [illegible]pean Jews and others who had suffered persecution under Nazi and Fascist regimes, so that they may be able to live peaceful and secure in their national homes.

The Arab States recognise in your endeavours a worthy human act that leads to a lasting peace by avoiding to cure an old injustice with a new one, and to relieve the persecution of a people by persecuting another.

If Zionism was allowed to realise its objective in Palestine, the Arabs would definitely lose their national rights in the [illegible] right by which they can determine their o[illegible] by their ancestors from time immemorial; this is in itself a persecution to the [illegible] the Jews in other countries [illegible] in and fascism [illegible] proper homes with whose [illegible] traditions [illegible]

Moreover, it has created a permanent friction between both parties that is leading [illegible] struggle between Jews on one side and Arabs and Moslems on the other, which had no precedent in history.

To the contrary, the Arabs and Moslems were, all through history, the most tolerant people on earth, and the most friendly to Jews. This new struggle will have the most unfortunate consequences not only on the Jews themselves but also on the peace and security of the East.

Therefore, your Excellency's statement is clearly adjusting the state of affairs by confirming the unchallenged Arab right in Palestine, and your intention not to support the creation of a Jewish State in that country.

[illegible] ing democracy, and thus enable the majority to practise its right of self-determination and realise the independence of Palestine which was pledged by your Government.

Your Excellency had pointed out in your statement, and in the attached notes to the Arab States, that you desire to continue immigration into Palestine at the present monthly rate, even after the entry of the full number of 75,000 that was granted in the White Paper of the 17th May, 1939.

Your Excellency expressed your wish to consult the Arabs in order to obtain their acquiescence to continue Jewish immigration.

The Arab States did not know on what basis the figure mentioned to some of them was formulated, nor was it clear what contributions the United States or the British Empire propose to contribute during this period in this matter, while you propose further new immigration to an Arab land.

The Arab League, by failing to understand the full reasons of your proposal asking for further immigration into Palestine, fear that it was proposed as a result of [illegible] is so, it is the more a reason for refusal to consent to a new immigration than to accept it.

The Zionist object is a Jewish majority and a Jewish State in Palestine, and for realising this object the Zionists are using all means of persuasion and violence. The Arabs, on the other side, will never be able to agree to a Jewish immigration emanating from Zionist pressure. When Britain gave [illegible] ances of 1939 and pledged a final policy in Palestine, Jewish persecution was at its worst. This policy was voluntarily laid down by Britain in view of her experience and her responsibility towards Arabs and Jews.

Seventy-five thousand immigrants were to be allowed, excluded the number of illegal immigrants, in five years, and by 1944 it was definitely declared that no further immigration shall be allowed, save with Arab acquiescence.

Now that the situation has been relieved of the exceptional circumstances of 1939 and the Fascist and Nazi régimes are utterly destroyed, and the persecuted Jews became in the safe trust of the victorious democratic Powers, the Arab League see no reason for further exceptional measures to be carried against the interests of the local population of Palestine, and which will only continue the troubled state of affairs in Palestine and expose dangerously the peace in the [illegible] Middle East.

It is known in many circles that a great number of Jews in Palestine itself desire to leave the country to the United States and to other places. They have expressed their desire, despite the Nazi Zionist terrorism which, unfortunately dominates Palestine and which opposes its authorities, and restricts the fr[illegible] of the Jews themselves as individuals or groups to express their own free opinions and wishes.

The case being so, would not your Excellency find it more reasonable and just to acquiesce to these legitimate desires to leave Palestine than to agree to a further Zionist immigration?

The States of the Arab League, who enjoy with Great Britain and the United States the best friendly relations, believe that all investigations by Committee of Enquiry for further immigration into Palestine are not justified, because, in the opinion of the Arab League, they will be enquiring into the same question in which [illegible] world. They are sure that all investigations would lead to the truth, which is indivisible. They are also sure that democratic principles, on whose basis they co-operate as members of the United Nations, will not reflect any doubt on Arab rights in Palestine, nor on their desire for self-determination and independence [illegible]

The League Council avail themselves of this opportunity to assure y[illegible] Excellency of their desire that friendly understanding should alw[illegible] British relations, and that the approach of problems and solving them should be in the light of supreme human principles, which must be established all over the world to overcome the miseries and calamities of the present time, and lead humanity to a new era, in which permanent peace can be secured and the spirit of toleration and justice can reign, and the exchange of world blessings in the interests of all on the basis of equality and fraternity.

CHAPTER IV.—PERSIA

N 14694 10674 38] No. 12

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Bevin. (Received 20th October.)

(No 259.)

Sir, *Tehran, 12th October, 1945*

IN reply to your despatch No 213, dated the 13th September, I have the honour to state that there is no Communist party in Persia There are individual Persian Communists, but they have not formed a party The Tudeh party wh is frequently called Communist, repudiates the title and its published programme is reformist. It is to be supposed that if the Tudeh leaders came into power they would become extreme in programme as well as ruthless on Soviet lines in methods, but it is not correct to call the party Communist, and if reasonable reforms were introduced in this country, it is possible that many members would fall away from the Tudeh which at present seems to hold out the only hope of an improvement in social conditions

2 The support given by the Russians to the Tudeh party which is obvious enough, is given through various channels In Tehran the Tudeh Deputies and other leaders are in contact with the Soviet press attaché but they also see the Soviet Ambassador not infrequently In Azerbaijan it is the Soviet Town Commandants who seem to inspire Tudeh action and to protect its members I the industrial town of Isfahan the Soviet vice-consul took part in the organisation of Tudeh "trade unions," which have, however, since collapsed

3. It remains to be seen what will happen when the Soviet troops have evacuated Northern Persia. The Tudeh party has become greatly discredited by its open dependence on Russia and may disappear In that case we might [illegible] the "Democratic" party of Azerbaijan extending to Tehran and other towns but here, again, the name is suspect. Reza Shah did not [illegible] party to exist in Persia, and he persecuted individual Com[illegible] probable that any Persian Government that had the power would try to suppress communism rather than remedy grievances. There are plenty of Russian trained Communists, mostly Armenians, in Persia who are qualified to carry propaganda after the withdrawal of the Russian troops but many of them may leave with the Russians or moderate their tone. For instance Ohanessian, the violently Communist Armenian Deputy from Azerbaijan can hardly hope to be elected again unless the elections take place before the Russians leave and without his immunity as a Deputy he might find it difficult to carry on propaganda

4. Persia then is in too elementary a stage, and too extraordinary a condition to fall exactly within the limits of your above mentioned despatch When their troops have left Persia the Soviet Government will presumably take stock of the position and adapt their policy according to whatever situation may develop Even if a Persian dictator of the force of character of Reza Sh[illegible] should arise it seems probable that the Russians will not submit to a resumption of the policy by which he prevented all Communist propaganda and executed or imprisoned any Communists on whom he could lay his hands Which channels they decide to use will depend on how openly they find it possible to work

I have &c.
R. W. BULLARD

E 9218 31 34 No. 13

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Bevin.—(Received 28th November.)

(No. 387. Secret.)

Sir, *Tehran 7th November, 1945*

WITH [illegible] despatch No. 26[illegible] to transmit herewith a report on Persian affairs during July, August and September 1945.

Copies of this despatch are going to His Majesty's Consular Officers in Persia, His Majesty's Representative in Moscow, the Government of India, the Persia and Iraq Command, the Middle East Command, the British Middle East Office and the Political Intelligence Centre Middle East

I have &c.
R. W. BULLARD

Enclosure to No 13

Internal Politics, Majlis

1. The political deadlock which began in June owing to the refusal of the minority group in the Majlis to accept Sadr as Prime Minister continued over nearly the whole of the period under review The minority persistently maintained their tactics of obstruction. Simply by absenting themselves from the Chamber whenever it appeared likely that a vote of confidence might be taken, they reduced the number of Deputies present below the quorum, which is absurdly high. The majority for their part refused to accept the dictation of the minority and to withdraw their support from Sadr, and eventually, on the 14th July Sadr was able to present his Cabinet to the Majlis when 104 members were present The Tudeh Deputies did not attend.

2 An inconclusive discussion of the Government's programme continued for some time. The minority eventually issued a manifesto against Sadr, and sent a deputation to the Shah to say that they would not accept any responsibility for the government of the country. Although the Shah was reported to have been entirely non-committal in his reply, it was generally believed that His Majesty was not in favour of Sadr, but would have preferred his own previous choice of Hakimi as Prime Minister In the meantime Government business was at a standstill, the only Bill passed being one to authorise the Government to incur expenditure up to one twelfth of the annual budget to cover current needs, particularly the cost of Government salaries

3. A special session of the Majlis to mark the end of the war with Japan was held on the 16th August, but the minority did not attend The minority consisting of some thirty two Deputies who, for various reasons, opposed the Government, appeared to have formed, together with the eight Tudeh members a solid [illegible] bloc determined to oppose Sadr at any price. Some of these Deputies were undoubtedly influenced by their desire to see Sadr replaced by a Prime Minister more likely to favour their re-election in the approaching elections, though a growing number of Deputies, including even some of the minority, were coming round to the opinion that no elections should be held until all foreign troops had left Persia

4 On the 18th August the Majlis, at the Prime Minister's request, held a special session to discuss a mutiny of army officers, which had occurred in Meshed a day or two earlier, and also the disturbances which had recently broken out in Azerbaijan Sadr let it be known that he considered the discussion on these events a test to determine the fate of his Government In the ensuing debate the majority reaffirmed their confidence in Sadr, declared that the minority by holding up the work of Parliament were responsible for the disorders in the country, and proposed to hold daily sessions and to invite the minority to attend The result was an improvement in the position of the Government, and although the two groups in the Majlis failed to compose their differences, the minority group did, early in September, consent to attend sessions and thus to provide the necessary quorum

5 At the session of the 4th September, after Dr Abdub a member of the Persian Delegation to the San Francisco Conference, had made a long and carefully prepared speech on the activities of the Conference on the drafting of the United Nations Charter, and its application to the Persia of to-day, the Majlis approved the Charter unanimously

6 On the 9th September a proposal by Deputy Ardelan that in future no foreign national should be engaged without the previous sanction by the Majlis was approved by a large majority On the 27th September a Bill was passed by 85 votes out of 105 authorising the Government to incur expenditure up to two twelfths of the annual budget to cover expenses for the period the 20th July to the 20th September Little further business was done by the Majlis up to the end of September Although the minority maintained their opposition to Sadr, and although even the majority began to show signs that they did not intend to keep Sadr in office indefinitely, there was a large measure of agreement among all but

the Tudeh and a few extremists, that it would be unwise to remove Sadr and precipitate a crisis at a moment when the fate of Persia was perhaps being discussed at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in London.

7. On the 28th September the Sadr Government at last obtained its vote of confidence from the Majlis by seventy votes to forty. This rather unexpected success for Sadr was obtained at a moment when much indignation was felt in Tehran at a telegram sent to the London Conference by a newly formed "Democratic" party of Azerbaijan which demanded autonomy for that province and claimed the right, while submitting to the general laws of Iran, "to be masters in their own land." Under the influence of a debate on Azerbaijan which [illegible] Sadr [illegible]

Soviet Penetration

9. Early in July a delegation of prominent Russian trade unionists arrived in Tehran in response to an invitation issued by the Tudeh party labour organisation. The visit was arranged without the permission of the Persian Government [illegible] not dare to stop it. Similar invitations issued to trades unions in Great Britain, the United States and France appear to have met with no response. The delegation made a tour of the Caspian provinces and visited Tabriz where they inspected various factories and talked with the workers but ignored the managers. The Russian controlled Persian press devoted much [illegible] to the "spontaneous" welcome said to have been shown to the visitors [illegible] trade unionists in Persia. A reasonable estimate of the total industrial population [illegible] 000 and by no means all are members of the Tudeh unions. At Isfahan, for instance, which is the main industrial centre, the great majority of the workers belong at present to a trades union which is opposed to the Tudeh, a fact made abundantly clear by the omission of the Russian delegation to visit [illegible] In agreement with the British military authorities, His Majesty's Embassy informed the Soviet Embassy that for security reasons it would not be possible to allow the Soviet Trade Union Delegation to visit the southern oil area. The Soviet Ambassador replied that they had no intention of doing so, though he could not understand what objection there could be.

9. In July there were signs of a general increase in Tudeh propaganda in [illegible] by Seyid Zia attacking Russian and Tudeh policy in Persia the *Pravda* published a violent article, later broadcast from Moscow, accusing Seyid Zia, the Prime Minister, and his Government, of reactionary activities and attempts to suppress freedom, of organising terrorist groups, arming the tribes, &c. The Russians broadcast the article from the Tehran Wireless Station. The Persian Minister of Propaganda intervened just too late to stop it, but in time to cut the transmission short. The pro-Russian section of the local press was now publishing increasingly violent anti-British articles accusing Great Britain of opposing all movements of freedom and progress in the interests of Br[illegible] [illegible] with the landlord and his supporters and [illegible] ensued in which some persons, including the landlord, were killed. A [illegible] the Government officials out. Although the Russian Ambassador disowned this movement on behalf of the Russians and (rather suggestively) on behalf of the Tudeh, and told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Government was free to take any action it liked to restore order in Maragheh, the Persian troops who ventured to arrest the local Tudeh leader were themselves confined to barracks by the Russians, who also released the prisoner. In Khorassan Tudeh complicity was suspected in a mutiny of the Persian army officers described below in the

section entitled "Persian Army." Tudeh activity it is true was not allowed to go entirely unopposed. Local peasantry encouraged perhaps by emissaries of Seyid Zia's party frequently came to blows with the Tude[illegible] Mazanderan, but by early September the civil administration a[illegible] Shahi and Babul was virtually in Tudeh hands, and armed Tu[illegible] Tudeh armlets were patrolling the railway stations of Bandar i Gaz and Shahi.

11. As a result of these disturbances and of reported disaffection in the army the Government ordered, on the 23rd August, the strict application in Tehran of the Military Government law including the prohibition of all political [illegible] the re-imposition of a curfew. The Government also sent a commission of enquiry to Azerbaijan and their arrival early in September was the occasion for the issue of a manifesto "by the people of Tabriz" appealing for protection against Tudeh oppression. The notices were, however, at once torn down by the Tudeh and the commission of enquiry appears to have achieved little. In fact the activity of the Russians in the North continued to cause increasing anxiety. They were paralysing the Persian administration, encouraging a Kurdish nationalist movement and allowing no political party except the Tudeh to exist. Until the removal of the censorship in September they filled the world with Tass propaganda about Persia and used the censorship to suppress news from other sources. A new [illegible] was reported at this time from Azerbaijan—the formation of a "Democratic party" which issued a proclamation on the 3rd September demanding autonomy for Azerbaijan "with due respect to the independence of [illegible] right of the Azerbaijanis "to manage the affairs of the pro[illegible] The close connexion between this new party and the Tudeh [illegible] from the beginning. The Tudeh movement had recently incurred mu[illegible] owing to its open connexion with the Russians. Its complicity in the military mutiny in Meshed had also by now been clearly established. It was therefore doubtless thought necessary to adopt new tactics. Hence the reorganisation, under Soviet inspiration, of the forces of disintegration in Azerbaijan under the new title of the "Democratic" party. This party held a meeting in Tabriz on the 25th September at which it elected sixty delegates to attend a General Conference of the party to be held early in October.

[illegible] party activity during this period there is little to report [illegible] party, the Tudeh i Milli, had planned to hold its first open air [illegible] Meshed on the 22nd July, but early in the same morning Soviet troops, [illegible] armed by Persian police, arrested many members of the party committee, [illegible] houses and confiscated documents relating to the party. Subsequently, most of the arrested men were released, but seven were banished, and after the dispersal of Seyid Zia's supporters the close co-operation of the Tudeh and the Soviet military propaganda authorities in Meshed was more in evidence than ever.

13. Tudeh attempts to hold party meetings and demonstrations in Tehran in mid-September were frustrated by prompt measures taken by the military governor who closed the party offices. A considerable number of Left wing newspapers were also suppressed during September, though some reappeared under other names. The Persian Government began also to show unusual courage protesting to the Soviet Embassy against Russian activities in the North and giving information on the subject to the press. They were encouraged to do so partly by the realisation that the evacuation of the whole of Persia by Allied troops was only a matter of months and partly by the abolition of the censorship on press telegrams which allowed the Persian Government to defend itself against the scurrilous and partial reports of Tass. The Persian Government's protests against Soviet interference in the internal affairs of the country either met, however, with no response or provoked a series of counter-accusations to the effect that Persian officials and police were inciting anti-Soviet activities. An article by an ex-Tudeh member in a Tehran newspaper accusing the Russians of transforming the Azerbaijan Tudeh party into the new Democratic party called forth a violent protest from the Russian Ambassador, who demanded an explanation, to be submitted to M. Molotov, within twenty-four hours. The Soviet "war of nerves" was, in fact, in full swing at the end of the period under review.

Tribal Situation

14. The tribal situation during the past three months has given the Persian Government little or no anxiety for Kurdistan. In Southern Kurdistan operations around Merivan and in the Avroman area have been undertaken to punish

Mahmud Khan Kanisenani for his attack on Merivan, to show the flag and to collect arms. Little has been achieved though the equivalent strength of two Persian divisions has been engaged. The Kurds have taken refuge in difficult terrain on the Iraqi frontier and the approach of winter will bring the operations to a close without any result having been achieved. The ill success of the Iraqi [illegible] certainly emboldened the Persian Kurds. There is some talk of a Persian Government commission being sent to Kurdistan to effect a settlement. If military officers of the Reza Shah school can be eliminated from its ranks, and if the commission sets about its task in the belief that the tribes of Persia have common rights to educational, medical and economic benefits and to a reasonable share in local Government employment, something may be achieved.

15. Northern Kurdistan, though not recently the scene of any military operations, is potentially the more dangerous area in that the Russians have encouraged both Tudeh activities and the Komala or Kurdish Autonomy party, the full effects of which cannot yet be assessed. A party of Kurdish chieftains was recently taken to Baku by the Soviet authorities, but it is not known whether the Kurds are being asked to support a separatist movement for Azerbaijan or whether Kurdish autonomy in addition is implied.

16. From other tribal areas there is nothing of interest to report.

Withdrawal of Allied Troops.

17. On the 10th July the Foreign Office set forth His Majesty's Government's aims regarding the withdrawal of Allied troops. Their object was to relax the Russian grip in North Persia and, if possible, to get all Russian troops out of Persia before the date prescribed by the Anglo-Soviet Persian Treaty (*i.e.*, six months after the armistice with Japan). His Majesty's Government had already proposed to the Russians simultaneous withdrawal by stages and military discussions to work out details, but had had no reply. It seemed clear that the Russians did not wish to withdraw their forces in the near future. They probably hoped by remaining to get so firm a hold in North Persia that they could establish their domination over the Persian Government. If they were successful the consequences for His Majesty's Government and their imperial interests in South Persia would be most serious. His Majesty's Government intended to propose at [illegible] forces should withdraw simultaneously from the Tehran district on an agreed date. Our only hope of dislodging the Russians lay in our readiness to withdraw British troops. We had no other form of pressure except to confront the Russians with the alternatives of withdrawal simultaneously with us or of being shown up publicly to Persia and to the outside world as the Power responsible for perpetuating foreign occupation of Persia. We could not be certain that the Russians would choose the alternative we desired but there was a reasonable chance that they might.

18. At Potsdam His Majesty's Government circulated a memorandum to the other delegates of which the following is a summary:—

The time had now come for the complete joint withdrawal of Allied forces from Persia. His Majesty's [illegible]

(1) British and Soviet forces to withdraw completely from Tehran at once.
(2) B[illegible] oilfield area and Soviet troops to a zone in either north-east or north-west Persia.
(3) British and Soviet troops would then be withdrawn from Persia altogether.

19. It was agreed at Potsdam (on about the 23rd July) that Brit[illegible] Soviet [illegible] Foreign Ministers at their first meeting in September 1945 should consider further [illegible]

20. The Foreign Office instructed His Majesty's Ambassador to make with his Soviet colleague a simultaneous notification to the Persian Government of the decision to withdraw from Tehran. He should not at present mention the proposed discussion by the Foreign Ministers of further withdrawals. The co-ordination of arrangements for withdrawal of British, Soviet and United

States forces from Tehran should be arranged locally by the embassies concerned. The following were the principal points for discussion:—

(a) The timing of the withdrawal. Our first aim should be to agree with the Russians on as early a date as possible for the evacuation from Tehran of all combatant troops.
(b) The arrangements for the liquidation of British military assets.
(c) The future of the British Airways service to Tehran.

21. As the Soviet Government obstinately refused to send instructions to their ambassador here, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires (Mr. Lascelles) informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs alone on the 2nd August that British and Soviet forces would be withdrawn from Tehran at once. Mr. Sepahbodi received the communication with gloom because he had been hoping for much more and because [illegible] information from the Soviet Ambassador. He also [illegible]quired whether "Tehran" meant the town alone or surrounding district. Mr. Lascelles replied that our nearest point would be Qum, and we hoped that the nearest Russian point to the west would be Qazvin (which was almost eq[illegible] distant). The next day Mr. Lascelles informed the Soviet Ambassador of the action and the latter seemed ready to admit that the Russian troops should withdraw to Qazvin. As the embassy had foreseen, however, he then fell back on the zones as defined in the exchange of letters of August 1941. (This had laid down that the British zone should be Khuzistan and the Kermanshah area, while the Russian zone would be Azerbaijan and part of Khorassan, Meshed was not to be occupied, but Russian troops were to guard the airfield.) He did not regard the withdrawal of the British troops to Qum as the equivalent of the Soviet withdrawal to Qazvin, because he argued that Qazvin was in the Soviet zone and Qum was far outside the British zone. His Majesty's Ambassador consequently pointed out to the Foreign Office that there was little hope of persuading the Russians at the Council of Foreign Ministers to withdraw from any part of their zone while we not only remained in ours but spread far beyond it.

22. With regard to point (c) above, the embassy pointed out on the 5th August that the withdrawal of troops involved a prior decision about foreign air lines using Tehran as a terminal. The position of air lines was this:—

(a) British Overseas Airways Corporation was a State line for the period of the war, though if there was room it carried private passengers on payment. The authority under which it operated to Tehran would come to an end with the departure of the last of the foreign troops and the consequent cessation of the Anglo-Soviet Persian Treaty.
(b) The Russians operated a military airline between Russia and Tehran and, in addition, used military aircraft for cabotage between Tehran, Meshed, Pahlevi and Tabriz.
(c) American Army Air Force operated military aircraft to and from Tehran carrying private passengers when it suited them.
(d) The French operated a military airline by agreement with us. The agreement was constantly infringed by the acceptance of civilian non-official passengers.

23. The aerodrome position was this:—

(a) *Mehrabad* was used by the British Overseas Airways Corporation, the Royal Air Force, the French and the Persian Air Service. The ground staff was provided by the Royal Air Force.
(b) *Qalek Murgeh* was occupied by the Russians and the Americans, the latter being there as our tenants.

If we retained British Airways with its present status, the Russians could argue that this justified the retention of their airlines as a military measure. The embassy recommended therefore that British Airways should apply to the Persian Government for a commercial concession. It would be difficult for the Russians not to follow suit and if they replaced their military by a commercial [illegible] they could hardly maintain their cabotage lines in Persia.

24. On the 7th August the embassy reported that the American military authorities in Tehran had provisionally fixed the middle of September as the date by which all American troops except for the United States Army Liquidation Commission should have left Tehran.

25. On the 9th August the Soviet Ambassador told His Majesty's Ambassador that his embassy had at last notified the Potsdam decision to the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Soviet forces would leave with the greatest possible speed. In reporting this to the Foreign Office the embassy pointed out that the Russians had the advantage over us and the Americans in that they had no assets of any importance in Tehran.

26. On the 15th August the Foreign Office communicated to the embassy their new proposals, revised in the light of the virtual end of the Japanese war for the withdrawal of British, American and Soviet troops, for discussion at the Foreign Secretaries' meeting in September. Two alternative courses seemed possible:

(1) To agree on the exact date in 1946 by which the withdrawal must be [illegible] noted and to publish the date.

(2) To act as in (1) above and to press in addition that there should be an [illegible] withdraw to specified zones. These withdrawals could be [illegible] the lines of point 2 of our Potsdam proposal [illegible] drawal to the British and Russian zones defined in Aug[illegible]

27. His Majesty's Embassy replied on the 22nd August that course (1) should be excluded as a first line of approach to the Russians as it a[illegible] saying publicly that the Allies regarded themselves as free to profit [illegible] y the letter of the treaty long after any [illegible] would play into the hands of the Russians [illegible] course (2) the embassy suggested that His Majes[illegible] to the Russians the total withdrawal of both troops in less than six months. N[illegible] that the war with Japan was over, the only delaying factors were physical diffi[illegible] culties of transport and the disposal of assets, and it should be pos[illegible] surmount these in less than six months in view of the political issues at stake. It would be ideal also if we could inform the Russians that we were ready to withdraw completely by about the 12th December—the date on which the Persian general elections were due to be held. If they rejected the proposal merely because they saw no reason to hurry, the world would then know that the blame for the delay did not lie with us. If, on the other hand, they decided to move out with us, it would hamper their plans for interfering with the elections.

28. Meanwhile, on the 20th August, the Foreign Secretary of the new Labour Government, Mr. Bevin, had announced in Parliament that His Majesty's Government did not desire, and did not believe that their Soviet Allies desired, to take advantage of the treaty facilities in Persia for any purpose other than for the prosecution of the war. Mr. Eden, in commenting on this speech for the Opposition, agreed entirely, and added that His Majesty's Government had only one interest in Persia, to see her prosperous, united and strong; the last thing they wanted was a recurrence of the zones of influence of many years ago.

29. On the 23rd August the embassy returned to the charge [illegible] position of British Airways. They pointed out that the [illegible] Force at Mehrabad aerodrome was so closely bound up with the Bri[illegible] service to Tehran that the withdrawal of the Royal Air Force could not be planned until the future of that service was known. Nor could the embassy discuss details of the withdrawal with the Russians as they would raise the question of the airfields immediately. If British Airways applied forthwith to the Persian Government for a commercial concession, the embassy could negotiate with the Persians accordingly and seek to arrange for Royal Air Force personnel to provide essential services at Mehrabad (which would be handed back to Persian control) until they could be replaced by British Airways officials pending the establishment of a suitable Persian organisation with the necessary foreign technical assistance, which, it was hoped, would be British. The alternative was to w[illegible] draw altogether, but this would throw the Persians into the hands of other air lines—probably American. Meanwhile, army plans for withdrawal from Tehran by the end of September were going ahead, and unless the main party of the R[illegible] situation, as they depended on the army for administrative services. *A decision about British Airways was thus an essential preliminary to the withdrawal of British troops.*

30. The Foreign Office replied on the 25th August that in British post-war plans for overseas air services Persia would not be served by any British airline, [illegible] Egyptian Company if and when it was set up. Also, British Airways were in

[illegible]

service to Tehran immediately.

31. The embassy answered on the 28th August that, since no British airline would run to Persia after the expiry of the Tripartite Treaty, it would make the evacuation of British troops from Tehran a much more clear-cut affair, and would be better for a number of technical reasons, if British Airways service ceased by the 2nd October when the withdrawal of the main body of Royal Air Force and British military forces would have been effected. In fact, the cessation of this military line would have an excellent political effect as marking the end of the British evacuation of Tehran. His Majesty's Government agreed to this proposal on the 2nd September.

32. Meanwhile the Foreign Office had been repeatedly enquiring of the embassy why Allied troops had not been withdrawn from Tehran at once as [illegible] reed at Potsdam. The embassy replied on the 30th August that, so far as the British troops were concerned the withdrawal began at once but to comple[illegible] it in a few days was not possible. It was complicated by many factors. The railway was now run by the Persians and worked slowly. Signals alone must take a considerable time to move. The 1,700 odd British troops in Tehran were split up into small units each with equipment, stores, &c. These were moving south all the time. Nearly all combatant troops would go on the 15th September and headquarters and everything else except rear parties would leave on the 1st October. This methodical evacuation enabled them to make arrangements for disposal of assets which otherwise would have been impossible. The whole scheme of evacuation had been delayed for lack of a decision about British Airways. Nor had it been possible to begin discussions with the Soviet authorities until that was settled. As regards Russian withdrawal from Tehran there was no sign of this yet, but they had so much less here than we had that that was not surprising.

33. Anticipating His Majesty's Government's decision about British [illegible] tary attaché to this embassy on the 28th August [illegible] g the withdrawal. Needless to [illegible] elicit a reply. On the 11th September, therefore, the Foreign [illegible] instructed the embassy to inform the Soviet Embassy in writing exactly what the British position in Tehran would be by the 2nd October and to request the Soviet Embassy to supply details of the evacuation of Tehran by Soviet troops. The embassy made the prescribed communication on the 19th September (adding particulars about the withdrawal of British troops by the 15th October). It stated that:

(i) by the 2nd October the British army and the Royal Air Force would have withdrawn from Tehran except for rear parties;

(ii) by the 15th October the only British troops in Tehran would be a liquidated party of sixty two officers and men;

(iii) a military survey party of 105 officers and men engaged by the Persian Government in connexion with the Lar irrigation project would be working south of Tehran until the 30th November.

The note also asked for corresponding information about the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Copies of this note were sent to the Persian Government and to the American Embassy. The Soviet Embassy has not replied to it.

34. Meanwhile the Persian Government had sent a note on the 9th September to the British, American and Soviet Embassies offering congratulations on the end of the war with Japan and requesting that, in accordance with article 5 of the Tripartite Pact, Persian territory should be totally evacuated by the 2nd March (*i.e.*, six months after the signature of the Japanese armistice); furthermore, any action taken for evacuation before then would arouse the gratitude of the Persian nation.

35. The departure from Tehran of British combatant troops began on the 12th September. Suddenly and without warning the Russians withdrew their troops from Qasch Murgeh airfield and barracks on the night of the 18th-19th September—leaving them in filthy condition. Intourist personnel, however, remain, and the existing Russian airlines to and within Persia continue, serviced by ground staff pretending to be civilian. The Russians continue to hold

the northern railway and at Tehran railway station they keep a considerable number of employees, some in uniform. They also retain in Tehran about forty five houses, some of them containing uniformed personnel.

36. British Airways' final flight from Tehran took place on the 29th September.

37. On the 30th September the Foreign Office telegraphed the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers regarding Persia, taken on the 22nd September. It was to the following effect:

> The council noted that letters had been exchanged between Mr. Bevin and M. Molotov and agreed that there was now no need for the withdrawal of troops from Persia to be discussed by the present conference.

38. The following is a summary of the letters referred to:

(1) Mr. Bevin to M. Molotov, dated the 19th September.—Since it was decided at Potsdam that the further stages in the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia should be discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers, the situation has been changed by the end of the Japanese war. Our two Governments will now withdraw their forces from Persia by the 2nd March, 1946, six months after the Japanese armistice, and all we need do is to ask the council to note this date. I further propose to suggest that, when the question comes up, our two Governments should agree that by the middle of December, 1945, their respective forces shall be withdrawn from the whole of P[illegible] except that until the 2nd March, 1946, British forces may remain in the southern oil area to the south of and including Andimeshk, and Soviet forces may remain in Azerbaijan.

(2) M. Molotov to Mr. Bevin, dated the 20th September.—The decision regarding the withdrawal of troops from Tehran has already been put into effect from the Soviet side. As regards the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Persia, the Soviet Government consider that this should be effected within the period laid down in Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty. If necessary, the final withdrawal of Soviet and British troops from Persia could be discussed between us towards the end of that period. The Soviet Government accordingly see no need for this question to be discussed in the Council of Foreign Ministers.

39. In a subsequent exchange of letters Mr. Bevin reiterated his view that the final date for withdrawal was the 2nd March, 1946, and the Soviet Foreign Minister replied reiterating the importance which his Government attached to the strict fulfilment of obligations (thus evading any commitment as [illegible] date of the withdrawal).

40. The Foreign Office at the same time instructed the embassy to communicate the text of the council's decision to the Persian Government, with [illegible] to communicate the substance of the exchange of letters for the present.

Anglo-Soviet Persian Censorship

41. On the 2nd July, His Majesty's Embassy suggested to the Foreign Office that the political censorship on press messages from Persia might now be abolished, and that the Russians should be asked to agree. The American Ambassador was also telegraphing to his Government in this sense. The British military authorities had no objection provided no information about numbers and movement of troops, &c., was sent out. The embassy added that the censorship was based on article 3 (ii) (d) of the Anglo-Soviet Persian Treaty and was intended to protect the communications mentioned in 3 (ii) (b). Article 3 (iii) required that in the working of the censorship full consideration should be given to the essential needs of Persia. The needs of Persia, in the view of the embassy, required that both sides of the internal political question should be presented to the world. At present, Russia was (through the Tass Agency, which, being official, was exempt from censorship) presenting one side and at the same time using the censorship to prevent the dissemination of even the mildest reports written from another point of view. This could not be reasonably claimed as necessary for the protection of Allied communications now that aid to Russia was no longer passing across Persia.

42. After discussion between the Foreign Office, the embassy, the United States Ambassador and Persia and Iraq Command, it was agreed that the

definition of condemnations in article 5 of the agreement of January 1942 under which the censorship was exercised should be replaced by the following:—

> "Any communication which conveys information concerning the deployment of troops or supplies in the prosecution of the war against Japan and the output in Persia, and distribution, of petroleum or other strategic products for use in the war against Japan."

43. Meanwhile, on the 31st July the Persian Government sent to the British and Soviet Embassies an official request for the abandonment of the political censorship.

44. The embassy was still pressing His Majesty's Government to accept the redefinition of condemnations described above, as political trouble in Azerbaijan made it important that political news should get out untrammelled, when the end of the war with Japan arrived. His Majesty's Gover[illegible] instructed the embassy to inform the Persian Government and the Sovi[illegible] that they regarded the continuance of Allied censorship as unnecessary. [illegible] embassy were to make a joint communication to the Persian Government with the Soviet Embassy but if the latter had no instructions within a week His [illegible] Embassy were to make the communication alone. The Soviet Embassy, as usual received no instructions, so His Majesty's Embassy, acting alone, duly informed the Persian Government on the 30th August that British censorship had ceased that day.

45. Inspired by this the Soviet section, on the 3rd September, waived censorship of all telegraphic and postal communications between Persia and the British Empire and United States.

46. On the 16th September the Persian Minister of Posts, Telegraphs and [illegible] phones instructed the Persian Post Office to cease sending mail to the Soviet section of the censorship and the Soviet censor protested. This courageous move on the part of the Persian Government, however, passed unnoticed as it was immediately overtaken by further developments. On the 19th September the Soviet Ambassador informed the Persian Government that all Soviet censorship was ceasing forthwith.

The Persian Army

47.—*A. Morale.*—Certain factors militating against good discipline have been noticed in previous reviews of the Persian army. They still persist. Recently discontent at their financial position among the officers has increased. The Russians were not slow to notice this and, through their agents, the Tudeh party, fanned the flames of this discontent. In mid August eighteen officers of the Meshed garrison, headed by a lieutenant colonel in the Supply Department, obtained possession of a jeep, two lorries, a wireless-telegraphy set and arms and ammunition. To prevent pursuit they immobilised the remaining army vehicles by removing their switch keys and by putting salt in their petrol tanks (sugar, though more effective, is too expensive in Persia). With the connivance of the Russian control post (some say avoiding the control post by a detour) they made their way to Bojnord, having taken the precaution of cutting the telegraph lines between Meshed and Kuchan. On arrival there they gave out that they were come [illegible] an inspection of the cavalry squadron stationed there. They disarmed the squadron and made for the Turcoman Steppe. It was thought in Meshed and the General Staff was so informed by the Russians, that these mutineers would join forces with a band of armed Turcomans said to number between 1,000 and 2,000 and subsequently attack Meshed. The Chief of the General Staff, having much experience of Russians, did not think that they would go out of their way to give him accurate information about a gang of mutineers with whom they were probably in sympathy, nor did he think it likely that the Russians would tamely allow them to attack one of their garrison towns. He acted, therefore, on the assumption that their information was wilfully misleading and reckoned on the mutineers heading in the opposite direction. Having no troops in Gunbad [illegible] gendarmerie who acted with the greatest promptness and energy. The local [illegible] and was able to assemble a force of about one and a half companies before the [illegible] A battle then ensued in which the gendarmerie, first putting the vehicles out of action, then fired upon their occupants. Seven of the mutineer officers were killed and two were wounded and taken prisoner. The vehicles, arms and ammunition were recovered. The next day three officers and four men were picked up in an exhausted condition nearby on the road between Gunbad-i Qabus and Shahrud

Later, six officers from the Tehran garrison, headed by a lieutenant-colonel on the General Staff had deserted and effected a junction with the Meshed mutineers just before the skirmish at Gunbad i Qabus. These seven and six of the Meshed mutineers, are still at large. Two others from Tehran and Tabriz who deserted later have also joined them. In Tehran a commission was appointed to examine the antecedents and contacts of officers of the central garrison. Thirty officers have been found to have close contacts with the Tudeh party or the Russians and are to be detained under a clause of the Military Governorship Law until military [illegible] been sent [illegible]

information so far extracted from the [illegible] a plot for a general uprising existed and that the Meshed party acted prematurely thus causing the general mutiny to go off at half cock. Two officers sent by the General Staff to make a full report on the Gunbad i Qabus skirmish and to retrieve the captured vehicles and arms were sent away by the Russians without being able to complete their task. A party of 200 gendarmes proceeding by lorry as reinforcements for the gendarmerie at Gunbad-i-Qabus were turned back by the Russians at Firuzkuh. A lorry conveying bombs for the Persian air force detachment at Meshed was turned back by the Russians at Semnan. Reinforcements for the Meshed garrison coming from Turbat-i Sheikh Jam were stopped at the Russian control post south of Meshed. The fact that the original party of mutineers was able to leave Meshed at all and pass through the Russian control post *en route*, the attitude of the Russian controlled [illegible] elsewhere towards the mutiny and the presence in Bajgiran [illegible] Consul at Meshed a few hours prior to the arrival of the mutineers [illegible] growing weight of testimony to the effect that the whole affair from beginning to end—and the end is not yet in sight—had the knowledge and approval of the Russians. A Bill has been introduced in the Majlis asking for a credit of 35 million rials (about £300,000) to provide certain financial benefits to officers such as free quarters, free issue of uniform, yearly increments of pay, children's allowance and the formation of a co-operative society. Unless the Bill is passed and the promises are implemented it would be unsafe to say that the mutiny has been entirely stamped out.

[illegible] and the work of General Rolley's American Military Mission is less and less evident. A Bill has been presented to the Majlis for a credit of 165 million [illegible] for the formation of two additional divisions numbering about 12,000 men in all. A Bill has also been presented to Parliament for a credit of 3 million dollars for purchases of military equipment from the United States.

40. *C. Command.* Ibrahim Zand and General Arfa continued to fill the posts of Minister for War and Chief of the General Staff respectively. Changes in the commands of the 2nd Tehran Division, 5th Senneh Division and 7th Kerman Division were made.

50. *D. Operations.* The only operations in progress during the past three months have been those in Kurdistan in the Dizli and Avroman areas. Some 1,500 arms from the settled districts—mostly arms previously issued to friendly chiefs for road protection duties—have been collected, but as an operation to disarm the main Kurdish tribes the operations have been unsuccessful as the Kurds have retreated to inaccessible country on and even across the Perso Iraqi border. The approach of winter will compel the Persian forces to withdraw to their permanent garrisons.

Persian Gendarmerie.

51. Colonel Schwarzkopf continues to [illegible] ment of the force and seems at last to have [illegible]

His mission has been reinforced by two more American officers. Further progress would appear to be limited by Colonel Schwarzkopf's failure to realise that however efficient his direction at the centre may be, constant inspection of his provincial posts is equally necessary. Most striking is the contrast between the improvements effected in Tehran and the constant reports from consular posts as to the sloth and corruption of the provincial detachments. Nevertheless the [illegible] the deserters from the Meshed garrison might well be claimed by Colonel Schwarzkopf as a sign of improvement in the force.

Persian Police.

52. There is nothing to add to previous reviews save that, if possible, [illegible] has declined still further. The force is useless and nothing but a complete overhaul by a foreign police mission can alter it. Colonel Schwarzkopf states that he has been approached unofficially to ascertain his readiness to accept the direction of the police in addition to the gendarmerie. He replied that he did not think the United States Government would consent to supplying the number of military officers required or that the Persian Government could afford to pay them.

Persian Air Force.

53. During the quarter there has been much discussion of proposals to expand and modernise the Persian air force by substantial purchases of British equipment, mainly Hurricane aircraft, and by reviving in some form the connexion between the force and Hawker Siddeley aircraft which existed up to 1942. With the help of the R.A.F. and of a representative sent out by Hawkers for the purpose, a fairly comprehensive plan was worked out which is believed to have been approved by all concerned up to the point of facing the appropriate committee of the Majlis, where the inability of the Minister of War to answer elementary questions on it has caused a postponement which may well be fatal.

54. With these developments in the offing, morale in the air force has improved, though it will hardly be able to stand the shock of a collapse of these hopes. Some keenness has been aroused during September by the return of airfields and the attempt, albeit a rather poor attempt, to maintain the signals and meteorological services on which the R.A.F. have taught them to rely. Meanwhile, almost entirely as the result of the efforts of the officers recently returned from the United Kingdom, there has been by Persian standards a notable improvement in flying training. Other training remains hardly perceptible.

[illegible] Government have formally submitted a request that the [illegible] under the Financial Agreement shall be placed at their disposal in Ottawa. The Government's sterling holdings fell from £18,600,000 to £14,900,000 during the quarter. The stock of gold held in Tehran by His Majesty's Government was transferred to Cairo at the end of September.

56. The free market price of sovereigns rose during the quarter from 683 rials on the 1st July to 716 rials on the 30th September. The sale of gold by the National Bank was resumed on the 23rd July. The market was fairly easy [illegible]

57. The free market rate for the dollar rose to 68 rials as compared with the official rate of 32 rials. Sterling commanded a small premium varying from 146 to 142 rials as against the official rate of 130·75 rials.

Exchange Control.

58. It was announced in August that the Minister of Finance had appointed an Exchange Control Commission to consider a reimposition of exchange control [illegible] the Exchange Control Commission has authorised banks to grant sterling exchange freely against imports on production of the necessary documents and to open documentary credits. Facilities have also been given in regard to limited personal remittances to the sterling area. Owing to their shortage of dollars the Persian authorities are imposing severe restrictions on the opening of dollar credits, and most of the private trade with the United States is at present conducted on the basis of black market dollars which command a premium of over 100 per cent. It is possible that the Exchange Control Commission may recommend a reversion to the system previously in force by which foreign exchange could only be obtained by the purchase of export certificates giving the importer who bought them the right to a specified percentage of the value in foreign exchange.

Imperial Bank of Iran's Concession.

59. The Bank Melli has given the Imperial Bank of Iran six months notice to terminate its present agreement; the effect of this denunciation would be to deprive the Imperial Bank of Iran of its right to deal in foreign exchange and would leave the bank without any provision in regard to the transfer of profits.

Concurrently with this action on the part of the Bank Melli, however, the Imperial Bank of Iran were negotiating direct with the Minister of Finance for a new concession which has now been ratified by the Council of Ministers and now awaits signature by the Minister of Finance.

Economic Situation.

60. The end of the war brought in its train the inquiries organisations in Persia. The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation no longer carries out any supply or transport functions and its remaining staff is concerned solely with the work of liquidation. Middle East Supply Centre was also, by the end of September, making arrangements for its withdrawal at the end of October.

61. The United States [illegible] to which they are appointed, but they [illegible] the indeterminate nature of their functions and many of them wish to resign.

62. There has been no improvement in the machinery of economic control exercised by the Persians themselves and, in particular, the import licensing department continues to be ineffective and corrupt. The business community has learned to take more and more advantage of the increased confusion [illegible] ment Departments and is now openly flaunting its contempt of controls despite the fact that the law still requires importers to obtain import licences for all commodities. The largest part of the goods which has come in during the last [illegible] in customs and then cleared by persuasion. To [illegible] the licensing departments are [illegible] bother to lodge applications.

63. [illegible] July the Cabinet sanctioned the abolition of the cotton monopoly, only retaining control over the import of raw cotton.

64. Markets were dull throughout the quarter despite the end of the war. This was mainly due to the reimposition of exchange control and a realisation that goods could still not be obtained freely from abroad. Despite the prec[illegible] on dollars, exports to the United States were confined to small quantities of caseins and lambskins.

Food Situation.

65. Although there is a huge surplus of food grains the Government still [illegible] it for export for fear of exposing themselves to the allegation from [illegible] inspired quarters that they wish to starve the Persian population for some nefarious end. For the same reason, useful as the surplus would be in such countries as Greece, the British Embassy has refused to make proposals for its purchase and have said that any proposal for export of grain must come officially from the Persian Government.

66. At the end of September the total collection of bread grains in Per[illegible] amounted to 170,000 tons, of which 108,000 tons was wheat. The stocks at Tehran equalled 211 days' supply.

67. It remains to be seen how the "Cereals and Bread Section" will succeed in the collection and distribution of wheat and flour now that the Middle East Supply Centre with its team of British officers employed in grain collection is closing down and that Colonel Ataullah, I.M.S., who has been the mainstay of the central cereals organisation for nearly three years is leaving.

[illegible]

68. *Railways.*—With the return of the southern section of the railway to Persian operation the usual statistics covering traffic movements have ceased to be available. Stocks of oil and cereals have both been adequately maintained [illegible] The full effect of the reduced efficiency of the system will not be felt until the coming winter.

69. *Road.*—The Persian Government is proposing to sell by public auction about 3,000 used lorries, the property of the now defunct Road Transport [illegible] number likely to be available for some time will be below importers' expectations.

70. Tyre prices have fallen heavily as the result of the sale of numbers of second hand tyres by the military authorities.

Civil Air Lines in Persia.

72. As recorded above, British Overseas Airways Corporation stopped at the end of September. The Russian services, which seem to be civil or military at will, were not brought to an end when the Russian troops left Qazvin Morgheh. The French are apparently trying to keep their military service in being pending the grant of commercial rights, and have said that the Persian Government asked them to carry on since the British had let the Persians down by stopping. The Americans have not yet replaced their military services by civil lines, though they are evidently anxious to do so. Meanwhile they propose to run occasional military aircraft as long as they have any troops left in Tehran.

73. The Iranian State Airline has run with commendable regularity between Tehran and Bagdad and Tehran and Bushire, though its operations are very inefficient and it is far from making full use of its few aircraft. It would be easy to expand frequencies, if not routes, had it only some manager of skill at its disposal, and it is not to be wondered at that the Ministry of Posts who control it should be lending an ear to proposals from private interests to take it over.

74. The private interests are, however, squabbling among themselves. They are in two groups which centre round the Mayor of Tehran, G. H. Eftekhari, who runs (among other things) Iranitour, and General Ahmad Nakhchevani, who seems to be relying on his past glories to put himself into a position where he can get a substantial rake-off from somebody. Efforts to bring the two groups together have so far failed. Iranian Airways, the company with which Eft[illegible] associated, have made a provisional agreement with the A[illegible] Continental Western Air for a joint subsidiary to run. It is on terms very favourable to Transcontinental Western Air, but nobody really expects the deal to be completed. Iranian Airways have also applied for four Dominie aircraft on hire from His Majesty's Government.

Disposal of British and American Military Assets.

[illegible] *tion System.*—An agreement was concluded (it was [illegible] end of the quarter) providing for the sale to the Persian [illegible] stries of Communications and of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones of the entire pole wire routes in Persia, together with the entire carrier and associated equipment. The American carrier equipment was not available for sale and was withdrawn. The purchase price was £300,000, payable as follows:

(i) 25 per cent. of the purchase price against signature of the present [illegible]

(ii) 25 per cent. within three months of signature.

(iii) 50 per cent. within two months after the beginning of the next Persian financial year, i.e., as from the 22nd March 1948.

76. *Fixed Assets (General).*—Fixed military installations in the North Persia area were offered to the Persian Government but they declined to buy on the ground that from their interpretation of article 4 of the Tripartite Treaty, buildings should revert to them free. As a further approach merely produced a reiteration of this claim, tenders were invited in the public press for the purchase of these installations. In general they have been sold at satisfactory prices, but the Convalescent Camp at Vanak did not produce any satisfactory offer owing to the fact that it was built principally upon Crown land. The camp has accordingly been dismantled and the buildings are in the process of being demolished. Difficulty is also being experienced as regards the saw mill which is on land belonging to the Persian State Railways. Negotiations are still continuing with the Railway Administration for the purchase of this saw mill by them, but if these fall through the installation will be dismantled and the machinery will be sold to private buyers. Schedules are being prepared of installations south of Hamadan and the Persian Government will, in due course, be asked to state whether they are interested in their purchase. We shall probably receive the same reply as that given in the case of the Northern installations, and in this event sale will be carried out by public tender.

77. *Railway Assets.*—This question is likely to be a very thorny one because apart from the fact that we shall have to overcome the Persian claim that all buildings should revert to them free, we are also handicapped by the absence of any agreement regarding freight rates.

78. The railway administration entertain large hopes that a substantial amount, in the neighbourhood of £7,700,000 will be paid to them in addition to

the sums we have spent to maintain the railways since 1942, but this hope is likely to be disappointed. At the end of the quarter, His Majesty's Embassy were on the point of addressing a note to the Persian Ministry of Foreign Affairs setting out the lines on which it is suggested negotiations, both for the settlement of freight rates and of payment for assets, shall be conducted.

79. *American Assets.*—The Americans offered for sale to the Persian Government their fixed installations in the Northern Area but no reply had been received by the end of the quarter. An agreement was reached [illegible] United States Embassy and the Persian Government by which the latter purchases its American locomotives, 1,350 wagons (including 277 oil tank cars) and surplus American railway stores to the value of $500,000. The purchase price was $10 million. The 277 oil tank cars in question are considered by the British and American railway experts to be the minimum number, in addition to the 303 tank cars already owned by the Persian State Railways, to ensure an adequate distribution of oil in Persia. This view is not shared by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which estimates that a further 146 tank cars should be purchased. These are available in Persia but they will be shipped elsewhere by the United States authorities unless the Persian Government come to a very early decision to pay dollars for them.

Press and Public Opinion.

80. Comment in the Persian press during the period was on well-established lines—wild or mischievous misinterpretations of foreign affairs and the actions of the great powers, violent criticism of internal policy and of those who apply it, without the offer of anything constructive.

81. Foreign interference in Persian affairs was a constant theme. The coming elections aroused particular anxiety in this connexion: the Soviet stranglehold on the northern provinces caused deep and articulate apprehension to the Right wing press, while its few remaining opponents countered with allusions to the alleged interference of British officials (sometimes designated by name) in [illegible].

[illegible] the military government of Tehran was abused as a recrudescence of [illegible]—especially by the Left wing "freedom front," most of whose papers it had suppressed. This muzzling of the pro-Russian press left the way almost entirely clear for its opponents to attack the Russian policy in northern Persia and these elements (as the Tudeh party and its offshoots, the "Democrat" party of Azarbaijan and the Kurdish nationalist "Kumala" group) which supported it. At the beginning of the period the Left wing papers were opposing the evacuation of foreign troops but this opposition was damped down by the [illegible]ation, in late July of an article in the *Times* in which evacuation was taken for granted, and extinguished by the appearance of the Bevin-Molotov correspondence in which M. Molotov, though he appeared to be evading mention of the 2nd March, agreed to evacuation within six months of the end of the war with Japan. It may be said that Persians in general are waiting with hope rather than confidence to see whether the Russian withdrawal will be completed by the [illegible].

82. The *Pravda* attack on Persia, the Khorassan mutiny, the more recent visit of Kurdish nationalists to Baku and divers high-handed actions of the Red army against the freedom of the individual (whether true or fabricated) have further exasperated Persian opinion against Russian interference in the northern [illegible]. Right wing papers have, on the whole, been bold and outspoken [illegible] for the first time since the days when the newly arrived American troops laid themselves open to attack by their rather free and easy behaviour in Tehran. The storm aroused by the discovery that the United States Government was not giving something for nothing is described below in the section headed "American Interests." The appearance of the American Embassy's communiqué and the after-thought that American support might some day be useful brought about a change in the attitude of the press which from hostile became conciliatory—in some cases almost sycophant.

85. The Foreign Ministers' conference in September had aroused high hopes in Persia and its failure caused profound disappointment. The Persians expected their problems to be given high priority in the agenda, forgetting that they were already provided for by Treaty. The not unnatural reaction has been to interpret the conference as a sign of dissension among the great Allies—a dissension which the less scrupulous papers are not reluctant to foment. Disagreement between Britain and the United States over oil and the situation in Palestine has been hailed with satisfaction in some papers.

86. The end of the Japanese war made small impression, and the [illegible] bomb also has aroused remarkably little comment, though one paper [illegible] the discovery of uranium on the Caspian coast and hoped that this discovery would not be as troublesome to Persia as that of petroleum.

87. Mr. Bevin's statement of the 20th August on evacuation and Mr. Eden's reply mentioning Britain's opposition to the principle of spheres of influence both had a particularly good effect. The advent of the Labour Government was at first regarded with suspicion, some circles supposing that it would try to conciliate Russia at Persia's expense, others declaring that since British foreign policy did not change it was a coming ramp. General opinion has now settled down and accepts it for what it is.

88. Alexander Clifford's articles on Persia in the *Daily Mail* achieved wide publicity, and though they received abuse from the "Freedom Front" it was impossible to disprove the revelations they contained. Hitherto only Tass had been allowed to export news from Persia, and the appearance of information from another source, with the revelation of the working of the Soviet censorship, had a soothing effect on public anxiety. *The Times* article on Persia aroused less anger than sorrow that it should be left to the foreign press to point out the defects of the Persian administration.

89. Near Eastern politics have received little mention. The wild Persian claim to Bahrain crops up periodically. The Arab Federation is opposed by the Left wing as a plan imposed by foreign imperialists in order to keep the Arabs in a backward and primitive condition.

British, and other Propaganda Activities.

90. Following Ministry of Information instructions, drastic steps have been taken to reduce expenditure in the Public Relations Bureau of this embassy. The budget estimates for the year beginning the 1st December 1945 amount to [illegible] November, 1945. Furthermore, various economies already effected will probably result in a saving of approximately £34,000 on the latter figure. The budget may be divided into three headings, namely:—

	£
(a) Staff salaries and allowances	41,400
(b) Operational expenditure	[illegible]
Total	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
Net proposed expenditure for 1945-46	[illegible]

91. From a total of some 186 persons at the beginning of the current year of whom 28 were British, the staff has now been reduced to about 80 persons, of whom only 7 are British. (Although the budget figures quoted include expenditure by consulates in the provinces, the figures of staff employed do not include those engaged wholly or partly for publicity purposes by consulates in the provinces.)

92. By far the largest economy is the closing down of the *Tehran Daily News*, the last number of which was due to be published on the 12th October. It was to be replaced by a daily revised bulletin issued privately to subscribers. Other economies have been effected by ceasing publication of the women's [illegible] the visual pu[illegible] two of the [illegible] and [illegible] signs that they [illegible]. In addition the press section of the French Embassy has grown considerably and is becoming [illegible] Information, the American Press Attaché's staff has grown recently, though so far his activities have appeared to be confined to Tehran.

94. Certain of the activities of the Public Relations Bureau may have to be reconsidered after the 2nd March next year when the Anglo Soviet Persian Treaty expires.

Indian Affairs

95. During the hot summer months the Indo Iranian Cultural Society was dormant, with most of its members out of Tehran, but the autumn has brought signs of its re[illegible]

96. The "Iran League" of Bombay have presented to Persia a bronze statue of the Persian epic poet Ferdousi. It has been erected in a prominent position in the City of Tehran and was to be unveiled with pomp and ceremony on the 2nd October.

97. The Director General of Archaeology in India (Dr. Mortimer Wheeler) is expected here by the end of October to start a thirty days' tour of the archaeological treasures of Persia before going on to Iraq.

[illegible] Indian teachers of English at Ahwaz, Kerman and Yezd took "refresher" courses under the British Council at Tehran, and it is felt that they will now be able to arouse more interest among the Persian pupils.

98. In December 1944 the Persian Government promised to allow the removal to India, for urgent use in connexion with the war with Japan, of some [illegible] of rails from an unwanted railway siding at Mirjawa, the frontier town [illegible] railway from India to Zahidan. However, by expert procrastination they succeeded in omitting to implement their promise until the arrival of VJ day made it difficult to continue to press for the rails.

Indian Trade

100. The Indian Government Trade Commissioner is now installed in his office. Many trade enquiries have been received from Indian merchants and Persian importers. Although trade is still controlled from both ends, the parties concerned are showing a keen interest and eagerly awaiting the relaxation and ultimate removal of the various restrictions. The importance of India as a source [illegible] share of Persia's import market. During the war also it has been the principal supplier of tea, cotton piece goods, spices and jute manufactures. It is hoped the internal supply situation in India will improve quickly and so permit a greater flow of the commodities in demand in Persia at the moment. Trade enquiries received show that the goods most needed are cotton piece goods, sugar, tea, spices, jute manufactures, leather goods and electrical equipment. Persian merchants are full of complaints against the various Persian State monopolies, particularly that of cotton piece-goods.

(a) *Cotton Piece-goods.*—The Government of India have been pressing for some time, through the Middle East Supply Centre, that the Persian Government should agree to the importation of cotton piece goods from India to be effected through normal trade channels. For the first half of 1945 they were willing to let the Persian Government make purchases up to 50 per cent. of the quota through their trade agent at Bombay, and let the other 50 per cent. to be bought through merchants. For the second half of 1945 they had stipulated that the entire quota be bought through merchants. The Persian Government have not been accommodating and the question is still ha[illegible]

(b) *Tea.*—The Government of India are also dissatisfied with the block purchase scheme by which Persia imports her requirements of tea from India and have represented this to the British Ministry of Food. The Persian Government have not yet replied whether they agree to the conditions made by the Ministry of Food for the procurement of tea from India.

101. The Persian Government are showing an interest in developing trade with India, and have deputed Dr. Ali Amini, a senior officer of the Ministry of Finance, to visit India and explore the possibility of strengthening the commercial links between the two countries.

American Interests

102. The visit of Senator Pepper in September on his w[illegible] Moscow served as an occasion for the exchange of American Persian compliments. In a press account of a party given to Mr. Pepper by the Speaker of the

Majlis, the Senator was reported as expressing the affection of Americans for Persians and declaring that the American Government supported the independence of small countries and neither intervened themselves nor allowed others [illegible] affairs of weak nations. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Senator Pepper expressed the same thoughts, but even more strongly at a dinner given to him at the Ministry. The fact that in the speech at the Majlis he declared that it was attachment to Persia that had prompted his visit to Tehran did not prevent Senator Pepper from pressing the request of an [illegible]

[illegible]

negotiating with a Persian company [illegible] to the Americans and the risk to the Persian [illegible] The American [illegible] the same time [illegible] ments including the Air Transport Agreement [illegible] Chicago Agreements, and being in general against the [illegible] the nature of a concession until the last of the foreign troops [illegible] the Minister for Foreign Affairs pleaded for time to consider the matter, in spite of the argument advanced by the American Ambassador that to give the Americans this material stake in Persia would engage the interest of the United States against possible aggression by Russia, a contingency which he suggested Great Britain would hardly be able to meet alone.

[illegible] learned (thanks to the British air attaché) what the Chicago [illegible] freedoms involved, the Minister for Foreign Affairs [illegible] Ambassador that the Persian Government must postpone consideration of so complicated a matter but (2) to offer to the Americans permission for their civil aircraft to fly to and from Tehran without prejudice to any future arrangement, and (3) to promise that after the withdrawal of the foreign troops the Persian Government would be prepared to conclude with the United States a civil aviation agreement provided that it took account of the [illegible] rights and needs of Persia in this region.

103. The hesitation shown by the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the American demand for air rights intensified the annoyance which the American Ambassador was already feeling at the criticisms published in some of the Tehran newspapers at the news that the United States Government intended to remove from Persia not only certain assets it needed but the remainder too, unless the Persian Government or Persian individuals were prepared to pay for them. The attacks were usually based on the fact that the presence of American troops in Persia had never been sanctioned by the conclusion of an agreement and some times they proliferated into abuse of the United States or into criticisms of the behaviour of the American troops in Persia. On the 27th September the American Embassy published a communiqué explaining the attitude of the American Government in regard to the assets, and asserting that if the presence of American troops was not governed by an agreement that was because the Persian Government delayed discussion of a draft put forward in 1943 by the American Ambassador not only on behalf of his Government but personally. He considered an agreement to be necessary. These attacks were resented by the American Ambassador not only on behalf of his Government but personally. He had long regarded himself as the champion of Persian independence, and as proof he claimed to have been the author of the Declaration about Persia which was issued after the Tehran Conference in 1943; and in his violent reaction against what he considered ingratitude to him in person he presented a sad spectacle of the disillusioned sentimentalist.

104. Although we did not hear of it officially until October, Mr. Murray was worrying about the failure of the Persian Government to make use of the American advisers, and was in correspondence with the State Department on the subject. We did know, however, that as soon as he took office M. Bader, Minister of Finance in the Sadr Government, began to consider a reduction in the number of the advisers. His ostensible plan was a good one—to get rid of the less efficient (there are many who would be no loss) and to keep perhaps eight or ten for tasks where disinterestedness and indifference to Persian political or personal pressure would be of most value, *e.g.* arbitration, partition of the crown lands among the tenants, and so on. Private information however showed that he came to think that Persia could dispense with all the advisers, and this doubtless influenced his attitude made him unwilling to consult the

Americans (though it is true that he tended to ignore his Persian assistants too), and therefore drove the American Embassy to the conclusion that the American mission was unable to perform any useful service and was doing harm to United States prestige by remaining here.

Transfer of Polish Legation to Warsaw Government

107. Late in June the Warsaw Government sent a telegram to the representative of "Polpress" in Tehran, M. Lopatniuk, instructing him to take all steps to secure the property of the Polish Government in Tehran. His Majesty's Embassy explained to the Foreign Office that he was an ex chauffeur of the Polish legation and had been convicted for theft, and was hardly suitable to be the official representative of the new Polish Government. The embassy added that instructions issued to the Polish Chargé d'Affaires by the Polish Government in London were to wait until the Persian Government withdrew their recognition from him and recognised so-and-so as duly accredited representative of the new Polish Government. He was then to ask the Persian Government to take over the Polish Legation and property here. The embassy added that the property and funds employed by the Polish delegation in Tehran for the benefit of the Polish refugees were presumably to be treated separately and not handed over to the representative of the new Government. The Foreign Office agreed.

108. On the 23rd July the Persian Government recognised the new Polish Government and in the middle of August they accepted a M. Eugene John Milniokel as chargé d'affaires. In peace time he had been an inspector of s[illegible] he had been captured by the Russians in 1939 and released in 1941, and h[illegible] come to Palestine, where he was court martialled and imprisoned by the former Polish military authorities on a charge of having defamed the Polish Government whilst in Russia.

109. The new chargé d'affaires presented his letters to the Persi[illegible] ment on the 22nd September and took over the Polish Legation pre[illegible] them. When he called on His Majesty's chargé d'affaires he asked for [illegible] tion about the Polish refugees and this was supplied to him.

Polish Refugees

110. The dissolution of the Polish Government in London left the P[illegible] es there anxious lest the refugees in Persia should be deported to Russi[illegible] against their will. The Foreign Office enquired whether there was any danger of this. The embassy thought not, particularly since the embassy had fo[illegible] Polish refugee section and the refugees were thus under its auspices. On the other hand, the presence of these refugees in a country partially occupied by the Russians was a potential source of Anglo-Russian friction, and it was desirable to remove them to less contentious territory. The history of the quarter is therefore largely concerned with the proposal to evacuate the refugees to the Lebanon. The first set-back was early in July, when the movement to the Lebanon of the children's school at Isfahan and their attendant teachers and parents totalling 800 odd persons, was cancelled owing to the anti French trouble there. The rest of the quarter was spent in overcoming various difficulties. T[illegible] first difficulty was that the Lebanon Government demanded further assurances from His Majesty's Government that the refugees would not be left indefinitel[illegible] The second difficulty was the question of accommodation in the Lebanon. By the end of the quarter the move to the Lebanon of the Isfahan Poles had been [illegible] their existing obligations, though they would be ready if asked to take [illegible] more economical lines.

112. On the 24th August the embassy pointed out to the Foreign Offi[illegible] [illegible] the one hand, Moscow newspapers were accusing representatives of the f[illegible] Poland, and since these representatives were controlled by His Majesty's Government, these accusations reflected on them. On the other hand, the obligation

imposed on the embassy by His Majesty's Government to reduce the expenditure of the refugees made the embassy unpopular. The embassy therefore recom[illegible] U.N.R.R.A. [illegible] as possible. On the 1st September the Foreign Office informed the embassy confidentially that they had asked U.N.R.R.A. to assume responsibility for displaced persons, the majority of whom were Poles, in the British Empire and, where U.N.R.R.A. had not done so already, in the Middle East including Persia. U.N.R.R.A. had not, however, replied by the end of the quarter.

113. At an interview with the Polish Refugee Section of the Embassy, the new Warsaw Chargé d'Affaires said that he was unable at present to give official assistance to any refugees wishing to return from here to Poland, though any who could travel at their own expense were welcome to go back. Nor could he maintain any refugees who adhered to him or establish camps for them. He however expressed a wish to visit their camp and asked for facilities to circulate his Legation's bulletin there as the refugees knew nothing about the present Poland. The Embassy agreed to both these requests. Finally, the Chargé d'Affaires explained that he saw no objection to the move of the refugees to the Lebanon [illegible] ation to Poland from there would be easier than from Persia.

114. The attitude of the Chargé d'Affaires made matters politically m[illegible] [illegible] for this Embassy, since his acquiescence in our arrangements min[illegible] mised the prospect of Soviet misrepresentation. On the other hand, his refusal to repatriate or maintain his adherents meant that none would declare themselves openly for him as otherwise they would forfeit their benefits under the existing refugee organisation. It is thought, however, that if given a firm chance of returning to Poland, about 300–400 (*i.e.*, some 10 per cent. of the total) would go.

115. By the end of the quarter the number of Poles in Persia had gone down [illegible] to 3,473.

Persian Internees

116. All remaining Persian internees, including both those interned in Persia and those interned in Palestine, were released on the 15th August or a few days later. In order to anticipate any manifestation in their favour, representing them as Persian patriot martyrs, a communiqué was published at the same time in the press by His Majesty's Embassy, emphasising their complicity in the German conspiracy against the Allies and reproducing, in facsimile, the letter addressed by the Sayyid Abul Qasim Kashani to the Grand Mufti and Rashid Ali in Berlin.

European Internees

117. In consultation with the Security Authorities it was decided on the 7th June that, in principle, none of the several hundreds of Europeans deported from Persia or arrested in Persia in and after the year 1941 should be allowed to return, except for compelling compassionate reasons. The grounds for this decision were—

(1) That under present economic conditions in Persia, Europeans would rarely be able to find employment.

(2) That the return to Persia of several hundred Axis partisans having little love for the Allies would be undesirable for reasons of security.

(3) That the necessary consultations with the Russians might cause difficulties.

118. Although the British Security control of entry into Persia was surrendered in August at the time of the end of hostilities against Japan, the Persian authorities appear to be unwilling to permit the entry of ex internees without express British approval. In these circumstances the above decision was then upheld and was made known to the Persian Government and to the Australian Government and the Government of India.

119. A considerable number of applications for permission to return to Persia [illegible] Germans still remaining in internment in Persia have similarly been refused permission to remain in the country after release, and are to be repatriated in due course to Germany.

120. The problem of the disposal of the wives, children and interests in Persia of repatriated persons remains to be solved.

British Council

121. In view of the considerable cuts in the Council's allocations to Persia, the staff of the Council here have been analysing the possibilities of intensifying

their efforts with a minimum of expense and have reached the conclusion that this can best be achieved in the following ways:—

(a) Maintenance of the present scale of English language classes with the assistance of Persian teachers since British teachers are not available in sufficient quantities.

(b) Concentration on the professional classes appealing to them through their specialised subjects and through professional societies or groups to be formed in connection with the Institute activities. The professional classes are [illegible] and eager [illegible] to finance such societies themselves, requiring of the Council only accommodation for meetings and up-to-date British professional literature.

[illegible] appointment to the Council's staff in Tehran of scientific and medic[illegible] advisers to cultivate Persians with scientific and technical qualifica[illegible]

[illegible]

the second was notable as the Council's first attempt to arch[illegible] Persian [illegible]

123. On the 30th September 1,327 students were registered at the Tehran, 417 at the Isfahan and 348 at the Shiraz Institutes.

E 356/5/34 No 14

Correspondence concerning Discussions on Persia at the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. 16th-27th December 1945

List of Documents

1. Extract from record of Secretary of State's first meeting with M. Molotov 16th December.
2. Extract from record of Secretary of State's first conversation with Generalissimo Stalin, 16th December.
3. United Kingdom Delegation, Moscow, to Foreign Office. Telegram No. 119. Worthy [illegible]
4. Memorandum [illegible] by United Kingdom Delegation, Moscow. 24th Dec[illegible]
5. [illegible] by the United [illegible]
6. United Kingdom Dele[illegible]
7. Discussion of [illegible] Secretary of State [illegible] December [illegible] with [illegible] paragraph 11 of No. 9 above.
8. Private conversation between the Secretary of State and M. Molotov [illegible] December. Reference paragraph 7 of No. 9 above.
9. United Kingdom Delegation, Moscow, to Foreign Office. Telegram No. 186. Worthy [illegible]
10. United Kingdom Delegation, Moscow, to Foreign Office. Telegram No. 189. Worthy of 27th December.
11. [illegible] Delegation, Moscow, to Foreign Office. Telegram No. 171. Worthy [illegible]

Extract from the Record of a Meeting at the Kremlin on 16th December, 1945

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY [illegible] to say that there were parts of the world where Soviet interests and British interests touched, for instance in Greece, Turkey and Persia. There would be no misunderstanding if we and the

Russians fully appreciated each other's motives. The last thing he wanted was to see ourselves in conflict with the Soviet Union.

MOLOTOV asked: What else? THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that there remained the question of peace treaties, but this would be better discussed in the company of Mr. Byrnes. Reverting to Iran, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that he was not making any concrete proposals, but he [illegible] like Molotov to understand that for many reasons there was deep sympathy [illegible] feeling in the United Kingdom for Iran, and that constant questions about t[illegible] country were put in Parliament. He had been at special pains in his replies to say nothing that could be provocative to the Soviet Union.

MOLOTOV then turned to Iran and reminded the Foreign Secretary that the question of the withdrawal of troops had been discussed twice within [illegible] months, in Berlin and in London. On both occasions it had been agreed [illegible] by the treaties. There had been no disagreements. The Soviet Government had recognised the treaties as binding and did not see why th[illegible] up again. The events which had occurred in Azerbaijan had been a completely natural phenomenon of post war conditions. Far from keeping this movement, the [illegible] olve itself in any way. The whole matter [illegible] "local national aspirations." It was a purely internal matt[illegible] Government could not have played the part of impassive onlookers, because of the proximity of Azerbaijan to the frontiers of the Soviet Union. But in fact the whole thing had been a national democratic movement directed neither against the Persian Government nor the Soviet Government. The Russians were determined not to intervene, although the troubles were occurring on their frontiers.

Extract from the Record of a Meeting at the Kremlin on 19th December at 10 p.m.

GENERALISSIMO STALIN said that Mr. Byrnes had then put to him questions about Iran. He had spoken about the withdrawal of troops and had asked for the views of the Soviet Government. Generalissimo Stalin had told him that the Soviet Government did not propose an early withdrawal; they desired to safeguard Baku and the oil wells there. There was no guarantee of security to that region on account of the hostile attitude of th[illegible]

Mr. BEVIN asked whether the Soviet Government were afraid of an attack [illegible] Iran.

GENERALISSIMO STALIN replied that he was afraid of acts of sabotage.

Mr. BEVIN said that it was important to bring out into the light of day the misgivings which either side might have. He himself was quite ready to tell the Generalissimo what was feared in England. It was thought there that the Soviet Government were following a policy aiming at the incorporation of Azerbaijan, or making it into a satellite State. He did not say that the Govern[illegible] but it was held in the House of Commons and in the [illegible] Generalissimo Stalin must realise what a sensitive point Iran was to both Governments. He had observed to M. Molotov the day before that if there was any point of friction between their Governments, it was important once to try to remove it at an early stage. His Majesty's Government had interest in Iran and in Mosul and the oil of those regions. If only His Majesty's Government could know what it was exactly that the Soviet Government wanted it might be possible to co-operate.

GENERALISSIMO STALIN said that, frankly and honestly, he had no claims against Iran, that was to say, he had no idea of incorporating any part of [illegible] into the Soviet Union and no intention of impairing the sovereignty of [illegible]. But he wished to safeguard the oil of Baku against diversionary activiti[illegible] [illegible] damage the Baku oil industry and who had plans of long standing for the incorporation of Baku in Iran. As to this, he had little fear but there was a real danger of diversionary activities. He had no territorial claim against Iran or any intention of infringing Iranian sovereignty.

Mr. BEVIN said that we could assume then that Azerbaijan would remain [illegible] GENERALISSIMO STALIN replied that Azerbaijan in fact consisted of two different regions, only one of which was genuinely Persian.

Mr. BEVIN said that, at any rate, the Persian part would remain in Iran and GENERALISSIMO STALIN indicated his assent.

Mr. BEVIN said that he had taken an interest in the proposal for the establishment of provincial councils throughout Iran. His Majesty's Government had suggested to the Iranian Government that that ought to be done. Could we not set up a tripartite commission to advise and assist them. The Iranians did not seem capable of carrying out reform by themselves. This reform seemed to be necessary and might effect a settlement of Persia. If this suggestion appealed to the Generalissimo, his personal opinion was that, if the latter favoured it, he (Mr. Bevin) might advocate it with the United States Government.

GENERALISSIMO STALIN said that he might support this idea, but he must know exactly what was intended.

Mr. BEVIN explained that the measure had been provided for in the Ira[illegible] constitution but had never been carried out. He thought it was essential to carry it out but he feared that the Iranian Government would be unable to do it without [illegible].

GENERALISSIMO STALIN thought that that was probably the case and said that he would study the matter and then discuss it further. He thought it possible that agreement might be reached on this point.

3

United Kingdom Delegation, Moscow, to Foreign Office. (Received 26th December.)

(No. 119. Worthy.)
(Telegraphic.) [illegible]

His Majesty's Ambassador at Tehran was authorised by the Foreign Office to suggest to the Persian Government that they should announce their intention to introduce a scheme of provincial councils for the whole of Persia, including Azerbaijan. Suggestion was made to the Prime Minister and in a speech to H[illegible] Majesty he made a statement in the proposed sense, though he told His Majesty's Ambassador that it would be dangerous to hold provincial elections so long as there were Russian troops in the country. It seemed to me that the Persian [illegible] d and in my first talk with Stalin I suggested that the three [illegible] the Persian Government to set up provincial councils [illegible] r the proposal but he [illegible] Nations Organisation [illegible] to send to Molotov. Letter to you w[illegible] R[illegible] and their unfortunate effect on P[illegible] a tripartite commission to help the [illegible] provincial councils and to supervise the first provinc[illegible] seemed to me the essential points in the terms of reference for the proposed commission and pressed this scheme as preferable to the obvious alternative, viz., that the question should be raised by the Persian Government with the United Nations Organisation. Byrnes proposed that the remonstrances and arguments should be put forward orally and proposed a memorandum consisting of our suggested terms of reference expanded by the inclusion of provisions designed to protect the Persians and of a clause empowering the commission also to "look into the question of facilitating the early withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia and to make appropriate recommendations to the Governments of the three Powers."

I thought it as well to accept the American memorandum as it stood, since it is with some difficulty that they had been brought to accept a share of the responsibility and I am putting it to the Russians as my own. It is true that it may take some time to set up the commission and that little of the six months from the conclusion of hostilities may be left before it makes recommendations for the withdrawal of Allied troops, but this is perhaps of little importance [illegible] view of the obvious intention of the Russians to keep their troops in Persia until the last moment. In my telegram No. 53, Worthy, I informed you of Stalin's allegation about the danger to Baku from the present "unfriendly" Persian Government—a theme which he developed still more strongly in his talk with Byrnes.

4

Memorandum circulated by the British Delegation at the 11th Meeting.

Suggested Draft Terms of Reference for Tripartite Commission on Iran.

1. The Commission to take as its point of departure the fact that durin[illegible] the presence in Persia of Allied troops the Persian economy and government organisation have been disturbed and difficulties have arisen between the central government and the inhabitants of certain provinces. The Three Powers recognise that they may have some responsibility for this and should therefore endeavour to assist the Persian State in re-establishing normal conditions to the satisfaction of all elements of the population and maintaining friendly relations with other countries.

2. With a view to allaying the apprehensions of the Persian Government [illegible] to remove causes of international friction, the Commission to look into the question of facilitating the early withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia and to make appropriate recommendations to the Governments of the Three Powers.

3. The Commission to keep in mind (*a*) the undertaking given by Great Britain and Soviet Russia in the Treaty of January, 1942, to respect the politica[illegible] independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Persia, and (*b*) the declara[illegible]ion about Persia issued during the Tehran Conference by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Stalin and Mr. Churchill.

4. With a view to reconciling the existing differences between the central Persian Government and certain regions of the country, the Commission to advise and assist the Persian Government in the establishment of provincial councils, in accordance with the provisions of the Persian constitution.

5. The recommendations of the Commission (which must receive the [illegible] before being submitted to the Persian Govern[illegible] [illegible] with respect to provincial [illegible] the Commission to recommend any [illegible] especially in regard to the elections [illegible] of the councils and the manner in wh[illegible]

7. The Commission also to make recommendations as to the use of the minority languages such as Arabic, Turkish and Kurdish for educational and other purposes.

8. The Commission to consult closely with the Persian Government and with representatives of all important elements of the population in the process of formulating its recommendations.

9. The Three Powers to use their best endeavours to persuade the Persian Government to pass into law and to put into execution the recommendations made by the Commission.

10. The Commission to make no recommendation which would weaken the fundamental unity of the Persian State.

11. The first provincial elections to be carried out under the supervision of the Commission.

Moscow, 24th December, 1945.

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(5)

Extract from Notes of a Conversation at the Kremlin on Monday, 24th December.

Iran

Mr. BEVIN said that he had communicated with His Majesty's Govern[illegible] did not help feeling that although, of course they recognised that the Soviet Government were entitled to take all measures to protect the Baku [illegible], the situation was not such as to j[illegible] forces in Northern Iran. British troops had been reduced in number to 4,000, and these were stationed at a considerable distance from the capital. Even if the last British troops were withdrawn, the situation which had developed would mean that there was no complete settlement. Therefore, he had submitted to M. Molotov a proposal for a Three Power Commission with a draft of their terms of reference. He felt, and His Majesty's Government felt, that the three Governments having had this area placed at their disposal for the purposes of the war, it would be unfortunate if they had to con[illegible] in order to clear up t[illegible] misunderstanding between our two Gover[illegible] now submitted offered a chance of clearing up the situation, safeguardi[illegible] grity of Iran and removing difficulties between Russia and the United Kingdom.

GENERALISSIMO STALIN said that the[illegible] for some sort of agreement. He would have some [illegible] substantial importance to propose, and he would communicate these that night or the following morning.

Mr. BEVIN said that those amendments, when received, would be carefully [illegible] and he would then consult with Mr. Byrnes and M. Molotov and try [illegible] agreement.

GENERALISSIMO STALIN said that he hoped that our two Governments might find a common ground. What was Mr. Byrnes's position?

Mr. BEVIN said that Mr. Byrnes had not definitely committed himself, but he would see him on the following [illegible]

Soviet Amendments to Memorandum circulated by United Kingdom Delegation (No. 4)

THE Soviet Delegation propose to introduce into the draft on the question of the competence of the Tripartite Commission on Iran the following amendments:—

1. The heading to read as follows: "On the Tripartite Commission for Iranian questions."
2. The draft to begin with the following introductory sentence: "[illegible] Governments of Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. have agreed on the formation of a Tripartite Commission for Iranian questions."
3. Second paragraph to read thus:

   "With a view to removing the apprehensions of the Iranian Government and causes of international friction, the Commission shall deal with the question of the acceleration, as far as possible, of the withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran and make corresponding recommendations to the Governments of the Three Powers."

4. In paragraph 5 for "certain regions of the country" read "certain provinces of the country."
5. Paragraph 7 to read as follows:

   "The Commission shall also make recommendati[illegible] the free use of the languages of national minorities s[illegible] Turki, Kurdish for purposes of education, &c."

[illegible]th December, 1945.

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(6)

Draft as finally accepted by the United Kingdom Delegation.

Tripartite Commission for Iranian Affairs.

THE Governments of Great Britain, U.S.S.R. and the United States have agreed on the formation of a Tripartite Commission for Iranian questions and [illegible] sent to the Iranian Government for their con[illegible] reference. The terms of reference are as follows:—

1. The Commission shall take as its point of departure the fact that during the presence in Persia of Allied troops, the Persian economy and governmental [illegible] have been disturbed and difficulties have arisen between the central [illegible] the [illegible] your to assist th[illegible] satisfaction of all elements of the po[illegible] with other countries.

2. With a view to removing the apprehensions of the Iranian Government and causes of international friction, the Commission shall deal with the question of the acceleration as far as possible of the withdrawal of Allied troops fr[illegible] Iran, and shall make appropriate recommendations to the Governments of the Three Powers.

3. The Commission shall keep in mind (a) the undertaking given by Great Britain and Soviet Russia in the Treaty of January 1942 to respect the political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Persia, and (b) the declaration about Persia issued during the Tehran Conference by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Stalin and Mr. Churchill.

4. With a view to reconciling th[illegible] Persian Government and certain pro[illegible] advise and assist the Persian Government in the establishment of provi[illegible] councils, in accordance with the provisions of the Persian constitution.

5. The Recommendations of the Commission (which must receive th approval of the Three Governments before being submitted to the Persian Government) shall cover the whole of Persia, including Azerbaijan.

6. [illegible] laws amplifying the relevant provisions of the constitution [illegible] vincial councils) shall be taken as the point of departure but [illegible] shall recommend any amendments which seem to be required especially in regard to the elections to the local councils, the powers and duties of the councils and the manner in which they are to be furnished with funds.

7. The Commission shall also make recommendations as to the free use of the minority languages such as Arabic, Turki and Kurdish for educational and other purposes.

8. The Commission shall consult closely with the Persian Government and with representatives of all important elements of the population in the process of formulating its recommendations.

9. The Three Powers shall use their best endeavours to persuade the Persian Government to pass into law and to put into execution the recommendations made by the Commission.

10. The Commission shall make no recommendation which would weaken the fundamental unity of the Persian State.

11. The first provincial elections shall be carried out under the supervision of the Commission.

25th December, 1945.

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(8)

United Kingdom Delegation, Moscow, to Foreign Office.—(Received 29th December.)

(No. 164. Worthy.)

[illegible] 27th December, 1945.

MY immediately following telegram gives the United States draft based on [illegible] ments, which are contained in my telegram No. 166, bore out his statement, as

reported in my telegram No. 142. Worthy, that they would be of no very great substantial importance. I decided, however, that we ought to try for amendments on the following three points:—

(a) In the preamble the addition of the words "and are submitting this agreement to the Persian Government for their concurrence." Mr. Byrnes agreed that it would be right to obtain Persian concurrence.

(b) In paragraph 2 omission of the words "as far as possible" and amendment of the paragraph to read "acceleration of the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia which is due to be completed by the 2nd March, 1946 at latest."

I was inclined to propose omission altogether of this clause since I was advised that in actual practice it would be difficult for any acceleration of the withdrawal to take place before the 2nd March seeing that the commission could hardly get to work before mid-January and would take time to complete its recommendations on this question, while troop movements would have to begin several weeks before the 2nd March if they were to be withdrawn before that date. There was, therefore, a danger that the Soviet Government would use this clause as a pretext to delay withdrawal. Mr. Byrnes was, however, insistent on the retention of the clause.

(c) In paragraph 7 I considered that we should return to the original language of our draft, viz., "The use of the minority languages."

2. An amended draft containing the Soviet amendments and the three counter amendments was discussed at an informal meeting on the 25th December. Mr. Byrnes remained silent except to support me when I deprecated the limitation of "acceleration" in the second paragraph by "as far as possible." I proposed "maximum possible acceleration," but this Molotov would not accept as to paragraph 7. I objected that "free use" might tie the hands of the commission from the beginning and proposed "right to use." There was also some discussion about the use of the word "national minorities," which seemed to me to beg the question, but in the end it was agreed that the word might be used in the Russian idiom and Soviet practice while the English text would read "minority languages." Thus, at the end of the informal meeting on the 25th December there were in our belief only two points left over for further consideration, viz., "as far as possible" in paragraph 2 and "free" in paragraph 7.

3. The next day I had decided that the insertion of "free" would not [illegible] accepted on the grounds that if we accept the Soviet assurance of their intention to leave by the end of six months, we must conclude that the removal of stores and troops would probably be in full swing before the commission could make any [illegible]

4. I therefore had a private conversation with Molotov before the informal meeting on the 26th December and said that I was prepared to accept the two outstanding Soviet amendments. To my surprise Molotov said that the Soviet [illegible] advanced was that they could not agree to the proposal that the agreement should [illegible] would not be possible to proceed without the concurrence of the Persian Government, the proposed agreement should be dropped. I emphasised the strong interest aroused in Great Britain by the situation in Persia, and said that a very bad impression would be created if it could not be announced that the matter had been raised in Moscow and an understanding reached.

5. I suggested that we should announce that views had been exchanged between them on proposals which were now being taken up with the Persian Government through the diplomatic channel. Molotov refused my proposal, and said that the furthest he could go was to consider including a passage in the communiqué to the effect that views had been exchanged between the three Foreign Secretaries, that understanding had been arrived at, and that the next step would be for the question to be pursued through diplomatic channels. He would not commit himself to agreeing that the approach to the Persian Government should be on basis of our draft proposals.

6. At the informal meeting on the 26th December immediately following this discussion I raised the question of Persia, and Molotov said that the Soviet delegation considered that the question should be dropped. He gave no reason for dropping the matter beyond alleging that it had been decided at the beginning

of the conference that it was to be taken off the agenda. He added that we must not say that nothing had been done: we had exchanged views. Mr. Byrnes gave me no support. I left Molotov in no doubt as to the unfortunate effect which the Soviet attitude would produce on His Majesty's Government. The meeting then went into recess and I requested an interview with Stalin.

7. In the evening I saw Molotov again and told him that I had informed His Majesty's Government of Stalin's views and that, if the subject were now to be dropped without any agreement being announced, it would cause great perturbation and misunderstanding. Molotov, besides employing the arguments he had used before, laid much stress on the hostile attitude of the present Persian [illegible] Prime Minister was possibly speaking under a certain feeling of frustration, due to his inability to visit certain parts of his own country. As it was plain that I could get nowhere with Molotov I broke off the interview after about an hour's discussion, but on leaving Molotov I made a very frank statement to him. I said that I did not want to be faced with *faits accomplis*. No one was more anxious than I to work in peace and collaboration with the Soviet Union, but I definitely resented being faced with *faits accomplis*. Public opinion at home was quite [illegible] Perhaps I might be wrong, but that was the impression which prevailed. Molotov replied that there were no grounds to look for *faits accomplis*. The Persian question was always open to discussion and Russia was making no claims on Persian territory.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Tehran as my telegrams Nos. 825 and 204 respectively.

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(9)

United Kingdom Delegation's Discussion on the Two Soviet Amendments in the Draft on the Tripartite Commission for Persian Affairs and Record of Secretary of State's Second (Private) Conversation with M. Molotov 28th December (with Annex) (Reference: Paragraphs 4 and 5 of No. (8))

THE Secretary of State discussed with Sir A. Cadogan, Sir R. Bullard and General Jacob this morning the two Soviet amendments in the draft on the tripartite commission for Persian affairs which were left unsettled at last night's meeting with the three Foreign Secretaries.

2. The first amendment was the insertion of the words "as far as possible" [illegible] "acceleration of the withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran." [illegible] 2. It was felt that in actual practice it would be difficult for any [illegible] take place before the 2nd March, since the [illegible] before mid-January and would take some time to complete its report on that point, while it would be necessary for the movement of troops to begin in early February if they were to be withdrawn by [illegible] It was therefore [illegible] attracted the United States De[illegible] terms of reference, but was lifted b[illegible] draft letter to M. Molotov which had [illegible] into the revised terms of reference which [illegible] attitude of the United States Delegation, the [illegible] the Soviet amendment and to drop his reques[illegible]

[illegible] the Soviet amendment of [illegible] *norities*) though he would [illegible] the right to use."

[illegible] the Secretary of State raised [illegible] M. [illegible] Sir A. Cad[illegible] M. Vyshinski, M. Pavlov and I were also present.)

6. M. Molotov at once raised the question of obtaining the concurrence of the Persian Government. [illegible] as follows: "The Governments of Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the United States have agreed to the formation of a tripartite Commission for Iranian questions." The United

Kingdom Delegation, said M. Molotov, had at first suggested the [illegible] the words "with the approval of the Persian Government." They had in[illegible] [illegible] mitting [illegible] Government for their concurrence [illegible] that the draft agreement ha[illegible] affairs without having obtained [illegible] M. Molotov therefore suggested [illegible] whole matter should be dropped.

7. In order to test M. Molotov's attitude the Secre[illegible] two Soviet amendments mentioned above. On the first amendment (concerning [illegible]) he said that for his part we stood by the treaty [illegible] es exchanged with M. Molotov in London. Did M. Mo[illegible] the intention to withdraw by the treaty date? M. Molotov [illegible] that this was the Soviet intention. The Secretary of State th[illegible] that he did not wish to press for the inclusion of the referenc[illegible] of the 2nd March by which withdrawal was due to be completed by the [illegible]. In regard to the second amendment he hoped that M. Molotov would be able to meet him by accepting "the right to use." M. Molotov said he would consider this lat[illegible]

8. Returning to [illegible] that the whole agreemen[illegible] be dropped owing to the di[illegible] tation with the Persian [illegible] ment, the Secretary of Sta[illegible] which had been [illegible] impression would be created unless it could be announced that the matt[illegible] [illegible] niqué should state that views had been exchanged [illegible] ts on the subject and that agreement had been re[illegible] hem on proposals which were now being taken up with the Persian [illegible] ut through the diplomat[illegible]

9. M. Molotov demurred to a statement on these lines, since he could [illegible] say that agreement had been reached. The furthest he would go we[illegible] under the inclusion of a passage in the communiqué to the follow[illegible]

> Views were exchanged between the Foreign Secretaries of the United Kin[illegible] United States and the U.S.S.R. on the Persian question, and understanding was arrived at. The next step will be for this question to be pursued through diplomatic channels with the Persian Government.

M. Molotov said that he would let the Secretary of State know later whether this suggestion could be accepted.

10. The Secretary of State enquired whether the approach to the Persian Government, if agreed, could be made on the basis of the draft agreement under discussion. M. Molotov assented. But his assent was presumably subject to confirmation as in the case of the suggested formula.

11. During the discussion with M. Molotov, which was hurried, the attached formula was drafted but not produced, its object being to make sure that the approach to the Persian Government would be on a firm and agreed basis, and to hold the Soviet Government to the terms of the draft on which, subject to our acceptance of the two outstanding Soviet amendments, agreement seemed to have been reached last night. But the Secretary of State felt that it would be useless to press M. Molotov further on the matter.

P. DIXON

Moscow, 26th December, 1944.

ANNEX

I.—*In the Protocol and the published communique.*

VIEWS were exchanged between the Foreign Secretaries of the United Kingdom, United States and U.S.S.R. on the Persian question, and agreement was reached between the three Governments on proposals which are now being taken up with the Persian Government through the diplomatic channel.

II.—*In the Protocol only (not published).*

Tripartite Commission for Iranian Affairs.

[illegible] U.S.S.R. have agreed on the following proposals regarding Persian affairs.

A Tripartite Commission consisting of representatives of the G[illegible] of the United Kingdom, United States and U.S.S.R. shall be formed with the following terms of reference:—

(See draft as finally accepted by the United Kingdom Delegation (No. (7)), subject to our request for substitution of "the right to use" for "the free use" in paragraph 7.)

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(10)

Extract from Record of 13th (Informal) Meeting of Foreign Secretaries, 26th December.

3. Iran.

M. MOLOTOV felt there was no purpose in discussing Iran further. It was not on the agenda.

Mr. BYRNES said that they had agreed to discuss it informally. They had better discuss the communiqué now and then revert to it.

Mr. BEVIN said that Austria and Germany were not on the agenda either [illegible] He [illegible] Iran informally.

M. MOLOTOV said there had been a lot of talk about Iran already, with no result.

Mr. BYRNES said that if no solution were reached they would meet again for the U.N.O. session in London.

M. MOLOTOV said that M. Vyshinski would probably represent the Soviet [illegible] colleagues did not want to.

* * * * * *

7. Iran (again).

Mr. B[illegible] [illegible] accepted virtually all the Soviet amen[illegible] which he had put forward were accepted as an understanding on the basis [illegible] with a view to the setting up of a Commission.

M. MOLOTOV said that he could not accept that. It should suffice that there had been an exchange of views [illegible] on the agenda, that no decision had been reached, and that there should be no reference to this matter in the communiqué.

Mr. BEVIN asked what M. Molotov thought the British Government's next step would have to be?

M. MOLOTOV replied that he thought that Mr. Bevin knew this well [illegible]

Mr. BEVIN said that he thought he understood the position. He regretted it. He had thought that his proposal constituted one of the steps that might be taken to clear up what looked like being a very awkward situation between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. It was a question which provoked a good deal of feeling.

On the proposal of Mr. Byrnes it was agreed to adjourn.

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(11)

Note of Private Conversation between the Secretary of State and M. Molotov held at Spiridonovka Palace on 20th December, 1945.

Mr. BEVIN said he would have liked to speak to Stalin on the subject of Iran. There was great public disquiet in the United Kingdom about the position there, and he was most anxious that nothing should happen in that country to disturb the relations between their two Governments. He had advised the British Government of Stalin's views and if the subject were now to be dropped without any agreement being announced it would cause great perturbation and [illegible]

M. MOLOTOV pointed out that the question of Iran had not been on the Conference agenda. In any case, several other questions had already been settled.

Mr. BEVIN said it was expected that there would be a written agreement between their two Governments regarding Iran, and he thought he had virtually achieved an understanding with Stalin as a result of their conversations. What happened to prevent this understanding being fully realised?

M. MOLOTOV said there was an understanding and also a treaty. Views had been exchanged both in London and Berlin.

Mr. BEVIN said that much had happened since then and the British Government did not know what the present Soviet policy was regarding Iran.

M. MOLOTOV said Mr. Bevin had had several talks with the Generalissimo.

Mr. BEVIN replied that everything seemed to have been withdrawn.

M. MOLOTOV said that the Soviet Government was not withdrawing. Talks would be resumed when the time came.

Mr. BEVIN [illegible] if no Commission were [illegible] Commission to Iran to examine the [illegible] treaty. He was afraid that the Iranian [illegible] difficulties arise.

M. MOLOTOV said that that would not be the first time such changes had occurred. He had been perfectly happy with the present Iranian Government until it began to abuse the Soviet.

Mr. BEVIN wished to be quite frank. His Majesty's Government were afraid of the policy pursued by the Soviet Government. He had felt reassured after his talk with Stalin that a satisfactory understanding would be reached. He would find it very difficult to sign a protocol which would make no mention of an understanding about Iran.

M. MOLOTOV said that would be Mr. Bevin's affair. There were no grounds for mentioning Iran in the protocol. As to the talk with Stalin, Mr. Bevin knew perfectly well that the Generalissimo "did not say his words for nothing and scatter them to the winds."

Mr. BEVIN agreed, but it was his understanding that the United Kingdom memorandum was acceptable, subject to minor amendments. He had been prepared to accept the original draft reading "[illegible] with the approval of the Iranian Government [illegible]" if that would ensure an understanding. He thought the document submitted offered a satisfactory basis of agreement subject to some amendment. Was that understanding to be regarded as withdrawn?

M. MOLOTOV asked what Mr. Bevin had in mind.

Mr. BEVIN enquired whether, if the concurrence of the Iranian Government were [illegible] public opinion if no firm understanding could be achieved on this proposal. The understanding was more important to him than the document.

M. MOLOTOV thought the document would remain a scrap of paper unless the concurrence of the Iranian Government were secured. Until then the question would remain open. No definite decision had yet been taken.

Mr. BEVIN pointed out that he had accepted all the amendments and yet there was still no decision. Would the approval of the Iranian Government offer a basis for implementing the agreement?

M. MOLOTOV reminded Mr. Bevin that he had had talks both with himself and Stalin, and [illegible] agreement with the present Iranian Government which kept on denouncing the Soviet Union.

Mr. BEVIN asked what was meant by denouncing.

M. MOLOTOV referred Mr. Bevin to the London Press. If this were not enough, he need only read a statement made by the Persian Prime Minister to the Majlis.

Mr. BEVIN pointed out that the Prime Minister was possibly speaking under a certain feeling [illegible] of his own country. He himself would strongly object to obstacles being put in the way of his visiting Scotland, for example.

M. MOLOTOV said that Mr. Bevin seemed to be justifying the Persian Prime Minister's action. He could not accept that.

Mr. BEVIN said that His Majesty's Government were deeply concerned in the affairs of Iran.

M. MOLOTOV pointed out that Iran was even closer to the Soviet Union than Great Britain was.

Mr. BEVIN agreed that both countries were close to Persia.

M. MOLOTOV then reverted to the "abuse" which was being showered on him by the Iranians. He resented it.

Mr. BEVIN replied that he himself got lots of abuse, but he brushed it [illegible] Would the Commission be proceeded with?

M. MOLOTOV said that was a matter to be discussed. As it was not possible to take a decision now, it was not much use going through the document. Mr. Bevin was aware of Stalin's views.

Mr. BEVIN assented, but pointed out that the matter had not crystallised.

M. MOLOTOV said this was due to the fact that a decision was not yet "ripe."

Mr. BEVIN asked what decision.

M. MOLOTOV said the decision which Mr. Bevin was seeking—the appointment of a Commission [illegible] that nothing could be decided without the assent of the Iranian Government. With that he agreed. It was [illegible] document to which the Iranian Government had not agreed. The way the question was being put was not acceptable to the Soviet Government.

Mr. BEVIN reverted to his query whether the approval of the Iranian Government would offer a basis for implementing the agreement.

M. MOLOTOV said the way Mr. Bevin was putting the question was not acceptable to him.

Mr. BEVIN said that the two Governments would have to watch the course of events.

M. MOLOTOV said the two Governments would find a way out of the difficulty.

MR. BEVIN asked when.

M. MOLOTOV said that Mr. Bevin and himself were "lively people," and would find a way out. There would be many occasions for discussing this question. Meanwhile, it would be good if the Persians would stop their abuse.

MR. BEVIN said he did not wish to see similar difficulties arise as had [illegible] by [illegible] nients pursue the same line of policy and not get involved in complications on account of small countries.

M. MOLOTOV agreed.

MR. BEVIN wished to be completely frank. He did not want to be faced with *faits accomplis*. No-one was more anxious than he was to work in peace [illegible] that a *fait accompli* was being staged. They might be wrong, but that was the impression which prevailed.

M. MOLOTOV said there were no grounds to look for *faits accomplis*. The [illegible] on Persian territory. Mr. Bevin had had a long talk with Stalin and had learned his views, which had not left the matter obscure.

As M. Molotov's arguments were becoming trivial, the Secretary of State broke off the conversation.

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(12)

United Kingdom Delegation, Moscow, to Foreign Office.—(Received 28th December.)

No. 168. Worthy.
(Telegraphic.) *Moscow, 27th December, 1945.*

My telegram No. 164. Worthy.

[illegible]

as well as to His Majesty's Ambassador, would enable me to a[illegible] [illegible] failed, discussion in the British press, with favourable comment on the [illegible]ble attitude adopted by the [illegible] Persians and damage the cause of [illegible]

2. It is possible that [illegible] Persian Government may want to on[illegible] [illegible] Persia at this conference may bring about the overthrow of Hakimi and his [illegible] and in this way also do what the Russians want. I consider, however, that it

would be difficult for any Prime Minister to reject our scheme and at the same time to recognise Azerbaijan autonomy and that we ought, therefore, to continue to back our scheme even if a pro-Russian Government should come into power in Tehran.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Tehran as my telegrams Nos. 829 and 208 respectively.

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(13)

United Kingdom Delegation, Moscow, to Foreign Office.—(Received 28th December.)

(No. 169. Worthy.)
(Telegraphic.) *Moscow, 27th December, 1945.*

My telegram No. 164. Worthy.

Pretext finally given by Molotov after suspicious beginning for refusal to [illegible] or Persia was Persian abuse of [illegible] themselves, but it might ease the [illegible] Ambassadors in London and [illegible] statements about Russia and if the Soviet newspapers in Tehran kept their criticism within narrower bounds than usual.

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Tehran as my telegrams Nos. 830 and 209 respectively.

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(14)

United Kingdom Delegation, Moscow, to Foreign Office.—(Received 28th December.)

(No. 171. Worthy.)
(Telegraphic.) *Moscow, 27th December, 1945.*

My telegram No. 164. Worthy.

Following is text of letter dated the 27th December, in which Mr. Byrnes has concurred, which I am sending to Molotov on my departure from Moscow, 28th December.

> 'It has been a great disappointment to me that, after my friendly exchange of views with the Generalissimo, we have been unable to come to a final agreement about the treatment of Persian questions, and I am sure that my Government will be equally disappointed. However, I will report to them fully the exchange of views that has taken place and the amendments to my proposals which you suggested and I accepted.
>
> I [illegible] uninformed and I am therefore instructing Sir R. Bullard to acquaint them with the course of conversations in Moscow and the proposals which were submitted for their views. I have informed Mr. Byrnes of the contents of this letter, who is advising his representative in Tehran in a similar sense.'

Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Tehran as my telegrams Nos. 832 and 211 respectively.

[E 5,5 34]

No. 15

Mr. Bevin to Mr. Farquhar (Tehran).

(No. 311.) *Foreign Office, 31st December, 1945.*

Sir,

THE Iranian Ambassador came to see me to-day. He enquired what had happened at Moscow with special reference to the statement by Mr. Byrnes regarding the setting up of a commission. I told the Ambassador that it was true that we did propose a commission of the three Governments with a view to

establishing for all provinces, including Azerbaijan, the provincial councils arranged under the Iranian Constitution of 1907, and also to consider whether the Allied troops could not be removed more speedily. Sir Reader Bullard was [illegible] back now to consult with the Iranian Government, and if a reply could be obtained quickly then we would go into the matter again immediately. I had not been in a position to settle anything in Moscow because I had not the views of the Iranian Government as to whether they would favour the proposal. I advised the Ambassador to tell his Government to keep calm and steady, and consider the whole in discussions which could be taken up with them as soon as our Ambassador arrived in Tehran.

2. The Ambassador also raised with me the question as to whether we would support Iran as a member of the Security Council on the ground of early entry into the war, geographical distribution and the services they had placed at the disposal of the Allies. I told him I would consider it, but could give him no assurance at the moment.

3. At the end of our talk the Ambassador expressed the fear that pressure would be brought to bear to bring his Government down. My advice to him was that the best step to take would be to move with speed and decision as soon as the Ambassador arrived.

I am &c.
ERNEST BEVIN

E 7339/70/34] No. 16

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 37, Secret, for the Period 17th September to 23rd September, 1945. (Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 336 of 24th September; Received in Foreign Office, 1st October.)

Persian Affairs

The Majlis

1. No [illegible] importance has been done during the past week. At [illegible] of the 16th September the debate on the Two-Twelfths Budget Bill was resumed but was not concluded. On the 18th September there was no public session as the Prime Minister had asked the Speaker to convene a special joint meeting of the Majlis Budget and Foreign Affairs Commissions to discuss ways and means for the transference of American military assets in Persia to the Persian Government. Representatives of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs, Roads and Communications and Finance also attended this meeting. On the 19th September the Majlis met but rose on account of there being no quorum. On the 20th September the Minister for Foreign Affairs made a statement in amplification of his recent note to the British, Russian and American Embassies on the subject of the evacuation of Persia by Allied troops (see paragraph 2 of last Intelligence Summary). In reply to criticism of his note he explained that in giving the 2nd March, 1946, as the date by which the evacuation of Persia [illegible] His Government did not wish to convey the impression that they were willing to see the Allied occupation of Persia continue up to that date. On the contrary the Persian Government regarded it as an essential preliminary to the return to normality that the evacuation should be begun as speedily as possible and concluded, if possible, before that date.

Political

2. There is some evidence to show that the Majlis majority does [illegible] the present crisis would be a very dangerous step. The name of Hakim-ul Mulk is again being mentioned as a possible successor to Sadr.

3. Growing anxiety is felt in political and ministerial circles at the lack [illegible] from [illegible] about the [illegible] Persia [illegible] Hitherto in expediting other people's business, invariably gave the highest priority [illegible] problem was not [illegible] Persian Ambassador [illegible] appearing

the agenda of the conference, had made no mention of Persia, contributed to the general feeling of suspense. More recently a message from Reuters alluding to a rumour current in London that the Russians might possibly ask for the separation of Azerbaijan from Persia has added to this consternation.

The Tudeh

4. The stock of the Tudeh party in Tehran has slumped during the past week. The reasons are —

(i) The closing of the Tudeh party offices by the Military Governor.
(ii) the suppression of some of the Tudeh papers.
(iii) the injuries sustained in a scuffle with the military by Dr. Kishawarz, the Tudeh leader.
(iv) the communiqué issued by the Chief of the General Staff on the recent mutiny in the Persian army in which Tudeh complicity is made amply clear;
(v) the evacuation of Tehran by Soviet troops by which the Tudeh realise that Russian armed assistance will be no longer available to save them from the consequences of their acts of hooliganism.

Internal Security

Azerbaijan

5. Increased activity is being shown by the newly formed Democratic party (see Intelligence Summary No. 35, paragraph 7) and by the Russians in giving open support to it. It has revealed its true colours and origin by its insistence on provincial autonomy for Azerbaijan. Nobody is likely to be deceived by this and everybody will realise that from provincial autonomy through separation from Persia to incorporation in the U.S.S.R. is but a short step. The Azerbaijan Tudeh party has announced the severance of ties with the central Tudeh party in Tehran and of its adherence to the Azerbaijan Democratic party.

Isfahan and Kuhkiluyeh

6. The General Officer Commanding, Isfahan Division, has despatched an infantry battalion to Feridan to assist in disarming some of the Chahar Lang Bakhtiari khans.

7. General Hamayuni, who has recently relinquished the command of the Khuzistan Division on being appointed to Kurdistan, gives a version differing widely from that of Murteza Quli Khan on the recent raid by Bahmai and [illegible] summary No. 34, paragraph 9). The general states that the raiders did not exceed 250 in number and that Murteza Quli Khan's own bakhdar at Izeh, one Ali Khalili, though supplied with 150 rifles by the State to maintain order, made no attempt to do so nor in fact reported the raid to any Government authority.

Kurdistan

8. A delicate situation is likely to arise if the General Officer Commanding Kurdistan Division, carries out the orders recently given him by the Chief of the General Staff. The latter, anxious to achieve a decisive victory and conclude these operations before winter sets in or other commitments arise, and impatient at the lack of success by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in securing Iraqi co-operation in closing the frontier to Kurds attempting to flee before the advancing [illegible] the Kurds if necessary across the frontier and continue his disarmament operations inside Iraqi territory.

Persian army

9. A short summary of a communiqué on the recent events in Khorassan and the mutiny in the Persian army which was given to the Persian press by the Chief of the General Staff is published as Appendix B to this summary.

Appointments

10. (i) Muhammad Namazi, a well-known business man and brother-in-law of General Muhammad Hussein Murza Firuz, has been appointed Persian Trade Commissioner in the United States.

(ii) Muhammad Muazzimi Gudarzi to be 2nd Secretary at Washington;
(iii) Abul Qasim Pannahi to be consul in New York,
(iv) Ghulam Abbas Aram from 2nd Secretary, Berne, to be 1st Secretary at [illegible]
(v) Dr Parviz Mahdavi to be vice-consul, New York,
(vi) Ghulam Abbas Quli Khalatbari to be 2nd Secretary at Berne,
(vii) Ali Asghar Shukuh to be 2nd Secretary at Beirut,
[illegible] Muhammad Hussein Najm to be Chief of the Personnel Department [illegible] the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
[illegible] Abbas Nafisi to be Persian Government delegates from the Red Lion and Sun Society at the forthcoming International Red Cross Congress at Geneva
(x) Engineer Habib Nafisi has been appointed chairman of the committee which is to represent Persia at the International Labour Conference which is to be held in Paris next month and Shahab Khusrusani is to represent factory owners. Representatives for the northern and southern factories and one representative for the workers are to be appointed by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and it is also probable that a Ministry of Finance representative will attend the conference. Dr Hisam-ul din Ihtisham is also one of the del[illegible]
(xi) General Muhammad Hussein Firuz, late Governor-General of Fars, to be an Inspector General of Military District No. 5 (Kurdistan).

British Interests

11. A note by the commercial secretary of this embassy on the present position regarding the disposal of British military assets in Persia is attached as Appendix A to this summary.

12. His Majesty's Embassy have communicated to the Soviet Embassy and the Persian Government the programme for the evacuation of Tehran by the British military forces. It is as follows:

(i) By the 2nd October all British army units will be clear of Tehran except for small rear parties. By the same date the Royal Air Force will have withdrawn from Tehran except for a rear party of approximately 86 British officers and men and 60 Royal Air Force Levies who will be located in the camp at Mehrabad.
(ii) By the 15th October these army and Royal Air Force rear parties will also have left and the only British troops remaining in Tehran will be those employed in liquidation of assets, disposal of claims, &c., as per list below:

	[illegible]	[illegible] ranks
Hirings, Disposal and Claims	[illegible]	[illegible]
Transportation Finance	[illegible]	[illegible]
Department of Movements	[illegible]	1
Administration Officer	1	1
Signals Department	1	11
Middle East Supply Centre	1	7
British Embassy Representative for Polish Refugees	1	
Royal Engineers Stores Organisation (Sawmill)		3
Public Relations Bureau		6
	25	39

(iii) A very [illegible] connected with the Lar irrigation project will also be working south of Tehran till the 30th November. Their numbers are as follows:—
5 officers and 160 British other ranks.
(iv) The Royal Air Force propose to retain their rights under the protocol [illegible] Soviet forces are withdrawn from the airfield and adjacent buildings. It is not intended to keep any Royal Air Force personnel in Tehran in this connexion.

The above information has also been given to the American Military Attache and the Persian Chief of the General Staff.

Russian Interests

13. The Soviet Ambassador has returned to Tehran.

14. The Russians withdrew their troops from Qaleh Murgheh aerodrome during the night of the 18th–19th September. Some twenty-five Intourist personnel have remained to operate the Russian military air services to Tabriz, Meshed and Moscow. The Soviet Ambassador informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 20th September that Soviet troops had evacuated Tehran and its environs and Qaleh Murgheh aerodrome and that Soviet censorship had been removed. In reply to a question by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Soviet Ambassador stated that the troops evacuated from Tehran would return direct to the U.S.S.R.

Polish Interests

15. The new Polish Chargé d'Affaires, M. Eugene Melnitsky, has taken over [illegible] Ministry for Foreign Affairs. His predecessor, owing allegiance to the Polish Government in London, had refused to hand over to M. Melnitsky.

Tehran, 23rd September, 1945.

Appendix A

Disposal of Assets—Persia

1. *Railways.*

(i) The present position as regards British assets is that an impasse has been reached. The Persian Ministry of Communications stand by the draft agreement [illegible] 1942, by which all fixed assets should revert to them free of charge. [illegible] the draft agreement was never ratified and, although the British [illegible] on the Transportation Committee defined what he conceived to be [illegible], only the actual buildings, there is no record that any agreement [illegible] was reached with the Persians. The result is that the Persian Railway Commission have so far declined to discuss prices unless it is conceded that fixed assets should revert to them free of charge. It is hoped that the position will be clarified in a few days' time.

(ii) The Americans have also reached a deadlock. They offered their locomotives, freight wagons and oil-tank wagons for sale, but failed to receive any firm offer from the Persian authorities. They have accordingly instructed the P.S.R. to remove all their rolling-stock south for shipment elsewhere. The American locomotives could, at a punch, be replaced by British locomotives, but [illegible] of a small type and unsuitable for Persia. Also, British freight wagons [illegible] box cars are needed. The most serious aspect of this matter is, however, the withdrawal of the oil tank wagons. The Persians themselves possess only 303, and to maintain adequate oil distribution a minimum of 580 and a maximum of 716 are needed. The withdrawal of the American oil tank wagons would lead to a total breakdown in oil distribution this winter. Representations have been made to London and Washington asking the Americans to reconsider their attitude.

(iii) The Persian Government have claimed from the British military [illegible] 17,700,000 [illegible] respect of freights in excess of the £10,000,000 which has already been paid since 1942 to keep the railways running. They are likely also to lodge an additional [illegible] the question of purchase of railway assets contingent on the settlement of their [illegible] question of purchase of what they conceive to be fixed assets.

2. *Telecommunications.*

The Persian Government want to buy the entire pole and line system, including the American section, representing some 31 per cent. The latter is, however, not for sale. They also want to buy the entire carrier installations. The British Military Disposals Board asked an over-all price of £400,000, and the Persians offered £200,000. A final offer of £300,000 was then made, and they were

informed that, unless they accept it by 1 o clock on the 23rd September, the British military will dismantle the pole and line system and ship the carrier system out of the country

3 *Other Fixed Assets*

The disposal of camps, cinemas, &c., in the North Persia area is proceeding normally Satisfactory offers have been received for all installations offered for sale by public adjudication. Prices realised have been quite satisfactory An agreement with the Persian Government has been reached about the payment of customs duty and a claim from the Ministry of Finance for the payment of sales tax has been rejected, as this tax is payable by the seller and the British contention is that one Government cannot levy taxes against another Government.

4 *Mobile Assets*

The sale of these by public tender is proceeding normally

Appendix B

Communiqué to Press by Chief of the General Staff on recent Mutiny in Persian

"Certain disaffected officers in contact with suspected elements had attempted to bring about a general mutiny, which was timed to break out at the end of September under the auspices of the Tudeh party

The General Staff had deemed it necessary to carry out a transfer of ring leaders from their distant posts or to deprive them of their appointments. It was thus that two officers, who had received transfer orders, decided to precipitate the mutiny without further preparations. This it was that constituted the Meshed" incident

The Tudeh party plan met with complete failure Not only were the rebels members of the Tudeh party duly registered and were by orders of the party carrying out Communist propaganda but had created the incident in Khorasan on its orders and with its assistance

In spite of this, the corps of officers had remained loyal to their Shah which was proved by the telegrams of numerous formations expressing these sentiments

A commission is investigating the antecedents of the officers involved Twenty six have been transferred under arrest to Kerman and nine others to distant places."

[E 7839 70 34] (2)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No 38 Secret, for the period 24th to 30th September 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No 343 of 1st October, Received in Foreign Office 18th October)

Persian Affairs

The Majlis

1 At the session of the 20th September Dr Kashawarz, with his head suitably swathed in bandages, described the injuries which he had sustained in his scuffle with the military. He gave his interpretation of parliamentary immunity attacked the Chief of the General Staff for having an English mother and an English wife, complained that no less than thirty six newspapers had been suppressed, and wound up by saying that, in oppression and hardness, the present military governorship in Tehran was just as bad as the tyrannical dictatorship of Reza Khan [*sic*]. On the 20th September the Prime Minister asked for a vote of confidence, but the Tudeh members and the minority walked out leaving no quorum. The majority members persuaded them to return as the minority leader Dr Musaddiq, was to speak. The two-twelfths budget bill was then passed. The session of the 27th September was remarkable for a fine speech by the Deputy Panahi, who ridiculed the idea of there being any

genuine separatist movement in Azerbaijan. Exposing the real nature of the Azerbaijan Democratic party's programme, he said they were democrats in nothing but name. The freedom they claimed was merely freedom to oppress, rob and murder their political opponents. He admitted that reforms Persia were long overdue but said that they could not be affected terrorism. Two other Deputies, Reza Hikmat (Sardar Fakhir) and Misbah Fatemi, spoke on much the same lines and described the high-handed acts now being perpetrated by the Tudeh in Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Khorasan [illegible] debate and got it punched for his pains by the Minister of Finance who accused him of untruthfulness. This affront to his dignity, [illegible] into one of his customary fits of sobbing. Accurately sensing the temper [illegible] House the Government seized the opportunity to ask for a vote of [illegible] which it secured by seventy votes against forty there being four abstentions [illegible] ends the first round of the fight between the Government and the Opposition which began as long ago as the 17th July

Internal Affairs

2 The Ministry of Justice is to set up a commission to hear complaints by the Tudeh party against the Military Governorship and complaints by that body and by individuals against the [illegible]

3 The Government has announced that any of its nationals who have sustained damage at the hands of the Axis Powers should state their claims to the Tehran Chamber of Commerce

4 The Ministry of Roads and Communications is reported in the press as having asked the Soviet Embassy to begin discussions for the handing back of the northern sections of the Iranian State Railway, *i.e.*, Tehran Bandar Shah Tehran Mianeh and Tehran Shahrud No mention was made of the section Tehran Julfa

5 The sub-governate (bakhsdari) of Qasr i Shirin is to be raised to the status of a governate (farmandari)

6 A disastrous fire broke out on the 24th September in the bazaar quarter of Kazvin and over 600 shops are said to have been destroyed

7 A riot occurred in Zenjan on the 28th September between the Tudeh and their opponents. The Governor was seriously wounded when attempting to calm the crowd

Internal Security

Kurdistan

8 According to consular sources the operations in Kurdistan are not going so well as the General Staff would have the public believe. General Hushang Afshar's road turns out to be but a fair weather track roughly completed only as far as Rezab. The Persian forces have not yet succeeded in capturing Dizli and there is little prospect of any result being achieved before winter sets in General Humayuni, the newly appointed commander of the Senneh Division is far from enthusiastic about his task He stated to the British Military Attaché that as far as he could see, there was no objective the gaining of which would achieve [illegible] to be disarmed, whereas at this moment there were no Kurds within striking distance of the Persian army columns as they had either fled across the Iraq border or had split into small parties in the inaccessible mountains. Winter would force the Persian army to fall back to its permanent garrisons before it forces the Kurds to return to their villages. General Humayuni gave the infantry strength of the forces now deployed as, Saqqiz one battalion Bandi two battalions Merivan two battalions, Avroman nine battalions, Sardasht one battalion and one battalion on the L of C near the Garan Pass He hinted that a mixed commission with representatives of other ministries might visit the area soon and try to effect a settlement

Khorasan

9 No very recent news of the mutiny has been received A party of 100 armed proceeding from Bujnurd to Gunbad i Qabus to round up Colonel Nawai's band of mutineers was turned back by the Russians. Ali Mansur, the Governor General, has arrived in Tehran. In Meshed it is thought that he will not return

Communications

10. Neither in the recent discussions about the disposal of British military assets nor in the previous negotiations regarding the handing back of the I S Railway to the Persian Government for operation was any mention made of the Zahidan-Mirjawa section of the Indian N W Railway The reason probably was that neither the construction nor the operation of this line had [illegible] n Government to any expense It is, however, a matter which [illegible] up for discussion before the expiry of the treaty period

[illegible]

11 —(i) Saifullah Nawab to be Governor General of Mazanderan,

(ii) Naukhuda III (Lieut Commander) Sultan Muhammad Ardelan to be [illegible] ne] Attaché at Washington

[illegible] brahim Mozzi to be Commander Khwash Brigade

[illegible] ang Azizi to be General Officer Commanding 7th Kerman Division

[illegible] shar ri recalled

(v) Sartip Ghulam Hussein Naqdi (Judge Advocate-General) is placed *disponibilite*,

(vi) Musa Nuri Isfandiari, Muwaffaq us Saltaneh (F O 100) to be Persian Ambassador in Ang[illegible]

[illegible]) The appointment of Mehdi Farrukh, Mutasam us Saltaneh (F O 61 M A 85, as Governor General of Eastern Azerbaijan had been announced in the press some weeks previously The appointment would now appear to have been confirmed as a press report states that the Cabinet have agreed to the demands made by Farrukh as a condition of his acceptance of the post These demands included the provision of funds for the extension of the railway from Mianeh to Tabriz and for road construction He also secured the Cabinet's approval of the appointment of his nominee Muhammad Wali Nuban as Deputy Governor General and Governor of Tabriz

Persian Army

12 The text of the single article bill referred to in Intelligence Sum[illegible] No. 36, paragraphs 1 and 23 is reproduced as an appe[illegible]

13 One more Persian army officer, a captain on the staff of the Officers [illegible] said to have left Tehran to join the [illegible] the Officers Training College in the presence of H I M the Shah The categories and numbers were as follows,

Military Accounts Department	51
Infantry . .	37
Cavalry	13
Artillery	7
Engineers . . .	14
Transport .	9
Medical . .	40

Persian Gendarmerie

15 Two new American officers have arrived to join Colonel Schwarzkopf's mission. Colonel Pappa is to replace Colonel Boone, and Major Biges is an additional officer

16 The Cabinet have approved a proposal of the Ministry of the Interior to extend the period of Colonel Schwarzkopf's engagement by two years

British Interests

17 His Majesty's Ambassador returned from the United Kingdom on the 24th September

18 Miss Lambton, Press Attaché to His Majesty's Embassy for the past six years, has left Persia to take up an appointment at the School of Oriental Studies, London

19 A party of Persian students has left Tehran to pursue their studies in London under the auspices of the British Council

Corrigenda

20.—(i) Intelligence Summary No 37 paragraph 15, for " Melnitsky " read " Milinkiel "

[illegible] paragraph 10 (xi) for (Kurdistan) [illegible] Appendix " A," paragraph 2, line 3 delete " This latter is, however not for sale " and substitute " They also wish to buy the entire carrier installation but the American part of the equipment is not for sale "

Tehran, 30th September, 194[illegible]

Appendix

Extract from Press

(Single Article Bill tabled by the Minister of War on the 11th September, 1945, for the formation of two new Army Divisions.)

The following is the text of the Single Article Bill tabled by the Minister of W[illegible] he 11th September for the formation of two new army divisions [illegible] This Bill has not yet become law)

Article 1

The Majlis shall authorise the Government to provide the following credits in addition to the present budget of the Ministry of War and to pay such credits to that Ministry

(a) 165 million rials for the addition of two divisions (numbering 12,132 men) to the present army organisation, for which a budget [illegible] 65 million rials has been estimated, payment of the budget for [illegible] lly as the organisa[illegible] proceeds

[illegible] to respect of child allowances difference in the cost of living at different posts, increase in pay for years of service, and the grat[illegible] of two suits of second clothing in a year

(c) The credit to cover the above expenditure, amounting to 100 million rials for the last six months of the year, will be paid to the Ministry of W[illegible] lly as required should the State revenue for 1324 not [illegible] to cover this additional expenditure, the Government shall be authorised to borrow the same from the National Bank, and to provide for its refund in the following years' budgets

[illegible] 2

Up to 3 million dollars credit shall be approved for the provision of military equipment and supplies for the year 1324 and the Ministry of War shall be authorised to place orders with the United States for the purchase of the equipment within the limit of this credit, and to pay for them after delivery; the credit for these purchases amounting to the above figure shall be provided in rials in the Ministry of War's budget for 1324

E 8002 70/34] (3)

Military Attaché [illegible] 1945.—(*Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 354 of 9th October, Received in Foreign Office, 18th October*)

Persian Affairs

The Majlis

1. No public session was held on the 30th September as the Prime Minister had asked the Speaker to call a secret session to discuss the purchase of American

surplus military assets in Persia. The Minister of Finance explained why the Government could not maintain its contention that all American assets should be handed over to the Persian Government free of charge and that the Government had decided to purchase those assets of which it stood in need. The House agreed on condition that the Persian Government should not be forced to pay in dollars for assets which they did not require or for those assets which were sold in the [illegible]

[illegible] At the session of the 2nd October the Minister of War asked for [illegible] on of his Bill for the provision of two additional divisions. (See Intel[illegible] Summary No. 38, paragraph 12.) The Minister for Foreign Affairs made [illegible]ement regarding the purchase of American military assets and also gave the [illegible]ons for the non-conclusion of a treaty governing the entry of American troops [illegible] Persia. Dr Musaddiq also spoke, repeating his assertion that Sadr had undertaken to resign should the Opposition to his Government reach the figure of forty. The Prime Minister denied ever having given any such undertaking. There was no public session on the 4th October but a number of Deputies, said to be as many as eighty, prepared the draft of a Bill to postpone the next electio[illegible] till at the latest, one month after the evacuation of Persia by Allied troops. A new Electoral Law is also to be passed which will result in the new elections be[illegible] concluded in a much shorter time than hitherto. (The Government's proclamation about the new elections should normally have been issued on the 16th September.) At the session of the 6th October Dr. Muhammad Sadiq Tabatabai was re-elected President of the Majlis by 64 votes against 47 cast for Ali Dashti. At the session of the 7th October Malek Madani and Amir Teymour were elected vice-presidents.

P[illegible]

2. The Prime Minister is reliably reported as having announced his intention of resigning at an audience with H.I.M. The Shah. He said that notwithstanding the vote of confidence which his Government had secured, the continued attacks made on him and his Cabinet by Dr. Musaddiq and the minority had made continuance of his task impossible. The Shah is reported to have asked Sadr to continue in office a little longer.

3. Persian anxiety about the outcome of the Foreign Secretaries' Conference in London seems to have diminished slightly. The more sensible realise that, disappointing as the Russian attitude to immediate evacuation was, the existence of a treaty containing a fixed date for the evacuation does afford a reasonable hope of liberation within five months from the present Russian stranglehold on the four northern provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazanderan and Khorasan.

Internal Security

A[illegible]

4. Seven members of the Komala (Kurdish Autonomy party) visited Baku between the 17th and 23rd September at the invitation of the Soviet Government. They were headed by Ghazi Mohammad of Mahabad. According to the press, the Persian Government, incensed at this visit without their permission and even without the obtaining of exit visas by the party, have protested to the Soviet Embassy and even demanded the extradition of the seven Kurds.

Lurs

5. The downward migration of the Qashgai and Khamseh tribes is well [illegible] and no acts of brigandage have been reported as yet. This year 500 additional families of Darrashori have remained behind in the summer quarters, making 1,000 families in all. These are divided into fifteen settlements.

Persian Air Force

6. Doshan Tappeh airfield and the aircraft factory were handed back to the Persian Air Force by the R.A.F. on the 1st October.

Persian Army

7. H.I.M. The Shah is reported to be greatly relieved at the fizzling out of the recent mutiny. Not everyone would agree, however, that the trouble is completely over. As is usual with Persians, treatment for a disease tends to stop when the malady passes from the acute to the chronic stage. In this case, the root [illegible] was the [illegible] have to serve, though it cannot be denied that the Tudeh party fanned the flames

[illegible] content with their propaganda. If the recent promises for the financial [illegible] of officers are not implemented it can safely be predicted that the trouble will break out again.

Civil Aviation

[illegible] The Americans are pressing the Persian Government to give an American [illegible] They obviously fear that, [illegible] similar or more extensive demands from the [illegible]

Persians generally are realising the inconveniences which they will suffer from the lack of adequate air communications with the outside world, which they [illegible] from the Soviet resources and this realisation [illegible] coupled with a typical desire to please the Ameri[illegible] material benefits may make it difficult for the Gove[illegible] attitude indefinitely. It is expected that the Persian Government w[illegible] limited rights to the Americans within the next few days.

At the Chicago Conference the Persian delegates followed the British [illegible] which was opposed to the grant of "Fifth Freedom" rights such as [illegible]

[illegible] The Persian Government [illegible] Persia to supervise the training of Persian personnel in the maintenance [illegible] operation of aircraft control and meteorological signals.

Economic

10. Export and import figures (in rials) for the first five months of 1324 (March–August 1945) are given as follows:—

Exports—	
Commercial goods	533,136,439
[illegible] products	1,005,289,136
[illegible]	1,[illegible]
Imports—	
Goods on which Customs Duties have been paid ..	968,184,269
[illegible] exempt from Customs Duties .	140,257,544
[illegible] from Customs)	2[illegible]4,112
Fines collected	1,000,000

Appointments

11. (i) Husain Khalipur to be Governor of Maku.
(ii) Musa Reza Lutfi to be Governor of Khalkhal.

British Interests

12. An invitation to visit the United Kingdom has been given by the Ministry of Information to six editors of Persian newspapers.

13. The British and American Embassies have announced that M.E.S.C. [illegible] Leased as from the 1st November [illegible] Relations Bureau of the British Embassy.

15. The Persian Government [illegible] purchase the British Military telecommunications. (See Intelligence Summary, No. 37, Appendix "A," paragraph 2.)

American Interests.

16. American resentment has been a[illegible] and the absence of any treaty governi[illegible] forces in Persia. The American [illegible] ing its attitude to both questions. Rega[illegible] has never [illegible]

over its surplus military assets free of charge. Concerning the non-concl[illegible]

[illegible] Embassy recently applied for a pass to the Russian military authorities to [illegible] visit Meshed can be granted but that the applicants should not travel via Gurgan as this area is unsafe. As the Soviet Embassy have turned back Persian gendarmerie proceeding to Gurgan to restore order and have repeatedly refu[illegible]

Re[illegible]

18. There are reports, almost certainly exaggerated, from Persian sources of large-scale Russian troop movements in western Azerbaijan towards the Perso-Turkish frontier. According to one source, over 200 Russian aircraft were [illegible] Maku and Russian troops had been constructing defences in plain view of the Turks. Shots had even been exchanged between the opposing armies though no actual crossing of the frontier had taken place. Steps are being taken through consular sources to confirm or refute these reports.

[illegible]

19. His Excellency Mr. Li Tieh-teeng, Chinese Ambassador, has left Tehran for China on leave.

Koweit Interests

20. [illegible] Persian claim to Koweit was brought to mind [illegible] tion of the despatch of some Anglo-Iranian Oil Company technicians from Abadan to Koweit. The Persian Government do not recognise the sovereignty of Koweit and will not issue visas for that [illegible] The Koweit authorities, in their turn, insist on Persians wishing to [illegible] having Persian passports with Koweit [illegible] for Persians to visit Iraq first and [illegible]

Tehran, 7th October, 1945.

E 8127/70/34 4

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 40. Secret, for the period 8th October to 14th October, 1945 (Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 362 of 18th October. Received in Foreign Office 27th October.)

Persian Affairs

The Majlis

THE only important business of the week has been the presentation of a Bill to postpone the next elections till the [illegible] of Persia by all Allied troops is completed. Procedure of "double urgency" was sanctioned. The Bill was then passed by a large majority. Some minor officials of the Majlis presidential body was elected. They were:

Secretaries: Zulfiqari, Jawad Masuli, Hashimi and Dr. Mujtahidi.
Tellers: Afkhami, Hishmati and Mirat Isfandiari.

2. The Ministry of the Interior has addressed a circula[illegible] [illegible] The centralisation of all governmental activities, which was such a [illegible] this clamour for autonomy in Azerbaijan it would be unwise for the Persian Government to provide such a weapon for the separatists to use.

3. The Persian Government has announced the continuance of the ban on the Mecca pilgrimage as their relations with the Saudi Arabian Government have not been clarified.

4. The Cabinet has approved a proposal of the Ministry of the Interior that the Governorates-General (ustandari) of Eastern and Western Azerbaijan should be amalgamated.

Appointments

5. Mustafa Quli Khosrovi to be Governor of Sari and Deputy Governor General of Mazanderan.

Communications

6. The cost of constructing the Mianeh-Tabriz railway extension has been estimated at 50 million rials, and a Bill to authorise the necessary credit is to be tabled in the Majlis shortly.

Internal Security

Azerbaijan.

7. The Azerbaijan Democratic party concluded its first annual general meeting on the 5th October. At one of the earlier meetings it passed a resolution allowing the Persian Government one year within which it had to substitute Turki for Persian in all schools. It also expressed its disapproval of the appointment of Mehdi Farrukh as Governor-General of Azerbaijan and threatened violence if he attempted to take up his duties. As a counterblast, four hundred Azerbaijani notables have telegraphed to the Prime Minister to express their disgust at the actions of a few unknown immigrants in claiming to represent the population of Azerbaijan, and in despatching a telegram demanding autonomy to the Foreign Secretaries' conference while in session in London.

Khorasan

8. The Tudeh party have recently turned their attention to students and teachers. Had not the party lost much ground recently through exposure of their aims, methods and Russian support, this latest investment would bring in a handsome dividend. Badly paid teachers and disillusioned students unable to find employment after completion of their studies offer as good a target for Tudeh propaganda as peasants and workers hitherto approached with offers of agrarian and industrial reforms.

British Interests

9. The telecommunications agreement referred to in last Intelligence Summary, paragraph 15, provides for the payment of £300,000 as follows: 25 per cent. against signature, 25 per cent. within three months of signature and 50 per cent. within two months of the beginning of the next financial year (22nd March, 1946). Under this agreement the British military authorities undertake to supply line maintenance equipment and vehicles to a value of £30,000 for which separate payment will be made.

10. The six newspaper editors referred to in paragraph 12 of last Intelligence Summary have left Tehran for the United Kingdom.

American Interests

11. The American Ambassador has addressed a note to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs regarding the American financial advisers. The note states that they are not in a position to do any good and that this is injurious to the prestige of the American Government. As individuals scattered among various departments they are powerless to achieve anything, but concentrated as a mission under a chief they could make their presence felt. The Persian Government, while prepared to recognise [illegible] chief for the purpose of internal administration of the advisers' affairs, see in this request a veiled attempt to secure executive powers comparable to those previously wielded by Dr. Millspaugh. Such powers they would under no circumstances grant to any individual adviser. No settlement has been reached as yet and there has been some talk in the press of the advisers resigning unless the situation is clarified.

12. Agreement has been reached on the sale of American railway assets. The Persian Government has paid 8 million dollars, and is to pay a further 2,100,000 dollars and is to receive 68 locomotives, 1,350 wagons, including 277 oil tank wagons, and 500,000 dollars worth of railway stores still in American possession.

Russian Interests

13. A consular source reports that a party of five Russian officers recently [illegible] the town of Neh between Birjand and Zahedan. They were engaged [illegible] survey.

14. A protocol to the 1935 agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Persia relating to co-operation in combating agricultural pests has been signed at Tehran.

15. The Soviet Consul-General at Meshed has arrived in Tehran. The probable reason for his visit is to ensure that, in the event of Ali Mansur not returning to Meshed, a sufficiently subservient Governor-General may be appointed.

16. His Excellency the Soviet Ambassador has a[illegible] Mansur without informing his colleagues. Before his departu[illegible] reassurances to the Minister for Foreign Affairs concer[illegible] blandly said that the question of [illegible] was of minor importance in the light of "Soviet [illegible] meant presumably evacuation by the expiry of the treaty period.

17. For some weeks there have been reports of [illegible] the Persian Government to send a good will diplomatic mission to Moscow to improve the present strained relations between the two countries. The name of Ali Mansur, Governor-General of Khorasan, was mentioned as a possible leader of the mission. It was hoped that advice from various quarters might have led the Persian Government to abandon a plan which seemed unnecessary and possibly dangerous. It is now learnt, however, that the Persian Ambassador in Moscow, acting on instructions from his Government, did actually make the suggestion to the Soviet Government. Their reply was briefly to the effect that relations between the two countries could easily and instantly be improved by the Persians by reopening the question of the northern oil concession.

Tehran, 14th October, 1945.

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 41, Secret, for the Period 15th to 21st October, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran despatch No. 370 of 23rd October, Received in Foreign Office 2nd November.)

Persian Affairs

The Majlis

1. Very little business was done during the week. At the session of the 14th October the Minister of Finance tabled five Bills, among which the most important were requests for a credit of 30 million rials for road and railway development in Azerbaijan, a request for credit for the purchase of American Railway assets, and a 2/12th budget Bill for the period the 21st September–20th November 1945. On the 15th October a number of influential Deputies met to discuss measures for the prevention of unconstitutional acts by Government employees during the intervening period between the 14th and 15th Majlises which will now occur as the result of the postponement of the new elections.

2. The letters exchanged between Mr. Bevin and M. Molotov on the subject [illegible] of Persia by Allied troops have been published in the Persian [illegible]

The Court

3. The Court has announced that, in view of the presence of foreign troops in Persia, the usual celebrations and receptions in connexion with the Shah's birthday (26th October) will not be held this year, with the exception of the official "salam" (levée). The expenses incurred by these celebrations in normal times will be devoted to poor relief during the coming winter.

[illegible]

4.—(i) Abdul Husein Sardar Yazdpur to be Governor of Maraghen.
(ii) Muhammad Hadi to be Governor of Zahedan.

Mehdi Farrukh (Motasam os Saltaneh) has not yet taken up his appointment [illegible] Governor-General of Eastern Azerbaijan (see Intelligence Summary No. [illegible] paragraph 11 (vii)); nor is it now believed that he will do so. A Moscow paper [illegible] his appointment by the Persian Government in the post [illegible] as an act of deliberate provocation. This Russian opposition and the fact that Farrukh is temperamentally unsuited for this, or indeed for any other post, will almost certainly induce the Persian Government to find some more suitable man. The name of Ali Mansur, who has had ample experience of Russian methods during his three years' tenure of the post of Governor-General Khorasan, is being men[illegible] possible candidate, as is also that of Khan Fahmi (Fahm al Mulk) [illegible] M.A. 82) who was Minister without portfolio in Bayat's Cabinet of [illegible] 1944.

Persian Army

[illegible]

Civil Aviation. (See Intelligence Summary No. 39, paragraph 8.)

8. The Americans appear to be pressing for (i) immediate provisional rights to run a Tehran–Abadan service to connect with the outside world, (ii) later on, for rights on a route Turkey–Persia–Afghanistan–India–China, for which Pan American Airways hold a C.A.B. licence.

Internal Security

Azerbaijan

9. A report [illegible] that Mutal[illegible] on Persia [illegible] gun) he arrived in Western A[illegible] tary authorities to occupy [illegible] village Ló kalan, south of Rezaieh. The Persian commandant of Rezaieh was [illegible] ordered by the General Officer Commanding, Tabriz, to inform Mullah M[illegible]a that he is a fugitive from justice and that he must lay down his arms and obey the orders of the local Persian commander. Unless the Russian mili[illegible] es, who are in complete control of the area, endorse these orders, there is [illegible] evidence to show that at least four lorry loads of rifles have been delivered [illegible] some less reliable evidence to the effect that others [illegible] Russians to Kurdish tribes, including those actually engaged in hostilities against the Iraq Government.

Fars

11. There are signs of the recrudescence of the old rivalry between Nasir Kh[illegible] Qashgai and his uncle Ali Khan Sardar Hashmat. The latter is believed to [illegible] with the Shishulukis, and possibly with other sub-tribes of the Qashgai, to entice them away from Nasir Khan's overlordship. The Shiraz paper *Parcham*, in its issue of the 4th October, published the text of a telegram sent by Nasir Khan to the Persian Government in Tehran, in which, after extolling his [illegible] further responsibility in this respect, because the present Government is

reactionary, differs little from that of Reza Shah, and shows no sign of desiring to better the living conditions of the poor in Persia. Though no immediate threat [illegible] none the less, unfortunate as tending to shatter the solidarity of the Qawam-Nasir Khan Murteza Quli Khan alliance and as embarrassing to the Persian Government at a time when their attention and armed resources must shortly be devoted to the restoration of order in the northern provinces.

British Interests

12. Some progress has been made in inducing the Persian Government to take adequate measures to ensure the safety of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's area of operations after the evacuation of British troops. The Persian Prime Minister has promised to take a Bill in the Majlis as soon as possible to obtain the necessary credit for increased police allowances. The chief prefect of police has sent telegraphic instructions to the chief of police of Khuzistan [illegible] enlisting 100 extra constables. The agreement of the Chief of the Ge[illegible] the Chief Prefect of Police and the American Chief Adviser [illegible] has been obtained to the responsibility for the security of the A.I.O.C. area [illegible] vested in the General Officer Commanding, Khuzistan Division, who will [illegible] the tasks of the army, gendarmerie and police under this head without [illegible] jealousies between these departments (as, indeed, between any two departments of the Persian Government) that this agreement has not been easy to obtain.

13. Despite the fact that the so called "evacuation" of Tehran by Russian troops has resulted in little diminution in their numbers, the Moscow press has attempted to make political capital out of it by stressing the fiction that, whereas the Russians and the Americans have evacuated Tehran, the British have not yet done so. Although the figures for those remaining behind in Tehran ("British [illegible] Liquidation Staff") had been communicated to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as long ago as the 20th September (and also to the Russian and American Military Attachés, and to the Chief of the General Staff on the 18th September) [illegible] done on the 17th October. Detailed figures for officers and other ranks were given. The nature of the various duties, *e.g.*, disposals, hirings, claims, &c., was explained and a forecast made as to when the various departments would have concluded their tasks and have left Tehran. The communiqué has had an excellent effect.

American Interests

14. To remedy the acute shortage of railway oil tank wagons the United States Military Disposals Board are prepared to sell to the Iranian State Railway a further 200 against a payment of $600,000. Some obstruction from the Majlis may be expected when the Bill is tabled to ask for the rial credit sufficient to provide this sum and the $2,100,000 still due to the Americans (referred to in paragraph 12 of Intelligence Summary No. 40). In the event of a refusal by the Majlis to grant these credits the Minister of Finance will probably request a loan from the Imperial Bank of Iran.

Russian Interests

15. Reports have reached the embassy from various sources which tell of Russian activity in the matter of oil in Northern Persia. There is little doubt that they have concluded a geological survey in the Semnan area roughly corresponding with what are believed to be the boundaries of the old Khurian concession. An undoubted oil drilling rig has been observed at Haft Tan beside the railway between Shirgah and Shahi. A report, more difficult to credit, states that the Russians are actually shipping oil from the Ashuradeh peninsula in the south-east corner of the Caspian Sea. Efforts are being made to verify this, but the area has been made almost inaccessible by the Russians.

Polish Interests

16. Some difficulty is being experienced in the move of about 3,000 Poles who still remain in Persia after the evacuation of the Isfahan contingent of Poles. This difficulty is due to the inability of the Lebanon authorities to absorb them as quickly as was first estimated.

French Interests

17. M. Pierre Lafond, delegate in Persia of the Provisional French Government, has been appointed Ambassador to Persia and presented his letters of credence to His Imperial Majesty the Shah on the 20th October.

P.S.—The Persian Prime Minister tendered his resignation to His Imperial Majesty the Shah on the 21st October, 1945.

Tehran, 21st October, 1945.

E 8553/70/34 (0)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 42, Secret, for the Period [illegible] *No. 370 of 30th October, 1945, received in Foreign Office 8th November.*)

Persian Affairs

Political

1. As reported in a postscript to last Intelligence Summary, Mohsin S[illegible] tendered his resignation to H.I.M. the Shah on the 21st October. Press acco[illegible] [illegible] nued opposition by the Majlis to all bills tabled by his Government [illegible] securing of a vote of confidence on the 27th September. With all [illegible] he can claim some small achievements [illegible] tion in the country is no worse [illegible] moderate) h[illegible] for the moment to [illegible] is due to the cessation of open support [illegible] they have in theory evacuated the capital, can[illegible] tan is of Tudeh toughs by escorts of Russian sol[illegible] Sadr has found the money for the purchase of British military telecommunications and the greater part of the American military railway assets. He has paid Persia's contribution to U.N.R.R.A. He secured the passing of the law to post[illegible] pone the next elections till all foreign troops have left the country. He has, at least, shown himself aware of the pressing needs of security in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's area and had undertaken to table a Bill to provide the necessary credits. In the face of the prevailing apathy in all Government departments, the hostility of the Russians, the ceaseless opposition of the minority and the obstruction of the Majlis as a whole, his record bears favourable comparison with that of his predecessors.

2. The President of the Majlis was received in audience by the Shah on the 21st October and was requested to urge the Majlis to choose a new Prime Minister by the 24th October. This they did with commendable promptitude and at a secret session on the 24th October elected Ibrahim Hakimi, Hakim ul Mulk, who received seventy-five votes as against six cast for Qawam us-Saltaneh. There were thirteen abstentions. Hakimi was Prime Minister for about one month in May of this year. Hakimi has not yet presented his Cabinet to the Majlis.

3. Other business in the Majlis during the week has been the election of the various Majlis commissions, an announcement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Persia would be evacuated by Allied troops by the 2nd March 1946, discussion of the Bill to authorise payment for the remaining American railway assets and the passing of a 1/12th budget Bill for Mihr 1324 (23rd September–22nd October 1945).

4. On the 26th October, the birthday of H.I.M. the Shah, the customary levee was held in the Gulestan Palace.

Appointments

5.—(i) Major Farzanegan to be assistant military attaché in Washington *vice* Ali Qawam (son of the Qawam ul Mulk) who has returned to Persia. Major Farzanegan spent some time in England under training at Marconis. He speaks good English and has for the past three years been Persian assistant to General Ridley of the American Military Mission.

(ii) Abbas Sadr, Chief of the Hamadan Municipality, has been appointed acting Governor of Hamadan *vice* Sardar Akram recalled.

Internal Security

Khorasan.

[illegible] is still without a governor [illegible] have not yet returned to Meshed from Tehran. Fatholah Pakravan (Major [illegible] F.O. 160 M.A. 208) is reported to have refused the post of governor [illegible]. Opposition to his appointment is also reported to have come from religious circles in Meshed who have bitter memories of Pakravan's previous tenure of that post from 1934 to 1942, during which period Asadi, the custodian of the shrine, was shot for treason and a number of visitors were machine-gunned within the precincts of the shrine.

7. Security on the Meshed–Zahedan road has deteriorated and all traffic between Meshed and Turbat-i-Haidari after sunset has to travel in convoy with a gendarmerie escort.

Azerbaijan.

8. The following extract [illegible] (1st–15th October) gives an [illegible] border:—

> Sepehr Rad, the aged inspector of the Ministry of the Interior, has inspected Dasht-i-Mishan, of which he was governor seventeen years ago. He brings back a story that about ten days before he left, Brigadier Humayun [illegible] Sheikhs living across the frontier, [illegible] lying on which, Muhammad Asi, the brother of Yunus, came back to Persia and, as reported in Ahwaz News No. (15), was killed by the Sawari tribe. The inspector paints a sorry picture of inefficiency and intrigue. His version [illegible]. At present the Persian Government has armed Moula Nasrullah, bakhtiar of Hewarzeh and relies on him and his followers to neutralise the Bani Turuf. Meanwhile the number of Persian Government departments is absurdly large for such a small area: there is an O.C. Garrison, a Frontier Commander, a Security Officer, a Gendarmerie Commander and a Head of Police, with civilians such as the Director of Posts, Civil Registration, [illegible] Finance &c., all nominally under a Farmandar who assisted by a Mayor or head of the Municipality. All these officials are at daggers drawn with one another. The Security Officer, Mustafa Khorasani, does not take bribes but is no politician and cannot keep order. The inspector's solution is (1) disarmament of all tribesmen, including the Hewarzeh Arabs, and the increase of the garrison from 30 to 100, the area being run by a strong military governor; (2) exile of the arrogant Bani Turuf Sheikhs and also of Moula Nasr[illegible].

Bakhtiaris

9. There is growing discontent among the rival branch of the tribe at Marteza Quli Khan's autocratic rule and at what they consider to be his virtual monopoly of the fruits of office. That Bakhtiari is comparatively tranquil matters but little to them who would prefer disorder and a "free for all" situation. Recently Manuchehr Khan assembled a band of malcontents in Junagan where he had collected arms and money, but in the end wiser counsels prevailed and he obeyed the summons to return to Isfahan which had been given by the General Officer Commanding, Isfahan Division.

10. A consular source states that the first result of the Russians' gift to Qazi Muhammad of a printing press and two tons of paper has been a manifesto [illegible] the "Democratic party of Kurdistan". This document, which is printed in Persian and Kurdish in parallel columns, after a preamble glancing at the wrongs suffered in ages past at the hands of Persian tyrants, makes the following demands:

(a) An autonomous Kurdistan within the frontiers of the Persian State.
(b) The use of the Kurdish language in schools and the administration of Kurdistan.
(c) The immediate election of a provincial council for Kurdistan to supervise all social and Government affairs.
(d) Selection of Government officials exclusively from the people of Kurdistan.
(e) Promulgation of a law to regulate relations between peasants and landlords.
(f) Co-operation with the other races of Azerbaijan, Armenians, Assyrians &c. to establish unity and brotherhood in the country.
(g) Exploitation of the natural resources of Kurdistan for the benefit of its people.

11. The Russians are laying new military telephone lines between Tabriz and Julfa and between Tabriz and Marand [illegible]. Tabriz, however, incorrectly [illegible] Farrukh was arriving to assume the [illegible] party of twenty-five Persian military [illegible] not only as a guard of honour but also to prevent disturbances such as had been threatened by the Tudeh party if he should [illegible]. The General Officer Commanding first obtained from the Russian military headquarters the pass which is necessary for all Persian armed forces to have before [illegible] ement is permitted by the Russians. On arrival at the Russian military check post at the eastern exit of the town of Tabriz the party was stopped by the Russians on the grounds that, though the pass was for twenty-five men, there was no mention of their arms!

Fars

[illegible] (see paragraph 11 of last Intel[illegible]) [illegible] Prime Minister to say that [illegible] of the tribe Ali Khan has assume[illegible] General Officer Commanding does not consider the [illegible] serious threat [illegible] Ali Khan's rebellion [illegible] to assume the responsibility. The General Officer Commanding also advised Nasir Khan that poverty and a sense of grievance have induced Ali Khan to take this step and that restitution of the properties which Samsam ul Dawleh, Nasir Khan's father [illegible] Ali Khan would be the best method of settling the dispute.

14. The Boir Ahmadi have started moving to the Abadeh–Semirom Yezdikhwast area which they do every year after that area has been evacuated [illegible] gendarmerie [illegible] Isfahan–Shiraz road will [illegible].

British Legation

15. Mr. H. L. Farquhar, M.C., arrived in Tehran on the 20th October 1945 to assume the duties of consular at His Majesty's Embassy.

Tehran, 28th October 1945.

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[illegible]

Persian Affairs

Political

1. The Prime Minister, Ibrahim Hakimi (Hakim-ul-Mulk), presented his Cabinet to H.I.M. the Shah on the 3rd November and to the Majlis on the 4th November. It comprises:—

Without Portfolio: Hasan 'Ali Kamal Hidayet.
Interior: Khalil Fahimi (Fahim-ul-Mulk).
Justice: Amanullah Ardalan.
Finance: 'Abdul Husain Hajir.
Agriculture: Ahmad Husain 'Adl.
Without Portfolio: Allahyar Salih.
War: Major-General Riazi.
Posts and Telegraphs: Muhammad Nariman.
[illegible] Dr. Malik.
[illegible] Ghulam Husain Rahnema.
Communications: Major-General M[illegible]
Foreign Affairs: Abul Qasim Najm.
Commerce and Industry: To be appointed, provisionally [illegible] Minister.

With the exception of Najm (believed to [illegible] has been ambassador) and Firuz, all the above have previously held [illegible] Hidayet, Dr. Malik and Rahnema were members of the previous Cabinet.

2. On the 4th November the Prime Minister presented his Government's programme to the Majlis. It contained six points, which can be summarised as follows:—

(i) Maintenance of friendly relations with foreign Powers and fulfilment of Persia's undertakings under the United Nations Charter.
(ii) Rehabilitation of the armed forces of the country to enable them the better to carry out their duties in maintaining security.
(iii) Budget reform, tax revision, raising of the standard of living.
(iv) Reorganisation of the Ministry of Health.
(v) Revision of laws governing the organisation and administration of the country.
(vi) Conduct of the next elections.

3. On the 6th November the Government obtained a vote of confidence on its programme, receiving 97 votes out of 103. The six Tudeh Deputies did not vote though Kambakhsh, the Tudeh Deputy, made a violent attack on the Government, the governing classes, the army, and Persia's foreign policy, which were tending to an estrangement between her and Russia.

Internal S[illegible]

Kurdistan (South)

4. The Chief of the General Staff stated to the British Military Attaché that no withdrawal from their forward positions near the Perso-Iraqi frontier had yet been begun by the Persian troops. He also stated that the Kani sec and Dizli chieftains were still in refuge across the frontier in Iraq and that he had asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs to approach the Iraqi Government with a view to their preventing the return to Persia of these two men. In this connexion it will be interesting to learn what replies are given by the Persian Government to a parallel request believed to have been made by the Iraqi Government to the Persian Government for similar services in respect of Mulla Mustafa and Sheikh Ahmed Barzani, who had conversely fled from their forces into Persia. In actual fact, the Persians could render no such assistance as the area in which the two fugitives are now living is completely under Russian military [illegible]. The C.G.S. also stated that the troops would be withdrawn to their winter quarters within a month, two battalions being quartered at Merivan and the remaining nine at Baneh, Sardasht, Saqqiz and Senneh.

Azerbaijan

5. One of the Kurdish chiefs, who recently visited Baku, is reliably reported to have said that the party was received in an interview by Baghirov, the President of the Azerbaijan Republic, who promised Soviet support for the Kurdish independence movement provided the Kurds would work with the new Democratic party of Persian Azerbaijan. The Tudeh party was never [illegible] Kurdish chiefs because of its programme of agrarian reform, highly repugnant to such large land-owners, but the Democratic party is not so repugnant being less radical in its programme.

6. A consular report states that Mulla Mustafa and Sheikh Ahmed Barzani have conferred with Ghazi Muhammad of Mahabad on the Kurdish Independence movement and on the chances of continuing their struggle next spring against the Iraq forces.

Reports from other sources tell of other Kurdish chieftains being taken [illegible] lorry loads of Russian rifles and 400,000 rials being delivered to Ghazi Mohammad, also the staging of a conference by the Russians at Maku [illegible] Kurds and, lastly, of a withdrawal of Russian troops from the Perso-T[illegible] border to their garrison towns of Maku, Khoi, Rezaieh, &c. If these reports are true, as they seem to be, two possible conclusions are (i) that the Russia[illegible] are anxious to unite Persian Azerbaijanis and Kurds in support of t[illegible] Autonomous Azerbaijan movement, and (ii) that they intend to use the Kurds of Persia and Iraq and not their own troops to further these designs in anticipation of the period subsequent to 2nd March, when they will have no troops in Persia to use in this connexion.

7. The Democratic party has announced its intention to begin forthwith the arrangements for both Majlis and Provincial Counc[illegible]

[illegible]

8. (i) Dr. Nasr, previously Governor-General of Mazanderan, to be Inspector-General of the Ministry of the Interior.
(ii) Muhsin Shahrukh, formerly head of the Personnel Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to be Director of the Contracts and Legal Affairs Department in the same Ministry.
(iii) Mohammad Husain Najm to be head of the Personnel Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
(iv) Hadi Arbabi to be Governor of Shahriza.
(v) Daulatshahi, recently appointed Director of Financ[illegible] Western Azerbaijan, has also been ap[illegible] General of the two Ustans pending an official appointment by the Ministry of the Interior.

Persian Gendarmerie

9. Colonel Schwarzkopf stated to the B.M.A. that—

(i) There was an overall shortage of about 4,000 in the total establishment of fifteen regiments.
(ii) That he was disregarding the prohibition of enlisting as gendarmes men who had not performed their military conscription service and that, when asked by the Ministry of War to surrender an individual wanted for conscription, he refused to do so on the ground that the man was, in the gendarmerie, performing military service of equal importance.
(iii) That he hoped soon to get Cabinet sanction for his proposed gendarmerie officers' training college which would enable him to train [illegible] officers and to dispense with the leavings of the Persian army which formed his present officer cadre.

British Interests

10. The C.I.G.S. and the G.O.C.-in-C., Middle East, visited Abadan and oilfields between the 2nd and the 4th November.

11. Sir William Fraser, chairman of the A.I.O.C. Limited, visited Tehran at the end of October. He was received in audience by H.I.M. the Shah and was entertained at an official luncheon at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

12 A commission was held in Ahwaz on the 5th November to arrange for the gradual resumption of responsibility of the Persian Government for the security of the A I O C 's area of operations British consular representatives, representatives of the A I O C and the Persian military gendarmerie and police chiefs attended The Commander, South Persia Area (British), presided The [illegible]th and disposition of the Persian army in Khuzistan were considered [illegible]tory Gendarmerie reinforcements not being available the [illegible] existing Khuzistan regiment of two companies each of three platoons, especially for A I O C protection, was considered the best solution for the time being The police again maintained that the low rate [illegible] C[illegible] prevented them recruiting the extra numbers required Press[illegible] upon the new Prime Minister to provide the necessary credits for increased pay is being maintained upon his successor The agreement of the gendarmerie and police headquarters in Tehran (an agreement not obtained without difficulty) to place their forces in Khuzistan under the orders of the Persian Army Divisional Commander for purposes of A I O C security will it is hoped, lead to better co-ordination of these duties

Russian Interests

13. The Russian consular agent at Zahedan recently visited Zahedan, Khwash and Iranshahr, and spread rumours to the effect that the Americans were to receive [illegible] concessions at Sabzawar and Khw[illegible] that such rumours [illegible] beneficial to Persia. It is reasonable [illegible] invented by the Russians, would justify the granting of similar concessions in the north west of Persia to the Russians by the Azerbaijan Provincial Council which from all reliable accounts, the Russians are actively trying [illegible]

14 The Russians are preventing the despatch of food stuffs, dried fruits and leather from Tabriz to Tehran. Russian cotton goods are allowed [illegible] played this game before, creating a surplus with cheap [illegible] under their military occupation and a shortage [illegible] of the country Their hireling press then expat[illegible]

[illegible] Cultural Relations Society decided [illegible] University The students were chosen after open competition and are to leave gradually for Russia The first six left by plane last Sunday They are to a[illegible] in Baku and they will then enter Moscow U[illegible]

American Interests

16 The American Embassy on instructions from the State Department has informed the Ministry for Foreign Affairs that as the conditions on which American economic and financial mission had been sent to Persia were no longer in force the functions of the mission would terminate on the 21st November next It is, however, left to individual members of the mission to make if they so desire individual contracts with the Persian G[illegible] six of them will elect to remain in Persian Gover[illegible] service (see Intelligence Summary No 40 paragraph 11)

17 The Commanding General, A M E T , has [illegible] the responsibility for the security of all American military personnel in the Persian Gulf Command with effect from 1st December having been informed that owing to the gradual evacuation of Persia, British troops will not be available for that purpose after that date

18 The Americans have now been paid a sum of $2,139,000 being the balance due from the Persian Government for rolling stock, tankers and locomotives (see Intelligence Summary No 41 paragraph 14)

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Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No 44, Secret, for the Period 12th November to 18th November, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 402 of 19th November, received 29th November)

Persian Affairs

Political—The Majlis

THE session of the 11th November was mostly taken up by one of Dr Musaddiq's long winded orations in which he attacked Mahmud Bader, the Minister of Finance in Sadr's recent Cabinet for alleged malpractices in the

[illegible] speedy action in the matter of [illegible] and Tudayyun On the 13th November after a [illegible] which the Tudeh Deputy Dr Kishavarz violently opposed the [illegible]ployment of any foreign advisers in any capacity the Bill for the [illegible] of Dr Avery as adviser to the Ministry of Health was passed The [illegible] Conscription Bill was also passed (see paragraph 2 below) A question was put [illegible] the Prime Minister by Deputy Foladwand asking in view of the British [illegible] the evacuation of Tehran Hamadan and Kermanshah, whe[illegible] [illegible]ed by the Russians At the [illegible] 15th November several Deputies expressed surprise at the announ[illegible] Paris of the existence of separatist movements in Kurdistan and [illegible] [illegible]ed his B[illegible] for the two new divisions for a credit for [illegible] right to provide financial relief for army officers (see [illegible] No 38 Appendix) In the ensuing debate the Tudeh [illegible] made attacks on army administration th[illegible] [illegible]ersian and the misuse of military power by [illegible]

[illegible]

2 [illegible] main points in the new Conscription Law passed by the Majlis (see paragraph 1 above) are as follows

(i) If the lists of those liable for conscription in any one area show a surplus [illegible] requirements then conscripts shall be chosen by l[illegible]

(ii) If the availability lists show a deficit, then conscripts who drew [illegible]tion in last year's lot will be taken to make up the deficit

(iii) If a conscript leaves exemption in successive years till he is aged 26 he will be conscripted as permanently exempt and relegated to the reserve [illegible]

3. The import and sale of cloth will no longer be a Government monopoly but owing to financial stringency the monopoly tax, in addition to custom duty will continue to be levied

4 (a) *Civil* Ahmad Mashayikhi to be Governor of Rezaieh

(b) *Military* (i) Sarlashkar Fatullah Aghevli to be head of the Military Tribunals *vice* Sartip Naqib transferred to the General Staff (This [illegible] officer once Chief of the Gendarmerie will be remembered as one of the [illegible]

[illegible] Haqq Amir Nizami is reappointed additional Deputy [illegible]

(iii) Sartip Muhsen Diba from Director of Artillery to be Director of the [illegible] Club

(iv) Sartip Abdullah Hedayat from *en disponibilité* to be Director of Artillery

Internal Security

Khorasan

[illegible] Security has further declined and some more holdu[illegible] between Meshed and Turbat i Haidari Meshed and Nishapur and near Turbat i Sheikh [illegible]

Azerbaijan

6 Reports from more than one Kurdish source tell of the forcible billeting of Mulla Mustafa's followers by the Russians on the various Kurdish tribes in the [illegible] of Lake Urumiyeh According [illegible] Bukan 150 on villages between Sidiz and Mahabad 100 [illegible] The rest appear to be distributed between Oshnu and Naqadeh A considerable sum of money has also been collected from the Persian Kurds for relief The same source reports that left to themselves, Mulla Mustafa's followers would probably prefer to seek an amnesty from the Iraqi Government and return to Iraq but that the Russians are preventing this and have instructed the fugitives to say that they have been reduced to their present plight by bombing from British aircraft

7 The Azerbaijan Democratic party has sent a circular to foreign consul[illegible] peasants and asks that the Great Powers be informed of the "people's [illegible] gendarmerie but at the hands of hireling cads of Armenians, Assyrians and

Chaldeans, who, emboldened by the support of their Russian masters, have the [illegible] Provincial Council and the adoption of the Turki language [illegible] few days. A party of Democrats attacked Mianeh Railway Station, over [illegible] Conscription Department, the sole representatives of the Persian army in Mianeh. The town is said to be in their hands. Near Maragheh a skirmish took place between Democrats and gendarmes. Two of the Democrats were wounded and thirteen made prisoner. Later the Russian Commandant at Maragheh intervened by disarming the gendarmes and setting free the prisoners. The Chief of the General Staff also informed the British Military Attaché that the towns of Ahar, Maragheh and Sarab are in the hands of the Democrats, that they are being armed with new Brno rifles by the Russians, that these rifles are part of those taken by the Russians from the Persian army at the time of the occupation, that [illegible] army soldiers have been put into mufti and armed, that attacks on Persian [illegible] villages and Persian army barracks are expected very soon and that [illegible] Persian General Officer Commanding, Tabriz Division, had been ordered to [illegible] these localities to the last.

Russian Interests

9. Some further news has been received regarding the report that the Russians were actually engaged in shipping oil from the Ashuradeh peninsula near Bandar Shah (see Intelligence Summary No. 41, paragraph 15). It now appears that the pipes and other material seen were brought for the [illegible] construction of oil tanks at the port of Bandar Shah and the improvement of a pipe line from the port to the town in order to facilitate the discharge of oil from tankers.

10. There is no sign of any relaxation of Russian control of the northern, north western and north eastern sections of the Iranian State Railway. Some twenty officers of field rank are still employed at Tehran railway station alone.

Iraqi Interests

11. Seyyid Abbas Mehdi Beg, formerly Iraqi Minister in Tehran, has been appointed Minister in Moscow and has arrived in Tehran on his way to his new post.

Czechoslovak Interests

12. The Czechoslovak Military Attache has announced that his office has been temporarily closed. Lieutenant Colonel J. Lipa and Captain Kalmus are to leave shortly.

13. A party of some 300 Czechs are to leave shortly for their country via Russia on repatriation. They have been in Persia since before the war and were mostly employed by Skoda or as railway technicians. About 150 Czechs will remain in Tehran in the employ of Skoda.

Tehran, 18th November, 1945.

Military Attache's Intelligence Summary No. 45, Secret, for the Period the 19th–25th November, 1945. (Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 413 of 27th November, Received 8th December.)

Persian Affairs

Political

THE recent events in Azerbaijan have occupied the Persian Government's attention to the exclusion of nearly all other business. They are described in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 below.

The Majlis

2. At the session of the 18th November speeches on the situation in Azerbaijan were made by Deputy Dr. Shafaq, the Minister for War and the Minister without Portfolio. The debate on the Minister for War's Bill was

concluded and the Bill was passed by 80 votes out of an attendance of 87. The Tudeh members abstained from voting. For the text of the Bill see [illegible] B[illegible] summary. On the 20th November, at a public session [illegible] ing a secret session, a Kurdish Deputy expressed surprise at the announcement on Radio Paris of the existence of a separatist movement in Kurdistan and reaffirmed the loyalty of the Kurds. A crowd of Azerbaijanis resident in Tehran said to number 1,000 persons, came to the Majlis, professed their loyalty to the Central Government and asked for permission to go to Azerbaijan to defend their homes against the rebels. On the 21st November there was a secret session. On the 22nd November the Minister of Finance tabled a Bill to provide for the participation of Persia in U.N.R.R.A., and a one-twelfth Budget Bill for the month of Aban (23rd October–21st November). This was passed.

3. On the 17th November the Persian Government addressed a note to the Soviet Embassy in which it stated:

(i) That a number of Kurds in Azerbaijan and Mahabad had obtained arms from foreign sources to further aims which were at variance with the [illegible]

(ii) That the Kurds had obtained a printing press and paper from the U.S.S.R.

(iii) That a party of Kurds had visited Baku without completing the usual [illegible] of passports and exit visas.

(iv) That Mulla Mustafa Barzani was allowed by the Russians to foment trouble in Kurdistan.

(v) That the Russian authorities exercised a complete control by means of passes and forbade entry into their zone.

(vi) That the Russians had stopped the despatch of food-stuffs from their zone to the south, thereby causing a rise in price, losses to merchants and a dislocation of the economic life of Persia.

(vii) That maintenance of law and order by the Persian forces had been rendered impossible by the prevention of the despatch of reinforcements.

(viii) That a cessation of Government administration had been caused in certain provinces because no governors existed or could be sent.

(ix) That the Russians had removed the Persian frontier guards and officials and had thus rendered impossible the prevention of smuggling of live stock, &c.

(x) That the Russians had rendered impossible the pursuit of malefactors though they themselves took very speedy action against any person regarded by them as undesirable.

(xi) That the Russians had prevented Persian troops from maintaining order or defending themselves in Mianeh on the 17th November and Maragheh on the 28th August and that conversations with the Russian authorities had produced no result.

The note concludes by saying that if the Russians continue to prevent the despatch of Persian military, gendarmerie or police to areas where they desire to restore law and order, the Persian Government must hold the Russians [illegible] le for any disorders which occur. The substance of this note was given [illegible] Persian Ambassadors in London and Washington to the Foreign Office and State Department respectively, and the Persian Ambassador in Washington (Edition) gave a summary of it to the American press. The Persian Government have now telegraphed to their ambassador in London to make the contents of the above note available to the British press.

4. At the same time as the above note was presented to the Soviet Embassy [illegible] Chief of the General Staff asked the Soviet Militar[illegible] Soviet military authorities in Qazvin and procure their consent to the despatch of two infantry battalions and a gendarmerie battalion to Mianeh and Tabriz. As no reply was received either to the note or to this request by the General Staff the latter decided to despatch the force. It left in lorries on the 19th November and the advanced guard reached a point about 40 kilom. from Qazvin, where it was stopped by a Russian staff officer, who said that if the column went on it would be fired at. The officer commanding advanced guard replied that he had received orders to advance even if fired upon and continued to advance. When the advanced guard reached the orchards on the outskirts of Qazvin town it was stopped by one Russian battalion in position across the road with four tanks and two armoured cars. The main body on receiving this information halted at Sharifabad, 7 miles short of Qazvin and about 85 miles from Tehran, and a rear party, halted by Russian troops at Kerej, some 21 miles west of Tehran

[illegible] ter two days, to join the main body and to take its tents and [illegible] prived during two days of incessant rain. The advanced guard subsequently retired to Sharifabad where the column still remains. The Russians have allowed four of its lorries to make one trip daily to Qazvin to obtain fresh supplies an[illegible]

[illegible] rding Russian movements in and around Tehran the Chief of the [illegible] d informed the British Military Attaché that

Arrivals and departures of Russian troops at and from Tehran by rail [illegible]

[illegible] sheets and [illegible] done up in cloth of about 1 metre in length [illegible]

Tehran to their military headquarters (still in existence despi[illegible] the ex evacuation of Tehran) and even to the Soviet Embassy [illegible] rsian railway workers belonging to the Tudeh had been armed by th[illegible] Russians at stations between Semnan and Garmsar (some 40 miles ea[illegible]

(iii) That the Tehran garrison, after the arrival of a battalion from Isfahan [illegible]

In his opinion the increases in the Russian garrisons at Semnan and [illegible] the recent infiltration of Russian troops into Tehran, the [illegible] all pointed to an impending occupation of the capital by Russian [illegible] with a rising of the local Tudeh and similar risings by the Democrat rebels in Azerbaijan. (The British Military Atta[illegible] n formed the Chief of the General Staff that he did not share this view and that the Russians could obtain their immediate objects without [illegible] Azerbaijan which would bring about autonomy and give them an oil [illegible]

The Press

8. An interesting article signed by eighty "intellectuals" has appeared in the paper *Bakhtar* of the 2nd November. It states that Persia has been occupied by Allied troops for four years and three months, its economic life has been upset, its currency has been inflated, Allies have interfered with its administration and intervened in its elections, it has not been paid the cost of the military Aid to Russia (not it carried over its railway), disaffected elements have been encouraged and assisted by the Allies and the despatch of food stuffs has been prevented. The article contrasts the promises and achievements of the British and Russians in the matter of evacuation and finally asks that British, American and French parliamentary delegations be sent to Azerbaijan to see for themselves whether the present separatist movement is a genuine one or inspired by foreign [illegible]

Appointments

[illegible] the appointment of Morteza Qoli Bayat (Foreign Office 47, Military Affairs 65) as Governor General of Azerbaijan, which had been announced in the [illegible] T[illegible] y Russian plane on the 25th November but was held up by bad weather.

(b) Abdul Husein Ansari (Foreign Office 21, Military Affairs 29), a Director General and head of the Tripartite Treaty Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to be Governor General of Gilan.

(c) Husein Saiati (Adib-us-Sultaneh) (Foreign Office 199, Military Affairs 234) to be Governor General of the 6th Ostan (Khorasan).

Dismissal

8. The Cabinet has cancelled its decree raising the status of Ardakan sub-governorate to a governorate. It thus remains part of the "Shahrestan" of Yezd.

The Court

9. Prince Ahmad Reza, fifth son of the late Reza Shah (by his third Queen [illegible] H[illegible] Bahrami, Ihya us Sultaneh (Military Affairs 59).

Internal Security

[illegible] Sayah.

10. There is but little definite news from Azerbaijan itself as telegraphic communications have been interrupted and the Persian army's wireless telegraphy links with Bezaieh, Miandoab, Khoi and Ardebil are not working. The General Officer Commanding at Tabriz is still in touch with Tehran by wireless telegraphy but can give very scanty information. The intelligence organisation of the Persian General Staff seems very inadequate and ill trained and incapable of checking the accuracy of any report which it receives. Actually very few fresh events of major importance from the military point of view have occurred in Azerbaijan since those reported in the last Intelligence Summary and the chief interest centres on Russian military mo[illegible] on what the Persian Government has done and will do in [illegible] Russians and what the Persian Government hopes the British and American authorities will do to bring home to the Russians that their present actions are at variance with their undertakings as signatories of the Tripartite Treaty.

11. On the 14th November the Democratic party of Azerbaijan announced in the press that the "first phase of their organisation" was complete, *i.e.* that the Tabriz Committee and those in the smaller towns were in being, and that the second phase, that of organisation of village councils, would begin. About the same time it was announced that the party had decided to ignore the decision of the Tehran Government to postpone the Majlis elections and that Azerbaijan, under the leadership of the Democratic party, would proceed with the elections both of the Majlis and of the provincial and town councils.

12. From information obtained from the Chief of General Staff and from [illegible] ar sources the situation, in brief, appears to be as follows:

Tabriz.—The town is quiet but apprehensive of future offensive action by the Russians or the [illegible] by the Persian military are probably incapable of resisting. The General Officer Commanding is in touch with the Persian General Staff by wireless. Telegraphic communications between Tabriz and Zenjan, Tabriz and Rezaieh, Tabriz and Astara, Tabriz and Kermanshah interrupted. Many merchants are leaving for Tehran. The Democratic party has patrols checking all civilian movement and preventing all Persian military, gendarmerie and police movement on all roads leading out of [illegible]

Rezaieh.—Believed to be quiet, but no wireless [illegible]

Khoi.—Believed to be quiet, but no wireless communicat[illegible]

Marashah and Ardebil.—32 and 50 miles respectively south-west of Tabriz, gendarme posts overpowered by Democrat rebels.

Maraghah.—Persian Army garrison of one company confined to barracks and town in hands of rebels. Two thousand rifles said to have been distributed by the Russians to the rebels.

Miandoab.—According consular report, believed to [illegible] t Chief of General Staff believes that the Persian A[illegible] battalion is still in control of the town.

Sarab.—In rebel hands, the garrison of one platoon having been disarmed and made prisoner.

[illegible] nt Chief of General Staff believes the garr[illegible] e safe though not in command of the situation. Eight [illegible] said to have been distributed to Democrats by the Russians.

Mianeh.—In rebel hands—two lorry loads of rifles said to have been distributed to the Russians. Pickets of "Muhajirs," Russian speaking and of a military bearing, control all movement between Tabriz and Mianeh.

Gendarmerie Posts.—Most of these are said to have been disarmed and captured. There are none remaining between Tabriz and Mianeh.

His Majesty's Consul General at Tabriz sums up by saying that while reports of fighting have been much exaggerated, the Democratic party really mean business. The Central Government has no authority whatsoever between Mianeh and Tabriz and the Democratic party is in control in every town and village of eastern Azerbaijan. A clear sweep has been made of the gendarmerie and the opportunity has [illegible] of landlords obnoxious to the Democrats. What has happened in Mianeh will happen on a bigger scale during the next week in Tabriz and an autonomous Azerbaijan will have come into being.

13. The People's Congress has distributed a French translation of their manifesto to foreign consuls in Tabriz. The document is reproduced as Appendix A to this summary.

14. *Corrigendum* (reference pa[illegible] 7 [illegible] the list of communities actively carrying out Russian designs in Azerbaij[illegible] course, be added certain Kurdish elements (chiefly Shakkak and Herki) [illegible] muhajirs " imported from the U.S.S.R. That some Persian Azerbaijanis support the Democrat party is not denied but the paragraph referred to was designed to show that minorities, disaffected tribal elements and immigrants form the backbone of the party

Brit sh Interests

15 Dr Mortimer Wheeler Director-General of Archaeology in India, arrived in Persia via Zahidan on the 28th October for a four weeks' tour of Persia under the auspices of the Indo-Iranian Cultural Society. He visited Isfahan, Shiraz and Persepolis, but was not permitted by the Russians to proceed to Meshed via Gunbad i-Qabus, or even to travel to Meshed by the direct route by air The party returned to India via Baghdad

American Interests

16 Having sold their railway locomotives and 277 of their oil tank waggons for the highly satisfactory figure of 85 per cent. of their cost the Americans are considering the sale of their remaining assets on the basis of 7½ per cent. of their [illegible] remaining 184 tank waggons which the Americans have for disposal [illegible] particularly as the buildings and camps which form the major part of these assets, would fetch very little in the open market. It would, however, adversely affect British military disposals if the British were obliged to adopt a similar figure, firstly because the British have not " cashed in " on any items comparable to the American railway assets and secondly, because they still have for disposal some valuable material chiefly in the form of harbour installations

[illegible]

17 An A I O C source in Tabriz considered reliable reports the erection of an oil drilling rig by the R[illegible] at a hamlet *Sennikh* (not marked on the map) some 15 miles from Tabriz on the Tabriz Marand road

18. The Moscow press has given prominence to events in Azerbaijan where it asserts, genuine democratic and labour movements are being harshly repressed by Persian military and gendarmerie It accuses the B B C of falsifying news of the recent events in order to divert world attention from the discreditable happenings in Palestine and Indonesia

Tehran 25th November 1945

Appendix A

Declaration du Congrès National d'Azerbaidjan

Le Congrès national qui est formé à Tabriz du 29 au 30 aban 1324 (20 au 21 novembre 1945) de tous les délégués de tous les départements et communes d'Azerbaidjan décida à l'unanimité à sa quatrième séance de référer par la déclaration suivante, au Gouvernement central de l'Iran et aux Puissances démocratiques du monde (États-Unis, Grande-Bretagne l'Union des Républiques Soviétiques, la France et la Chine), et déclarer ses desiderata justes et légaux qui se résument dans les articles ci-dessous

1. La nation azerbaidjanienne, pour des causes et des événements historiques [illegible]

2. [illegible] politiques [illegible] avec les pertes [illegible] pour [illegible]

et départements de l'Iran et en raison des multiples sacrifices que les Azerbaidjaniens ont subis pour la fondation et la création de l'Iran actuel (qui ont été effectivement ses fondateurs), pour ces raisons, voulant conserver à tout prix l'intégrité de son territoire, ils ne sont aucunement décidés d'établir leurs desiderata légitimes sur sa division ni de porter atteinte à ses frontières

3. La nation azerbaidjanienne réclame de toutes ses forces le régime démocratique qui est en Iran sous forme de Constitution et Gouvernement national

4. La nation azerbaidjanienne, comme les habitants de tous les points de l'Iran, participera dans l'administration des affaires sociales et du Gouvernement central en envoyant ses Députés à " Madjlessé Chouravé Milli " et en payant ses justes contributions.

5. (*)La nation azerbaidjanienne déclare ouvertement et officiellement qu'à l'exemple de toutes les nations actives du monde entier, a droit tout en conservant bien entendu l'intégrité territoriale conformément aux principes démocratiques et souveraineté nationale

6 La nation azerbaidjanienne a supporté des peines abondantes [illegible] sacrifices innombrables pour la liberté elle souhaitait par conséquent que son Gouvernement autonome soit établi sur une base démocratique réelle. C'est pourquoi se conformant aux statuts approuvés par son " Congrès national," elle élit son Parlement national " et elle trouve en même temps nécessaire que le Gouvernement national régional d'Azerbaidjan soit constitué des membres élus parmi les Députés du Parlement national et soit responsable vis-à vis de lui

7 La nation azerbaidjanienne est particulièrement attachée à sa langue maternelle, l'imposition d'une autre langue l'a retardée jusqu'ici de la caravane du progrès et de la civilisation et a été comme un obstacle pour l'avènement de sa culture nationale. Pour obvier à cet inconvénient et s'assurer les [illegible] progressifs de l'Azerbaidjan le Congrès national a ordonné au [illegible] national " de mettre en vigueur au plus tôt possible la langue azerbaidjanienne dans les administrations de l'État et de pratiquer son enseignement dans les établissements scolaires publics et privés

8. Le Congrès national, qui a été constitué par la participation et suivant la signature de cent cinquante mille personnes et la délégation de [illegible] représentants des différents points de l'Azerbaidjan, s'est appelé [illegible] constitutionnelle nationale " par la volonté du peuple et il a élu [illegible] " de trente neuf membres pour l'administration de questions et affaires intérieures de l'Azerbaidjan à qui il a donné plein pouvoir d'employer des mesures nécessaires pour la réalisation de ses vues nationales et d'entrer en [illegible] avec les autorités compétentes, ainsi que de prendre à leur charge les élections du " Madjlessé Chouravé Milli " et du " Parlement national

Attirant enfin l'attention du Gouvernement iranien et des Puissances démocratiques du monde sur les questions susmentionnées, le Co[illegible] vouloir employer que des moyens de propagande et d'organisation pour a[illegible] à ses buts pacifiquement et ne permettre en aucune façon ni dispute ni guerre intérieure à moins que le Gouvernement central ne veuille piétiner [illegible] légitimes par contrainte et force armée. Dans ce cas, il défe[illegible] tout prix et combattra jusqu'à la dernière personne pour imposer enfin son [illegible] nationale coûte que coûte

L'Assemblée constitutionnelle a donc donné carte blanche au " Comité national " d'entrer en pourparlers avec les autorités compétentes pour assurer l'autonomie d'Azerbaidjan et d'en obtenir la solution pacifiquement, mais le " Comité national " ne peut en aucune façon passer outre des droits de l'autonomie régionale et du Gouvernement national, ni faire quoi que ce soit contre l'intégrité territoriale et l'indépendance de l'Iran

[illegible] qui s'est préparé à défendre ses droits de tout son pouvoir pour dresser le pavillon de l'[illegible] d'Azerbaidjan et qui [illegible] d'assurer son autonomie par son énergie nationale et nous espérons que les autorités compétentes iraniennes et les Puissances démocratiques de l'univers ne nous épargneront pas leur gracieux

(*) The French translation of the Persian and Turki texts of the " Declaration of the National Congress of Azerbaijan " was made by the Azerbaijan Committee itself

The Acting Consul General at Tabriz reports that a phrase appears to have been omitted from paragraph 5 of the French version, which he considers should be understood in English [illegible]

" The people of Azerbaijan offic ally and publ cly declare that like other living nations [illegible] the independence and integrity of Iran, is empowered to manage [illegible] azerbaijan in accordance with the principles of democracy and national sovereignty

concours dans la réalisation de notre but national, qui est basé, du reste, sur le Pacte de l'Atlantique

Avec ses considérations [illegible]

Le Président du Congrès national (Assemblée constitutionnelle centrale de l'Azerbaïdjan) [illegible]

Appendix B

The following is the text of the Ministry of War Bill passed by the Majlis on the 18th November 1945:—

Single article.—The Majlis shall authorise the Ministry of Finance to provide the following credits in addition to the Ministry of War's present budget and to pay them to that Ministry:—

(i) The Ministry of War shall be authorised to add 12,142 men to the present army strength, for which the budget for the last [illegible] of the year amounting to approximately 52 million rials shall be paid by the Ministry of Finance.

(ii) To improve the living conditions of army officers a credit of 5 million rials shall be paid annually to the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of War to be used for the following purposes:—

(a) A monthly allowance of Rials 100 for each minor child irrespective of the officer's rank.

(b) [illegible] shall be paid in the second year of the time when they could normally have expected promotion, represe[illegible] difference between the pay for the higher rank and the lower rank. In subsequent years also one fourth of the [illegible] difference shall be paid annually as an increase in pay.

(c) An allowance of up to a maximum of 20 per cent. of every [illegible] of the difference in the cost of living in the various parts of the country.

(d) Two suits of service clothing shall be granted to every officer each year.

Note.—The Ministry of War shall be authorised to re-commission in their former rank those regular officers who have by this date resigned but who now desire to re-enter the army, provided that they have [illegible]

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 46. Secret, for the Period 16th November to 3rd December 1945. (Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 427 of 4th December, 1945. Received in Foreign Office 18th December.)

[illegible] *Affairs*

AFFAIRS in Azerbai[illegible] Government during the past week. The Persian Government anxiously awaits the reply of the Soviet Government to the notes presented by the American and British Ambassadors. The Soviet Embassy's reply to the Persian Government's [illegible] 3 of last Intelligence Summary) re[illegible] It will be seen that the Russians [illegible] the Persian Government. Over the most important question, that of the despa[illegible] of Persian troops, the Russians give no satisfaction but throw the onus of resp[illegible]sibility on to the shoulders of the Persians, adduce the threat th[illegible] troop movements will necessitate an increase in Russian garrisons [illegible] existing Persian garrison of Azerbaijan—some 4,000 effectives on [illegible] gendarmerie, could possibly constitute a menace to Russian forces totalling at

least 30,000 men, and secondly that the existing garrisons are, in fact, garrisons. The gendarmerie throughout the province are known to have been disarmed and the military are either restricted in action to an area within 5 miles of their barracks, as at Rezaieh, or confined to barracks as at Maragheh, or besieged in their barracks as at Miandoab, or allowed to perform static guards under Russian surveillance as at Tabriz. The one thing they are not allowed to do is to take action against Democrat rebels when disturbing the peace. Such action br[illegible] Russians intervene on the local Russian town mayor, who orders the P[illegible] troops back to barracks and liberates anyone made prisoner by them.

2. On the 22nd November the Persian Government addressed a second note to the Soviet Embassy in which it protested against the continued presence of Russian troops in Tehran after the town had been declared officially as evacuated by them. The note also protested against the introduction into the capital of refugees in plain clothes.

3. The speeches of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Mr. Eden in the House of Commons have greatly heartened Persians of all classes.

4. The Russian military have evacuated their military movements staff and all troops from Tehran railway station and are said to have established them near Ferruzkuh. They have also evacuated their military headquarters (which has gone to join its parent body at Qazvin) and some, but not all, of their [illegible]. They still have a camp some 5 kilom. west of the [illegible]

5. The Persian Government has addressed a note to His Majesty's Embassy asking that an invitation be procured for the Persian Government to attend the International Conference on War Reparations now in session in Paris, on the grounds that Persia has been at war with Germany and has thereby suffered many direct and indirect losses.

The Majlis

6. On the 25th and 28th November the Majlis Budget [illegible] during the 4 12th Budget Bill recently tabled by the Minister of [illegible] Minister of the Interior made a short speech mainly about the departure of Isayat, the newly appointed Governor-General for Azerbaijan. The urgency of the Peasants' Insurance Bill was discussed but there were insufficient Deputies present for a division. The urgency of the Justice Commission (Powers) Bill was also discussed but no decision was taken. In view of the developments in Azerbaijan a secret session of the Majlis was held on the 26th November at which the Prime Minister informed the House of the steps he had taken during the [illegible] few days. At a secret session of the Majlis on the 27th November it was d[illegible] to appoint a commission of sixteen members appointed from all the Majlis groups [illegible] study the recent events in Azerbaijan and the decisions taken by the Govern[illegible] keep in constant touch with the Government. Malik Madani and Siqatol were appointed to represent the Mihan group, Iskandari and Farmanfarmayan the Azadi group, Shari' Atradeh and Hiramati the Ittihad-i Meli group, Siqat-ul Islam and Samson the Democrats (no connexion with the Azerbaijan Democrats), Dr. Kashavarz and Shahab the Tudeh, Masudi and Dr. 'Abdulk the Mustaqil group, and Dr. Musaddiq and Dr. Shafaq the Independents. The commission met for the first time on the 28th November.

[illegible]

Azerbaijan (see paragraph 12 of last Intelligence Summary).

7. Events which have occurred since the last Intelligence Summary are written are as follows:—

[illegible].—The Governor has been shot by Democrat rebels [illegible] been seized by the rebels who shot the Persian [illegible] on the Caspian coast so far as [illegible]

Miandoab.—No change. The rebel garrison is believed to number 2[illegible]

Zenjan.—This place, though not in Azerbaijan, has been occupied by the rebels. The rebel [illegible] 200 [illegible]

Tabriz Zenjan Road.—[illegible] the road. They control all movement and search [illegible]

Ajr (near Sarab).—A party of Shahsevan tribesmen came to the rescue [illegible] Nusrat, their chief, who was besieged by rebels. The Shahsevan [illegible] and rescued their chief, killing fifty-seven rebels and [illegible]

Qazvin.—Tudeh or Democrat pickets reported (requires confirmation) to be in charge of all exits from the town and to be preventing the transport of all food stuffs.

[illegible] besieged in its barracks. It has succeeded in establishing contact by messenger with the Persian garrison of Saqqiz.

Saqqiz.—The garrison has despatched two companies on detachment to Tikab, some 70 miles north-east of Saqqiz to prevent any southward movement of the rebels towards Bijar and Hamadan.

Khorasan

8. A consular source reports that the arrival of a party of Tudeh leaders in Meshed is causing the local authorities some alarm. They feel they [illegible]

9. Ten lorry loads of arms and ammunition sent from Tehran for the Persian military garrison in Meshed are reported to have been detained *en route* by the Russian military authorities.

10. The same source reports that the survivors of [illegible] Tepe near Gumbad-i-Qabus for some time, have now joined the Azerbaijan Democrat rebels.

Persian Army

11. Reinforcements, amounting to a battalion [illegible]

12. During the past week there has been some activity, mostly from the [illegible] members, designed to displace General Arfa, the Chief of General Staff as being obnoxious to the Russians. Several prominent Deputies have represented to the Prime Minister and the president of the Majlis the unwisdom of such a change during the present crisis. The Prime Minister is believed to have agreed with their views.

[illegible]

13. (i) Abul Qasim Najm, Minister for Foreign Affairs, [illegible] has [illegible]

(ii) Bayat, the newly appointed Governor General of Azerbaijan, has arrived in Tabriz by Russian plane.

(iii) Mubasir Roshani has been appointed Deputy Governor-General of Azerbaijan and Governor of Tabriz.

(iv) [illegible] governorates general of Khorasan and Fars respectively.

Administrative

14. The Cabinet have approved [illegible] Ministry [illegible] Kermanshah [illegible]

Russian Interests

15. The United States Air Attaché, who [illegible] reported [illegible] Stormovik dive-bomber machines under covers on the Tabriz aerodrome and eight fighters at Qazvin. He considers that the Russians [illegible]

British Interests

16. The long range squadron, which has been operating in East Persia for the past two years, has now returned to India.

Tehran, 3rd December, 1945.

Translation of Russian Embassy Memorandum of the 20th November, 1945, handed to the Second Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, at 10·30 a.m., the 20th November, 1945.

THE Soviet Embassy present their compliments to the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and in reply to Memorandum dated the 17th November, 1945 have the honour to state that the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Soviet officials are interfering in the internal affairs of Iran is unfounded and is not consistent with the actual facts. Likewise, the question of Soviet authorities rendering assistance to the Kurds in their political activities in those areas is completely unfounded, and in particular they have had no connexion with the activities of the Kurdish tribal chiefs living in the 4th District (Mahabad), nor did they have anything to do with Mulla Mustafa Barzani's crossing the Irano-Iraq frontier as alleged in the Minister for Foreign Affairs memorandum.

It is clear in the mind of the Soviet Embassy that the Soviet representatives did not, as alleged in the Minister for Foreign Affairs' memorandum, [illegible] release of any of those people detained by the gendarmerie at Qili Kund [illegible] there any question of Persian military guards, who were proceeding towards the prison building in Tabriz, being detained by the Soviet authorities.

To confirm that Soviet authorities prevent the passage of Persian subjects in the northern provinces would not be consistent with the true facts, it is obvious that the Soviet system of issuing passes for travelling to the northern provinces of Persia where Soviet forces are stationed applies to subjects of other countries. The statement made in the Minister for Foreign Affairs' memorandum that Soviet officials are interfering in the economic life of the northern provinces is unfounded. It is clear, on the other hand, that the Soviet [illegible] accordance with its duty of friendship, rendered assistance to Persia in [illegible] 1943 at the most difficult of times even for the Soviet Government, by providing 25,000 tons of wheat for the populace of the capital of Persia—Tehran. By importing other Soviet goods Soviet commercial organisations during the war improved the distribution of goods for the Persian people.

It is obvious that the Soviet Government cannot be held responsible for the absence of Government [illegible] and other Government officials in the northern provinces. As regards [illegible] departure of such officials to the places of their appointment, the Soviet [illegible] in this respect, always assisted the Persian Government [illegible] few days ago the Soviet Embassy proved their assistance by providing a plane for the departure of M. Bayat to Tabriz. Without giving [illegible] the question of protecting the Persian-Turkish borders, the relevant Persian authorities repeatedly informed the Soviet officials that the establishment of frontier posts on the Persian-Turkish border present great difficulties for them and in spite of repeated proposals by Soviet officials in this respect they have refused to protect this frontier. Under these circumstances the objections raised by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs about the absence of gendarmerie posts on the Persian-Turkish border cannot be considered relevant.

The statement to the effect that Soviet [illegible] in the judicial affairs of Persians and to have prevented the enforcement of the penal code with regard to Persian subjects is very surprising in view of there being no foundation for such a statement and its inconsistency with the actual facts and it cannot be ignored that local Persian officials have repeatedly created obstacles in the unearthing of treacherous elements and local judges have [illegible] such elements or have purposely issued light sentences for [illegible] in the areas where Soviet troops are stationed [illegible] military property and even for the murderers of [illegible] of this the Soviet military officials did not have [illegible] but desired the [illegible] accordance with [illegible] could not overlook [illegible] with regard to Persian subjects [illegible] officials and military personnel. However [illegible] interference in the judicial affairs of Persia.

Activities on the part of certain Persian political parties in the northern provinces, such as the incidents which took place in Miandoab and Maraghch, were

referred to in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs' memorandum, which connected such activities with the Democratic party of Persian Azerbaijan. Information received by the Soviet Embassy does not confirm the questions brought up in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs' memorandum. In any case, the incidents in the northern provinces of Persia which are connected with the activities of political parties constitute in fact Persian internal problems. Soviet officials and military authorities have not interfered and do not interfere in the political life of the northern provinces. Therefore the Soviet Embassy strongly rejects the efforts to transfer responsibility for these incidents from the Persian to the Soviet authorities, who have in no way interfered in these incidents.

Since the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to support its statements, thought it necessary to appeal to the Tripartite Pact, the Soviet Embassy is obliged to state that the above-mentioned pact dated 1942 is fully and carefully observed by the Soviets.

At the same time, the Soviet Embassy is obliged to point out that the section of the above-mentioned pact connected with the maintenance of security inside Persia is often not observed by Persian officials; the behaviour of certain members of military and gendarmerie groups has not been consistent with the establishment of security in the areas of their appointment. This matter was duly mentioned in memorandums of the 20th August, 1945, and in subsequent [illegible]

[illegible]

expedient, and it must be taken into con[illegible] addition to the regular Persian army and [illegible] armeria stationed in these districts should enter these areas, then such action would lead to disturbances and bloodshed in the northern provinces of Persia. The Soviet Government would then be obliged, for the maintenance of the security of the Soviet garrison, to bring in new reinforcements of their own. As the Soviet Government does not desire to bring reinforcements into Persia, does not, therefore, deem it expedient for Persian military reinforcements to enter the northern provinces of Persia.

E 9995 70 34. (11)

Military Attache's Intelligence Summary No. 47. Secret, for the Period 4th December to 9th December, 1945. (Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 436 of 11th December.—(Received in Foreign Office 21st December.)

Persian Affairs

Politics

1. The Persian, though capable of spasmodic feats of bravery, is not renowned for that dogged brand of courage which sustains prolonged resistance in adverse circumstances. His vanity leads him to think that his vital interests must be those of the entire world. He is ignorant of how democracies work and how they conduct their diplomatic business. He was dismayed that approaches made to the Soviet Government by the British and American Governments did not immediately elicit favourable replies. All these factors have combined to cast a gloom over political circles and it is not surprising that the Persian's courage is beginning to ooze away. The Majlis majority behind the Prime Minister, seeing no immediate or tangible results from his policy of resistance, have began to waver and the minority, led by Dr. Musaddiq, with their policy of appeasement began to gain ground. Supporters of the Qawam-us-Saltaneh began to lobby on his behalf and some forty-five Deputies are believed to have signed a document pledging their support of him. His policy, of which he makes no secret, is that of appeasement in general and, in particular, that of granting the Russians an

oil concession, agreeing to hold the elections on the original date and the removal of officials obnoxious to the Russians. Like most Persians he is obsessed with the idea of his own cleverness and thinks that if he were to come into power, he could by prevarication and procrastination keep the Russians dangling on the end of a string until the 2nd March—a belief which few outside the ranks of his countrymen would share. The recent news of the forthcoming meeting of the three [illegible] Secretaries in Moscow has slightly diminished this gloom and given the Persians a ray of hope that their problem may yet be settled.

2. The Cabinet is said to be considering the idea of asking the three Big Powers, and possibly France and China in addition, to supervise the next elections so as to refute the Russian accusation that the Persian Government is reactionary.

3. The Soviet Embassy's reply to the Persian Government's note of the 12th November (see paragraph 2 of last Intelligence Summary) merely referred to [illegible]sian Government to the Soviet Embassy's reply of the 20th November (see [illegible]ix to last Intelligence Summary) to which it had nothing to add. A further [illegible] the Persian Government dated the 4th December has not yet been answered.

4. On the 26th November the Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed to His Majesty's Embassy a memorandum of which copies had been sent to the Soviet, American, French and Chinese Embassies in Tehran. This is reproduced as an appendix to this Intelligence Summary.

The Majlis

5. At the sessions of the 2nd, 4th and 6th December the attention of Deputies was almost entirely devoted to events in Azerbaijan. The only Majlis business conducted was a discussion of the Prison Reform Law at the request of the Minister for Justice and the tabling by the Minister of Finance of the Income Tax Amendment Bill.

Internal Security

[illegible]

6. There is a change for the worse in the situation as reported in paragraph 7 of last Intelligence Summary. News from some places, because it concerns Democrat activities, is given in this paragraph for the sake of convenience even though these places are outside the boundaries of Azerbaijan. Bayat, the newly-arrived Governor General, issued a proclamation on the 3rd December [illegible] and he expressed his readiness to enter into negotiations with representatives of all classes and strata of the population. He admitted the urgent need for reforms throughout Persia and in particular, in Azerbaijan. He deprecated attempts to secure these reforms by violence and murder. He stated that he had instructed the police to maintain law and order and appealed to all Azerbaijanis to co-operate in this task. According to reports received the Democrats have so far ignored Bayat's approaches. Voting for the National Parliament ended on the 2nd December. A Democrat paper has warned the Persian army that the first shot fired by them will be the signal for battle between the Democrats and the army.

News from the various centres is as follows:

Tabriz.—A police officer was murdered by the rebels outside his office about a week ago and another was murdered on the 8th December by five Caucasians in civilian dress who subsequently fled to a Russian military billet. The effect on the Tabriz garrison's morale is said to be bad as the officers feel that they will be slaughtered one by one while Russians look on and render them powerless to resist. The Chief of the General Staff is of the opinion that matters are coming to a head in Tabriz and that the rebels will soon begin attacks on public buildings and the garrison in order to present a *fait accompli to* the Moscow Conference when it meets.

Maragheh.—No accurate information but a report from the General Officer Commanding Tabriz Division states that, after murdering the governor, the rebels have left the town.

Astara and Caspian Coast.—No change.

Mianeh.—No change.

Zenjan.—The governor is reported to be a prisoner in the hands of the [illegible] been arrested and removed to Tehran some weeks ago. The Democrat leader Dr. Jehanshahlu, has assumed the duties of governor and is issuing orders in the town.

Tabriz Zenjan Road.—No change but see paragraph 12 below.

Qazvin From the Persian press and from another source comes the news that the governor has succeeded in persuading the Tudeh pickets to permit the passage to Tehran of food stuffs in transit

Mianeh —No cha

Hurand. This place, about midway between Tabriz and Julfa is now in rebel hands. They shot three prominent landlords

Sarab Confirmation from two sources has now been received of a report heard as long as ten days ago to the effect that after the military garrison of one platoon had been overpowered disarmed and taken prisoner by the rebels, two officers and twenty one men of the gendarmerie were taken outside the town and murdered in cold blood

Shahin Dej (previously known as *Sain Qalch*) The rebels who hold Bukan have now penetrated as far as this place which is some fifty miles north-east of Saqqiz where there is a strong military garrison

Habubar in Mazandaran is reported as being in Tudeh hands, and in Mazanderan and Gilan in general Tudeh activities have much increased. A no rent campaign has been successfully launched among the peasants by the Tudeh

Karaj —The Russians have posted a strong picket on the main Tehran Karaj road about twenty miles west of Tehran

In Tehran itself the town is quiet and the military forces are adequate to deal with any outbreak unless the rioters are reinforced from outside On the 8th December four lorries, driven by Russian soldiers, deposited at a Russian billet a total of about 100 Caucasians in civilian clothes

[illegible]

7 The movement against Murteza Quli Khan has flared up again and [illegible] Bakhtiari Khans of the rival faction have been trying to stir up trouble in Chahar Mahal. A summons to return to Isfahan issued by the General Officer Commanding Isfahan Division has, so far prevented the trouble spreading

Fars

8 Some attempts have recently been made to compose the differences between the Nasir Khan and Ali Khan branches of the Qashgai family Nasir Khan [illegible] Ali K[illegible] [illegible] The latter has not yet accepted this offer and would prefer a gift of land or, more accurately speaking the just restoration of lands previously his The [illegible] of a monthly allowance he feels, would brand him as Nasir's paid [illegible] diminish his prestige. It might also damage his reputation in the eyes of the Persian Government if, in the e[illegible] [illegible] Ali K[illegible] part [illegible]

Appointments

9.—(i) Muhammad Nariman, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, has been appointed Mayor of Tehran in addition to his other duties. The sudden dismissal of Ghulam Husein Ibtehaj (F O 89, M A 117) is believed to be due to pressure by the Russians with whom he was highly unpopular on account of his firm attitude to Tudeh agitators

(ii) Abul Qasim Kahalzadeh to be Director of the Propaganda Department. (There is no information as to the previous career of this obscure individual.)

British Interests

10. A statement in some Persian newspapers to the effect that large British reinforcements had been landed in South Persia was officially denied in the *Daily News Bulletin*. One newspaper came out with the fantastic story that several British battleships had arrived in the Shatt el Arab

11. The British military authorities propose to hand over to the Persian Government on varying dates between the 11th and 22nd December the following :—

Kerman aerodrome, Kerman-Zahidan road, Zahidan-Mirjawa road, Zahidan aerodrome British military buildings in Zah[illegible]

12 The British Embassy courier van was stopped on its way to Tabriz on the 4th December at Zenjan by a picket of Democrat rebels. The driver showed his Russian pass but the picket insisted on examining the contents of the truck [illegible] to do but could not prevent the picket from entering the truck and s[illegible] there was. The driver was obliged to drive to a garage while the re[illegible] decision. Eventually two Russian officers arrived and, after explanations by the driver, they told the rebels that the truck should be allowed to proceed

American Interests

13 Unfounded rumours published in some Persian newspapers, to the effect that large American military reinforcements had arrived in Tehran, produced an official denial from the American Embassy The rumour was probably caused by the arrival of a draft of some 200 service personnel as guards for the American camp at Amirabad to relieve a similar number of men due for discharge

Russian Interests

14. About a week ago local Armenian newspapers published an announcement by Moscow Radio to the effect that the Council of National Representatives in Moscow, in view of the numerous petitions received from Armenians resident abroad, had acceded to the request of the Government of Soviet Armenia that the gates of the Soviet Armenian Republic be thrown open to Armenians wishing to [illegible] They would be granted free customs entry and advances of money [illegible] houses up to 50 per cent of the cost Since then small crowds of A[illegible] have been seen daily outside the Soviet Consulate General in Tehran [illegible] 1945 some propaganda to the same effect by the Archimandrite of Julfa (Isfahan) was reported in the Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary

15. Reference paragraph 15 of Intelligence Summary No. 29, dated the 8th July, 1945, the Under Secretary for War gave the British Military Attaché some additional information about the losses incurred over the contract for supplying the Russians with arms and ammunition from the arsenal The revised figures are as follows —

(i) *Deliveries to Russians*

41,950 Brno rifles at 910 rials each, though the cost price to the Persian Government was 2,002 r[illegible]

10,282 machine pistols at 710 rials each, though the cost price to the [illegible] Government was 2,840 rials

[illegible] 000 cartridges at 1 46 rials each, though the cost price to the Persian Government was 3 40 rials

600,000 ramrods, for which no charge was made

415 series of spare parts for machine pistols, for which no charge was made

(ii) *Payments by Russians.*

The Russians have paid :—

10,000,000 rials to the Persian Government
2,500,000 rials to Skoda.
1,800,000 rials to Iran-Sovtrans for transport.
5,000,000 rials as an initial advance to the Persian Government

(iii) At the same time the Russians are making *unspecified* claims for materials and tools furnished by them for the manufacturing in addition to 7,200,000 rials due in salaries to Russian specialists, experts and advisers

(iv) The Russians proposed to settle by giving the Persian Government 262,191 metric tons of steel. It is estimated that this would settle Russia's debt for the above material if calculated on the basis of $4,000 per metric ton.

(v) Persian Government [illegible] (the matter is still under discussion as the Russians say "they await instructions from Moscow") they have lost on the deal 86,485,772 rials

Polish Interests

16 The movement of Polish refugees to the Lebanon has been in progress for some weeks. Isfahan is now clear of Poles and the numbers in Tehran and Ahwaz as at the 8th December was as follows

	Men.	Women.	Children.	Total
Tehran .	159	442	66	667
Ahwaz .	44	624	350	1,018
	20[illegible]	1,066	416	1,685

Swedish Interests

17 M Sven Harald Poisette, who was Swedish Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran from October 1941 to June 1945, has returned as Swedish Minister and presented his letters of credence to His Imperial Majesty the Shah on the 6th December Dr Gunnar Jarring the counsellor of the legation since December 1942, has been transferred to Addis Ababa

Tehran 9th December 1945

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy

(No 6024)
Memorandum

Tehran, 28th November, 1945

The Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, and have the honour to state that

As the embassy are aware a limited number of people have had recourse to certain measures in the Ustans 3 and 4 of Azerbaijan, raised certain undesirable voices and even issued a proclamation in support of their statements with the result that they have created a situation which entirely violates the Organic Law and which is against the security, peace and tranquillity of the country Chaos and disorder is increasingly wi[illegible] have attacked security officials, have occupied [illegible] roads and disturbing traffic security As a result th[illegible] owing to interruption of the telegraphic and telephonic communications, no true information as to the situation of their officials in these Ustans, and cannot send necessary instructions to the officials concerned in a proper manner and be confident [illegible] instructions will be carried out

[illegible] views are that if every individual group or commun[illegible] in the country h[illegible] any allegations to make which are not of a rebellious natur[illegible] against the Central Government and the Organic Law then such leg[illegible] allegations will be examined and [illegible] district. At the same time the Government is compe[illegible] to restore sec[illegible] of such elements who may have recourse to certain [illegible] and honour of the country, to take certain fundamental measures in order to establish and maintain the power of the Central Government throughout the country in the interests of public welfare.

[illegible] expectations of the Imperial Government, while taking into view the friendship and good r[illegible] particularly in view of the guarantees given in the proclamation issued by the leaders of the three Powers in Tehran and signed by Roosevelt, Stalin and Mr Churchill are that the Allied Powers, whose military forces are still in this country without having the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the country should express their views about the measures and action taken by the Cent[illegible] legal Government and inform the Imperial Government of the nature of [illegible] recommendations which they may have to make for the restoration of [illegible] in those Ustans. It is evident that they should also take into view the [illegible] the Government, with a view to maintaining security and assuring peace and tranquillity of the public will have to utilise the security forces of the country by sending a sufficient number of them as reinforcements to wherever this be found necessary The Imperial Government's forces should enjoy freedom of action inside the country in order to be able to stop the activities of the rebellious elements and to restore security in the places involved As they seem to intend to take

[illegible] measures shortly in the Ustans 3 and 4 which would be against Organic [illegible] it is desirable that they should bear in mind that the matter is of great [illegible] urgency, and the Persian Government therefore request that the [illegible] authorities of the friendly and Allied Governments may give immediate instructions to quarters they deem expedient to extend the required assist[illegible] and co-operation.

A copy of this memorandum has been sent to the Embassies of the U S S R and the United States in Tehran. A copy has also been sent to the Embassy of the Provisional French Government and a copy to the Chinese Embassy in Tehran

(Sealed) Ministry for Foreign Affairs

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Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 48, Secret for the Period 10th December to 16th December, 1945 (Communicated in Tehran Despatch No 443 of 18th December received 31st December)

Persian Affairs

[illegible]

DURING the past week events in Azerbaijan have moved rapidly to their inevitable conclusion and have fulfilled to a remarkable degree the prediction of His Majesty's Consul General at Tabriz recorded in paragraph 12 of Intellig[illegible] Summary No 45 They are described in paragraph 8 below The first round has gone to the rebels and, for the time being at least, Azerbaijan is in the Russian bag [illegible] Meanwhile in Tehran certain actions by the Prime M[illegible] to estrange still further the Majlis majority which supported him These actions are four in number Firstly, the Prime Minister refuses to take the Majlis [illegible] into his confidence and, in reply to numerous questions, merely replies [illegible] steps to end the deadlock are being taken Even the Cabinet would appear not to have been consulted in some of his decisions. Secondly, he has convened a 'high council' of elder statesmen That this council is entirely unofficial has been stressed but, all the same, their reputations and political leanings do not inspire confidence among the advocates of resistance The Qawam us Saltaneh, who has vast estates in the Russian Zone and whose candidature for the premiership the Russian controlled press has long been advocating makes no secret of his belief in a policy of appeasement in general [illegible] d, in particular, of granting an oil concession to the Russians, of removing officials obnoxious to the Russians and in holding the elections for the next Majlis [illegible] d the postponed date Mushtashar ul Dowleh is a tool [illegible] ly related to the leader of the rebels who staged the disturbances in Zenjan. Ali Mansur (Mansur us Saltaneh), though intelligent and able, has a dubious record as Governor General in Meshed where His [illegible] ty's Consul General recently described him as "either the Pétain or the Quisling of Khorassan." Pirnia though honest is far advanced in senile [illegible] Raha ul Mulk Qaragozlu is [illegible] ment and foolish It was inevitable that the selection of such men by the Prime Minister as his unofficial advisers should arouse mistrust Thirdly without informing His Imperial Majesty the Shah or the British or American Ambassadors the Prime Minister has suggested to the Soviet Govern[illegible] nent through the Persian Ambassador in Moscow that he and the M[illegible]ister for [illegible] Affairs should go to Moscow "for conversations" The possible consequences of this are obvious and would provide justification for the Russian view so often expressed in the Moscow press and in the Russian controlled Persian press, that the Azerbaijan affair is a domestic one between Russia and Persia and [illegible] ould not be raised to the status of an international issue Realising how greatly this direct approach will have weakened the position of the British and American Secretaries of State, His Imperial Majesty the Shah prevailed upon the Prime Minister to retrieve his mistake as far as possible by making a public appeal to the three Powers to remove their troops from Persia immediately and by addressing a request to the three Governments that Persia should be represented [illegible] article 6 of the Tripartite Treaty, at any discussions in Moscow [illegible] Persia Fourthly, in his desire to avoid any action provocative to the

Russiane, the Prime Minister, against the advice of the Chief of the General Staff despatched a telegram to the garrison at Tabriz ordering them to resist in principle (whatever that may mean), ordering the officers to disband the soldiers, to destroy their arms and make their way to Tehran

3. While Persians continue to pin their faith to a successful outcome of the Moscow Conference there are few who regard the recent Russian [illegible] Azerbaijan as the limit of their aims in Persia That the Tudeh [illegible] Gilan, Mazanderan and Khorassan will follow suit is their conviction, while the truly pessimistic aver that all these are but first steps to a Russian domination [illegible] their seizure of the Khuzistan oil and severance of Britain's communications between the Near East and In[illegible]

The Majlis

4. Apart from speeches on the Azerbaijan situation the only noteworthy proceeding has been the continuation of the debate on the Income Tax Law (Amendment) Bill

Legislation

5. The Cabinet have decreed that, as from the 5th December, the import and export of Persian currency notes will be strictly forbidden Travellers will be allowed to bring in or take out Persian currency to the value of 1,000 rials (about £7 10s.). Rials in excess of this will be confiscated and offenders will be [illegible]

6. The [illegible] Bill is reported to define the powers of provincial councils, the methods by which the councils will be elected The capital town of each Ustan to have twelve representatives and each "shahristan" of the province to be represented by one member, all meeting in the capital town of the province to form the council Independent "shahristans," like Qazvin and Arak, will be represented at the capital town of each Ustan by six representatives, and the "districts" of such independent "shahristans" by one representative

Internal Security

Azerbaijan

7 Bayat, the Governor General, has returned to Tehran as the Democrats had broken off relations with him on the grounds that their plans had already been made and could not now be modified

8. The elections for the Tabriz Deputies to the Azerbaijan National Council have been concluded. The provincial results are not yet to hand. There were in all forty seven candidates for twelve seats. The "successful" candidates all obtained from 21,000 to 23,000 votes, while none of the others received as many as fifty. The poll is headed by Pishaveri, who was elected two years ago as a Tudeh candidate to the Majlis from Tabriz but who had his credentials rejected The second is Biriya, a prominent Labour agitator educated in Baku. The tenth Ipekchian, is a Tudeh member of the present Majlis. The eleventh, Mashinji, was an unsuccessful Russian candidate for the Majlis. Among the general populace the attitude to the elections seems to have been one of indifference amounting to apathy, but much activity was shown in conveying crowds of youths in lorries to the polls As most of these would be illiterate and as ballot papers had to be written on the spot, the supervising committee at each polling booth would not have been without influence.

9. The National Council, now styling itself the National Parliament, opened on the 12th December. The Soviet Consul General attended the ceremony. The British, American, Turkish and Iraqi Consuls-General, though invited, d[illegible] attend. The National Parliament proceeded to the election of a Cabinet of eleven members This Cabinet includes a Minister for War

10. The manager of the National Bank received instructions from Tehran to hand over his cash to the Imperial Bank of Persia for safe custody. Though informed by the manager of the Imperial Bank of his readiness to accept it, the National Bank manager feared to carry out his instructions lest the transfer of the cash should be observed by the Democrats. The National Bank deposits are, therefore, now in rebel hands.

11 The press attaché of the American Embassy, who has just returned from a five-day visit to Tabriz, states that Pishaveri, in an interview with hi[illegible] admitted that the Democrats were receiving Russian support. The press atta[illegible] found the atmosphere of terror typified by the difficulty of getting interviews with non-Democrats. He gained the impression that during the past few days events had been speeded up probably in order to confront the Moscow Conference with a *fait accompli*

12 Four British newspaper correspondents who applied to the Russia[illegible] Consulate in Tehran through the embassy a week or more ago for passes to enable them to proceed to Tabriz have not yet received their passes

13. The situation in Azerbaijan from the military aspect is, briefly, as follows —

Tabriz. The General Officer Commanding, of whose loyalty and will to resist the Chief of the General Staff and His Ma[illegible] [illegible] that he and his garrison had been invited by the Democrats to join their cause The Democrats had stated that those officers who did not elect to join them would be free to go. The General Officer Commanding asked what reply he was to make He was told to resist. A later message from his Chief of Staff said that the General Officer Commanding had personally gone over to the rebel cause and that the remaining officers and men were still in barracks and were being urged [illegible] Chief of the General Staff prepared a message ordering them to resist to th[illegible] but was prevented from despatching it by the Prime Minister Minister [illegible] and His Imperial Majesty the Shah, who substituted for it the [illegible] summarised in paragraph 2 above. A further message was received on the evening of the 14th to the effect that the officers were ready to leave for Tehran Since then there has been no wireless-telegraphic communication with Tabriz and it is to be feared that the garrison and its arms are in rebel hands. The garrison, according to the Chief of the General Staff numbered only 750 Their arms consisted of rifles, light automatics and three mountain guns.

Resaieh – Wireless-telegraphic communication with Tehran has been re established and the garrison of two battalions is still in its barracks. Looting of shops by Democrats is reported Some Caucasian immigrants have recently arrived from Tabriz

Khoi and *Shokpur* are believed to be in rebel hands. There are no Persian garrisons there

Miandoab -The garrison, a weak battalion of 250, reports by wireless telegraphy that it is besieged by a force of about 2,000 Kurds, Assyrians and Democrats. A break out to the south to join the Saqqiz brigade is impossible. It [illegible] battalion from Saqqiz to go and attempt its extrication, but it is unlikely that the R[illegible]

Ardebil. No news and it is feared that the garrison will disintegrate [illegible]

Other Troop Movements outside Azerbaijan — A Persian battalion is being [illegible] supplies for the capital and which has no garrison. It could also deal [illegible] rebel infiltration into that area southwards from Bukan and Shahin De[illegible]

The Persian column of two battalions and a company of gendarmes which had been at Shartfabad near Qazvin ever since the beginning of the crisis has returned to Tehran. Once the Government control of Azerbaijan had ceased and as long as the Russians refused to allow troops to enter Azerbaijan it served no useful purpose.

Kurdistan

14 It will be recalled that Hama Rashid, after sacking Baneh fled into Iraq and gave himself up to the Iraqi authorities in November 1944. Negotiations for his extradition broke down and the Government of Iraq would only agree [illegible] residence for Hama Rashid at Kirkuk. The Persian General [illegible] to have received information that Hama Rashid has been allowe[illegible] to leave or has escaped from Kirkuk and has arrived at Penjwin on the Perso Iraqi border. They fear that his presence there may endanger the recent and [illegible] Mahmud Khan Kanisenani, by the death of Mahmud Khan Dizli and by the flight and surrender to the Iraqi authorities of Hasan Khan Rezaei

A [illegible]

15. [illegible] There have been further arrivals of Tudeh leaders from Tehran. "Muhajirs" [illegible] have been seen in Nishapur and Sabzewar. Villagers in [illegible] twentieth anniversary of the university [illegible]

18. The Chief [illegible] ned the British Military Attaché on the 15th Decem[illegible] ment had proclaimed "a general [illegible] and other tribal [illegible] that they will refrain from blackmailing the Government in its present pli[illegible]

Appointments.

17.—(1) Nasr Quli Itimadi (Nasr ud Dowleh) (Foreign Office 101) has been appointed Governor General of the 8th Ustan (Khorasan).

(2) Mehdi Farrukh (Mo'ayeman us Saltaneh) (Foreign Office 61 Military [illegible] 85) has been appointed Governor General of the 7th Ustan (Fars). It was reported in paragraph [illegible] the appointment. He appears to have reconsidered his decision as it is announced in the press that he will leave for Shiraz in a few days.

Persian Army

18. Colonel Mashari has left for Paris to attend a course of eight months duration at the French Staff College. This officer is an instructor at the Persian Staff College and was one of the Persian Military Mission invited to Mide[illegible]

British Interests.

19. His Excellency the Ambassador left Tehran on the 14th December to attend the Foreign Secretaries Conference in Moscow.

Tehran, 18th December 1945.

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Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 49 Secret for the Period 17th December to 23rd December, 1945.—(Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 449 of 24th December, 1945. Received 10th January, 1946.)

Persian Affairs

Political.

THOUGH important news has come from Azerbaijan, except for some excitement on the 19th December caused by the arrival in Tehran of the General Officer Commanding, Tabriz, interest seems to have shifted to Moscow and an air of tense expectancy as to the outcome of the conference prevails.

2. On the 18th December in the Majlis the Prime Minister made his long [illegible] in Azerbaijan. It was firmer in tone than any of his previous utterances and accused the Russians [illegible] the internal affairs of Persia. He reiterated his intention to proceed to Moscow

In this connexion it is learned that the Persian [illegible] unsuccessful in his attempts to contact any resp[illegible] Foreign Affairs. They invariably plead pressure of business as an excuse for not see[illegible]

3. The programme of the Azerbaijan Government, as reported by Radio B[illegible] published in the Tudeh organ *Rahbar* of the 18th December, is reproduced as Appendix "A" to this summary.

4. An account of the inaugural meeting of the Azerbaijan National Assembly, taken from the paper *Rahbar* of the 18th December, is published as Appendix "B" to this summary.

5. An article in the Russian paper *Pravda* of the 14th December, discussing the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Persia, states that "in reality, there is no question at all, as the Soviet Anglo Persian Treaty of 1942 clearly defines the tasks, conditions and period of stay of Soviet t[illegible] in Persia." While there is nothing new in this attitu[illegible] a more unusual note is heard when the article goes on to say that "in any case, under the Soviet Persian Treaty of 1921 the Soviet Union has the right to bring its troops into Persian territory." For the benefit of those recipients of this Intelligence Summary who have not a copy of the treaty referred to, the following relevant paragraph is reproduced here:

> VI. If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such Power should d[illegible] to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if a foreign Power should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those of its allies [illegible] if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such [illegible] after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defence. Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the danger has been removed."

It would appear that the writer of the article has an elastic conscience or that he failed to notice the preceding paragraph which states that the two high contracting parties undertake:

> [illegible] the formation or presence within their respective territories of any organisations or groups of persons, irrespective of the [illegible] by which they are known, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility [illegible]ainst Persia or Russia, or against the allies of Russia.

6. The ninth and tenth days of Moharram passed off quietly in Tehran. M[illegible] processions had been strictly banned by the Military Governor as it was thought that bands of armed hooligans might be assembled under the guise of religious fervour.

The Majlis

7. At the session on the 13th December the Income Tax (Amendment) Bill was passed by a majority vote of 81. A translation will appear in a later issue of this Intelligence Summary. At the session on the 18th December the Prime Minister made a lengthy speech about the situation in Azerbaijan and the steps taken by his government. The speech was frequently applauded. (See paragraph 2 above.)

Internal Security

Azerbaijan.

8. On the 19th December Sartip Darakhshani, G.O.C. Tabriz, accompanied by 14 of his officers, arrived in Tehran by Soviet plane. He had, apparently, thought better of his decision to join the rebel army and availed himself of the invitation given previously by the Democrats that those officers who did not wish to join them would be free to leave. He is now under arrest and will be tried by court martial. It was reported in the press on the 23rd and 24th December that a further 70 officers of the garrison have arrived in Tehran by motor coach and train. This leaves about 30 still in Tabriz awaiting transport. Of the 750 rank and file all are reported to have fled, about one-third of them taking their arms. The total of arms seized by the rebels in the deserted barracks is about 800 rifles, 18 machine guns and one mountain gun.

9. The latest news about other garrisons in Azerbaijan is as follows :—

Miandoab.—Garrison surrendered. A party of 85 gendarmes made its escape to Saqqiz losing about 35 on the way in casualties and desertions.

Ardebil.—Garrison surrendered.

Maragheh.—[illegible]

Rezaieh.—No definite news but Moscow radio reported that fighting is in progress.

Meshkin Shahr.—This small place (50 miles north-west of Ardebil) was omitted from a list of Azerbaijan garrisons previously given to the B.M.A. by the C.G.S. It is now learnt that its garrison of one platoon has surrendered after losing two officers and half its strength killed.

Other troop movements consist of the despatch of a battalion from the Sanandaj garrison to Bijar to protect Hamadan.

10. According to the Governor of the National Bank, the balances at the Tabriz branch which fell into rebel hands (see paragraph 10 of last Intelligence Summary) amounted to 40 million rials (about £300,000), most of which represented private and not Persian Government deposits. According to the same authority, the National Government of Azerbaijan has had the effrontery to ask for more funds to be sent from Tehran. This request has, of course, been refused. It is possible that the Azerbaijan Government may now issue some form of notes of its own. Meanwhile it has prohibited the drawing of more than 20,000 rials (£154) on any private account and has advertised the sale of 100 tons of [illegible] which should bring in about 6 million rials (about £45,000).

11. The exchange of the Governor of Zenjan for two Tudeh members (see paragraph 6 of Intelligence Summary, No. 47) has now been completed and the governor has returned to Tehran.

12. His Majesty's Consul-General Tabriz reports that the town is quiet with the Democrats exercising strict control. Their armed forces appear to be less than before.

Gilan, Mazanderan and Gurgan.

13. According to reports reaching the general staff from Persian policy sources and reports (*) received in this embassy from other sources, Tudeh activity in these provinces is increasing. Recent arrivals and departures of Soviet troops show an overall deposit of some 500 remaining in the area. The Tudeh party is said to be preparing a proclamation of autonomy for "Tabaristan." (This classical geographical name properly covers the provinces of Mazanderan and Gurgan but is certainly intended to include Gilan also.)

* From that and other sources comes the news that they are calling for volunteers and appear to be anxious to build up an Azerbaijan army of sufficient strength to oppose any Persian forces sent against them if and when the Russian troops withdraw. Recruits are reported to have been offered 150 rials per mensem in addition to clothing and food.

Bakhtiari.

14. Murteza Quli Khan has been summoned to Tehran for discussions. He is stated to be loth to obey this summons as long as that firebrand Abul Qasim Khan is left behind in Bakhtiari to sow the seeds of dissension and possibly revolt in his absence.

Fars. (See paragraph 17 of last Intelligence Summary.)

15. Allusion to this "general amnesty" has been made in the press. Coupled with the amnesty was a permission to "bear arms with a licence during the present crisis." The Russian controlled press has not been slow to detect in this an arming of the southern tribes by the reactionary Government of Persia which seeks thereby to start a civil war between these tribes and its freedom loving subjects of Azerbaijan.

16. Mehdi Farrukh, the newly-appointed Governor-General of Fars, has arrived in Shiraz. He called on His Majesty's Ambassador before leaving and stated that he would seek the advice of His Majesty's Consul in Shiraz on all matters affecting the welfare and security of his province.

Appointments.

17. (i) Ahmad Ali Bastadam to be Governor of Shiraz and Deputy Governor-General of Fars.

(ii) Imad Mumtaz, Director-General of the Tribal Department of the Ministry of the Interior, to be Governor of Meshed and Deputy Governor-General of Khorasan.

(iii) Ahmad Qadimi Navat to be Persian Consul at Quetta.

(iv) Yusuf Sadiq to be Persian Consul at Kerbela.

(v) The Persian Press announces the appointment of Hashem Sabet, Director of the Agricultural Bank, as Minister of Commerce, Industry and Mines—a portfolio hitherto vacant in the present [illegible].

(vi) The same communique announced the appointment of Allahyar [illegible] Fahimi appointed "Ustandar of the West," *i.e.*, Governor-General of Kermanshah. An unconfirmed report says that [illegible] has denied his appointment to this post and has challenged the Prime Minister's right to drop him from the Cabinet. Allahyar [illegible] (F.O. 198/M.A. 253) is reputed, on fairly good authority, [illegible] a fervent advocate of a policy of appeasement *vis à vis* the Russians in the present crisis. The other two are General Muhammad Husein Firuz and Nasrullah Fahimi, as a member of Saed's Cabinet of August 1944 to November 1944, which refused the Russians an concession, the terms Russian [illegible] are. His reappearance, as Minister without Portfolio in Bayat's Cabinet (November 1944–April 1945) and as Minister of the Interior in Hakimi's Cabinet of November 1945 recommended this [illegible]ment. More recently he has been attacked by Dr. Musaddiq, [illegible] He is believed to have cordial relations with Seyyid Zia ud Din. The recent change therefore has the appearance of a sop to the Russians.

British Interests.

18. The following item of news appeared in a recent issue of the *Daily News Bulletin* in Tehran:

"A few days ago rumours appeared in a Tehran paper that a British firm was exploiting chrome deposits in Iranian Baluchistan. This allegation was denied by the B.B.C. in its Persian service of the 11th December. It was not considered necessary to repeat the denial in this country, since of course anyone is free to go to Baluchistan to see the facts for himself. The same applies to other equally ridiculous rumours of what is happening in Baluchistan. Commentators point out that so far no independent witnesses have been permitted to proceed to the north to investigate charges of illegal exploitation of petroleum in Azerbaijan and Mazanderan."

American Interests.

19. [illegible] Tehran and near Tehran, though included [illegible] ing assets on the basis of 7½ per cent. of their original cost, was actually sold to His Imperial Majesty the Shah who presented it to the university of Tehran. At a formal ceremony in the presence of the Shah the American flag was hauled down and the camp handed over. The ceremony was marred by a rush of looters who fell upon the camp as soon as the American guards were withdrawn. Telephones were the chief attraction, but, according to one witness, the mob tried to remove "everything that was not screwed down."

20. The American Military Mission has recently received some officer replacements and reinforcements. The wives of General Ridley and two of his senior staff have also arrived. Though no official announcement of the prolongation of the contract of the mission has been made it would appear that the mission expect to stay for a year at least. Results of their work are less and less in [illegible].

Russian Interests.

21. [illegible] diaries for November received from Zahidan report some [illegible] officials in South East Persia. They have contacted [illegible] their commercial agents and have made enquiries about the strengths of British troops in the area and the extent of British trade. Their chief tribal contact appears to be Sardar Muhammad Reza Khan Pardih.

Tehran, 23rd December, 1945.

Appendix A

The Programme of the Azerbaijan Government

IN the programme of the Azerbaijan National Government it is stated that :—

The Azerbaijan National Government starts its functions with the object of putting an end to all the hardships and difficulties of the nation. It announces its programme as follows :—

1. It should be announced to all men and to the public throughout the world that Azerbaijan has obtained autonomy within the boundaries of Persia. The Government is obliged, with a view to consolidating Azerbaijan's autonomy to approach the Central Government and to obtain the agreement of the central authorities.

2. In order that a national government may be formed in conformity with the desire of the people, the public must be allowed to share in the administrative affairs of the country by provincial councils.

3. With a view to the development of the provinces the election of provincial councils must be started.

4. Honest and liberal persons must be appointed as Bakhshdars and Farmandars.

5. The gendarmerie and police must be cleared of treacherous elements and criminals, and the gendarmerie and police activities must be so regulated as to ensure public tranquillity and convenience.

6. A budget must be drawn up after the full needs of Azerbaijan have been studied and estimated.

7. With a view to defending Azerbaijan's autonomy the armed detachments formed in the provinces must be converted into national guards.

8. In the matter of education two problems must be solved. (1) The Azerbaijan language must be taught and made official in all schools and departments. (2) Compulsory education must be enforced so as to make the public literate, and steps must be taken to establish a national university of Azerbaijan with a view to providing an educational cadre.

9. In connexion with industry, great importance must be attached to the expansion of industry in the country.

The National Government will acquire the necessary means to develop commerce, and will endeavour, by the expansion of industry, to meet the requirements of the people.

10. The establishment of complete order and discipline on all telegraph and telephone communication lines and the repair of roads and highways.

11. In order to remove any differences between peasants and landowners, laws to be enacted which will afford satisfaction to both parties.

12. With a view to fighting unemployment and eliminating it, the Crown lands and property belonging to reactionary elements who have escaped from Azerbaijan to be distributed among the peasants. The latter class also to be helped through agricultural banks in order that they may be able to buy the lands which the landowners are prepared to sell at reasonable prices.

13. In order to ameliorate the living condition of the public, the artisans and guilds to be helped.

14. With a view to ameliorating the living conditions of labourers, laws including Labourers' Insurance Law, to be passed and enacted.

15. The Government of Azerbaijan, who attach great importance to hygiene will provide free means of treatment for the public.

16. The Government of Azerbaijan, who believe in private ownership, will support all measures showing initiative and which are aimed at increasing wealth and finance.

17. The Government of Azerbaijan admits full respect towards freedom of thought, faith and conscience.

18. The Government of Azerbaijan admits equal rights for various nationalities resident in Azerbaijan such as the Armenians, Kurds, Assyrians, along with the inhabitants of Azerbaijan and will allow them to study their native tongue.

19. The Persian Azerbaijan Government recognises the Central Government and will carry out its orders so long as it does not contravene the laws and decisions of the National Consultative Assembly of Azerbaijan.

Appendix B

The Inauguration of the National Assembly of Azerbaijan.

WEDNESDAY, the 21st Azar, 1324 (12th December, 1945), will be considered an historic date in the history of the valiant Azerbaijanis, and future generations will celebrate this victorious day. On that day the nation of Azerbaijan, by founding their National Assembly in a very honourable manner, proved to the world that they are mature and self-dependent and can decide their own destinies and that they are the rightful persons to manage their own houses. On Wednesday morning the Deputies of Tabriz and those of other towns and districts gathered together in the Assembly's public hall. Great crowds gathered in the street to watch the opening of the Majlis. At 9 a.m. a public session was held at which about eighty Deputies were present. M. Nizam ud-Dauleh Rafi'i was elected as President of the Assembly and opened the first public session of the Azerbaijan National Assembly by making a short inaugural speech. The internal regulations of the Assembly were read out by Vulla'i, were fully explained by Pishehvari, and were all passed. The presidential body of the Assembly was then elected by a secret vote. Haji Mirza Ali Shabistari was elected as Speaker and MM. Padiz[illegible] and [illegible] were [illegible] as Secretaries. The Speaker then pronounced the desire of the majority in connexion with Pishehvari's premiership and appointed him to form a Government. In the afternoon of the same day the Cabinet was formed and presented to the Assembly :

Sayyid Jafar Pishehvari : Prime Minister
Dr. Javid : Minister of the Interior
[illegible] : Minister of the National Forces
Dr. [illegible] : Minister of Agriculture
Muhammad Biria : Minister of Education
Dr. Urangi : Minister of Health
Ghulam Riza Ilhami : Minister of Finance
Yusuf Azima : Minister of Justice
Kabiri : Minister of P.T. and Roads
Rasuli : Minister of Commerce and Economics
Minister of Labour will be appointed later

Zainul Abedin Qami was appointed as head of the Supreme Court and M. Ibrahim as Public Prosecutor of Azerbaijan by Pishehvari, and it was stated that as they had no intention to separate from Persia, no Minister for Foreign Affairs will be appointed and that their Minister for Foreign Affairs will be the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Later the Prime Minister submitted the Cabinet's programme to the Assembly, it was passed by a majority vote.

[E 319 315 34] (14)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 50. Secret. for the Period 24th November with 1st December 1945. (*Communicated in Tehran Despatch No. 458 of 31st December 1945. Received 10th January, 1946.*)

Persian Affairs

Political.

SUCH news as has appeared in communiqués on the Moscow Conference and such information as has so far been given to the Persian Government and the deductions made therefrom by intelligent Persians have caused widespread despair. It is [illegible] to appreciate [illegible] all [illegible] British prestige and a further weakening of Hakimi's Cabinet are already noticeable.

2. Two political forces appear to be working. The first is a move by Hakimi himself to get rid of those Ministers obnoxious to the Russians. Fahimi has gone [illegible] Wolpert [illegible] General Razmara. As a decision, Hakimi has approached General Yardan Panah with the offer of the War Ministry. The latter refused. The second is a move by the Right to overthrow Hakimi's Cabinet and introduce one with more will to resist. Advice has been tendered to the effect that a change would be premature until His Majesty's Ambassador returns with more detailed information about what has transpired at Moscow and with advice as to the course now to be pursued.

3. The election of Provincial Councils (see paragraph 6 of Intelligence Summary No. 48) is engaging the attention of the Persian Government and instructions to this end have been issued to Provincial Governors. It is not clear whether they will be elected according to the original law providing them (which is in many details out of date) or by an amended law now said to be ready for presentation to the Majlis. Many Persians believe that the setting up of these councils at this time is dangerous and that they will merely provide a legal way of creating a situation in other provinces similar to that recently created illegally in Azerbaijan. Their fears, naturally, are chiefly over the provinces of Gilan, Mazanderan and Khorasan, which are still in occupation by Russian troops.

4. Dr Sivasi, Dr Kishavarz [illegible] of the Uzbegistan Republic to [illegible] University, have returned to T[illegible]

5. The Persian delegates to the United Nations Organisation which is to meet in London on the 10th January are as follows: The P[illegible] London, Nasrullah Intezam, Mustafa Adl (Mansur-us-Salteneh), Seyyid Baqir Kazemi. The following are attached to the delegation: Abul Hasan Hakimi, Fazlullah Nafisi, Assadullah Bayerdor.

The Majlis

6. Since the 23rd December the Majlis has met daily. A one-twelfth budget Bill to cover the period of Azar 1324 (22nd November–21st December 1945) was passed. The Bretton Woods Agreement has been ratified unanimously.

Internal Security

Azerbaijan

7. The garrison of Rezaieh has surrendered. It was the sole remaining Persian military force in Azerbaijan. A Tass agency message of the 18th December reported that the commander of the garrison had been wreaking vengeance on those inhabitants who were in sympathy with the Democrats. His Majesty's Acting Consul-General, who visited Rezaieh on the 22nd December, reported that the Democrats had been in complete control of the [illegible] the 19th December, the garrison having surrendered. Its commander [illegible] Zanganeh, is believed to be a prisoner in Democrat hands in Tabriz. The [illegible] officers, as well as the balance of the Tabriz officers, have either arrived in Tehran or are on their way. Only one, a Captain Hormuz Farvar, is reported [illegible] we joined the rebel army. Regarding the alleged atrocities committed by the [illegible]ison before its surrender, His Majesty's Acting Consul-General reports that on the 15th December a column of gendarmes, supported by light tanks, drove a party of armed Democrats from the village of Deghar Bokah situated about 1 mile from Rezaieh. From the evidence of the Chaldean inhabitants of the village it appears that the Democrats suffered no casualties and that no villager [illegible] fire on the Persian column. The Persian commander maintains that he [illegible] The light tank is said to [illegible] driven over the bodies of those killed. The Soviet Vice-Consul [illegible] scene and photographed the bodies. The Russian press will make the [illegible] of this affair.

8. His Majesty's Acting Consul-General has also visited Maragheh, where all is quiet with the Democrats in control. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's manager whose murder was reported in the last Intelligence Summ[illegible] have been killed on account of his being a landowning capitalist a[illegible] his association with the company.

9. In general Azerbaijan is quiet with Government officers functioning under Democrat control and police, aided by Democrat volunteers, maintaining street order.

10. A recruiting drive for the "Azerbaijan People's Army" opened in Tabriz on the 19th December. Some fifty horsemen and 2,000 infantry volunteers were brought into the town. The section commanders carried Tommy guns and the rank and file rifles. A few light machine guns were also seen.

11. General Hasan Muqaddam, a former Governor-General of Azerbaijan, has left for Tabriz by Soviet plane. He has vast estates between Maragheh and Miandoab. He is reported to have been offered a post in the Azerbaijan National Government. He is a brother-in-law of Kaburi, the Azerbaijan Government Minister of Posts and Telegraphs and Roads. He is clever, able and unscrupulous.

12. Financial difficulties may cause the Azerbaijan Government to declare its complete independence. It has accused the Central Government of attempting to starve it by cutting off funds and strangling trade. The National Bank has [illegible] by the National Government. The Perso-Soviet Bank has never influenced trade. The Imperial Bank of Iran is still functioning. No purchaser for the 100 tons of Persian Government sugar has yet come forward. The National Government has demanded 30 million rials from the Central Government for the payment of officials' salaries for the next six months.

13. Another source reports that three types are distinguishable among the Democrats' armed forces, viz.:

(a) Officers and soldiers of the Red army in civilian clothes, dressed in dark blue coat and "plus fours" tucked into the ordinary short black [illegible] Russian boot. They are armed with light machine guns and [illegible]

(b) [illegible] Muhajirs") imported into Azerbaijan by the Russians. They are clad in leather coats and fur hats and armed with rifles and machine pistols of Persian arsenal manufacture.

(c) The native Azerbaijani armed variously with iron shod sticks and Brno rifles of Persian arsenal manufacture.

14. Mr Harold Minor, chief of the Eastern Department in the American State Department and a former secretary in the American Embassy in Tehran, who came to Tehran a fortnight ago to study events in Azerbaijan, has not been able to proceed to Tabriz as the Russian authorities have refused to give him a pass. Six American and British journalists have likewise been prevented from entering an area where Russia "is in no way interfering in internal affairs."

15. Some short personality notes on the members of the Azerbaijan National Government are given in Appendix A to this Summary.

Khorasan

16. A consular report states that Muntasir, brother of Saulat, is organising an anti-Government gang near Turbat-i-Sheikh Jam in order to revenge his brother's death. He is receiving Tudeh support. The same report states that the [illegible] the Tudeh party. It will be recalled that Saulat-us-Saltaneh, a Hazara chief rebelled against the Persian Government in January 1942 and was killed while attempting to escape from a gendarmerie post in the autumn of 1943.

Fars

17. Mehdi Farrukh, the newly appointed Governor-General, has had a chilly reception. A movement to boycott him and force him to return to [illegible] the work of Khosrow Qashqai, was frustrated by the efforts of the Qawam ul-Mulk, who persuaded Nasir Khan Qashqai to desist from this unwise plan. Nasir Khan is reported to have realised that any disturbance in Fars at this juncture will only embarrass the Central Government at a time when their hands are full and play into the hands of the Russians.

18. The announcement of the general amnesty (referred to in paragraph 15 of this [illegible] report from Shiraz. It gives both sides cause for satisfaction. It removes from [illegible] the Central Government. [illegible] flow of messages to Tehran conveying the loyalty and support of nearly all the tribes of Persia.

Kurdistan

19. During the past few weeks the Democrats have occupied the stage in Azerbaijan and very little news has been received about Kurdish affairs or Kurdish reactions to the seizure of power by the National Government of Azerbaijan. According to Kurdish sources of doubtful value in Tehran the Kurds are far from happy at the turn which events have taken. They have been drawn into the Russian orbit and have obtained some arms and ammunition, a printing press and a free excursion to Baku. On the debit side they have estranged the Governments of Persia, Iraq and Turkey and have suffered military defeats at the hands of the first two. [illegible] of an independent Kurdistan have been fulfilled. They are not interested in agrarian or labour reforms. They have not

been given posts in the new Azerbaijan Cabinet They may well be thinking that all they have achieved is the exchange of a Persian Government for an Azerbaijani Democrat Government

Persian Army

20 Reference paragraph 13 of Intelligence Summary No. 48, the General Staff has decided to find the battalion for Hamadan from Saqqiz so as not to decrease the Tehran garrison

21 After the elimination of the Persian army garrisons in Azerbaijan, the only Persian troops remaining inside the Russian Zone (stretching from the Perso Iraqi frontier near Ushnuyieh to the Perso-Russian frontier near Sarakhs) are the following —

At Meshed, one infantry regiment, one artillery battery, one battalion of engineers
At Bujnurd, one cavalry regiment

[illegible]

22 ("A" : Civil)

(i) Abbas Quli Ardelan to be Treasurer [illegible]
(ii) Ahmad Sulubi to be Governor of Hamadan *vice* Sardar Akram
(iii) Hormuz Ahmedi (Bakhtiari) to be Governor of Burujird
(iv) Burzu Kalhor, an Inspector in the Ministry of the Interior, to be [illegible] ernor of Firdaus (formerly known as Tun) in Khorasan
(v) Dr Muhsin Nasr, formerly Governor of Mazanderan, to be Director [illegible] Ministry of the Interior
(vi) Dr Ali Akbar Itimad (Hakim-ul-Saltaneh) to be Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Health
(vii) Ismail Hakimi to be Governor of the Agricultural Bank
(viii) Musa Shaibani (Zika-ul Dowleh) to be Director of the Direct and [illegible] Department of the Ministry of Finance
(ix) Abdul Hasem Bibiaya to be Director General of the Accounts and Audit Department and Chief of the Budget Depar[illegible] Ministry of [illegible]
(x) Muhsin Gharib to be Director-General of the Inspection Department in [illegible] Ministry of F[illegible]
(xi) [illegible] to be Director General of the Ceded Properties [illegible] Department in the Ministry of F[illegible]
(xii) [illegible] the Ministry of the [illegible] been placed "[illegible] disponibilité." Mahmud Darakhshan has replaced Siphr and Dr Muhsin Nasr (see (v) above) has replaced Fatimi
(xiii) Abul Hasan Ibtehaj and Abdullah Daftari have been re-elected by the Majlis as Governor and Deputy Governor of the National Bank for a further period of three years

("B" : Military)—

(i) Colonel Murteza Zahidi to be head of the Personnel Department of the General Staff
(ii) Colonel Husain Mutamid to be Deputy Director of the Officers' Training College

Brazilian Interests

23 His Excellency Senhor Abelardo Bretanha Bueno Do Prado, the newly arrived Brazilian Minister to Persia, presented his letters of credence to His Imperial Majesty the Shah on the 29th December

Yugoslav Interests

24 The Persian Government has recognised the new Yugoslav Government

Tehran, 30th December, 1945

Appendix A

Reference Appendix B to the last Intelligence Summary, some short biographical notes of the members of the Azerbaijan Cabinet are given below

1 *Seyyid Jaafar Pishehvari* Prime Minister Age 50 A native of Tabriz, but is little known there, having spent most of his life in Tehran and elsewhere. Was imprisoned in Tehran as a Bolshevik in the time of Reza Shah A prominent member of Tudeh Iran, he has published the Tehran newspaper Iskir for the party He came to Tabriz in 1944 exclusively for the elections, and his candidature was supported in every possible way by the Russians. His credentials were subsequently rejected by the Majlis. He is supposed to be a careerist rather than a man of firm political convictions He now appears to have changed his title "Mir" to "Seyyid"

2. *Dr. Salamullah Javid* Minister of the Interior. Nothing is known except that he is believed to be a Jew from Mesh[illegible]

3. *Jaafar Karam*,—People's Army Minister. Nothing is known except that he is a Deputy for Marand in the "National Assembly."

4. *Dr. Mahtash*—Minister of Agriculture. He is a veterinary surgeon [illegible] Age about 40 He [illegible] chairman of the Workers' Union; his appointment to the Ministry of [illegible] reputation as a composer of light verse [illegible] y in organising the workers, but he has no [illegible]

6 *Dr* [illegible] Minister [illegible] Nothing is known of him

7 *Ali* [illegible] Minister of Finance He was formerly head of the Tabriz Municipality and was removed from his post by the Central Government earlier this year for disloyal activities; he has presumably some administrative experience, but is false, wily, hypocritical and a great gambler

8 *Yusuf Azima*,—Minister of Justice He was formerly Public Prosecutor for both districts of Azerbaijan and was likewise discharged by the Central Government a few months ago. He was notoriously pro-Russian, an ardent Tudeh member and showed his partisanship openly in the Liqvan affair last August

9. *Rabi's Kabiri*, Minister of Public Telephones and Roads. He is a native of the Maragheh region, and is have been of a wealthy family, but has squandered his patrimony and is now burdened with debts, has been most active in raising [illegible] he has been in practically absolute control of the Maragheh region for several months past. He is a brother-in-law of General Hasan Muqaddam

10 *Reza Rasuli*,—Minister of Commerce and Economics. He is a former municipal employee [illegible]

CHAPTER V. SAUDI ARABIA

E 5328 5328 25 No. 17

Personalities in Sa'udi Arabia.—(Received in Foreign Office, 5th December, 194[illegible])

INDEX

Note on Titles, &c

1 *Sherif* Said to apply strictly in Arabia to persons recognised as being to the direct male [illegible] from Hasan, the son of the Caliph Ali [illegible] however much confusion as to the exact [illegible] of this and the following term.

2 *Seyyid.*—Said to apply in Arabia, though much [illegible] in some other countries, only to persons [illegible] as being in the male descent from [illegible] the son of A[illegible]

provincial governors.

[illegible] *Shaykh* Applied very widely [illegible] ately not only to tribal [illegible]

[illegible] with age [illegible]

[illegible] *Hajji* [illegible] where every Hejaz adult has [illegible] the pilgrimage, for certain [illegible] gives a title to, *e.g.* [illegible] Yusuf Zeina

7 *Effendi.* Still applied in persons hardly entitled to be called Sherif or anything equivalent, *e.g.*, Muhammad Effendi Ali Ridha

8 *Ibn, Bin* Means, like its variant, Bin, "son of," or by extension, "descendant of." Replaced sometimes by the article 'al, which it [illegible] away to distinguish from "al, [illegible] names of Ali four forms are [illegible] of the King, "'Abdul Aziz ibn (son of) [illegible] of Faysal al [illegible] the house of Sa'ud [illegible] al sometimes ibn Sa'ud or bin Sa'ud. The use of the patronymic "Ibn So-and-So" is so common as often to make a mere personal name [illegible]

9 *Abu* Means "father." Used in combination with the name of an actual son or the name of an object born a fantastic name or nickname which sometimes becomes an accredited surname. Thus Colonel Glubb is known in the desert as "Abu Hunnik," or the father of the little Jew. Surnames are sometimes formed from other terms of relationship.

10 *Composition of Names.*—The most normal formation is to build from a personal [illegible] adding that of his father and some [illegible] remoter ancestors and or a family name. It is not [illegible] to omit at least the first Ibn and place the father's name immediately after that of the [illegible] It cannot be [illegible] two unsyncopated names [illegible] especially if the first be M[illegible] title more than a prefix.

11 The following index gives, except in two cases the first name of all living Arabs mentioned otherwise than incidentally in the report, but where Muhammad appears to be no more than a prefix it is reduced to M and ignored for purposes of alphabetical order. Secondary entries have been made in many, but not in all, cases, where a patronymic or family name seems likely to help to trace particular individuals.—

1 *Royal Family.*

(1) *Abdul Aziz ibn 'Abdur-Rahmân al-Faysal al Sa'ûd*—King of Sa'ûdi Arabia, commonly known as Ibn Sa'ûd.

Born probably in 1882. Accompanied his father in flight from Riyadh upon its occupation by Rashîd in 1891. Grew up under tutelage of Shaykh Mubârak of Kuwait, who gave asylum to family. Seized opportunity in course of local warfare in Eastern Arabia to deliver surprise attack on Riyadh in January 1902 with very small force and retook it. Became recognised head of the family although his father 'Abd ur-Rahman survived until 1928. Extended his authority gradually over whole of Nejd and Qasim and in 1914 took the coastal province of Hasa from the Turks, who then made an agreement with him. Entered into treaty relations with His Majesty's Government. [illegible] Turkish Hâ'il in 1921 and finally destroyed the power of Bani Rashîd. Next fought King Hussein. Took Mecca in 1924 and completed conquest of Hejaz by compelling abdication at end of 1925 of Hussein's son and successor Ali. Acquired 'Asir in 1926. Converted position into one of practical sovereignty in 1930 and later raised 'Asir to status of military province, following on repression of a rebellion there. Consolidated position by the Sa'ûdi-Yemen Treaty of Taif of the 20th May 1934, which secured his legal title to 'Asir and Najrân. Has thus become ruler of territory, [illegible] of which extend from just south of Aqaba [illegible] just north of Mecca to Yemen and from Kuwait [illegible] to north of Qatar Peninsula.

[illegible] of the Wahhâbis. In 1921 Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies, in January 1926 King of the Hejaz, in 1927 King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies, and finally in September 1932 King of the Kingdom of Sa'ûdi Arabia defined as a single and united State, comprising his existing dominions.

[illegible] this spectacular aggrandisement is a man of fine presence, some 6 feet 3 inches in height and handsome except for a bustle across the left [illegible] neglected leucoma. He continues a [illegible] charm which, though now a little stereotyped, is still attractive. He is feared rather than loved by his subjects on all of whom except those of the Shi'a [illegible] he imposes at least the forms of [illegible] tempered by a readiness to compromise when his temporal position requires innovations contrary to the prejudice of extremists or sometimes even to the original principles of his sect. On his own ground he is an efficient ruler and a hard one, a Napoleon of the desert, but too much of the desert to cope quite successfully with the problems with which his conquest of the Hejaz and his attainment of an international position have confronted him. In diplomacy he is normally fairly honest, but difficult. He is as well disposed towards foreigners as is compatible with his fundamental belief that Islam is all in all. He has tried a strong constitution very high by living hard and by innumerable marriages. It was reckoned some years ago that he had already had over 200 wives, though never more than the permitted four at a time. He is known to find the natural decline in his powers in this direction disconcerting. In 1928 it was observed that he walked slowly and stiffly and Mr Philby stated that he was not only averse to physical exertion, but also indifferent to public affairs, but he subsequently showed great activity of mind in the Palestine dis[illegible] [illegible] greatly prize an honour which he considers too reminiscent of a past connexion with the Government of India only and in some sense vassal [illegible]

Received the G.C.B. in November 1935, at the time [illegible] Riyadh of Sir Andrew Ryan. H[illegible] Great Britain have been [illegible] friendly and since 1936 he has acted as though he firmly believed in his repeated asserations, that [illegible] interests and those of the Arabs in general are [illegible] with those of His Majesty's Government. In earlier editions he was described as expecting [illegible] but his attitude throughout the Palestine crisis of 1937 [illegible] and during Rashid Ali's [illegible] in Iraq in 1941 entitles him to the cordiali[illegible] [illegible] description [illegible] his sympathy for [illegible] Allied cause throughout present war and he has pr[illegible] by his acts that he [illegible] his friends, the British Govern[illegible] support possible to his peculiar and [illegible] ally politically closed country. In January 1945 King Farouq of Egypt visited Ibn Sa'ûd at Yenbo [illegible] a private one, but was marked [illegible] pageantry and much [illegible] by a visit from the Syrian President, [illegible] was on his way home from the Ya[illegible] [illegible] went to Egypt on a United States des[illegible] [illegible] was also in Egypt at the [illegible] [illegible] was arranged [illegible] cruiser. The Maj[illegible] [illegible] of eight days [illegible] [illegible] Nations and participation in [illegible] A personal visit by the Viceroy of India to Riyadh, on his way to India in [illegible] gave the King great pleasure. Britons who examined the King in February at his requ[illegible] [illegible] that his ge[illegible] physical condition was [illegible] and his expectation [illegible]

The King's eldest son Turki died in 1919 leaving [illegible]

[illegible] the best English authority on the Sa'ûd family as a whole, but does not claim to be absolutely accurate.

(2) *Sa'ûd ibn 'Abdul Aziz*—Born at Kuwait in [illegible] or early 1902 of a lady of Sa'ûdi stock. Has for [illegible] seldom visited the Hejaz. Until 1935 he was [illegible] travelled than his half-brother Amir Faysal, having only left the country once [illegible] he went to consult [illegible] shortly after the "Ma[illegible] incident of 1929. [illegible] Europe and visited several capitals including Lo[illegible] where he stayed about five weeks (he received G.B.E. on that occasion), and he represented Sa'ûdi Arabia at the Silver Jubilee and at the Coronation of His Majesty King George VI. In 1940 he visited [illegible]

Sa'ûd's designation as Heir to the [illegible] formally announce[illegible] [illegible]

war. He now affects a European style of entertaining—even serving afternoon tea to his English visitors—and prides himself on his skill in the management of Christian cutlery, to the amusement of his father, who calls him "Sa'ûd the Civilised." He professes a desire to see Sa'ûdi Arabia progress on Western lines (*e.g.*, introduction of air communications, modern architecture, &c.). He claims that he himself designed his country house at Badia near Riyadh, the amenities of which include a swimming pool. He owns a cinema projector and gives regular showings of British news films. When His Majesty's Minister visited Riyadh in February 1942 Sa'ûd broke with Arabian custom by inviting the ladies of the party to dinner. His eldest son Fahad, was born about 1925 and was married to a daughter of the Amir Faysal, No. 1 (8). In May 1945 is being allowed by his father to take an increasing share in the internal administration of the country and was present at many of the audiences between His Majesty's Minister and the King in September 1943 and March 1944. Appointed Commander-in-chief of the Sa'ûdi army in March 1944.

(3) *Faysal ibn 'Abdul Aziz.* Viceroy of the Hejaz in his father's absence and permanently [illegible] Affairs, the Interior, and, in theory, War. [illegible] Wahhâb in or about 1905. Educated partly by Shaykh Hafiz Wahhâb [illegible] than most of his brothers of [illegible] intelligence and powers of observation. Has lived mostly of late years in the comparatively civilised surroundings of Mecca and has [illegible] Holland and perhaps other countries and in 1939 [illegible] he headed the Sa'ûdi mission which visited [illegible] and many other capitals. In physique a [illegible] heavier version of his father and elder brother [illegible] owing to excessive delight in the horses from his [illegible] stables. At first very [illegible] [illegible] in 1932 by playing his part [illegible] that of a figurehead, with a good [illegible] is not known to [illegible] been until he reached Kuwait where his indulgence in night life scandalised the Shaykh and his subjects. Believed not to see eye to eye with [illegible] and joined in the onslaught by Fuad, Philby and others on Ibn Sa'ûd's principal henchman, 'Abdullah Sulaymân, in October 1934. Although 'Abdullah Sulaymân had the best of the [illegible] and the King has continued to treat Faysal [illegible] consideration. Received many decorations during his tour in 1932, including an honorary G.B.E. In 1935 showed surprising dash as a horseman in races held at Riyadh on occasion of Sir Andrew Ryan's visit. Reported to have married in October 1935 a daughter of his aunt Nura. Represented Sa'ûdi Arabia at the London discussions on Palestine in 1939, and seems to have played the part well. In the last two years seems to have acquired much more self-confidence and tries to fill his rôle as Foreign Minister by showing an up-to-date knowledge of events. He talks freely and intelligently in the company of European [illegible] [illegible] brothers possess. On occasion he is capable of acting with firmness within the instructions given to him by the King, as was shown in the expulsion of the Italian Minister in February 1942. Visited America and England from September to December 1943 with his brother Khâlid (No. 1 (5)). The two Amirs, who were accompanied by the Shaykh Hafiz Wahhâb (No. 25) travelled [illegible] the battlefields in [illegible] Headed the Sa'ûdi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. A private visit to London, where he may require to receive medical treatment for gastric ulcers, is projected for the summer of 1945.

(4) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul 'Aziz.*—Born in or about 1918. Headed the Sa'ûdi forces which entered Medina in 1925. Was made acting Viceroy when the Amir Faysal went abroad in 1932 but got beyond himself and was replaced by his brother Khâlid. Met Faysal at Kuwait on his return and shared in the bout of dissipation there. Visited the United Kingdom with the Amir Sa'ûd in 1937 and 1938. Lives mostly at Riyadh, visiting the Hejaz only for the pilgrimage. Said to be popular with the tribes. Appears to be being brought gradually [illegible] father's commands, was prese[illegible] Amir Sa'ûd [illegible] His Majesty's Minister and the King at Riyadh in March 1942. Visited India for health reasons in June 1943 together with Mansur No. 1 (9) and Shaykh Abdullah Sulaymân (No. 11). Owing to their indiscreet and extravagant living their visit was not a success. Returned in October 1943. Accompanied his father to Egypt for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr Churchill in February 1945. He, together with two other joy-riding princes (Fahad and [illegible] Sa'ûdi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945.

(5) *Khâlid ibn 'Abdul 'Aziz.* Born in or about [illegible] Acting as Viceroy of the Hejaz in 1932 (see [illegible] above). Visited the United Kingdom with the Amir Faysal in 1939. Full brother and constant companion of Amir Muhammad (4) above. Accompanied his brother Faysal when they visited America and England in the winter of 1943.

[illegible] twenty-two. The following is a correct list in order of age: Nâsir (1920), Sa'ûd (1921), Fahad (1921), Mansûr (1921), 'Abdullah (1922), Bandar (1924), Sa'ûd (1924), Musa'id (1927), Mish'al (1927), 'Abdul Muhsin (1929), Mûsâ'id (1932), Muteb (1933), Turki (1933), Abdur Rahman (1935), Turki (1934), Badr (1934), Nawwâf (1934), Nayef (1935), Fawwâz (1936), Majid (1937), Sulân (1938) and (?) (1939). Two of them, Mish'al and Sa'ûd, are said to be adopted sons of the family of the Bani Rashîd.

Mansûr, No. 1 (9), deserves separate notice. His mother, a Caucasian concubine, was the King's favourite until her death in 1938. A favourite of his father, he is perhaps alone among the King's sons in being interested in something other than political gossip, field sports and domestic pleasures. He, [illegible] machines, personally sees to the maintenance of his cars and speaks a good [illegible] garage in Riyadh. [illegible] when [illegible] [illegible] the maintenance of the electrical installation at the Royal Palace at Riyadh. Visited Egypt in March 1942 as the guest of the British Commander-in-chief. On his return to Jedda he gave an interview in which his father's approval of his remarks to a representative of the B.B.C. which was recorded in the Royal Palace at Jedda and later broadcast from London. He owns a cinema projector. Visited India for health reasons, in June 1943 with his brother Muhammad and Abdullah Sulaymân. In October and again in November he visited Palestine for further medical treatment, returning with Faysal, whom he joined in Egypt in December 1944. Appointed Minister of Defence in March 1944. Visited Khartoum in December 1944 to arrange for the training there of Sa'ûdi army personnel in driving and maintenance. Accompanied his father for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr Churchill in Egypt in February 1945. Acting Viceroy during the absence of the Amir Faysal at the San Francisco [illegible]

Talâl, No. 1 (16).—One of the King's favourite sons. His mother, Umm Talâl, one of the royal concubines, is the King's favourite. Talal went to

[illegible] suffering from asthma, and so [illegible] treatment returned by air in Oct[illegible]

Brothers. Al Ar[illegible]

No 28 in 1944 report, *Muhammad ibn* [illegible] Died July 1943 (see obituary)

(28) and (29) Sa'd and Sa'ud, who died in 1916 and 1930 respectively. The former left three so[illegible] Faysal, Sa'ud [illegible] Muhammad and Faysal [illegible]

[illegible] Described as neat and spruce [illegible] well as ha[illegible] H M S *Ka*[illegible]

[illegible] and on his visit to Egypt [illegible] February 1945 for the meetings with Pre[illegible] Roosevelt and Mr Churchill.

(31) to (34). *Ahmad, Mansur, Sa'd* and *Abdul Mohsin*. Younger men, the children of the old ag[illegible] of Abdul Rahman ibn Faysal [illegible]

[illegible] but a general mention may be made of the 'Arâif as being members [illegible] branch of the family by virtue of descent from Sa'ud ibn Faysal, an older brother of the King's father and a former ruler at Riyadh. These generally 'Arâif are now applied to camel caravans, subsequently "recognised," as the root implies, and recovered by their owners. It seems to have been given to them because they had remained in the hands of the Beni Rashid, but escaped to Ibn Sa'ud in the course of battle in 1904. Some of them rebelled against him [illegible] 1910, but the present members of the family form portion of the King's guard of camels [illegible] Although uncompanionable, they might pr[illegible] [illegible] Tehiya. The most [illegible] these individually the m[illegible] Arâif, would appear to be—

(35) *Sa'ud ibn Abdul Aziz ibn Sa'ud* [illegible] Married the King's sister Nura. Seems to play a certain rôle in Ibn Sa'ud's [illegible] according to a reliable informant, a friend [illegible] Ajman tribe and secretly hostile to the S[illegible] Daughter reported to have married Amir Faysal (q v) in October 19[illegible]

2. *'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Ibrahim*

[illegible] of Medina (technically Acting Governor [illegible] King's son Amir Khalid, who never actually held the post) until May 1926, when he was re[illegible] succeeded by Abdullah as Sdayri (No 30 (1)). Had the reputation of being a severe and arbitrary Governor. Was Governor of Abha in 1923 at the time of the clash between the Ikhwân and the Yemeni pilgrim caravan, the Usha'ir in the Wadi Tanuma. In 1926 appointed a member of the Council of Mi[illegible]

3. *'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Mu'ammar*

Governor of Jedda until June 1935, when he was appointed Governor of Taif in the room of Amir Abdullah, maternal uncle of Amir Faysal (No 4 (3)). Born in or about 1884. Comes of a former ruling family of Nejd, apparently the same Beni Mo[illegible] [illegible] times in Philby's *Arabia*. Brought up principally at Hâ'il. Was Governor of Yanbu' for some time and earned a good reputation there. Was appointed to Jedda in August 1932, with the title of Amir, on the death of Hajji Abdullah Al Riza, a leading local mer[illegible] had been governor with the old title of Qaimmaqam since King Husayn's time. He is good looking and pleasant, but pretentious, probably on the score of his descent. He was keen on riding and other forms of sport [illegible] afflicted by paralysis in 1931 [illegible] [illegible]ical treatment in March 1941 but returned incurable in October 1941 [illegible] completely deaf and unable to walk.

4. *'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Mus'id ibn Jilawi ibn Sa'ud*

[illegible] came to the Kingdom. Governor of Hâ'il since 19[illegible] [illegible] to have aged greatly [illegible] in 1929 [illegible] [illegible] which I was in fact in [illegible] Dismissed by the King at [illegible] Was [illegible] [illegible] proceeded from Riyadh to Abha and Jizan [illegible] [illegible] of the forces to Asir. Said then to be arranged for the disarmament of the whole Asir area, but [illegible] Hâ'il. A man for occasions requiring drastic action. Appointed inspector of the frontier area on the Sa'ûdi Iraq frontier in 1936, duties he combines with [illegible] [illegible] Hâ'il. In 1937 was said to have [illegible]

5. *Abdul 'Aziz (ibn Hamud) ibn Zeyd*

[illegible] in Transjordan from the area [illegible] 1907. Cousin of a Hâ'il family [illegible] Beni Rashid. Said to [illegible] [illegible] Governor of Jedda. Sent to Amir [illegible] 1930) as Sa'ûdi agent at the MacDonald [illegible] regarding raids. Appointed Inspector [illegible] June, 1931, held meetings at [illegible] frontier area into three sectors under inspectors with wide powers. In May 1943 was appointed Saudi Consul at Damascus in succession to Khurshid Pa[illegible]

6. *'Abdullah ibn Blayh[illegible]*

A leading figure among the W[illegible] Comes from Hâ'il. Qâdhi of Mecca after [illegible] tion by Ibn Sa'ûd, and was described in Eldon Rutter's account of him (1925-26) as a [illegible] and wizened little man. Appointed Grand Qâdhi of the [illegible] in January 1926. Was instrumental in May [illegible] obtaining a fatwa from seventeen Ulama of Medina in support of the Wahhabi policy of destroying tombs. Head of the Najdi delegates at the Modern Congress of June 1926. Again visited Medina in November of that year in attendance on the King and in the company of Abdullah ibn Hassan (see 12 (1)), bent on purging the place of impurity as Mecca had been purged. Vacated post at Mecca in 1928 and returned to Hâ'il. Was thought at that

time to favour the extremists of the Ikhwân movement. Still visits Mecca at intervals. Thought to be embarrassing in high places owing to his frankness and fanaticism. Signed the pronouncement by the Ulama of Nejd in favour of Jihad at the time of the Ibn Rifada rebellion in 1933.

7. *'Abdullah Kâzim*

A Hejazi said to be of Cossack origin. Born about 1887. Was employed in the Mecca Post Office in King Husayn's time. Appointed Sa'ûdi Director General of Posts and Telegraphs in 1926 and still holds the post. Went to [illegible] [illegible] wireless negotiations in the spring of 1935.

8. *'Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Aqil (or Aqeyl).*

In 1926 Governor of Jauf, but had vacated the post by March 1928 when he was put in command of a force sent to quell the disturbance created at Wajh by Hamdi ibn Rifada. Probably elected with the [illegible] in May 1931 as a candidate for the governorship of Tabuk but was not appointed. Abdullah ibn 'Aqil commanded [illegible] Ikhwân mobilised in June 1933 to repress [illegible] [illegible] ibn Rifada.

9. *'Abdullah ibn Muhammad al-Fadhl*

Vice President of the Legislative Council [illegible] [illegible] formerly a merchant in Jedda [illegible] [illegible] sobriquet of "Kagl[illegible] [illegible] Sheep [illegible] Ibn Saud [illegible] known [illegible] [illegible] on a delegation [illegible] with Ibn Sa'ûd at Mecca. Went over [illegible] his representa[illegible] [illegible] when the young A[illegible] Figured as a Hejazi delegate at the Modern [illegible] June 1928 [illegible] period, in partnership with Indians settled in Mecca, contract for motor transport, but lost it. Did better [illegible] purveyor to the Government. Sent on an unsuccessful mission to Eritrea in 1927 in connexion with negotiations for the recognition of Ibn Sa'ûd by Italy and proposed treaty arrangements. Also had some part in the treaty negotiations with Great Britain. Became assistant to the Viceroy at Mecca and on to appointment to his present post in or before 1929. Went in that year on a [illegible] Persia. Alleged in the same year to have [illegible] in the company of Abdullah Sulaymân by cutting bonus, &c., just before new duties were imposed. Appears to enjoy the King's confidence in a high degree and to steer an even or wayly course between rival factions. Not impressive in appearance or conversation, still somewhat of a sheep [illegible] recent dignities with an acquired air of dignity, sobriety and sagacity, which may be a part of his success. May still have commercial interests, but has long been dissociated from the business of the other Fadhls. Acting Viceroy during Faisal's absence in 1930 and again during Faisal's absence in the winter of 1943.

10. *'Abdullah an Nafisi*

Important as being Ibn Sa'ûd's agent at Kuwait where he is established as a merchant and once did a large business in rice, &c. Now elderly and inactive. Seems semi-se[illegible]

11. *'Abdullah ibn Sulaymân al Hamdân*

Minister of Finance. Born about 1887. [illegible] plebeian Anayza origin. Started life in a small way with the Qusaibis, originally it is said, as a coffee boy. Spent ten years as clerk in their Bombay office. Returned to Nejd about 19[illegible] [illegible] his brother, who had died, as a [illegible] Diwân. Rose to be h[illegible] Diwân. Became Director-General of Fi[illegible] had acquired complete control of all financial matters by September 1929, when it was remarked that he travelled in greater sta[illegible] between Mecca and Jedda [illegible] powerful of the King's [illegible] strongly assailed in October 1931 by a [illegible] included the Amir Faysal, Fuad Hamza, Abdullah al Fadhl (perhaps a doubtful enemy) and Mr Philby. Was sent for a time to Jauf on a mission with the Tawil [illegible] in Hasa, but had his place kept warm for him and returned to it. Was promoted in August 1932 from being Director-General of F[illegible] post of Minister of Finance [illegible] Independence, thus obtaining [illegible] Wajh, hitherto enjoyed only by the Amir Faysal [illegible] [illegible] in the finances [illegible] his finger in many other pies, being [illegible] of the Privy Purse, Grand Maste[illegible] Quarter Master General [illegible] [illegible] ages of the King [illegible] slaves and pilgrimage organisa[illegible] [illegible] Probably [illegible] whose needs he supplies at the expe[illegible] having demands on the Treasury and who give him a free hand in finance regardless of the effect [illegible] public opinion. A man of rather mean appearance but emphatically a "live wire." Reads and [illegible] and full of ideas about [illegible] In recent years has often spent long periods at Jedda acting as the representative of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, taking turns in the [illegible] with Yusuf Yasin. The main burden of [illegible] and he acquitted himself very creditably. He [illegible] originator of the agricultural development scheme at Al Khurj and showed great energy and enthusiasm in the face of much [illegible] Unnatural criticism from his brot[illegible] successors [illegible] keen fisherman and a [illegible] good [illegible] [illegible] by the disorders in April 1944 of his friend and protégé Najib Sa'ba, Sy[illegible] whose pro-American enthusiasm he is thought to share. Was a very harassed and worried man during 1944 when faced with the prospect of having reorganise the country's finances on [illegible] sounder lines. Accompanied the King to Egypt February 1945 for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr Churchill. Is said valued by the Americans whose increasing tendency to play the rôle of Lady Bountiful to Saudi Arabia naturally appeals to him as Minister of Finance. The abuse of his official position by his brother Hamed and the latter's sons is gross and scandalous.

12. *Abdul Wahhâb*, Descendants of

The following seem to be the most notable of the descendants of the founder of Wahhâbism.

(1) *Abdullah ibn Hasan.*—Is one of the leading Wahhâbi Ulama in Mecca. Played a rôle in 1926 with 'Abdullah ibn Blayhad (q v.) in the Wahhabi purging of the Holy Cities, and was in 1929 thought like him, to favour the Ikhwân extremists. Signed

the pronouncement of the Ulama in favour of Jihad [illegible] the time of the Ibn Rifada re[illegible] I Qasim. Proud and fanatical.

(2) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn* [illegible] transferred to [illegible] in 1932 as Assistant to the Amir Sa'ud.

(3) *Abdul-Latif Family*.—Four sons and a [illegible] on of a descendant named Abdul [illegible] among the ten signatories of the declara[illegible] mentioned under (1). No. (2) [illegible] of the Amir Faysal (q.v.) also [illegible] belong to this connexion.

13. *'Abdul Wahhab Abu Mithn*

A personage of consequence in 'Asir, possibly of the Shaykh's family of Mithn near Sa'ya, although [illegible] cannot be affirmed. Was searched in 1927 as Director of Finance in 'Asir and was in that year [illegible] he tur[illegible] finance and commanded the Sa'ud forces which occupied Sa'wa in November 1932.

14. *'Abdur-Ra'uf as-Sabban*

Born in the Hejaz probably between 1880 and 1885. Grandson of an immigrant from Egypt. Educated in the Hejaz and in Egypt. Associated with his father Hasan, and others in what was in 1917 the principal silk and skin business in Jedda and Mecca. Impressed the Hejaz at that time by his knowledge and European manners. Was made Director of Education in Jeddah, but was [illegible] and reverted to trade in cotton goods and skins [illegible] of one of the Dabbighs. Given a post by the Amir 'Abdullah as manager of his [illegible] jordan in or before 1931. Was at [illegible] of the Hizb al-Ahrar al-Hijazi, and was concerned in 1932 in the press propaganda and financial arrangements of the [illegible] 1932 as a result of these political activities but went on with them. Excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan, whereupon he retired to Baghdad, where he was understood to have become [illegible] tary to the late ex-King Ali. Re[illegible] with [illegible] at the same time as Ahmad al-[illegible] July 1935, and was appointed in 1936 a [illegible] the Legislative Council. In 1938 did some propaganda for Dr. Saud in Egypt. Appointed Director General of Waqfs in December 1942, succeeding [illegible]

15. *Muhammad Sa'id al-Kurdi*

Formerly Director of Police in Jeddah. Of Kurdish origin, from Zakho. Was previously Director of Police at Hofuf and gave offence to the legation by trying to commandeer a car which was taking [illegible] Nawab of Bahawalpur to Medina. W[illegible] 1932. Was removed from his post [illegible] apparently reappointed to Rangh in 1933. Officer Commanding troops in Jeddah in 1940, in which capacity he was in charge of aviation during the presence of the Italian Air Mission 1937-39. According to a Russian pilot, showed ability and a real desire to learn about aviation. Was cultivated assiduously by the Italian pilot, probably received bribes from him, and learned Italian. Very anti-British when the Palestine trouble was at its height.

16. *'Abdur-Rahman al-Bassam*

Second Assistant in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Educated in Egypt. Speaks English. Helped Sheikh Yusuf Yasin with the English versions of the Sa'udi-Kuwait Agreements signed at Jedda in April 1942.

17. *'Ali Taha*

Assistant Governor of Jedda since 1928. A Hejaz born about 1884. Rose from a small post as secretary to the Governor. Cadaverous and unhealthy. Speaks Turkish well. Well meaning, [illegible] out intelligence, but frightened of [illegible]. Serves as no more than a transmitter of messages to and from Mecca. Acted as Deputy Governor of Jedda from April 1944 and showed himself helpful and co-operative over routine matters with His Majesty's Legation. Has a working knowledge of French but is afraid to use it. Reverted [illegible] former post of Ass[illegible] [illegible]ment in April 1945 of a new [illegible]

18. *Bujad (or Humayd) Family*

A leading family in the economically [illegible] that section of the A[illegible] [illegible] may Ibn Bujad and the Bujad foul court, but they would appear all to apply to one and the same man. This is [illegible] in what follows regarding [illegible] commanders [illegible] when they took Mecca in 1924. Had a [illegible]ter married to the King. [illegible] Noted early in 19[illegible] of the early days who were then in young age [illegible] with him later, but finally [illegible] Ibn Sa'ud's opponents in the Najd rebellion of 1929 [illegible] cond only to Faysal al-Dawish [illegible] of the earlier leaders to fal[illegible] and was imprisoned at Riyadh in the spring of that year. Appears to be still in close contact, as he was found [illegible] of the death of Sultan ibn Bujad, the best known of the names cited above, and [illegible] Hamud [illegible] now over his imprisonment).

(2) *Nasir ibn Faysal ibn Humayd*.—A pretender [illegible] the chieftainship of the Atayba but moved to Iraq in 1924, having been ousted by Na'if. Played with the idea of recovering his position in June 1929 [illegible] Sheyd, [illegible] a refugee in Iraq and as a possible aspirant to the hand of Mas'ufna, sister of Faysal al-Dawish, but the engagement or marriage was denied.

19. *Dabbagh Family*

A Meccan family of Mawrish (i.e. some North West Africa) origin. Appear to be Sayyids. Became prominent in 1932 in connexion with plot behind the revolt of Ibn Rifada and the preparations for the retarded revolt in 'Asir. The family is numerous. Certain members of it still reside in the Hejaz, including two who were arrested and deported to Riyadh in June–July 1932, viz.—

(1) *Ibrahim ibn 'Abdullah* and

(2) *Isa ibn 'Abdullah*.

More important are the following persons [illegible]

(3) *Husayn ibn 'Abdullah*, brother of the above. Migrated to Makada in or about 1920. Has since done school-mastering in South West Arabia and has been an active intriguer against Ibn Sa'ud. Went to India in 1927 to enlist support for the Hizb al-Ahrar al-Hijazi and their National Pact. Sought

and probably enlisted, the support of Shaukat Ali, who, with his brother, had been violently [illegible] heads with Ibn Sa'ud at the Modern Co[illegible] June 1926. Went to Egypt and perhaps to Transjordan in 1929. Said to have attended Modern Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931, when persons concerned in Hizb al-Ahrar seem to have formed a pendant organization called Jama'at ad-Da'wa il-Hijaz. Was using Aden as [illegible] 1932, but left in summer owing to adverse [illegible] of British authorities and seems [illegible] worked mainly in Eritrea. Now excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan. Returned to Aden in 1936 and allowed to stay there. Opened a school, but soon began to send anti-British articles to Egyptian papers. Left for the Upper Yafa country, where he engaged in anti-British propaganda. Probably financed by the Italians. Arrested [illegible] Deported [illegible] but earlier when [illegible] tried to escape early in [illegible] but was unsuccessful and he [illegible] ever since. Governor [illegible] Amir.

(4) *Muhammad 'Ali ibn 'Abdullah*, another brother. Less [illegible] very active. Took a hand in the actual revolt in 'Asir. Reported drown[illegible] Hijaz, but report was contradicted later.

(5) *Muhammad Tahir ibn Musa'id*, uncle of the above. Described as "an egg shaped man." Born in 1880. Had some employment under King Husayn. Obtained British protected passport at Cairo in 1926. [illegible] to Amir Shakir of the 20th February 1932, which fell into hands of Sa'ud [illegible] conspirators. Seem[illegible] he arrived [illegible] 1932. H[illegible] excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan. Was understood in January 1935 to be heading back to Massawa, and perhaps thence to Aden and the Hadhramaut. Made his peace with Ibn Sa'ud after [illegible] of amnesty early in 1936. Returned [illegible]

Other members of the family need not be [illegible] but they all seem to hang together and [illegible] attached with Hashimites. One, Mas'ud, a hangeron at Arumah, was closely concerned in the Ibn Rifada affair and was hoted with Ibn Rifada. The family also have attachers with the Idrisi, although there is nothing to explain one mentioned (3) above as Husayn bin 'Abdullah ad-Dabbagh [illegible]

20. *Dawish Family*

A leading family in the Mutayr tribe. Its best known member, Faysal ad-Dawish, famous as a raider as one of Ibn Sa'ud's principal lieutenants and as a rebel against him, died as a State prisoner at Riyadh in October 1931. His name is, however, still potent in Eastern Arabia, where he was regarded [illegible] more than an ordinary sheykh—a kingly [illegible] and a king maker. This gives importance to his sons, two of whom have figured in reports from K[illegible]

(1) *Bandar ibn Faysal ad-Dawish*.—Still a young man. Said to be looked to by the Mutayr as the leader they desire, but to be himself very cautious and unwilling to move at present. Reported in December 1932 to have countered a question by Ibn Sa'ud as to whom the Mutayr wanted for a leader by saying "No one but Your Ma[illegible]

Mutayr and Ajman, still hostile to him, and was [illegible] well received and rewarded.

The ladies of this family seem to count. The [illegible] tion agent at Kuwait who had befriended them when Faysal was summoned to Ibn Sa'ud in January 1930, was visited by various of them [illegible] several occasions in 1932. They included Faysal's mother, who had bitter hatred of the King beneath [illegible] courtesy, a sister, whose rumoured marriage to a Harb Shaykh was regarded as an augury of reconciliation between his tribe and the Mutayr, but was afterwards denied, and a cousin, still a woman of considerable charm and humour, who had been married to Sheykh M[illegible] sirak of Kuwait, [illegible] a deceased son of Faysal al-Dawish and, apt[illegible] as prize of war to Ibn Sa'ud's brother 'Abdullah.

21. *Fadhl (al-Fazal) Family*

Nejdis of Ameyra origin long settled in the Hejaz. An original Abdullah, or at least five sons, are now deceased, with one possible exception. Each of them had issue. Members of the first and second [illegible] tions after the original Ab[illegible] firms do[illegible] Hejaz and [illegible] where th[illegible] n, enhanced [illegible] position as o[illegible] Ibn Sa'ud. Family [illegible] of their business at Bombay and Karachi in that year. The two partners most actively concerned in the business in India since [illegible] Hejaz were a third tries to dissociate h[illegible] the partnership. The affairs of the fir[illegible] been [illegible] [illegible] Apart from 'Abdullah [illegible] bin Muhammad ibn 'Abd Allah, w[illegible] [illegible] ured. In business in Jeddah and does a fair trade [illegible]gam. Disinherited by the latter in 1948 as a result of a quarrel.

(2) *Ibrahim ibn 'Abdurrahman*.—One of the two [illegible] d from India in 1930. Appointed a [illegible] ed in October 1930 [illegible] Amir Faysal. Was [illegible] resign, ostensibly on grounds of ill-health [illegible] Amir Faysal. He is now living in Mecca and engaged in trade in an unimportant way, but is still said to enjoy the confidence of Amir Faysal.

(3) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdurrahman ibn 'Abdullah*.—[illegible] ber to the firm which ad[illegible] in India [illegible] and in Jeddah and tried to dissolve [illegible] partners, his brother and [illegible]

'Abdullah ibn Ibrahim ibn 'Abdullah.—Private secretary to the Amir Faysal in 1926. Afterwards one of the partners who absconded from India. Selected in 1931 for the post of chargé d'affaires in Holland, under circumstances which did not conduce to his having a legation there with the Sa'udi Minister in [illegible] Government later in 1931 as a result of the [illegible] [illegible] ment representa[illegible] American Oil Company at [illegible] matters in Bahrain. Speaks English.

(5) *Ibrahim ibn Sulayman al-'Aqil*.—Son-in-law of father of (4), and has taken the place of (2) as Ra'is al-Diwan of the Amir Faysal. Is an important official and enjoys Amir Faysal's complete confidence. Accompanied him to London in 1939 for the Palestine discussions. As a young man spent considerable time in India. Speaks a very little English and some Urdu. A man of culture and pleasing manners. Accompanied the Amir Faysal

to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. Has been suggested as a possible minister in London but for some reason Ibn Saud does not use him.

22. *Fahad ibn Zu'ayr*

Late Governor of Asir. Was head of [illegible] sent to Asir in May 1930 to make the arrangements which subsequently culminated in its practical annexation by Ibn Saud. Was later appointed Amir, though probably not the first to hold the post. Reported to Ibn Saud with increasing urgency in the autumn of 1932 that the Idrisi was getting beyond himself. The Idrisi, professing complete loyalty to the King, complained bitterly of Fahad's rough treatment. The King, anxious to placate the Idrisi, steered a middle course and sent a [illegible] ion to investigate. Before it could reach the spot the Idrisi had gone into open revolt and Fahad had to escape from his seat of government at Jizan. [illegible] the heard of for some time afterwards, but appointed Governor of Qunfida in or about June 1933.

23. *Fawzân as-Sâbaj*

Saudi Chargé d'Affaires in Egypt and consul [illegible] in Cairo. Appointed in August 1936 upon the [illegible] of the Saudi-Egyptian Treaty of May 1936. Previously Saudi agent in Egypt. Born about 1898. Belongs by origin to the Ujeyl, the [illegible] educated in a Turkish school at Amman. Said to have lived for many years in Damascus. In by profession a dealer in camels and horses and still appears to do this business. Was Ibn Saud's agent in Damascus before 1924. Moved in that year to Cairo, where he became Saudi Chargé d'Affaires in 1937. Is described by Sir W[illegible] Maclean, plain, slow [illegible] politically rather innocent but possessed of a [illegible] nature shrewdness. He is never used by Ibn Saud for important political work. A keen race-goer who spends much of his time at the [illegible]

24. *Fuad Bey Hamza*

Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born about 1900 he is a Druze of Aleih, in the Lebanon, where the family are less prosperous than they were. One brother Said was accused of complicity in the murder of a Christian priest at Aleih in 1930, but was finally acquitted in April-May 1934. Educated in Turkish schools in Aleih, the Teachers' Training College, Beirut, and the Syrian Protestant College, Beirut. Was Inspector of Schools at Damascus for a time. Obtained a post as clerk under the Palestine Department of Public Health in 1921. Resigned after a few months and took service under the Department of Education as a teacher in Acre. Transferred in 1922 to a secondary school in Jerusalem as teacher in English and remained until 1926. Studied simultaneously at the Law School and got a certificate of Legal Studies in 1925 [illegible] History and Public International Law, for the Diploma, but did not complete the course. Had a uniformly good record in Palestine, but was in [illegible] and the Druze insurrection [illegible] 2nd December, 1926. A[illegible] on a Syro-Palestinian delegation, but was drawn to the Hejaz, where, after giving English lessons for a time, he was taken into the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Yusuf Yasin, then acting for Dr. Abdul [illegible] Daniláji. Became Acting Minister in July 1928 when Dr Daniláji left on a mission, never to return. Had probably worked earlier to undermine Daniláji's position. Remained Acting Minister until the Amir Faysal became titular Minister with Fuad as Under-Secretary but still effective head of the Ministry in December 1930. Retained his post, with a seat on [illegible] one of the authors, develop on moder[illegible] [illegible] has made himself part. Keeps in touch [illegible] In 1939 was appointed first Saudi Minister to [illegible] France in 1940. Withdrawn to [illegible] visit to the Lebanon during the troubles in November 1943. Was permitted to return to Saudi Arabia [illegible] record during the Vichy period in France [illegible]

25. *Hafiz (Hâfidh) Wahba*

[illegible] probably between 1885 and 1890. Educated at Al Azhar. Mixed up in Nationalist and pan-Islamic politics in early manhood and was closely associated with Abdul Aziz Shawish. Definitely anti-British at time of Great War and said to have been deported from India. Said to have been in Bahrein at one time. Started a school at Kuwait and passed thence in Ibn Saud's service. Became tutor to the Amir Faysal and accompanied the prince to London in [illegible] one of Ibn Saud's delegates at the abortive Kuwait Conference in 1923-24. In supreme charge of the civil side of the Administration at Mecca in 1925, with a viceregal title, and did well

Read the King's inaugural address at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Much employed on missions and negotiations [illegible] years. *Inter alia* took part in negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928 and expounded Ibn Saud's views and fears regarding Italian policy [illegible] the Red Sea, Bolshevik activity and H[illegible] [illegible] agency in neighbouring countries [illegible] Residency at Cairo early in 1938. During [illegible] period waged a ding-dong struggle against the Syrian influences around the King, and had ups and downs. Was occulted towards the end of 1939, but returned to favour soon after and became Assistant Viceroy beside the Amir's Faysal. [illegible] undisposed the Amir by his [illegible] tutor and his disregard [illegible] for the Amir's position [illegible] to the post of Director of [illegible] 1929 to re[illegible] Postal Congr[illegible] selected for the post of Minister in London but he not take up the post for over a year during which interim he went on a sort of undefined mi[illegible] [illegible] King's person, though he [illegible] have met around to the S[illegible] [illegible] Was designated in 1931 to be Minister at [illegible] but the arrangements have never mat[illegible] [illegible] necessary. Represented Saudi Arabia at [illegible] the Tokyo mosque in 1938. Wahba has sown his political [illegible] anti-British sentiments are supposed [illegible] [illegible] or before 1928 when [illegible] sentiment to say to a[illegible] [illegible] would always be against Great Britain. [illegible] but, as a servant of Ibn Saud, achieved [illegible] interest to lie in friendly relations with His Maj[illegible] [illegible] He has certainly shown himself well disposed in London, and has been distinctly helpful. He is a good propagandist for Ibn Saud on the [illegible] [illegible] is by his sense of humour and looks anything but a Wahhabi, except that he abstains from alcohol and tobacco. At the Hyde Park Hotel or the Savoy. Likes the theatre too, and alleged to have a passion for night clubs in which [illegible] full rein in New York in 1936. Speaks moderate [illegible] Bosnia. A useful servant to the [illegible] [illegible] returned via Kuwait, where he settled [illegible] Political Agent, the temporary form of the Saudi Kuwait Agreements, which were then brought into force pending the drawing up and signing of the final texts. Accompanied the Amirs Faisal and Khalid on their visit to America and Egypt [illegible] 1943. He returned with them [illegible] December 1943 and was present at most of the interviews between His Majesty's Minister and the King in March and April 1944. Showed himself genuinely [illegible] country's finances and general [illegible] officials. The King appeared [illegible] under him as one of his most trustworthy counsellors. He returned to England in April 1944. Visited the King again in January 1945 and accompanied him to Egypt in February for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr Churchill. Was a member of the Saudi delegation which attended the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. Will probably be chosen by Ibn Saud to be first Saudi Minister in Washington.

26. *Hamad Suleymân*

Under Secretary of State for Finance, brother of [illegible] Suleymân, *q.v.*, and has worked under [illegible] Once a petty trader in Bahrein and fled the country to evade payment of debts. Acted for his brother as Director-General of Finance during his relegation to Hasa towards the end of 1931. W[illegible] appointed Wakil or Under-Secretary when Abdullah was made Wazir or full Minister in August 1932. Has been employed on missions in Asir since November 1932, when he was sent with Khalid Qargani to investigate the differences between [illegible] Idrisi and Ibn Saud's Governor. They were too late to reach the spot before the Idrisi went into [illegible] revolt. Went with a Saudi mission to the Yemen 1934, and was reported to have been detained by the Imam at Sana on the situation with Saudi Arabia [illegible] Returned well before the outbreak [illegible] in 1934. In 1935 was a member [illegible] [illegible] Bahrein, to negotiate [illegible] Agreement and to Kuwait to the [illegible] the Saudi blockade of that [illegible] [illegible] reported for an old debt. Fell into disgrace with Ibn Saud in the spring of 1936 as he had done at least once previously, but was apparently bagged off by his brother Abdullah. Of even mean appearance, like his brother, a poor talker and not apparently very intelligent. He disclosed to His Majesty's Minister at Taif in 1942 that his outdoor sport was [illegible] Sheyukhs's Hamad, born about 19[illegible] part in public affairs, he was for a [illegible] of the agricultural project at Al Khaj[illegible] 1943 he went to Egypt to buy machine [illegible] parts for the Ministry of Finance. Suleyman represented Sheikh Yusuf Yasin as Acting Minister for [illegible]

27. *Hamdi Bey*

Furnerica Dere[illegible] [illegible] of Military Organisation. Born about 1892 to 1900. Believes [illegible] Kurd and to have risen to a [illegible] rank in the Turkish army. Was [illegible] of King H[illegible] [illegible] before 1926 [illegible] his at that year. Ap[illegible] Military Organisation [illegible] Fawz Bey Kawakji [illegible] under contract there [illegible] [illegible] the British staff of the Hejaz air force [illegible] Now insignificant, having ceased to hold any military position and to be [illegible] as A.D.C. to the Amir Faysal. S[illegible] [illegible] resigned and wanted to return to Iraq [illegible] allowed by Ibn Saud to leave the country. Boon companion of the Amir Faysal's. A bantam step-brother-in-law Ibrahim Adham. In spite of a gorgeous air form gives an impression of seed [illegible] and has been known to touch a member of the legation for a loan or 2 rials.

28. *Seyyid Hamza al Ghauth al Madani*

At one time consul-general designate for Java. Became first Saudi Minister to Bagdad 1938. A Hejazi of Medina, born perhaps 1895. Said to have been educated in Turkish schools and to have frequented Turkish society. Sided with Turks at time of Arab revolt and edited an anti-Hussein p[illegible] at Medina in their interest. Continued to be anti-Hussein after the success of the revolt and fled. Said to have been sentenced to death by default during his absence. Seems, nevertheless, to have been [illegible] an important post at Damascus, which he continued to hold under King Faisal's régime there [illegible] after King Hussein had launched against him an accusation, probably trumped up, of having stolen

valuables from the Prophet's Tomb. Was in Ibn Sa'ud's service by end of 1923 and was one of his delegates at the abortive Kuwait Conference of 1923-24, an appointment which led to a revival by the Iraqi delegates of the robbery charge. Became Assistant Governor of Medina after its occupation by Sa'udi forces in 1925. Was later employed in the Palace. Selected in 1931 for the proposed consulate-general at Batavia, to the creation of which the Netherlands Government agreed, but which has never been opened, probably owing to financial difficulties. Filled in time as a member of the Legislative Council, whence he was transferred to the Amir Sa'ud's Diwan in September 1932. Came in King's train to Mecca in March 1933. Much of a palace man evidently. Fell into disfavour during his visit to Medina in 1941, but was later [redacted] reinstated in the King's entourage [redacted] frequently present at meetings of the [redacted]

29. *Hithlayn Family*

People of importance in the Ajman tribe, much concerned in the Nejd revolt of 1929. Its principal member, Dhaydan ibn Hithlayn, was slain treacherously in April of that year. The following other members of the family deserve mention:—

(1) *Naif ibn Hithlayn* (nicknamed Abu Kilab). S[redacted] Dhaydan and carried on the re[redacted] [redacted] fered in January 1930 to the Br[redacted] [redacted] in Kuwait, and was in due course hand[redacted] Ibn Sa'ud. Has since been a State prisoner at Riyadh, closely confined.

(2) *Hazam ibn Hithlayn* al[redacted] the revolt, and was one of two [redacted] July 1929 visited Kuwait in the hope of enlisting support. Was fighting together with Naif in October. Eventual fate unknown.

(3) *Khalid ibn Muhammad ibn Hithlayn*, described as a "delicate and handsome young warrior." Was one of the Mutayr and Ajman Shaykhs living in Iraq under King Faisal's protection. Visited Kuwait in 1932 at the time of the Ibn Rifada affair, apparently to size up the chances of new acts [redacted] Appointed Amir at Sudin or Governor of the Ajman desert, with headquarters at Awayna (80 miles W.N.W. of Al Qatif), in 1938.

30. *Huseyn al Awayni (or Aouaini)*

A young Syrian merchant established [redacted] An enterprising fellow, who derives some importance from being a friend of Fuad Hamza and Yusuf Yasin [redacted] Syrian, Abdul Ghani Y[redacted] [redacted] head of a small company there. This association was closed early in 1932 when Idlibi visited Jedda in order to work up business and with great ideas of getting concessions of all sorts. They claimed to have important support in Lancashire [redacted] of the Calico Printers' Association [redacted] reported in 1932 that Awayni was leaving Jedda for good, but he still returns occasionally. In February or March 1934 he went to Riyadh on behalf of certain merchants to try and dissuade the King from proceeding with the concession to the ex-Khedive's group for the creation of a national bank. A man likely to have ups and downs of fortune, in dealing with whom commercially great care should be used. Closely associated in business with Najib Salha (q.v.). Spends most of his time in Beirut, where he is said to act as Ibn Sa'ud's semi-official purchasing agent. Although nothing has yet been proved against him, the British security authorities regarded him for a long time as suspect and only reluctantly agreed to his return to the Lebanon. Visited Ibn Sa'ud in February 1944 and returned to Beirut in April. Ibn Sa'ud wished to appoint him first Sa'udi Minister in Beirut, but later agreed with His Majesty's Government that such an appointment would be unsuitable.

31. *M. Huseyn Nasif*

A well-known Hejazi of Jedda of Egyptian origin. Born about 1882. Inherited much property from his father, Omar Nasif, who was a notable personage in Turkish times, as well as the agency in Jedda of the Sherifs of the Abadilah branch. Occupies the largest house in Jedda and was once prosperous, but is now probably less so. Was said in 1917 to have lost favour with King Huseyn, who had previously been accustomed to stay with him when in Jedda. Was said also to be desirous of British naturalisation at that time. Described as having been a Wahhabi by conviction, even before the Sa'udi invasion. Deported to Aqaba during King Ali's short reign. Figured as a Hejazi delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Was [redacted] the privilege of putting Ibn Sa'ud up during the years following the fall of Jedda, but has not done so since the King acquired the "Green Palace" [redacted] erected, under the [redacted] perhaps owing to doubt as to his trustworthiness. Rather a dark horse nowadays and may both dislike and be disliked by the régime, but keeps quiet. Said to be a good Arabic scholar and possesses what passes in Jedda for a remarkable library. An unfortunate figure. His eldest son, Husain Nasif, has written a book on the history of the Hejaz. A cousin, M. Salih Nasif, was the figurehead president of the [redacted] [redacted] Mecca in 1937 [redacted]

32. *Ibrahim [redacted]*

[redacted]

Mu[redacted] Egypt and elsewhere and [redacted] and probably also as journalist and pro[redacted] 1926 became head of Ibn Sa'ud's [redacted] that of the Amir Sa'ud in 1930. In 1933 [redacted] Affairs at Baghdad. In all [redacted] occasions, and in 19[redacted] necessitated his removal. An active able man, interested in world affairs and with a great sense of humour. Has improved Jedda considerably, is useful to pilgrims [redacted] helpful to foreigners within the limits of his powers [redacted] on behalf [redacted] Foreign Affairs, but is not now trusted by the King or the Amir Faisal in confidential matters.

His eldest son, Abd-[illegible], born about 1921, formerly served under Yusuf Yasin in the Political Bureau at Riyadh and has now (May 1945) been appointed first secretary at the Sa'udi Legation in Baghdad [redacted] hearty rogue, he was dismissed in April 1944 as a [redacted] of a scandal connected with a slave-girl and [redacted] peculation of Government stores and [redacted]

33. *Ibrahim Shakir*

Born [redacted] 1903 in the Hejaz of Turkish Syrian [redacted] employed as chief clerk in the Jedda Quarantine Department during the latter part of the Hashimite régime. Next heard of as partner of Hussein-al-Awayni (q.v.) in 1927. Has since managed Awayni's piece-goods business in Jedda and acquired a considerable personal fortune in conjunction with Awayni and Najib Salha (q.v.). Acts as land agent for the Amir Faysal. In 1943 built a large mansion outside Jedda, which he has now (July 1944) let to the United States Legation at an exorbitant rental. Has also built a luxurious villa in Cairo. A close friend of Yusuf Yasin. Director of the "Sa'udi Arabian Trading Company," formed in January 1945, which advertises itself as importers of cars, tyres, refrigerators and [redacted] machinery. The Dodge car agency formerly held by Awayni has been taken over by the company. According to Ibrahim Shakir two-thirds of the capital are owned by him and a third by Najib Salha. Ibrahim Shakir has also obtained the agencies of the Banque Misr and other Misr organisations including the Misr Steamship Line in Sa'udi Arabia, and is associated with Abdullah Suleyman in the exploitation of a valuable agricultural area near Hadda in the Wadi Fatima. He is used also by American big [redacted]

34. *Izzet Din Shawa*

Born about 1905 in Gaza. Palestinian of a well-[redacted] a College [redacted] the [redacted] 1927-[redacted] secretary to the Mufti [redacted] Came to Iraq in 1940 [redacted] and joined Rashid Ali's rebel army in May 1941. Escaped after the rebellion had been crushed and was granted asylum by Ibn Sa'ud provided he refrained from political activities. He has been in Sa'udi Arabia ever since and has kept his word. Appointed Director of Agriculture at Al Kharj early in 1944 and in April Director of the Office of Public Works at Jedda in succession to Najib Salha. A sincere Nationalist, he is outspoken about [redacted] Palestine, but is not really anti-British. The Legation has found him to be an intelligent and co-operative colleague in his new job, and therefore a pleasant change from the majority of Sa'udi officials. He [redacted] son at Victoria College. Easy to the confidence and support of the King and has succeeded to a large extent in clearing out the Augean stables of the Office of Public Works and, as Director of Tr[redacted] of the Government garage. He engaged [redacted] of Egyptian technicians for the latter and two [redacted] assistants for the Office of Public Works. In June 1945 he resigned the post of Director [redacted] Transport in favour of one of his Egyptian [redacted] Sa'udi [illegible]. He professes [redacted] [redacted] dislike of Shaikh Yusuf Yasin (q.v.) who [redacted] of Izzet Din's prestige with the King. This [redacted] might give him more important [redacted] Shaikh Abdullah Suleyman to do [redacted]

35. *Muhammad 'Id Rawwaf*

Formerly Sa'udi Consul in Damascus. Born about 1898. One of a Sherari family which migrated from Jauf to Damascus in 1910. Family not highly considered in Damascus, but 'Id's father maintained close connexion with Ibn Sa'ud and was helpful to him in negotiations with the Turks. He, the father, made a fortune in camel-dealing and left wealth to his two sons. According to his own account, Muhammad made a large sum of money during the Great War by buying up English bank-notes in Damascus at a discount of 20 per cent. to 80 per cent., stealing away to Baghdad as soon as it fell into British hands, and cashing the notes at par. Appointed to his Damascus post in 1920 in succession to his brother Yasin. H[redacted] [redacted] was considered by His Majesty's present consul in Damascus rather stupid, though pleasant and useful. Well informed on local currents of thought and pushes in Syrian Nationalist circles, without apparently carrying much weight, the idea of an Arab Empire with Ibn Sa'ud as a suitable ruler for it. The brother Yasin Rawwaf [redacted] [redacted] the Viceroy of the Hejaz in September [redacted] faded out of Sa'udi officialdom and now lives at Damascus. Muhammad 'Id Rawwaf was superseded as consul at Damascus by Rusheyd Pasha (q.v.) in May 1939 and appointed an Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In [redacted] at Baghdad in 1939, when a Sa'udi Minister [redacted] appointed, and was made a member [redacted] Council of Ministers.

36. *Idrisi Family*

Founded by Ahmed al[redacted]

M[redacted] died in the odor [redacted] [redacted] his tomb is still venerated. The Idrisis supplanted the Sherifian family, which had ruled at Abu Arish in the time of his son Muhammad and Muhammad's son Ali. The branch of the family identified with Asir is descended from the [redacted] ars from the following table, which [redacted] complete or accurate [redacted] of both:—

Ahmed, the founder

Muhammad

Ali

(1) Muhammad, died 1923 | [redacted] Hasan

[redacted] (4) [illegible] Mahdi | [illegible] Ali, died 1938 | Abdur Rahman | [illegible] of Ahmed

[redacted] of this branch deserve [redacted]

(1) The Mahdi and was a notable man in his day. Born in 1876. Studied in Egypt and at Kufra. Organised opposition to the Turks [redacted] after 1909. Made treaties w[redacted] and in [redacted] 1920 [redacted] the country about [redacted]

(2) Displaced (3) in 1926, after complicated events. Accepted in that year the suzerainty of Ibn Sa'ud by a treaty signed at Mecca. Accepted in October 1930 the practical annexation of Asir by Ibn Sa'ud, retaining a simulacrum only of [redacted] Joined in the rebellion against [redacted] November 1932, and on its collapse [redacted] [redacted] said to remain in the Yemen under the Imam's supervision, and accorded him a pension. Appears to be a man of weak character, very amenable to influence. Was described some years ago as [redacted]

(3) Succeeded his father in 1923. Was upheld by the Masariha and other tribes in 1924 [redacted] attempt to dispossess him by his cousin Mustafa, No. (6), who established himself temporarily at Hodeida, then an Idrisi possession. Ali, however, lost Hodeida to the Imam in 1925, and was displaced by (2) in 1926. Retired to Mecca in [redacted] and seems to have lived mostly there until he was suddenly arrested and deported to Riyadh in the summer of 1932, under suspicion, apparently, of intending a coup in Asir. Attempted to escape. Was foiled, but did not die, as was rumoured.

(4) and (5), who died on the 5th April, 1933, were very active in organising and conducting the 'Asir revolt of November-December 1932.

The original Ahmed has a numerous posterity
rough another son, various
Asir Mata Hib hereditar
ited with Shaqran
of pilgrimage, and with Egypt
these of the Imam
Arab

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Mecca in that year
for the [illegible]

[illegible] years Workshop
[illegible] it was alleged in the Hejaz
[illegible] apparently pro-Saudi role in 1925
[illegible] time of and after the
Saudi a success by over Asir
at time [illegible] from
1937 Was thought peri
post of [illegible] of Asir Yemen
and owned in Jedda on the 15th
Mr Stockmeyer had [illegible]
being the King's unofficial adviser in regard to Asir
and broad views pro-Saudi but not pro-Wahhabi
Accused by the Saudi Gover
every thing Italian materials and
the political plot behind the Asir

(2) Much concerned in the Asir revolt
November December 1932 Was at Jizan at
[illegible] time and after [illegible] and [illegible]
to get His Majesty's
as the [illegible]
[illegible] was [illegible] early in 1933
with his relations in Al Arabi No 7
All members of the family have [illegible]
There is a close connection between the
the Senusis whose founder was a disci
[illegible] Ahmed al Idrisi The spiritual relationship
[illegible] The Idrisis have also a connection with the
Meghani family whose head resides in the Sudan
and is chief of yet another Tariqa, quite [illegible]
and still important

37. A[illegible] Family

The war has brought into the limelight
previously unknown family of Kaaki Reputedly of
Syrian origin but long resident in the Hejaz, this
the traditional family calling of
[illegible] agents They dabbled in the
and various members of the family
were small indep changers They are
[illegible] real [illegible] of Saudi Arabia, and
[illegible] transaction ever now takes place without
the Kaakis being directly concerned They owe their
present position first to Naib Salha (q v), the venal
right hand man of Abdullah Suleyman and
former Director of Public Works, and to Abdulla
[illegible] himself Since His Majesty's Govern
[illegible] started paying an annual subsidy to Ibn Saud
the Kaakis have made money at will A big
proportion of the subsidy goods that come into the
country are dealt with by this family and through
their machinations and those of Naib and of
Abdullah Suleyman much of the gold presented by
His Majesty's Government has eventually found its
way into the coffers of one or other of the various
Kaaki firms In 1944 Salaka and Siraj Kaaki, the
[illegible] important [illegible]
attempt to smuggle £ gold [illegible]

[illegible] dire reprisals on the gold-breakers These however
gradually faded into the background and when Ib
[illegible] received in Jedda after meeting King Farouq
Salaka and Siraj Kaaki petitioned His
[illegible] grounds that they did not know that
[illegible] doing wrong and the King, fresh from
[illegible] entertainment of King Farouq
[illegible] Kaakis and returned home the
[illegible] certain that Abdullah Suleyman arranged this
[illegible] having advanced the money by
[illegible] anxious to royally to entertain
[illegible] state of the funds
[illegible] £ gold 175 000 besides
property in Mecca In April 1944 they
started to interest themselves in real estate and
[illegible] Misr Hotel and
The Banque Misr
[illegible] £ gold 30 000
[illegible] of this fortune are
[illegible]
[illegible]
every [illegible] way in the Hejaz and the Nejd
[illegible] Mecca where the financial acts are
[illegible] verified by [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
£ gold 175 000
See also remarks above

(3) *Abdul Aziz Kaaki* A money-changer in Jeddah
[illegible] owns a bakery [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
partners his son Ahmed (see 4 and 5) in another
firm of money changers in Jeddah Mecca the
the figure
£ gold 20 000
(4) Saleh Al
(5) *Abdullah Mohammed Kaaki* —These two are
brothers and uncles, it is believed, of (1), (2) and (3)
Before the war they were the most affl
of the Kaaki family and flourished in Mecca with a
capital of something like £ gold 15,000 Their
present capital exceeds £ gold 60,000—and from
relationship with Abdul Aziz Kaaki, (3) above
have a share of a business which hardly existed
before the war but is now worth £ gold [illegible]

37. A[illegible] *Abu'l Hadab*

A Tripolitan, who is said to have served under the
Senusi, fought the Italians and retired into exile
in Egypt, where he has a daughter married to
Abdur Rahman 'Azzam Bey formerly a desert
Senusi cause, former Egyptian Minister
Saudi Arabia. Al Qarqani was brought
[illegible] Saudi a notice it is said by Sheikh Hafiz
[illegible] came to the Hejaz in 1930
[illegible]
[illegible]
went into business with the German
afterwards honorary German Consul de H
employed by the Government to accompany the
American engineer Twitchell on his tours of survey
for water and minerals Was sent with Hamad
Suleyman (q.v.) to Asir in November 1933 to
investigate the dispute between the Idrisi and Ibn
Saud's Governor This mission could not be
accomplished by the two delegates, who, in the
following year with Turki al Madhi, formed an

equally unsuccessful delegation to Sana before the
outbreak of the Saudi Yemen war Was a Saudi
delegate to the Bahrein Transit Dues and Kuwait
Blockade Conferences of 1935 Was also a Saudi
representative at the negotiations over the Red Sea
oil concession with Petroleum Concessions Limited
(added in 1939). Acted as buyer for certain German
goods for the Saudi Government In 1938 was found
to be on the staff of Amir Saud, but later in the
year officially appointed to that of Ibn Saud Said
to have a large salary Seems to be a trusted adviser
and said to be honest in negotiation, though
not necessarily scrupulous in financial matters
Accompanied Dr Mahmud Hamouda to London
and Paris in 1939 in connection with the proposed
amendment of the Sanitary Convention. Visited
Germany in 1939 before the outbreak of war on a
mission to purchase arms for Saudi Arabia. Had
an interview with Hitler but was otherwise unsuc
cessful. Has a slight impediment in his speech
Speaks French and Turkish and perhaps Italian
Claims to have travelled a good deal
including Russia, and is regarded by
an expert on European affairs An interesting talker
but can be waspish. Said by some people to be anti
British but is probably only rather sourly pro-Arab
Is now in poor health (1943). Attempts by His
Majesty's Legation to obtain permission for Khalid
(who has been
doctors) to settle in Egypt with his fa
far (June 1945) proved unsuccessful

38. *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul Aziz ibn Wathi*

A Nejdi, formerly Governor of Jizan Transferred
about 1940 to be Governor of Al Khobar which ju
[illegible] ng but Arabic and that
with a strong Nejdi accent Comes much into
contact with the Americans of the Arabian American
[illegible] at Dhahran and was lavish in his
[illegible] to His Majesty's Minister when he visited
Dhahran in March 1942 Earned the gratitude of
the Royal Air Force for his help when one of their
[illegible] ft forced-landed on Tarut Island in January 1942
A younger brother is Governor of the town of Al
Qatif, and another brother, Abdul Aziz ibn Wathi
is Governor of Dhaba

39. *Mehdi Bey*

Director-General of Police, with headquarters in
Mecca, for several years, but in 1938 [illegible]
Director-General of Public Security, though [illegible]
[illegible] Said to have been a regimental clerk in the Turkish
army in which a brother of his is still an officer
Was employed also in King Hussein's army He
appears to be arbitrary and ruthless and to w
considerable authority A man of orga
and the Mecca orphanage, which is under his charge
has been declared by a competent Indian witness
to be the best-organised concern in Saudi Arabia
In 1938, when he had extended the system of regular
police to Hasa, he was given by Ibn Saud the title
of *al Muslih* (The Reformer)

40. *'Abdur Rahmân ibn Mubârak*

Governor of Wejh. Little known to the Legation
but worth mentioning because of the importance of
his post in relation to Egypt and Transjordan, and
because he was one of the leaders of the forces
with advanced base at Dhaba, employed against
Ibn Rifada in 1942 Is possibly a tribal personage
rather than an administrative Governor and may
be of the family of Husayn ibn Mubârak of the
Harb tribe, who was a power at Rabigh at the time
of the Arab revolt

41. *Muhammad al Tawil*

A native of Jedda of Egyptian origin. Got a small
post in the customs in Turkish times and rose to be
director of Customs in Jedda under K
Played a leading part in the movement of the Hejaz
notables to compel Husayn's abdication and the
accession of King Ali in October 1934 Remained
Deputy Director of Customs only but wielded great
influence under Ali, and was described as being
practically dictator' in November 1925, after his
triumph in a dispute with Ahmed Saqqâf, the Pri
Minister who decided to leave. Promised at the
time to devote to the cause of the Hejaz every penny
of certain economies which he had effected while
Director of Customs. Left the Hejaz on the fall of
Jedda, but returned in 1927 or early in 1928 and
started a motor transport business. Was said to
[illegible] Arar a
[illegible] after a
[illegible] very
1928 as a deportation. Was slow to receive official
[illegible] nt, and was perhaps considered unsuitable
for such employment in the Hejaz, but was in
September 1936 placed at the head of a commission
study and reorganise the financial and
[illegible] on Ou
[illegible]
[illegible] have tightened up reg
[illegible] corrupt in the process
[illegible] Our Hejaz Customs as pay
hoped. A capable and well-educated
[illegible] at Bahrein, but he fell fo
[illegible] Company to
[illegible] David Hudson was sent to look after the
[illegible] with the Government in 1935 Al Tawil
[illegible] recalled in 1936 and replaced by two separate
officials in his posts as Director of Finance and
[illegible] Customs. In 1939 appointed (against
his will) manager of the Nejd Motor Transport
Company Since 1943 appears to have lived in
[illegible] on his estate in Hasa The company is
[illegible]

42. *Mustafa Badruddîn*

Director of Customs in Jedda A North African
of North African origin He probably about
1864 Was given a small post in
[illegible] some years ago and later became Director of
Customs at Yanbu' Transferred to Jedda in the
same capacity in 1930 A man of little ability,
[illegible] very honest Popularly supposed
[illegible] and certainly conceals very
[illegible] have for the British Is
reputed to be well in with gangs of dhow-men
[illegible] across the Red Sea Arrested in
[illegible] a large consignment of gold was
caught being smuggled out of Jedda to Egypt
Released shortly after

43. *Ibrahim an Neshmi*

Formerly Amir of Jauf Said to be a Nejdi
have been originally a native of native foot g
have been in Medina while the Hashimites still
held it and to have escaped to the Saudi
where his knowledge of the situat
so useful that he was given a
He appears
to have been employed at Tebuk and perhaps at
Yanbu in the reasoning years. He became notorious
in February 1930 for a large-scale raid into Transjordan similar to that of Abdul Aziz ibn Musaid (q v) about the same time He was apparently at the time already Governor of Jauf, a post from which the King dismissed him about the end of the year not, it was explained, because the man was bad, but because the King desired to eliminate causes of quarrel with His Majesty's Government Reappeared subsequently as Governor of Al 'Ula, but was transferred to an unspecified post in or about June 1933

[illegible] 936) one of the more important [illegible] commanders in the Western Army on [illegible] nor of Turaba in [illegible], which he was appointed

44. *Qattân Family*

(1) *Yusuf ibn Sa'ud* [illegible] originally a servant in a coffee-[illegible]

Rose to be president of the Mecca [illegible] under the Turks, but was [illegible] so uneducated that he was said to be unable to tell [illegible] the letter Aut [illegible] a telegraph pole. Became Minister of Public Works under King Husayn. Was said in 1930 to be full of schemes connected with the pilgrimage [illegible] the advancement of his son No. 2 below. Has also come to notice as one of the agents concerned with the properties of the Sherifian family.

(2) *Abdullah Qattân*, an ambitious young man, born about 1901, who was himself president of the municipality in Mecca in 1930 and still occupies that post. He is the right-hand man of Sheikh Abdullah Suleyman, Minister of Finance, and is chief organizer of the hotels at Mecca, Jeddah and Medina.

45. *Quraishi Family*

An important merchant family to the Persian Gulf. The information is indebted to the political agent [illegible] son for an account of them, which was drawn up in June 1931 and of which the following [illegible]

[illegible] I. Ibrahim [illegible] composed of the five brothers [illegible] below [illegible] children of the same mother or two brothers. H[illegible] [illegible] and property [illegible] spite the assumption of wealth [illegible] men of better birth [illegible] and wine. He [illegible] regarded pious, respected by [illegible] Ibn Sa'ud's delegate to the shaikhs [illegible] at Kuwait in 19[illegible] *Hassan*, more or [illegible] and a wonderful fellow for pearl dealing. Possesses [illegible] some knowledge of French and English and [illegible] also stationed to go to Paris on pearl [illegible] Sa'ud's [illegible] but [illegible]

(3) *Abdullah ibn Hassan*, intelligent and [illegible] but of mean and low character and [illegible] reputed to be boastful and disliked by Ibn Sa'ud.

(4) *Hassan ibn Ibrahim*, very foolish and gruff and as low a character [illegible]

(5) *Ali ibn Ibrahim* [illegible] Hassan. Not [illegible] to be a good [illegible] and 14.

When the above information was supplied in 193[illegible] the Quraishis had great influence owing to their position as agents of Ibn Sa'ud in Bahrain and owners of his requirements for Nejd, as well as to their wealth and their hold on many to whom they had [illegible] the King himself, who owed them in 1930 something like £80,000, and who, although about half of this had been paid off by June 1931, still owed them the balance. Abdurrahmân was given in the latter year a roving commission to try and raise the wind for the Sa'ûdi Government in Europe, but failed completely. The relations of the Quraishis with the King no longer [illegible] close as formerly. They resented the [illegible] d by Muhammad at-Tawîl (q.v.) [illegible] y were driven by bad business to press the King for money. He has of late employed other persons to buy for him, but he is not known to have deprived the Quraishis of their general agency for him at Bahrein. The Amir Sa'ûd frequently employed the Quraishis to buy goods for him in Bombay, but was [illegible] in April 1942 to have become dissatisfied wit[illegible] [illegible] d to be employing other agents.

46. *Rashid Family*

Former rulers of Hail. Little is known of the remnants of this family once so powerful and [illegible] fallen, even before its final collapse that it was [illegible] even in such a land of [illegible] ool of [illegible] [illegible] rule of [illegible]

e.g., if the Shammar tribes from which it sprang should go against Ibn Sa'ud. It is understood that after the fall of Hail, the King pursued a policy [illegible] ception, not of annihilation, and that many [illegible] [illegible] sight up with his young [illegible] be included in the list of his sons are said to be the children of a Rashidi lady whom Ibn Sa'ud married after their birth. Their nam[illegible]

1. *Sultân* and
2. *Wali al* [illegible]

the latter of which corresponds with that of an infant child of the last ruling ibn Rashid as given in the 1917 volume of Personalities in Arabia. Two other [illegible] have come to notice who are said to be related to the Ibn Rashid:

3) *Mansur ibn 'Ajaf*, who is said to have been taken into Ibn Sa'ud's service and to have served for a term as Governor of Tebûk, and his brother

4) *Nasir ibn 'Ajaf*, who also served Ibn Sa'ud but was reported to have deserted into Transjordan [illegible]

As the information [illegible] [illegible] worth noting that [illegible] [illegible] Ibn Sa'ud [illegible] [illegible] Abdul Aziz

(7) Rashid al Muhayyim al Jabr
(8) Sultân bin Turki al Jabr
Fahad bin Rashid al Jabr

[illegible] may be identical with (1) and [illegible] The Umm al Qura early in 193[illegible] gave a list [illegible] Ibn Rashid who came to the Hejaz with Ibn Sa'ud in March of that [illegible] This list gave all the names, except (6), un[illegible]

(10) Abdumuh a. Mu[illegible]
(11) Ubaid al Abdulah

At least one Ibn Rashid accompanied the Kin[illegible] son, the Amir Faysal, to the Yemen front in Apr[illegible]

[illegible] t princes are greatly in evidence to Ibn [illegible] being treated generally [illegible] like his own younger sons.

The only member of the family outside Sa'ûdi Arabia, and therefore of some importance, is (12) Muhammad ibn 'Abdul Muhsin ar Rashid born about 1900. Lives at [illegible] [illegible] to a 1930 report, out of whose privy purse [illegible] to receive a pension of about £20 a month. [illegible] d to have set out, with the cognisance of the late King 'Ali, to raise the Shammar [illegible] frontier and take Hail, but returned [illegible] with standards still furled, having judged the moment not propitious. Still keeps in touch with the Shammar and maintains bedouin mode of life. Described as ordinarily a rather dull, breeding young [illegible] and perhaps not very resourceful, but, presented with a good enough opportunity, he w[illegible]

quickly be off across the desert to n[illegible] [illegible]

47. *Rifâda Family*

[illegible] Chiefs of the Ibn [illegible] [illegible] ment at Weih. The most n[illegible] the family, Sultân Aftan, played a not inconsiderable [illegible] [illegible] in 1[illegible] [illegible] another Sa'ud, who on his death left a son Hamid. The cousins in this generation were at enmity. Hamid made a bid for the Sheikhship [illegible] his uncle's death. He was one of several Hejaz sheikhs who approached the Residency in Cairo in 1924, complaining both of King Husayn's tyranny and his inability to protect them against [illegible] Wahabis. He came into greater prominence [illegible] 1938, when, having returned from Transjordan and taken to brigandage, he attempted a coup at Weih [illegible] [illegible] of the tribe. After a further period of exile he came into still greater prominence in 1932 by invading the Hejaz at the head of a rebel band. He and two, it was said, of his [illegible] kind, but there may be surviving [illegible] branch. At the outset of the revolt H[illegible] the King at the head of a loyal delegation. He is still head of the Ibn [illegible] in the Hejaz, but the Governor of Weih is now Ibn Mubarak, see No. 40. The family have *attaches* with a section of the U[illegible] established in Egypt.

48. *Rashdi Malhas*

Was editor of the *Umm al Qura*, [illegible] important of the two weekly newspapers p[illegible] official organ of the Sa'ûdi [illegible] [illegible] ed post in 1938 though believed to be still connected with the newspaper. A Palestinian from Nab[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] Year [illegible] been troubled with the [illegible] al in Jeddah. Well read in Arabic literature and history. Speaks good Turkish and some French.

49. *Salih ibn Abu Bakr Shâta*

Born probably not later than 1901. Comes of a [illegible] [illegible] Fled to the Hejaz [illegible] of King Husayn in October 1924 and relied on de[illegible] course to Ibn Sa'ud. Became [illegible] to the Amir Faysal in his capacity as Viceroy. Spoken of in 1930 as a possible Minister of Education in a Cabinet then rumoured to be in contemplation, but, if the rumour was true, the project was not pursued. When the Cabinet was eventually organised on its present lines early in 1932 and the Amir Faysal was given the Ministry of the Interior as well as of war, Salih Shâta was made his chief assistant in that Ministry. In 1936 was a member of the Legislative Assembly. Related to No. [illegible] referred to in 1943 as "Second Deputy" of the Advisory Council.

50. *Sdayri Family*

Take their name [illegible] Nejd. Are related to Ibn Sa'ud through the fact that his mother was a Sdayri. He has, moreover, taken two wives from the family. Six members of the family are worthy of notice, viz.:—

1) *Abdullah as-Sdayri*, Governor of Tebûk since about the beginning of 1931. Transferred early in 1936 to Medina (see No. 2).

2) *Tu*[illegible] *as Sdayri*, Governor of Asir with headquarters at Qariyat. Because of the proximity of his Governorate to Transjordan and his frequent contacts with the authorities of that country he is [illegible] and most important member of the [illegible]

3) *Muhammad as Sdayri*, younger brother of [illegible] Governor of Sakaka.

5) *Ahmad ibn Turki as Sdayri*, Governor of Al-Qunfida.

6) *Abdur Rahman as Sdayri*, formerly Governor of Dilafor, appointed Governor of Jeddah in April of 1943. A handsome, erect-looking man of about 35 [illegible] y bright but wisely relies on Asi[illegible] [illegible] a [illegible]

51. *Shaibi Family*

Important in Mecca as the Keepership of the Key of the Ka'aba is hereditary in the family. The [illegible] entering the Ka'aba are supposed to make a present to the Keeper according to their means. The family is admittedly descendants of the Quraysh tribe but not of the Prophet. It is claimed that the [illegible] pre-Islamic times and [illegible] to keep the key also dates from that [illegible] According to one story there was a break [illegible] eleven in the 10th century, when the [illegible] deceased, fa[illegible] and the succession passed through a lady of the family who married a [illegible] The late Keeper's physical appearance [illegible] that this might be true, but there is [illegible] another branch of the [illegible] descent formerly li[illegible] Mecca. The present Keeper of the Key is—

(1) *Muhammad ash Shaibi*, an elderly [illegible] ably the nephew of the late Keeper, who d[illegible] [illegible] a relat[illegible]

[illegible] *Abdullah ash Shaibi*, next in succession a[illegible] [illegible] of Key. Is member of the Legislative [illegible] posts of an honorary nature. Highly respected.

52. *Sherifian Family*

Also called Hashimites by virtue of descent from [illegible] of the Prophet, but this [illegible] [illegible] are particularly affected by the famous [illegible] a. There have been in the past and [illegible] the present numerous families claiming this [illegible] through one or other of the sons of 'Ali, the fourth Caliph and son-in-law of the Prophet. There [illegible] in Arabia itself numerous [illegible] of Sherif, which is [illegible] Hasan, the elder son of Ali, and whole clans known [illegible] tively as Ashraf. The strains most conspicuous in the Hejaz trace this descent through an intermediate common ancestor Hasan ibn Abû Numey, who was Grand Sherif of Mecca in the latter part of the 10th century. Three groups of his descendants are accounted specially important:

The Dhawi Zeyd,
The Abadila, a particular branch of which [illegible] the Dhawi Aun, and
The Dhawi Barak.

All Grand Sherifs of Mecca in the 17th century were drawn from the rival Dhawi Zeyd and Dhawi Aun. The last Grand Sherif belonging to the former [illegible] Abdul Mutalib, who held the post three times at long intervals. The majority belonged to the Dhawi Aun, of which came the late King Husayn and his sons.

Although the most important members of the [illegible] dy now live outside Sa'ûdi Arabia, their [illegible] with the Hejaz is so close as to justify

this general notice. The following list, very incomplete, shows those who are worthy of notice —

(A) *Dhawi Zayd*

(1) *Ali Haydar.*—Formerly resided in Constantinople. Worked in with the Young Turks and [illegible] at one time Minister of Auqaf. Appointed [illegible] Sherif to supersede King Huseyn in or about 19[illegible] but was naturally unable to assume the post effectively. Sought early in 1926 for British support [illegible] obtaining post of Regent or Governor of Hejaz under Ibn Sa'ûd. Moved later that year to Beirut, where he died in 1934. Had several sons, the el[illegible] princess (who is not, however, as stated in a previous Personalities Report, a daughter of the ex-Caliph Abdul Majid), and showed signs of political ambition after the Armistice. One of Al Hoy[illegible] the mother of two of his younger [illegible] birth. Yet another son stud[illegible] at St. [illegible] had the distinction of acting as best man at the marriage of a Scotch d[illegible] vine at St. [illegible] to a Cultured Civilised people, important to keep in mind, though of no obvious political importance at present.

(2) *Ja'far Haidar*, brother of the abov[illegible] lived in Constantinople. H[illegible] with the elderly Sherif Ali Ja'fa[illegible] lived at Lake[illegible] 1934 and was described as a [illegible] Ar[illegible]

(3) *Sharif Adnân Pasha al Ghalib ibn Zayd.* Formerly frequented both Co[illegible] Hejaz. Spoken of in 1925 as a p[illegible] Hejaz if Ibn Sa'ûd won the war. Elected president of the Moslem Congress at Mecca in June 1926, and was later the vehicle of Ibn Sa'ûd's refusal to hold another owing to attitude of the Ali brothers. Represented Ibn Sa'ûd in 1927 at conference at Jizân to deal with the Red Sea Petroleum [illegible] concession in the Farsan Islands [illegible] as "grizzled and dabbling [illegible] court. Appointed [illegible] Ibn Sa'ûd in Jan[illegible] is now a member of the Legislative Council. In 1939 appointed to be a member of the King's suite. Appears now (1945) to spend all his time at Mecca and Taif. A courteous, dignified man, rather silent and with something of a brooding air.

(4) *Abdul*—A nephew of the Ali Ja'fa[illegible] [illegible]d at 2). Implicated in the conspiracy [illegible] Ibn Sa'ûd in 1932 and was native in and around Aden. Perhaps the same as Sherif Khâlid Sadiq Adnân.

(B) *Dhawi Aun.*

(5) *Ali ibn 'Abdullah.*—Formerly Grand Sherif. Dismissed by the Turks in 1907. Resides in Egypt. Described in June 1932 as an active supporter of the Hizb-al Ahrâr al Hijâzi.

(6) *Ali ibn Huseyn.*—Ex King of the Hejaz. Succeeded King Huseyn on his abdication in October 1924, but was compelled to abandon untenable p[illegible] in Baghdad where he died on the 19th February 1935.

(7) *Faysal ibn Huseyn.*—King of 'Iraq. Died in 1933 and was succeeded by his son Ghazi, who died in 1939 leaving an infant son Faysal.

(8) *Abdullah ibn Huseyn.*—Amir of Transjordan.

(10) *Zeyd ibn Huseyn.* Had a Turkish mother, a granddaughter of the well known Grand Vizier Reshîd Pasha, and has property interests quite [illegible] not from those of his brothers. Born in Constantinople in 1900—formerly Iraqi Minister at Ankara. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935. Now resides in Turkey occasionally visiting his nephew the Amir Abdul Ilah, Regent of Iraq.

All these, except perhaps (10), have issue. So had King Huseyn's brother Nâsir, now deceased, who left six sons and four daughters.

(10a) *Abdul Hamid Al Aun.*—Understood to be a grandson of (6). Chiefly noteworthy as being the [illegible] figure in the Sherifian plot against Ibn Sa'ûd [illegible] Arrested and sentenced to death, he was pardoned (Amir Abdullah of Transjordan interceded for him). After a period of detention at Riyâdh he was allowed to leave the country with the two younger brothers and some other relatives who were [illegible]ested. Now believed to be in Egypt.

(C) *Dhawi Barakat*

(11) *Sharif ibn Abdul Muhsin.*—Seems to have served King Huseyn in Egypt, but entered the ser[illegible] Ibn Sa'ûd and became Amir al-Arbân, or [illegible] Appointed President of the [illegible]pectorate of Government Departments in 1930. His present official status is not known, as the Inspectorate is understood to have been abolished.

(D) *Apparently of the Abadila stocks though not of the Dhawi 'Aun.*

(12) *Shâkir ibn Zayd ibn Fawwâz.*—Formerly Governor of Taif, a post which seems to have been hereditary in his family. President of the Bedum [illegible] associated with the Amir Abdullah, with whom he has thrown in his lot. Died at Ar[illegible] 1934. Was a tenacious [illegible] [illegible]lay boy than his master.

[illegible] *Zayd*, brother of the preceding. [illegible] the same as the Sharif Hamûd who [illegible] the plot with No. (10a) and was carried off to [illegible] ...ong, it is said, on the road [illegible] *ibn Rajih*, a cousin of (12) [illegible] Said to have also been Governor of Taif at one time. Now resides at Baghdad. Identified both in Jerusalem and Baghdad as being the Sherif Sharaf mentioned by Tâhir ed Dabbâgh in February 1924, in a letter which fel[illegible] into the hands of the Sa'ûdi Government, as a man who might be enlisted in the conspiracy against Ibn Sa'ûd.

(E) *Even less easy to place, but perhaps of the Abadila.*

(13) *'Ali ibn Ahmad ibn Manzûr.*—A younger member of a family two of whom were prominent in King Huseyn's time and had great influence in the Harb tribe. This 'Ali has only come to notice as having been one of the persons arrested at Mecca [illegible] and deported to Riyâdh at the time of the Ibn Rifâda affair in 1932.

(16) *'Ali ibn Huseyn al Harithi.*—One of the Sherifs of Muda'iq, near Taif. Took part in the Arab revolt and is remembered as one of the conquerors of Taif. [illegible] having been at that time an attractive young man, physically splendid and full of courage, resource and energy. Seems to have resided in the Hejaz, as he was arrested at Mecca and deported to Riyâdh at the time of the Ibn Rifâda affair in 1932.

(17) *Muhammad Mokanna.*—One of the Jedda family, one member of which was chief of the Customs Department in 1917, and was then deser[illegible] [illegible] "bottle-nosed bandit," while his brother still alive, was said to have acquired wealth by smuggling and general robbery. This Muhammad is only interesting because he was arrested at Jedda and sent to Riyâdh at the time of the Ibn Rifâda affair.

(18) and (19) *M. Ali* and *Muhammad al Bedeyni* (a diminutive of Bedawi). Members of a family distantly related to King Huseyn and formerly important in the Juheyna tribe and in the coast towns of the Northern Hejaz. Despite the similarity of name, they would appear to be two distinct, though closely related persons. Both were mixed up in the Ibn Rifâda affair in 1932. M. Ali became an object of attention in Transjordan and was more or less arrested in July to the displeasure of the Amir. Muhammad seems to have been in trade at Suez and Dhaba and was concerned in attempts to

get supplies by sea to Ibn Rifâda. It was probably he who was reported killed in the defeat of the rebels.

53. *Suwayt Family*

Leaders in the Dhafir tribe. Two members of it figured in reports from Kuwait about 1930 —

(1) *Ja'dân*, a disgruntled man, hovering between allegiance to King Faysal or to Ibn Sa'ûd and too proud to come to terms with either, and

(2) *Ajmi*, recognised as chief of the tribe by Ibn Sa'ûd.

54. *Abu Tuqeyqa Family*

Formerly chiefs of the Ti[illegible] section of the Huweytat tribe, with [illegible] station at Dhaba. Rafi'a, their common ancestor, was chief of the tribe prior to his death in about 1870. One of his many grandsons, Ahmed ibn Muhammad ibn Rafi'a, was chief in 1917. He came to notice in 1934 as one of several Bedu sheykhs who approached the Residency in Cairo with a complaint of King Huseyn's tyranny and his inability to protect them against the Wahhâbis. H[illegible] to have been Governor of Dhaba in 1927 but [illegible] year the family were apparently in serious trouble with the Government, as it is said that Ahmed and four others were "killed by Ibn Sa'ûd," and others fled to Egypt. Numerous members of the family were concerned in the rebel invasion of the Hejaz by Ibn Rifâda in 1932. Seven of them lost their lives in that adventure and five more were reported by the Sa'ûdi commander to have been slain after Ibn [illegible] Among the survivors was, how[illegible]

(1) *Muhammad ibn [?] Abdurrahim ibn Ahmad* [illegible] a colleague with Ibn [illegible] left Aqaba for Egypt early [illegible] the person against whom an exclusion order was made in Egypt rather later but whose name is given [illegible] Muhammad bin Ahmed.

[illegible] probable survivor is

(2) *Mahmûd ibn Ahmed ibn Hafi'a*, who rallied on Ibn Rifâda early in the rebellion and tried to make his peace with Ibn Sa'ûd.

Although the above sum[illegible] at all points, it is inserted [illegible]ntity of the family hatred of Ibn Sa'ûd, and the survival of (1), who seems to have been an active leader and may crop up a[illegible]

55. *Turki ibn Madhi*

Was in 1932 Inspector-General of Asir and was associated with Fahad ibn Zu'ayr in efforts to make Ibn Sa'ûd realise the gravity of the situation preceding the open revolt of the Idrisi at the end of October. Identical with the person mis-named at the time Abdullah ibn Turki ibn Mundi who, with Abdul Wahhâb Abu Mu'ha and two chiefs of Asir tribes, was sent on a mission to the Imâm [illegible]ya in June 1927. Took part in further negotia[illegible]ns with the Imâm early in 1928. Would therefore appear to be one of Ibn Sa'ûd's experts in Asir and Yemen affairs. Accompanied Khâlid al Qarqani and Hamad Suleyman on their fruitless mission to Sa[illegible] in 1933, before the outbreak of the Sa'ûdi [illegible] war. Visited the Yemen again in May 1943 and in the autumn of 1944 as Ibn Sa'ûd's special envoy to the Imâm. The real purpose of his visit was to report on conditions in the Yemen. He described the people as groaning under the yoke of the Imâm and anxious to transfer their allegiance to Ibn Sa'ûd.

56. *Yahya an Nasri*

Principal quarantine doctor at Jedda. A Syrian like most doctors, now employed by the Sa'ûdi Government. Born probably about 1897. Studied in Constantinople and Beirut. Previously quarantine doctor at Yanbu'. Pleasant and well regarded by the legation. Speaks Turkish and French. Was Sa'ûdi delegate to the meeting of the International Health Office, Paris, in October 1934. Appointed early in 1948 to be Director-General of Public Health in succession to Mahmud Hamdi [illegible] (See 1937 report.) Reported to have suffered [illegible]mentia eclipse and to have left for treatment in January 194[illegible]

57. *Yusuf Yasin, Shaikh*

Probably born about 1890. A Sy[illegible] said by his enemies to be of Yezidi origin. Was at school in Jerusalem in 1917. Joined King Faisal at Aqaba and went with him to Damascus. Left on the approach of the French and joined King Huseyn in Mecca. Attached by him to the Amir 'Abdullah [illegible] Ammân, with whom he remained six months. Formed so low an opinion of the Amir that according to his own account he broke with Huseyn in [illegible] since. Joined Ibn Sa'ûd in due course [illegible] Najd, delegate at the [illegible] Remained [illegible] [illegible] years, but [illegible] Took part in negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928. Acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in absence of Dr. Abdullah Dabbâgh in 1926 and 1927. Reported in 1928 to have worked to undermine the influence of Dabbâgh, who resigned that year, and of Hâfiz Wahba (q.v.). Employed in various negotiations and [illegible]ected at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for [illegible]81 and for the Amir Faysal [illegible] Ministry for Foreign Affairs, during the absences of Fuad Hamza in 1934, 1937 and 1939. Went to Baghdad at the end of 1935 to negotiate the Sa'ûdi-Iraq Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance. Was [illegible] for his obstructiveness during the Clayton negotiations, and is naturally obstinate and fond of sitting in discussion, but can on o[illegible] be amiable and even convincing. Turns his eye[illegible] fact from the King himself in whom he appears [illegible] who probably trusts [illegible] Sulaymân. Is pro[illegible] [illegible] an most of the [illegible] character and less European knowledge [illegible] even of a fanatic, but has acquired the figure of a bon vivant. Works very hard but delights in creating difficulties and seeks to earn his master's praise for solving problems of his own manufacture. He feels sufficiently sure of his usefulness to the King and the real power of his position to allow himself to be the butt of the king and of those who aim their wit the same way as the King, and often deliberately plays [illegible] he judges the King to be in the mood [illegible] and monogamy are standing palace [illegible] of 'Abdullah al Suleyman [illegible] assistant Najib Sa'ûd [illegible] constantly in the [illegible] in Jedda. As the principal channel of communication between the King and the legation he has in practice exercised the functions of Foreign Minister, the Amir Faysal being little more than a figure-head. He was the negotiator for Sa'ûdi Arabia of the Sa'ûdi-Kuwait Agreements which he signed at Jedda on the 20th April, 1942. He still exercises control over the [illegible] publication in it. He has much increased the stock of English which he acquired during a short stay in

Surbiton when he accompanied the Amir Sa ûd to England for the coronation of King George VI [illegible] ster rapidity than [illegible] in Arabia and retains smoking of [illegible] rth Lebanon accent. Went on a visit [illegible] where he and his two brothers own farm property, in May 1943. A rapprochement took place between him and Najib Sâlihâ (No. 60) in 1943 and he bitterly opposed the latter's dismissal in April 1944, remaining in close touch with him after his departure to Egypt. During the discussions between His Majesty's Minister and Ibn Sa ûd early in 1944 [illegible] the reorganisation of Sa ûdi finances and economy was mostly obstructive and supported Abdullah Suleiman in opposing any proposals for reform. A pompous busybody, his loyalty to the King appears to be genuine though it occasionally serves as a cloak to hide personal motives. A difficult colleague with the small-mindedness of a Lebanese grocer but not unpleasant if taken with a pinch of salt. His English continues to improve, thanks to the successive efforts of legation secretaries.

Was the Sa ûdi delegate at the Preparatory Committee Meeting of the Arab Conference at Alexandria in October 1944, and signed the covenant of the Arab League on behalf of Sa ûdi Arabia in March 1945. Accompanied Ibn Sa ûd on his visit [illegible]

58. *Muhammad Surur as-Subhân*

[illegible] Department. Son [illegible] have been Abyssinian), and became the moving spirit in their hide and skin business, which was at one time important, but became latterly bankrupt. Was a clerk in the municipality under King Husayn, and is said to have tried to assassinate Ibn Sa ûd when he conquered the Hejaz in 1925, and to have been subsequently incarcerated at Riyadh. Returned to the Hejaz about 1929 and was taken up by the Minister of Finance, whose powerful influence got him appointed about two years ago to his present post. Became second only to him in the Ministry of Finance in practical importance, and during the latter's absence at Hudeyda in May 1944 was in [illegible] of it. Manager of the Arabian [illegible] ued to promote [illegible] Continues to have [illegible] commercial enterprises. Reported in 1935 to have a great following in official circles. Pleasant, generous and said to be most capable. Has a younger brother, Abdullah, who is not, however of any importance. By 1939 Muhammad Surûr had lost all influence, and was kept strictly to the limits of his post as head of the Accounts Branch of the Ministry of Finance. Since the dismissal of Najib Sâlihâ (q.v.) has rapidly regained his influence. Early in 1945 was reported to have quarrelled with Shaikh Abdullah Suleymân owing to the appointment over him of an Inspector in the Ministry of Finance. Left for Egypt in a huff in June. It is said that the Government owe him over £500,000.

59. *'Abdul Karîm ibn Zeyd*

Appointed Governor of Qaf in 1936. Nephew of Abd el-Aziz ibn Zeyd (No. 5).

60. *'Abdullah Khawaiter*

Of Nejdi origin. Born about 1897. Intimate of Abdullah Suleymân and Hamad Suleymân with whom he spent many years in Bombay. Head of a section of the Ministry of Finance and may be a coming man. Is spoken of as a rival to Muhammad Surûr (No. 58).

61. *Asaf ibn Huseyn*

Appointed Governor of Najrân and the territories of Yam in 1934, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Taif with the Yemen. Had previously been Governor of Ris.

62. *Ibrahim Shura*

Egyptian. Born at [illegible] in about 1928 as a teacher [illegible] Education Dep[illegible] with Sheykh Hafiz Wahba. Ar[illegible] Has a stuttering of [illegible] appointed head of the Sa ûdi Pilgrimage [illegible] Bureau at Mecca.

63. *Jamil Daûd al Musallim*

Legal adviser or assistant, in [illegible] Foreign Affairs. Born about 1906. [illegible] in Egypt. Good knowledge of Eng[illegible] his present appointment since Id Rawwaf (No. 35) in January 1936. This was notable chiefly as a Hejaz[illegible] [illegible] d was attributed to the [illegible] Jamil Daûd is brother of a pilgrim guide whose activities have come to the unfavourable notice of the legation. Has been found on many occasions obstructive and tactless. Is probably neither very intelligent nor energetic. Has [illegible] self latterly (1944) to be more co-operative in his dealings with the legation. Accompanied the Sa ûdi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945.

64. *Kâmil al Qassâb*

Syrian. Born about 1878. Formerly Acting Director of Education in the Hejaz under King Husayn. Later threw in his lot with Ibn Sa ûd and became Sa ûdi propagandist. Prominent in 1[illegible] during troubles in Palestine on account of his activities as Ibn Sa ûd's go-between with the Supreme Arab Committee at Jerusalem, where he [illegible] charged with communica[illegible] Paid an unobtrusive visit in summer of 1936 to the Hejaz, and in 1937 tried to persuade Ibn Sa ûd to take part in a Moslem conference on Palestine. In 1942 was jockeying for the post of Syrian representative to Sa ûdi Arabia.

65. *Khairuddîn Zirikli*

Syrian journalist.

Born about 1890. Editor of *Al Qibla*, Mecca [illegible] joined the latter. Adviser to the S[illegible] Cairo in 1935. Now (1945) Secretary [illegible] Legation there. Counsellor of the legation in 1944. A crony of Shaikh Yusuf Yasin and Najib Sâlihâ. It is he and not the ageing Fawzan-as-Saloq (q.v.) who runs the Sa ûdi Legation which he skilfully uses as a cover for the promotion of his [illegible] done considerable harm to Sa ûdi [illegible] thoroughly unpleasant type, unscrup[illegible] intriguer. Attended the Preparatory Meeting of the Arab Conference in Alexandria in October 1944 with Yusuf Yasin and also the discussions which led up to the signing of the Covenant of the Arab League in March 1945. King Ibn Sa[illegible] has now (June 1945) decided to recall Khairuddin from Cairo to Jedda where he is to be Yusuf Yasin's assistant at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

66. *Muhammad Sadiq ibn 'Abdullah*

Born in Hejaz about 1889. In 1920 was principal of the Military School at Mecca. Was commandant of the Jedda garrison during last days of King Ali. Left for Egypt in 1927.

An associate of Tâhir ad-Dabbâgh in anti-Sa ûdi activities abroad. At instance of Sa ûdi authorities was required to leave India in 1933. Subsequently travelled in Iraq, Transjordan and Palest[illegible] Returned with Tâhir to Sa ûdi Arabia under the amnesty of 1935 and in 1936 was made successively Assistant Director of Auqâf and Director of the Census. Reported to be a man of integrity.

67. *Seyyid Muhammad Skata*

Younger brother of Sâlih ibn Abu Bakr [illegible] No. 49). Born about 1908. Holder of an Egyp[illegible] degree in religious law. Inspector in the Ministry of Education. In 1935 member of an unofficial delegation for the collection of Waqf moneys in various Islamic countries and India, which did not, however, leave this country. In 1936 appointed Inspector of Sharia Courts.

68. *M[illegible] at Tayyeb*

[illegible] Born about 1897. Held [illegible] Has made reg[illegible] [illegible] beginning of 1936 from a post in the Sa ûdi police to be secretary and A.D.C. to the Deputy Minister for Defence. Attached as liaison officer to the British R.A.C. training unit which arrived in Taif in May 1944 to instruct the Sa ûdi [illegible] in the handling of armoured cars presented to the Sa ûdi Arabian Government by His Majesty's Government. An intriguer who is not popular with his colleagues and who in September 1944 [illegible] replaced by a younger officer.

69. *Najib Ibrahim Sâlihâ*

A young man of Syrian origin, educated at the American College, Beirut. Born probably about [illegible] the Hejaz via the Sudan. [illegible] by Gellatly, Hankey [illegible] n (Limited). After a short but [illegible] rrice with that firm in Jedda [illegible] whose secretary he became. In 1936 placed in charge of a newly-created [illegible] tment of the Ministry of Finance, styled "[illegible] ffice of Public Works," established to deal wit[illegible] the growing number of foreign concerns holding concessions in Sa ûdi Arabia. By 1939 he had established himself in the confidence of Abdullah [illegible] n to the detriment of Muhammad Surûr [illegible] on ployed as purchasing agent for the [illegible] rching himself almost openly ha[illegible] [illegible] Became indispensable to [illegible] of Finance and was specially commissioned by the King to deal with supply matters, but found it difficult to exercise his functions without much interference from Yusuf Yasin. After the outbreak of war he was in constant contact with the legation and showed himself intelligent and frank. He worked very hard and co-operated most helpfully with the legation in the endeavour to organise the provisioning and finances of the country. Was free in his criticism of the ignorance and incompetence of most of the members of the Sa ûdi Government and made many enemies but was loyally backed by Abdullah al Suleymân, and was probably the most efficient of all the King's servants. He was said to have enriched himself but this is scarcely remarkable in a country where emoluments are certain of payment only if the official is in a position to help himself. Although he abstains from tobacco and alcohol he makes no pretence of being a Wahhâbi or even a very devout Muslim. Early in 1944 evidence came to light which showed him in his true colours. It was found that he had made use of his position to enrich himself and one of his associates [illegible] that he had deliberately misinformed the legation [illegible] a true supply and financial situation of the [illegible] in order to ensure the continuance of H[illegible] Government's generous assistance to Sa ûdi Arabia and thereby to increase his own fortune. When in Cairo early in 1944 he began intriguing with the Americans, whom he had always sought to play off against the British, and warned His Majesty's Minister that the Sa ûdi Arabian [illegible] vernment would ask for his recall. The were not complacent over the matter of supplies and [illegible] Ibn Sa ûd, who learned of Najib's [illegible] was furious and dismissed him in April in [illegible] to of strong pressure from Abdullah Suleiman and Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, telling His Majesty's Minister that he had always disliked Najib and had only kept him on because he enjoyed British support. He is at present (July 1944) in Cairo, where he has started a transport company. Ibn Sa ûd, always generous to those that have served him, is said to be paying him a "retaining fee." His place as Director of the Office of Public Works at Jedda has been taken by Fuad Ibn Shawa (No. 34). Najib [illegible] where he acts as unofficial agent of [illegible] Royal family and is in close touch with Yusuf Yasin and his associates. He has acquired valuable house property in Cairo, for which he has paid about half a million pounds. He is busy trying to obtain the agencies of American cars and is a partner of Ibrahim Shakir (q.v.) in the Sa ûdi Arab Trading Company formed in January 1945.

70. *Sa'ûd ibn 'Abdullah ibn Jiluwi*

Appointed Governor of Hasa upon the death of his father in October 1936. Born about 1900. Made an unfavourable general impression on Sir Andrew Ryan, who was received by the new Amir at Hofuf with a singular lack of ordinary Arab politeness, in December 1935. Described as repulsive in appearance owing to a super-squint. Reported from [illegible] to take an even stronger line with the [illegible] than his father did, and that [illegible] work in the last four years of [illegible] done by the a[illegible] presence of foreigners, but this can be [illegible] In 1938 it was reported that his powers were being curtailed by the King, and that troops not under his control were to be quartered at Hofuf.

71. *Sa'ûd ibn Hedhlûl*

Appointed Governor of Tabûk in 1936 in succession to Abdullah as Sdayri (No. 50 (1)). Reported from Transjordan to have made a popular start partly by recruiting his bodyguard locally, a departure which created a favourable impression.

72. *Tala at Wafa*

Born about 1900 in the Hejaz. In 1934 member of Sa ûdi boundary commission for the Yemen-Sa ûdi frontier after the conclusion of the Treaty of Taif. Police official of importance, being Director for the Provinces of Asir and Najrân, and O.C. regular forces in Najrân and Abha in 1936. Appointed Deputy Director of Public Security in 194[illegible]

73. *Ibrahim Tâsân*

A Nejdi born and brought up in Asir. Formerly [illegible] Ottoman army. Now Commandant of the [illegible] ditary district and "Director of the Air [illegible] Served in the Arab army of Sharif Hussein and was associated with Colonel Lawrence.

74. *Asad al Faqih*

Syrian, a native of Aley in the Lebanon. Counsellor to the Sa ûdi Legation in Baghdad in 1938. Afterwards chargé d'affaires and appointed in 1943 to be minister there. Has some knowledge of English, and speaks French well. Member of the Sa ûdi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945.

75. *Khalid Hajjan*

Director of Police, Jedda. Formerly in Turkish [illegible] captured by the British during the Great War but volunteered to join the Sharifian forces. Joined Ibn Sa'ud after the fall of Jedda in 1925. A [illegible] ker

76. *Khuraiji, Shaikh Muhammad al-*

[illegible] to Shaikh Abdul Sumainah [illegible] wealthiest man in M

77. *Sa'ud ibn Faisal*

[illegible] Dawadmi, 1938. Born about 18[illegible] Sa'ud a dawal slave

78. *Shaikh al Arab*

Formerly [illegible] in a few [illegible] very good [illegible] from Syria as [illegible] to have [illegible] and to Ibn Sa'ud as [illegible] the Amir Mansur on a visit to Egypt [illegible] brother Fakhri, who [illegible] as agricultural expert, was in [illegible] small experimental garden at Riyad [illegible] employed [illegible] Fakhri was appoin[illegible] in 1942 and transf[illegible] 1948 as first Ibn Sa'ud Consul to Basra. M. Abdul was dismissed by the King in July 1948 but [illegible] at the request of Yusuf [illegible] Syrians in the Sa'udi [illegible]

79. *Shaikho, Muhammad*

[illegible] the numerous young Syrians in the [illegible] for Foreign Affairs. Accompanied the Amir Sa'ud [illegible] the United Kingdom in 1935 for the Silver Jubilee. Sent to the Yemen in 1937 [illegible] negotiating the Sa'udi-[illegible] at Jedda in 1940-42. Appointed [illegible] secretary to the Amir Mansur in [illegible]

80. *Yusuf ibn Ahmad al-[illegible]*

[illegible] al at Jerusalem in February [illegible] A [illegible] gent young man with pleasing manners [illegible] English w[illegible]

81. *Bashir as-Sa'dawi*

A Tripolitan, believed to be related to Khalid al Qarqani (*q.v.*). Like Khalid, fought against the Italians. In 1939 used by Ibn Sa'ud as emissary in Syria and was present at all but the most confiden[illegible] talks between the King and His Maj[illegible] at Riyadh. H[illegible] King's [illegible] evidence during His M[illegible] Riyadh in March 1942 nor [illegible] King of 1941 [illegible] Egypt in February 194[illegible] President Roosevelt and Mr. Ch[illegible]

82. *Nasir ibn 'Abdullah ibn 'Aqil*

Director of Finance at Jedda. A cousin of Ibrahim [illegible] Sulaiman ibn 'Aqil.

83. *Suleyman Nashi*

Director of [illegible] A Najdi, like nearly al[illegible] of the serv[illegible] friend [illegible]

84. *'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Fauzan*

[illegible] the Royal [illegible] known on what [illegible] said to have served with the British [illegible] Iraq during the war of 1914-18. A fa[illegible] strong drink and has an [illegible] contact with the Amir Mansur who freq[illegible] Saraya. Appointed Deputy Minister of Defence in [illegible] latter as of the [illegible] the Syrian gang whose influence in the g[illegible] of the country he constantly de[illegible]

Obituary

[illegible] last report—June 1948

[illegible] *Intercepts* No. 28 in 194[illegible]

CHAPTER VI.—GENERAL

[E 7151 175 G] No. 18

Mr Beeson to His Majesty's Representatives at Bagdad (No. 279), Cairo (No. 697), Tehran (No. 255), Beirut (No. 239) and Jedda (No. 182)

Sir, *Foreign Office*, 18*th October*, 1945.

A CONFERENCE of British representatives in the Middle East met in London from Wednesday, the 5th September, to Monday, the 17th September, 1945, under my chairmanship.

2. The Conference was composed of—

(*a*) His Majesty's Ambassadors at Bagdad, Cairo and Tehran
(*b*) His Majesty's Ministers at Beirut and Jedda.
(*c*) The High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan
(*d*) Representatives of the British Middle East Office, and
(*e*) The Director-General of the Middle East Supply Centre

Representatives of the Foreign Office and other interested London Departments also attended.

3. I charged the Conference with the duty of surveying the whole field of foreign policy in the Middle East on the basis that His Majesty's Government would continue to assert their political predominance in that area and their overriding responsibility for its defence.

4. I suggested that the matter ought to be viewed in the light of the following considerations:—

(*a*) Influence that rested on military or political props could not be enduring; we should broaden the base on which British influence rests and to this end should develop an economic and social policy that would make for the prosperity and contentment of the area as a whole.
(*b*) To reach the right solution of our Middle East problems it was necessary to consider the area as a single region.
(*c*) We had the benefit of the war-time experience of the Middle East Supply Centre which had, in fact, pursued a policy of economic co-ordination throughout the region in co-operation with the Territorial Governments.
(*d*) We should aim at an economic partnership between the United Kingdom and the Middle East countries and, by promoting developments in that field, move towards a partnership in the sphere of defence.
(*e*) Measures for the promotion of British trade in the region should also be formulated.
(*f*) Step by step with activities in the economic and commercial field we should do all that we could to promote the social betterment of the people of the region.
(*g*) The whole question would have to be studied in relation to the capacity of the United Kingdom to make a contribution to the development of the Middle East by way of capital (where it was needed), equipment or the services of technical experts.
(*h*) It would be necessary to take into account the political and economic factors arising out of—

(i) the Palestine question, and
(ii) the activities of the United States, France and Soviet Russia in the Middle East.

5. The Conference took these various questions into their consideration and a full exchange of views took place as a result of which the following recommendations were made to and approved by the Cabinet:—

(a) *Palestine.*—This question should be dealt with separately.
(b) *United States' activities.*

(i) The Americans are commercially on the offensive in the Middle East, but their export drive has now been held up by the stringency of the dollar situation in the Middle East countries. This state

of affairs has produced a degree of exasperation in American minds which is not likely to be removed unless some relief in the dollar situation is forthcoming. This circumstance (for which we are blamed, but not responsible) dominates our relationships with the Americans in the Middle East, but we cannot afford to make any concessions in view of our difficult foreign exchange situation.

(ii) The experiment in Anglo-American co-operation that took shape in the Middle East Supply Centre has survived, but only just survived, the war and does not offer much encouragement for a continuance of co-operation, at least in that form, in fields that are essentially competitive.

(iii) With the lifting of war-time controls (for which in the Middle East the Americans have been vigorously and prematurely pressing for some time) we shall enter a period of commercial rivalry, and we should not make any concession that would assist American commercial penetration into a region which for generations has been an established British market, except as regards the further expansion of their oil concessions, in accordance with the United States Government's of the 24th September 1945.

(c) *Relations with France*

(i) In the Middle East, our relations with France centre in the situation in the Levant States to the almost complete exclusion of any other consideration.

(ii) His Majesty's Government have publicly announced their desire to see France maintain her privileged position in that area, if she is able to get it from the States themselves. Our intervention in Syria during the disturbances in the early summer of this year restored our prestige in the Arab world to a point as high as it had ever stood before, but any overt support we might give to the French to secure a position which the States themselves are not disposed to give them in free negotiation, would without doubt be viewed by the whole of the Arab world with hostility.

(iii) The French appear to have created an impossible position for themselves in Syria and all but done so in the Lebanon. Any participation by French nationals (at least as representatives of the French Government) in administrative or advisory capacities in the Levant States may be ruled out of account until the present animosities have subsided.

(iv) The Conference endorsed my recommendation that the most fruitful line of approach to a solution of the present difficult situation in the Levant States was by way of a conference of representatives of His Majesty's Government, the French Government and the Governments of the Levant States after the method and tempo of evacuation had been agreed between His Majesty's Government and the French Government.

(d) *Russian Activities*

(i) Our short-term relations with Russia in the Middle East crystallise in the situation in Persia, where the Russians and ourselves are under a Treaty obligation to withdraw our troops within six months of the end of the Japanese War. I have, in an exchange of letters with M. Molotov, given and received undertakings that both the Russian and British troops will be withdrawn from Persia, in accordance with the Treaty, before the 2nd March, 1946.

(ii) There are increasing signs of Russian political and economic penetration in almost all Middle East territories. These are viewed with extreme apprehension by the Governments and people in those countries. The most effective counter to Russian advances in the area is the economic and social betterment of the people whose lot under the existing social system makes them ready listeners to the propaganda of Communism.

(e) *Defence.*—The Conference had the opportunity of hearing informal views from the Chiefs of Staff on the defence of the Middle East, against the background of my proposal that we should work to create a partnership between the United Kingdom and the Middle East Territories themselves in matters of defence. The question was further studied by the Chiefs of Staff and formal recommendations made. It was, however, generally agreed by the Conference that the question of defence is susceptible of most effective treatment within the framework of our general policy towards the region.

(f) *British Economic Policy in the Middle East*

(i) The Conference made certain recommendations with regard to British economic policy in the Middle East which are contained in Part I of the Annex to this despatch.

(ii) Summarised, they are:

(1) Economic development and the amelioration of social conditions must go forward hand in hand.

(2) As the Middle East Governments are among the largest of our creditors our policy should be to give them wise guidance in mobilising and spending their existing ample sterling resources by

(A) encouraging each of them to draw up *itself* its own plan of economic development;

(B) by offering to place at their disposal technical and specialist assistance to help them in formulating their schemes; and

(C) to steer their plans along lines in conformity with the limitations imposed on ourselves by our own financial and supply situation and with the needs of the region as a whole.

(3) Certain measures recommended by the Board of Trade for the stimulation of British commerce in the Middle East area should be adopted.

(4) A start can best be made by placing qualified technical experts at the disposal of the Middle East Governments who require them. These experts should be attached to and operate as part of a British organisation located in Cairo. The British organisation should develop a scheme of regional technical conferences leading to the eventual establishment of a Middle East Development Board or Council composed of representatives of His Majesty's Government and of the Governments of the various territories in the region. It would be the function of this Board or Council to direct economic and social development along lines of a coherent, co-ordinated, regional plan.

(g) *Machinery for Regional Co-ordination of British Policy*

(i) The Conference made recommendations on this subject which are contained in Part II of the Annex to this despatch.

(ii) Summarised, they are:—

(1) The Conference took note of the decision of His Majesty's Government to establish a Middle East Office in Cairo.

(2) The Conference recommended the establishment of a "British Middle East Conference," as a standing committee composed of His Majesty's Representatives in the region to co-ordinate and to formulate for consideration by His Majesty's Government British policy in the region. The Conference would meet in Cairo as often as necessary and its secretariat would be provided by the British Middle East Office. For the present His Majesty's Minister at Beirut shall *not* be a member of the Standing Committee.

(3) The co-ordination and development of British policy in its economic aspects in the Middle East region should be a function of the British Middle East Office.

(h) *Relations with the Arab League.*—The Arab League has not yet developed sufficient cohesion to warrant, even if it were desirable, its recognition as a corporate body representative of the Arab States as a whole. It has, however, established an economic committee with the set purpose of achieving some co-ordination of economic policy among the constituent members of the League. It will be inevitable that there should be informal political contacts with the League from time to time, and for this purpose the Conference agreed that, in existing circumstances, the focal point of such contacts should be His Majesty's Embassy in Cairo. Contacts with the Arab League shall not deal with questions affecting either Syria or the Lebanon. The Conference also agreed that in economic matters it was desirable, in existing circumstances, that the focal point should be the British Middle East Office. The practical difficulty, however, of drawing a nice line of distinction between matters "political" and matters "economic" will make it essential that the closest possible liaison should be maintained between the Cairo Embassy and the British Middle East Office on all questions affecting the relationship of His Majesty's Government with the Arab League.

I am, &c.,
ERNEST BEVIN.

ANNEX TO No. 18

PART I

BRITISH ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A.—General.

1. The raising of the standard of living of the masses of the people of the Middle East will promote internal stability in the region, and increase its importance as a market for imported goods.

2. British policy in the region, both in the general and economic field, [illegible]

3. [illegible] existing maldistribution of purchasing power in the Middle East [illegible] the political field on the part of the Governments concerned, directed towards, for example:—

(a) Reform of the present system of land tenure (including rents), and improvement in wages and conditions of service in the agricultural [illegible]

(b) Reform of the existing systems of taxation, which, in general, fail to preserve a proper balance between direct and indirect taxation [illegible] constitutional development of trade unionism), education (including rural education in the widest sense of that term) and improvement of the civil services.

4. Without measures of social reform on the above lines, economic develop[illegible] and landed proprietors, and be largely a waste of capital and effort.

5. It is important, therefore, that social reform should move forward step by step with economic development.

B.—Financial Background.

6. The extent to which British capital and [illegible] participate [illegible] Middle East

must be considered against the following background which has been supplied to us by His Majesty's Treasury:—

(a) The needs of the home market, both for capital and consumer goods, are enormous and cannot be denied. The first charge upon our exports must be the cost of imported food for our people and of the raw materials which we must have if our manufacturing industries are to be kept alive. The second charge upon our exporting capacity must be, for many years to come, to make some contribution towards the liquidation of our overseas liabilities, these now exceed the vast total of £3,500 million sterling.

(b) We have pressing claims to help those worse off than ourselves—U.N.R.R.A., Colonial development and rehabilitation, Greece and other Allies.

(c) It will therefore be only in the most exceptional and compelling circumstances that we shall be able to assume yet more charges on our productive capacity—*i.e.*, to grant credits to overseas borrowers.

(d) The Middle East territories (except Saudi Arabia) are among the largest of our creditors. They already hold sterling exchange to an extent far in excess of the amount needed to pay for any capital equipment that, over any reasonable period of time, they are likely to require and that the industrial capacity of the United Kingdom is likely to be able to provide.

(e) The internal counter value of the sterling balances held by these Middle East territories is for the greater part in the hands of a wealthy minority in the communities; the capital needed for schemes of large scale economic development can well be provided by the Middle East territories themselves, either in the form of Government loans (where Government is the authority promoting the schemes) or by subscription to companies or finance corporations (where development is left to private enterprise).

(f) We must at present proceed on the assumption that the present dollar stringency in the Sterling Area is not likely to be relaxed for some years to come.

(g) The process of reconversion of British industry from war to peace production cannot be accomplished otherwise than gradually; heavy simultaneous demands from a variety of sources upon our exporting capacity during the next 12 to 18 months may lead to the disappointment of our potential customers.

7. With the foregoing considerations in mind, we must be careful, therefore, that, in adopting a policy of economic development, we do not:

(a) Create a demand from the Middle East territories for the participation of British capital beyond our capacity.

(b) Create a demand to spend the sterling balances more rapidly than we could contemplate.

(c) Create a demand that we should sell them gold or dollars which we have not got, on the ground that if the United Kingdom cannot supply, our creditors should be enabled to go elsewhere (viz., to the United States).

8. If we take an undue initiative in drawing up, and recommending to the Middle East Governments, a plan of large-scale economic development, there is a danger that we may find ourselves in all of these embarrassments.

9. It is suggested therefore that our policy should be to give the Middle East Governments wise guidance in mobilising and spending their existing ample sterling resources and to this end:

(a) To encourage each of the Middle East Governments to draw up, *itself*, its own plan of economic development.

(b) To offer to place at their disposal such technical and specialist assistance as they may require to formulate their schemes.

(c) To steer their plans, particularly as regards timing, along lines that will be in conformity with the limitations imposed on us by our own financial and industrial situation, and that will take account of the needs of the region as a whole.

C.—British Trade Interests.

10. The fact that most of the Middle East economies have at their disposal large balances in sterling (and are, at the same time, short of dollars) in itself

[illegible] development are proposed [illegible] for the British [illegible] the Department of Over[illegible] should be taken for the promotion of British trade in the region [illegible] these recommendations are attached in a paper [illegible]

(c) El[illegible]

(b) [illegible]

(c) Increased [illegible]

(d) Restoration of Parcel Post Air Mail and improvement of existing Air Mail facilities

(e) Increased facilities for visits by officials of London Departments

(f) The opening by British firms of regional offices in Cairo

(g) The encouragement of [illegible] survey work by British firms of [illegible]

[illegible] (d) and (e) above would [illegible] (1) by relief from E.P.T. in respect of any expenditure [illegible] British firms in activities of this nature and (2) by the [illegible] necessary [illegible] from His Majesty's [illegible]

(i) [illegible] Establishment with [illegible] the Middle East

(j) Direct participation of British firms in local industries

(k) Representation in the Middle East of the Export Credits Guarantee Department

The Conference endorses these recommendations and wishes to draw particular attention to the necessity of adequate al[illegible] of living in the Middle East. The Conference considers that as far as possible [illegible] and visa formalities should be [illegible] that regard should be given to the importance of cheap air travel [illegible] an instrument for furthering British commercial interests in the Middle East. Similarly the Conference [illegible] hers that there should be an improvement at [illegible] United Kingdom and the Middle East even if [illegible] postal revenue.

D. Economic and Social Development in the Middle East.

11. (1) The directions in which schemes of economic development can best contribute to the welfare of the common people of the Middle East can at this stage be indicated only in broad general outline. They fall, however, into three broad categories:

(a) Schemes for the development of the agricultural industry, among which may be mentioned:

(i) irrigation

(ii) village development

(iii) afforestation

(iv) agricultural stations

(v) construction of roads

(vi) agricultural housing

(vii) improvement of strains of livestock and [illegible]

(viii) veterinary services

(ix) [illegible]

(x) promotion of rural [illegible]

(xi) anti-locust measures

(b) Schemes of industrial development

(c) The promotion of public works of a more general character.

(2) In formulating any development programme of the kind, however, the fact should not be lost sight of that the economy of all the Middle East territories is predominantly agricultural and that the development of, and improvement of conditions in, that industry should take first priority in the scheme.

(3) At the same time care must be taken to preserve a balanced development and the claims of industrialisation must not be overlooked. *It is, however, important that the local governments should be discouraged from building up tariff walls industrial undertakings which, without this protection would have no chance of survival in face of world competition.* A [illegible] on the international field would be the most effective, if not indeed the only, means of [illegible] tendencies of local governments [illegible]

12. A wealth of detailed information on all of these subjects is available in the reports of Professor Peers and Drs. Keen, Worthington Allen and Wright, and we suggest as a first step that these reports should be examined in detail and [illegible] be tried in other fields [illegible]

13. Side by side with these measures of economic development the pro[illegible] of schemes of social betterment must go forward. In general outline [illegible] should include:

(i) better health [illegible]

(ii) improved education

(iii) the constitutional development of Trade Unionism, and

(iv) above all a review of the present system of land tenure.

14. With a programme of economic development and improvement of the [illegible] standards of the people of the Middle East of the kind adumbrated in the [illegible]g paragraphs, the question arises how best a contribution can be made [illegible] His Majesty's Government to assist and guide the local governments along the desired lines.

E. Provision of Experts

15. (1) We have mentioned that the Middle East communities are amply provided with the financial resources to finance their development. What they are short of is adequate technical and specialist personnel to assist them in formulating their schemes along the most economical and effective lin[illegible]

(2) There has been a manifestation of a desire on the part of almost all local [illegible]ments to obtain and employ specialists in these fields. It is clearly desirable in the political and commercial interests of the United Kingdom that wherever possible these experts should be British and that they should not be second rate men, but men of a calibre as good as can be obtained elsewhere. It would clearly be illegal and exte[illegible] the requisite standing for each Government in the area. It would be less difficult and less expensive to maintain [illegible] nucleus" of technicians attached to a central organisation available to be consulted by any of the [illegible]

(3) As a beginning the number of these technical experts would be small and should cover the more important fields in which the schemes of development would be likely to emerge, for example, agriculture, health, education and general economics, public works, engineering and finance. These experts should not be specialists in any particular branch of their subject. Each expert should, of course, have adequate professional qualifications in his own group of subjects, but need not [illegible] and preferably should not be an extreme specialist; for example, the chief expert in agriculture would not be expected [illegible] to be a specialist in soil chemistry or in any of the other scientific branches of agriculture. He should be the type of man capable of making a reli[illegible] technical problem or set of problems within his general field, and of giving general advice on the lines of their treatment and able to put the [illegible] in touch with the be[illegible] technical assistance and research [illegible] his advice.

(4) The experts would also be in touch with any related interna[illegible] organisations (*e.g.*, the I.L.O. and the F.A.O.). Men of this type would also be best fitted to appreciate the technical problems of the region in relation to the wider economic picture and thus to contribute to the co-ordination of British policy in the area.

16.—(1) The Ministry of War Transport have prepared a memorandum on the subject of the provision of experts, which is attached to this report as Appendix B. Summarised, it recommends that three main types of scientific and [illegible]al personnel should be envisaged:

(a) A small strategic nucleus attached to the Cairo Headquarters but making tours as necessary within the Middle East.

(b) Personnel farmed out for a period to the service of local governments on their [illegible]

(c) Experts who, owing to their greater eminence or their narrower specialisation would only be called out from the United Kingdom for short periods as [illegible]

The Conference endorses these recommendations.

(2) In the present situation of scarcity of experts of the kind contemplated full use should be made of any resources which the Dominions, India and the [illegible]nial Service may be able to make available particularly since many of the experts in those countries are likely to be familiar with conditions comparable with those of the Middle East. Moreover Moslem susceptibilities might best be met by recruitment from India.

17. The nucleus of experts referred to above should be part of a British Middle East organisation and operate from that base.

F. Regional Technical Conferences.

18.—(1) While it would be a principal function of this British Middle East organisation to arrange for the examination of surveys already undertaken [illegible] [illegible]sh surveys to be conducted we also envisage [illegible] regional technical conferences on the subjects [illegible] and upon other subjects as opportunity offe[illegible].

(2) The territories under British administration in the Middle East should participate in these conferences, as past experience has shown that they [illegible] to contribute as well as to gain; there is no reason why their participation sh[illegible] in any way affect the direct relationship between the administrations of such [illegible]torios and the Departments to which they are responsible in Lo[illegible] [illegible] ment of regional technical organisations in particular fields; possible lines of progress in this direction are particularly indicated in Dr Worthington's Report. Such technical organisations should be related in due course to their international counterparts, such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation and the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations Organisation. Some of them would need to cover an area wider than the Middle East for example, the Anti Locust Organisation should include East Africa and India.

G. Middle East Development Board or Council.

19. By means of technical conferences of this character, the way would be paved towards the formation of a Middle East Development Board or Council, but we suggest that this Council or Board should be framed on an advisory and consultative rather than an executive basis, enshrining, nevertheless, the principle of partnership between the local Governments and His Majesty's Government. We feel that in present conditions Middle East inter territorial rivalries are only [illegible] [illegible] W[illegible] also be alive to the danger of establishing any organisation which would arouse the suspicions or hostility of the Americans.

20. (1) A Council of this kind would not have the character [illegible] utility or finance corporation, but would serve as the medium for inter terri[illegible] exchange of information and experience. Under its aegis, projects for economic development could proceed on a territorial basis, backed by capital provided either by Governments or by private interests but we see no reason to rule out the participation of British capital as soon as our financial position permits. Moreover, opportunities for British trade and enterprise are bound under this scheme to arise through the close collaboration between British experts and interested parties in the Middle East. It would be of the essence of the scheme that every effort should be made to hold the balance, in a regional interest, between schemes promoted by individual territories, although we can have no assurance that any strict system of priorities which might be involved could be implemented by Departments of His Majesty's Government.

(2) It is important, in view of all the factors that we have mentioned, that further consideration should be given to the title of any body such as we have proposed.

H. Machinery.

21. The activities outlined above, which we suggest might provide the framework of a British economic policy in the Middle East are, in our view proper subjects for examination, development and co-ordination by a British organisation located in Cairo with responsibilities extending to all the territories in the Middle East region.

PART II

REGIONAL CO-ORDINATION OF BRITISH POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

I.—Regional Aspects of British Policy.

22. We have outlined in Part I of this Report the shape of a British Economic Policy in the Middle East, and have proposed that this policy should be developed and co-ordinated through a British regional organisation located in the Middle East.

23. There are, however, certain other aspects of British policy in the region which, while presenting special features in individual territories, are essentially regional in their characteristics and elements, and are susceptible of adequate treatment from the angle of His Majesty's Government only on a regional basis. Among these are in their economic aspects:

(a) Oil.
(b) Civil Aviation.
(c) Telecommunications.
(d) American activities.
(e) Russian activities. (These while manifesting themselves most actively in Persia are by no means confined to that territory.)

24. While these questions (as well as the economic matters mentioned in Part I of this Report) must always be handled in a particular territory by His Majesty's Representative in that territory it is to the common advantage and in the best interest of His Majesty's Government that a regional approach should be devised, and that policies in one territory should not go forward in isolation and without regard to the circumstances of other territories or of the region as a whole.

J.—Meetings of His Majesty's Representatives.

25. [illegible]lation, discussion and exchange of views, at reasonably frequent intervals, among His Majesty's Representatives in the Middle East territories is in our view, the best method of devising a common approach to these problems [illegible] of advising His Majesty's Government on questions of regional policy in general.

26. The occasional meetings of His Majesty's Representatives which have been held in Cairo during the years of the war, on the initiative of Mr R. G. Casey (as Minister of State) and of Lord Altrincham (as Minister Resident) have proved the value of regional consultation at that level.

27. We therefore recommend that there should be meetings of His Majesty's Representatives in Middle East territories at least twice a year, and *ad hoc* as circumstances require.

K. British Middle East Conference.

28. We suggest that it should be a main function of these meetings to co-ordinate, and to formulate for consideration in London, British policy in the region (including the economic questions examined in Part I of this Report) and with this function in mind, we would propose that these meetings warrant [illegible] W[illegible] therefore suggest that they should be established in the form of a standing committee to be known, domestically as "The British Middle East Conference."

29. The Conference would be composed of:

(a) The Heads of His Majesty's Diplomatic Missions at Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut and Jedda, and as required, Tehran.
(b) The High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan.
(c) The Governors of Cyprus and Aden, as required.
(d) The Commanders-in-Chief of the three services in the Middle East Commands.
(e) The Head of the British Middle East Office (referred to in Section L below).

30. (*a*) We would hope that it might be convenient for the Minister of State or the Parliamentary Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs to attend some of these conferences and to preside over them. Where this was not possible, we would suggest that the senior among His Majesty's Ambassadors should be Chairman of the Conference.

(*b*) The seat of the Conference should be Cairo as being the most convenient centre in the area and by convention the regional capital.

(*c*) The Conference should be convened by the Head of the Middle East Office, acting upon the authority of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

31. We would most strongly urge that senior representatives of the London Departments should come out to Cairo and take part in the meetings of the Conference. This would have the double advantage of keeping His Majesty's Representatives in touch with the general policy of His Majesty's Government and of affording to the Home Departments a chance of informing themselves at [illegible] hand of conditions and tendencies in the Middle East.

32. The Conference would require the services of a Secretariat, not only to arrange its periodical meetings, and to co-ordinate its documentation, but also to handle, in the intervals between its meetings, day-to-day matters arising out of, or in connection with, the questions with which the Conference would be concerned.

33. The proposals in this Section are not intended to preclude meetings on a less formal basis of His Majesty's Representatives, either in Cairo or elsewhere in the region.

L. British Middle East Office.

Functions of British Middle East Office.

34. (*a*) His Majesty's Government have already publicly announced their intention of establishing in Cairo a British Middle East Office, to carry on certain of the functions formerly discharged by the Office of the Minister Resident. It seems to us to be appropriate that this Office should also handle the development and co-ordination along regional lines of the British economic policy outlined in Part I of this Report. We suggest that this Office should constitute also, the Secretariat of the British Middle [illegible]

(*b*) We also recommend that meetings should be held in Cairo from time to time of representatives of His Majesty's Embassies and Legations and of the [illegible] in section K. The Commercial Secretaries, for example, might meet from time to time with advantage. These meetings we suggest should be convened by, and held under the chairmanship of the Head of the British Middle East Office.

Relationship with Diplomatic Missions.

35. It would be essential that no feature of this plan for co-ordinating British policy on a regional basis, and no assignment of function to the British Middle East Office, should interfere with the responsibility of His Majesty's Diplomatic Mission in a particular territory for representing to the Government to which it was accredited the views and policies of His Majesty's Government. Approaches to the independent territorial Governments would therefore be made either through, or with the acquiescence of, the Mission concerned.

36. The correct relationship that we have in mind between the British Middle East Office and His Majesty's Missions could, we think, best be established by appointing the Head of the Office as a member of the staff of *each* of the Missions in the region, [illegible] Minister (Economic) or Counsellor (Economic), his rank in a particular case depending on the status of the Mission concerned. Such an arrangement would make it clear that territorial questions (and the territorial aspects of regional questions) fell unequivocally within the scope of the Head of the Mission, through whom representations would be made to the territorial Government and also to the Foreign Office.

37. The British Middle East Office (by virtue of its function as Secretariat of the Middle East Conference) would communicate direct with the Foreign Office. The Office would also communicate direct with the Foreign Office and through the Foreign Office, with other Departments in London on questions of a regional character arising out of its day-to-day work. Similar considerations would govern communications *from* the Foreign Office (and other London Departments) *to* the British Middle East Office.

38. The channel of communication should be through the Cairo Embassy, as for the Office of the Minister Resident at present.

39. Much of the success of the plan proposed would depend upon the maintenance of a close liaison, in both directions, between, on the one hand His Majesty's Diplomatic Missions and the Governments of British-Administered Territories in the Middle East, and, on the other, the British Middle East Office. Arrangements should therefore be made for telegrams to be repeated and despatches to be copied, in both directions. As well, the Foreign Office should keep the British Middle East Office informed in the same way on all questions likely to affect the regional aspects of the work of the Office.

40. It will not always be practicable, because of expense or because of [illegible] of qualified personnel, to attach to each of His Majesty's Missions in the Middle East, on a full time basis, an officer capable of giving specialised [illegible] referred to in Section I of this part of the Report. The requirements of the Missions can, we suggest, best be met by arranging that an adequate corps of experts is maintained on the staff of the Middle East Office, upon whose services all of the Missions would be entitled to draw at need.

41. Such an arrangement would not exclude the appointment to any Mission of an Attaché specialising in a particular subject (*e.g.*, finance, labour, agriculture or civil aviation) if the duties arising at a particular Mission justified a full time appointment. The sphere of operations of this Attaché would, however, be confined to the territory to which his Mission was accredited and would not extend to other parts of the region.

Status of British Middle East Office.

42. It is proposed that the British Middle East Office should be established in Cairo. Egypt is an independent territory. It is clearly necessary, in view of the functions which the Office would discharge, that its office premises, archives and staff should have a degree of "immunity." This would be secured if the Office were afforded either (*a*) diplomatic immunity or (*b*) military immunity (the Office of the Minister Resident is regarded as part of G.H.Q., Middle East and, in that guise, has up till now enjoyed the military immunities of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty).

43. The changed circumstances, and the alteration in function now proposed for the British Middle East Office, make it scarcely appropriate that it should operate as a "para military" organisation. It is suggested, therefore, that the Office should have diplomatic immunity. This could be secured only by giving the Office the "cover" of the Embassy, and it is proposed that this should be done. The Head of the Office would, in Egypt, be a member of the staff of His Majesty's Ambassador with, as we have proposed, the title of Minister (Economic). The members of the staff of the Office could be accorded similar "cover" in the same way and to the same extent as the staff of the Embassy itself.

44. In the other Middle East independent territories the Head of the British Middle East Office, in the quality of Minister or Counsellor (Economic), and a very small number of his senior staff whose duties might require them to pay regular visits to the various territories, could be similarly attached as members of the staff of each of the Missions.

45. An arrangement of this kind would ensure that the British Middle East Office stood in a similar relationship to all His Majesty's Missions in the Middle East.

Relationships with Governments of British-Administered Territories.

46. This should present no problem. There would be no direct official communication between the Office and the Colonial Office or the War Office, with which the Governments of British Administered Territories would deal direct hitherto, on all territorial questions. A close liaison on regional questions would be maintained between the Office and the Governments concerned.

Staff of British Middle East Office.

47. The staff and internal organisation of the British Middle East Office would depend upon the functions [illegible] to it, and we have these [illegible] determined, in the light of those functions, by the appropriate authorities.

M.—Co-ordination of Middle East Policy in London.

48. It appears to be the general view that the success of any attempt at co-ordination of British policy by a body located in the Middle East itself must depend upon adequate arrangements for co-ordination at the centre in London. The Conference takes note of a paper on this subject prepared by the Ministry of War Transport annexed to this Report as Appendix C. It is important, in our view, that whatever committee or committees are set up in London to deal with Middle Eastern Affairs should be so constituted as to ensure that prompt and authoritative directions and decisions are given to all the establishments maintained by His Majesty's Government in the Middle East. The Conference has no competence to decide by which method this objective should be achieved.

49. A co-ordinating body of this character will require a permanent Secretariat; and we envisage that the normal channel of communication on regional questions will be between the Secretariat of the Middle East Committee in London (through the Foreign Office and in the name of the Secretary of State) and the British Middle East Office in Cairo.

N.—Miscellaneous.

Middle East Defence Committee.

50. We recommend that the Middle East Defence Committee should continue in being, and that the Head of the British Middle East Office should act as its Chairman.

Political Advice for the Commanders-in-Chief.

51. While we see no objection to the Commanders-in-Chief being kept informed by the British Middle East Office on current political and economic developments throughout the region, on the basis of telegrams and despatches received from His Majesty's Representatives in the various territories and from other official sources, we feel that it should be to His Majesty's Representatives in each territory that the Commanders-in-Chief should look for advice and guidance with regard to the political situation and tendencies in that territory, and that military action in a particular territory should be undertaken only after consultation with His Majesty's Representative in that territory. We do not regard it as desirable that an official should be attached to any of the Commanders-in-Chief in the capacity of a "Political Adviser," nor, we understand, do the Commanders-in-Chief desire an arrangement of that kind.

APPENDIX A.

IMMEDIATE MEASURES FOR THE PROMOTION OF BRITISH TRADE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

MEMORANDUM BY THE BOARD OF TRADE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF OVERSEAS TRADE.

1. *Strengthening of Commercial Diplomatic Posts.*

Almost all the Middle East posts are at present under-staffed and will require substantial reinforcement if they are to be able to cope with the flow of new work which must be expected with the dissolution of the Middle East Supply Centre, the reopening of trade and the orderly disposal of military surpluses with the minimum of interference with our exports. The importance of providing additional staff is fully recognised and what can be done with the present extremely limited man-power is already in hand. Special arrangements have also been made by the Treasury and Department of Overseas Trade to enable posts to engage local assistance on a temporary basis. In attempting to recruit this staff, however, we are hampered by two particular difficulties:—

(*a*) New staff over 30 can be engaged only on a very temporary basis, which is quite unattractive to the right type of man.

(*b*) Allowances in Middle East countries have not kept pace with the cost of living so that candidates without private means are discouraged from accepting appointments.

The problem of strengthening our Commercial Diplomatic posts is, of course, a general one and the Middle East position cannot be considered in isolation. The new staff in sight over the next nine months is limited and there are many competing claims for it from our missions all over the world.

2. *Trade Missions.*

It is planned to send a Goodwill Mission to Egypt, probably towards the end of November. Mr. Hanbury-Williams, Deputy Chairman of Courtaulds and a Director of the Bank of England, has agreed to lead it. It is hoped that the same mission (or, at least, some individual members of it) will go on to visit other Middle Eastern countries, including Palestine, Cyprus, Syria and the Lebanon and Iraq. The alternative of sending separate missions to these countries has been dismissed owing to the difficulty of finding the right personnel for a number of missions.

The Mission will not be a selling mission; its function will be to prepare the ground, by a convincing display of the interest of the United Kingdom industry in the Middle East, for the visits of the sales representatives of individual firms who will follow on its heels. It is suggested that the Mission might be sponsored by the F.B.I. It would not be sent as from His Majesty's Government, but it would be made clear that it had the full support of the Government.

Arab and Jewish trade missions from Palestine have already visited the United Kingdom, and it is hoped that missions from other countries will return the visit to be made by the British Mission.

3. *Increased Travel Facilities.*

It is most important that better facilities (including visas, priorities, &c.) be provided for visits in both directions by responsible business men. At present formalities for the average traveller are lengthy and available transport both by sea and air is inadequate to meet the demand.

4. *Restoration of Parcel Post Airmail.*

This is much needed to provide a rapid means of transport for samples, engineering drawings, survey instruments, &c. The Post Office are pressing for a restoration of services, but have been held up by shortage of transport aircraft. Improvement of ordinary Air Mail facilities is also important.

5. *Increased Facilities for Visits by Officials of London Departments.*

More frequent visits by officials of Home Departments are most desirable, both from the point of view of the Home Departments themselves, who should keep in close touch with local developments, and from that of the local officials who should be more regularly informed of the trend of home policy. At present, visits are severely limited by shortage of man-power, but the position in this respect should now begin to improve. Similarly, we should continue to encourage frequent visits home by officials in the Middle East for consultation.

6. *Branch Offices.*

British firms are being advised and encouraged to open area offices in Cairo to supervise their Middle East interests, and to appoint a local director with power to take decisions. Export Groups and similar trade organisations are being advised to open offices in Cairo for co-operative work on behalf of their members. Some, *e.g.*, the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders and the Textile Machinery Manufacturers, have already done so. Action on these lines is likely to have more direct practical results than the opening of "Britannia Houses."

7.

Every effort is being made to encourage British firms of consulting engineers to undertake preliminary survey work for important contracts in the hope that this will lead to the contracts themselves being placed in this country.

8.

Particular importance is attached to the provision of British technical advisers, but this question is being dealt with in another context.

9. *Establishment Conditions.*

In Egypt conditions of residence and establishment for British subjects are far from satisfactory and such limited treaty protection as we now possess will be lost when the Montreux Convention lapses in 1949. It is most important that

this should be remedied and a new draft Treaty of Commerce and Establishment is being drawn up for that purpose. It has still to be submitted to Ministers here but, subject to ministerial approval, we hope to be in a position to begin negotiations with Egypt in November. It may be that at a later date similar treaties will be required with some of the other Middle East countries.

10.

A number of important British firms have already engaged in negotiation, particularly in Egypt, for direct participation in local industries in conjunction with local firms. Although the opportunities of business are considered good, little solid progress has yet been made owing to the threat of restrictive nationalist legislation, *e.g.*, the proposed Egyptian Company Law. Success in this field depends mainly upon the extent of our success in diverting the nationalistic feeling behind these tendencies into more fruitful channels.

11.

The Export Credits Guarantee Department have had a representative touring the Middle East in order to arrange if possible for local departmental representation. Any person appointed would, of course, work in close collaboration with the Embassies concerned. There is no doubt that much work needs to be done on bringing our status information up to date.

12.

Restrictions over exports to the Middle East, both at the importing and at the exporting end, are being relaxed as rapidly as conditions permit.

APPENDIX B

PROVISION OF EXPERTS

NOTE BY THE MINISTRY OF WAR TRANSPORT.

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the proposed policy of economic and social development in the Middle East can only succeed if it is based on an adequate supply of first-rate scientific and technical advice. First-rate scientific and technical men are in extremely short supply, and so far as British subjects are concerned their services are urgently needed in many other directions. It is therefore essential that machinery should be created for obtaining and using their services with the utmost efficiency and economy. There is no machinery at present in view which is adapted for this purpose. Even to make contact with the wide range of specialists who will at one time or another be required is a formidable task calling for a specially qualified establishment officer with a good knowledge of the scientific and technical field, and with excellent personal contacts. After contact has been made the problem of persuading experts to serve in the Middle East is considerable. Even assuming that local Governments (*e.g.*, Iraq) are prepared to offer really adequate salaries, comparatively few good men will throw up or forgo other employment in order to take a relatively short-term contract with the prospect of getting out of touch with their own field and finding themselves in a blind alley. If satisfactory results are to be obtained it will probably be necessary to arrange for the Middle East Office to act as an intermediary in many cases and for its London representatives to arrange not only with the expert in question but with his employer (whether that is a university or industrial firm or a research station) for a loan or transfer of services for, say, six months, a year or even two or more years, according to conditions. It will be essential to be able to safeguard pension rights, &c., if valuable men who are willing to serve are not to be lost. In general it seems desirable that as large a proportion as possible of the experts sent out should retain their status with their previous employers so that new blood can be readily introduced, and the effects of climate and working conditions on health counteracted by a short period of service in the field. It also seems desirable that both non-British local Governments and any regional or international agencies which may be set up in the Middle East should look to the British Middle East Office for at least part of their British scientific and technical staff, who could be seconded to these tasks as Wing-Commander Skilbeck to the embryo Middle East Council of Agriculture.

It will also greatly improve the attractions of the Middle East as a field of service and the speed with which we can progress if frequent opportunities are afforded for journeys home to consult, and if the proposals of Drs. Keen and

Worthington for the provision of technical information (*e.g.*, by the Imperial Bureaux) are fully implemented. The existence of an adequate scientific and technical element in the London Secretariat, backed by a really strong committee of scientific and technical men with Middle East experience, will also assist in getting prompt and effective attention to requests for help from the experts who are sent out, and this again will encourage good men to serve, and by enabling them to do their task more quickly will reduce the strain on man-power which is also heavy elsewhere.

It is recommended that three main types of scientific and technical personnel should be envisaged:—

(*a*) The small strategic unit attached to Cairo Headquarters, but making tours as necessary within the Middle East;

(*b*) Personnel farmed out for a period to the service of local Governments or other agencies; and

(*c*) Experts who owing to their greater eminence or their narrower specialism would only be called out from the United Kingdom for short periods as and when required.

It is submitted that the effective handling of this problem will form one of the most vital elements in the success of any development policy in the Middle East.

APPENDIX C.

LONDON ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEALING WITH MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS.

NOTE BY THE SUPPLY SECTION FOR THE MIDDLE EAST OF THE MINISTRY OF WAR TRANSPORT.

1. Successive Resident Ministers, Commanders-in-Chief and officials responsible for affairs in the Middle East have emphasised the discouragement and paralysis of effort which results if requests to London for guidance, help and advice on policy and general matters are not handled with a promptitude and effectiveness beyond the capacity of the complex Departments now concerned.

2. Among proposals put forward for overcoming this fundamental weakness at the London end have been—

(*a*) appointment of a Minister for Middle East affairs attached to the Foreign Office;

(*b*) appointment of a Middle East Ministerial Committee;

(*c*) appointment of a new Middle East Official Committee with a strong chairman;

(*d*) creation of a Middle East Department within the Foreign Office responsible for all His Majesty's Government's political and administrative relations with Middle East territories including those at present responsible to the Colonial Office. This is proposed by Lord Altrincham in paragraph 24 of his Memorandum; and

(*e*) creation of a strong London secretariat acting on behalf of all Departments concerned with economic and technical aspects on the model of the Supply Section for the Middle East in the Ministry of War Transport which has served as the London secretariat of the Middle East Supply Centre. This raises the question whether such a secretariat should be located in the Foreign Office or in the Cabinet Office.

3. These proposals point clearly to the two outstanding needs which are:—

(*a*) a sufficiently high level and authoritative channel for giving (or where necessary obtaining from the Cabinet) decisions on matters of Middle Eastern policy; and

(*b*) a staff of adequate quality and scale in London giving their whole time and attention to Middle East problems from a regional standpoint, more particularly on economic and technical matters.

To some extent 2 (*a*) and 2 (*b*) are alternative ways of meeting the first of these needs and 2 (*d*) and 2 (*e*) of meeting the second although none of these courses are mutually exclusive. 2 (*c*) (the Official Committee) is by common consent necessary in any case.

4. If there is not to be a special Minister for the Middle East either resident in the region or in London a Cabinet Committee for the Middle East will be highly desirable if not essential in order to co-ordinate policy over the whole field. Equally the scope of the policies now under discussion makes it quite clear that if Lord Altrincham's more drastic proposal for an amalgamated Middle East Department is not adopted forthwith the absolute minimum requirement for avoiding a breakdown is the creation of a really strong secretariat in London to do for the new Middle East Office at least as much as the Supply Section for the Middle East has done for M.E.S.C. As an indication of scale, S.S.M.E. has required about the half-time services of an energetic Assistant Secretary and the wholetime of two or three Principals and the equivalent of three of four Assistant Principals with the necessary general staff. In the absence of some comparable establishment of really high quality experience shows that the many and exacting needs of a vigorous British Staff in the Middle East cannot be satisfied.

5. There are now or will shortly be in England several ex-officials who have great experience in problems of Middle East development; there are also Professor Peers and Drs. Keen and Worthington, whose reports are a "bible" for Middle East Development, and others. It is recommended that these men should be invited to join an advisory committee or panel and that it should be the business of a qualified member of the London Middle East Office or Secretariat to see that their advice is sought in all appropriate cases.

[Z 12033/13/17] No. 19

Mr. Duff Cooper to Mr. Dixon.—(Received 24th October.)

My dear Dixon, *Paris, 4th October*, 1945.

I SEND you two memoranda—one on the Secretary of State's conversation with M. Bidault, and another upon my subsequent conversation with Massigli.

2. Other matters were discussed between Mr. Bevin and M. Bidault, namely: the recent Council of Ministers, the Emerald Buddha, the future of the Rhine and the Ruhr, and the establishment of central Secretaries of State in Germany.

3. With regard to the first matter, the Secretary of State said that, in his opinion, Molotov, who had admitted in private that the question of procedure on which the conference had collapsed was of little importance, was, in fact, only interested in two things, namely: the recognition by the other Governments of the present régimes in Bulgaria and Roumania and the satisfaction of Russian ambitions either in Tripolitania or elsewhere in Africa. When Molotov found that he was not going to get satisfaction on either of these points he deliberately wrecked the conference.

4. With regard to the Emerald Buddha, the Secretary of State told M. Bidault that the demand for the return of it was one which was likely to cause a feeling of great humiliation to the Siamese, and he hoped, therefore, that the French would drop it. M. Bidault replied that he was not fully conversant with the facts, but he understood that the Buddha had been stolen at some earlier date and that the Siamese were now proving very intractable; but if they would be more conciliatory on other points this could be dropped. In any case, he asked why the Siamese had made their approach through the British Government. If they felt so strongly about the Buddha, they had better approach the French themselves on the subject.

5. With regard to the future of the Rhine and the Ruhr, M. Bidault suggested that conversations should continue in London between the French, British, and American deputies of the Council of Ministers. He said he had already mentioned the matter to Mr. Byrnes, who had not objected, and he understood that Mr. Dunn would remain in London for some time, as would also the French deputy, M. Couve de Murville. The Secretary of State replied that he would look into this matter without delay, but that he was not at present in a position to take a decision.

6. With regard to the German Secretaries of State, M. Bidault said that he hoped the military authorities would be instructed not to be in a hurry with regard to their appointment. He himself was apprehensive as to the result. We had seen in London during these last three weeks how difficult it was for four Powers to act together. If, in future, Germany had, on the one hand, the

representatives of four Powers attempting to collaborate and, on the other hand, one capable German acting alone, the result would very soon be that the single German would exercise complete control and the divergent efforts of the four Powers would be frustrated.

7. The Secretary of State replied that instructions in the sense desired had already been given both to Field-Marshal Montgomery and to General Eisenhower, and he emphasised that this information was strictly confidential.

8. I might add that the conversation throughout was extremely friendly, that the parting was almost affectionate, and I felt that M. Bidault was highly satisfied.

Yours ever,
DUFF COOPER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 19

Record of Conversation between the Secretary of State and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on 3rd October, 1945.

THE Secretary of State began by saying that he did not approve of the suggestion of forming an Anglo-French "front" in the Middle East. He was opposed on principle to the formation of "fronts" and *blocs*. He preferred to settle all matters in dispute between France and England on their merits and he was quite prepared to conclude a treaty with France similar to those which existed already between France and the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.

He wished now to get a settlement with regard to the Levant question and he enquired whether the French had any other interests in the Middle East apart from the Levant. M. Bidault replied that they had interests in every part of the Middle East, as there were many French schools and institutes in all the countries concerned. Mr. Bevin suggested that such interests were rather of a cultural nature than political. M. Bidault said that it was very hard to draw a line between the two and anything that happened in the Levant affected French interests in all the other countries.

Mr. Bevin referred to a conversation that he had had with M. Bidault after dinner at Chequers on the 15th September, when he had said that he saw no objection to holding the conference on the Levant in Paris. He had since been told that to hold it in Paris might give great offence to the Syrians and Lebanese, and he asked whether M. Bidault saw any objection to holding the conference in London or elsewhere. M. Bidault said that he would consider this point and there was no need to take a decision immediately. All that was happening at present was preliminary conversations between experts and the time for a conference had not yet arrived. He wished, however, to impress upon Mr. Bevin the difficulty which the French Government would have in agreeing to hold a conference on the one issue of the Levant. The French had long considered that Syria and the Lebanon concerned France only, and if they were to hold a conference with Great Britain with regard to those territories they would feel that they were being placed in the dock. When it was suggested that representatives of Syria and the Lebanon might attend such a conference, M. Bidault rejected such a possibility. The presence of the Arabs would obviously increase the impression that France was being asked to justify herself and her actions. He repeated that in his opinion the time for a conference had not yet arrived, but he hoped that conversations would continue either in London or in Paris. He said that he himself was not very intimately acquainted with the details of the subject, but that M. Massigli (who arrived towards the end of this conversation) was fully informed on the subject.

D. C.

4th October, 1945.

Enclosure 2 in No. 19

Record of Conversation with M. Massigli on 3rd October, 1945.

M. MASSIGLI wanted to see me before I left London, and I called at the French Embassy on the morning of the 3rd October. He referred to the conversation which had taken place earlier that morning between M. Bidault and the Secretary of State, at which he had been present only during the last few minutes. He said he felt that little progress had been made, and that we were very much where we were before the conversation had taken place.

He emphasised the importance, in his opinion, of Great Britain and France having a common policy in the Middle East (he had not been present when this facet of the question had come under discussion). He said that we were going to have trouble in Palestine and might have trouble in Iraq or in Egypt, and surely it would be a good thing if the two countries stood by one another in that part of the world.

I said that I did not think that His Majesty's Government took that point of view. An agreement of the kind that he was thinking of would have the appearance of being an anti-Arab alliance formed in the interest of Franco-British imperialism. I also indicated that we should not require French help in Palestine even if troubles did occur there, and that our position in Iraq was defined by treaty. With regard to the Levant, I suggested that it might not prove necessary to hold a conference. A draft agreement with regard to the evacuation of British and French forces had already been drawn up. If that could be concluded, I myself felt that Great Britain would have no further special interest in that territory and that if troubles occurred there it would be a matter for the new world organisation to arrange.

M. Massigli answered that supposing French and British troops were withdrawn and that, subsequently, the Christian population were maltreated, the Russians, who were not far away, might be glad of an excuse for intervening and seizing the opportunity of establishing themselves on the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean. It was for this reason, above all, that he thought it important that Great Britain and France should agree upon a common policy.

D. C.

4th October, 1945.